Bataclan v Medina GR L-10126 (1957)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10126           October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,

LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by
their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-

appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a
certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There
were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.
Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right
of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just
called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of
the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the
four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the
bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front
tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch
on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some
of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan
and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in
the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the
wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull
out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle,
but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear
that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating
the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the
lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set
it on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside
the bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason
of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her
five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus
P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay
City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the
defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the
complaint.

Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier
to its passengers and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are
reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is

further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and
7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers

safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries
to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common
carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees.

ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a

passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
 through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to
carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the
trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through
his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of
the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of
the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of
the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-
zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the
canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is

liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the
opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including
himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the
time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded,
not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We
disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume
38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down
a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,
and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the
same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to
the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back
and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that
in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the
bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a
large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come
under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733,
1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the

earning capacity of the deceased, as well as the other elements entering
into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that
plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services
rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the
course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by
them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800)
PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is
adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us.
According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the
injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she
was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his
visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said
inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they
were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the
driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been
diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety
of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with
new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding,
as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in
all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his
vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers,
physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their
goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and
with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the
fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the
complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the
record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in
that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the
said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said
erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but
for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded
by the trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO
SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO
EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the
attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby
affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.