RUSSIAN

INTELLIGENCE
A Case-based Study of Russian Services
and Missions Past and Present

KE VIN P. RIEHLE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRESS

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 CONTENTS

k k k
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

SECTION I: WHO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 1: Historical Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chapter 2: Post-Soviet Development
of Russian Intelligence and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

SECTION II: WHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Chapter 3: Internal Security and Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter 4: Political Intelligence Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Chapter 5: Economic and S&T Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Chapter 6: Military Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Chapter 7: Covert Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

SECTION III: HOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Chapter 8: Human Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Chapter 9: Technical Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235
Chapter 10: The Future of Russian Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Relationship of Foreign Intelligence Activities
to Internal Threat Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 2. Intelligence Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 3. Military Counterintelligence of the FSB
of Russia, 1918-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 4. Richard Sorge Postage Stamp, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 5. U.S. Intelligence Priority Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Figure 6. Major Terrorist Attacks in Russia
Since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Figure 7. Notable Protest Actions in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Figure 8. Comparison of Soviet and Russian
Intelligence Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 9. Reported Russian Computer Incidents Targeting
Ministries of Foreign Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Figure 10. Arrests of Individuals Working in Ministries
of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Figure 11. Russian Intelligence Officers Targeting
Defense Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Figure 12. Russian Computer-Based Operations Targeting
Ministries of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Figure 13. Russian Intelligence Operations Targeting Elections . . . . 120

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 Contents

Figure 14. Cases Involving Russian Targeting of an Intelligence

or Counterintelligence Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 15. Human Intelligence Methods Used in Economic
and S&T Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Figure 16. Technical Intelligence Methods Used in Economic
and S&T Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Figure 17. Corporate Intelligence Methods Used in Economic
and S&T Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Figure 18. GRU Officers Who Defected or Attempted
To Defect During the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Figure 19. Strategic Forces-related U.S. Espionage Cases . . . . . . . . . . 175
Figure 20. Soviet-era Active Measures Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Figure 21. Russian Assassination Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Figure 22. Russian Calculus for Action Against
Internal Oppositionists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Figure 23. Chechen External Assassinations Targets
in the Putin Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Figure 24. Officer Lines Within an SVR Rezidentura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Figure 25. Cold War-era SIGINT Defectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Figure 26. SIGINT Collection Room in the Hotel Viru
in Tallinn, Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Figure 27. Management of Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Post-Soviet Civilian Intelligence and
Security Reorganizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Table 2. Foreign Intelligence Operations Neutralized,
per Putin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

CHARTS
Chart 1. Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Chart 2. Federal Security Service (FSB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Chart 3. Federal Protective Service (FSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Chart 4. National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chart 5. Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6
 INTRODUCTION

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This book sprang from a global pandemic. When the National Intelligence
University (NIU) transitioned from a traditional classroom setting to
online instruction in spring 2020, NIU faculty were required to reformulate
lectures to include only information that could be shared across an open
video link. This initially appeared to be a daunting proposition for a course
on Russian intelligence and security activities since one would assume that
such information is not generally publicly available. Intelligence activities
are, by nature, secret.
As I reformulated lectures on Russian intelligence, however, I came
to realize that a large amount of reliable and accurate information exists
in the public domain. Although not all public information is reliable and
much of it exaggerates or mischaracterizes the subject, with careful selec-
tion a comprehensive picture emerges. I also realized that no single volume
existed that credibly presented a complete, unbiased picture of Russian
intelligence. I set out to develop a series of lectures, which now forms the
basis for this book.
Some of the publicly available information used in this book is histori-
cal. Although this book is not intended to be a comprehensive history, Rus-
sian intelligence and security services today are deeply rooted in history, and
Soviet-era organizational structures, practices, and priorities are still evident

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

in Russian services and operations. Russian intelligence leaders deliberately

evoke and celebrate historical precedents and players to justify Russian
actions today and propagandize the Russian security state to the Russian
people and the world. Consequently, a bounty of information about Rus-
sian intelligence history is available for a discerning reader to tap and use
as a solid foundation for understanding the goals and concerns of today’s
intelligence services.
However, historical information does not tell the full story. More recent
information is needed to build on that historical foundation and connect
the present to the past. Fortunately for students of Russian intelligence, an
abundance of recent case material illustrates the modern manifestations of
historical precedents. This large quantity of publicly available information is
not to Russia’s benefit in most cases, and Russian leaders often cry “Russo-
phobia,” deny its existence, and spew counterclaims of foreign intelligence
services threatening Russia. Still, a constant flow of arrests, diplomatic expul-
sions, defections, and forensic investigations yield data that richly illustrate
Russian intelligence today.

BOOK ORGANIZATION
This book is based on a fusion of that historical and modern case material
and is divided into four sections.
The first section answers the question who is Russian intelligence. Chap-
ter 1 lays the foundation by presenting a brief history of pre-Soviet and
­Soviet-era intelligence and state security services over a nearly 80-year period.
This history shows the establishment of patterns that continue to exist in
Russian intelligence and security activities today. Chapter 2 focuses on the
three decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, covering the tumul-
tuous 1990s, when post-Soviet Russian intelligence was struggling to find a
new path, to the Putin era, when it has found strong presidential support.
The second section answers the question, why, explaining the pri-
mary directions of Russian intelligence as they have developed across the
Soviet era into today. The chapters are based on a categorization posited

8
 Introduction

by Soviet intelligence officer Alexander Orlov (real name Leyba Feldbin),

who defected to the United States in 1938. As Iosif Stalin’s Great Purge
raged in the Soviet Union, Orlov became convinced that he was next to
be arrested or executed, so he escaped from his position with the People’s
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in Spain. Reportedly having
struck a deal with the NKVD to maintain the secrecy of vital information
in exchange for his and his family’s safety,1 he did not discuss his accesses
and knowledge until 15 years later when, after Stalin died in 1953, Orlov
published a blistering book about Stalin and the Great Purge.2 Orlov wrote
a second book in 1963 about his views on how Soviet intelligence operat-
ed.3 He kept his secrecy agreement, never revealing several important pieces
of information to which he had access, such as his connection to purges
that took place during the Spanish Civil War, and criticizing other defectors
who did expose such matters.4
Despite his incomplete, delayed, and at times self-serving revelations,
Orlov’s 1963 book about Soviet intelligence contains an analysis of eight
Soviet intelligence “lines of operation.” Although based on information
Orlov had acquired prior to 1938, his typology serves to describe the orga-
nizational schema of Soviet-era intelligence that endures even today. When
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published an excerpt from the book
in Studies in Intelligence, the journal editor described Orlov as “a thoughtful
former insider” whose information is of “sufficient importance to warrant
this special presentation for the intelligence community.”5
Thus, the second section is organized along the eight “lines of operation”
that Orlov described, which are adapted and grouped into five chapters:

Chapter 3 Internal security and counterintelligence (CI), which

aligns with Orlov’s category of infiltrating security
agencies and intelligence services of foreign countries.
Chapter 4 Political intelligence, which Orlov called “diplomatic
intelligence.”
Chapter 5 Economic intelligence, economic CI, and science and
technology intelligence.

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Chapter 6 Military intelligence.

Chapter 7 Covert activities, encompassing Orlov’s categories of
misinformation, influence operations, and sabotage
operations.

These five chapters also draw on cases revealed during the past two
decades to illustrate how Russian intelligence continues to organize its oper-
ations along these lines of operation.
The third section answers the question, how, and is divided into two
chapters describing the platforms that Russian intelligence and security
services employ to perform their collection and covert action missions.
Chapter 8 describes Russian human intelligence platforms, including legal,
nonofficial, and illegal cover, along with their advantages and disadvantages.
Chapter 9 discusses technical platforms, including signals intelligence, geo-
spatial intelligence, and computer-based—or cyber—operations.
The tenth and final chapter posits a future for Russian intelligence,
analyzing Russian services using the equation: threat = intent x capability
x opportunity.6 Russian intelligence services have both advantages and chal-
lenges that will affect the performance of their future collection and covert
action missions, and thence the threat they pose. Russian intelligence lead-
ers, including Vladimir Putin, publicly portray Russian intelligence as invul-
nerable and unstoppable, and Russian intelligence services benefit when the
world parrots that propaganda line. A balanced, realistic analysis of Russian
intelligence will prevent the tendency to see its practitioners as “10 feet tall
and bullet proof,” while simultaneously recognizing the true threat that they
pose to target countries’ national security.

HOW WE KNOW WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT

RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE
A treasure trove of publicly available source material informs this book.
The sources of information span a wide range of Russian-origin and foreign
materials. No single source should be viewed in isolation, but an aggregate

10
 Introduction

analysis provides a comprehensive and credible picture of Russian intelli-

gence: past, present, and future.

Soviet-era Intelligence Archives

Brief glimpses into Soviet and pre-Soviet intelligence archives provide valu-
able foundational material for studying the origins of Russian intelligence
and state security. For the most part, those archives are closed to all but a few
select, politically reliable Russian researchers, but some portions have made
their way into the public domain, albeit in a controlled way.
In the 1960s, the CIA commissioned a study of the archives of the
pre-Soviet Russian security service, the Okhrana, seeking the historical
foundations of Cold War Soviet intelligence—that history continues to be
informative today. The Okhrana ran external operations from its office in
Paris, and the Paris archives were moved to the Hoover Institution Archives
at Stanford University after the Bolshevik revolution. After the archives
were opened in 1957, a CIA CI analyst studied them to learn what the
Soviet Union had inherited from its Russian imperial predecessor. The CIA
declassified and published that study in 1997.7
At the end of the Soviet era, as the Soviet policy of glasnost (openness)
was taking hold and people were allowed to speak more freely and truth-
fully about dark aspects of Soviet history, Aleksandr Yakovlev, an advisor to
Mikhail Gorbachev and philosophical founder of glasnost and perestroika
(restructuring), led research into Soviet state security archives. Yakovlev
famously presented a study before the Soviet parliament confirming the
existence of a secret protocol attached to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact—a nonaggression pact dividing eastern Europe into Nazi German and
Soviet Russian spheres of influence—which the Soviet Union had vehe-
mently denied throughout the Cold War.8 Thousands of pages of material
from Stalin-era state security archives are now available online in the Alek-
sandr Yakovlev Archive, including many documents that describe brutal
and violent actions.9 Yakovlev’s organization, the International Democracy
Foundation, also published a series of books based on Soviet-era archives,

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

including intelligence files.10 These works offer first-hand views into Soviet
intelligence operations, policies, and organization, although Russian nation-
alists today criticize them for portraying a negative image of Soviet history.
During the 1990s, the Soviet government granted several researchers
limited access to Soviet-era archives. Russian émigré journalist and former
Committee for State Security (KGB) officer Aleksandr Vassiliev was allowed
to view Soviet-era KGB archives specifically seeking information about Soviet
espionage in the United States. His notes, which identify U.S. persons who
cooperated with Soviet intelligence in the 1930s and 1940s, are now available
online through the Wilson Center in Washington, DC,11 and they have been
the basis for several books about Soviet-era intelligence operations.12 Sepa-
rately, Oleg Tsarev, another former KGB officer, was granted access to files
about Soviet intelligence defector Alexander Orlov. Tsarev teamed with Brit-
ish historian John Costello to publish the findings in a 1993 book, Deadly
Illusions,13 and with British espionage writer Nigel West in 1999 on another
book from Soviet-era archives titled Crown Jewels, which addressed Soviet
espionage in the United Kingdom (UK).14 Because Russia’s Foreign Intelli-
gence Service (SVR) sponsored both Vassiliev and Tsarev, critics have accused
them of being conduits for deliberately selective releases of information for
Russian propaganda purposes.15 Nevertheless, their work provides a brief but
limited window into the information available in the Soviet archives.
Both the SVR and the Federal Security Service (FSB) have also offi-
cially, albeit selectively, published archival materials. Between 1997 and
2006, the SVR sponsored a six-volume book series, edited by former SVR
Director Yevgeniy Primakov and titled Essays on the History of Russian For-
eign Intelligence.16 In 2004, the FSB published a book glorifying the history
of military counterintelligence17 and, in 2007, sponsored an edited volume
of archival materials from the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for
Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (VChK or Cheka), the first
Bolshevik state security service.18 These and other similar volumes, writ-
ten by KGB veterans rather than professional historians, contain highly
selective, tightly-controlled materials about Russian intelligence and state
security. Although they make no attempt at objectivity, portraying Soviet

12
 Introduction

intelligence as a driving force for good in the world in opposition to an evil

United States, they contain anecdotes and details that are not available in
any other forum.19
Other Eastern Bloc and former Soviet states have been more forthcom-
ing with their intelligence archives, providing additional glimpses into how
the KGB operated in conjunction with its partners. Ukraine, Lithuania,
Poland, Germany, and Czechia have made large amounts of former Soviet
and Eastern Bloc materials available to researchers. The Ukrainian and Lith-
uanian governments, for example, have opened access to previously classi-
fied KGB journals and publications, such as Сборник КГБ (KGB Digest), a
classified in-house journal in which KGB officers discussed operations and
methods, and Труды Высшей Школы (Works of the Higher KGB School),
which published studies of state security topics.20 The governments of Cze-
chia and Poland have declassified much of the archives of their commu-
nist-era security services.
Some Russian works since the end of the Soviet era have fixated on the
topic of Russian traitors. Books recounting the lives and unhappy fates of
Soviet and Russian intelligence officers who defected or were recruited as for-
eign intelligence service penetrations have become popular in Russia. Dmi-
triy Prokhorov’s What is the Cost of Betraying One’s Homeland?21 and Vitaliy
Karavashkin’s Who Betrayed Russia,22 for example, present Russian traitors
whom Russians can claim to be the source of Russia’s problems. Within these
unmistakable propaganda narratives, however, are also historical facts.23

Memoirs
Numerous former Russian intelligence and state security officers have pub-
lished memoirs revealing details of their service. Authors from across the
Russian intelligence spectrum—military and civilian, legal and illegal offi-
cers—shed additional light on events during the Cold War. Among the
most prominent is Pavel Sudoplatov’s memoir, Special Tasks, which was
published in 1994 in collaboration with American journalists Jerrod and
Leona Schecter and portrayed Sudoplatov’s interpretation of events from

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

the 1930s to 1950s.24 A Russian version of the book was published several
years later.25 Other retired officers—including intelligence illegals, officers
sent abroad under false identities with no overt government connections—
have offered glimpses into their careers.26 These books provide a one-sided
recollection of intelligence, often vaulting the author into a starring role, and
some historians have criticized them for their undocumented assertions.27
But, when combined with other sources available about the period, pieces
can be gleaned to understand the actual events more clearly.

Counterintelligence Archives
Western CI archives contain large amounts of declassified Soviet-era intel-
ligence- and CI-related materials, focusing particularly on the early Cold
War. These operational and investigative collections offer insights into the
priorities, people, and methods of Cold War Soviet intelligence activities,
based on Western observations, and supplement the original case files from
the Soviets’ Eastern Bloc allies. U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps and
CIA archives show how the United States operated against Soviet and East-
ern Bloc intelligence services and what CI services knew about their adver-
saries at the time.28 Other countries have declassified similar CI material
that contains a combination of Eastern Bloc operational files (e.g., Ukraine,
Czechoslovakia, Poland), and Western CI files that show the countermea-
sures taken against them (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Neth-
erlands, Sweden). Although these archives are historical, they shed light on
the antecedents to today’s Russian services and, in a few cases, show the spy-
vs-spy game that played out during the Cold War through the eyes of that
era’s adversarial intelligence services.29

Press Reporting
Throughout the Cold War, espionage prosecutions, defections, and spy
stories regularly appeared in both Western and Eastern Bloc press, reveal-
ing important details about Russian intelligence, although often with a

14
 Introduction

propaganda or political purpose—and occasionally missing the mark. In

1972, for example, Western newspapers reported that a Soviet illegal using
the name Anton Sabotka had defected in Canada. The Canadian govern-
ment responded that no such person existed; however, a Canadian CI train-
ing manual did include a fictitious person with that name created from real
cases for illustrative purposes.30
In 1985, the year that became known as the “Year of the Spy,” however,
a series of major Soviet-related espionage cases broke in the United States:
Ronald Pelton, the John Walker ring, Randy Miles Jeffries, Edward Lee
Howard, and others provided or attempted to provide intelligence to Soviet
officers. The arrests and associated investigations received broad publicity
and gave insights into Soviet intelligence services’ methods and their priori-
ties. Also in 1985, Vitaliy Yurchenko, a senior KGB officer, defected in Italy,
providing the CIA with information that led to investigations of Pelton and
Howard. Yurchenko’s re-defection after only three months in the United
States yielded massive press coverage of Soviet intelligence and the U.S. han-
dling, or mishandling, of defectors.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, reporting about the Aldrich
Ames, Harold Nicholson, Earl Pitts, and Robert Hanssen espionage cases,
among others, demonstrated continuing post-Cold War Russian empha-
sis on collecting intelligence on the United States. Then in 2010, the FBI
announced the arrests and deportations of 12 Russian illegal intelligence
officers operating in the United States, whose missions were to spot and
assess potential assets and to be a fallback option in case of a break in diplo-
matic relations (see Chapter 8).31 Public revelations of these cases, supported
by declassified FBI material, shed additional light on Russian intelligence
activities. More recent cases like those of Yevgeniy Buryakov and Aleksandr
Korshunov, two Russian intelligence officers arrested in New York City in
2015 and Rome in 2019, respectively, have expanded our knowledge fur-
ther (see Chapter 5). Although many details remain classified, much can be
gleaned from the publicly available reporting on these cases.
In the past decade, press reporting has extensively covered Russian covert
operations in military and political conflict settings. Computer forensics

15
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

companies have frequently reported the technical details of Russian comput-

er-based collection and sabotage operations. Such openly available reporting
can carry heavy doses of political bias and must be read in the context of
overall Russian intelligence and covert activities, but this book is intended to
assist with sorting through the hyperbole and political leanings and to set the
context for understanding the reporting accurately.

Electronic and Human Penetrations and Defectors

Penetrations of Russian services can also teach much about Soviet and Rus-
sian intelligence. The U.S. Venona program intercepted and decrypted thou-
sands of Soviet intelligence cables during the 1940s, identifying numerous
Soviet-recruited sources and contacts inside the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and other countries. Some of the cables took decades to decrypt, and
the program continued into the 1970s. Over 3,000 cables were declassified
in the mid-1990s and are now available online.32
The United States and other allied countries have also recruited human
sources inside Soviet and Russian intelligence services, who have provided
valuable insider information about priorities, personnel, and operations.
Early successes included Petr Popov and Oleg Penkovskiy, officers with the
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Armed Forces General
Staff, with more recent cases including Aleksandr Poteyev, Sergey Skripal,
and Oleg Smolenkov. These sources provide insights but are fragile and can
easily be lost, and press reporting on their activities must be read with the
understanding that much remains classified.
Intelligence defectors have been some of the most important sources
of information about Soviet and Russian intelligence, providing significant
insights into intelligence activities, priorities, people, and tradecraft. During
the Soviet era, approximately 160 intelligence and state security officers
defected to other countries. After World War II, most of them came to the
United States. Defectors are different from penetrations because their escape
from foreign control offers more time to debrief them in a secure setting,
although their information starts to become obsolete the moment they defect.

16
 Introduction

There were several periods of history when defectors escaped in concen-

trated groups, such as during the Great Purge of the 1930s and in 1953–54,
after Stalin’s death. The most intense period of intelligence officer defections
in the Soviet era came from 1987 to 1991, when dozens of intelligence offi-
cers became disenchanted with the Soviet system and offered their knowl-
edge abroad. More than 25 other publicly known defectors—including
Vasiliy Mitrokhin, Oleg Kalugin, and Sergey Tretyakov—left after the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union. Many defectors have chosen to publish books
and articles for various reasons: to present their personal stories; to reveal
damaging information about their former employer; to earn money; or
sometimes, with the support of a receiving intelligence service, for propa-
ganda. Defectors have occasionally been difficult to handle and withheld
important information, and some have chosen to re-defect, as noted above in
Yurchenko’s case. Nevertheless, their insights, based upon their elite level of
access to insider information and offered in debriefings and published works,
add much to our understanding of how Russian intelligence operates.33

Official Russian Government Statements

Russia, more than almost any other country, looks back on its intelligence
officers and agencies with pride, glorifying them with postage stamps, mem-
oirs, official historical celebrations, and government awards. Russian gov-
ernment officials, especially during the Vladimir Putin era, regularly make
public statements about the important role that intelligence and state secu-
rity play in Russian life. Although these statements have a clear propaganda
purpose, they also occasionally reveal previously unpublished information,
such as the identities and careers of retired intelligence officers or past intel-
ligence operations. For example, the United States first learned of an illegal
named George Koval, who operated during the 1940s inside the U.S. Man-
hattan Project nuclear weapons program, when the Russian government
posthumously awarded him the title Hero of the Russian Federation in
2007.34 Such actions provide insights into past intelligence operations and
into the current Russian government mindset toward intelligence.

17
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Russia also publishes laws governing its intelligence and state security
agencies, including the FSB in 1995 and the SVR in 1996, that openly pro-
vide these services with their authorities. The Russian government publishes
its National Security Strategy, Foreign Policy Concept, military doctrine
and strategy, and other formal policy documents, which reveal the objec-
tives, priorities, and threat perceptions and drive the activities of Russia’s
intelligence and security services. Both the FSB and SVR also have pub-
lic-facing web sites where the services publish press releases.35
These sources—carefully selected and placed in context—lay the foun-
dation for understanding Russian intelligence activities today. This book is
intended to assist in building greater awareness of the strengths and weak-
nesses of Russian intelligence and security services.

Kevin P. Riehle
January 2022

18
 SECTION I
WHO

k k k
This first section provides a brief introduction to the history and founda-
tions of Russian intelligence and security services, focusing on the aspects
that have made Russian services what they are today. Russian services count
their history from the early Bolshevik era, beginning on December 20, 1917,
when Vladimir Lenin ordered Feliks Dzerzhinskiy to establish an extraordi-
nary committee to protect the infant revolution. Events such as the Soviet
export of revolution in the 1920s, the collectivization period of the early
1930s, the Great Purge of the late 1930s, World War II, the Cold War, and
the chaos of the 1990s all factor into the identity of Russian intelligence
and security services today. This identity rests on the foundation of the pre-­
Bolshevik Russian security service, the Okhrana, as early Soviet services bor-
rowed much from their Tsarist-era predecessor.
These chapters are not intended to be a comprehensive recounting of
the history of Russian intelligence and state security; that would require
volumes. However, because Russian services portray themselves through the
context of history, and the threat perceptions associated with the mythos of
the “chekist” (a Russian intelligence or state security officer) remain, a brief
review of history is required to understand who those services are today.

19
 CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

k k k
Before the Soviet era dawned in 1917, the Tsarist Russian empire established
a state security service to root out revolutionaries and protect the Tsar. The
assassination of Tsar Aleksandr II in 1881 clearly showed the need, lead-
ing his son Tsar Aleksandr III to create the Okhrana, or security force. The
Okhrana was Russia’s first modern secret police organization and became
the foundation on which other such organizations were based.36 In his 2020
speech commemorating the 100th anniversary of Russian foreign intelli-
gence, Vladimir Putin noted that Russian intelligence and state security
employees today are continuing the traditions not only of their Bolshevik
predecessors, but also of those that served pre-­revolutionary Russia.37
Ultimately, the Okhrana failed to neutralize its primary target, Bolshevik
revolutionaries. Nevertheless, when the Bolsheviks took control in November
1917, the new regime created a security service that in many ways resembled
the Okhrana, including its strong-arm tactics to repress revolt. Recognizing
the heavy opposition that the Bolsheviks faced, the new leadership created the
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage
on December 20, 1917—a date that is still remembered today as the founding
of Russian state security. The organization became known by its Russian acro-
nym ЧК (ChK) and is correspondingly often called Cheka, a pronunciation of
those letters, in English; the following year, the Bolsheviks expanded its name

21
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

to All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolu-

tion, Profiteering, and Corruption (VChK). The Cheka’s duty was to perform
a similar security function for the Bolsheviks that the Okhrana had done for
the Tsar, and the people running the Cheka were the very people the Okhrana
was pursuing before the Cheka’s founding. Thus, the author of the first Cheka
operational manual included details of Okhrana tradecraft, reportedly stat-
ing that, although the new organization had a different goal than “bourgeois”
intelligence agencies, it needed to learn from their experience.38
Still, Fedor Drugov, one of the early members of the Cheka Collegium,
the organization’s leadership body, expressed unease with the methods
that the Cheka was adopting from the Okhrana to deal with counterrev-
olutionaries and other undesirables. As he wrote in a Paris-based Russian
émigré journal:

Each of us felt in the depth of our souls that we were called upon
to create something similar to the old Okhrana—and we were
ashamed of the thought. It was completely obvious that the very
character of the task before us would make it necessary to employ a
system of surveillance and denunciations (of the latter, by the way,
we had already accumulated quite a few). Who will fill the role of
“stoolies”? On one hand, the thought sickened the revolutionaries,
but on the other, such a task could only be assigned to people who
were devoted to the revolution. How could that be?39

One of the defining similarities between the pre-Soviet state security

order and its Soviet-era descendant was that both existed expressly to secure
the ruling elite and its ideological path. Throughout Russian/Soviet history,
Russian leaders have kept intelligence and state security under their direct
control, both to exploit these services’ capabilities to support the elite’s
needs and to prevent them from becoming a force that could challenge the
elite. The Okhrana’s mission was to secure the Tsar and the imperial system.
After the Bolshevik revolution, the object of protection shifted to the Bol-
shevik leaders and the political system they established. As the 1977 history

22
 Historical Foundations

manual of the Committee for State Security (KGB) states unambiguously:

“The activities of the organs of state security wholly and completely serve
the policies of the Communist Party at the fundamental stages of develop-
ing the Soviet state.”40 In the post-Soviet era, Russian intelligence and state
security continue to protect the interests of the Russian ruling elite, espe-
cially the modern manifestation of a Russian “tsar,” Vladimir Putin.
Another key semblance between the Okhrana and Soviet state security
was the focus on internal threats and their perceived foreign support—a link-
age that persists today in the Russian security mindset. Using the archives of
the Foreign Okhrana—exfiltrated from Paris, the center of Okhrana foreign
operations, and brought to Stanford University in the 1920s—the CIA in
1960 conducted a study of the Okhrana’s methods, looking for precedents
and indicators of how Soviet heirs to Russian security might operate. This
assumption of linkage was borne out when two KGB-era defectors, Oleg
Gordievsky and Oleg Kalugin, noted that the KGB used Okhrana materials
to train its officers in the 1950s and 1960s.41
The CIA analyst who performed the research, under the pseudonym
Rita T. Kronenbitter, found both similarities and differences between the
pre-­Soviet Okhrana and Soviet-era state security. Focused on internal threats,
both organizations used similar tactics in conducting intelligence activities and
recruiting domestic sources to control the population and for counterintelli-
gence (CI) purposes.42 Their penetration of domestic opposition groups was
aimed at reducing the threat to the regime, often presupposing a link between
domestic groups and foreign powers. The Okhrana’s emphasis on internal secu-
rity was founded on an unwavering assumption that foreign powers were med-
dling in Russian affairs, and that assumption continued into the Soviet era. A
1977 KGB manual used in training new KGB employees made this point:

By organizing sabotage of state workers, the exploiting class wanted

to force the Soviet government to abandon the decisive path toward
breaking the old bourgeois-landowner state apparatus: by encourag-
ing speculation they tried to exacerbate economic ruin to drown the
revolution in famine; with conspiracies and armed revolts, inspired

23
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

by the participation of the imperialist West, the domestic counter-

revolution tried to crush the power of the workers and peasants.43

OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
The similarities between the Okhrana and the Cheka, and subsequently
other Soviet services, extended to the methods they used: agents provoca-
teurs, disinformation, and double agents.

Agents Provocateurs
The Okhrana made limited use of agents provocateurs: agents who have been
covertly dispatched, in the name of an adversary, to cause unrest or physical
damage that can then be exploited to discredit the adversary. The Okhrana,
for example, created a plot in 1890, which exploited Russian revolutionaries’
eagerness to launch terrorist bombings against the Tsarist government, to
convince the French government of the dangers of revolutionaries and to
prove that the Tsarist government was tough on terrorists. With the help
of an agent provocateur, the Okhrana created a fictitious plot to assassinate
Tsar Aleksandr III, convened a group of revolutionaries in Paris, and then
passed the information to the French authorities, who arrested the plotters.
Only the agent provocateur escaped, with the Okhrana’s help. The ensuing
trial raised awareness of the revolutionary threat in France and resulted in
the neutralization of about 25 conspirators.44
The Soviet Union learned from the Okhrana’s use of agents provocateurs.
Like the Okhrana, the Cheka manufactured its own opposition groups to
blame for violence, such as a fictitious anti-Bolshevik conspiracy, known as the
“envoy’s plot,” in which the British adventurist Sydney Reilly played a part. The
supposed plot involved a Cheka officer posing as a counterrevolutionary, who
informed British and French envoys in Moscow that the Latvian regiment in
the Kremlin was ready to lead an anti-Bolshevik uprising. Reilly, who at the
time was working for the British Secret Intelligence Service, provided funds to

24
 Historical Foundations

the agent provocateur, who passed the money directly to the Cheka. When the
Cheka wound up the “envoy’s plot” in September 1918, it loudly and publicly
proclaimed that it had “liquidated a conspiracy organized by Anglo-French
diplomats,” when in reality the Cheka itself had hatched the plot.45
The Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), the secret police organi-
zation that succeeded the Cheka, also sent agents provocateurs to meet with
White Russian Army General Aleksandr Kutepov in Paris. They brought him
optimistic but false reports of a flourishing anti-Bolshevik underground inside
Russia, leading him to declare in 1929, “Never have so many people come from
‘over there’ to see me and ask to collaborate with their clandestine organiza-
tions.”46 Kutepov fell further victim in 1930 when he became the target of an
OGPU kidnapping and died during the operation.47 By the following year,
Soviet provocations had burned Western intelligence services multiple times,
and the possibility that the Soviet Union would use defectors as agents provo-
cateurs led Western governments to question even legitimate defectors; when
Georgiy Agabekov (real name Arutyunov) defected in 1930, the British Home
Office initially assumed his defection was fake and he was a provocation.48
The Soviet state security system perfected the use of agents provocateurs,
using them on its own people to identify anti-regime elements. In 1918, the
VChK created the Особый Отдел (Special Section; OO) to protect against
what the Bolshevik regime perceived as internal and external threats to Soviet
military units.49 The OO, which eventually transformed into the KGB Third
Chief Directorate and later the FSB Military Counterintelligence Service, used
agents provocateurs among Soviet forces to identify discontent and opposition-
ist sympathies. For example, Vadim Shelaputin, an officer with the Main Intelli-
gence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, noted after
his defection in 1949 that the Ministry of State Security (MGB), the post-World
War II predecessor to the KGB, had embedded an officer in the office where
he worked. The clandestine MGB officer would try to provoke opposition by
telling anti-Soviet jokes and then asking others if they knew any.50 Later in the
Soviet period, the KGB Fifth Directorate, which was responsible for repressing
opposition to Communist Party rule, used agents provocateurs pretending “sym-
pathy to the cause” to infiltrate dissident groups and implicate oppositionists.51

25
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Disinformation
Soviet intelligence and state security services also modeled their disinforma-
tion efforts on the Okhrana’s tactics, particularly noted for planting media
stories to confuse Russia’s enemies and lure them into traps and to support
the bona fides of agents. The Okhrana, for example, planted stories in West-
ern newspapers detailing terrorist attacks inside Russia to convince Western
intelligence services of the revolutionary threat and to corroborate agent
reporting. Attacks were staged to appear serious but to cause little real dam-
age. Disinformation also facilitated the Tsarist government’s control over
its population and countered foreign adversaries by regulating the flow of
information citizens received.52
Similarly, the Soviet services extensively used disinformation to support
Soviet foreign policy objectives and manipulate foreign perceptions. Soviet
intelligence organizations created elaborate disinformation plots that exposed
anti-Soviet sentiments while also obscuring other Soviet influence activities.
Petr Mikhailovich Karpov, the first OGPU officer to defect to the West,
described OGPU disinformation operations in the early 1920s that were
designed to create the public image of anti-Bolshevik émigrés as anti-Semitic
and to blame monarchist and White Army forces for pogroms in Russia that,
in reality, were perpetrated by Red Army soldiers and Bolsheviks.53
Karpov himself was caught in an OGPU disinformation operation
after his defection in 1924. German authorities arrested Karpov in 1929
and accused him of counterfeiting Soviet intelligence documents and selling
them to the press. Among the documents that Karpov and his partner Vlad-
imir Orlov sold was a set claiming to show that two American senators, Wil-
liam Borah and George Norris, had each received $100,000 from the Soviet
regime for their advocacy of pro-Moscow policies in Washington.54 One of
the Soviet Union’s strategic objectives in the mid-1920s was to convince a
reluctant United States to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet regime.
Recognition was a hotly debated topic in Washington, and Borah and Norris
advocated for it. Dmitriy Prokhorov, a Russian historian of Soviet intelligence,
claims that Karpov and Orlov’s documents were actually part of an elaborate
and risky deception operation run by the OGPU station in Berlin, codenamed

26
 Historical Foundations

Фальсификатор (Falsifier), to discredit Orlov, whose “anti-Soviet activities

had caused headaches in Moscow,” and neutralize Karpov. The operation also
simultaneously insulated Borah and Norris from accusations of Soviet manip-
ulation. According to Prokhorov’s version of events, Karpov’s funds had run
dry since his defection, and he approached the Soviet embassy offering to sell
his services. The embassy reportedly used him as an unwitting conduit for fab-
ricated documents that a court would assuredly rule as fakes, thereby publicly
disproving the allegations contained in them.55 While American historian
Richard Spence provides some reason to suspect that Soviet influence agents
had at least inspired Borah’s pro-­Soviet positions, the court case deflated public
accusations that he had taken money to advocate for diplomatic recognition.56
Vasiliy Mitrokhin, a KGB officer who defected in 1992, defines the pur-
pose of Soviet-era “active measures” as being “to create conditions favorable to
the successful implementation of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.”57 Thomas
Rid, in his book Active Measures, details numerous disinformation campaigns
during the Soviet and post-Soviet era, from the 1920s to the 2000s, that
involved planting press stories, creating front groups, and leaking doctored
stolen classified documents to cast a negative light on the United States and
its allies. In line with Mitrokhin’s definition, Rid discusses Soviet and Eastern
Bloc operations, including invoking extreme right-wing and racist narratives
to divide populations in Europe, the Middle East, and North America,58 and
others that played both sides of the political divide in Germany to support
the Soviet Union’s and Russia’s foreign policy objectives. Nuclear and military
policies of the West were frequent targets of Soviet-era disinformation.59 Rev-
elations of Russian disinformation operations as recently as the 2010s show a
continuing heritage from the Okhrana days, through the Soviet era, to today.

Double Agents
The Okhrana and Tsarist-era Russian military intelligence also used double
agents, often captured adversary agents who were turned or coerced into
approaching their original sponsors while reporting back to a Russian han-
dler. Double agents helped to identify adversary agent handlers and served

27
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

as a conduit for disinformation directly into the adversary’s decisionmaking

apparatus. When the Okhrana arrested agents of revolutionary organizations,
it would often try to double them back, using either threats of exile to Siberia
or incentives.60 An example of Tsarist-era Russian military intelligence’s cul-
tivation of double agents began when Jose Maria Gidis approached a Russian
military officer in China in 1904 and offered to provide information about
Japan, which at the time was one of Russia’s primary external enemies. The
Russian officer suspected Gidis of contact with Japanese intelligence but cau-
tiously accepted him and received military intelligence from him, eventually
gaining control of the operation and doubling him back against the Japanese
just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.61
The Cheka similarly realized the value of double agents during the Rus-
sian Civil War, famously in Operation Trest (Trust), through which the Cheka
identified and neutralized Europe-based, anti-Bolshevik activities. Trest began
when the Cheka intercepted a November 1921 letter from a Russian monar-
chist agent, Aleksandr Yakushev, who advocated that revolt against the Bolshe-
viks needed to be organized inside Russia, not by émigrés. The Cheka arrested
Yakushev and turned him, using his own opinions and probably also threats,
to persuade him to support their efforts against foreign-based counterrevolu-
tionary activities. Trest created a fictitious anti-­Bolshevik organization called
the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia (MOTsR), whose members
purportedly included Soviet officials who were ready to overturn the Bolshe-
vik regime. The operation ran from 1921 until early 1927, when another dou-
ble agent, Aleksandr Upeninsh (aka Eduard Opperput) turned himself over
to émigrés and informed them that MOTsR was controlled by Soviet state
security.62 Trest caused irreparable damage to the morale and capabilities of the
anti-Bolshevik movement in Europe. Vladimir Burtsev, an anti-Soviet activist
in Europe, wrote in December 1927, “at this distance it is practically impos-
sible to know which of these persons are working for and which against the
Bolsheviks, and still more difficult to know which may be supporting Stalin
against the Opposition, and which the Opposition against Stalin.”63
The primary differences between the Okhrana and its Bolshevik successor
organizations were the organizational scale and unbridled ­Soviet-era power of

28
 Historical Foundations

state security, especially during Stalin’s reign. Although the Okhrana did not
hesitate to use brutal and deceptive methods, it was not authorized to conduct
summary executions based solely on a state security ruling, as Stalin-era organi-
zations were. During the collectivization period of the late 1920s-early 1930s,
and then again during the Great Purge of the late 1930s, Soviet state security
organizations arrested hundreds of thousands of people and either exiled them
to corrective labor camps or summarily executed them. That unbridled power
was reined in somewhat after Stalin’s death. Nevertheless, in the wake of the
Prague Spring in 1968, which raised alarms among Soviet leaders that demo-
cratic forces could threaten Communist rule, the KGB created an entire direc-
torate, the Fifth Directorate, dedicated to suppressing internal dissent and
removing ideological opponents, although more often by exiling them or forc-
ibly placing them into psychiatric institutions than by killing them. Russian
services today do not exercise the same unlimited power that Stalin-era services
did, although the suspicious deaths of journalists who have written unflatter-
ingly of the Putin regime, as well as the attempted assassination of prominent
Russian oppositionist and anti-corruption activist Aleksey Navalny in August
2020, suggest that killing opponents is returning as a state security method.

INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL THREAT

Although in the West we think of Russian intelligence most often as the for-
eign intelligence arm of the Russian government, the core mission of Russian
intelligence and state security, from the Okhrana to today, is to neutralize
threats to the Russian regime itself. Thus, even the external manifestations of
Russian intelligence are tied to internal security, in what John Dziak, author
of Chekisty: A History of the KGB, called a “counterintelligence state.”64
The Cheka’s first name, the Extraordinary Commission for Combating
Counterrevolution and Sabotage, encompasses that security role. In 1918,
the Bolshevik regime expanded the name to All-Russian Extraordinary
Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Profiteering, and Corrup-
tion (VChK). Counterrevolution remained a major element of the Cheka’s
mandate, and criminal activities, such as profiteering, contraband smuggling,

29
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

and extortion, were all viewed as efforts to destroy the Bolshevik revolution,
unless the Bolsheviks themselves were conducting them. This internal focus
predominated during the Russian Civil War, when the existence of the Bol-
shevik regime was at risk from those who opposed the 1917 Bolshevik coup.
As the Bolsheviks began to prevail in the civil war and push anti-­
Bolshevik forces out of Russian territory, Bolshevik state security increas-
ingly began to look outward to those foreign powers that were harboring or
actively supporting the anti-Bolshevik resistance. These efforts, like Opera-
tion Trest, were still focused on internal security but broadened the security
circle to unmask counterrevolutionary groups wherever they were, founded
on the premise that internal threats invariably had external sponsorship.
As the Bolshevik regime struggled to consolidate power, it was forced to
rely on non-party members to fill the ranks of the Workers and Peasants Red
Army (RKKA), as the Bolshevik military force was called. Some of these
recruits either volunteered for the money or were coerced into supporting
the Bolshevik cause, and thus were not fully reliable troops. Occasionally
White forces planted agents to penetrate the RKKA and bring it down
from the inside. The RKKA especially lacked a trained officer corps and was
forced to rely on former imperial officers as “specialists” to lead the troops.
Beginning in 1918, the mission of the VChK’s Special Section (OO), and
later of the KGB’s Third Chief Directorate, was to identify and root out
unreliable officers and troops inside the Soviet Union.
The Cheka founded the International Department (INO) in 1920 with
the goal of exposing “counterrevolutionary organizations on the territory
of foreign states engaged in subversive activity against our country.”65 Thus,
although the INO operated internationally, its initial focus was internal.
During its early years, the INO ran multiple operations directed toward
unveiling foreign-based Russian émigré plots directed toward weakening or
overthrowing Bolshevik rule.
In May 1922, the OGPU established the Counterintelligence Director-
ate, based on the assumption that foreign intelligence services were trying to
infiltrate the Bolshevik regime.66 By 1922, as the Russian Civil War was wind-
ing down, Bolshevik state security forces could start turning their attention

30
 Historical Foundations

outward, more toward foreign sponsorship of internal threats. According to

OGPU defector Georgiy Arutyunov (aka Georgiy Agabekov), the Soviet
leadership saw a foreign hand behind many anti-Soviet plots inside Soviet
territory. For example, Soviet intelligence believed that the British were sup-
plying weapons and money to Central Asia Basmachis (resistance fighters) to
fight against Bolsheviks in Turkestan,67 and the OGPU saw nefarious motives
in any British move in South Asia.68 While there was truth to a few of these
suspected foreign-sponsored plots, and the British did run some intelligence
operations in Central Asia,69 the Soviet leadership was engaging, at least in
part, in mirror imaging. Soviet leaders were sponsoring revolutions abroad,
so they assumed that foreign powers were hatching revolutionary plots inside
the Soviet Union, too.

SUPPORT TO FOREIGN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Marxist-Leninist ideology held that the Soviet revolution was just the begin-
ning of a worldwide revolution to bring down capitalism. Consequently, the
same agencies tasked with preventing counterrevolution within Russia were
also assigned with catalyzing revolution abroad. In the wake of the Bolshevik
revolution, the new Soviet government saw little need for diplomacy and oper-
ated under the philosophy that communist revolutions would quickly spread
around the world and that the only foreign ties the Bolshevik regime needed
would be to support that process. The Narkomindel (People’s Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs) initially ran revolutionary propaganda and communist support
activities through its subordinate Bureau of Revolutionary Propaganda, simul-
taneously with overt diplomacy. The Council of People’s Commissars allocated
two million rubles in late December 1917 (approximately $4 million in current
U.S. dollars)70 to support the international revolutionary movement, with deci-
sions on its disbursal left to the Narkomindel.71 Lev Trotsky, the first People’s
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, is purported to have said that he would “issue
a few revolutionary proclamations and then shut up shop.” Although Trotsky
later disclaimed those words, maintaining they exaggerated his views, he did
acknowledge that diplomacy was not the “center of gravity” of Soviet activities.72

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

The higher priority was to support foreign communist parties and accel-
erate their efforts to establish Soviet-style governments. Although the Soviet
Union disavowed control over the Communist International (Comint-
ern)—indeed the Comintern exercised a degree of independence73—multi-
ple defectors revealed a Soviet hand in numerous Communist revolutionary
movements throughout Europe and Asia. For example, Samuel Ginzberg
(aka Walter Krivitsky) and Ignatiy Poretskiy (aka Ignace Reiss), who defected
in 1937, were directly involved in covert Comintern-sponsored propaganda
activities in Poland that mixed with conventional military operations in an
attempt to overthrow the Polish government during the Polish-Soviet War
in 1919–20. Defectors’ revelations provided an unambiguous picture of
covert Soviet monetary, weapons, and intelligence support to communist
revolutionary movements in Germany (1919 and 1923), Hungary (1919),
Persia (1920), Estonia (1924), Bulgaria (1925), and Latvia (1928–30).74 The
OGPU and the Red Army Staff ’s Разведывательное Управление (Intelli-
gence Department); known by the acronym Razvedupr) supplied money
and propaganda for communists in these countries, which they used to insti-
gate labor unrest and violent attacks hoping—in vain—to catalyze prole-
tarian revolutions. Defectors also revealed Comintern propaganda support
to Indian, Turkish, and Iranian communist parties in the 1920s, along with
the OGPU’s use of them for intelligence and sabotage missions. In China
(1923–27) and Spain (1936–37), the Soviet Union provided extensive mil-
itary aid and advisors to support its chosen side in civil wars.
During the first several years after the Bolshevik revolution, the revo-
lutionary military nature of Comintern activities drew active Razvedupr
involvement, while the OGPU also supported foreign communist parties for
both intelligence and CI purposes. Arutyunov revealed that, until the lat-
ter 1920s, the OGPU and the Comintern had a very friendly relationship,
including close association between INO head Mikhail Trilisser and chief
of the Comintern International Liaison Department, Osip Pyatnitskiy. As
Arutyunov wrote, “It could not have been otherwise, since the OGPU con-
ducted operations abroad to monitor counterrevolutionary and oppositionist
organizations, which included all Russian and foreign anti-­Bolshevik parties,

32
 Historical Foundations

beginning with the Social Democrats and the IV International and ending
with fascists. The OGPU naturally shared this information with the Com-
intern to facilitate its work in combating influences hostile to communism.”75
Intelligence sharing went in both directions. Soviet-era archival materials
corroborate this close working relationship, as shown in a September 1922
telegram from state security chief Dzerzhinskiy to his deputy Iosif Unshlikht
directing the collection of information about the background, organization,
and methods of Italian fascism. Dzerzhinskiy ends the telegram, “Who do we
have in Rome? Could we get this information from the Comintern?”76
The juxtaposition of Comintern revolutionary activities with diplomacy,
however, soon became a burden, especially as the Soviet Union attempted to
develop trade with foreign countries, necessitating diplomatic recognition
and legitimate relations.77 These ties particularly affected relations with the
United States. In a diplomatic note written in August 1920, U.S. Secretary
of State Bainbridge Colby included the connection between the Soviet gov-
ernment and the Comintern as one of the reasons why “it is not possible
for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of
Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly gov-
ernments can be maintained.”78 A key Soviet concern fueling the formation
of the independent Comintern in March 1919—namely, the incompatibil-
ity of conducting both conventional diplomatic relations and revolutionary
appeals and propaganda from the same agency—was borne out.79
The lack of diplomatic recognition also limited Soviet intelligence ser-
vices and forced them to identify other platforms for placing intelligence
officers abroad. Beginning in 1918, this limitation drove the Soviet use of
intelligence illegals (see Chapter 8) and also necessitated the use of other
non-diplomatic platforms, such as commercial establishments, for cover.
These commercial covers prominently included the All-Russian Coopera-
tive Society (ARCOS), established in 1920 in London, and Amtorg Trading
Company, established in 1924 in New York. Both companies were registered
under host country laws but operated as cover platforms for intelligence
operations. A defector, calling himself variously Mikhail Stein and Mikhail
Hendler, offered information about Amtorg’s use for intelligence cover as

33
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

early as 1926, although the U.S. Government at the time did not accept his
offer.80 The British government raided ARCOS in 1927 based on suspicion
that the Soviet government was using it as cover for intelligence operations.81
As Soviet-sponsored attempts to install communist regimes abroad in
the early 1920s repeatedly failed and the resulting blowback impeded Mos-
cow’s efforts to secure diplomatic recognition, these failures ushered in a
trend away from using the Comintern as an arm of Soviet foreign policy.
Soviet clandestine agitation operations shifted to what former Razvedupr
officer Ginzberg/Krivitsky labeled “decomposition work,” which consisted
of instigating pro-Soviet agitation in capitalist countries’ governments and
military forces.82 These operations included instructions to communist par-
ties around the world to promote the image of Stalin as the brilliant heir
to Marx and Lenin and as the only leader to whom the world should look
for guidance and peace. The target shifted from countries where the Soviet
Union hoped to facilitate the installation of communist governments to
capitalist countries, where the Soviet Union endeavored to develop stay-­
behind espionage and sabotage networks that could disrupt those coun-
tries’ ability to attack the Soviet Union. This new strategy of clandestine
infiltration of capitalist governments, as opposed to overthrowing them
outright, would be clearly revealed in defector reporting during the decade
following World War II.

FOREIGN COLLECTION
Soviet operations directed at uncovering foreign support for internal threats
gradually transitioned during the 1920s to operations to collect intelligence
about the foreign powers themselves, particularly their political and military
intentions and their scientific and technological advancements (see Figure 1).
This transition led the INO and Razvedupr to develop operations to pen-
etrate other countries’ foreign affairs ministries and military forces. Soviet
leaders’ threat perceptions determined the priority countries for these intel-
ligence operations, with a small group of leading world powers attracting the
bulk of the effort. This notion of a primary threat would eventually become

34
 Historical Foundations

known during the Cold War as the главный противник (main enemy) con-
cept—the prioritization of Soviet intelligence and national security activities
around one or two powerful adversaries that posed the greatest potential
threat to the Soviet Union. Initially, if any country earned that label, it would
have been Great Britain. Soviet leaders perceived British anti-Soviet plots
throughout Europe and Asia, and numerous Soviet intelligence operations
sought to penetrate British diplomatic facilities and recruit people capable
of reporting on British political activities around the world. Other countries,
such as Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, and Romania also featured high on
the list of Soviet intelligence priorities during the 1920s and 1930s.

Figure 1. Relationship of Foreign Intelligence Activities to Internal Threat Concerns.

Internal threats are at the heart of Soviet state security thinking, expanding to foreign
connections to those internal threats, leading to intelligence activities against the for-
eign states themselves.

External support
to internal threats
Internal
Threats
Foreign states
themselves

The Nazi ascent to power in 1933 brought Germany into a more prom-
inent position among Soviet intelligence priorities and, by the mid-1930s,
Germany had assumed a place alongside Great Britain as a “main enemy.”
Still, Stalin never abandoned hope for an accommodation with Hitler,
which he achieved temporarily with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939.
In the words of one defector, Leon Helfand, “Stalin had been nibbling for an
agreement with Hitler since 1933.”83

35
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Figure 2. Intelligence Organizations

State Security Internal Affairs
1917 1917
ChK NKVD

1918 1918
VChK

1922 1922
GPU

1923 1923
OGPU

1934 1934
GUGB/
NKVD
1941 1941
NKGB

1943 1943
UKR/
SMERSH
1946 1946
MGB MVD
KI
1953 1953

1954 1954
KGB

1991 1991
MB GUO SVR

1993/4 1993/4
FAPSI FPS FSK FSO

2003 2003
FSB

2016 2016
Rosgvardiya

STATE SECURITY KI Committee of Information

ChK Extraordinary Commission for Combating MB Ministry of Security
Counterrevolution and Sabotage MGB Ministry of State Security
FAPSI Federal Service for Government NKGB People’s Commissariat of State Security
Communications and Information OGPU Joint State Political Directorate
FPS Federal Border Service SVR Foreign Intelligence Service
FSB Federal Security Service UKR/SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate
FSK Federal Counterintelligence Service VChK All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for
FSO Federal Protective Service Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage
GPU State Political Directorate
GUGB/NKVD Main Directorate for State Security/ INTERNAL AFFAIRS
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs
GUO Main Administration of Protection NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs
KGB Committee for State Security Rosgvardiya National Guard of the Russian Federation

36
 Historical Foundations

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the main
enemy naturally shifted to Germany. Even before Germany was defeated,
however, Soviet intelligence began targeting its wartime allies.84 After World
War II, the Soviet system initially returned to its pre-war main enemy, Great
Britain, as the primary threat, but the United States soon joined Great Britain
in what the Soviets called the “Anglo-American” anti-Soviet bloc. By the late
1940s, when it became clear that Great Britain was weakened economically
and was losing its empire, while the United States was assuming the role of
the leader of the democratic world, the Soviet Union coined the label “main
enemy” and applied it to the United States. The label stuck for the rest of the
Soviet era and could be said to remain in Russian intelligence minds today.

Historical Development of State Security Names

Those who study Soviet and Russian civilian intelligence and state security
history often remark about the numerous name changes that the services
have undergone.85 However, those names show elements of consistency
from the 1930s onward, and changes up to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union reveal the ebb and flow of intelligence and state security in relation
to internal security (See Figure 2).
The acronyms for Soviet and Russian intelligence and state security
organizations all come from the Russian words that comprise their titles.
As noted earlier, the first name given to a Soviet state security service was
ChK, which stood for чрезвычайная комиссия (Extraordinary Commis-
sion), so named because of the extraordinary measures needed to defeat
counterrevolutionaries in the Russian Civil War. The full name, which repre-
sented the organization’s portfolios and subordination, was “Extraordinary
Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage under the
Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR.”
In 1918, the state security organization’s name was changed to VChK,
adding the word всероссийская (All-Russian) to represent the greater reach
of the organization. The full name—All-Russian Extraordinary Commission
for Combating Counterrevolution, Profiteering, and Corruption—reflected the
organization’s priorities and the expanding threats that the Bolshevik regime
faced, most of which still came from within the country. The name VChK was

37
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

retired in 1922, at which time the Bolshevik leaders publicly declared victory
over counterrevolution, profiteering, and corruption, and thus the end of the
need for an extraordinary commission and the extralegal methods that the
VChK had employed to stabilize the Bolshevik regime. However, none of the
VChK’s resources, roles, or missions ended. Instead, they were transferred
to the State Political Directorate (GPU) under the People’s Commissariat for
Internal Affairs (NKVD), a temporary bureaucratic demotion for state secu-
rity functions by placing them under a people’s commissariat rather than
directly under the Council of People’s Commissars.
That demotion lasted only a short time, and, in November 1923, the
organization was reinstated as an independent committee with the name
Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU) under the Council of People’s
Commissars. The word “unified” represented a centralization of state secu-
rity responsibilities under Moscow’s leadership. Previously, each Soviet
republic had its own GPU, staffed with local personnel and operating mostly
independently. As a “unified” body, the OGPU could command state secu-
rity efforts across the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In
1927, in an article titled “Long Live the VChK-OGPU,” the Communist Party
newspaper Pravda overtly connected the OGPU to its predecessor: “Let the
word ‘chekist’ remain a hated word for all enemies of proletarian dictator-
ship.”86 The OGPU lasted with that name for a decade.
As Stalin’s policies increasingly emphasized domestic political loyalty,
civilian intelligence and state security functions were resubordinated in
1934 to an organization under the NKVD—this time the Main Directorate for
State Security (GUGB). This resubordination marked the beginning of the
Great Purge period, later called the Yezhovshchina, so named for Nikolay
Yezhov, the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs; in 1936, Yezhov suc-
ceeded Genrikh Yagoda who had been dual-hatted as People’s Commissar
for Internal Affairs and Director of State Security from 1934 to 1936. A
period of political repression, the Yezhovshchina resulted in the deaths of
an unknown number of people ranging from hundreds of thousands to mil-
lions, including a large number of state security officers who were accused of
being enemies of the people. The accusations were often based on little to no
evidence beyond the denunciation of another jailed person, who was forced
to name accomplices, whether they existed or not. Lavrentiy Beriya suc-
ceeded Yezhov in 1938, effectively ending the Yezhovshchina. Both Yagoda
and Yezhov themselves were among those arrested and soon thereafter

38
 Historical Foundations

executed, accused by their own subordinates of being enemies of the people.

The Yezhovshchina period left a deep scar on the Soviet psyche, effectively
frightening the Soviet population into total submission to Stalin’s will.

Persistent Roots in Soviet Intelligence and State Security

Organizations, 1934–91
From their resubordination under the NKVD in 1934 until the end of
the Soviet Union in 1991, the status of intelligence and state security
functions fluctuated with Soviet political winds: sometimes subordi-
nate to, equal to, combined with, or superior to internal affairs. The
history of Soviet intelligence and state security is, in part, the history
of bureaucratic battles for supremacy within the Soviet system.
Throughout these shifts, however, intelligence and state security
organizations were recognizable by two acronym roots:
■ -VD = внутренние дела (Internal Affairs), as in NKVD
and MVD.
■ -GB = государственная безопасность (State Security),
as in GUGB, NKGB, MGB, and KGB.

Throughout World War II, those outside the Soviet Union usually
referred to the Soviet intelligence and state security with the acronym
NKVD, although these entities continued to move in and out of NKVD con-
trol. Intelligence and state security functions were moved into their own
People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) in February 1941 when
Lavrentiy Beriya was promoted to deputy chairman of the Council of Peo-
ple’s Commissars, retaining the internal affairs role. The new and separate
people’s commissariat was bureaucratically equal to the NKVD but was
short-lived. Soon after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941,
Stalin ordered the creation of the State Defense Committee to coordinate
the defense of the Soviet homeland and the execution of the war, and
state security was again subordinated to the NKVD. Then, in 1943, the
NKGB was again separated from the NKVD and remained so until Stalin’s
death 10 years later.
As the Soviet Union attempted to engage less awkwardly among the
society of nations in 1946, the government abandoned the organizational

39
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

title “people’s commissariat”—a Bolshevik phrase that had been used to

describe major Soviet government elements like the NKVD and NKGB—in
favor of the more conventional “ministry.” Thus Soviet intelligence and state
security elements and internal affairs elements were renamed the Ministry of
State Security (MGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), respectively.
World War II led to several short-lived exceptions to the -VD and -GB acro-
nym naming conventions. Since 1918, military CI had been conducted by
NKVD Special Sections (OOs) attached to military units as an outside control
over the military’s loyalty. OO officers gained a reputation for interfering in
military affairs, especially during the Yezhovshchina when respected military
officers like Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy were arrested, accused of espio-
nage, and executed. In 1943, OOs were transferred to military control under
a department that was renamed the Counterintelligence Directorate (UKR)
SMERSH, a portmanteau of the Russian words Смерть Шпионам (Death
to Spies). UKR SMERSH became a
Figure 3. Military Counterintelligence feared organization during its short
of the FSB of Russia, 1918-2003 existence, running double agents and
agents provocateurs inside the Soviet
military to root out spies and disloyal
soldiers. Several SMERSH officers
defected during and soon after World
War II, including Mikhail Mondich, a
Czech and Hungarian interpreter who
described brutal interrogations in a
book published after his 1945 defec-
tion.87 The MGB subsumed SMERSH
in 1946, retaining only the acronym
UKR. The SMERSH name was retired
at that time, but its menace lived on
in popular literature as Ian Fleming
gave the name to the Soviet organi-
zation in which several antagonists
worked in his James Bond series.88
Source: Book cover, as published by the
Today’s descendant of the OOs,
Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia UKR SMERSH, and the MGB’s UKR is
(Moscow: Moskovskiy Poligraficheskiy the FSB Military Counterintelligence
Dom, 2003). Service. In 2004, the FSB Military

40
 Historical Foundations

Counterintelligence Service published a book regaling its history, which it

counts from 1918 (see Figure 3). The book only briefly mentions the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union while connecting today’s organization to the heroic
exploits of the Soviet era.89
Another naming anomaly came after World War II, when the Committee
of Information (KI) was created to coordinate between civilian and military
foreign intelligence collection elements. The purpose of the merger, accord-
ing to Vladimir and Yevdokiya Petrov, who worked in the KI before defecting in
Australia in 1954, was to eliminate “wasteful duplication of effort and harm-
ful friction.”90 KI managed civilian and military collection under the leader-
ship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and thus the KI rezidenturas (stations)
were under the authority of an ambassador at an embassy. This arrangement
lasted only from 1947 to mid-1948 when the GRU refused to share its source
information and withdrew from the KI. MGB foreign intelligence components
remained under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leadership for several more
years, but by late 1951 the experiment was declared over.91

ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, put the Soviet
Union at risk of collapsing altogether. In this environment, the Soviet ten-
dency to merge espionage and sabotage into a single mission came to the
fore, strengthening practices Soviet intelligence and state security services
had implemented from the beginning of the Soviet era. Soviet intelligence
activities were divided into two lines: intelligence and diversion. Initially,
the intelligence directorate, led during World War II by Pavel Fitin, was
responsible for collecting intelligence about Germany and its allies. The
diversionary directorate, led by Pavel Sudoplatov, dispatched “intelligence
sabotage” teams behind German lines to disrupt Germany’s supply lines,
command and control, and rear areas and to assassinate German officers.
According to Fitin, the intelligence directorate supplied intelligence for the
diversionary directorate, and officers were regularly exchanged between the
two.92 This crossover between intelligence and sabotage operations is a con-
tinuing characteristic of Russian intelligence services today.

41
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Even before Germany’s defeat in 1945, Soviet intelligence services,

both civilian and military, began to divert some of their attention away
from Germany and toward Moscow’s wartime allies, reinvigorating espio-
nage networks in Great Britain and the United States. By 1943, the GRU
and NKGB had established new rezidenturas in places like Ottawa, Can-
ada, and Canberra, Australia—all while conducting liaison with British and
American forces in the fight against Germany. Soon after World War II, this
emphasis against wartime allies transitioned into what came to be known as
the Cold War.
The Soviet government, however, refused to acknowledge openly that
it was engaging in espionage, claiming instead that the foreign intelligence
services of adversarial capitalist states, bent on destroying the Soviet Union,
were the true practioners of espionage. The 1940 version of the Soviet Polit-
ical Dictionary defined “espionage” as

one of the basic means used by capitalist nations in their fight among
themselves, and in particular in their fight against the USSR. For-
eign intelligence agencies began to send their spies into Soviet Russia
immediately after its emergence. Foreign espionage in our country is
closely tied up with diversionist and wrecking activities and is aimed
at the undermining of Soviet military and industrial might.93

This definition was a mirror image of the Soviets’ own practice, combin-
ing intelligence collection and sabotage together. The Russian narrative of
being under siege by foreign intelligence services continues today.
Soviet intelligence continued operating secretly not only in foreign
countries but also inside the Soviet Union during the Cold War, focusing
its efforts around the “main enemy,” as discussed above. News of espionage
arrests and defectors going in both directions across the Iron Curtain kept
Soviet intelligence at the forefront of people’s minds in the West.94 U.S.
Congressional hearings frequently featured Soviet intelligence themes,
and defectors appeared before Congress to openly discuss their operations
against the United States. From this political climate emerged McCarthyism,

42
 Historical Foundations

named for Senator Joseph McCarthy, who conducted misguided investiga-

tions of Communist infiltration and launched unfounded recriminations
and criticisms of U.S. and other countries’ policies. Even popular literature
and fiction reflected this Cold War focus on espionage, with Mad maga-
zine’s Spy vs. Spy comic strip, Boris and Natasha playing the villains in Rocky
and Bullwinkle cartoons, and Ian Fleming’s James Bond perennially fighting
a Soviet counterpart.
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union began the post-
war period honoring Soviet intelligence officers’ heroic efforts in defeating
the Nazi invasion. In 1947, a film entitled Подвиг Разведчика (The Intelli-
gence Officer’s Deed) appeared on Soviet and Western screens portraying a
self-sacrificing Soviet officer dispatched behind German lines to infiltrate
the Nazi government. The hero was reportedly modeled on a Soviet offi-
cer named Yevgeniy Khokhlov, who had conducted similar operations
during the war. Unfortunately for the film maker, Khokhlov defected in
Germany in 1954, dimming his heroism in Soviet eyes and possibly leading
the Soviet government to replace Khokhlov with a different officer as the
heroic model.95
Moscow’s attempt to shine glory on Soviet intelligence and state secu-
rity officers was not well received, however, as state security turned its
attention on the Soviet people amid reinvigorated fears of internal threat.
Stalin’s fear of foreign infiltration through returning prisoners of war and
refugees manifested itself in increased suppression of the Soviet people and
strict rules against associating with foreigners. For the first several decades
of the Cold War, Soviet popular media portrayed spies as foreign demons.
Defectors noted that the Soviet leadership was concerned about shielding
the Soviet population, especially state security officers, from the West’s rel-
ative economic prosperity and political influences. With the Yezhovshchina
not far from Soviet citizens’ memories, millions more Soviet citizens were
forcibly relocated, were sentenced to “corrective labor” camps, or simply dis-
appeared. The title “chekist” became a demeaning epithet denoting a stool
pigeon in the 1940s and 1950s, and Lavrentiy Beriya’s arrest in June 1953
and subsequent execution further tarnished the “chekist” name.

43
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

By the mid-1960s, the Soviet government began striving to rehabil-

itate the image of the intelligence officer as a patriotic, self-sacrificing
hero who saved the Soviet Union from fascism and continued to protect
against the “main enemy.” One of the first test cases for this renewed pub-
licity policy was Richard Sorge, a Soviet illegal who operated in Japan
against Germany until he was arrested in Japan in October 1941 and later
executed. After years of obscurity and incriminations as a German spy,
Sorge posthumously received the Hero of the Soviet Union medal in late
1964 and was featured on a Soviet postage stamp in 1965 (see Figure 4).96
Sorge was the first in a long line of Soviet intelligence officers to be so
honored, including five World War II partisan leaders and sabotage oper-
ators in 1966.
When Yuriy Andropov became KGB chief in 1967, he launched an
even more aggressive public relations campaign to recover the image of the
KGB officer, which was just beginning to shed the reputation of a fearful
thug who knocks on the door in the middle of the night and makes peo-
ple disappear. The popular TV series Seventeen
Figure 4. Richard Sorge Moments of Spring, which was based on Soviet
Postage Stamp, 1965
fiction writer Yulian Semyonov’s 1968 novel,
appeared in 1973 and portrayed a Soviet intelli-
gence illegal who had penetrated the Nazi mili-
tary hierarchy during World War II, collecting
vital information that led to the defeat of Nazism.
The series became a Russian cultural staple, com-
parable to the prominence of the series M*A*S*H
in the United States. Most Russians recognize the
miniseries theme song, and Putin has compared
himself to the quick-thinking, brave protagonist
Source: Publicly available
image of postage stamp
of the story, Max Otto von Stierlitz, the alias of
issued by the Soviet Union; the Soviet intelligence illegal, Vsevolod Vladi-
see, for example, https:// mirov. The plot of the miniseries included a fic-
commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Dr_Richard_
tional U.S. plan to negotiate a separate peace with
Sorge_spy.jpg. Germany to the Soviet Union’s disadvantage,

44
 Historical Foundations

framing the popular understanding of World War II among Russian cit-

izens for decades.97
This popularity campaign, however, was also accompanied by increased
repression driven by fear of internal threat. By the 1970s, the KGB under
Andropov had created a Fifth Directorate, responsible for monitoring
“ideological subversion,” which was defined as internal dissent and religious
activity. During the late Soviet era, the KGB played two sides of the Rus-
sian problem. On the surface, the KGB accepted and claimed to adhere to
the principles of glasnost, and it conducted anti-dissident missions more
quietly rather than openly arresting people. Some KGB officers were sym-
pathetic with Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizat-
siya (democratization) concepts, and they began to lose faith in their own
organization. Between 1985 and 1991, over 30 Soviet intelligence officers
defected; over half of them from 1989 to 1991, the densest and most sus-
tained flow of Soviet intelligence officer defectors in USSR history, with
the possible exception of World War II. These defectors demonstrated an
increasing level of disenchantment with the direction that Soviet intelli-
gence and security services were taking.
At the same time, much of the KGB’s workforce was highly conserva-
tive, and many officers viewed the increasing chaos and disintegration of
the Soviet Union with anger and fear. The organization became increas-
ingly repressive while keeping its actions quiet and out of the news. That
divergence finally burst into the open in August 1991, when the KGB
Chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, emerged as one of the leaders of an
anti-Gorbachev coup attempt. The failure of that coup attempt left the
KGB’s reputation in tatters. In a September 1991 poll of Russian citizens,
only 8 percent said they trusted the KGB, while 39 percent did not trust
the KGB and 18 percent did not fully trust the KGB. Twenty-five percent
refused to respond, likely representing lingering fear that their answers
could be used against them.98
After Kryuchkov’s arrest for his involvement in the coup attempt,
Gorbachev appointed Vadim Bakatin, the Minister of Internal Affairs, as
KGB director. Bakatin, whom Gorbachev assigned to dismantle the KGB,

45
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

wrote in 1992: “The traditions of chekism are to be eradicated, chekism as

an ideology must terminate its existence. We must comply with the law,
but not ideology.”99

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Soviet/Russian military intelligence has followed a path parallel to civil-
ian intelligence and state security. Organizational names have remained
fairly consistent: the “RU” in GRU, which is the Russian acronym for
“intelligence directorate,” has persisted through Soviet/Russian military
intelligence history until recently. The name GRU was officially changed
in 2010 to the GU (Main Directorate), dropping the word “intelligence.”
Nevertheless, at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding
of Russian military intelligence in November 2018, Putin expressed won-
der at why the name had been changed and suggested the old name, GRU,
be restored.100
The first Bolshevik military intelligence organization, the Registupr
(Registration Department) was created in November 1918 as an element
of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army. The department
was tasked with coordinating army intelligence units that supported Bol-
shevik forces in combating counterrevolutionary forces during the Russian
Civil War. In April 1921, the Registupr was renamed the Разведывательное
Управление (Intelligence Department) of the Red Army Staff, often called
by its Russian abbreviation Razvedupr. Even though the name was offi-
cially changed in 2010, most people inside and outside Russia continue to
call it the GRU.
As noted above, Soviet, and now Russian, military intelligence has
always had two roles: intelligence collection to support military decision-
making and covert action to support Soviet political objectives. These two
concepts are combined in the Russian word razvedka, which is usually trans-
lated into English as “intelligence.” According to Ginzberg/Krivitsky, a Raz-
vedupr officer who was transferred to the NKVD in 1936 and subsequently
defected in 1937, the Razvedupr was

46
 Historical Foundations

charged to obtain not only the fullest possible information about

a foreign army, navy, or air force, but all political and economic
information which, when collated, might influence the General
Staff and the Politbureau in matters of foreign policy. At one time
an attempt was made to draw a distinction between military and
political and economic intelligence, but it was found impossible to
divorce political and economic questions from those of pure mili-
tary intelligence.101

Mirroring civilian intelligence and internal security, the history of Rus-

sian military intelligence is filled with bureaucratic conflict, and the Soviet era
saw frequent struggles between military and civilian intelligence. When Sta-
lin took full control of the Soviet Union in 1927, trust between services began
to erode. Stalin distrusted military intelligence for representing the views of
his archrival, Lev Trotsky, whom Stalin exiled from the Soviet Union in 1928
and finally arranged to be assassinated in 1940. Military leaders reciprocated
Stalin’s mistrust. Multiple Razvedupr officers who defected provided infor-
mation about their role in supporting Comintern-sponsored revolutionary
activities. In some cases, these officers’ defections came a decade after Stalin
took power, when the Soviet emphasis had shifted from world revolution to
“Socialism in one country”—a policy that officers who had served in the Raz-
vedupr during the early Bolshevik years viewed as a betrayal of Lenin’s path.
When Razvedupr officer Poretskiy/Reiss defected, he issued an
anti-Stalinist manifesto in a letter to the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, dated July 17, 1937: “The working class must defeat Stalin and
Stalinism so that the USSR and the international workers’ movement do
not succumb to fascism and counter-revolution. This mixture of the worst
opportunism, devoid of principles, and of lies and blood threatens to poison
the world and the last forces of the working class.” He further demanded a
“return to Lenin’s international!”102 Ginzberg/Krivitsky decried that “Bol-
shevism, Leninism, and socialism are dead in the Soviet Union, and that no
genuine attempt is now being made to carry out the teachings of Karl Marx.
The Soviet Union has become a rigid dictatorship maintained by a system

47
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

of wholesale purges, and Stalin is attempting to maintain his unstable posi-

tion by a policy of military aggression.”103 Aleksandr Graff (aka Alexander
Barmine), another Razvedupr defector, wrote in an open letter in December
1937: “Had I consented to remain in the service of Stalin I should have felt
myself morally defiled, and should have had to take a share in the responsi-
bility for crimes committed daily against the people of my country. It would
have meant betraying the cause of Socialism to which I have dedicated
my life.”104 By the mid-1930s, these attitudes were not uncommon among
Lenin-era military intelligence officers.
Adding to Stalin’s mistrust, the Razvedupr experienced a series of com-
promises and failures in Europe in the early 1930s, leading Soviet leadership
to transfer senior NKVD officers to the Razvedupr to “correct” these failures
in 1934.105 In 1935, Stalin removed the long-serving Razvedupr chief, Yan
Berzin, who had been promoted to that position just after Lenin died in
1924. At about the same time, Stalin ordered the NKVD to begin collecting
military intelligence, either duplicating or edging out the Razvedupr in some
cases,106 and he had high-producing Razvedupr officers, including Ginzberg/
Krivitsky and Porestsky/Reiss, transferred to the NKVD to strengthen its
capabilities. Berzin returned for a short period as Razvedupr chief in 1937
after a deployment in the Spanish Civil War, but later that year he was
arrested and accused of Trotskyism. He was executed in 1938. Razvedupr
officers respected their leader and saw Berzin’s removal from power as a strike
against their profession. This sentiment was strengthened by the arrests and
executions of eight senior Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Mikhail
Tukhachevskiy. After their executions in June 1937, Graff/Barmine made an
unguarded comment to a friend: “What on earth is happening there? This is
too horrible. The best men—the flower of the Army….”107
Ginzberg/Krivitsky speculated that Stalin may have wanted to remove
military leaders because they saw Germany as a greater threat than Great
Britain, in opposition to Stalin’s view.108 Among the senior military leaders
whom Stalin’s purges removed were Jews who were unsurprisingly opposed
to any pact with Nazi Germany. The military leadership’s resistance may have
impeded Stalin’s efforts to reach an agreement with Hitler. That agreement

48
 Historical Foundations

finally came in August 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, but not
until most senior military leaders, including many in military intelligence,
had been purged. Ironically, when Tukhachevskiy and seven other senior
military officers were arrested and executed in 1937, they were accused of
espionage on behalf of Germany.
When military intelligence sources began in 1940 to report that Ger-
many was preparing an attack on the Soviet Union, Stalin refused to believe
those reports. He had the sources investigated, assuming they were British
spies trying to ruin the Soviet relationship with Germany.109 A 2006 Russian
analysis of why the Soviet Union was not ready for a German attack in 1941
stated, “The main reason for the Red Army’s unpreparedness to actively
repel aggression was miscalculation by the political leadership in assessing
the situation and indecisiveness and insufficient principles of the military
leadership and leadership of the RU in 1941.”110 This analysis did not men-
tion Stalin by name, but his views—that reports of British plotting were
more believable than those of German betrayal—were reflected in a histor-
ical essay sponsored by Russia’s current Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR):

From reliable sources in London and Paris, [Soviet] intelligence

received information about instructions that the governments of
England and France gave to their military delegations in negoti-
ations in Moscow, where measures to prevent aggression against
Poland were being discussed. The instruction directed the delega-
tions to stretch out the time, not to take any obligations on them-
selves, and not to sign any documents; in other words, to facilitate a
conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union.111

Military intelligence quickly gained greater respect, however, when it

became indispensable in fighting the invading German army. Along with the
NKGB, Soviet military intelligence deployed intelligence and intelligence-­
sabotage groups into the German rear area to collect intelligence through
human and technical means and to destroy German lines of communica-
tion. According to a Russian history of the GRU, 564 military intelligence

49
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

officers were awarded the rank of “Hero of the Soviet Union” during the
war.112 Moscow elevated the status of the Razvedupr in 1942, bestowing
the title Main Intelligence Directorate (or GRU)—a name it retained for
nearly 70 years.
As the GRU tasked its sources to turn their attention to the USSR’s
wartime allies, collection focused on three main areas: military forces infor-
mation, known today as foundational military intelligence; military-related
science and technology information; and political information. Among sci-
ence and technology targets, a high priority for collection was information
about atomic weapons development. Several important GRU operations
penetrated U.S. and British atomic weapons establishments, providing the
Soviet Union with the information it needed to develop its own atomic
bomb by 1949, significantly earlier than it could have done without the help
of espionage. Throughout the rest of the Cold War, the GRU continued
along these basic collection lines, using legal and illegal human platforms
and increasing its use of technical platforms, including satellites.
By the end of the Cold War, GRU collection focused on several major
themes that will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6:

■ Collecting foundational military intelligence, i.e., information

about the basic elements of a foreign military force that the Russian
military would face in a military conflict.
■ Collecting intelligence on strategic forces, particularly nuclear weap-
ons capabilities and strategic missile defense capabilities.
■ Collecting intelligence for strategic contingency purposes, including
information on an adversary’s critical infrastructure to support attack
planning and covert operations should Russia find itself in a war.
■ Collecting intelligence about foreign military weapons research and
development.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the GRU has continued to
exist with little change. GRU personnel were heavily involved in conflicts in
Chechnya and Georgia, and they continue to be involved in conflicts today

50
 Historical Foundations

in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya. Their mission remains similar to what it was at
the beginning of the Soviet era: to collect military intelligence and to con-
duct covert operations.

CONCLUSION: EVOLVING PRIORITIES

Despite shifts in organizational status and name changes, the methods
employed by Soviet intelligence and state security services and their sub-
ordination to the Communist Party remained consistent throughout the
Soviet era. As stated in the 1959 KGB basic regulation:

The Committee for State Security of the USSR Council of Min-

isters and its local bodies are political bodies, performing the
guidelines of the Central Committee of the Party (CPSU) and
Government on the protection of the Socialist State from attacks
of foreign and domestic enemies, as well as the defense of the
USSR state border. Their mission is to thoroughly monitor the
secret activities of the Soviet state enemies, reveal their intentions,
and prevent criminal activities of imperialistic intelligence services
against the Soviet state.113

Correspondingly, within both the internal and external threat calcula-

tion, the focus of Soviet intelligence and state security evolved over time in
line with Party priorities. KGB defector Petr Deryabin published a book
with American journalist Frank Gibney in 1959 that cited a KGB apho-
rism: “In the Yezhovshchina, the god of state security sat in the political sec-
tion. During the period of collectivization, god sat in the economic section.
During the war, god was in intelligence and, after the war, in counterintel-
ligence.”114 Using the image of a “god of state security,” Deryabin captured
the fluctuations in intelligence and state security priorities in the Soviet era.
During the early 1930s, when the Party’s emphasis—at Stalin’s insis-
tence—was on the collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization
of the Soviet economy, “god” sat in the economic section. The primary state

51
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

security mission was to counter the internal threat that originated with
millions of Soviet citizens who resisted the forced and wrenching transfor-
mation of the economy. During the Yezhovshchina era, the threat was also
focused internally but transitioned to political loyalty, and the NKVD Polit-
ical Directorate took precedence. During World War II, when the country
faced a legitimate external threat, the “god” sat in intelligence, which was
needed to defeat the German invasion. When the war ended, “god” returned
to a perceived internal threat, represented again by the Soviet people them-
selves. Counterintelligence, which in the Soviet definition includes any
connection between the Soviet people and foreigners, took precedence,
and Soviet state security directed the bulk of its attention at the Soviet pop-
ulation. Several post-World War II defectors objected to this turn inward,
perceiving their wartime intelligence and state security mission to be honor-
able and necessary in the face of external enemies; however, they could not
endure the post-war mission that mandated they turn these tools against the
Soviet people.

52
 CHAPTER 2

POST-SOVIET DEVELOPMENT
OF RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY

k k k
Despite an ebb in popular acceptance of the “chekist” after World War II, the
concept of a “chekist mindset” continued to permeate state security functions
in the Soviet Union. The apogee of the KGB’s power came in 1982, when
Yuriy Andropov became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. No chekist had risen to that position since Lavrentiy Beriya
assumed control of the Soviet government at Stalin’s death in 1953, only to
be arrested soon thereafter and executed. Twenty-nine years later, a chekist
was in charge of the whole country. It would be 17 more years before another
chekist achieved comparable standing: Vladimir Putin was a junior KGB offi-
cer in Leningrad when Andropov rose to the post of Party General Secretary.
The chekist mindset is defined by constantly perceiving threats and
seeking ways to mitigate them. Threats might come from within Russia.
The Russian people are potential sources of unrest that could challenge the
Russian leadership. Thus, the Putin regime has endeavored to co-opt the
Russian people by spreading patriotic rhetoric and controlling the informa-
tion they receive, thereby preventing the emergence of popular movements
that could rival him.

53
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Threats can also come from outside Russia, such as the United States
and NATO, and this view became the foundation of the “main enemy” con-
cept during the Soviet era. Today, that same pursuit of foreign enemies is
why Putin sees a U.S. hand behind “color revolutions” in the Near Abroad,
why Russia has publicly accused the United States of being behind expul-
sions of Russian diplomats from European and other countries in 2018, and
why this theme permeates Putin’s rhetoric in general.115
Historian Julie Fedor explored the foundations of Russia’s threat per-
ception in a 2011 article that analyzed Russian conspiracy theories about
the West. The most common among those conspiracies is a fictitious con-
cept called the Dulles Plan, named for Allen Dulles, who served as the U.S.
Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961. The plan outlines a
grandiose plot to destroy Russia, using clandestine infiltrations into Rus-
sian society to debase the Russian people’s morals and turn Russians against
their own government, based on a non-existent speech that Dulles suppos-
edly gave in 1945.116 The plot of the 1970s Soviet TV mini-series Seven-
teen Moments of Spring reflected a related conspiracy theory, portraying
Dulles—a U.S. Office of Strategic Services officer in Bern, Switzerland,
during World War II—as plotting with Nazi Germans to betray the Soviet
Union.117 Fedor demonstrates that the belief in the Dulles Plan continued
well into the Putin era, and that the leaders of Russia today, whose profes-
sional lives began during Andropov’s time as KGB director, were immersed
in the legend. As recently as May 2020, Russian Permanent Representative
to the European Union (EU) Vasiliy Chizhov cited the Dulles Plan as the
basis for Western criticism of Russia.118
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the Boris
Yeltsin administration faced the task of figuring out what to do with the rem-
nants of the KGB and the chekist mindset that permeated it. How could
Yeltsin use or control this organ of the government that had caused so much
fear during the Soviet era and had discredited itself by attempting to remove
Gorbachev from power? The last KGB director, Vadim Bakatin, quickly
eliminated the Fifth Directorate and went as far as revealing to U.S. Ambas-
sador Robert Strauss the existence and locations of KGB listening devices

54
 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

inside the new U.S. embassy building in Moscow.119 Strauss reported that
Bakatin made this revelation out of a sense of cooperation and goodwill, with
“no strings attached.” Bakatin’s action, however, was met with harsh criticism
within the state security apparatus, including allegations of treason.120
The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not mean that threats to the
Russian Federation ceased. The newly independent Russian Federation
faced significant security threats and turned inward even more, focusing its
security apparatus on legitimate concerns. These dangers included nuclear
proliferation, terrorism, and organized crime, along with armed conflicts
near or even inside Russia’s borders in Tajikistan, Moldova, Armenia-­
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and later Chechnya. Russia also regretted losing the
influence, especially the economic connections, that it had enjoyed in the
other 14 suddenly independent former Soviet republics. Russian security
services continued to perceive the need to defend Russians both inside the
Russian Federation and abroad.
While some politicians, like Andrey Kozyrev, publicly advocated for
removing barriers that had separated the Soviet Union from the West, espe-
cially from the United States,121 operations targeting the old enemies of
the Soviet Union continued. Bakatin lasted in position only a few months
before the Soviet Union dissolved, and Soviet-era politicians who shared a
mindset closer to that of the chekists whom Bakatin had tried to eradicate,
succeeded him as leaders of the new Russian intelligence and security ser-
vices. These officers harbored Cold War suspicions of the West, believing
that forces abroad wanted to keep Russia in a state of controllable paralysis.
They sought to uncover and frustrate outside attempts to influence the situ-
ation inside Russia. The chekist search for outside explanations to domestic
problems survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
During the Yeltsin era, the guiding philosophies of Russian intelligence
and security grew into concepts similar to those we see now under Putin:

■ A struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics has replaced ideo-

logical conflicts.
■ Efforts must be made toward the “reconstitution of Russian statehood.”

55
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

■ Russia’s defense capability can on no account be allowed to be weakened.

■ Free access to other countries’ markets must be guaranteed.122

Just as in the earliest days of the ChK, the chekist mindset today is
constantly looking for, and sometimes fabricating, a connection between
domestic threats and foreign enemies. This perceived connection makes
the repression of internal dissent more acceptable to the Russian people by
making it appear to be a defense against foreign invasion. For example, when
prominent Russian opposition activist Aleksey Navalny released a documen-
tary in 2015 that exposed corrupt business deals by Russia’s Prosecutor Gen-
eral Yuriy Chayka’s family members, Chayka dismissed the video as a political
attack by an American businessman. When Russians protested before Putin’s
inauguration as president in 2016, Russian state media labeled the protesters
as pro-Western, unpatriotic, and immoral.123 The chekist mindset is at the
foundation of this threat narrative that ties internal dissent to foreign powers.
The introduction to a 2013 memoir by Valeriy Velichko, a former
general-major in the KGB 9th Directorate, expressed suspicions common
among state security personnel about Russian leaders perceived to be under
Western influence:

Who are they? Are Yeltsin, Gorbachev, activists in the interregional

deputies’ group, Gaydar, Chubays, and the “father of Russian democ-
racy” A. Sakharov, the heroes who brought an end to the “cursed total-
itarian communist regime,” who granted independence to the union
republics, and long-awaited freedom to the Soviet people? Indepen-
dence from whom and what? Or are they open traitors under the
direction of the West, who destroyed a great state, stole and sold off its
riches, and submerged the majority of its citizens for years of humili-
ating existence. No thanks to them, even now we cannot destroy the
limitless criminality and rampant corruption of Russian officialdom
at all levels. Wasn’t it through their doings that God’s commandments
and the precepts of the builders of communism have been forgot-
ten, that the basest instincts have been awakened in the masses, and

56
 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

immorality, fraud, and passion for immeasurable wealth are flourish-

ing? Where were those all-seeing and all-knowing Andropovite chek-
ists, whose duty it was to foresee and prevent such a tragedy?124

In 2010, 12 Russian intelligence illegals were arrested or indicted in the

United States, representing a continuation of the Russian intelligence prior-
ity placed on the United States even in the post-Soviet era. Among the illegal
officers arrested, one husband and wife couple (Mikhail Vasenkov, aka Juan
Lazaro, and Vicky Palaez) had been dispatched to the United States in 1983 and
continued their operations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Others
included two husband and wife couples dispatched to the United States during
the Yeltsin years: Vladimir and Lidiya Guriyev (aka Richard and Cynthia Mur-
phy) and Andrey Bezrukov and Yelena Vavilova (aka Donald Heathfield and
Tracy Lee Foley). These illegals will be covered in more detail in Chapter 8.
Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russian state security activities, has noted
several manifestations of the mindset in Russia’s security services to con-
tinue intelligence operations against the United States. He cites Russian
intelligence and state security officers as saying:

■ “If the West loses, we gain”: a projection advancing a zero-sum prop-

osition in the struggle of Russia and the West.
■ “Russia is at risk”: a narrative professing that the West was attacking
Russia through “color revolutions” and that Maidan demonstrations
in Kiev, Ukraine, were orchestrated by the CIA.
■ “Better action than inaction”: intelligence and state security organs
have a bias toward acting, even without coordination with less
aggressive organizations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.125

From the depths of the August coup in 1991, the chekist mindset has
returned and is alive and well in Russia. Today, Russian intelligence and secu-
rity officers proudly claim the title “chekist” to recall the greatness of their
history. State Security Workers Day, popularly known as “Chekists Day,” was
reinstated as a public day of recognition in 1995. That day now is celebrated

57
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

annually on December 20, the anniversary of the founding of the Cheka

in 1917. In 2017, an interviewer asked FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov
whether using the word “chekist” to refer to Russian state security workers
today bothered him because of the parallels with the original VChK. He
answered that it did not bother him at all. In his view, the history, experience,
and tradition reflected in that title are not limited to the period of the VChK
or to the time of the “avenging sword of the revolution.” To deny the word
“chekist” would be to “assign generations of our ancestors to oblivion.”126

POST-SOVIET REORGANIZATIONS
When the Soviet Union dissolved and Yeltsin took charge of Russia, the Rus-
sian government took steps to break up the all-powerful KGB into several
agencies. Initially, it was divided into three: the SVR, which continues its for-
eign intelligence mission today; the Ministry of Security (MB); and the Main
Administration of Protection (GUO), which was responsible for protecting
senior leaders and important government facilities. The MB contained most
of the functions and personnel of the old KGB, and by 1993, Yeltsin began to
realize that this renamed but still potent organization could become a threat to
his governing power.127 Reformers succeeded in persuading Yeltsin to dissolve
the ministry and split the functions into three additional organizations: the
Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) inherited the CI functions of the
MB; communications security and signals intelligence (SIGINT) were trans-
ferred to the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Informa-
tion (FAPSI); and the largest portion of personnel became the Federal Border
Guard Service (FPS). Consequently, by 1994, five different Russian agencies
conducted the missions that the KGB had previously run.
Most of the KGB-era directorates were transferred in their existing
form to one of the newly founded organizations (see Table 1). Their direct
descendants continue to fulfill their responsibilities today. As noted above,
one exception was the Fifth Directorate, which was responsible for inves-
tigating dissent and anti-Soviet activities. This directorate caused the most
fear among the Soviet population, since it investigated anti-Soviet literature,

58
 Table 1. Post-Soviet Civilian Intelligence and Security Reorganizations
KGB Directorate/Department Function 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
1st Chief Directorate Foreign intelligence KGB SVR
2nd Chief Directorate Counterintelligence KGB MB FSK FSB
3rd Chief Directorate Military counterintelligence KGB MB FSK FSB
4th Directorate CI support to transport and comms KGB MB FSK FSB MOD
5th Directorate Anti-dissident ops KGB FSB?
6th Directorate CI support to the economy KGB MB FSK FSB
7th Directorate Surveillance KGB MB FSK FSB
10 Department Archive KGB MB FSK FSB
12th Department Electronic surveillance KGB MB FSK FSB
Directorate “OP” Counter-organized crime KGB MB FSK FSB
Directorate “SCh” KGB Special Forces KGB MB FSK FSB

59
Chief Dir for Border Troops KGB MB FPS FSB

8th Department Cryptography KGB MB FSK FAPSI FSB*

16th Department SIGINT KGB MB FAPSI FSB*

9th Department Protection of leaders KGB GUO FSO

15th Department Security of gov facilities KGB GUO FSO

Note: FSB? indicates the FSB gained, as of 2005, some functions similar to those of the KGB Fifth Directorate, including investigating anti-government speech;
FSB* indicates most of FAPSI was folded into the FSB in 2003, while portions also transitioned to the SVR and the FSO.

Acronyms
Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

FAPSl=Federal Agency for Government FSK=Federal Counterintelligence Service MOD=Ministry of Defense

Communications and Information FSO=Federal Protective Service SVR=Foreign Intelligence Service
FPS=Federal Border Guard Service GUO=Main Administration of Protection
FSB=Federal Security Service MB=Ministry of Security
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

statements, and jokes. On Vadim Bakatin’s order, the Fifth Directorate was
eliminated in 1991.
Commentators in the West saw this reorganization as a great improve-
ment. The hated KGB and its repression were officially gone, and no sin-
gle organization could control the new democratic Russia, they thought.
However, despite agency leaders’ assurances,128 a spirit of competition arose
among the five services, and failures, such as the disastrous operation to free
hostages held in a hospital by Chechen separatists in Budennovsk, Stavropol
Krai, in June 1995, left the services looking weak and incapable.
What is known today as the Federal Security Service (FSB) came into
existence in 1995, less than a week after the Budennovsk debacle. Vladimir
Putin led the FSB from July 1998 to August 1999 and saw firsthand the coor-
dination problems that the splintering of Russia’s intelligence and security ser-
vices created. After being elected president in 2000, Putin began the eventual
re-accumulation of state security functions that had been broken up during
Yeltsin’s time. The Federal Border Service was resubordinated to the FSB in
2003. FAPSI was also dissolved in 2003, with most of its functions going to
the FSB and a few pieces going to the SVR and Federal Protective Service
(FSO), the successor to the GUO. As of 2005, the FSB regained all but a
few specialized functions that the KGB had controlled during the Soviet era,
including the suspected return of functions and practices similar to those of
the KGB Fifth Directorate, including investigating anti-government speech.

CONTINUING HISTORY
Russia has not forgotten its glorious intelligence past. In December 1999,
then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said, “Bodies of state security have always
defended the national interests of Russia. They must not be separated from
the state and turned into some kind of monster... We nearly overdid it when
we exposed the crimes committed by the security services, for there were not
only dark periods, but also glorious episodes in their history, of which one
may really be proud.”129 In 2005, Putin publicly used the phrase “Бывших
чекистов не бывает” (“There is no such thing as a former chekist.”). This

60
 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

phrase had been popular within the KGB for many years to indicate the orga-
nization’s pride and elite nature, similar to when a member of the U.S. Marine
Corps says, “there is no such thing as a former Marine.” Putin’s public use of
the chekist phrase shows both his trust and reliance on state security organi-
zations, as well as his expectation that former employees of the state security
organs should remain loyal and compliant with his orders.130
This historical continuity was evident when Russia issued a postage stamp
in 2000 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the founding of Russian for-
eign intelligence. The stamp lists three acronyms: INO, PGU, and SVR. These
acronyms represent the names of the Russian foreign intelligence organization
from its original founding under the Cheka in 1920 (International Department,
INO) to the founding of the KGB in 1954 (First Chief Directorate, PGU) and
the SVR today. There is no disruption in that history as far as Russian intelli-
gence officers are concerned. During a celebration at SVR headquarters to com-
memorate the organization’s 80th anniversary in 2000, Putin met with other
former KGB/SVR chiefs—Vladimir Kryuchkov (1988–91), who had served
three years in prison for his role in the August 1991 coup attempt; Leonid
Shebarshin (1991); Yevgeniy Primakov (1991–96); and Vyechaslav Trubnikov
(1996–2000)—as well as famous intelligence agents, including British defector
George Blake. Notably absent from the attendee list was Vadim Bakatin.
Similarly, a history of the FSB Military Counterintelligence Service pub-
lished in 2004 hardly mentions the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia
also issued a commemorative postage stamp in 2017 commemorating the
100th anniversary of the founding of Russian state security. In the subse-
quent years, additional 100th anniversaries were celebrated: the founding of
the illegals program, radio-technical intelligence (known in English as signals
intelligence), border guards, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SVR)

As the name implies, the SVR is Russia’s service for conducting foreign intel-
ligence activities. The organization descends directly from the KGB’s First
Chief Directorate. Its manpower is approximately 10,000 to 15,000, roughly

61
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

a quarter of which is stationed abroad. According to the SVR’s official web-

site, it is divided into operational, analytical, and functional sub-elements.
The main SVR operational directorates are reminiscent of several of Orlov’s
“lines of operation,” and correspond with their Soviet-era predecessors.
Chart 1 is adapted from the SVR’s website.131 Some of the directorate names
and elements, such as Political Intelligence and Illegal Intelligence, are not
listed on the chart but exist in the service.

Chart 1. Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)

Director Group of
Zaslon
Consultants

Collegium

First Deputy
State Secretary
SVR Director

Director’s
Press Liaison
Staff/Protocol

Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Director

Director for Director for Director for Material/Technical
Science Operations Staff Logistics

NTR (S&T Operations

Intelligence) Operational and Support
Depts. Analysis and
Information
Operational
Technology
Foreign CI
Information
Systems
ER (Economic
Intelligence)
SVR Academy

Sources: Organization chart created by author from multiple sources, including the SVR website,
www.svr.gov.ru; government seal image from Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Russian_Foreign_Intelligence_Agency.png.

Directorate PR: Political Intelligence is the primary operational direc-

torate within the SVR and is the direct descendant of an element with the

62
 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

same mission that existed in the KGB First Chief Directorate. Directorate
PR is divided into geographically focused departments that manage political
intelligence operations in SVR rezidenturas around the world. SVR reziden-
turas are divided into “lines” within which officers specialize in a type of
intelligence. Political intelligence officers abroad work in what the SVR calls
Line PR sections. The operations of this directorate will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4.
Directorate NTR: Scientific and Technical Intelligence is the direct
descendant of the KGB-era Directorate T. It collects technology that Rus-
sia determines it needs to defend itself against foreign weapon systems and
to advance Russia’s own science and technology (S&T) developments.
Directorate NTR manages S&T collection operations in SVR rezidenturas
abroad under what is known in the SVR as Line X. This directorate will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Directorate ER: Economic Intelligence manages operations to col-
lect intelligence about and to influence foreign economic systems, known
as Line ER operations in SVR rezidenturas abroad. The operations of this
directorate will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Directorate S: Illegal Intelligence is divided into both geographic and
functional departments. The latter include departments for selecting and
training illegals, developing cover legends, and providing transportation
and funding for illegals abroad. Directorate S is also responsible for the SVR
Mobilization Department, which administers the SVR’s participation in
wartime environments. It manages Line N operations, related to the illegals
program, in SVR rezidenturas abroad. The operations of this directorate will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
Directorate KR: External Counterintelligence carries out infiltration
of foreign intelligence and security services and exercises surveillance over
Russian citizens living outside the country. It manages Line KR operations
in SVR rezidenturas abroad, which are responsible for monitoring diplo-
mats at overseas Russian government facilities.
Directorate MS: Мероприятия Содействия (Measures of Support)
replaced what was formerly Service A under the KGB, which ran “active

63
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

measures” operations. Directorate MS operations derive from those of other

directorates, using intelligence collected across the agency to create influence
operations that support Russia’s foreign policy priorities. These operations
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
SVR analytical directorates produce both strategic analysis for Russian
decisionmakers and tactical analysis for other SVR directorates.

■ The Analysis and Information Directorate and Directorate I:

Computer Service (Information and Dissemination) analyze and
distribute intelligence data and publish daily current events summa-
ries for Russia’s president.
■ Directorate R: Operational Planning and Analysis evaluates SVR
operations abroad.

Functional Directorates include:

■ Directorate OT: Operational and Technical Support is the

descendant of the KGB directorate of the same name. It provides
equipment and technical personnel to support SVR operations.
■ Academy of Foreign Intelligence (AVR), the SVR’s training acad-
emy, is the descendant of the KGB’s Red Banner Intelligence Acad-
emy and trains SVR personnel.
■ Personnel, internal security, and staff, and logistical units.

A special operations element known as Zaslon is reportedly directly

subordinate to the SVR director. Zaslon is responsible for protecting senior
Russian embassy officials and other Russian government officials when they
travel to dangerous locations. For example, Zaslon officers provided security
when then-Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin traveled to Syria
in 2014.132 The element also conducts covert action missions. Little is pub-
licly known about the group, but it reportedly was created in 1998 to replace
special forces units that had been subordinate to the KGB First Chief Direc-
torate during the Soviet era and moved to the Ministry of Security after the

64
 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

dissolution of the Soviet Union (for further information on covert action

elements, see FSB Alfa and Vympel units below).133
As of 2021, the director of the SVR is Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin,
a career KGB officer whose chekist mindset and loyalty to Putin have pro-
pelled him into senior political positions. He joined the KGB in 1978, not
long after Putin, and both worked in Leningrad at the same time. Naryshkin
remained in the KGB up to the end of the Soviet era, operating under diplo-
matic cover in Belgium collecting S&T intelligence,134 and he transitioned
to the St. Petersburg city government soon after Putin did. When Putin
moved to Moscow in the mid-1990s, Naryshkin remained in St. Petersburg,
during which time he led foreign investment efforts for the St. Petersburg
Oblast government.
Naryshkin moved to Moscow in 2004, where his career has greatly ben-
efitted from his proximity to Putin. At that time, Putin appointed him as an
economic advisor in the Russian Presidential Administration, and he simul-
taneously served on the board of directors of Sovcomflot, a Russian shipping
company that specializes in gas and oil tankers; Rosneft, Russia’s oil giant;
and the Russian television company, Channel One. From 2008 to 2011,
Naryshkin was director of the Russian Presidential Administration during
the Dmitriy Medvedev presidency. In 2009, Medvedev appointed Narysh-
kin to the Historical Truth Commission, which is tasked with protecting
Russia’s historical reputation. In December 2011, he was elected to the State
Duma, serving as its chairman until 2016. He was in this position during
Russia’s covert operation to annex Crimea, and he consequently became the
target of U.S. and European Union sanctions for submitting legislation to
institutionalize that illegal Russian government action. Putin appointed his
close associate Naryshkin to lead the SVR in 2016.

FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (FSB)

The FSB has inherited most of the KGB’s historical functions and, thus, is
a large organization. Much of its manpower is in the Border Guard Service,
which was resubordinated from the FPS to the FSB in 2003.

65
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

The FSB is Russia’s primary internal security organization, and thus it

has the bulk of resources devoted to that mission. The FSB has several main
operational services, which correspond directly to Soviet-era KGB director-
ates and carry out the FSB’s primary functions (see Chart 2).

Chart 2. Federal Security Service (FSB)

Director

First Deputy
State Secretary
FSB Director

Border Guards Anti-Terrorism

Service Committee

First Second Military Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh

Service Service Service Service Service Service
CI
CI Maintaining the Economic CI Operational Personnel Finance
Constitutional Information and
Order and International
Combating Liaison
Terrorism
Center for
Information Security

Special Purpose
Logistics Service Forces

Sources: Organization chart created by author from multiple sources, including the FSB website,
https://fsb.dossier.center//; government seal image from Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Emblem_of_Federal_security_service.svg.

The Counterintelligence Service is the remnant of the KGB Second

Chief Directorate and is one of the primary elements of the FSB today. Its
mission is to thwart attempts by foreign intelligence services to operate inside
Russia, including penetrating foreign diplomatic establishments, harassing
foreign diplomats, and investigating Russians who come in contact with for-
eigners. These operations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
The element called the Service for the Defense of the Constitutional
Order and Fight Against Terrorism combines counterterrorism and

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

constitutional order into one element. This service is responsible for combating
terrorism, extremism, and ethnically based organized criminal activities. It also
conducts counterintelligence activities in the ministries of Health, Culture,
and Education, in the religious sphere, and in noncommercial organizations.
The same people who investigate terrorism also investigate internal instability
created by dissent or protests. Consequently, oppositionists are often charged
with violating extremism laws, which are linked to terrorism laws.
This element’s name is eerily reminiscent of the Soviet era, when in 1989
the KGB Fifth Directorate was renamed Directorate Z, or the Directorate
to Defend the Constitution. This directorate was responsible for internal
security functions against the Soviet people, including combating politi-
cal dissent, controlling religious activity, and monitoring dissident writers
and artists, all of which the KGB described as “ideological subversion.”135
The resurrection of an element with a similar name and portfolio gives the
appearance that the FSB has brought back a modernized version of the KGB
Fifth Directorate, now combined with counterterrorism.
The Military Counterintelligence Service is the remnant of the KGB
Third Chief Directorate and the descendant of OOs in the early Soviet era
and the UKR SMERSH of World War II. It monitors the loyalty of military
forces and conducts CI investigations and operations inside military units.
The FSB also manages a similar element that monitors the loyalty of per-
sonnel in the Internal, Emergencies, and Justice ministries. A history of FSB
military CI, written in 2004, indicates that the directorate retained its mili-
tary spirit and work ethic after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, although
it shrank in size and underwent some reorganization. It is unclear whether
the downsizing has been reversed since then.136
The Economic Security Service is the remnant of what was once called
the KGB 6th Directorate. It is directed toward economic crimes and is orga-
nized around the venues where crime might take place: industry, the trans-
portation infrastructure, the banking system, etc. Chapter 5 will discuss the
FSB’s role in the economic realm.
The Border Guard Service was a directorate under the KGB during the
Soviet era but was separated from the security service in 1993 to become an

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

independent agency. However, in 2003, it was returned to the FSB struc-

ture, and today makes up the largest personnel element in the FSB.
The Center for Information Security (TsIB), also called Center 18,
conducts both internal Internet monitoring directed at Russian citizens and
foreign intelligence collection. One of the elements that the FSB inherited
from the former FAPSI, the TsIB has been discussed in public infrequently,
initially in relation to requests for information about Internet users. For
example, the owner of the website Roem.ru received a request from a TsIB
officer in 2011 asking for information about a subscriber, originating from
the email address [email protected] More recently, TsIB has gained
notoriety for its overseas operations. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice indicted several TsIB officers for hacking into millions of Yahoo email
accounts.138 Media reports also connect TsIB with the attempted hacking
of election systems in several states during the 2016 U.S. elections, which,
when the attempts became public, led to arrests of TsIB officers in Russia
for allegedly compromising the operation to the U.S. Government. The offi-
cers were charged with espionage on behalf of the United States.139 The FSB
also sponsors multiple advanced persistent threat computer-network actors,
including one known in the West as Venomous Bear, aka Turla, which may
be affiliated with TsIB.140 TsIB reportedly operates in concert with an FSB
SIGINT unit known as Center 16 in targeting Ukrainian government, law
enforcement, and military entities.141
The FSB also inherited two special purpose covert action elements
from the KGB, called Alfa and Vympel. The units were part of the KGB
First Chief Directorate during the Soviet era and had a foreign covert
action role.142 When the SVR was created in 1991, they were transferred
to an internal security function, necessitating their later replacement with
Zaslon in the SVR. Alfa and Vympel are responsible for tracking and neu-
tralizing terrorists or other threatening entities inside Russia. They have
been deployed in the Chechen wars and during hostage situations in the
North Caucasus, such as the Beslan school and Budennovsk hospital oper-
ations. Although they are described as domestic counterterrorism forces,
these elements have reportedly recently resumed a foreign covert operations

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

mission similar to their KGB predecessors. A 2020 Bellingcat investigation

indicated that the assassin involved in the August 2019 murder of Georgian
émigré and Chechen militant, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, in Germany was
associated with Vympel.143 Alfa and Vympel may also have been behind the
assassinations of other Chechen militant leaders outside Russia, such as in
Turkey (see Chapter 7).
As of 2021, the director of the FSB is Aleksandr Vasilyevich Bort-
nikov. Like SVR Director Naryshkin, Bortnikov is a career state security
officer, beginning in 1975. He also worked in Leningrad/St. Petersburg at
the same time as Putin, and he remained in St. Petersburg until 2004, finish-
ing his time there as chief of the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast FSB
office. Bortnikov moved to Moscow in 2004 to become director of the FSB’s
Economic Security Service, and he has served as FSB director since 2008.
He holds the rank equivalent to a four-star general.
It is notable that both Naryshkin and Bortnikov, long-time Putin associ-
ates, were selected for positions close to Dmitriy Medvedev when he became
president in 2008. Their regular association with Medvedev reinforced
Putin’s influence in Medvedev’s administration.

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE (FSO)

Another player with significant influence in Russian internal security is
Федеральная Служба Охраны (Federal Protective Service, FSO). Its best-
known role is to protect the Russian president and about 40 other senior
government officials, including the prime minister, the chairmen of the Fed-
eration Council and State Duma, the chief of the Presidential Administra-
tion, the chairman of the Security Council, and the FSB director. The FSO is
the descendant of several pieces of the former KGB: the Ninth Directorate,
which was responsible for senior leader security; the 15th Directorate, which
was responsible for protecting important government facilities; and parts
of the Eighth Directorate, which secured Russian government communica-
tions. The FSO’s current functions, as defined by the 2004 law under which
it operates, fall into those same three categories: safeguarding senior leaders,

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

providing security for protected facilities, and securing government commu-

nications, including special encrypted communications (see Chart 3).144

Chart 3. Federal Protective Service (FSO)

Director

First Deputy
State Secretary
FSO Director

Presidential Special Comms and

Security Service Information Service

Information Information and

Systems Technical Support
Directorate Directorate

Protective Engineering and Commandant Enterprise Support

Measures Service Technical Support of the Moscow Service
Service Kremlin

Directorate for Kremlin Guard

Personal Security
Planning and Regional Directorate
Directorate
Organizing Protective Offices
Measures

Sources: Organization chart created by author from multiple sources, including the Russia Wiki-
pedia website https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Федеральная_служба_охраны; government seal
image from Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Great_emblem_of_
the_Federal_Guard_Service.svg.

The FSO consists of the Presidential Security Service, the Directorate

of Special Communications and Information (see Chapter 3 for informa-
tion about FSO domestic sentiment analysis), protective security planning
and organizational directorates, engineering and technical directorates, and
housekeeping functions. The FSO also maintains offices in each of the fed-
eral regions around the country, which are responsible for the security of
senior government officials there.145
As of 2021, the director of the FSO is Colonel-General Dmitriy
Viktorovich Kochnev, who was appointed to that position in May 2016.

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

Kochnev has worked in the FSO since 2002 and, during the year before
being named director, he served as the deputy director and chief of the Pres-
idential Security Service. He has worked in Soviet/Russian state security
organizations since 1982.146

NATIONAL GUARD
In 2016, Russia created a new security service called Rosgvardiya (National
Guard of the Russian Federation), assembled mostly from pieces of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its purpose is to respond to what the Rus-
sian government calls “destabilization attempts,” or what outside Russia
would be called popular discontent. Its mandate includes suppressing pro-
tests both in the physical realm and the computer-based realm.147 Some
have questioned why, if Putin is so popular, he needed to create a security
service directed at suppressing the Russian people. As the commander of
the National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, spelled out in 2017, referring to anti-­
government protests:

The protests are clearly systemic and have scenarios similar to those
of color revolutions in other countries. The genuine goal of the fight
against corruption is being substituted with general destabilization
and chaos. Under the pretext of violations of rights and democratic
freedoms in Russia, mass media outlets in the European Union, the
United Kingdom, and the United States are constantly launching
information attacks aimed at the political discrediting of the leader-
ship of our country.148

Similarly, former FSB Director Nikolay Kovalev claimed that the cre-
ation of the National Guard “becomes especially topical amid the continued
expansion of the North Atlantic alliance towards our borders and its heads
openly state the intention to contain Russia. We register such calls ever more
frequently.”149 In other words, Zolotov and Kovalev blame foreign powers
for any manifestation of discontent within Russia. The National Guard was

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

established with the same chekist mindset on which all other Russian intel-
ligence and state security services are founded.
The National Guard consists of special police, rapid reaction, and coun-
terterrorism units. Some of its missions overlap considerably with the FSB,
although the primary purpose of the National Guard is to remain organiza-
tionally close to the president in case of internal disorder and dissent. The
National Guard also maintains a strong presence in the North Caucasus,
where it actively counters internal dissent (see Chart 4).

Chart 4. National Guard

Director

National Guard Regulatory

Forces Command Functions

Special Operational Private Security

Purpose Division Regulation
(ODON)
Federal Oversight
Naval Services of Firearms
Corps

Special Operations Special Rapid Special Purpose

Regional Offices
and Aviation Center Response Unit (SOBR) Mobile Unit (OMON)

• Central • North Caucasus

Zubr Vityaz
• Northwestern • Ural
• Volga • Siberian State Unitary
• Southern • Eastern Rus Yastreb Enterprise “Okhrana”

Sources: Organization chart created by author from multiple sources, including the website of
the National Guard of Russia, https://rosguard.gov.ru/; government seal image from Wikimedia
Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Guard_of_Russia.svg.

The chief of the National Guard, since its founding, is Viktor Vasily-
evich Zolotov. He was a KGB Ninth Directorate officer from the 1970s,
moving to the newly formed GUO in 1990 to serve on Boris Yeltsin’s secu-
rity detail. Zolotov has been a close associate of Vladimir Putin since at
least the early 1990s when Zolotov served as the bodyguard for Anatoliy

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg, under whom Putin worked as deputy;
Zolotov reportedly now serves as Putin’s judo sparring partner.150 Zolotov
was a senior figure in the FSO from its founding in 1996 but moved to
the MVD in 2013 to serve as commander of MVD internal troops. When
those troops transitioned into the newly created National Guard in 2016,
he became the new agency’s first director.151

Comparing Security Personnel in Soviet Era to Today’s Russia

Combining all of the agencies that have a security function in Russia,
there are more security personnel per capita in Russia today than there
were during the Soviet era. In 1991, there were approximately 490,000
KGB personnel in a country of 291 million people, which calculates as
one state security employee for every 593 citizens. More recently, the
FSB, SVR, and FSO combined have approximately 350,000 personnel in a
country of 141 million, which calculates to one for every 402 citizens. Add
to that the Russian National Guard, with its approximately 340,000 inter-
nal troops, and Russia today has nearly three times the number of people
working in KGB successor organizations per capita than state security
organizations had during the Soviet era.

MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF (GU)

The GU (until 2010, the GRU) is responsible for both intelligence collec-
tion to support military decisionmaking and covert operations to support
foreign policy objectives, as it has since the founding of military intelligence
in the Soviet era. Its organization—both geographically and functionally—
reflects those two missions. The intelligence mission includes directorates
that cover the European Union; North and South America, along with
Anglophone countries; Asia; and Africa. Another directorate focuses on
NATO specifically. Other directorates cover functional intelligence areas,
including military technology, military economics, strategic doctrine and
armaments, and nuclear weapons. A separate directorate houses SIGINT,

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

which includes space-based and battlefield SIGINT platforms (see Chapter

9). Management of covert action is handled by another directorate, called
the Diversionary, or Sabotage, Directorate, which houses Spetsnaz (GRU
Special Purpose forces) (see Chart 5).

Chart 5. Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU)

Director

Support Directorates
Space Operational Admin
Intelligence Technology Technology

Information Foreign
Archives Personnel
Systems Liaison

Operational Directorates
First Second Fifth
Sixth
European N/S America, Third Asia Fourth Africa Operational
SIGINT
Union Anglophone Intel

Eighth Ninth Tenth Eleventh Strat Twelfth

Seventh
Sabotage Military Military Doctrine and Nuclear
NATO
(Spetsnaz) Technology Economics Armaments Weapons

Sources: Organization chart created by author from multiple sources, including the Russia
Wikipedia website, Главное управление Генерального штаба — Википедия (wikipedia.
org); government seal image from Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Emblem_of_the_GRU.svg.

As of 2021, the GU director is Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, the first

Navy admiral to lead Russian military intelligence. He was appointed at a
turbulent time in the service’s history, in the midst of multiple public expo-
sures of GU tradecraft and operations since 2016, primarily focused on the
covert action side of the GU’s mission. Kostyukov’s two predecessors both
died suddenly while in office, although there is no apparent foundation
for rumors of foul play in either death. The official Russian version of GU
Director Igor Dmitriyevich Sergun’s death in January 2016 states that he
died of a heart attack in Moscow. He was replaced by Igor Valentinovich

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

Korobov, who died after less than three years as GU director. In 2016 and
2017, all three officers were recognized with the Hero of the Russian Feder-
ation award, with Sergun’s award being posthumous.

RIVALRY AMONG SERVICES

The various Russian intelligence and state security services have a tradition
of rivalry, partially due to intentional overlaps in their missions. The KGB’s
First, Second, and Third Chief Directorates (now the SVR, the FSB’s Coun-
terintelligence Service, and the FSB’s Military Counterintelligence Service,
respectively) frequently fought for power, personnel, and resources within
the Soviet system. The First Chief Directorate viewed itself as more sophis-
ticated than and superior to its internal sister organizations. The First Chief
Directorate also clashed with the GRU, as manifested when the Soviet gov-
ernment experimented with the Committee of Information in the late 1940s
and early 1950s. The GRU refused to cooperate with civilian intelligence
and removed itself from the organization after only a year. The GRU viewed
the KGB and its predecessors as “chekist” organizations that were more
aligned with purges and internal oppression than with intelligence work.
The rivalries continue today, with organizations’ missions overlapping
in such areas as counterterrorism, covert action, and operations in the Near
Abroad. When Russian intelligence organizations conducted computer
intrusions into the Democratic National Committee in the United States in
2016, both the GRU and probably the FSB ran parallel, uncoordinated oper-
ations in the same servers, apparently unaware of each other’s operations.152
Rumors often float in Moscow about major reorganizations of intelli-
gence and security services, some of which probably originate from the ser-
vices’ rivalry. In 2016, a Russian newspaper reported a rumor that the Russian
government planned to create a “Ministry of State Security” similar to what
had existed during the Soviet era. The rumored ministry would be based on
the FSB, with the FSO and SVR rejoining it, nearly mirroring the KGB.
The rumors came soon after the creation of the National Guard, when other
law enforcement functions that had been housed in independent agencies,

75
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

like the Federal Tax Police, were attached to the MVD.153 Just six days after
the original report, the same newspaper walked back the story and called it
a “rumor;”154 no such reorganization occurred. The rumors may have been
intentionally leaked in the ongoing battle between intelligence and security
services, either by the SVR to ward off FSB overreach by equating the FSB
with feared Soviet-era organizations, or by the FSB to gauge public reaction
to a possible power grab. Either way, the rumors quickly faded, and nothing
came of them.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
The public perception of state security can at times be negative. State secu-
rity is not sacrosanct. A 2019 op-ed in a Russian newspaper discussing a
mandate for Russian communications companies to provide encryption
keys to the FSB stated, “It is obvious that the fact of providing keys works
against a company. The reputation that our siloviki (security services) have
is such that any structure that cooperates with them loses in the eyes of
society. Resistance to their pressure, on the other hand, strengthens a com-
pany’s position in public opinion.”155 Being seen as bending to state security
demands can be bad for business.
Recent activities—ranging from ill-advised to illegal—by FSB officers
have tainted the service in the public eye. In 2016, graduates of the FSB
academy produced a film of themselves driving around Moscow in forma-
tion in expensive Mercedes Benz SUVs, waving and cheering themselves. It
was an embarrassing lapse of security for recently graduated officers. Heads
rolled in the FSB, and the graduates themselves were threatened with ban-
ishment to minor offices in the provinces.156 Publicly, the event gave the
impression of a young cadre of unruly, self-centered officers that contrasts
with the patriotic image that the FSB tries to portray.157
More recently, FSB officers have been arrested on a variety of corruption
charges. In spring 2019, an FSB colonel in the counter-corruption director-
ate was arrested with several colleagues for taking bribes. In July 2019, FSB
officers were arrested and accused of robbing a bank and extorting money

76
 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

from a businessman. About the same time, the special assistant to the Pres-
idential Special Envoy to the Urals and a member of the Security Coun-
cil was arrested for high treason for communications with Poland. State
security officers are under greater pressure today than they have been for a
long time—at least since the FSB’s involvement in botched counterterror-
ism operations in the early 2000s. Reports of the FSB’s involvement in the
attempted assassination of Aleksey Navalny in 2020 and Navalny’s subse-
quent ability to trick a reported FSB officer into discussing the operation
have further embarrassed the service.158

CONCLUSION: HISTORICALLY GROUNDED

IN THE SOVIET ERA
Russian intelligence and state security organizations today are firmly
founded on their Soviet predecessors, both in structure and in mindset.
They continue to manifest historical chekist attitudes that see any internal
dissatisfaction with the regime as being caused by foreign infiltrations. How-
ever, post-Soviet services today, including the SVR, FSB, FSO, GRU, and
National Guard, are more prevalent and larger per capita even than during
the Soviet era. Much of that manpower is directed internally at gauging,
monitoring, suppressing, and demonizing internal dissent, which will be the
topic of Chapter 3.

77
 SECTION II
WHY

k k k
Analyzing National Security Priorities. A country directs its intelligence
capabilities toward its highest priority concerns, and thus, by looking at
where a country applies those capabilities, we can infer its priorities. In other
words, if we look at what a country’s intelligence system tasks its assets to
collect and what placement and access it seeks in its sources, we can begin to
develop an image of that country’s priorities. Add to that analysis how the
system is organized and on what targets it places the preponderance of its
resources and the types of liaison relationships it develops and why, and that
image becomes even clearer.
For example, over its history, the United States has developed a partic-
ular model for the policymaker-intelligence relationship, based on an intel-
ligence system within a democratic society that recognizes the legitimacy
of an elected leader and accepts guidance based upon legally defined rela-
tionships (see Figure 5). In this model, the President and National Security
Council formally and informally articulate their intelligence priorities, in
which they identify the national security issues that are at the forefront of
their attention and the areas where they need intelligence to inform policy.
These priorities shift and evolve at irregular intervals, based on geopolitical
events and domestic politics. The National Security Council conveys the
President’s priorities to the Director of National Intelligence, whose staff

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

translates them into the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).

U.S. intelligence agencies take their collection, analysis, and dissemination
priority guidance from the NIPF by breaking it down into the requirements
on which they focus their efforts.

Figure 5. U.S. Intelligence Priority Structure

President

National Security Council

ies
teg
rt a
s President’s
nd

Intelligence
sa

Priorities
icie
pol o
ck t

Director of National Intelligence

k ba
Observables trac

National Intelligence Priorities Framework

18 Intelligence Community Agencies

Collection
HUMINT

MEDINT
MASINT
GEOINT
SIGINT

FININT
OSINT

operations,
CI

prioritized
per NIPF

Observable Activities

The phrase “intelligence system” describes the entirety of a country’s

intelligence and security resources, since most governments have more than
one organization to fulfill these tasks. In the United States, we call the sys-
tem a “community,” consisting of 18 agencies and numerous sub-elements,
ideally all working in unison to fulfill decisionmakers’ needs. Russia, on the
other hand, has four main intelligence and security services (FSB, SVR,

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

GRU, and FSO), along with other supporting organizations (Ministry of

Interior, National Guard, Investigative Committee, etc.). To understand the
entirety of national security priorities, we would need to look at the activi-
ties of all of these organizations together as a system. Although the U.S. and
Russian systems differ significantly in form, each serves its respective deci-
sionmakers’ end goals. Even where agency-specific agendas differ or agencies
specialize in certain aspects of the bigger intelligence picture, the aggregate
end product informs the deliberations of the state’s decisionmakers.
Orlov’s Lines of Operation. This section looks at how those priori-
ties manifest themselves in the Russian intelligence system. It is organized
around Alexander Orlov’s eight “lines of operation,” as the former Soviet
intelligence officer described in his 1963 book, Handbook of Intelligence and
Guerrilla Warfare.159 Orlov’s lines focused on external activities; however,
based on the resources applied and using a modified version of Orlov’s con-
struct, internal security would appear to be Russia’s highest priority. Among
external operations, political intelligence collection is clearly a priority
for Russia, based on the numerous reported Russian intelligence activities
directed against political targets. Other priorities include economic and
S&T intelligence and military intelligence, both of which protect Rus-
sia from what it perceives to be a threatening world bent on destroying it.
Informed by the intelligence that these disciplines collect, Russian leaders
have at their disposal a spectrum of action options, from public statements
in the information realm to covert activities in the military realm. Intelli-
gence and state security services also are responsible for executing some of
these options. Although covert activities such as political manipulation and
assassinations are prominent in the media, they need to be analyzed in the
context of other priorities placed on Russian intelligence and state security
services. This section will analyze those major priority areas.
Orlov’s first line of operation was what he called “diplomatic intelli-
gence,” or what Russian intelligence services today call political intelligence.
This means the collection of intelligence to support the foreign policy deci-
sionmaking of the Russian leadership. For the KGB during the Cold War
and the SVR today, political intelligence has always been a major effort, and

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

the largest section in an SVR rezidentura is политическая разведка (polit-

ical intelligence; Line PR). These operations will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The second line of operation is the infiltration of foreign countries’ secu-
rity agencies and intelligence services. This line has both counterespionage
and foreign intelligence purposes. While infiltrating a foreign intelligence
service provides the obvious opportunity to identify recruited agents inside
one’s own government, foreign intelligence services also have access to clas-
sified information from across their government, including foreign policy
and military plans, making them lucrative intelligence targets. Penetrating
a foreign intelligence service could also yield information about encrypted
means of communication, which can be exploited for further intelligence
collection purposes. The role of infiltrating foreign intelligence and security
services inside Russia today is fulfilled by the FSB, while that same function
outside Russia is the responsibility of the SVR, which has an element ded-
icated to foreign counterintelligence. These will be discussed in Chapter 4.
The next two lines of operation are economic intelligence and what
Orlov called “industrial intelligence.” Economic intelligence is the informa-
tion Russia requires to understand the economic levers that other countries
are employing against Russia. It also encompasses efforts to uncover per-
ceived foreign plots to damage Russia’s economy. This is partially the SVR’s
responsibility, but the FSB, which has an economic counterintelligence mis-
sion, also plays a role. Orlov’s industrial intelligence, which today is called sci-
ence and technology (S&T) intelligence, seeks to collect foreign countries’
latest scientific advances that Russia can use either to fuel its own technology
development or to form the basis of countermeasures. In the latter category,
the priority falls on foreign military technology to support Russian military
planning. S&T intelligence is the responsibility of both the GRU, which
particularly focuses on military technology, and the SVR. These will be dis-
cussed together in Chapter 5.
Orlov’s fifth line of operation is military intelligence, which seeks infor-
mation the Russian military will need to fight. This can run the spectrum
from tactical information about military units and equipment to informa-
tion about the strategic targets Russia would need to strike and neutralize

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 Post-Soviet Development of Russian Intelligence and Security

to be victorious in a future war. Russia’s military intelligence service, the

GRU, is predominant in this area of intelligence collection. However, both
the SVR and FSB also participate in collecting intelligence about foreign
military capabilities and intentions. Military intelligence will be discussed
in Chapter 6.
Orlov’s last three lines of operation are misinformation, influencing
­foreign governments’ decisions, and sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Rather
than intelligence collection missions, these are policy execution missions
assigned to Russia’s clandestine services. Misinformation has become the
most well-known of these through widely publicized Russian efforts, from
meddling in foreign elections to manipulating foreign investigations of
aggressive Russian actions abroad. Formerly labeled “active measures,” this
Cold War-era term has been replaced in the Russian system by the phrase
“мероприятия содействия” (“measures of support”). Influencing foreign
governments’ decisions can take the form of recruiting assets with access
to policymaking circles who subtly use their proximity to sway decisions
toward Russia’s favor. Sabotage and guerrilla warfare have factored into
Soviet/Russian intelligence activities since the Bolshevik revolution. As
noted in Chapter 1, the Russian word разведка, which is usually trans-
lated in English as intelligence, expands beyond collecting information to
employing covert operations against an enemy force and includes activities
from supporting foreign revolutions to targeting an enemy’s critical and mil-
itary infrastructure during wartime. These three lines of operation benefit
from the intelligence collected by the other lines and represent clandestine
and covert tools that Russia can use to advance its own political, military,
and economic goals. Covert operations in their various forms will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 7.
This section looks at the Russian intelligence system and the primary
categories of effort the Russian government employs that system to fulfill.
From that structure, along with the resources dedicated to those categories,
we can derive Russia’s overall national security priorities.

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 CHAPTER 3

INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

k k k
Russian state security begins with securing the internal political environ-
ment. By far the largest portion of Russia’s intelligence and security resources
are directed at countering internal threats. Counterintelligence in its Russian
definition includes working against foreign intelligence services, as is typical
of other countries. However, Russian CI extends further to securing the rul-
ing regime from any political threats, regardless of their origin. Protecting the
regime is the primary purpose of Russia’s intelligence and state security services,
particularly the FSB, FSO, and National Guard, and the SVR outside Russia.
Internal security is intended to counter potential threats from several
directions:

■ Foreign intelligence services operating inside Russia.

■ Terrorism.
■ Dissent and anti-regime activities.
■ Economic crimes.

All of these categories are combined together in the view of Russia’s internal
security apparatus. This chapter will be organized around the first three of these
directions, while the fourth, economic crimes, will be described in Chapter 5.

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COUNTERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Since at least 2012, Vladimir Putin has given an annual address at the FSB’s
Lubyanka Headquarters, where he has praised the service for its success
in catching spies. In his speech, he has usually cited statistics about for-
eign intelligence-affiliated persons whom the FSB has neutralized in the

Table 2. Foreign Intelligence Operations Neutralized, per Putin

Agents of Foreign
Foreign Officers Total
Intelligence
2012 34 181 215
2013 no data no data ?
2014 >50 almost 300 ~350
2015     >400*
2016 53 386 439
2017 72 397 469
2018 129 465 594
2019 no data no data ?
2020 72 423 495

*Putin gave only an approximate aggregate number in his 2016 speech covering 2015 statistics.
Sources: “Заседание коллегии Федеральной службы безопасности” [“Conference of
the Federal Security Service Collegium”], Kremlin.ru, February 14, 2013, http://kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/17516; “ФСБ сюсюкать не будет: На все угрозы национальной
безопасности Путин пообещал адекватный ответ” [“The FSB Is Not Lisping: Putin Promised
an Active Response to All Threats to National Security”], Lenta.ru, March 26, 2015; “Заседание
коллегии Федеральной службы безопасности” [“Conference of the Federal Security Service
Collegium”], Sosluzhivtsi.ru, February 26, 2016, https://sosluzhivtsi.ru/public/politika/1977-­
zasedanie-kollegii-fsb/; “Заседание коллегии Федеральной службы безопасности”
[“­Conference of the Federal Security Service Collegium”], Kremlin.ru, February 16, 2017, http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53883; “Заседание коллегии Федеральной службы
безопасности” [“Conference of the Federal Security Service Collegium”], Kremlin.ru, March 5,
2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56977; “Заседание коллегии Федеральной
службы безопасности” [“Conference of the Federal Security Service Collegium”], Kremlin.ru,
March 6, 2019, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59978; “Заседание коллегии ФСБ”
[“Conference of the FSB Collegium”], Kremlin.ru, February 20, 2020, http://kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/62834; “Заседание коллегии ФСБ России” [“Conference of the FSB Collegium
of Russia”], Kremlin.ru, February 24, 2021, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65068.

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previous year, including foreign intelligence service staff personnel and

their agents (see Table 2). Up to 2020, the numbers had grown each year,
and by 2018 were astronomical: nearly 600 people. In 2020 the numbers
dropped for the first time since 2012, according to Putin’s 2021 speech,
only because of the “demands of the current epidemiological situation.”160
Putin has cited no data to support the numbers and has said nothing about
the countries involved or suspects’ names. For unknown reasons, he did
not cite concrete 2019 statistics in his 2020 address; however, he did stress
that counterintelligence remains a crucial part of FSB’s activities and “fig-
ures show that the activity level of foreign special services in our country is
not declining.”161
Putin makes such outlandish assertions to substantiate Russian claims
that Russia is increasingly under siege by adversarial foreign powers. The
numbers send a message to the Russian people to be on alert for foreign
spies everywhere and thus justify the implementation of strict internal secu-
rity measures, including those that restrict the rights of Russians domes-
tically. Furthermore, the numbers probably represent retaliation for CI
activities against Russia abroad. Russia’s 2018 arrest count undoubtedly
includes an American named Paul Whelan, who was arrested for espionage
on December 28,162 just 15 days after Mariya Butina, accused of acting as an
unregistered foreign agent for Russia, pleaded guilty to conducting a clan-
destine political influence operation in the United States.163
Putin’s citation of espionage statistics is reminiscent of reports that
his idol, former KGB Director Yuriy Andropov, provided to the Soviet
Communist Party leadership. In 1968, for example, Andropov gave an
account of arrests that had occurred during 1967, which stated that the
KGB “brought to justice 738 persons, 263 for particularly dangerous state
crimes, and 475 persons for other state crimes.”164 Those convicted for
criminal offenses included:

■ 3 who carried out diversion operations.

■ 121 traitors and war criminals from the German-Fascist occupation.
■ 34 indicted for treason to the Motherland and for treasonous plotting.

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■ 96 persons for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

■ 221 persons for illegal crossing of state borders.
■ 100 persons for embezzlement of state and public property in large
amounts and for corruption.
■ 148 for illegal smuggling of goods and for violations of currency
operations rules.
■ 1 foreigner and 1 Soviet citizen who were arrested for espionage.

Putin appears to have resurrected this Andropov-era accounting, even

approaching the number of arrests Andropov reported in 1968. Although
not specified, Putin’s aggregated numbers probably combine crimes such
as treason, anti-Russian agitation and propaganda, and espionage, just as
Andropov’s numbers did.

Embassy Operations
It is axiomatic that an intelligence or counterintelligence service is more
capable on its home territory than in places it does not control. Conse-
quently, Russian CI operations inside Russia are more capable than opera-
tions elsewhere. This reality applies to Russian operations targeting foreign
diplomatic establishments inside Russia.
Defectors throughout Soviet history have provided consistent reports
of active infiltrations of foreign embassies in Moscow. Aleksandr Zhigunov,
an NKVD counterintelligence officer captured by German forces during
World War II, told his German interrogators about Soviet operations
against embassies in Moscow, specifically noting targeting of the German
and Hungarian embassies.165 Zhigunov also discussed the September 1939
visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoğlu to Moscow to negotiate
a mutual assistance treaty, noting that Saracoğlu was under NKVD observa-
tion during his entire visit, particularly during a long car ride he took with
a British embassy official through the streets of Moscow.166 KGB defector
Yuriy Rastvorov reported participating in operations soon after World War
II to recruit sources among Japanese diplomats, particularly using women

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as bait to lure targets into compromising situations.167 Afanasiy Shorokhov

(aka Vladimir Petrov) reported an almost identical operation also target-
ing a Japanese diplomat.168 The first U.S. individual to defect to the Soviet
Union during the Cold War—James MacMillan, a cipher clerk at the U.S.
embassy in Moscow—was recruited by the MGB in 1948 with the help of a
Russian woman.169
In addition to human targeting, the KGB extensively used technical
means to penetrate foreign embassies in Moscow, from miniature micro-
phones embedded in furniture or walls to directing microwaves, infrared
light, or lasers at an embassy.170 In October 1963, former KGB officer Alek-
sandr Cherepanov passed a package of documents to an American tourist in
Moscow and asked him to give it to the U.S. Embassy. The documents con-
tained details of KGB counterintelligence methods, personnel, and techni-
cal devices employed in operations.171 Rather than accepting the documents
and following up with Cherepanov, the U.S. Embassy—against the CIA’s
wishes—returned them to the Soviet government, although the CIA did
take the opportunity to photograph them. Cherepanov was soon arrested,
and he was executed in April 1964.172 Also in 1964, Yuriy Nosenko, another
KGB officer, defected and provided additional details of Russian targeting
of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Nosenko revealed the KGB Second Chief
Directorate was targeting hundreds of foreigners, including diplomats and
journalists in Moscow and visitors to the Soviet Union, for counterintelli-
gence purposes.173
Today, the FSB is the primary Russian organization responsible for pen-
etrating foreign diplomatic establishments in Russia. The FSB still uses both
human and technical means for that purpose. For example, FSB officers
coerced a Russian citizen to pass information on the UK’s visa application sys-
tem. The individual worked for a company TLSContact that provides com-
puter network services for consulates, and he provided computer assistance
to the British consulate in Russia until he fled in 2016. The FSB reportedly
attempted to use the Russian individual to explore options for clandestinely
obtaining UK visas for two Russian travelers, who may have included the
GRU officers responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergey Skripal

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in 2018.174 The FSB reportedly also recruited a Russian woman who served
as a liaison between the U.S. Secret Service office in Moscow and Russia’s
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The woman had access to a U.S.
Embassy email system until she was fired from her employment in 2017.175
Computers at the Armenian embassy in Moscow were reportedly
broken into in 2020176—an intrusion probably led by an FSB computer
operations unit. A similar incident had been reported at the EU delega-
tion in Moscow in 2017.177 An unspecified European embassy in Moscow
was among the targets of a spearphishing campaign detected in 2018 that
involved emails masquerading as messages from Janes, the British defense
journalism company, and targeting ministries of foreign affairs in North
America and Europe.178 Such incidents probably occur more often, but they
are not reported because they either go undetected or the victims choose not
to discuss their vulnerabilities publicly.
Russian attempts to penetrate foreign embassies can benefit both intel-
ligence and counterintelligence missions. Intelligence purposes may include
collecting personal information about individual employees that a Russian
intelligence service could use for HUMINT recruitment efforts or, as noted
above, to obtain visas for clandestine travelers. Such operations also pro-
vide political information, plans, and priorities of the embassy staff, as well
as potential access to cipher and encryption information to use in future
SIGINT collection operations. Counterintelligence purposes include iden-
tifying foreign intelligence personnel posted to Russia under diplomatic
cover. Embassy penetrations can also identify connections between foreign
embassies and oppositionists inside Russia—an important target for Rus-
sian internal security operations. More broadly, they can inhibit embassy
operations by preventing both clean diplomats and intelligence officers
under diplomatic cover from fulfilling their mission.
One method the FSB uses to inhibit embassy operations is harass-
ment of U.S. and other countries’ diplomats in Russia, which has increased
dramatically since 2014. Harassment has involved arbitrary police stops,
physical assault, break-ins into diplomats’ homes, and broadcasting their
personal details on state TV channels, thereby placing them at risk of public

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harassment.179 The FSB may employ diplomatic harassment for several rea-
sons: as a tool to retaliate for U.S. counterintelligence or law enforcement
operations directed at Russian diplomats, to identify diplomatically cov-
ered intelligence officers, to provoke a response that can be used against the
United States in propaganda messaging, or simply to create stress among the
diplomatic staff, thereby limiting their effectiveness. In general, the FSB’s
harassment of foreign diplomats is a counterintelligence method that the
Russian government uses to reduce the overall effectiveness of foreign intel-
ligence operations in Russia.

COUNTERTERRORISM
Russia’s second leading internal security mission is counterterrorism. Rus-
sia has experienced significant terrorist attacks on its soil (see Figure 6).
Countering terrorism is the primary mission of what is now called the
FSB’s Service for the Defense of Constitutional Order and Fight Against
Terrorism. The Russian National Guard also has a counterterrorism func-
tion, and its inheritance of quick reaction units from the MVD in 2016
has created an overlap between the FSB and National Guard missions.
Additionally, both the SVR and GRU have responsibilities for collecting
intelligence about terrorism that threatens Russia, and the GRU Spetsnaz
forces are trained to conduct counterterrorism operations. The Russian
government claims success in countering terrorism, and it proudly pro-
claimed in April 2009 that counterterrorism operations in Chechnya were
complete.180 Putin holds up this stated success as a major accomplishment
for his legacy, and it is one reason domestic support for Putin is high. How-
ever, major terrorist events in Russia did not end with the declaration of
victory in Chechnya, and high-profile attacks have occurred since then in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other Russian cities. In February 2021, Putin
declared that 72 “terrorist crimes” had been thwarted in 2020, up from 57
in 2019, and that “in December last year, the last organized bandit group
that was committing crimes on the territory of the Chechen Republic and
Ingushetia was destroyed.”181

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Figure 6. Major Terrorist Attacks in Russia Since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Date Description
June 1995 During the first Chechen war, Chechen fighters stormed
a hospital in Budennovsk near the border with Russia,
taking many civilians hostage (some estimates say as
many as 2,000 people) and threatening to kill them
unless the war ended. Russian forces’ attempts to raid
the hospital failed. More than 100 people were killed
before an agreement was reached, and the militants were
allowed to return to Chechnya.

January 1996 Chechen fighters took hundreds hostage in a hospital

in Kizlyar, Dagestan, and moved them by bus to
Pervomayskoye on the Chechen border. Most rebels
escaped, but many hostages were killed during a
rescue attempt.

September 1999 Bombings of apartment buildings killed almost 300

people in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk. The
attacks were blamed on Chechen separatists and
eventually led to the second Chechen war, but some
conspiracy theories link Russia’s intelligence services to
the attacks.

October 2002 Dozens of Chechen militants seized the Dubrovka

Theater in Moscow, taking 700 people hostage.
Russian security forces attempted to enter the theater
and pumped a strong narcotic gas into the building to
sedate the attackers. Most of the casualties occurred in
the raid, which happened on the third day of the crisis.
Ultimately, 41 Chechen militants and 129 hostages were
killed, most of them succumbing to the gas.

December 2002 A suicide truck bomb destroyed the headquarters of

Chechnya’s Moscow-backed government in Grozny,
Chechnya. The attack left 72 people dead.

August 2003 Chechen militants killed 50 in a suicide bombing using

a truck rigged with explosives and driven into a military
hospital in Mozdok, North Ossetia.

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Date Description
December 2003 An explosion killed 46 people and injured an additional
146 near Yessentuki station in the Stavropol Krai.
February 2004 A suicide bomber hit the Moscow subway during rush
hour, killing 41 people and wounding more than 100.
A little-known Chechen group later claimed responsibility
for the attack.
May 2004 A suicide attack at a stadium in Grozny killed 24 people.
Among those killed was Akhmad Kadyrov, the Moscow-
backed Chechen president and father of Chechen leader,
Ramzan Kadyrov.
June 2004 Chechen militants stormed the interior ministry building
in Nazran, Ingushetia, resulting in the deaths of at least
92 people, including acting regional Interior Minister
Abukar Kostoyev.
August 2004 Two suicide attacks targeted flights from Moscow’s
Domodedovo airport. All 90 passengers on the flights were
killed. The two female attackers were later found to have
bribed an airline agent with 1,000 rubles (about $34 at
the time) to board the planes. Just days later, a suicide
bomber killed 10 people on the Moscow subway.
September 2004 Chechen rebels assaulted a children’s school in the
southern Russian city of Beslan, taking over 1,000
hostages. Those killed throughout the seizure and
subsequent attack by Russian forces and local armed
vigilante groups numbered more than 331, half of
them children.
October 2005 Islamist militants launched attacks on police and
government buildings in the city of Nalchik, Republic of
Kabardino-Balkaria, in the North Caucasus. A large group of
attackers targeted buildings housing the Russian security
forces, killing more than 100 people, including civilians.
August 2009 A suicide bomber killed 20 people and injured 138 more
after driving his truck, packed with explosives, into a police
station in Nazran, Ingushetia.

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Date Description
November 2009 A suicide bomb exploded on the high-speed rail link from
Moscow to St. Petersburg, killing 28 people and injuring
130. Ten men were imprisoned for their role in the attack,
nine of whom were from the same family in Ingushetia. A
second explosion occurred as investigators were searching
the wreckage. The Caucasus Emirate movement was
reported to have ordered the attack.
March 2010 Two female suicide bombers on the Moscow subway killed
more than 40 people. One of the stations targeted, the
Lubyanka Station, is near FSB headquarters.
January 2011 A suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport killed
37 people and wounded 172. Doku Umarov of the Caucasus
Emirate movement claimed responsibility for the attack.
August 2012 A suicide bomber attacked the funeral of a police officer
fatally shot a day earlier in Russia’s North Caucasus
region, killing 7 people and injuring 10 in mourning.
October 2013 A female suicide bomber from Dagestan blew up a
passenger bus in Volgograd, killing 6 people and wounding
more than 30 others.
December 2013 Two suicide bombings a day apart targeted the public
transport system in the city of Volgograd. A total of 34
people were killed in the attacks on a train station and
a trolley bus, including the perpetrators. The bombings
occurred weeks before the start of the 2014 Winter
Olympics, being held about 400 miles away in the Russian
Black Sea resort of Sochi.
October 2015 A charter jet taking Russian vacationers home to St.
Petersburg from an Egyptian beach resort town crashed
in a remote part of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, killing all
224 passengers and crew members on board. Russian
authorities concluded that a homemade bomb smuggled
onto the jet detonated 23 minutes after it took off from
Sharm el-Sheikh, the popular Red Sea resort town.
Terrorists tied to the Islamic State claimed responsibility
for the attack.

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Date Description
December 2016 A Russian flight traveling to Syria crashed into the Black Sea
near Sochi, killing all 92 on board. A number of passengers
were members of the Red Army choir scheduled to perform
a New Year’s concert in Syria. Although authorities found no
signs of an explosive, a terror motive was not ruled out.
April 2017 Two explosions killed at least 10 people and injured
dozens more in a busy metro station in St. Petersburg.
December 2017 President Putin called President Trump to thank him for
CIA-provided information that helped prevent an Islamic
State attack in St. Petersburg. The attackers planned to
strike crowded sites, including the Kazan Cathedral.
December 2017 A bomb exploded in a St. Petersburg supermarket, injuring
13 people. The bomb was hidden inside a rucksack in a
locker where shoppers leave their belongings. The person
who left the rucksack was described as being of “non-
Slavic appearance.”
December 2019 President Putin thanked President Trump for U.S. intelligence
that led to the FSB arresting two Russian nationals in St.
Petersburg who were planning attacks on New Year’s Eve.

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Adam Taylor, “The Recent
History of Terrorist Attacks in Russia,” Washington Post, April 3, 2017, https://www.washington
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/03/the-recent-history-of-terrorist-attacks-in-russia/;
David Filipov, “Putin Thanks Trump for CIA Intel that Foiled a Planned Terrorist Attack in Russia,”
Washington Post, December 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-thanks-
trump-for-cia-intel-that-foiled-a-planned-terrorist-attack-in-russia-the-kremlin-says/2017/12/17/
f4274600-e349-11e7-9ec2-518810e7d44d_story.html; Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Putin
Thanks Trump for Information That He Says Helped Foil a Planned Terrorist Attack in St.
Petersburg,” Washington Post, December 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
putin-thanks-trump-for-information-that-helped-foil-a-planned-terrorist-attack-in-st-peters-
burg/2019/12/30/9788ee34-2b32-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html.

When terrorist attacks occurred in the United States in September

2001, Russia was quick to offer its help. The Russian government claimed
that it had been fighting terrorists for years and hoped that the new U.S.
emphasis on terrorism would lead the United States to see things Russia’s

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way. However, Russia’s definition of terrorism made cooperation difficult.

Russia views terrorism broadly as a political threat to the Russian regime,
and any violent act that harms Russia’s influence or prestige around the world
is terrorism; this interpretation can include anything from Islamist extrem-
ism to protests against the Russian government’s handling of elections. In
contrast, the United States defines terrorism as the unlawful use of violence
and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.
Russia’s definition is internalized, while the U.S. definition is global.
Based on Russia’s broad definition and its national experience with ter-
rorism, the 2016 Russian Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation
includes strong language about the need to counter terrorism around the
world. But, in addition to countering violent extremism, Russia’s counter-
terrorism message carries a veiled criticism of U.S. policy: “The ideologi-
cal values and prescriptions imposed from outside these countries [in the
Middle East and North Africa] in an attempt to modernize their political
systems have exacerbated the negative response of their societies to current
challenges.”182 As the policy document goes on to say, the Russian Federa-
tion “categorically opposes any reliance by States on terrorist organizations
in pursuit of political, ideological or other aims,” and “advocates consoli-
dating the UN-led collective efforts to defeat foreign terrorist fighters by
blocking all forms of material support available to terrorist organizations.”183
Some of this language sounds familiar to a Western ear, and the Russian
and U.S. definitions of terrorism have occasionally aligned, such as when
the United States provided information to the Russian government that
led to the neutralization of terrorist operations in St. Petersburg, Russia, in
2017 and 2019.184 However, often it does not. Russia does not view groups
affiliated with Iran as terrorists, while it does see U.S.-supported groups that
oppose Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as terrorists. Russia viewed its two
wars in Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s as wars against terrorism,
while many in the West viewed them as civil wars in which the Russian gov-
ernment’s brutal methods caused as much harm as good.185
The chekist mindset under which Russian counterterrorist agencies
operate, which always sees foreign ties to domestic threats, also applies to

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terrorism. Putin and other government leaders espouse the narrative that
any terrorist action inside Russia has been sponsored from abroad—to
include foreign powers, especially the United States. After a car-bomb attack
in 2009, then-interior minister of Dagestan, Ali Magomedov, is reported to
have said, “Certainly, what is happening now is being exacerbated from out-
side, beyond the Russian borders. There can be no other explanation. Dages-
tani people do not need to kill one another.”186 Speaking to an SVR audience
in 2017, SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin asserted, “You are well aware of
the challenges that Russia faces. They include attempts to restrain our devel-
opment, to impose confrontation, to destabilize the regions near Russia’s
borders, including by using terrorist and extremist groups as a weapon. It is
no secret that some of these are carefully fostered, and even received direct
support from the special services of a number of countries.”187
In an interview with producer Oliver Stone in 2015, Vladimir Putin
was more to the point: “You don’t have to be a great analyst to see the
United States supported financially, provided information, supported
them [Chechen terrorists] politically. They supported the separatists and
terrorists in the North Caucasus.”188 As noted earlier, Putin gained prom-
inence initially and was first elected president on the reputation he built
for being tough on terrorism and crime. His reputation for toughness is
a foundation for his current popularity and translates today into rhetoric
that ties foreign powers, especially the United States, to Russia’s domestic
terrorism problem.

COUNTERING DISSENT AND ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES

The third leading internal security mission is to suppress dissent and domes-
tic anti-regime activities (see Figure 7). This is the most publicly visible
aspect of Russia’s internal security functions. Suppressing dissent has been
an important element of Soviet internal security since the foundation of
Soviet rule, especially during Stalin’s reign. Per Deryabin’s saying, the “god of
state security” shifted to counterintelligence after World War II,189 although
Russia’s definition of CI primarily encompassed state security efforts to

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prevent foreign influences from infiltrating the Soviet population and thus
to counter the potential that the Soviet people could embrace democratic
ideas. The list of successes noted above that Yuriy Andropov reported to the
Communist Party leadership in 1968 included acts such as anti-Soviet agi-
tation and propaganda as a state security threat. As noted earlier, Andropov
also established the KGB’s Fifth Directorate in the late 1960s, which was
responsible for countering “ideological subversion,” meaning any dissident
or religious activity.
From the beginning of Putin’s tenure as president, he has steadily
increased the internal security services’ power to monitor dissent and pre-
vent it from gaining strength inside Russia. Much of today’s effort dates
from Putin’s 2012 reelection and the public opposition that was expressed to
his running again for president. The year 2012 was a watershed for Russia’s
response to internal dissent. The previous year, Putin announced he would
run for president after one term as prime minister, in what some called a
“castling” move.190 Many Russians saw this as an unconstitutional usurpa-
tion of power, since Putin had already served two terms as president from
2000 to 2008. Thousands demonstrated against his return to the presidency,
chanting “For Honest Elections,” although his reelection was a foregone
conclusion.191 From December 2011 to May 2012, Russian police arrested
hundreds of anti-Putin protestors, led by two prominent oppositionists:
Boris Nemtsov, who was assassinated in 2016, and Aleksey Navalny, who
was the target of an assassination attempt in 2020.192 Putin’s new term as
president emboldened him to crack down on dissent, and Russian security
services since then have followed that political imperative.
The FSB has many law enforcement tools available to suppress internal
dissent among Russian citizens: tax laws; laws against extremism/terrorism
and organized crime, as well as money laundering and narcotics trafficking;
and laws that forbid inciting hatred or public insult of an authorized repre-
sentative connected with the fulfillment of his responsibilities (see Chapter
5 for more information on the use of economic counterintelligence mea-
sures to suppress dissent). In June 2012, the State Duma passed amendments
allowing judges to treat a single-person protest as an unsanctioned assembly

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if they detect a “common intent and organization.”193 In 2016, the Russian

government established another entity to quash internal dissent, the National
Guard, which is responsible for enforcing anti-­assembly laws and preventing
protests from threatening the ruling regime. Since then, the National Guard
has been involved in suppressing multiple protest events across Russia.

Figure 7. Notable Protest Actions in Russia

2008: Small anti-war demonstration in Moscow against Russian war

in Georgia
2011–13: Demonstrations in Moscow to protest presidential elections
2014: Small anti-war demonstrations against the Russian annexation
of Crimea
2017–18: Anti-corruption protests in multiple cities
2018: Demonstrations across Russia to protest pension reform
2019: Demonstrations in Moscow to protest the disqualification of
candidates for Moscow city council elections
2020: Demonstrations in Khabarovsk to protest the mayor’s arrest
and Moscow’s influence in the region
2021: Demonstrations across the country protesting the arrest of
Aleksey Navalny

Russian state security services have broad authority to intercept and

monitor domestic communications within Russia. Russian law enforcement
and security services use “lawful intercept” authority, through which they
can access communications at gateways and nodes, potentially giving them
visibility into all computer traffic traversing Russia’s communications sys-
tem. The Система Оперативно-Розыскных Мероприятий (System for
Operational Investigative Measures; SORM) was initially implemented in
1995 and has been updated several times. SORM requires Russian commu-
nication providers, including voice and Internet, to install devices on their

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networks that allow the FSB to track all electronic traffic. As Internet tech-
nology has advanced, SORM rules have adapted to keep up. Multiple inves-
tigative organizations inside Russia have access to SORM data, including
most prominently the FSB and its sub-element, the Border Guard Service;
Russia’s Tax Police within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD); the FSO
and its sub-elements, the Kremlin Regiment and the Presidential Security
Service; and Parliamentary security services. SORM also offers its commu-
nications-monitoring capabilities to former Soviet states, which often use
Russia-based communications lines.
Russia’s monitoring of its internal networks has increasingly tightened
over the past several years. In 2016, under the pretext of countering terrorism,
the Russian State Duma adopted the Yarovaya Law, named after its parlia-
mentary sponsor, Irina Yarovaya. The Yarovaya Law requires telecommuni-
cations providers to store the content of voice calls, data, images, and text
messages for six months and the metadata associated with them (e.g., time,
location, sender, and recipients of a message) for three years. Online services
such as messaging services, email, and social networks that use encrypted
data are required to allow the FSB to access and read their encrypted com-
munications.194 Internet and telecommunications companies must disclose
these communications and metadata and “all other information necessary”
to authorities on request and without a court order.195 This requirement was
originally scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2018; however, the State Duma
decided to postpone the start date until 2023 to allow companies time to
install the extreme amount of data storage needed to fulfill it.
The FSB began enforcing a demand for telecommunications companies
to provide encryption keys for traffic traversing their networks in 2017, but
several companies have resisted. The chat service Telegram refused to pro-
vide encryption keys in 2017, as did the Internet service provider Yandex
in 2019. After Telegram founder Pavel Durov refused, Russia’s telecommu-
nication watchdog organization, Roskomnadzor, included the service in
its register of banned resources but never managed to block its operation
on Russia’s territory. It is not clear how negotiations between Yandex and
the FSB ended; Yandex Managing Director Tigran Khudaverdyan stated

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that the company “has a solution to the problem” but did not disclose the
details.196 In the first half of 2020, Russian government agencies sent Yandex
more than 15,000 requests for users’ information, of which Yandex report-
edly fulfilled 84 percent.197 
Russia has also announced plans to isolate Internet traffic within Rus-
sia from the world’s Internet, creating something called the RUNET. This
would serve several functions: to allow Russian telecommunications equip-
ment companies exclusive rights to the Russian market, so they would not
be forced to compete with international products; to facilitate the monitor-
ing and intercept of traffic within Russia; and to prevent unwanted external
content from reaching a Russian audience. This continues to be an aspira-
tional goal, although the Russian government claimed to have conducted a
successful test of the RUNET in 2019.198

CONCLUSION: STRENGTHENING INTERNAL SECURITY

Internal security is the highest priority of Russian intelligence and state
security services. Multiple services, including the FSB, FSO, and National
Guard, use all available tools, including human and technical platforms,
to neutralize threats to the ruling regime. Russia has intensified its use of
technical methods to monitor the domestic communications environment,
making thousands of requests for Internet users’ information, to meet a mix
of all three major internal security missions: counterintelligence, counter-
terrorism, and suppressing internal dissent. Russia is even working toward
isolating the Russian Internet from the rest of the world to facilitate opera-
tional and investigative measures as well as to prevent Russians’ minds from
being tainted by foreign thinking. Although some of the threats that Russia
sees in its society have Western analogues, such as foreign intelligence ser-
vices and terrorist groups, Russia’s pursuit of internal security encompasses
threats from the domestic Russian population, which most countries would
consider legitimate opposition. At the same time, Russian services are con-
stantly seeking, and claiming to have found, foreign connections to internal
threats, whether they exist or not.

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 CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION

k k k
Political intelligence is the traditional type of foreign intelligence that has
existed across governments and time. The purpose of political intelligence is
to support political and foreign policy decisionmaking. In Russia, that pur-
pose has remained consistent from the Soviet era to today.
Alexander Orlov called “diplomatic intelligence” the most important
of his eight types of Soviet intelligence, with its purpose being “… to keep
the Soviet government informed of the secret deals between governments
of capitalistic countries and of the true intentions and contemplated moves
of each of those governments toward the Soviet Union.”199 KGB defector
Oleg Gordievsky similarly defined this category of intelligence 30 years
later, asserting that “information from the intelligence service must assist
our authorities to reach optimum foreign policy decisions.”200 When dis-
cussing a political intelligence incident in the UK in 2011, an official of
MI5, the UK’s counterintelligence and security agency, stated that Russia
defines political intelligence as information that would “enable Russia to
formulate policies which win maximum advantage in the light of insights
gained from intelligence.”201 The U.S. Intelligence Community calls this
“decision advantage.”202

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When Gordievsky defected in 1985, he brought materials that identi-

fied Soviet intelligence priorities during the previous several years, including
a Soviet intelligence document that advised: “Begin from the assumption
that the United States is trying to secure a dominant position in the world
regardless of the interests of other states and nations.”203 Gordievsky dis-
closed that the head of the KGB First Chief Directorate, Vladimir Kryuc-
hkov, had directed Soviet intelligence in 1983 to uncover U.S. and Allied
plans to dominate the world and conduct subversive activities in the Soviet
zone of control. An American nuclear attack was especially high on the
minds of Soviet national security policymakers, who viewed every U.S. move
through the lens of a potential nuclear war. As one of the two superpowers,
the Soviet Union also needed to monitor hot spots in other parts of the
world, like the Middle East and South Asia, the Non-Aligned Movement,
and the Vatican, although those intelligence targets were often founded on
perceived nefarious U.S. intentions.204
The United States and its allies remain the main targets of Russian
political intelligence today just as they were during the Cold War. The 2016
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation articulated a similar
theme, identifying Russia’s primary adversary and its allies with phrases like
“unipolar power” and “western powers.”

Western powers’ attempts to maintain their positions in the world,

including by imposing their point of view on global processes and
conducting a policy to contain alternative centres of power, lead to a
greater instability in international relations and growing turbulence
on the global and regional levels. The struggle for dominance in shap-
ing the key principles of the future international system has become a
key trend at the current stage of international development.205

A comparison of Cold War-era Soviet intelligence priorities with recent

Russian intelligence operations reveals notable continuity (see Figure 8).
U.S. and NATO political intentions remain high on Russia’s list, but with
two key differences. One is the redefinition of Russia’s sphere of influence

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Figure 8. Comparison of Soviet and Russian Intelligence Priorities

Current Russian Intelligence

KGB Priorities for 1984
Priorities
Inform Soviet and Eastern Bloc Monitor Western weapons
foreign policy steps to limit and development and defense policy,
reduce nuclear missiles and other especially vis-a-vis Russia
weapons of mass destruction

Monitor U.S. and allied preparations Monitor U.S. military plans toward
to launch a surprise nuclear attack Russia
on the Soviet Union

Monitor the principal aspects of U.S., Monitor U.S. and allied diplomatic
Western European, and Japanese foreign policy toward Russia
strategies toward the Soviet Union

Monitor the plans and subversive Monitor U.S. and allied foreign policy
actions by the main enemy towards toward the Near Abroad
weakening the unity of the countries
of the socialist community

Monitor the development of events Develop liaison relations with

in areas where crisis situations exist, countries in the Middle East and
especially in the Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan

Monitor the internal political situation Monitor the internal political situation
in the United States in the United States

Monitor China’s foreign policy and its Keep China as a close ally
approach to Sino-Soviet relations

Monitor the activities of the Non- Monitor Africa, Latin America, and
Aligned Movement, the Socialist the Middle East
International, the Vatican, and
Islamic states

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Christopher Andrew and
Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations,
1975-1985 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, December 1, 2016; and
multiple Russian intelligence operations discussed below.

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from the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War to the Near Abroad in the post-
Cold War era. As Russia lost the Warsaw Pact alliance at the end of the
Cold War, its priorities shifted from employing Warsaw Pact countries to its
political advantage, to viewing them as NATO and European Union adver-
saries. Consequently, Russia was forced to retrench closer to the borders of
the former Soviet Union, while even those borders are insecure. The other
difference is the place that China occupies in Russian intelligence targeting.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Soviet Union perceived China as a competi-
tor, and Soviet intelligence treated it as a threat. Today, although Russia has
probably not forgotten that history altogether, its public objectives include
keeping China close to avoid surprises and to tap into China’s political and
economic might in the world.
Russian political intelligence collection targets the policymaking estab-
lishments of foreign countries. Prominent among Russian political intelli-
gence targets are ministries of foreign affairs, corresponding with Orlov’s
label “diplomatic intelligence” to describe political intelligence. Policy-
making targets also include ministries of defense and NATO. Russia seeks
intelligence about foreign countries’ strategic plans and future capabilities,
including plans for a surprise attack and principal aspects of strategy—just
as in the 1984 KGB priorities—to inform Russia’s political leadership about
possible countering moves in the political realm. Intelligence collection to
support tactical military decisionmaking and covert operations is discussed
in Chapter 6.
Russia views its political reputation in the world as a national security
priority, in relation to perceptions of its relative power and ability to coerce
other countries and to the credibility of the ruling elite within the Russian
domestic political environment. In Putin’s perception, a Russia that appears
to be weak is a vulnerable Russia. As he wrote in 2012: “We should not
tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak… Falling behind means
becoming vulnerable.”206 Putin’s 2012 statement echoed Stalin, who report-
edly said nearly 90 years earlier, “The Soviet Union must never be toothless
and groveling before the West again.”207 Thus, Russian intelligence organi-
zations are tasked to track hot, current topics related to Russian interests,

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including investigations involving Russian actions or NATO membership

discussions. When Russia is publicly criticized for activities, such as using
a dangerous chemical weapon in a public place on another country’s sov-
ereign territory, sheltering Syria’s use of chemical weapons, running a con-
certed doping program for its athletes competing in international sporting
events, or supplying the weapon that shot down a civilian airliner, it uses its
political intelligence collection capability to monitor those discussions and
inform Russia’s response.
Russian disinformation operations and so-called “hybrid warfare”
have received much publicity since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in
2014. Although these covert operations could not proceed without polit-
ical intelligence to identify specific targets and exploitable themes—Rus-
sia uses every tool available to denigrate its adversaries and build its own
military and political power—political collection operations are separate
from covert and disinformation operations. Covert operations and politi-
cal collection are conducted by different organizations within the Russian
intelligence system, and the two types of operations serve mostly differ-
ent purposes. While some information derived from traditional political
intelligence collection operations can be repurposed for disinformation
or influence operations, such covert missions are not the sole reason for
that collection.
The role of political intelligence in Russian operations is further illus-
trated in a database that the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has com-
piled of over 350 government-sponsored computer intrusion incidents and
computer-network attack incidents dating back to 2005.208 Eighty-four
of those incidents are attributed to a Russian government-affiliated threat
actor. For comparison purposes, the CFR attributes 129 incidents to China,
36 to Iran, and 28 to North Korea, with 41 others distributed among 24
different countries.
Of the 84 operations attributed to Russia, the majority appear to target
political collection targets: defense, diplomatic, election, and other gov-
ernment computer systems or think tanks that advise governments. Eight
of the Russia-related incidents target sports regulation organizations or

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organizations that monitor doping among athletes, a target of particular

political importance to the Russian government’s reputation abroad. Six
others target journalist and media organizations, particularly those that
publish information about Russian malign political actions. Although
political collection is most prominent among these operations, 10 of the
incidents also target infrastructure control systems, including electricity
generation, water distribution, and transportation infrastructures, which
are either related to the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine or have a
contingency motive in case of future military conflict with another world
power (see Chapter 6).

TARGETING MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ministries of foreign affairs have been the continuous target of Russian
intelligence operations since the Soviet era. SVR Line PR continues to be
the largest section in rezidenturas around the world, meaning that polit-
ical intelligence, particularly directed at diplomatic entities, is still a high
priority. These activities are intended to get inside information about for-
eign countries’ political moves, especially as they relate to Russia, but also to
Russia’s allies and diplomatic partners, such as China, Venezuela, Syria, and
Iran. Russian intelligence services use a spectrum of methods to penetrate
ministries of foreign affairs, from close access SIGINT and human recruit-
ment to computer-network collection, conducted by a combination of SVR
and GRU officers.

HUMINT
As was typical during the Soviet era, human targeting is the predominant
method Russia uses in political collection operations. Russia relies heavily
on human sources for political collection around the world. Sergey Tre-
tyakov, the SVR deputy rezident (chief ) who operated under diplomatic
cover at the Russian Mission to the United Nations during the 1990s,
described Russian recruitments of diplomats from various countries,

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including Germany, Greece, Poland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbeki-

stan, and an unspecified African country.209 These foreign diplomats,
some of whom may not have even realized they were Russian intelligence
sources, provided a variety of information about U.S. political actions,
other countries’ relations with the United States, NATO political and
military discussions, Central European countries’ aspirations for NATO
and European Union membership, and other similar topics. Tretyakov’s
biographer, Pete Earley, described the United Nations as a “big candy
store” for SVR officers.210
Russian illegal intelligence officer Lidiya Guriyeva (aka Cynthia Mur-
phy) sought to cultivate access to an associate of the U.S. Secretary of State
in 2009.211 Guryeva and her husband Vladimir Guriyev (Richard Murphy)
had been dispatched to the United States in the mid-1990s, and they oper-
ated for nearly 15 years until their arrest in 2010. When Guryeva reported
her contact, Moscow responded that the individual was a “very interesting
target” and that she should “try to build up little by little relations with him
moving beyond just [work],” because he might be able to supply “remarks re
U.S. foreign policy” as well as “‘rumors’ about White House internal ‘kitch-
en.’”212 The word “kitchen” in Russian can refer to office politics or inter-
nal gossip. After this connection became public in 2010, then-­Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton issued a public statement that there was “no reason”
to think the secretary was a target of the illegals.213 However, secretaries of
state and ministers of foreign affairs are routine targets of Russian political
intelligence collection. Being a target does not mean being a spy—Russian
intelligence typically targets potential recruits surrounding such a high-
level target, with the secretary or minister only seldom becoming the actual
recruited agent. The targeted individual may not even realize the cultiva-
tion is taking place.
Russia actively cultivates sympathetic politicians who not only have
access to sensitive political information but also are willing to present a
Russia-slanted picture of events, particularly focused on the EU. In 2018,
a Hungarian politician from the right-wing Jobbik Party, Bela Kovacs, was
arrested and charged with espionage. He reportedly provided “information

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on a range of European Union matters connected to Russia, including

details about energy negotiations, relations with Belarus, the future of the
European bank sector and a possible EU visa waiver for Russia.”214 A Bul-
garian politician, Nikolai Malinov, was arrested in 2019 for providing
information about Bulgarian political decisionmaking related to Russia and
Europe. Malinov, the leader of a pro-Russian group in Bulgaria called the
Russophiles National Movement, also allegedly took part in an attempt to
exert influence on the Bulgarian government’s foreign policy toward Russia
and the West. One of the documents Malinov provided “outlines the steps
needed to be taken to completely overhaul the geopolitical orientation of
Bulgaria away from the West towards Russia.” Russian representatives called
the arrest an American-sponsored spy fiction.215

Close Access SIGINT and Computer Intrusions

Catching Russian intelligence officers in the act of close access SIGINT
operations is a relatively rare occasion. Several incidents have been pub-
licized, however, that focused on political collection. In 1999, the FBI
arrested Stanislav Gusev, a Russian embassy officer who was caught servic-
ing a transmitter implanted in a chair rail in a conference room of the U.S.
State Department in Washington, DC.216 The FBI seized the equipment
that Gusev was using to control the implanted microphone and expelled
him from the country. According to U.S. press reporting, the bug allowed
the Russian intelligence service to “capture a wide variety of information,
much of it classified,”217 but as of 2021, no information is publicly available
to explain how or when the microphone was emplaced.
Although intended to be clandestine, at least three close access technical
operations have been identified publicly since 2018. One targeted a diplo-
matic gathering, the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland,
in 2019. Swiss police arrested two Russians carrying diplomatic passports,
one of whom was posing as a plumber, near the WEF venue. Swiss press
sources described the two men’s activity as “preparatory work for spying on
the World Economic Forum,” adding that the Russians “had their sights on

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the WEF” and might have planned to conduct electronic surveillance of

the summit.218 Two other close access collection incidents occurred in 2018
in Norway and the Netherlands, when Russian intelligence officers were
caught with signal intercept equipment in or near the Parliament building
in Norway and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap-
ons (OPCW) in the Netherlands. These incidents will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 9.

Computer-based Collection
Computer network operations are particularly prevalent against minis-
tries of foreign affairs around the world, either because the ministries are
soft targets or because they have competent computer security monitoring
that catches penetrations (see Figure 9). As in many computer collection
ventures, the victim’s choice to make it public carries some cost because the
penetration can highlight systemic vulnerabilities, although those are often
mitigated with the assistance of computer security personnel.

Figure 9. Reported Russian Computer Incidents Targeting Ministries of Foreign Affairs

2009–13: Finland—Computer penetration at foreign ministry

2013–14: United States—Computer penetration at State Department
and White House
2015–16: Denmark—Computer penetration at foreign ministry
2016: Multiple—Spearfishing campaign targeting foreign ministries
2016: Italy—Compromised email communications between Rome
and missions abroad
2016: Czechia—Compromised electronic communications; two paral-
lel attacks
2016–17: Multiple Eastern European countries—Computer penetra-
tions in consulates and embassies

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2017: North America and Europe—Spearphishing attack on two foreign

affairs government institutions
2017: Czechia—Computer penetration attempt at foreign ministry
2017: Romania—Spearphishing campaign targeting foreign ministry
2018: Germany—Computer penetration at federal foreign office
2018: United Kingdom—Foreign and Commonwealth offices targeted
by computer intrusion attempt
2018: South Korea—Foreign ministry and financial institutions target
of computer intrusion attempt
2019: Eastern Europe and Central Asia—Spearphishing campaign
targeting embassies and foreign ministries
2020: Armenia—Computer penetration of the consular section of the
Armenian embassy in Moscow
2020: United States—Massive computer intrusion using SolarWinds
computer management software penetrated multiple U.S. Government
entities, including the U.S. Department of State, seeking intelligence
on U.S. policies toward Russia

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Anthony Cuthbertson,
“Chinese and Russian Hackers ‘Targeting South Korea Ahead of US-North Korea Summit,’”
The Independent, June 5, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/
news/trump-us-north-korea-summit-kim-jong-un-hackers-china-russia-a8384586.html;
Sean Lyngaas, “Russian Intelligence-Backed Hackers Go After the Armenian Embassy Website
with New Code,” Cyberscoop.com, March 12, 2020, https://www.cyberscoop.com/turla-fsb-
eset-armenia/; “Joint Statement by The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), and the National Security Agency (NSA),” January 5, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/
news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-
infrastructure.

Regardless of the method—SIGINT, human, or computer network

collection—Russian intelligence activities targeting ministries of foreign
affairs worldwide reflect Russia’s high priority for monitoring foreign pol-
icy establishments.

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 Political Intelligence Collection

TARGETING DEFENSE AND SECURITY

POLICY INFORMATION
Understanding other countries’ defense policies is especially important for
Russia, given its underlying suspicion that the West intends to harm Russia.
Countries that are already NATO members, as well as those that aspire to
NATO membership, are at the top of the target list for penetrating defense
establishments. Russian targeting of defense establishments has several goals,
namely to identify:

■ Conventional military plans, especially as they involve potential

attacks on Russia.
■ Strategic nuclear plans.
■ Future weapons systems that Russia will need to counter.
■ People who can serve as influence or penetration agents.

These topics have both political and military relevance, and intelligence
on them can support Russia’s political actions vis-a-vis the United States
and NATO.

HUMINT
Between 2008 and 2020, at least 14 foreign nationals serving as Russian
intelligence agents were arrested for providing NATO policy and defense
information to the SVR or GRU (see Figure 10). Russian intelligence
agencies recruited these agents across a 20-year span of time, beginning
during the Soviet era and continuing to at least 2009. One of the agents,
Martin Möller, was recruited in the 1980s while serving as a member of
the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) in
Tehran, Iran;219 he was handled by the GRU. Two others were recruited in
the 1990s. The SVR recruited Herman Simm in about 1995, and he gave
the SVR access to intelligence about Estonian, NATO, and EU information
security procedures.220 Recruited in 1996, Peter Debbins realized he was
working for the GRU by 1999. He served as an army officer from 1998 to

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2005 and, although he had little access to information of interest to Russia

from 2005 to 2010, he gained access to classified information as a contrac-
tor from 2011 until his arrest in 2020.221

Figure 10. Arrests of Individuals Working in Ministries of Defense

2008: Estonia—Herman Simm, chief of Estonian Defence Ministry

Security Department
2012: Canada—Jeffrey Delisle, Canadian Navy officer working in NATO
intelligence fusion center
2013: Netherlands—Raymond Poeteray, Dutch diplomat with access
to NATO and EU policy information
2018: Austria—Martin Möller, Austrian military officer with access to
Austrian interactions with NATO
2019: Poland—Arrest of individual working for a contract company
that supported the Defense Ministry’s Agency for Military Property
2019: Lithuania—Arrest of Romanas Šešelis for collecting information
for Russia on NATO military ships, an LNG terminal company, and
other infrastructure
2020: United States—Peter Debbins, former U.S. Army officer who
worked in various IC-related contracting companies
2021: Bulgaria—Six Bulgarians arrested for providing classified defense
information to Russian intelligence officers in Bulgaria
2021: Italy—Italian Navy captain arrested for providing defense and
national security policy information to Russian diplomatically covered
officers

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including U.S. District Court, Eastern
District of Virginia, “USA vs. Peter Rafael Dzibinski Debbins, aka ‘Ikar Lesnikov’,” August 20, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1307186/download; “Bulgaria: Six arrested over
‘Russian spy network,’” DW.com, March 19, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/bulgaria-six-­arrested-
over-russian-spy-network/a-56934658; Crispian Balmer and Angelo Amante, “Italy arrests navy
captain for spying, expels Russian diplomats,” Reuters, March 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.
com/article/uk-italy-russia-spies-idAFKBN2BN0W4.

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 Political Intelligence Collection

Russia recruited other intelligence agents during the Putin era. Jef-
frey Delisle walked into the Russian embassy in Ottawa in 2007 and was
recruited by the GRU. Delisle had access to classified computers that con-
tained data from the Privy Council Office—responsible for the day-to-day
planning of the Canadian government—the Canadian Security Intel-
ligence Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as Five
Eyes Coalition and NATO intelligence. He admitted that much of what he
provided was SIGINT-derived intelligence.222 Raymond Poeteray, who was
recruited in 2009, provided information about NATO activity in Libya,
EU fact-­finding missions in Georgia, and Dutch peacekeeping missions
in Kosovo and Afghanistan. SVR illegals Andreas and Heidrun Anschlag,
who lived in Germany, handled Poeteray.223 A Polish official arrested in
2019, identified publicly only as Piotr Ś., had access to Polish and NATO
information, particularly about construction projects at the Multinational
Division North East Headquarters, which coordinates the activities of
NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battle groups deployed in the Baltic
states and Poland.224 The timing of his initial recruitment is unclear, but he
probably was handled by the GRU.
During the same 20-year timeframe, a number of Russian intelligence
officers were arrested, expelled, compromised, or disappeared after targeting
defense policy information in multiple countries. In some cases, the iden-
tities of the agents they were running are not publicly available, but their
targets are consistent (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. Russian Intelligence Officers Targeting Defense Information

2009: Poland—Russian nonofficial cover (NOC) officer who had contact

with defense officials was arrested.
2009: United States—Illegals Michael Zotolli and Natalya Perevezeva
(aka Patricia Mills) moved into an apartment near the Pentagon,
where many of their neighbors were Department of Defense officials.

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2010: Spain—Illegal Sergey Cherepanov (Henry Frith) disappeared;

his targets reportedly included intelligence on Croatian NATO
membership.
2011: Germany—Illegals Andreas and Heidrun Anschlags were
arrested; they were later revealed to be running Raymond Poeteray.
2011?: France—Russian embassy officer “Vladimir F.” quietly
expelled for targeting parliament members for defense and security
information.
2012: Canada—Russian embassy officers expelled for Delisle case;
the Russian embassy denied its officials had been expelled and
claimed they left Canada on a normal rotation.
2014: Canada—LtCol Yuriy Bezler expelled for reasons related to
Russian actions in Ukraine.
2016: Hungary—One GRU officer was expelled for activities not pub-
licly described but reportedly related to NATO.
2018: Slovakia—A Russian diplomat was expelled “for engaging in
intelligence activities against Slovakia and NATO.”
2020: Bulgaria—Russian military attaché was expelled for collecting
sensitive military information, including about U.S. troops deployed to
Bulgaria.
2021: Bulgaria—Two Russian diplomats were expelled for running an
espionage network within defense circles.
2021: Italy—Two Russian diplomats were expelled for espionage
involving an Italian Navy captain with access to defense and national
security policy information.

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Laura Stone, “Canadian Diplo-
mat Expelled From Russia,” Global News, April 22, 2014, https://globalnews.ca/news/1284073/
canadian-diplomat-expelled-from-russia/; Panyi Szabolcs, “Russian Diplomats Caught Spying in
Hungary Get Expelled Quietly as Usual,” Direkt36 (Hungary), December 20, 2018, https://www.
direkt36.hu/en/orosz-diplomatakat-ertek-kemkedesen-magyarorszagon-es-szep-csendben-
ki-is-szoritottak-oket/; “Slovak PM Says Russian Diplomat Expelled For Spying,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, December 5, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/slovak-pm-says-russian-
diplomat-expelled-for-spying/29639128.html.

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Sometimes the targeted country does not report its expulsions publicly
to avoid embarrassing Russia; they are occasionally revealed years later when
journalists find out about them. Nevertheless, the publicized expulsions show
a continuing human-based effort to collect defense policy information.

Computer-based Collection
In addition to these human penetrations, numerous Russian computer intru-
sion incidents have been reported targeting ministries of defense, including
several incidents of penetrations or attempted penetrations into U.S. com-
puter systems (see Figure 12).
In some cases, the target’s computer security systems detected and inter-
dicted Russia’s computer penetration attempts before they accessed any
sensitive data; in other cases, Russia gained access to the targeted networks.
Either way, these computer-based operations, in concert with continual
HUMINT operations, represent a consistent Russian campaign to collect
defense-related policy information. Both human and technical collection
efforts are valuable. While computer-based operations can yield information
that is sensitive but unclassified, human penetrations offer access to classified
files that computer penetrations often cannot reach.

Figure 12. Russian Computer-Based Operations Targeting Ministries of Defense

2008: United States—DoD computers penetrated (“Buckshot Yankee”)

2014: Ukraine—Ministry of defense computers penetrated, allowing
the insertion of false information into the system
2015 (early in the year): United States—Computer penetration of
DoD networks
2015 (July): United States—Computer penetration of DoD networks
2015–16: Denmark—Computer penetration into Danish defense
ministry

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

2016: Czechia—Computer penetration attempts target Czech Republic

defense ministry
2016–17: Multiple—Computer penetration attempts target
defense-related organizations
2017: Montenegro—Computer penetration of government networks
related to NATO accession
2017: Germany—Computer penetration into German defense ministry
2018: Czechia—Compromise of personal emails of armed forces
personnel
2018: European government organization—Spearphishing campaign
using defense-related bait
2018: United Kingdom—Computer penetration attempt at Defence
and Science Technology Laboratory

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including “From Espionage to Cyber Pro-
paganda: Pawn Storm’s Activities over the Past Two Years,” TrendMicro, April 25, 2017, https://
www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/in/security/news/cyber-attacks/espionage-cyber-­propaganda-two-
years-of-pawn-storm; “Introducing WhiteBear,” Kaspersky SecureList, August 30, 2017, https://
securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/; National Cyber Security Centre, “Reckless
Campaign of Cyber Attacks by Russian Military Intelligence Service Exposed,” October 3, 2018,
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/reckless-campaign-cyber-attacks-russian-military-intelligence-
service-exposed.

TARGETING ELECTIONS
Foreign elections are a consistent target of Russian intelligence collection
because elections offer a window into a country’s policies and leadership.
Although much Western media coverage has surrounded Russian covert
manipulation of elections, the incidents in Figure 13 reflect intelligence col-
lection activities, not meddling. Even in widely publicized cases of covert
election meddling, such as in the United States, Great Britain, and Spain,
Russia’s intelligence collection preceded covert action, although the intelli-
gence collection was not always publicly visible. Elections are an important
Russian political intelligence target because they identify:

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■ The views of the incoming administration regarding Russia.

Years before the now-famous computer intrusions, illegals in the
United States were tasked with collecting information about the
newly elected Obama administration, focusing on important for-
eign policy issues.225
■ Individuals on the new team who might be amenable to Russian
views or strategies or who could serve as influence agents. In the
United States, the 2019 Mueller Report on the Investigation into
Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election discussed this
potential in excruciating detail.226 Although some of the individuals
that Russian intelligence targeted may not have progressed to the
point of being recruited agents, these incidents offer insights into
Russian political collection priorities.
■ Potentially damaging personal information that could be used
should Russia choose to discredit a foreign leader. The Steele
Dossier, alleging cooperation between the Trump presidential
campaign and Russia in 2016, is alternatively characterized in the
press as political opposition research or a component of Russian
disinformation.
■ Themes and divisions that could be exploited in disinformation
campaigns. Inside Russia, elections are more theater than real voter
choice. Thus, as Russia views elections in other countries, it mir-
ror-images them as representing the insincere government engineer-
ing that occurs inside Russia.

Most of the publicly available examples of targeted foreign elections

since 2014 involve computer-based operations, although Russia also con-
tinues to use human platforms. While Russia may repurpose the infor-
mation collected in these operations for covert election meddling, such
intelligence may also support Russian political and foreign policy deci-
sionmaking. While multiple cases of collection of election-related infor-
mation have targeted the United States, the United States is not Russia’s
only target.

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Figure 13. Russian Intelligence Operations Targeting Elections

2009: United States—The SVR tasked illegals (Guryevs/Murphys) to

collect information about newly-elected U.S. President Barack Obama’s
views on START, Afghanistan, and Iran
2014: Ukraine—Computer intrusions into Election Commission
2016: United States—Computer intrusions into Democratic National
Committee
2016: United States—Senator Marco Rubio’s office targeted by com-
puter intrusion attempt
2016: United States—Computer intrusions into Arizona, Illinois, and
Florida election systems; 18 others targeted
2016: Montenegro—Computer intrusions on the day of parliamentary
elections
2017: France—President Emmanuel Macron’s office targeted by
spearphishing campaign
2017–20: Bulgaria—Russian embassy officers expelled for collecting
information about the electoral process
2018: United States—Senator Claire McCaskill’s office targeted by
computer intrusion attempt
2018: United States—Democratic National Committee targeted by
computer intrusion attempt
2019: Libya—Wagner Group employees arrested for attempting to
influence elections in Africa
2019: Indonesia—Computer intrusions into voter database

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Viriya Singgih, Arys Aditya, and
Karlis Salna, “Indonesia Says Election Under Attack From Chinese, Russian Hackers,” Bloomberg,
March 13, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-12/indonesia-says-poll-­
under-attack-from-chinese-russian-hackers; David Ingram, “Democratic Senator Alleges Russian
Hackers Unsuccessfully Tried To Access her Computer,” NBC News, July 26, 2018, https://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/democratic-senator-alleges-russian-hackers-unsuccessfully-tried-­access-
her-computer-n895131; Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Russians Arrested as Spies in Libya
Worked for Russian firm Wagner, Official Says,” Washington Post, November 18, 2019, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russians-arrested-as-spies-in-libya-worked-for-russian-
firm-wagner-official-says/2019/11/18/c0cee91a-0a21-11ea-a49f-9066f51640f6_story.html.

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Examples of Russian penetrations into election-related computer systems

in the United States have been widely publicized. The Democratic National
Committee was the target of a computer intrusion before the U.S. election in
2016 that led to the theft of emails, some of which were leaked to embarrass the
Hillary Clinton campaign. Other intrusion attempts reportedly targeted the
Democratic National Committee, along with individual members of the U.S.
Congress, in 2018. Because U.S.-Russian relations have been particularly sour
since 2014, the United States probably publicizes such activities more than
other countries. Computer intrusions into election databases have also been
reported widely in the United States, but similar actions have been reported
in Montenegro and Indonesia. Other cases of Russian intrusions into election
databases have probably occurred and either gone undetected or unreported.

TARGETING LEGISLATIVE BODIES

Russian political collection operations have also targeted legislative bodies,
including members of parliaments and their staffers. Like the efforts that
target other decisionmaking bodies, operations that target parliaments are
both to collect information about a country’s priorities and future policies,
especially as they relate to Russia, and to identify individuals—such as elected
officials or their staff members—who could become influence or penetration
agents. These activities can at times also yield classified information. Like the
operations discussed above that have targeted ministries of foreign affairs and
defense, Russia’s targeting of other countries’ legislative bodies covers the spec-
trum of collection platforms, from embassy-based officers cultivating human
sources to computer-based operations and close access technical operations.
Penetrating parliaments has long been an objective of Soviet and Eastern
Bloc intelligence services. Fred Rose, a member of the Canadian Parliament,
was recruited as a Soviet source in the 1930s, and then, after serving a brief time
in jail for subversive activities, he contacted the GRU rezidentura in Septem-
ber 1942 and again offered his assistance.227 Rose was already serving as a GRU
agent when he was elected to the Canadian Parliament in August 1943 and
reelected in June 1945.228 In addition to being the hub of a source network, Rose

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provided information on parliamentary and political matters, including the

details of a closed session of Parliament that occurred near the end of 1944.229
Soviet intelligence defector Oleg Kalugin claimed that the KGB consid-
ered planting an electronic eavesdropping device in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives’ Armed Services Committee in 1967, but the FBI interdicted
the device before it transmitted any information.230 The KGB also reportedly
increased the number of agents it had recruited in the Sri Lankan Parliament
in the 1980s.231 Other Eastern Bloc services, such as the Czechoslovakian, also
enjoyed success in recruiting members of parliaments during the Cold War.
The Czechoslovakian service ran a West German member of the Bundestag,
Alfred Frenzel, for seven years until his arrest in October 1960.232 Czechoslo-
vakian state security archives also indicate that four members of the British
Parliament worked as intelligence sources in the 1960s and 1970s.233

HUMINT
Several Russian operations targeting members of parliament have been
reported in the United Kingdom during the Putin era, probably reflecting the
British government’s willingness to publicize the incidents rather than a par-
ticular Russian attention to the United Kingdom. In 2008, a member of the
British Parliament, Andrew MacKinlay, was censured for meeting on multiple
occasions with Alexander Polyakov, a suspected SVR officer covered as a coun-
selor at the Russian embassy in London. Over the year of his meetings with
Polyakov, MacKinlay posed a series of Russia-related parliamentary questions
in the Commons that had a clearly pro-Russia slant: for example, why had Brit-
ain granted political asylum to Boris Berezovsky, an exiled enemy of then-Prime
Minister Putin. Berezovsky had been close to Putin critic Aleksandr Litvinenko,
who was poisoned in London in 2006. MacKinley’s questions also addressed
the number of accredited Russian diplomats, extradition provisions between
the United Kingdom and Russia, and the circumstances surrounding the 2007
deportation of a Russian suspected of plotting to murder Berezovsky.234
Another diplomatically covered SVR officer in London, Mikhail Repin,
circulated from 2009 to 2011 in security and defense circles looking for

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potential recruits who could provide information about British defense

issues. Repin joined influential international think tanks focused on politi-
cal and military affairs, where he socialized with several British members of
Parliament who had access to defense-related policy information.235
Also in the UK, a young Russian national named Katia Zatuliveter was
arrested in 2010 on espionage charges, based in part on her ties to a British
legislator. Zatuliveter was both an aide to and the mistress of a member of
the British Parliament who served on the British delegation to the Western
European Union and the Council of Europe, as well as the Defence Select
Committee in the House of Commons. She was also being cultivated by a
Russian embassy officer in London identified only as Boris, who was expelled
from the United Kingdom in 2011. Boris reportedly told her that she had a
“dream job.” Zatuliveter was acquitted of espionage in December 2011; she
was probably a target of opportunity who had access to political information
and whom an enterprising SVR officer noticed and tried to recruit. Whether
she was guilty of espionage or not, the incident shows that a Russian intelli-
gence officer was targeting an MP’s aide.236
Mariya Butina may have been a similar target of opportunity in the United
States, although her connections to Russian intelligence are circumstantial.
Butina overtly circulated in U.S. gun rights circles from 2011 to 2018, while
in close association with multiple Russian individuals with suspected ties to
Russian intelligence services. Throughout these years, for example, she worked
with Aleksandr Torshin, a member of the Russian State Duma from the United
Russia Party and later the Deputy Governor of the Russian Central Bank; the
U.S. Government sanctioned Torshin for playing a role in Russian meddling in
the U.S. elections in 2016.237 After traveling to the United States occasionally
from Russia between 2011 and 2016, Butina arrived in the United States in
August 2016 on a student visa to study at American University in Washington,
DC, sponsored by Konstantin Nikolayev, a Russian billionaire businessman
who served as Russian minister of transport from 2004 to 2012. Nikolayev
allegedly has ties with Russian security services, although he denies the alle-
gations.238 While studying in Washington, DC, in January 2018, Butina met
with Oleg Zhiganov, the director of the Russian Cultural Center.239 Zhiganov

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also represents the Russian organization Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency

for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad,
and International Humanitarian Cooperation), which is a direct descendant
of the Soviet-era organization, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries (VOKS).240 VOKS was a frequent cover for Soviet
intelligence officers, given its access to a fertile recruiting pool of Russian émi-
grés and foreigners sympathetic to Russia.241 With these Russian connections
supporting her, Butina cultivated relationships with individuals close to the
Trump campaign, including political activists with congressional connections.
The FBI arrested her in July 2018 on charges of being an unregistered agent
of a foreign power. She pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in prison,
and she was deported from the United States in 2019.242
Zatuliveter and Butina have been compared to Anna Chapman, a Russian
illegal arrested in the United States in 2010 (see Chapter 8 for more details).243
However, both were probably quite different from Chapman. There was no
indication that either Zatuliveter or Butina were directly affiliated with an
intelligence service, as Chapman was. Zatuliveter may have been simply a target
of opportunity, as a Russian national who had developed close relations with
an MP. Butina probably began by developing relations with people who shared
her passion for guns but was similarly exploited for her access by a Russian gov-
ernment official, Aleksandr Torshin. Zatuliveter and Butina were both human
agents, while Chapman was a staff member of a Russian intelligence service.

Computer-based Collection
Russia has also used technical platforms to target foreign parliaments. In
2015 and 2016, parliaments in Germany, Norway, and Turkey reported com-
puter intrusions originating from Russia.244 The German incident, which was
detected in May 2015, resulted in a year-long penetration of the Bundestag’s
internal server and the loss of data. The German government subsequently
also reported that an electrical maintenance worker passed the Bundestag
building floor plans to a GRU officer working under diplomatic cover at the
Russian embassy in Germany in 2017.245

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After the 2016 intrusions in Norway, the Norwegian government again

accused Russia of penetrating and stealing data from the Norwegian Parlia-
ment’s email system in August 2020.246 Additionally, in 2018, Norwegian
authorities arrested a Russian named Mikhail Bochkarev for what proba-
bly was a close access SIGINT operation. While attending an international
function at the Norwegian Parliament building, which included staffers
from 34 European parliaments, Bochkarev was arrested on suspicion of
using a laptop to monitor the building’s Wi-Fi network.247 Bochkarev was
tried in a Norwegian court but later released and allowed to return to Rus-
sia. Unsurprisingly, the Russian government denied the allegations.248

TARGETING INTELLIGENCE AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
Russia is always eager to penetrate foreign intelligence and counterintelli-
gence services. This was one of Orlov’s eight primary tasks of Soviet intelli-
gence, and the Soviet Union experienced multiple successes in penetrating
the services of Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States, and many
other countries during the Cold War. The year 1985 became known in the
United States as the “Year of the Spy” because of the number of espionage
cases revealed in that year alone, including individuals who worked for U.S.
intelligence and counterintelligence services. Some of the last Soviet-era
espionage cases in the United States were penetrations of intelligence ser-
vices, including the CIA, NSA, and FBI. Penetrating an intelligence or
counterintelligence service gives Russia a number of advantages: allowing
Russia to identify spies within its midst, providing a window into another
country’s national security priorities, and opening access to the classified
information shared with intelligence and counterintelligence services from
across the targeted foreign government and its allies.
Such incidents have continued during the Putin era (see Figure 14).
Most of the publicly known cases since 2000 are related to Estonia, reflect-
ing both Estonia’s aggressive counterintelligence efforts against Russia and
its willingness to discuss penetrations of its security service openly. In 2019,

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the Estonian prosecutor general’s office collaborated on a published mono-

graph that analyzed prosecutions using Estonia’s treason law. The mono-
graph identified 20 people prosecuted under that law from 2008 to 2018, all
of whom were affiliated with Russia; several cases involved penetrations of
Estonia’s security service.249

Figure 14. Cases Involving Russian Targeting of an Intelligence or

Counterintelligence Service

2001: United States—50 Russian diplomats were expelled in retalia-

tion for Robert Hanssen case.
2012: Canada—Russian embassy officers were expelled for Jeffrey
Delisle case; the Russian embassy denied that its officials were
expelled and claimed that they left Canada on a normal rotation.
2007?–12: Estonia—Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) officer
Aleksei Dressen was arrested for providing investigative information
to Russia’s FSB.
2002–13: Estonia—Vladimir Veitman was arrested for providing
information about Estonian intelligence and counterintelligence
software.
2013: United States—Russia obtained access to information about
U.S. intelligence collection capabilities from Edward Snowden.
2014: Estonia—KAPO officer Uno Puusepp defected to Russia; he had
been cooperating with Russia for over 20 years.
2019: Estonia—Dual Estonian-Russian citizen Dmitri Kozlov was
arrested for providing Russia with information on the Estonian police
department’s activities, employees, and equipment.
2012?–19: Estonia—Retired KAPO officer Vladimir Kulikov was
arrested for cooperating with Russian intelligence.

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Ivo Juurvee and Lavly Perling,
Russia’s Espionage in Estonia: A Quantitative Analysis of Convictions (Tallin: International Centre
for Defence and Security, 2019); Ian Austen, “Russian Envoys Leave Canada After Officer Is
Accused of Spying,” New York Times, January 20, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/
world/americas/russian-diplomats-leave-canada-as-spy-case-heats-up.html.

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However, Estonia is not the only target. Canada’s Jeffrey Delisle, also
listed earlier as a source of defense/NATO collection, worked in a NATO
intelligence fusion cell where he had access to intelligence in support of
NATO activities. The United States has also been affected by penetrations
of its intelligence apparatus through Robert Hanssen, although most of his
activities occurred during the Soviet era, and Edward Snowden, who vol-
unteered his information to Russia, causing massive damage to U.S. intelli-
gence collection.
Other such cases have almost certainly occurred around the world.
Although some targeted countries do not openly discuss penetrations of
their intelligence and security services, Russia has not stopped attempting.

HOT-TOPIC TARGETING
Russian intelligence has shown the inclination to redirect its collection
apparatus toward hot topics that arise on the international stage, such as
foreign investigations into Russian covert activities and NATO enlargement
events. While Russia publicly denies allegations that it violates international
norms, it simultaneously targets the investigations into those allegations
using the whole spectrum of intelligence collection measures. Most of these
incidents have occurred since 2014, possibly indicating a more aggressive
Russian intelligence policy to protect Russia’s image in the world.
During the several years that followed the 2006 assassination of Alek-
sandr Litvinenko in the United Kingdom, Russian intelligence actively
sought to learn about the UK investigation of the event, as well as the fol-
low-on investigation into allegations that Russia was targeting Litvinenko’s
supporter, Boris Berezovsky. As noted above, a suspected SVR officer was
observed in 2007 and 2008 meeting with a member of parliament in Lon-
don, probably for both collection and influence purposes. Berezovsky died
in the United Kingdom in 2013, apparently of suicide, although some have
questioned that determination.250
After the 2014 shootdown over Ukraine of Malaysian Airlines Flight
MH17, on which over 200 Dutch citizens were flying, Russian intelligence

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targeted the Dutch government agency that was conducting the investiga-
tion. In 2015, Russian operators attacked the computers of the Dutch Safety
Board, which was leading the investigation in cooperation with Malaysian,
Australian, Belgian, and Ukrainian authorities and was about to present a
report concluding that Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists using Rus-
sian-supplied weapons were responsible for the shootdown. The Dutch
government reported multiple coordinated computer network attacks
intended to obtain unauthorized access to sensitive material related to the
investigation.251 At about the same time, Russian collectors also conducted
a spearphishing campaign against the investigative journalist organization
Bellingcat, which was reporting information about Russia’s role in the
MH17 shootdown.252
Russia is constantly attempting to penetrate NATO through all meth-
ods to collect intelligence on NATO defense policies, and its intelligence
and covert activities become especially aggressive when states are considering
joining NATO. In 2017, Russian computer network operators penetrated
computers in Montenegro that held data related to that country’s NATO
accession, using spearphishing emails that directly addressed NATO mem-
bership.253 The following year, Greece expelled two Russian diplomats and
blocked the visas of two others in retaliation for meddling in the North
Macedonia naming issue. North Macedonia was formally invited to join
NATO, contingent upon agreement on the country’s name. Russian officers
reportedly paid Greek organizations to protest the resolution to the naming
issue, which further delayed North Macedonia’s NATO membership. Ulti-
mately, however, Russian attempts to derail North Macedonia’s NATO acces-
sion were unsuccessful, and the country became a NATO member in 2019.254 
When Russia and its allies are accused of using chemical weapons,
Russia’s immediate reaction is to deny it, while Russian intelligence ser-
vices simultaneously target the resulting international investigations. Rus-
sia sided with Syria in denying allegations that the Syrian government used
chemical weapons on its people in the Syrian civil war in 2017 and 2018.
Russian computer operators targeted the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague and media companies as

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the OPCW was investigating the allegations. Russian intelligence services

also targeted OPCW in reaction to allegations that GRU officers used a
highly toxic chemical weapon to attempt to assassinate Sergey Skripal in the
United Kingdom in 2018. In addition to these remote computer intrusion
operations targeting the OPCW, as well as a chemical analysis laboratory in
Switzerland, four Russian intelligence officers were arrested in the Nether-
lands for attempting a close access technical operation against the OPCW
in 2018.255 Bellingcat computers were again targeted in 2019 after the orga-
nization reported the identities of the Russian officers involved in the attack
on Skripal.256 
After the Russian government was accused of pursuing a concerted,
government-sponsored doping program for Russian athletes competing
in international sporting events, Russian intelligence targeted the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which was investigating Russian athletes
who benefitted from the program. Russian actors penetrated a WADA
database related to the investigation and later used the collected informa-
tion in a “hack and leak” operation to discredit athletes from other countries
who had received legitimate exemptions for certain chemical substances
on health grounds. Russia used the leaks to claim a double standard in the
investigation of Russian athletes.257
Foreign government and private investigations have identified several
Russian offices and groups, particularly affiliated with the GRU, involved
in many of these cases. Considerable crossover is evident from one case
to the next, including Russian intelligence officers whose names come up
repeatedly across these investigations. For example, the German government
issued an arrest warrant in May 2020 for Dmitry Sergeyevich Badin for his
involvement in hacking into the German Bundestag in 2015. The U.S. Gov-
ernment indicted the same GRU officer in 2018 for conducting intrusions
into the Democratic National Committee in 2016 and WADA in 2018.258
These incidents show how, when Russia is the subject of international
allegations, Russian intelligence activities follow, both for collection pur-
poses and in support of covert activities to discredit the investigation and
turn attention away from Russia. Such activities are likely to continue, as

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Russia is repeatedly caught conducting assassination operations and covert

political operations around the world.

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL COLLECTION AS A PRIORITY

Political collection is a high priority for Russian intelligence. Russia sees a
political motive behind many of the defense, economic, and intelligence
activities of other countries. In the Russian government’s calculus, if Russia
can understand other countries’ political drivers, it can protect itself in all
other areas as well.
This calculus contains a caveat, however. Russian intelligence services
have a long history of telling the boss just what he wants to hear. Russian
and Soviet leaders have seldom been tolerant of an intelligence service
giving them information that contradicts their firmly held political views.
Stalin was known for demanding investigations into sources that provided
incompatible information. Gorbachev tried to break that trend by demand-
ing more objective information free of Cold War political assumptions,259
but the KGB responded with lip service, as then-KGB Chairman Vladimir
Kryuchkov became involved in the 1991 plot to remove Gorbachev from
power. The intelligence that percolates to the Russian president today does
not necessarily reflect reality as much as it reflects the president’s personal
preferences; as a former intelligence officer, Putin probably prefers raw infor-
mation that he can analyze himself. Such selective intelligence can create a
dangerous cycle of assumptions that allows only the most nefarious interpre-
tations of world events to enter the decisionmaking process. It also leads to a
cycle of aggressive Russian political moves: Russian malign actions prompt
international investigations, which create more disfavor for Russia in the
international environment. That disfavor feeds Russia’s view that the world is
against it, which leads to more aggressive actions. Russian political collection
can thus be both an indicator and a driver of Russia’s worldview.

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 CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC AND
S&T INTELLIGENCE

k k k
For Russia, economic status is a national security concern. Russia’s economy
relies on foreign trade to survive, and its GDP is closely connected to the oil
and gas markets: as the global price of oil and gas rises and lowers, so moves
Russia’s prosperity. With this dependence on trade in mind, one of Russia’s
declared foreign policy priorities is “to create a favourable external environ-
ment that would allow Russia’s economy to grow steadily and become more
competitive and that would promote technological modernization as well as
higher standards of living and quality of life for its population.”260
For Russia, foreign trade also is on the same level as, and closely tied to,
the development of its own military capabilities. The increase or decrease of
trade income affects Russia’s ability to pay for defense programs and to pre-
pare itself for what it sees as inevitable conflict in the future. Russia also gains
significant economic benefit from the sale of military weapons and nuclear
power technologies. In 2012, President Putin published an op-ed that
expressed the connection in his mind between Russia’s military and security
strength and its economic wellbeing. As he wrote in the journal Foreign Policy
(or at least his name was attached to the article), “the huge resources invested
in modernizing our military-industrial complex and re-equipping the army

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must serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, cre-
ating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new
jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research.”261
Thus, because Russia’s economic health is key to its defense, the econ-
omy is an important national security topic against which Russia applies its
national security-related agencies, including intelligence and state security.
Although Russia operates openly in some economic arenas—for example,
selling its oil and gas and military weapons on the open market—it often
uses clandestine intelligence capabilities, even in areas where it could legally
operate, under the assumption that foreign governments are cheating and
stealing from Russia. Where Russia cannot operate legally—for example, in
purchasing the many goods that the country cannot acquire due to interna-
tional sanctions—it uses clandestine or criminal methods.
Foreign intelligence organizations, including Russian, use various
methods to identify and recruit sources of economic or technological
information. Those methods sometimes resemble classic human intelli-
gence operations, in which a case officer or agent recruits a human with
placement and access to the targeted information or to other people with
placement and access. In 1995 the first Annual Report to Congress on Eco-
nomic Collection and Industrial Espionage identified methods collectors
used, including human intelligence methods, technical methods, and cor-
porate methods, to collect economic and science and technology informa-
tion.262 This author was the primary drafter of that document, which was
mandated by the U.S. Congress and published by the National Counterin-
telligence Center. A 2019 U.S. Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency report offers a comparable list of methods that foreign intelligence
institutions apply directly to U.S. companies that conduct research and
development of defense technologies.263
A comparison of the methods described in those two documents shows
many similarities across a 24-year time span (see Figure 15). They include
classic agent recruitment, in which Soviet services excelled during the Cold
War and which recent cases show is still being used to target economic
and S&T information. Human sources include targeted individuals with

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desired accesses, such as Russian émigrés and employees of firms that com-
pete with Russian companies in the international market. They also include
elicitation at international conferences and trade shows, especially looking
for people who have access to information or technology of value and who
are willing to assist Russia.

Figure 15. Human Intelligence Methods Used in Economic and S&T Collection

1995 Report to Congress 2019 Targeting U.S. Technologies

Agent recruitment Exploitation of relationship
Accepting volunteers Exploitation of experts
Tasking employees of foreign firms Exploitation of insider access
Headhunting, hiring competitors’ Résumé submission
employees
Surveillance and surreptitious entry Surveillance
(hotel rooms, offices)
Recruitment of émigrés; inviting
émigrés to return home
Tasking foreign students
Elicitation during international
conferences and trade fairs
Debriefing visitors to foreign countries
Hiring information brokers and
consultants

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including National Counterintelligence
Center, Annual Report to Congress on Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage (Washington,
DC: NACIC, 1995) and Defense Security and Counterintelligence Agency, Targeting U.S. Technolo-
gies: A Report of Foreign Targeting of Cleared Industry (Washington, DC: DSCA, 2019).

Technical collection methods include computer intrusions, signals intel-

ligence, and open-source collection, including the clandestine collection of
openly available information to mask the origin of the research. Technical

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

operations, including computer network monitoring, are the norm in the

economic counterintelligence field inside Russia itself (see Figure 16). How-
ever, despite the prominence that Russian computer-network threat activity
has gained in the past few years, such as for internal security and political
collection, economic and technological intelligence operations abroad still
rely heavily on humans, including known Russian intelligence officers and
criminal groups—sometimes manned by “former” intelligence officers—
that operate in the interests of the Russian government.

Figure 16. Technical Intelligence Methods Used in Economic and S&T Collection

1995 Report to Congress 2019 Targeting U.S. Technologies

Hacking Exploitation of cyber operations
Communications intercepts Exploitation of security protocol
Open-source collection; clandestine
collection of open-source materials

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including National Counterintelligence
Center, Annual Report to Congress on Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage (Washington,
DC: NACIC, 1995) and Defense Security and Counterintelligence Agency, Targeting U.S. Technolo-
gies: A Report of Foreign Targeting of Cleared Industry (Washington, DC: DSCA, 2019).

The Russian government also uses corporate methods to collect eco-

nomic and S&T intelligence, such as exploiting capital investments, spon-
soring foreign research activities, inviting foreign companies to set up
research centers and support educational institutions in Russia, establishing
joint ventures, or proposing corporate mergers and acquisitions (see Figure
17). For example, in the past several years, as Russia has emphasized research
into artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, the Russian govern-
ment has invited foreign firms, including industry leaders from China
and South Korea, to come to Russia and set up research centers. The firms
have brought their technology to Russia, sponsored training for Russian
researchers, and developed joint research ventures that greatly supplement
Russia’s indigenous capabilities. Although these efforts are overt and legal,

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 Economic and S&T Intelligence

they are undoubtedly accompanied by at least counterintelligence surveil-

lance of the visiting foreign researchers in Russia and probably by recruit-
ment efforts directed at them to gain a long-term source inside the foreign
company. Merging overt corporate activities with clandestine operations for
intelligence and counterintelligence is a typical Russian tactic.

Figure 17. Corporate Intelligence Methods Used in Economic and S&T Collection

1995 Report to Congress 2019 Targeting U.S. Technologies

Foreign government use of private RFI/Solicitation
sector organizations, front companies,
and joint ventures
Corporate mergers and acquisitions Exploitation of business activity
Corporate technology agreements Attempted acquisition
Sponsorship of research activities Economic disinformation
Exploitation of supply chain

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including National Counterintelligence
Center, Annual Report to Congress on Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage (Washington,
DC: NACIC, 1995) and Defense Security and Counterintelligence Agency, Targeting U.S. Technolo-
gies: A Report of Foreign Targeting of Cleared Industry (Washington, DC: DSCA, 2019).

Russian economic and technological intelligence activities demon-

strate a number of these methods, from human intelligence to technical
and corporate intelligence. Russia applies these methods both against for-
eign targets and against political oppositionists inside Russia, as will be dis-
cussed below.
Russian intelligence and state security activities related to the economic
aspect of Russia’s national security can be divided into three areas, each of
which is organizationally distinct within the Russian intelligence system:

■ Science and technology intelligence.

■ Economic intelligence.
■ Economic counterintelligence.

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S&T COLLECTION
For Russia, science and technology intelligence, or what Orlov called “indus-
trial intelligence,” is the collection of foreign information and technological
products to support the development of Russian science and technology. It
focuses on the priorities and direction of Russian scientific research organi-
zations, and it strives to raise the overall technological capacity of Russian
enterprises. This collection often requires the clandestine circumvention of
sanctions or foreign laws that prohibit the export of technologies to Russia,
particularly targeting equipment or know-how to suppors the Russian mil-
itary or security industries. The overall goal is to bolster Russia’s own eco-
nomic and military strength. 
Both the SVR and GRU collect S&T intelligence, often competing
with each other for sources and targets. The SVR has the distinct Научно-
Техническая разведка (Directorate NTR, or Science and Technology Intel-
ligence Directorate). This unit is the direct descendant of the Soviet-era
KGB’s First Chief Directorate, which had an equivalent component, then
called Directorate T. Because of its focus on military technology, S&T intel-
ligence is also a priority function for the GU (formerly called GRU).

Early Soviet Era

Historically, Soviet technology collection operations appeared in any coun-
try where technology was available, the most technologically advanced
countries being the most likely to be targeted. These operations were con-
ducted partially because Russia could acquire foreign technology more
cheaply than could be done legally; partially because foreign countries
placed protections on their technology, especially military-related and dual-
use technology, that prohibited Russians from acquiring it legally; and par-
tially because Russia lacked the technology base on which to develop the
technology domestically.
For example, Soviet illegal Samuel Ginzberg (aka Walter Krivitsky)
served in Italy in the 1920s as a Russian military intelligence officer, under-
cover as a scholar researching the history of slavery in the Vatican library. His

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intelligence mission, however, included obtaining the plans for an Italian

submarine.264 Benito Mussolini had agreed to sell the plans for an outmoded
submarine model to the Soviet Union, but Stalin wanted the most recent
model. In 1928, Ginzberg used a communist sympathizer to contact an Ital-
ian engineer who was willing to sell the plans.265 For his effort, Ginzberg
received the Order of the Red Banner in 1931. His network later collected
the plans for a French submarine as well.266 Similarly, a British intelligence
source reported in the early 1930s that another Soviet illegal, Ignatiy Porets-
kiy (aka Ignace Reiss), targeted the German chemical company IG Farben-
industrie, recruiting an individual named Krupp.267
During the 1930s, S&T collection was the primary Soviet intelligence
effort directed against the United States, which the Soviet Union saw first and
foremost as a repository of technology. According to a Soviet military intel-
ligence defector, the Soviet Union’s goal in the 1920s/1930s was to “catch
up to and surpass America.”268 In 1934, a Soviet illegal intelligence officer,
Iosif Volodarsky, arrived in the United States to work as an assistant to Gaik
Ovakimyan, an OGPU officer operating undercover as an engineer at Soviet
Amtorg Trading Company in New York City. Ovakimyan had arrived in the
United States a year earlier, and his operations focused particularly on scien-
tific and technological intelligence. In December 1935, Ovakimyan openly
stated that he was in the United States to “investigate American methods of
producing chemicals. If I believe such methods would prove beneficial to my
country and satisfactory arrangements can be made, I recommend a license
be obtained so we may produce under patent rights. In some cases, we ask
your manufacturers to design and sell to us chemical producing machinery.”269
Volodarsky’s engineering background corresponded well with supporting this
mission, which was not always as above board as Ovakimyan made it sound.
Volodarsky himself described a process through which he received tech-
nology collection requirements from Ovakimyan and dispatched an Ameri-
can agent to factories and engineering facilities around the United States to
acquire sketches or drawings. Ovakimyan provided money to Volodarsky, and
he passed it to an agent to pay sources. The agent communicated the infor-
mation back to Volodarsky, who evaluated it and determined whether it met

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the requirement and was worth the money.270 Volodarsky’s main targets were
strategic industries, such as steelworks and precision machine manufacturers,
as Stalin’s five-year plan stressed the need to grow the Soviet steel industry.271
Other advanced manufacturing technologies were targeted to support
Russia’s strategic industries. Orlov described Soviet intelligence efforts to
steal the industrial process to manufacture artificial diamonds in Germany.
The Soviet Union initially approached a German company to buy the patent
legally, but the company charged an astronomical figure. Orlov quotes Sta-
lin as saying, they “want too much money. Try to steal it from them. Show
what the NKVD can do.”272

Cold War
Among the numerous Cold War examples of economic and technological
collection by Soviet intelligence services, much of the technological intelli-
gence was destined for weapon system development, while some supported
other industries, like agriculture or pharmaceuticals. In the mid-1970s, the
KGB reportedly boasted about having recruited sources in 17 U.S. technol-
ogy enterprises, including IBM, Texas Instruments, ITT, and the National
Institutes of Health. KGB defector Vasiliy Mitrokhin provided a KGB
report claiming that over half of Soviet defense industry projects in 1979
were based on Western-acquired science and technology. The chief of the
KGB Directorate T—responsible for collecting technological information
and the predecessor to today’s SVR Directorate NTR—boasted that the
value to the Soviet economy of the information his directorate collected was
100 times greater than the cost of his operations.273
GRU officer Vladimir Rezun (better known by his pen name Viktor
Suvorov) revealed the GRU’s tradecraft for targeting trade shows in Europe.
In an extended description of a group of GRU officers descending on a tele-
communication technology trade show in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1975, he
explained how the officers looked for owners of small companies that supplied
technologies to bigger weapon system manufacturers. As Rezun described,
the officers launched the process of recruiting the small company owners as

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GRU sources by offering the less well-off companies an opportunity to sell

their products for more money than they could typically expect to get.274
Between 1981 and early 1982, KGB officer Vladimir Vetrov passed a
series of documents to the French counterintelligence service detailing KGB
technology collection efforts, which came to be known as the Farewell Dos-
sier. Vetrov was an engineer who had been assigned to evaluate information
on NATO hardware and software. Vetrov’s nearly 4,000 secret documents
included the complete list of 250 Line X (technology collection) officers
stationed under legal cover in embassies around the world; a list of Soviet
organizations involved with scientific collection; and summary reports from
Directorate T on the goals, achievements, and unfulfilled objectives of the
program, along with more than 100 leads to Line X recruitments.275
SVR officer Vladimir Konoplev operated under the cover of first secre-
tary of the Russian Embassy in Brussels, Belgium, where he was responsible
for scientific technological collection, and he shared details about his work
after defecting with his family in March 1992. Konoplev reportedly had con-
tacts inside the European Economic Community Commission, the Belgian
Defense Ministry, and NATO. He revealed the names of several Belgians
who were providing the Soviet Union with military and economic infor-
mation, including Guido Kindt, an aerospace science correspondent for the
Belgian newspaper De Standaart, who provided the KGB with information
about technological developments in the U.S. space program.276 Kindt sub-
sequently reported that his handler mainly requested technical information
about the places Kindt visited as a journalist: NATO SHAPE, the Belgian
aircraft manufacture Sabca, and the Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynam-
ics, which conducted high-speed wind tunnel tests.277
The KGB also used SIGINT to collect S&T intelligence. According to
Mitrokhin, Soviet SIGINT facilities in the United States intercepted the com-
munications of Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island in New York
and several major companies.278 The SIGINT facility at the Soviet diplomatic
resort on Long Island was in a position to intercept communications from the
Grumman Corporation, which was involved in defense research and develop-
ment. The Soviet, and later Russian, consulate in San Francisco was located on

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a hilltop that gave it line-of-sight access to high-tech facilities in Silicon Valley.

According to a former U.S. Government official, “It was almost like everyone
they had there was a technical guy, as opposed to a human-intelligence guy.”279
With the continuing use of Russian diplomatic establishments as SIGINT
facilities (see Chapter 9), their use for S&T collection is a strong possibility.
In 1982, the U.S. National Intelligence Council summarized Soviet
technology collection efforts as follows:

The USSR is engaged in a well-organized, centrally directed, and

growing worldwide program to acquire U.S. and other Western mili-
tary technology, embargoed equipment, and manufacturing technol-
ogy to satisfy its military and defense-industrial needs. The Soviet
intelligence services and their Eastern European surrogates play a
major role in this worldwide program through a broad range of clan-
destine, technical, and overt collection operations. Although these
intelligence operations constitute a small part of the overall Soviet
technology acquisition effort, we believe these operations are respon-
sible for acquiring the overwhelming majority of the militarily signif-
icant Western technology that finds its way into the Soviet Union.280

In short, the Soviet Union had many legitimate, overt S&T relation-
ships through which it acquired technology. But in the military technology
area, it heavily used its intelligence services.

Post-Cold War
Such activities continue today on at least the same level as during the Cold War,
ranging from highly sophisticated and well-funded clandestine operations to
simple attempts to carry prohibited items across an international border in a
suitcase. Multiple individuals have been arrested in the United States and other
countries for illegally acquiring technology, with Russian military and state
security agencies sometimes identified as the direct recipients. Technology col-
lection operations in the past decade have exhibited several of the methods

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that the U.S. National Counterintelligence Center identified in 1995, such

as investing in start-up technology companies, establishing front companies,
and recruiting former employees of competitor companies as insider sources,
including by embassy-based intelligence officers. Sometimes these efforts
involve recruiting insiders to steal trade secrets, recruiting high-tech specialists,
or establishing a business presence abroad that can act as a legitimate company
while redirecting information or high-tech components to Russia.
In 2011, the Russian government-owned venture capital firm Rusnano
opened operations in Menlo Park, California, and began to insert people
into venture capital groups around Silicon Valley that financed nanotechnol-
ogy projects.281 Rusnano also used business investments to fund research at
­leading-edge technology companies, including $50 million in Boston-area
nanomedicine firms. Just a few months after the United States imposed
sanctions on Russia in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea, the FBI
began to warn U.S. companies and universities about the risks of entering
into technology-sharing agreements with a Russian government-owned
firm.282 Although most of Rusnano’s and other similar Russian companies’
activities are not connected to intelligence collection, these firms serve as
a platform for identifying people and promising technologies that Russian
intelligence services can target.
U.S. law enforcement agencies more recently have publicized a steady
stream of incidents involving Russian citizens or émigrés illegally exporting
or stealing high-tech components or information. In October 2016, the
U.S. Government arrested a naturalized U.S. citizen from Russia and two
Russian citizens for illegally exporting controlled cutting-edge microelec-
tronics technology from the United States to Russia. The Russians used
front companies to purchase the components from U.S.-based suppliers
and then falsely classified them on export documents, first shipping them
to Finland and then forwarding them to Russia.283 In another case, several
Russians were sentenced in a U.S. court in 2016 and 2017 for establishing
front companies in the United States that used false end user certificates to
ship approximately $50 million worth of microelectronics components to
Russia between 2002 and 2012. The components included analog-to-digital

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converters, static random-access memory chips, microcontrollers and micro-

processors, and other technologies. During the investigation, law enforce-
ment agencies found documents showing orders originating directly from
the Russian Ministry of Defense and the FSB.284
In July 2018, a Russian father and son, both named Aleksandr Brazh-
nikov, were indicted in a U.S. federal court for procuring electronic compo-
nents in the United States and shipping them to Russia. The son owned a
U.S.-based electronics export company that advertised itself as offering con-
venient and inexpensive access to American-made electronics.285 According
to the U.S. indictment, the younger Brazhnikov purchased electronic com-
ponents from U.S.-based distributors and re-packaged them for shipment
to his father in Moscow, falsifying the end users and value of the compo-
nents. The indictment identified the Russian clients, including the Ministry
of Defense, the FSB, and Russian entities involved in the design of nuclear
warheads and other weapons.286
A more recent arrest in Sweden demonstrated a classic human intelli-
gence method for collecting sensitive technological information. In Feb-
ruary 2019, Swedish police arrested a naturalized Swedish citizen meeting
with a Russian diplomat, who used the name Yevgeniy Umerenko. The
Swedish Foreign Ministry identified Umerenko as an SVR Line X officer
responsible for technology collection. Kristian Dmitrievski, the Swedish cit-
izen who had previously held a Russian passport, was described as a special-
ist in computer simulation and biophysics. Umerenko had been developing
Dmitrievski as a source since at least 2017, and Umerenko had previously
been observed running similar operations in Germany.287
Acting on a U.S. arrest warrant in August 2019, Italian police arrested
a Russian citizen, Aleksandr Korshunov, for allegedly using a method sim-
ilar to what the National Counterintelligence Center in 1995 called “task-
ing employees of foreign firms.” The head of business development for the
Russian company United Engine Corporation (UEC), a subsidiary of the
Russian state technology conglomerate Rostec, Korshunov was accused of
working with Italian citizen Maurizio Paolo Bianchi, the former director
of the Italian company Avio Spa, to steal trade secrets; the Italian firm is a

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subsidiary of the U.S. company General Electric Aviation, which manufac-

tures components for civil and military aviation. Although Bianchi left Avio
Spa in 2013, he maintained relationships with several employees, whom he
hired as consultants while they were still working for Avio Spa. Bianchi, on
Korshunov’s instructions, tasked the employees to provide proprietary engi-
neering data about aircraft engines.288 Both Korshunov and Bianchi were
arrested in 2019 and are being held in Italy pending a ruling on extradition
to the United States. President Putin personally weighed in on the arrest,
claiming that it was based on nothing but the United States trying to elim-
inate the competition.289 In a blatant attempt to derail the extradition, the
Russian government demanded that Korshunov be extradited not to the
United States, but to Russia on a suddenly emerging embezzlement charge;
Putin did not mention the embezzlement charge in his statement.290
Similar to the operations that prompted the 1982 U.S. National Intel-
ligence Council assessment of Soviet technology collection, these cases
demonstrate several collection methods—from classic human intelligence
recruitment in Sweden to establishing front companies in the United States
and entering into a consultant relationship with employees of a competing
company in Italy. They also show Russia’s sense of urgency to overcome sanc-
tions-related barriers that inhibit its technological development, especially
for technology that has military and security applications.
This technological intelligence activity reveals, however, another weak-
ness in the Russian, and in its predecessor Soviet, economic system. The
centrally managed Russian economic system itself inhibits the technolog-
ical innovation that freer political and economic structures encourage. The
Russian government, not private research organizations or companies, funds
the majority of S&T research, which both limits the funding available for
basic research and focuses it on government priorities, particularly defense
priorities. Additionally, many educated Russians would prefer to emigrate
from Russia for better economic opportunities abroad, creating a brain
drain effect that inhibits Russian high technology research.
Consequently, Russian intelligence services are dispatched across the
world to steal what Russia cannot develop domestically. Russia’s innovation

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ecosystem cannot support many of the technology development needs that

the Russian government has identified as priorities, such as artificial intelli-
gence and automation. By applying its intelligence services to these hard-to-
develop technologies, Russia is essentially outsourcing its innovation. That
dynamic is self-defeating in the long term, because a national program to
steal technology effectively ties the Russian economy to innovations devel-
oped in other countries rather than producing its own. Thus, Russia’s use of
intelligence capabilities to advance its aspiration to become a great power—
and the systemic weakness it demonstrates—serves to condemn Russia to
permanent second-class status as a scientific and technological power, not-
withstanding its intelligence successes.291
Just as the KGB boasted of having recruited sources in IBM, Texas
Instruments, ITT, and the National Institutes of Health, Russian intelligence
tries to do so in equivalent enterprises around the world today for the same
reason. While that intelligence collection can damage the national security
of the countries from which technology and technical know-how is stolen, it
may not provide Russia with the long-term benefit it hopes for itself.

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Economic intelligence is the collection of information on foreign gov-
ernments’ economic activities, economic and financial organizations, raw
materials markets, metals, and currency, which are priorities for the Russian
Federation. Russian economic intelligence includes supporting institutions
that create favorable conditions for Russia to achieve its foreign economic
objectives and targeting foreign countries’ economic actions that disadvan-
tage Russia.
The SVR is the primary organization responsible for economic intel-
ligence, and several SVR elements have related responsibilities. The SVR
directorate dedicated to this type of collection is Экономическая Разведка
(Directorate ER). Directorate NTR also plays a role. Additionally, separate
from both Directorate ER and Directorate NTR, a third directorate man-
ages what are called “measures of support,” or what during the Soviet era

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were called “active measures.” These measures of support involve disinfor-

mation operations that are intended to influence a foreign power to act in a
way that is beneficial to Russia, and they occasionally facilitate the work of
the economic and S&T directorates. In a recent case, intelligence collected
by an SVR officer under nonofficial cover fueled a Russian influence opera-
tion to gain Canadian support for an aircraft manufacturing joint venture,
highlighting this connection (see below).
Retired SVR officer Sergey Vorontsov defines economic intelligence as

Receiving information on all fields of foreign political actors’ eco-

nomic activity and their economic and financial structures, cur-
rency market conditions, raw materials, precious metals, etc., that
are of interest to Russia, and also the organization and management
of enterprises directed toward creating profitable circumstances for
Russian foreign economic interests, for developing effective foreign
economic cooperation, concluding profitable trade and economic
deals and agreements, etc.292

Russia requires the economic intelligence that Vorontsov describes to

give its struggling economy a boost in an interconnected economic world.
Just as with S&T collection, there are many economic fields in which Rus-
sia legitimately interacts in the global economic environment. However,
global economic interconnectedness is itself a threat to Russia’s strength
because of the cutthroat world of economic competition. Thus, in addition
to Vorontsov’s traditional definition, much of Russia’s “economic intelli-
gence” is related not just to studying other countries’ economic systems per
se, but also to collecting intelligence about efforts by perceived adversaries
to harm Russia’s economy, operating on the foundational assumption that
such a phenomenon is invariably occurring. Soviet/Russian intelligence ser-
vices have a long history of collecting information about real or presumed
unfriendly foreign power activities to “wreck” the Soviet/Russian economy.
This activity also enters into the category of economic counterintelligence,
which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

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Soviet Era
The Soviet Union operated on the ideological assumption that capitalist
countries were bent on destroying the Soviet economy. Suspicions of the
West, fueled by a mixture of anti-capitalist dogma and a sense of economic
inferiority, drove the Soviet Union to apply its intelligence collection capa-
bilities to protect it from what it viewed as a hostile global environment.
The Soviet Union regularly conducted intelligence operations to circumvent
the perceived anti-Soviet commercial practices of foreign countries. Orlov
claimed that the Soviet Union believed foreign companies colluded to raise
the prices of their exports to Russia 60 to 75 percent to bilk the Soviet Union
and to take advantage of Russia’s poor credit rating.293 Consequently, Soviet
state security was charged with controlling Soviet export and import opera-
tions and protecting Soviet foreign trade from perceived pressures and abuses
from international cartels and other organizations of monopolistic capital.294
Based on those suspicions, Soviet illegal Ignatiy Poretskiy (aka Ignace
Reiss) operated in Germany during the 1930s under nonofficial cover as a
Soviet Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) specialist and journalist. His
cover provided him access to German economic information and was suf-
ficiently convincing to fool a British intelligence source who encountered
Poretskiy/Reiss in 1933 and assumed that he had left intelligence work alto-
gether and joined the GOSPLAN full time. As the source reported, Porets-
kiy/Reiss was formulating a variety of economic projects.295
Similarly, Soviet illegal Iosif Volodarsky, mentioned earlier in relation to
S&T collection, worked undercover as an employee of the Soviet company,
Russian Oil Products, in the United Kingdom before his assignment to the
United States. He was arrested in London in 1932 for trying to recruit a
British oil company employee to provide proprietary information about the
company’s production and sales figures. Volodarsky’s requests came just after
the Soviet Union had lost a contract for supplying petrochemical products
for the British military.296
During Stalin’s reign, Soviet leaders preached the threat of capitalist
encirclement, which they used as a pretext to explain poor Soviet economic
performance. One former NKVD officer wrote that his supervisors gathered

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office personnel together to explain why there were long lines for consumer
goods. They claimed that the problem was international capitalism and that
an unnamed saboteur, using money from foreign capitalists, was buying up
all of the goods manufactured for the Soviet people, creating shortages in the
Soviet Union. The solution was a more serious study of Communist Party
history and theory.297 Capitalist encirclement continued to drive Soviet
thinking after World War II and throughout Stalin’s reign.298 Although
today the Cold War-era communist ideology is stripped away from Russian
thinking, Russian propaganda still claims that the United States is pursuing
a policy of “hostile encirclement” of Russia.299 Similar to during the Soviet
era, the answer today is Russian patriotic education, accompanied by eco-
nomic intelligence efforts to reveal the adversarial plans of the United States
and other economic powers.
Soviet economic intelligence operations went beyond collecting intel-
ligence to include actively manipulating and undermining capitalist coun-
tries’ economies. Petr Karpov, an OGPU officer who defected in Germany
in 1924, claimed that the Soviet government, via OGPU clandestine opera-
tions, attempted to disrupt foreign economies by disseminating counterfeit
foreign currency.300 Ginzberg/Krivitsky later wrote about a Soviet opera-
tion to counterfeit U.S. currency, which he described as an attempt by Sta-
lin to add hard currency to the Soviet treasury.301 The operation resulted
in arrests of OGPU agents in Germany in 1929 and in the United States
in 1933 after police found counterfeit currency originating from the Soviet
Union.302 Orlov was in Germany when the story broke about counterfeit
U.S. banknotes being deposited in a German bank, forcing him to flee in the
face of intensified German counterintelligence scrutiny.303

Post-Cold War
Although no longer fueled by the communist-capitalist ideological con-
flict, Russia’s suspicions about foreign government intent continue in the
21st century. The 2015 arrest of Yevgeniy Buryakov, an SVR officer work-
ing under nonofficial cover in the New York City office of the Russian

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bank VneshEconomBank, and two Russian diplomatically covered SVR

officers, Igor Sporyshev and Viktor Podobniy, demonstrated the continu-
ing application of intelligence resources toward this line of effort. The
operation revealed requests from Moscow for intelligence on economic
issues, including potential U.S. sanctions against Russia and U.S. efforts to
develop alternative energy resources.304 Russian officials interpret sanctions
as evidence that the West, especially the United States, is intent on destroy-
ing Russia’s economy.
Buryakov arrived in the United States in August 2010 and began using
his position in banking circles to support Russian intelligence collection
activities. In 2013, Sporyshev tasked Buryakov to help formulate questions
that a Russian ITAR-TASS news agency journalist could use for intelligence
collection. Buryakov recommended the following questions, as subsequently
recorded in the U.S. Department of Justice indictment:

■ Ask about how the New York Stock Exchange uses exchange-traded
funds, particularly how they are used as mechanisms for destabiliza-
tion of markets.
■ Ask them what they think about limiting the use of trading robots.
■ Ask about technical banking matters involving the exchange of
funds to the Russian Federation, such as “technical parameters” and
“other regulations directly related to the exchange.”305

A few weeks later, an SVR officer operating undercover as an ITAR-

TASS journalist sent an email to an employee of the New York Stock
Exchange repeating Buryakov’s proposed questions nearly verbatim.306
As early as April 2014, shortly after the international community
imposed economic sanctions on Russia, Sporyshev relayed collection task-
ing to Buryakov to research “the effect of economic sanctions... on our coun-
try.” In response, Buryakov conducted Internet searches for “sanctions Russia
consiquences [sic]” and “sanctions Russia impact” and reported the results
to Sporyshev.307 In mid-2014, Buryakov also began cultivating an Ameri-
can businessman who offered information about U.S. sanctions. The source,

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who unbeknownst to Buryakov was cooperating with the FBI, approached

Buryakov with a proposal to establish a casino in Russia. In the course of his
presentation, the source remarked about the impact of sanctions on the pro-
posed project, and he produced a document labeled “Internal Treasury Use
Only” that contained a list of Russian individuals subject to U.S. sanctions.
The source asked whether Buryakov was interested in such information, to
which Buryakov responded enthusiastically and asked to take the document
with him. The source later showed Buryakov a list of Russian banks, marked
“UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO,” and told him that the U.S. Government used
the list to identify Russian banks on which to impose sanctions. Buryakov
expressed interest in getting more information about sanctions, specifically
information about when additional sanctions would be imposed, the types
of sanctions, and on which companies or entities. He tasked the source to
provide information not just about banks, but about any Russian institution
that could be affected by sanctions.308
Buryakov’s mission also included supporting an influence operation—
or “measures of support”—to remove obstacles to a huge Russian trade deal.
In 2012 and 2013, the Russian aircraft technology company Rostec—the
same company involved in a 2019 arrest in Italy noted above—was in nego-
tiations with the Canadian aircraft manufacturer Bombardier to create a
multimillion dollar joint venture that would allow Rostec to manufacture
Bombardier’s Q400 aircraft in Russia.309 However, Canadian labor unions
associated with Bombardier opposed the plan, fearing the loss of jobs.310 The
SVR’s solution was to launch an influence operation geared toward pres-
suring labor unions to drop their opposition and approve a deal on Rus-
sia’s terms. Buryakov’s role was to travel to Canada several times and gather
information to feed that influence operation.311 The deal started to break
down when the West imposed sanctions on Russia; Bombardier pulled out
of the deal altogether in late 2014, rendering the proposed influence oper-
ation moot.312 Nevertheless, the FBI investigation of Buryakov from 2012
to 2015 provided evidence that Russia continued to task its intelligence
services to collect economic intelligence and to influence foreign economic
decisions, as it had done during the Soviet era.

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In a separate case, a bank employee was the target of an alleged Russian

intelligence operation in Japan. This Japanese SoftBank employee was arrested
in January 2020 for passing confidential bank information to Russian officers
covered as employees at the Russian Trade Representation in Tokyo begin-
ning as early as 2017. The arrested employee admitted to stealing low-level
information. Nevertheless, the Russian Embassy provided a typically reflex-
ive response, claiming that Russia “regrets Japan has joined anti-Russian spec-
ulation trend in the West on the hackneyed topic of spy mania.”313
Russia’s actions to overcome sanctions also benefit its allies. In some
cases, Russia-affiliated companies use their vast sanctions-busting experi-
ence to support Russian allies that are encountering similar obstacles, such
as Zimbabwe, Iran, and Syria. A U.S. citizen was arrested in 2010 for sell-
ing Russian helicopters to Zimbabwe in violation of sanctions; the purchase
was made through a Russian company.314 A naturalized U.S. citizen from
Iran was arrested in 2013 in the United States for acquiring technology that
helped Iran launch its first earth imagery reconnaissance satellite; the sat-
ellite was launched in partnership with the Russian government.315 In June
2018, eight businessmen, including five Russian nationals who worked for
the Russian shipping company Sovfracht and three Syrian nationals, were
indicted in a U.S. federal court for conspiring to send jet fuel to Syria and for
conducting U.S. dollar wire transfers to Syria in violation of U.S. economic
sanctions against Syria and Crimea. After the U.S. Government placed sanc-
tions on Sovfracht, the Russian employees created a front company to con-
duct the money transfers and deliver the fuel to Syria with less scrutiny.316
As oil is such a significant element of the Russian economy, Russian illicit
activity in the oil market is especially prominent, reportedly with intelligence
service support. Russian SVR defector Sergey Tretyakov revealed the SVR’s
involvement in running the UN Oil-for-Food program in the late 1990s,
which allowed Iraq to sell oil vouchers for food imports into Iraq. Accord-
ing to Tretyakov, an SVR Directorate ER officer was assigned undercover to
the UN office responsible for administering the Oil-for-Food program. The
SVR officer eventually became the sole administrator of the program, allow-
ing him to manipulate prices and give senior Russian government officials

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and other Russian entities, including the Russian Presidential Administra-

tion, as well as other people who were friendly to Russia, opportunities for
enormous profits as they traded on the vouchers.317 This same sort of opera-
tion may have a more recent analogue: in 2015, the EU placed sanctions on
George Haswani, based on what the EU called overwhelming evidence that
he was serving as a middleman for oil purchases by the Syrian regime from
the so-called Islamic State.318 The U.S. Government designated Haswani for
sanctions later the same year.319 According to Turkish media, Haswani is a
dual Russian-Syrian citizen who was trained in Russia.320 Although SVR
involvement in the Haswani allegation is not firmly established, the case
resembles the SVR’s illicit activity in the 1990s.
With SVR intelligence support, the Russian government backs the Rus-
sian oil and gas industry, while undermining other countries’ competing
industries. If reports are true that the director of Russia’s state oil company
Rosneft, Igor Sechin, is a former KGB officer, this association may influ-
ence that SVR support.321 According to a U.S. intelligence assessment, the
Russian government conducted an aggressive propaganda campaign to crit-
icize the natural gas extraction method known as fracking, probably driven
largely by the Russian government’s concern about the impact of U.S. natu-
ral gas production on the global energy market and its potential challenges
to Russia’s profitability.322 Possibly connected to this, alternative energy
sources were revealed as intelligence targets in the FBI investigation of Yev-
geniy Buryakov. Igor Sporyshev, an SVR officer who worked with Buryakov,
began cultivating a U.S. oil industry expert in 2013, promising him access
to oil deals in Russia in return for information about the oil and gas indus-
try. An SVR officer at the time explained his recruitment method, which
included cheating, promising favors, and then discarding the intelligence
source once the SVR obtained the relevant information.323
Other countries’ oil and gas infrastructure is another frequent target of
Russian collection. In April 2019, Lithuanian police arrested a Russian-born
Lithuanian citizen, Romanas Šešelis, for providing information about the
LNG terminal operator Klaipėdos Nafta and other infrastructure to a Rus-
sian intelligence agency between 2015 and 2017.324 Based on unconfirmed

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allegations, individuals involved in the Nord Stream II pipeline project—

designed to transport Russian natural gas to the EU—may also have Russian
intelligence connections. Suspected individuals include Nord Stream CEO
Matthias Warnig, an ex-captain in the East German Stasi, who is now closely
associated with President Putin, himself an ex-KGB officer who served in
East Germany.325 U.S. intelligence officials have also voiced suspicions that
the intelligence relationship to the petrochemical industry could go the
other direction, expressing concerns in 2018 that the Nord Stream pipeline
system could allow Moscow to emplace listening and monitoring technol-
ogy on the Baltic seafloor.326
The close connection that ties the Russian economy, especially the
oil and gas industry, to Russian national security drives Russia to apply its
national security apparatus, including its intelligence capabilities, to mon-
itor economic developments worldwide. Economic intelligence collection
and influence operations both protect against suspected foreign efforts to
damage the Russian economy and undermine economic competition.

ECONOMIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The third application of Russian intelligence and state security in the eco-
nomic arena is economic counterintelligence. This is the mechanism by
which the Soviet, and now Russian, government has used economic levers
internally to prevent damage to the ruling regime, whether it be the Bolshe-
vik regime of the early post-revolutionary period or the Putin regime today.
The objectives and methods have remained similar across the 100-plus years
since the Bolshevik revolution. Economic counterintelligence is weighted
more heavily toward state security than intelligence. Nevertheless, it uses
various clandestine means to accomplish its missions. Economic counterin-
telligence has two primary directions: to prevent the leakage of Russian eco-
nomic information abroad, even information that most countries publish
openly, and to use economic levers to punish antiregime activists at home.
Today, economic counterintelligence is the FSB’s responsibility through
its dedicated Economic Counterintelligence Service, which is responsible

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for monitoring the credit and financial, industrial, telecommunications,

and transportation sectors of the Russian economy. Within the Economic
Counterintelligence Service are three primary operational departments:

■ Department K, which provides counterintelligence services for

banks and financial institutions.
■ Department T, which provides counterintelligence services for the
transportation sector.
■ Department P, which provides counterintelligence services for
industrial enterprises.

The Economic Counterintelligence Service’s functions differ from

economic intelligence and S&T intelligence because they are derived from
the Soviet-era KGB Second Chief Directorate, which was responsible for
internal counterintelligence, as well as the KGB Fourth and Sixth Director-
ates, which had counterintelligence responsibilities in the economy. Conse-
quently, these functions operate separately from the SVR and GRU foreign
collection operations.

Soviet Era
Immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, the regime had an urgent need
to stabilize the internal economic situation. Less than a year after the revo-
lution, new missions were added to the first Bolshevik state security organi-
zation, as evidenced by its name’s expansion: the All-Russian Extraordinary
Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Profiteering, and Cor-
ruption (VChK) (emphasis added). Corruption among Soviet officials had
reached the severity of a national security threat.
Several intelligence officer defectors who had been involved with Soviet
state security in its earliest days have provided insights into this economic
side of state security. Orlov, writing under the pseudonym Lev Nikolayev,
published several articles in the journal Soviet Justice Weekly in 1923 expos-
ing the financial misdemeanors of Soviet officials. In one case, he wrote

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about a judge collaborating with a prosecutor to demand bribes for leni-

ency—the accused were convicted and sentenced to execution.327 In another
case, a prosecutor offered freedom to a suspect on the condition that the
family pay 500 million rubles.328
OGPU defector Petr Karpov noted that economic crime was integrated
into the Soviet state security service from its foundation. He wrote that the
VChK could not meet all of its operational expenses with official allocations
from the Bolshevik government. Consequently, the VChK was forced to
supplement its income by selling property requisitioned from wealthy Rus-
sian citizens, trafficking contraband goods confiscated in raids, and counter-
feiting tsarist-era currency. But eventually, this authorized criminal activity
had to be brought under control, and the Soviet state security service was
forced to pursue its own people for economic crimes.329
Corruption and domestic economic resistance remained a state secu-
rity concern through the rest of the Soviet era. As Stalin ordered the collec-
tivization of farms, those who resisted were labeled “wreckers,” and anyone
who refused to fulfill state orders was accused of economic “sabotage.”330
The NKVD Economic Department was the preeminent state security ele-
ment of the early 1930s, as the Soviet Union was striving to establish its
industrial base and collectivize agriculture, according to KGB defector
Petr Deryabin.331
During the Soviet era, people viewed as traitors were often accused of
committing economic crimes. When a Soviet embassy learned of a defec-
tion, it reflexively claimed that the defector had stolen or embezzled money,
and thus should be returned to face Soviet criminal charges. For example,
when Lithuanian merchant seaman Simas Kudirka attempted to defect to a
U.S. ship in 1970, the immediate response from Soviet authorities was that
Kudirka had stolen 3,000 rubles from his Soviet ship’s safe and thus should
be returned as a fugitive criminal.332 Vladislav Krasnov, in his groundbreak-
ing 1985 book on Soviet defectors, noted that stealing money or property
was the most common accusation Soviet authorities made when demanding
the return of a defector. However, official Soviet court indictments against
defectors included theft in only a small percentage of cases, indicating that

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the claim of an economic crime was usually only a superficial attempt to

besmirch the defector’s name and demand extradition.333 As was pointed
out in a U.S. Congressional hearing following the Kudirka incident, “it
seems fairly obvious that anyone who was going to defect would not steal
rubles. That would be excess baggage.”334
Additionally, as noted above in relation to economic intelligence, the
Soviet Union routinely expected capitalist powers to overcharge and cheat
Soviet purchasers, so it employed economic counterintelligence measures
to circumvent disadvantageous deals. In 1936, for example, Iosif Volodar-
skiy purchased shares with NKVD money in a New York City company
called Round the World Trading Company. Based on the assumption that
Western trade partners colluded to overcharge and bilk the Soviet Union,
Soviet intelligence used this company to gather commercial information.335
When the Soviet Amtorg Trading Company sent an offer to an American
firm to purchase machinery, Volodarskiy, using the American-based Round
the World Trading Company as cover, contacted the same American sup-
pliers and asked for price quotations for the same products. Amtorg could
then compare prices and determine whether it was being overcharged as a
Soviet entity.336

Post-Cold War
Today, the Russian government, particularly the FSB, uses the enforcement
of economic crime laws as a lever to inhibit the activities of foreign pow-
ers and domestic opposition groups inside Russia. Additionally, Russian
national security leaders have expressed a suspicion similar to Soviet-era
leaders, that foreign powers are intent on destroying the Russian economy.
For Russia, counterintelligence is not narrowly defined as catching spies, but
it also includes preventing anyone, whether foreign or domestic, from coun-
tering the regime’s power. That reasoning extends into the economic realm.
Foreign nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that support Russian
democratic civic groups are a particular target of Russian accusations of for-
eign economic intrigue. In 2004, President Putin accused Russian NGOs

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of pursuing “dubious group and commercial interests” for taking foreign

money. FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev told the Russian State Duma
in 2005 that the FSB had uncovered spies working in foreign-sponsored
NGOs. He further claimed, “Foreign secret services are ever more actively
using non-traditional methods for their work and, with the help of different
NGOs’ educational programs, are propagandizing their interests, particu-
larly in the former Soviet Union.” Patrushev accused the United States of
placing spies undercover within the Peace Corps, which was expelled from
Russia in 2002, the Saudi Red Crescent, and the Kuwaiti NGO Society for
Social Reform. Patrushev attributed an economic motive to these perceived
foreign plots, alleging that industrialized states did not want “a powerful
economic competitor like Russia.” Echoing Soviet-era accusations of nefar-
ious Western economic intent, he claimed that Russia had lost billions of
dollars per year due to U.S., EU, and Canadian “trade discrimination.”337
Pushing for stronger regulation of NGOs, Patrushev said, “The imperfect-
ness of legislation and lack of efficient mechanisms for state oversight creates
a fertile ground for conducting intelligence operations under the guise of
charity and other activities.”338 In 2012, Putin signed the “foreign agent law,”
which ordered Russian civil rights organizations that received any foreign
funding to register as “foreign agents.”339
The FSB also regularly uses economic statutes to suppress political forces
that rival Russian central authority and facilitate infighting among rival
elites. Through a number of high-profile arrests, this FSB tactic has become
one of the foremost manifestations of economic counterintelligence within
Russia. In some cases, arrests have silenced criticism of official corruption
within the government itself.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch who used dubious commercial
practices to become the richest man in Russia during Boris Yeltsin’s time
as president, clashed with Putin and was arrested in 2003, along with other
executives of the oil giant Yukos, for tax evasion and economic crimes.
Although he was certainly not the only oligarch whose wealth was founded
on a questionable basis, his primary offense was his support for politicians
who opposed Putin. Khodorkovsky was sentenced in 2005 to nine years

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in prison. He was charged with other economic crimes while serving his
sentence, and he was finally released in 2013 and left Russia.340 In May
2020, an organization sponsored by Khodorkovsky published an online
expose on the FSB, titled The Lubyanka Federation, that highlighted the
agency’s economic focus, showing that the allegations against him have
not silenced him.341
In another case, American-British investor William Browder became
infamous in Russia for his claims of Russian government corruption. In
2008, Browder’s Moscow-based tax advisor, Sergey Magnitsky, alleged that
Russian police and tax authorities had attempted to steal over $200 million
from the company, claiming that it was delinquent in its taxes. The case was
widely seen as retaliation for Browder’s anti-corruption campaign, and Mag-
nitsky was arrested after publicizing the allegation. Magnitsky later died in
prison, inspiring the United States to institute the Magnitsky Act, which
levies sanctions against corrupt Russian government officials.342 Magnitsky
was later tried posthumously in Russia for tax fraud.343
One of the highest profile arrests based on an alleged violation of a finan-
cial statute came in 2016, when the FSB arrested Russian Minister of Econ-
omy Alexei Ulyukayev. He was accused of trying to extort $2 million from
the oil conglomerate Rosneft to approve its purchase of the state-owned
oil company Bashneft. The case has been assessed as the result of infighting
within the power centers of the Russian government. Rosneft director and
Putin loyalist Igor Sechin, an economic hard-liner, reportedly launched the
bribery accusation against Ulyukayev, an economic liberal. Ulyukayev was
sentenced to eight years in prison in 2017.344
Similarly, anti-corruption activist Aleksey Navalny was arrested in 2013
on embezzlement charges. His case was dismissed but retried in 2017, when
he was found guilty. The guilty verdict effectively barred him from running
in the 2018 presidential election and, thus, the allegation of economic mal-
feasance removed a potential political opponent to Putin.345 Amid these
actions, the Russian State Duma passed legislation that would make it illegal
for a Russian citizen to reveal any Russian-government information without
explicit approval, thereby blocking foreign government investigations into

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fraud or corruption by Russian subsidiaries of multinational corporations.346

The new law also made it illegal to publish statistics of the Russian economy
independently of the Russian government itself.
The FSB’s economic counterintelligence role has also arisen as a lucrative
way for FSB officers to get very rich, echoing the early days of Bolshevik state
security. The Soviet, and now Russian, security services’ use of economic
criminal procedures—simultaneously to protect the ruling regime and to
silence anyone who criticizes regime-sponsored corruption—has been a
continuous characteristic of economic counterintelligence since the earliest
days of the Bolshevik regime. Regime-sponsored corruption is far from a
thing of the past. Just as the VChK did in the early Bolshevik period, FSB
investigators today use counterintelligence powers to capture vast amounts
of money. Oleg Vyugin, a former senior official at the Bank of Russia and
the Ministry of Finance, went so far as to say that the security services have
“become one of the key elements of the economy… Unfortunately, they’re an
element that’s an obstacle to its normal development.”347
FSB Colonel Kirill Cherkalin was arrested in May 2019 with money
and valuables totaling over $180 million in his apartment. Two other FSB
officers, Dmitry Frolov and Andrey Vasilyev, were arrested soon after that.
Cherkalin had been a manager in Department K, the FSB component
responsible for economic counterintelligence in the banking sector, and
he was reportedly a member of an interministerial committee for fight-
ing money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction;348 FSB Department K had investigated Sergey Mag-
nitsky in 2008 and Aleksey Navalny in 2013. Cherkalin was accused of
using his regulatory power over banks to demand bribes and protection
money. The Moscow Times reported after Cherkalin’s arrest that FSB offi-
cers could extort money from banks in several ways: they could demand a
percentage of all cash withdrawals (up to 0.2 percent of the transactions),
or they could demand bribes and payoffs for specific violations.349 In
November 2020, a former FSB Department K officer Aleksey Artamonov
(aka Janosh Neumann) claimed that money laundering has become so
rampant in Russia that the authorities responsible for combating it cannot

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defeat it, so they have decided simply to control it; however, staying “clean”
is impossible when FSB officers are involved in state-supported money
laundering operations.350
Because money laundering is common in Russian banks, Russian bank
regulators can readily claim grounds for pressing their corrupt demands. The
Ministry of Interior faces the same temptation. In October 2019, a Moscow
court sentenced a colonel from a Ministry of Interior department respon-
sible for regulating banks to 12 years in prison for bribery and obstructing
justice; the colonel had accumulated more than $125 million in bribe mon-
ey.351 Orlov’s articles about official corruption in the 1920s do not appear as
distant as time would suggest.

METHODS AND MOTIVATIONS IN THE

ECONOMIC AND S&T REALM
Available information shows that Russian services heavily rely on human
methods, such as agent recruitment, front companies, and human penetra-
tions of competing companies, for economic and S&T intelligence tasks.
Russia has also taken advantage of a foreign corporate environment that is
willing to cooperate with Russian companies, using corporate agreements
and investments as platforms for intelligence activities. Some of these deals
have also become the target of Russian disinformation campaigns when
there is a threat that things might not go Russia’s way. Russian intelligence
officers also collect open-source information clandestinely or task sources to
collect information for them.
As Russian computer-based intelligence activities have been widely pub-
licized over the past several years—centering primarily on aggressive Russian
actions against geopolitical adversaries, such as Ukraine, the United States,
and Western European countries—reports have increased of these same
methods being used for economic and technological collection. For exam-
ple, in 2011, the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
changed the name of its annual report to Congress from Economic Collec-
tion and Industrial Espionage to Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets

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in Cyberspace.352 In 2018, that same organization repeated this theme in a

report titled Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace.353
Publicly available information, however, provides a less compelling argu-
ment that Russia uses computer-network operations as a primary method
for collecting economic and technological information, although it does
extensively use computer-based operations for internal economic counter-
intelligence purposes. For foreign targets, Russian computer network threat
actors appear instead to be more focused on fulfilling Russia’s military and
political requirements. Even in cases where a Russian actor targets an indus-
trial enterprise, the actions often appear to be for sabotage rather than intel-
ligence collection.
Only a handful of the reported Russia-related incidents in the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR) database of government-sponsored computer
intrusions noted in Chapter 4 appear to have an economic or technology
collection motive, and even those are mixed with geopolitics. In late 2016,
a computer-network threat actor, believed to be affiliated with Russia, tar-
geted Ukrainian banks and destroyed banking data, and, in early 2017, a
threat actor targeted infrastructure entities in the oil and gas sector, pri-
marily in Ukraine. A threat actor targeted biological and chemical labora-
tories in Ukraine and other countries in Europe in mid-2018, probably in
reaction to allegations of Russia’s use of a chemical agent in the Sergey Skri-
pal assassination attempt in the United Kingdom. Later in 2018, a threat
actor targeted U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company, a nuclear power
developer. None of these activities appear to be solely to collect economic
or technological information for Russian exploitation, but instead to have
the primary mission of collecting information that could be used for geopo-
litical confrontation purposes, particularly in relation to Russia’s aggressive
actions against Ukraine.
The CFR’s database is by no means comprehensive. CFR relies solely
on information that is publicly reported, and its data collection emphasizes
politically driven operations. Nevertheless, this database seems to align with
the analysis of other organizations that monitor Russian-sponsored com-
puter network attacks. For example, the computer security company FireEye

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concluded in 2014 that the activities of the widely known Russian-based

group labeled APT28 (aka Fancy Bear), which the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice assessed was affiliated with the GRU, indicated a political, not an eco-
nomic motive.354 According to FireEye, “this group, unlike the China-based
threat actors we track, does not appear to conduct widespread intellectual
property theft for economic gain. Nor have we observed the group steal and
profit from financial account information.” APT28’s activities suggest more
a motive to collect intelligence on Russian defense and geopolitical interests
rather than economic interests.355
Another Russian computer network threat group, APT29 (aka Cozy
Bear) also targets political information. The Dutch intelligence service
AIVD has assessed that APT29 is affiliated with the SVR or the FSB,356
and U.S. investigators have connected APT29 to the SVR after the 2020
SolarWinds operation.357 Primary targets for another Russian threat group
labeled Venomous Bear (aka Turla) are in the government, aerospace,
NGO, defense, cryptology, and education sectors. Venomous Bear, possibly
sponsored by the FSB, was particularly active in early to mid-2015 when
it compromised multiple countries’ embassy, government, educational, and
NGO websites.358
One Russian computer network threat group appears to be more
focused on economic targets than the others. Energetic Bear has targeted
industrial control software vendors, potentially giving hackers access to
everything from power grid systems to manufacturing plants. The group
seemed at least in part focused on broad surveillance of the oil and gas
industry, including gas producers, firms that transport liquid natural gas and
oil, and energy financing companies.359 In the context of Russia’s intelligence
activities, this may fall into the economic intelligence category, since foreign
oil and energy companies compete with Russian companies in the global
petrochemical market.
The U.S. Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s 2019
report mentioned above indicates that only 17 percent of reported incidents
of foreign targeting of U.S. cleared defense contractors have been conducted
via computer-based operations. These attempts usually come in the form of

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unsolicited emails carrying malicious code, which computer security proto-

cols often catch.360 With some technologies, like electronics and aeronautics,
which were noted above as being the targets of human-based operations,
computer network operations are even less prevalent.361
Nevertheless, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Con-
stitution reported in 2016 that a GRU-affiliated hacking campaign was
observed operating in German research institutions and companies, espe-
cially in the field of laser technology and optics.362 More recently, Russian
computer-based intelligence collection operations may have targeted phar-
maceutical companies in the race to find a vaccine for COVID-19.363 Russian
leaders made public statements in 2020 encouraging Russian companies to
be the first to find a vaccine, because it would bolster Russia’s technological
reputation in the world. Even in this case, Russia has a geopolitical motive
for its intelligence collection operation, not merely an economic one.
The U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center’s (NCSC’s)
2018 report, Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace, claimed that “in
recent years Russia has dramatically increased its demand for source code
reviews for foreign technology being sold inside the country.”364 The NCSC
interprets these actions as being related to economic collection. That may be
valid, inasmuch as Russia relies on Western technology to maintain its econ-
omy, as noted earlier. However, such a trend could just as easily fall within the
FSB’s economic counterintelligence mission. Founded on Russia’s historical
suspicion toward foreign powers and the assumption that they are invariably
trying to damage Russia’s economic potential—along with the reality that
the FSB, the entity responsible for economic counterintelligence, conducts
most of these code reviews—it should come as no surprise that Russia might
use these source code reviews to protect Russia’s economic and defense sec-
tors from perceived foreign enemies or internal threats.
The NCSC’s 2018 report also assessed that “Russia uses cyber operations
as an instrument of intelligence collection to inform its decisionmaking and
benefit its economic interests.” In support of that assertion, NCSC cited a
claim by a Russian hacker, who used the handle “Eas7” and in 2016 reported
having collaborated with the FSB on economic espionage missions.365 Eas7

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is probably Alisa Belousova, a 2004 graduate of the North Caucasus State

Technical University who has described herself as a programmer, system
administrator, computer security analyst, and system architect.366 NCSC
did not mention in its analysis that the report about “Eas7” originated with
a 2016 article in the online tabloid site Vice TV. Although that report has
been repeated online, it has not been corroborated.367 The remainder of the
examples that NCSC provides in its 2018 report are more likely related to
either political collection or critical infrastructure collection supporting
military contingency planning (see Chapters 4 and 7, respectively).

CONCLUSION: NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

FUEL ECONOMIC/S&T COLLECTION
Economic and S&T collection are potent tools for the Russian government to
use in maintaining and growing its economic and military strength. Because
Russia’s economic status, especially as it relates to oil and gas commodities,
plays such a pivotal role in Russia’s national security decisionmaking, Russia
feels an urgent need to understand foreign economic plans and technological
developments. Such collection starts from the foundational assumption that
Russia is surrounded by adversarial powers, which is reinforced by sanctions
designed to change Russia’s inimical geopolitical behavior. Unlike in polit-
ical intelligence collection, where computer-based methods have become
increasingly prevalent, as evidenced by the SolarWinds operation in 2020,
human operations still predominate in foreign economic and S&T collec-
tion. Inside Russia, however, where the Russian government enjoys nearly
complete control over the telecommunications environment, the FSB and
other Russian services heavily use computer surveillance and other technical
methods to monitor the domestic oppositionist activities—and these inves-
tigations often employ economic counterintelligence resources and laws.368

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 CHAPTER 6

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

k k k
As discussed in the previous two chapters, both political and S&T col-
lection contain a defense component that supports political decisionmak-
ing and technological development. Defense-related collection seeks to
understand a potential adversary’s defense policies and research and devel-
opment toward future weapons capabilities at the strategic level. Those are
important elements of military intelligence.
Another part of military intelligence is to collect the information that
military forces will need to conduct military operations, both in a current,
tactical context and in a broader, strategic context. There are three main
major components of Russian intelligence that support military activity:

■ Foundational military intelligence, which collects and analyzes

information about the basic elements of a foreign military force
that the Russian military would face in a military conflict.
■ Intelligence on strategic forces, particularly nuclear weapons
capabilities, and strategic missile defense capabilities, which
touch on Russia’s primary military capability—its strategic nuclear
deterrent.
■ Intelligence for strategic contingency purposes, which includes
collecting intelligence about and planning for future attacks on an

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adversary’s critical infrastructure that would support military action

if Russia ever found itself in a war.

This chapter is organized around these three components. Intelligence

collection to support military decisionmaking is primarily the GRU’s role,
although the SVR, as did the KGB before it, also runs sources who provide
military-related information, and the FSB is involved in this collection in
the countries of the former Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, the United States gathered a large amount of
information about the priorities and targets of Soviet military intelligence,
including what the Soviet military wanted to know about the United States
and its allies and how the Soviet military acquired that information. A focus
on the Cold War still provides valuable lessons for several reasons: first, a
large amount of information is publicly available, and second, the GRU is
the Russian intelligence organization that has changed the least since the
Soviet era. The activities of the Soviet era continue to provide a useful pat-
tern for how Russia conducts military intelligence activities today.
Of the approximately 100 publicly known Soviet intelligence officers
who defected or attempted to defect during the Cold War (1945 to 1992),
about one-fourth of them were GRU officers. Despite their smaller number
these officers provided unique information about all three of the Soviet mil-
itary intelligence collection directions described above (see also Figure 18).
From 1945 to 1992, at least 11 of the approximately 100 intelligence
officers who defected chose to redefect. Of those redefections, six were
GRU personnel, making up a much larger proportion of redefectors than of
the total defector number. Of those six, four redefected in the early 1970s
and three within a three-month period in 1973. The reason for these rede-
fections is unclear, but there are several potential explanations: a deliberate
Soviet program to dispatch intelligence officers as defectors and then bring
them back for propaganda purposes; a less welcoming resettlement program
in the United States; or a group of young Soviet officers who struggled to
adapt to a new, foreign environment. More research is needed to determine
which of these explanations fits this brief period of redefections.

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Figure 18. GRU Officers Who Defected or Attempted To Defect During the Cold War

Igor Gouzenko, 1945: GRU taskings to collect U.S., British, and

­Canadian weapons and troop information
Name unknown, 1946: Radio operator for GRU special-purpose radio
unit in Hungary
Vladimir Skripkin, 1947: Diplomatic cover in Japan (failed defection)
Mikhail Denisov, 1947: Interpreter for Allied Control Commission in
Hungary and at Soviet embassy in Hungary
Vadim Shelaputin, 1949: GRU translator in Vienna; designated to run
operations
Name unknown, 1950: Operational-Intelligence Section of a GRU unit
in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany
Name unknown, 1953: GRU illegal sent to infiltrate Turkey
Ivan Ovchinnikov, 1956: Translator for 28th Separate Radio Regiment
(SIGINT unit), East Germany (redefected)
Kaarlo Tuomi, 1959: GRU illegal sent to the United States; testified
in 1963 against illegals who were tasked with providing information
about rocket-launching sites, nuclear weapons shipments, and troop
movements
Mikhail Strygin, 1959: Diplomatic cover in Burma (failed defection)
Yuriy Pyatakov, 1966: Worked aboard a Soviet SIGINT collection ship
(redefected)
Anatoliy Chebotarev, 1971: Diplomatic cover in Belgium; reported on
GRU SIGINT collection against NATO (redefected)
Nikolay Petrov, 1972: Diplomatic cover in Indonesia; ran an agent in
the Indonesian Navy (redefected)
Yevgeniy Sorokin, 1972: Diplomatic cover in Laos (redefected)
Vladimir Rezun (pen name Viktor Suvorov), 1974: Diplomatic cover
in Austria; published several books that describe GRU organization
and methods

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Viktor Korolyuk, 1980: Interpreter during East-West troop reduction

negotiations in Vienna
Sergey Bokhan, 1985: Diplomatic cover in Athens; provided infor-
mation about Greek sources who reported naval installations,
the plans for the U.S. Stinger surface-to-air missile, and satellite
antennae
Andrey Remenchuk, 1987: Diplomatic cover in Canada (redefected)
Yuriy Smurov, 1988: Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation
Organization in Montreal
Aleksandr Krapiva, 1991: Soviet mission to the UN in Austria
Sergey Dvyrnik, 1991: GRU position and type of intelligence collected
not publicly available
Stanislav Lunev, 1992: ITAR-TASS correspondent in the United States

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Ismail Akhmedov, In and Out
of Stalin’s GRU: A Tatar’s Escape from Red Army Intelligence (Frederick, MD: University Publica-
tions of America, 1984); Viktor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: MacMillan,
1984); A. Korzun and V. Filin, “Stirlits Worked at the ‘Aquarium’: 13 Little Known Facts from
the Life of the Main Intelligence Directorate,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 10, 1992, 3,
translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Asia, Military Affairs, JPRS-
UMA-92-044, December 9, 1992, 1.

In addition to defectors, Western intelligence services ran several prom-

inent penetrations of the GRU during and after the Cold War that provided
valuable information about the organization:

■ Petr Popov (1953–58)

■ Dmitriy Polyakov (1960–85)
■ Oleg Penkovsky (1961–62)
■ Sergey Skripal (1995–2001)

Petr Popov was familiar with Soviet illegals operating in the United
States and other NATO countries. He provided information about the

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organization of the Soviet military, the structure of the GRU, and the names
and operations of Soviet intelligence agents in Europe. The United States
ran Dmitriy Polyakov for 25 years until he retired from the GRU as a general
officer. He provided huge amounts of information about Soviet weapon sys-
tems and Soviet concerns about U.S. weapon systems. Oleg Penkovsky had
access to Soviet missile information, and he provided indications that the
Soviet Union could place missiles in Cuba. He also provided large amounts
of information about Soviet military doctrine and strategy, which was at the
foundation of intelligence collection. Although Penkovsky suggested that
the United States plant small nuclear devices around Soviet military and
government headquarters to decapitate the Soviet government, the United
States never took the recommendation seriously. Sergey Skripal had access
to the GRU personnel department and could identify hundreds of GRU
officers operating under diplomatic cover abroad.369
These defections and penetrations combined provided a window into
how the GRU operated and what its priorities were. Dozens of espionage
investigations and arrests, some of which were the result of defections and
penetrations, yielded further insights into what Soviet intelligence was try-
ing to acquire and, in some cases, what it successfully acquired.
In the view of Russian military commentator Pavel Felgenhauer in
2005, the GRU not only collected and analyzed military intelligence, but
it also used its access to senior Russian decisionmakers to influence their
decisions and provide greater emphasis on Russian military resource needs:

Through the GRU, the General Staff controls the supply of vital
information to all other decisionmakers in all matters concerning
defense procurement, threat assessment, and so on. High-ranking
former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet times the General
Staff used the GRU to grossly, deliberately, and constantly mislead
the Kremlin about the magnitude and gravity of the military threat
posed by the West in order to help inflate military expenditure.
There are serious indications that at present the same foul practice
is continuing.370

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If Felgenhauer’s assessment is correct, the GRU may intentionally exag-

gerate the capabilities and intentions of adversarial military forces, fueling
an even greater aggressiveness to collect intelligence on that threat.

FOUNDATIONAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Foundational military intelligence is the information needed for planning
and conducting military operations and the basis on which a military makes
decisions about what weapons to procure, what military doctrine to develop,
and how to train its forces. The Soviet Union placed a high priority on col-
lecting foundational military intelligence before the Cold War began and
continued to do so throughout that period.
Even before World War II ended, the GRU tasked its rezidentura in
Ottawa to collect foundational military intelligence on U.S. and Canadian
forces. According to the materials that Igor Gouzenko brought with him
when he defected, Moscow tasked GRU rezidenturas to recruit people in
military services and collect military organizational data, including informa-
tion about U.S. troop units in Europe and transfers of units to the Pacific
Theater. The Ottawa rezidentura received a requirement to collect the loca-
tions, strengths, and future plans of specific U.S. divisions and corps, as well as
the establishment of a U.S. Army headquarters in Germany, its location, and
the identity of its new commanding officer. The GRU headquarters telegram
that tasked this collection began with the caveat: “It is very important that
we receive this information.”371 The GRU also tasked the Ottawa rezidentura
to collect information about future weapon systems, inventories, production
projections, guns, shells, small arms, optical and radio equipment, automo-
biles and tanks, chemical warfare equipment, and the details of plants pro-
ducing them—all while the Soviet Union was still a supposed ally.372
Other defectors provided information about Soviet SIGINT collection
against U.S. ports and weapons production. U.S. espionage cases displayed
a consistent requirement for foundational military intelligence, including
information about weapon systems, troop movements, ship capabilities,
repair manuals, airstrip capacities, missile sites, naval installations, and

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NATO war plans. The United States was not the only target. Defectors and
espionage cases provided information about Soviet targeting of military
information across Europe and Asia.
Today, Russia follows, or attempts to follow, a similar plan—conducting
intelligence to understand foreign military forces to the level that, if Rus-
sia needed to face them in battle someday, it would know how to defeat
them. From 2016 to 2021, arrests of military-related suspects committing
espionage for Russia have occurred in Canada, Poland, Hungary, Greece,
Slovakia, Estonia, Austria, the United States, and Italy. These espionage sub-
jects have had access to their own government’s classified information and
NATO information.

Military Intelligence in Wartime—Test Cases

Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria are test cases for how Russian intelligence oper-
ates in a modern combat environment. Analysis of those conflicts helps to
understand how Russia employs military intelligence before and during
military operations. Although Russian military leaders talk about a blurred
line that separates peacetime and wartime,373 an analysis of the methods
that Russia has applied on the battlefield in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria,
contrasted with the methods Russia has used elsewhere, makes it clear that
Russia is willing to go further where there is an active military conflict than
where there is not. Russia uses military warfare tactics in Ukraine, for exam-
ple, but does not go to the same lengths of conducting active military oper-
ations in the United States or EU countries.  
When Russia launched a short war against the much smaller Georgian
military in 2008, its performance revealed gaps in Russian military planning
and execution capabilities.374 However, Russia also introduced an innovation
during that conflict: conducting computer-based actions in concert with mil-
itary actions. For example, Georgian government websites were disrupted
simultaneously with Russian military actions inside Georgia.375 Although
entities that claimed no connection to the Russian government conducted
the disruption operations, and the operations had little military significance,

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this marked the first instance of such a combination of physical and virtual
attacks in a military conflict.376 On October 28, 2019, GRU-sponsored
hackers again attacked Georgian Internet providers and damaged websites,
including those of the Georgian government, judicial officers, media, and
businesses, indicating a continuing wartime footing in Russia’s mind.377 These
attacks require intelligence before execution, which Russian military intel-
ligence collectors probably obtained through a combination of Soviet-era
knowledge about Georgian infrastructure facilities and more recent intelli-
gence collection that identified specific sites and avenues of approach.
For Russia, Ukraine is an unreserved wartime target, where Russia has
applied all intelligence disciplines, characteristic of how it might operate in
other military environments. On the HUMINT front, Russian officers in
Kiev had many Soviet-era personal ties with their Ukrainian counterparts,
making it easy to find recruitments inside the Ukrainian military. Ukraine
expelled a Russian military attaché in May 2014 for collecting information
about Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO.378 As the counterintelligence
environment in Ukraine became more hostile for Russian collection after
Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Russia moved to neighboring countries to
conduct intelligence activities related to Ukraine. The Moldovan govern-
ment expelled five reported GRU officers in 2017 for trying to recruit fight-
ers for the Russian-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine.379
Russian computer-based operations in Ukraine show a refinement of
Russia’s use of them in concert with military actions, which in each case has
relied on previously collected intelligence. As in Georgia, but on a larger
scale, Russia conducted computer-based attacks to disrupt the Internet in
Ukraine while undeclared Russian forces were seizing control of Crimea
in 2014.380 Those attacks required detailed intelligence about the nature
of the communication systems in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, which,
as in Georgia, was probably a mix of both historical knowledge and more
recent collection. From 2014 to 2016, the GRU exploited an intrusion into
an Android application used by Ukrainian artillery forces to process artil-
lery targeting data, which required penetration of that Android application
prior to its use in combat. Over 9,000 Ukrainian artillery personnel used

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the application, and the intrusion contributed to heavy artillery losses.381

In October-November 2018, a Russian-origin phishing campaign targeted
Ukrainian government computers in the weeks preceding the November
2018 seizure of Ukrainian fishing vessels in the Sea of Azov. The targets pos-
sessed maritime information directly relevant to the seizure,382 and a Russian
military operation followed soon after this intelligence collection.
Syria has been a testing ground for new Russian tactical military intelli-
gence capabilities tied to operations. Russia has used space-based sensors in
Syria and, for the first time, from 50 to 70 drones for intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as targeting. Targeting intelligence and
video footage are reportedly provided simultaneously to the Russian com-
mand staff in Hmeymim, Syria, and to the General Staff in Moscow. Russia
is perfecting what it calls the “reconnaissance-strike complex,” which means
using collection sensors for real-time targeting of precision-guided munitions.
A similar concept is called “net-centric warfare” in the United States. Since
2015, Russia has rotated many of its military commanders through Syria
on three-month deployments, using Syria as a school for training officers in
modern warfare and these new ISR-driven tactics.383 Russia has fielded several
of its newest reconnaissance aircraft in Syria to test their capabilities and to
refine the doctrine regarding their use (see Chapter 9). Russia has also devel-
oped intelligence-sharing relationships with the players in the Syria conflict.
Since 2015, Iraq, Russia, Iran, and Syria have had a joint intelligence center
in Baghdad where they share intelligence and coordinate military operations.
Russia gains much from its tightly controlled intelligence-sharing relation-
ships, which allow it to steer other countries selectively toward its priorities
and recruit officers from its allies for influence and collection purposes.384

STRATEGIC FORCES AND STRATEGIC

MISSILE DEFENSE
Nuclear weapons are at the top of Russia’s military intelligence collection
requirements and have been since the beginning of the Cold War. While
the Soviet Union was involved in active military operations only a few times

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during the Cold War, it was involved in a nuclear standoff throughout the
entire period. Even during World War II, Russian military and civilian intel-
ligence services sought to understand the West’s nuclear capabilities and
intent, reflexively assuming that it was always directed at annihilating the
Soviet Union.
Soviet intelligence services began to focus on atomic weapons devel-
opment several years before such weapons were ever used. GRU defector
Igor Gouzenko wrote that as early as 1942, “the word ‘uranium’ was listed
among the more frequently used phrases in the secret cipher codebook of
the director of Military Intelligence in Moscow.”385 Soviet intelligence used
the code word “ENORMOUS” to describe its collection of information
about atomic programs. This same codeword continued to be used into the
1950s; Yevgeniya Kartseva (aka Petrova), a KGB officer who defected in
1954, noted that she first encountered that code word in a message to Can-
berra 15 days after an atomic test, presumably referring to the British nuclear
test conducted in the Australian desert in October 1953.386 The first espi-
onage cases after World War II, including Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and
David Greenglass in the United States and Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May
in the United Kingdom, involved penetrations of the U.S. nuclear weapons
program. Both military and civilian intelligence services sent illegals to the
United States in the late 1940s either to become penetrations of the nuclear
weapons program themselves or to handle penetration agents. Today, Russia
probably uses all available collection methods, especially humans and signals,
to satisfy its requirements for intelligence on this priority target. Computer
intrusions probably are not as good a source of information about strategic
weapons because of tight security.
During the Cold War, espionage cases showed a continuous effort by
Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence services to target the U.S. Strategic
Air Command, the B-2 bomber, strategic submarine forces, theater and
intercontinental nuclear-armed missiles, and ballistic missile research (see
Figure 19). The baseline Soviet assumption was that the United States had
a nuclear capability that it intended to use offensively. Espionage cases of
German civil servants also yielded significant information about U.S. and

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NATO military capabilities; for example, Margaret Höke, a secretary in the

German Chancellor’s Office, provided U.S. plans to place Pershing II mis-
siles in Germany.387

Figure 19. Strategic Forces-related U.S. Espionage Cases

William Henry Whalen, 1959–66: U.S. troop deployments and Strate-

gic Air Command nuclear retaliatory strike plans
John William Butenko, 1963: Research on the Strategic Air Command
Gary Lee Ledbetter, 1967: Information about the Polaris submarine
piping systems
Clyde Lee Conrad, 1974–88: NATO’s plans for fighting a war against
the Warsaw Pact, including detailed descriptions of nuclear weapons
and plans for movement of troops, tanks, and aircraft; handled by
Hungarian and Czechoslovakian services
James Durward Harper, Jr., 1975–83: Minuteman ICBM and ballistic
missile research; handled by a Polish service
Ruby Louise Schuler, 1979–83: Minuteman ICBM and ballistic missile
research; handled by a Polish service
Christopher M. Cooke, 1980–81: Strategic missile capabilities
Thomas Patrick Cavanagh, 1984: Technical research on the B-2 bomber

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including Frank J. Rafalko (ed.), CI
Reader: American Revolution Into the New Millennium (Washington, DC: Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, 2004); Katherine L. Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans:
1947-2007 (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2008).

In the 1980s, the Soviet government initiated an intelligence collection

emphasis called Operation RYaN, which was an acronym for the Russian
phrase ракетно-ядерное нападение (nuclear missile attack). According to
KGB defector Vasiliy Mitrokhin, RYaN was founded on the assumption
that the Western alliance, especially the United States and Great Britain, was
preparing for a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. RYaN was a historically

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unusual instance in which Soviet civilian and military intelligence collab-

orated worldwide beginning in the early 1980s, although their collection
yielded little, as no such Western preparations existed. This emphasis on
nuclear missile attack led to the Soviet alarm during the 1983 NATO Exercise
Able Archer, which the Soviet nuclear warning system interpreted as a possi-
ble nuclear attack. A memo from KGB First Chief Directorate Chief Vladi-
mir Kryuchkov, which enumerated Russian intelligence priorities for the year
1984, included the instruction to collect intelligence on “preparation by the
USA and its allies of a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; plans and
actions by the main adversary to increase its strategic military potential and
to step up the American military presence in Western Europe and other stra-
tegically important areas of the World.”388 According to the Soviet leadership,
NATO’s preparations included “the expansion of sabotage-training intelli-
gence schools and increase in the recruitment of émigrés from the Socialist
countries and persons who know the language of these countries, and the cre-
ation of émigré military formations and sabotage and intelligence teams.”389
For the Russian government, strategic missile defense has also been a dan-
gerous development. If U.S. strategic missile defense worked as planned, it
would nullify Russia’s most capable military deterrent—its nuclear force.
According to Mitrokhin, the Soviet leadership viewed Reagan’s Strategic
Defense Initiative, better known as Star Wars, as part of a program to prepare
the American people psychologically for nuclear war.390
Although there are few publicly available cases directly related to Rus-
sian collection of strategic missile defense information, the historical record
of Soviet collection on strategic military systems, coupled with current Rus-
sian rhetoric about the supposed threat posed by missile defense, indicates
that missile defense is a major target of Russian concern. In one possible
case, GRU computer-based collectors conducted a nearly two-year effort
beginning in March 2015 to intrude into Danish Ministry of Defense com-
puters. The operation began less than two weeks after Denmark announced
plans to participate in NATO’s missile defense system, and Western analysts
have assessed that Denmark’s decision prompted the collection operation.391
The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation states, “Russia

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views the creation of the global missile defence system by the US as a threat
to its national security and reserves the right to take adequate retaliatory
measures.”392 The Russian government opposes what it calls “unilateral,
unrestricted actions by States or groups of States to build-up missile defense
systems that undermine strategic stability and international security.”393 As
an analyst at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories wrote in 2018:

A major aspect of Russian anxieties about the Aegis Ashore [ballis-

tic missile defense] deployments is a sincere, if paranoid, fear that
the system will be used offensively in a first strike against Russia as
part of a U.S. grand strategy of unilateralism and global dominance
that entails encircling and constraining Russia. The transfer of U.S.
nuclear weapons to the Aegis Ashore base in Romania would sup-
port this Russian narrative.394

Russian clandestine collection to fully understand and counter the mis-

sile defense threat, similar to RYaN of the 1980s, undoubtedly accompanies
Russia’s public declarations of concern and employs all collection disciplines.

WARTIME STRATEGIC TARGETS

Russia’s military intelligence collection is an outgrowth of Russian military
doctrine. An element of Russian military doctrine that envisions preparing
for and winning the initial period of war is the concept of Стратегическая
Операция по Поражению Критически Важных Объектов (Strategic
Operation for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets, SODCIT).
This concept governs a multidomain operation intended to destroy critical
enemy facilities in the initial stage of war to dissuade the adversary from
escalating into full-scale war.395 SODCIT is divided into three categories of
targets, based on the level of conflict that they affect:

■ Tactical targeting directly focuses on enemy military forces to pre-

vent them from posing a threat to Russia.

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■ Operational targets take one step back to disrupt the capabilities

that directly support those military forces, including command and
control and logistics.
■ Strategic targets are foundational capabilities that allow a government
to field and maintain a military force.

As is often the case in Russian military planning, the language defin-

ing military concepts is defensive, not offensive. Thus, the definition of a
critically important target can be extracted from Russian government docu-
ments on civil defense: “a target (or facility), the destruction or suspension
of functionality of which would lead to loss of control of the economy of
the Russian Federation, of a subject of the Russian Federation, or of the ter-
ritorial unity of the Russian Federation, her unrecoverable negative change
(destruction) or a substantial lowering of the security of the vital functions
of the population.”396 These same concepts apply in reverse in Russian offen-
sive targeting. The objectives of destroying a critically important target are
to prevent the adversary from being able to conduct war by:

■ Disrupting national command and control.

■ Destroying strategic strike capabilities.
■ Destroying military forces and stockpiles.
■ Disrupting governance at the national and regional level.
■ Disrupting the means of production and transportation and imped-
ing the embarkation of follow-on forces and critical supplies.

During the Soviet era, the Soviet government was convinced that a
conflict would inevitably break out with the major capitalist powers.
Soviet propaganda constantly trumpeted the threat of capitalist pow-
ers starting the next war. Vasiliy Mitrokhin’s materials indicate that the
KGB was collecting information about critical infrastructure sites across
NATO countries at least as early as 1959, preparing for what now could be
called SODCIT. This collection aimed at preparing target packages and
infiltration plans for covert teams tasked with damaging and disrupting

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critical infrastructure sites during a future conflict, thereby reducing the

target country’s ability to support the conflict. Both the KGB Thirteenth
Department and the GRU conducted similar collection, sometimes dupli-
cating or conflicting with each other, as each planned for a future war with
the West. Targets included electrical power transmission lines, oil pipe-
lines, communication systems, and major industrial complexes in nearly all
NATO countries.397
These strategic operations were a continuation of sabotage missions
that Soviet state security organizations had been responsible for conduct-
ing since the beginning of the Soviet era. In the early Soviet days, sabotage
was directed against the capitalist powers with the hope of catalyzing local
revolutions to overturn the government and install a Bolshevik-style revolu-
tionary government in its place. When Stalin changed the Soviet philosophy
from world revolution to socialism in one country, he also shifted the focus
of sabotage operations from prompting revolution in vulnerable countries
to contingency planning in the major capitalist powers, such as the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States.
After World War II, during which sabotage operations were directed
primarily at German targets, the Soviet Union returned to preparations
for these operations in the Cold War context. KGB and GRU intelligence
collection operations focused on building target packages for critical infra-
structure sites, including detailed information about terrain, landmarks, cli-
mate during different seasons, prevailing winds, populated areas, and local
customs. Target packages would support the infiltration of диверсионно-
разведывательные группы (diversionary-intelligence groups, DRGs), teams
of operatives that would clandestinely infiltrate by air or sea to conduct the
critical infrastructure sabotage operations.
After KGB officer Oleg Lyalin defected in the UK in September 1971,
he shared intelligence on his work for the KGB Thirteenth Department
(later renamed Department V), where he was responsible for identifying,
collecting information about, and planning sabotage attacks against critical
infrastructure sites. Lyalin reported that his targets included public utilities,
railways, government and military communications, government offices and

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continuity-of-operations sites, and emergency food supplies. Based on the

information he was tasked with collecting, Soviet air- and seaborne sabotage
units would attack these targets if war broke out with the West. Lyalin was
also supposed to develop a group of agents inside the United Kingdom that
would support sabotage operatives when they landed. According to Lyalin,
the KGB did not conduct what he called “industrial sabotage” in peacetime.
The Soviet Union instead planned to begin sabotage operations during the
period of crisis that preceded the outbreak of war; during that period, sabo-
tage measures would include the demoralization of the civilian population
and disruption of the country’s political and economic life.398 Lyalin also
identified his counterpart responsible for performing the same mission in
the United States, and he provided information about a plan to land sab-
otage agents on the California coast. As later KGB defector Oleg Kalugin
wrote, every large KGB rezidentura around the world had one Department
V officer tasked with preparing for future war.399
Mitrokhin similarly claimed that infrastructure targeting was not lim-
ited to the United States and Great Britain. He reported that planning for
sabotage was more active in Iran than in any other non-Western country.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet intelligence services drew up detailed plans
to attack royal palaces, major ministries, the main railway station, police
and SAVAK secret police headquarters, TV and radio buildings, electricity
transmission stations, and telephone exchanges. None of these targets had
proceeded past the planning stages before Lyalin defected in 1971.400

Ukraine
Russian collection on critical infrastructure targets continues today, and the
infrastructure attacks launched in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea
are the result of previous intelligence collection to prepare for sabotage
operations. For Russia, Ukraine is an easier target than most countries,
because it was formerly part of the Soviet Union, and thus Moscow is famil-
iar with its infrastructure networks, which are largely remnants from the
Soviet era. The combination of that baseline knowledge and Russia’s ability

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to penetrate Ukrainian computer systems has made Ukraine an easy target

for these types of operations.
Just as with foundational intelligence collection, the use of intelligence
services for military targeting is more intense in Ukraine than in other parts
of the world, which is evidence that Russia sees its relationship with Ukraine
as an active military conflict. Targets in Ukraine have repeatedly included
the strategic facilities identified in the SODCIT concept.
Ukraine has experienced repeated massive computer intrusions and
attempted intrusions into its government and electric power infrastructures.
For example, in 2015, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported a
Russian spearphishing email attack on Ukrainian computer systems aimed
at disrupting government and law enforcement networks, primarily those
engaged in operations in Eastern Ukraine.401 In December 2015, remote
network intrusions caused unscheduled outages in three Ukrainian regional
electric power distribution companies impacting approximately 225,000
customers, and malware was also found in Ukrainian companies in other
critical infrastructure sectors. The attack was reportedly synchronized and
coordinated, probably following extensive reconnaissance of the victim net-
works.402 The GRU computer intrusion team known in the West as Voodoo
Bear is believed to be behind the attacks.403 This group has conducted sabo-
tage operations throughout Ukrainian society, destroying hundreds of com-
puters at media companies, deleting or permanently encrypting terabytes
of data on government computers, and paralyzing infrastructure, including
Ukraine’s railway ticketing system. Voodoo Bear’s known operations are
consistent with an entity supporting Russian military and political objec-
tives through targeted espionage and sabotage operations.404 In December
2016, Russian-origin malware attacks again targeted Ukrainian electrical
grids, during which a power distribution station near Kiev unexpectedly
switched off, leaving the northern part of the capital without electricity.
Ukrainian investigators assessed that the attacks might have been a proof of
concept rather than a full attack.405
The most damaging Russian attack targeting Ukraine occurred in 2017,
when the NotPetya virus was unleashed in Ukrainian computer networks.

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On June 27, 2017, a series of cyberattacks targeted the websites of Ukrainian

organizations, including banks, government ministries, newspapers, electric-
ity firms, and state-owned enterprises such as Boryspil International Airport,
Ukrtelecom, Ukrposhta (postal service), State Savings Bank of Ukraine, and
Ukrainian Railways. The radiation monitoring system at Ukraine’s Cher-
nobyl Nuclear Power Plant went offline during the attack. The malware
overwrote and permanently damaged files in the infected computers, despite
the malware’s displayed message to the users indicating that all files could be
recovered “safely and easily” by meeting the attackers’ demands and making
the requested payment in Bitcoin currency.406
The NotPetya attacks damaged more than just Ukrainian targets.
Although the attacks were probably launched to cause SODCIT-like
damage and degrade Ukraine’s ability to conduct warfare against Russia,
the GRU officers who released the virus either failed to calculate the vast
collateral damage that NotPetya would cause or thought little of it. Most
prominently, the virus also caused severe disruptions in the operations of the
Danish Maersk shipping line, along with other probably inadvertent targets
around the world. Wired magazine quoted former U.S. Homeland Security
adviser Tom Bossert as saying, “While there was no loss of life, it was the
equivalent of using a nuclear bomb to achieve a small tactical victory. That’s
a degree of recklessness we can’t tolerate on the world stage.”407
Russia did not stop there. In July 2018, Ukraine’s SBU claimed to have
thwarted an attack on network equipment belonging to the LLC Aulska
chlorine plant in eastern Ukraine. The attack was allegedly geared to dis-
rupt the stable operation of the plant, which provides sodium hypochlo-
rite for water treatment.408 Such a disruption could have caused massive
civilian damage.
The above examples are all manifestations of the “industrial sabotage”
attacks for which Lyalin collected intelligence in the 1970s. In Ukraine, they
have progressed beyond the collection phase to execution. Due to today’s
global computer-network accessibility and Russia’s pre-war infrastructure
collection, events in Ukraine probably demonstrate how Russia would oper-
ate in a military conflict elsewhere.

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Outside Ukraine
Another infrastructure-level attack took place in 2018 that had nothing
to do with Ukraine. In February 2018, a crippling computer virus labeled
the “Olympic Destroyer” brought down the IT infrastructure for the Seoul
Korea Olympics. Investigators were initially confused about attribution
because the attack used elements that pointed to multiple countries’ mal-
ware signatures; however, a computer forensic investigator found a conclu-
sive signature that showed a Russian hand, with all the others being false
flags. This attack turned out to be a GRU operation deliberately obscured
behind other misleading pieces of evidence.409
Why would Russia launch such an attack that is not part of a military
campaign? As discussed in Chapter 4, Russia launched computer intru-
sions into the World Anti-Doping Agency in 2016 to collect information
about the investigation into a Russian state-sponsored program to provide
performance-enhancing drugs to its athletes. That investigation concluded
that Russia did, in fact, have a systematic doping program, resulting in the
ban on Russian athletes’ participation in the 2018 Olympics. The “Olympic
Destroyer” probably is the next stage in what Russia sees as a political war
being waged against its global reputation. Computer security experts pre-
dicted similar attacks on the 2020 Olympics in Japan; however, postpone-
ment of those Olympic Games, due to the global coronavirus pandemic,
appears to have derailed any such plans.

STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY COLLECTION

Today, when the Russian media talks about diversionary intelligence groups
(DRGs), they refer to repelling foreign DRGs invading Russian soil, not
deploying DRGs to infiltrate foreign soil. In the post-Soviet era, however,
Russian collection for future wartime sabotage operations continues, as
indicated by the prevalence of computer-intrusion attempts and operations
into critical infrastructure sites in the United States and other countries. The
U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense have
issued multiple warnings about surveillance of critical infrastructure targets,

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probably as a modern equivalent to the longtime Soviet practice of prepar-

ing for future war.410 Infrastructure penetrations for intelligence collection
purposes and to prepare for future warfare have been reported in the United
States as recently as October 2020.411 Other countries—such as Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Israel—have reported similar penetrations.412
Targets include nuclear power, electric utilities, water, aviation, telecommu-
nications, critical manufacturing sectors, and commercial facilities, similar
to those that Oleg Lyalin discussed in 1971.
This computer-based collection coincides with other types of intel-
ligence collection that appear to be coordinated. U.S. counterintelligence
officials have observed Russian intelligence personnel traveling to remote
places across the United States, standing outside a particular site for a few
minutes, sometimes holding a device in their hands, and then getting back
into their cars and driving off. The U.S. counterintelligence community has
correlated this activity with the locations of communications nodes associ-
ated with U.S. military bases. The U.S. Government has also noted that Rus-
sian Open Skies Treaty flights sometimes overfly U.S. critical infrastructure
sites at the very time that Russian officers on the ground travel to those sites.
The two types of collection appear to be coordinated to map critical U.S.
military communications infrastructure elements that could be targeted
for sabotage if war broke out with the United States.413 Russian collection
against communication nodes is taking place in U.S-allied countries as well.
In early 2020, Irish police arrested Russian intelligence personnel who were
apparently mapping the precise locations of landing points for undersea
fiber-­optic cables in Ireland.414
Russia’s strategic contingency collection assets may also include a Rus-
sian undersea research ship and submarines, which reportedly troll around
the ocean, possibly surveilling undersea communication cables—a critical
element of the world’s telecommunications infrastructure. According to
a 2015 New York Times article, the United States that year closely mon-
itored the Russian oceanic research ship Yantar, which is equipped with
two self-propelled deep-sea submersible craft, as it cruised off the U.S.
East Coast toward Cuba, where one cable lands near the U.S. naval base at

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Guantanamo Bay. Naval officials claim the ship and the submersible craft
are capable of cutting cables miles deep beneath the sea.415
Some analysts, including a self-described Canadian military buff, have
questioned the legitimacy of the U.S. assertion that the Yantar is surveilling
undersea cables, claiming instead that the Yantar is exploring the locations
of sunken Russian and other countries’ ships and submarines, and that
minor damage frequently occurs to undersea telecommunications with-
out major disruptions.416 Nevertheless, in 2017, British defense officials
warned that the Russian Navy poses a potentially “catastrophic” threat to
undersea cables.417 NATO also has assessed that Russia is capable of attack-
ing undersea cables and causing massive disruptions to commercial and
government communications.418 In February 2020, the U.S. Department
of Defense published its 2021 budget request, in which it included a map
overlaying Russian and Chinese naval activity over international undersea
communications cables. Although the purpose of the map was to advo-
cate for greater funding for the U.S. Navy, it makes clear that foreign naval
forces are potentially threatening the global economy by putting undersea
cables at risk.419

CONCLUSION: PREPARING FOR WAR

Up to now, none of these collection cases, whether by computer, Open
Skies aircraft, on-the-ground officer, or seaborne system, has resulted in
sabotage to critical U.S. or NATO infrastructures. However, Russian mil-
itary intelligence activities in Ukraine and Syria show how Russia oper-
ates in a wartime environment. When Russian troops occupied strategic
positions in Crimea in 2014, special operations forces detachments took
over the Simferopol Internet exchange point and selectively disrupted
cable connections elsewhere on the Ukrainian mainland. That operation
left Crimea isolated from the global information environment, allowing
Russia to dictate the information flow into and out of Crimea.420 Russia
probably is collecting intelligence now to prepare for similar operations in
case of war with the West.

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All three military collection directions—foundational, strategic weap-

ons, and contingency military collection—are priorities for Russian intelli-
gence services today. Russian services, especially the GRU, use all collection
disciplines to target those topics. As Russian military leaders continue to
assume that the West in general, and the United States in particular, are
planning a surprise attack on Russia, they will use all available tools to pre-
pare for that attack.

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 CHAPTER 7

COVERT ACTIVITIES

k k k
Russian intelligence services mix the concepts of intelligence collection and
covert activities closely together. While intelligence collection supports deci-
sionmakers with information, covert action executes the decisionmakers’
plans and policies. They are both elements of the Russian concepts разведка
or razvedka, which translate into English as “intelligence” or “reconnais-
sance.” The preceding chapters have covered types of intelligence collection.
This chapter will cover the other side of razvedka: covert activities, including
the three major categories of political operations, undeclared military oper-
ations, and assassination operations.
In wartime, military members covertly penetrate the enemy’s territory to
conduct diversionary actions. Russia commemorates many covert operators
from World War II as heroes who saved Russia from the Nazis. The Soviet
Union organized thousands of partisans behind German lines who extended
the reach of Soviet intelligence services and helped to adapt Soviet opera-
tions to local conditions. In some cases, those partisans became the post-war
leaders of Eastern European countries, such as Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia
and Władysław Gomułka in Poland. In other cases, Soviet partisan leaders
were recognized as heroes, such as Anna Morozova and Imant Sudmalis,
who were named as Heroes of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, and Aleksey
Botyan, who was awarded the title Hero of the Russian Federation in 2007.

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Soviet-era intelligence officer defectors give us insights into the lengths

Russian military forces will go to execute covert military activities. Chapter
6 introduced the concept of диверсионно-разведывательные группы (diver-
sionary intelligence groups, DRGs), based partially on information provided
by KGB officers Oleg Lyalin, Oleg Kalugin, and Vasiliy Mitrokhin. During
military warfare, these groups take intelligence collected about adversary
targets and execute operations against them, with the goal of:

■ Creating disorder in the rear area functions of the enemy.

■ Disabling the enemy’s transportation and communications.
■ Spreading panic among the enemy’s troops and civilian population.
■ Collecting intelligence about the movements, dispositions, arma-
ments, and numbers of the enemy’s forces, its military-economic
potential, militarily significant industrial facilities, and transporta-
tion and communications systems.
■ Destroying the enemy’s upper and middle command staffs and des-
ignated political and administrative personnel.

These actions are tools of military war. We see Russia using these opera-
tions in places where it considers itself to be involved in a military war, such
as in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, and more recently in Libya. As
noted in Chapter 6, Russia’s use of the NotPetya virus against Ukraine reflects
Soviet-era plans for operations to demoralize an adversary’s population, disrupt
its political and economic life, and diminish its ability to sustain war. As such,
this activity is part of a military campaign, not a political campaign. However,
for Russia, there is a difference between political warfare, which could occur
in what most countries call peacetime, and military warfare, which occurs in a
generally recognized wartime environment. Political warfare does not employ
all the weapons of military war, but it is also not identical with peacetime.
While the West views the relationship with Russia as a tense peacetime
one, Russia sees it as being in a political wartime environment. Russian ana-
lysts claim that the United States is already conducting a political war against
Russia. They perceive a nefarious Western hand behind any event that has

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an anti-Russian tone, even where no such hand is involved. Russia views the
“color revolutions” that occurred initially in former Soviet republics (Kyrgyz-
stan, Georgia, and Ukraine) and later in other countries (Syria and Libya) to
be Western manifestations of covert political operations. Russian leaders sim-
ilarly characterize the anti-Putin demonstrations that occurred in 2011-12
as Western political warfare. Russia believes that it must defend itself from
Western disinformation and “Russophobia” (such as public claims of Rus-
sian spying around the world), Western undeclared military activities (such as
­Russia-alleged Western support to terrorists in Chechnya, Syria, and Libya), and
Western assassination operations (such as the killing of Moammar Qadhafi).

Clandestine vs. Covert

The words clandestine and covert do not mean the same thing, even though
they are often used interchangeably. Clandestinity conceals the operation,
while covertness conceals the operator. Most of what has been discussed
previously in this book falls into the category of clandestine activities—inter-
nal security and intelligence collection operations performed in such a way
that they are not publicly visible. Clandestine means secret; something is
done so that only those involved in it know it is happening. Most intelligence
operations are clandestine, because if they became public, sensitive sources
and methods could be damaged or eliminated. However, the sponsoring gov-
ernment does not usually hide its involvement in the operation. For example,
when an intelligence service pitches a HUMINT source, the source usually
knows for what government he/she is working, unless the service is using a
false flag to deliberately misrepresent its affiliation.
Covert means the sponsoring government does not reveal its involve-
ment. Although covert operations are usually clandestine in the planning
stages, the result of a covert activity often becomes public, even intentionally.
That includes covert sabotage, in which an object is damaged: for example,
when a bomb explodes or a computer system goes offline. The primary ele-
ment of covert activities is the phrase “plausible deniability,” which means
the action is visible, but the perpetrator’s identity is hidden. This chapter dis-
cusses covert activities in which Russia tries to deny its involvement, albeit
often unsuccessfully and with little plausibility.

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Thus, Russia responds to what it views as an ongoing covert war with

covert actions, such as political manipulation operations, which it sees as
appropriate in a political war. However, during non-military war, these
actions require more deniability since, if a country is found to have con-
ducted them, they can escalate into a military war, which Russia is not eager
to have happen.

COVERT OPERATIONS: POLITICAL WARFARE

During the Soviet era, the KGB conducted covert political operations
labeled “active measures,” a Cold War concept of covert political manipula-
tion. Vasiliy Mitrokhin provided the following definition of active measures:

Agent-operational measures directed at exerting influence on the

foreign policy and the internal political situation of target countries
in the interests of the Soviet Union and of other countries of the
socialist community, the World Communist and National Liber-
ation Movement, weakening the political, military, economic, and
ideological positions of capitalism, undermining its aggressive plans,
in order to create conditions favorable to the successful implemen-
tation of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, and ensuring peace and
social progress.421

The Russian phrase агентурно-оперативные мероприятия (agent-­

operational measures) means clandestine intelligence methods. That is
what placed active measures into the KGB’s mission; however, the actions
were covert because the Soviet Union sought to hide its sponsorship of the
political manipulation operations that it conducted worldwide. The end
goal of active measures was to create conditions favorable for implementing
Soviet foreign policy. Mitrokhin’s definition originated in the Cold War,
so it includes the Cold War ideological narrative of the socialist vs. capi-
talist world. Today, that ideological element is gone, and Russian intelli-
gence services no longer use the phrase active measures. Instead, as noted

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in Chapters 2 and 5, the SVR has a directorate labeled MS (мероприятия

содейстия or measures of support), which conducts equivalent operations
today in a different ideological environment.
In a speech given in 1992, SVR Director Yevgeniy Primakov echoed
much of Mitrokhin’s definition, saying that “measures of support are those
measures that are implemented so that the policies of Russia and our state
proceed better and more efficiently.” He continued:

Let me give you an example. If it became known that a country is

toughening its position and wants to prevent the G7 from provid-
ing large-scale economic support for the reforms being carried out in
Russia, then intelligence methods can and should obviously be used
to bring to public opinion and to the leaders of the G7 countries
the desire of one of the member-states to shift the economic burden
onto the shoulders of others and take advantage of the situation in
order to generate support for their position on a territorial issue.422

Measures of support are sometimes equated with disinformation and

propaganda, although they are more likely to be related to disinforma-
tion operations than propaganda activities. Propaganda is an overt act. It
involves deliberately taking one side of an issue and making it look better,
while sometimes denigrating the opposing side. Spreading propaganda is
a normal practice in public diplomacy, political dialogue, and advertising,
to which we are subjected every day. This undisguised act does not require
clandestine activity, although intelligence activities can support propa-
ganda by feeding it clandestinely acquired information that supports an
overt theme.
Disinformation is the deliberate manipulation of information. It is a
covert action and thus is more closely connected to intelligence and secu-
rity services. According to Czechoslovakian intelligence officer defector
Ladislav Bittman, the Cold War saw more than 10,000 Soviet and East-
ern Bloc disinformation operations.423 Political scientist Thomas Rid, who
reported Bittman’s statement, went on to say:

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Understanding ‘cyber operations’ in the 21st century is impossible

without first understanding intelligence operations in the 20th cen-
tury. Attributing and countering disinformation operations today
is therefore also impossible without first understanding how the
US and its European allies attributed and countered thousands of
active measures throughout the Cold War.424

The pace of Soviet/Russian active measures operations has fluctuated,

aligning with shifts in Russian foreign policy. During the 1950s and 1960s,
active measures to counter U.S. military alliances and plans were relentless.
These operations subsided in the early 1970s during the détente period, fol-
lowed by an even greater intensity in the mid-1980s, and then a long ebb
throughout the 1990s. In the late 2000s, disinformation operations began
to rise again.
During the Cold War, the U.S. Department of State hosted an Active
Measures Working Group that identified and attempted to counter Soviet
disinformation operations. The group publicly declared in 1981 that “Mos-
cow makes extensive use of ‘active measures’ to achieve its foreign policy
objectives and to frustrate those of other countries.”425 This quote could
apply today just as it did during the Cold War, although Russia no longer
uses the phrase active measures to describe those activities. Over the last
decade of the Soviet Union, Soviet intelligence actively cultivated numer-
ous stories around the world to, as the State Department wrote in 1981,
“achieve its foreign policy objectives, frustrate other countries objectives,
and to undermine leadership in other countries.”426 (see Figure 20).
In some cases, the stories were completely manufactured with no truth
to them at all, such as forged documents intended to derail the Middle
East peace process in 1976;427 the famous Operation INFEKTION, which
claimed that the AIDS virus was manufactured in a U.S. military labora-
tory;428 and the ghastly rumor that the United States harvested body parts
from children in Latin America for transplants in the United States.429 The
Soviet Union manufactured and disseminated these absurd stories to a Third
World audience that was inclined to believe any anti-U.S. information. In

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other cases, active measures narratives either twisted a real story in a Soviet
direction or accentuated one side of a story and denigrated the opposing
side to present a Soviet perspective.

Figure 20. Soviet-era Active Measures Campaigns

1977: Forged U.S. Department of State documents criticizing the

Egyptian leadership
1977: Booklet “America’s 200 Years”
1977–78: Campaign against enhanced radiation weapons
1979–80: Anti-Theater Nuclear Forces campaign
1983–87: Operation INFEKTION—AIDS virus disinformation
1984: “Reagan means War!”
1985: U.S. backing for the South African apartheid regime
1985: Counternarrative regarding U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet
Union
1985: American militarization of space
1987: “Baby parts” stories—kidnapping to harvest organs disinformation

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including U.S. Department of
State, Soviet “Active Measures”: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, Special Report
No. 88, October 1981; Thomas Boghardt, “Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence
and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign,” Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (December 2009):
1-24; Calder Walton, “Spies, Election Meddling, and Disinformation: Past and Present,” The
Brown Journal of World Affairs 26, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2019): 107-124, http://bjwa.brown.
edu/26-1/spies-election-meddling-and-­disinformation-past-and-present/; Seth G. Jones,
“Russian Meddling in the United States: The Historical Context of the Mueller Report,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies Briefs, March 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
russian-meddling-united-states-historical-context-mueller-report.

Modern Russian disinformation campaigns focus on a consistent set

of themes. The Russian government repeats these themes throughout Rus-
sia’s information operations, whether they be overt, covert, or a crossover
between the two:

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■ Russia played the leading role in World War II. Russia emphasizes
its own role in World War II and vehemently criticizes any country
that questions that narrative. The downplaying or countering of Rus-
sia’s narrative in Estonia, Poland, and Czechia has met Russian overt
and covert responses. Russia’s advancing of its World War II theme
slowed during the COVID-19 lockdown in Moscow in 2020, which
prevented the Moscow celebration of the 75th anniversary of the
defeat of Germany. However, the event went on anyway in a smaller
and delayed form.
■ Russia is the victim. Allegations made against Russia in interna-
tional forums, such as when a Russian is arrested or expelled for
intelligence activities, are often met with counter-allegations claim-
ing that Russia is under threat of Western political attacks.
■ The United States is a source of instability. Russian disinforma-
tion focuses on U.S. actions, often tying world events to the CIA.
Russian disinformation during the MH17 shootdown investigation
in 2014–15 attempted to recast the event into a CIA-sponsored plot
to provoke a confrontation with Russia.430
■ NATO is a threat to international security. Russian operations fre-
quently criticize plans for NATO enlargement and exercises, while
downplaying its own activities to increase its influence over other
countries and hold massive military exercises.
■ The European Union is on the verge of collapse. The COVID-19
pandemic allowed Russia to spread disarray in Europe through dis-
information and by providing targeted support to some European
countries while criticizing others.431

In Thomas Rid’s 2020 book Active Measures, which recounts the history
of disinformation campaigns from both the Soviet and Western directions,
he translates the Soviet-era methods into a post-Soviet context, illustrating
the continuity of Russian intent over 100 years. According to John Emer-
son, these operations, both historical and current, show a pattern of activity
that can be described with four “Ds”:432

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■ Distort. Twist real information; take a truth and recast it in a dif-

ferent light to make it either seem more or less attractive. Russia
regularly does this with its narrative of World War II, an undeni-
ably legitimate topic of discussion that Russia twists for its political
purposes.433
■ Distract. Draw attention away from real information, as with the
2014 shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine.
Russian media created multiple conflicting stories, each of which
had no validity, but all of which pointed responsibility away from
Russia.434 This was also the case with Russian operations to leak
information about athletes from multiple countries supposedly vio-
lating doping rules to take the attention away from the Russian gov-
ernment’s doping program.435
■ Dismiss, Deny. Vladimir Putin himself boldly denied that Russian
troops were involved in seizing Crimea or supporting insurgents in
Ukraine,436 or that the Russian government carries any responsibil-
ity for the attempt to assassinate former GRU officer Sergey Skripal
in 2018.437
■ Dismay. Inflame fear, hate, or disgust, such as the Russian-­originated
claims that German troops had raped a young girl in Lithuania in
2016.438

Russia uses a variety of channels to disseminate patently false or decep-

tively half-true information. These operations vary in their level of covert-
ness and by how much clandestinely collected information supports them.
Russian media channels are often used to distribute Russian disinformation,
and Russian intelligence services occasionally feed clandestinely collected
information into overt broadcasts. These campaigns do not acknowledge
the Russian collection of the information, but they make no attempt to
hide the Russian hand in disseminating it. Russia also uses illicit Internet
channels to dump politically damaging or salacious material into the public
domain, from which it can then draw this “information” into overt media
“reports.” These illicit channels include already existing leaker web sites (e.g.,

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Wikileaks) or clandestinely created leaker websites (e.g., DCLeaks), which

hide the Russian hand behind both the collection and dissemination of the
information.439
Russian disinformation operations also employ overt non-Russian
media channels, such as newspapers, social media platforms, and journal-
ist forums, to insert politically damaging or divisive information and cause
dissension and confusion. For example, a Russian-linked illicit Twitter
site called “Anonymous Bulgaria” has become a platform for disseminat-
ing Russian disinformation, including claims that the United States sent
weapons to the Islamic State in Syria.440 Like Russia’s illicitly created chan-
nels, Russian intelligence services use these non-Russian channels without
revealing the Russian collection of information or the Russian hand behind
its dissemination.
An item of disinformation may start in one channel and then be rein-
forced in the others, particularly from illicit or non-Russian channels
into Russian media. For example, information about U.S. political cam-
paigns that was leaked through illicit channels during the 2016 Presiden-
tial election period was later reinforced through Russian media channels
and fed to non-Russian media. This practice follows a historical method
used during the Soviet era, when the famous Operation INFEKTION of
the 1980s initially planted an AIDS virus origin story in a non-­Russian
media channel and later broadcast it via Russian news media. One of Alek-
sandr Kaznacheyev’s responsibilities when he served as a KGB co-optee in
Burma in the late 1950s was to translate materials provided by Moscow
into English for clandestine distribution as if they came from local sources.
Local translators would then render the letters into Burmese and send
them anonymously to local, often pro-Communist newspapers, report-
edly from unnamed press correspondents. After the “Burmese articles”
appeared in print, Kaznacheyev would translate them back into Russian
and send them to Moscow, from where they would be disseminated glob-
ally via Soviet press as purportedly of Burmese origin.441 Similarly, MH17
disinformation in 2014 used obscure web-based media services to post
false material on the airliner shootdown initially, and then broadcast it via

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Russian media when the perceived need arose to disrupt the investigation
into the incident.442

Collection vs. Operationalizing

Key “who” and “how” differences exist between collecting intelligence and
operationalizing it. Collection and disinformation operations are con-
ducted separately but sometimes cooperatively. Correspondingly, per the
2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment of GRU officers responsible for
the hack and leak operations leading up to the 2016 U.S. elections, the hack
portion of the operation was conducted by a different element than the leak
portion.443 Information used in leak operations may be collected through
normal political collection using SIGINT, HUMINT, or computer-based
methods (see Chapter 4), or it can simply be manufactured outright. The
information is then handed to a covert action unit that operationalizes it.
The same intelligence could also be used for other purposes, such as national
security decisionmaking.
The GRU element called Unit 26165 is a SIGINT unit that collects
information for various customers, including other GRU units responsible
for covert operations. The unit, which is also known as the “GRU 85 Spe-
cial Service Main Center,” is located at 20 Komsomolskiy Prospekt, Mos-
cow. Unit 26165 conducted the operation to penetrate emails associated
with Hillary Clinton’s presidential election campaign and the Democratic
National Committee in 2016. The GRU officers arrested in the Netherlands
while conducting a close access SIGINT operation against the OPCW in
2018 were also from Unit 26165. The same unit was involved in computer
intrusion operations of the Dutch Safety Board in 2015, related to the pub-
lication of the MH17 crash report, and the World Anti-Doping Agency
intrusions in 2018.
The leak, or covert action, portion of the 2016 U.S. election-related oper-
ation was conducted by an element labeled Unit 74455, also known as the
“Main Center for Special Technologies” (GTsST). Located in the Moscow
suburbs, Unit 74455 is an execution arm of the GRU—the covert action

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side of razvedka—responsible for sabotage and disinformation actions. This

element is the computer-network equivalent of a DRG, conducting sabo-
tage and covert operations behind adversary lines. In addition to the 2016
leak operations in the United States, Unit 74455 has been connected to
multiple destructive computer-based attacks, including those that affected
critical infrastructure elements in Ukraine and the “Olympic Destroyer”
attack that targeted the Seoul, South Korea Olympics in 2018.444 Members
of Unit 74455 mostly conduct operations remotely.
Another GRU element, Unit 54777, also called the 72nd Special
Service Center, is reportedly a psychological and disinformation opera-
tions unit that maintains front organizations, including InfoRos and the
Institute of the Russian Diaspora; InfoRos was named in April 2021 U.S.
sanctions as an organization that spreads false conspiracy narratives and
disinformation promoted by GRU officials.445 Unit 54777 spread covert
Russian-sponsored messages during the annexation of Crimea. During the
November 2018 Kerch Strait incident, the unit sent bogus text messages
to Ukrainian soldiers in the border region calling on them to report for
military service. Letters sent to members of the U.S. Congress in 2015
from a group calling itself “The Patriot of Ukraine” are also believed to
have come from GRU Unit 54777; the letters claimed that the Ukrainian
military is corrupt and sells weapons to the so-called “Donetsk People’s
Republic,” and they demanded that U.S. decisionmakers take control of
the Ukrainian military.446 These covert influence operations are probably
founded on intelligence collected from a variety of sources, twisted to a
Russian narrative.
Members of yet another GRU element, Unit 29155, are accused of
conducting covert operations across Europe, including assassination opera-
tions, such as against Sergey Skripal in 2018; political meddling in Ukraine,
Moldova, Montenegro, Spain, and the United Kingdom; and sabotage
operations in Czechia and Bulgaria. Unlike Unit 74455, this unit dis-
patches officers abroad to conduct physical actions, not remote computer-­
based actions. Press investigations have identified a Switzerland-based
forward headquarters, led by a GRU officer previously accredited to the

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 Covert Activities

World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, as a coordinating ele-

ment for the unit.447
Western investigative journalist organizations have revealed these unit
designations publicly, and consequently the GRU may have changed them.
Nevertheless, the separation of responsibilities within the GRU for intelli-
gence collection and covert action missions remains.

COVERT ACTIONS: UNDECLARED MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The second major field of Russian covert action is undeclared military
activities. The military forces dispatched from Russia for these undeclared
operations are sometimes directly affiliated with Russian government orga-
nizations and sometimes not, offering some level of deniability that persists
at least long enough to accomplish the mission. The purpose of these forces
is to fulfill Russian policy goals while trying to avoid the political cost or
escalatory effect of conducting aggressive, often internationally objection-
able, military operations.
Undeclared military forces usually employ either GRU Spetsnaz covert
action personnel deploying undercover or former GRU Spetsnaz person-
nel operating as private forces. The GRU Spetsnaz is Russia’s covert action
arm, and it has a long history of fulfilling Russian political objectives. GRU
officer defector Vladimir Rezun (pen name Viktor Suvorov) served as a
Spetsnaz officer before becoming a GRU case officer, and he has written
extensively about his training to conduct rear-area sabotage operations and
covert infiltrations.448 During the Cold War, the Spetsnaz competed with
the KGB for supremacy in planning and conducting covert infrastructure
attacks, like the operations Lyalin discussed in his debriefings (see Chap-
ter 6). During the Cold War, Spetsnaz personnel operated covertly in
Angola, Lebanon, Vietnam, and Cambodia and conducted sabotage and
assassination operations in Afghanistan. They operated similarly during the
Chechen wars and in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. GRU Spetsnaz fosters
a reputation as a war-­hardened unit that can be called upon to go places
where others cannot go.

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Little Green Men in Crimea

In March 2014, Russian soldiers wearing unmarked uniforms began occupy-
ing government and military buildings in Crimea, paving the way for Rus-
sia’s illegal annexation of the territory. This sequence of events resembled the
August 1968 takeover by Spetsnaz forces of the main administrative build-
ings in Prague, Czechoslovakia, to pave the way for a Soviet-led invasion
to quell the Prague Spring.449 Although the Russian origin of the so-called
“little green men” in Crimea, Ukraine, was subsequently indisputably estab-
lished, the covert nature of the operation created deniability when the events
were occurring in 2014. The resulting doubt allowed Russia to complete the
operation. In April 2014, during the Crimea operation, BBC reported that
the soldiers occupying Ukrainian government and military buildings were
claiming to be Ukrainians or Cossacks, although even at the time, they were
not pushing that cover very hard.450 Russia, including Putin himself, referred
to them as “self-defense forces” at the time. A year later, Putin acknowledged
that the forces were Russian, but by that time, deniability was no longer nec-
essary—Crimea was firmly in Russian control.451

Nongovernment Forces
In addition to Russian government forces operating without acknowledg-
ment, Russia has also increasingly used nongovernment military forces
managed by Russian corporations for covert military activities. According
to an article in the Atlantic magazine, using nongovernment forces “allows
Russia to enter a foreign, largely hostile environment with minimal risk, and
to exploit both political and economic opportunities there.”452 Since 2014,
Russian private military corporation soldiers have operated in Ukraine,
Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Mozambique, and Libya. The
deniability that these nongovernment forces create has allowed Russia to
play two sides of those conflicts simultaneously, providing covert military
support to its preferred side in the conflict, while claiming openly to be an
honest broker. The forces’ private status has also allowed Russia to disclaim
responsibility for casualties and violence. In 2017, the Islamic State captured

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two fighters from the Russian Wagner Group in eastern Syria and paraded
them before cameras. Had they been acknowledged as Russian servicemen,
the outcry at home would probably have been vigorous. Instead, the Krem-
lin brushed aside their captivity, claiming they were “probably volunteers.”453
Covert military forces are fulfilling Russia’s foreign policy requirements,
just as political warfare operations are, although at times their success is
questionable. In 2018, Wagner Group forces famously attacked a position
in Syria occupied by U.S. forces and were decimated.454 In Mozambique,
when Wagner Group forces arrived to support Mozambiquan forces fight-
ing Islamist insurgents, the Russians were quickly overwhelmed and forced
to retreat to a base; the Wagner Group forces were accused of being ill-­
prepared for jungle fighting and disrespectful of the Mozambiquan forces
they were supposed to be supporting. Similarly, Wagner Group forces in the
Central African Republic are reportedly facing similar difficulties working
with locals.455 On the other hand, the Wagner Group has seen success in
Libya, where the group has been a major source of support to the forces of
Gen. Khalifa Haftar, the rebel leader who controls the oil-rich eastern por-
tion of Libya. The Wagner Group has deployed a larger contingent of forces
to Libya than to other countries in Africa.

COVERT ACTIONS: ASSASSINATIONS

The third category of Russian covert activities is assassinations. Russian assas-
sination operations have become a major topic of political and journalistic
discussion in the West, with assassinations being reported both inside and
outside Russia during the Putin era. The attempt on Russian opposition-
ist Aleksey Navalny’s life in August 2020 thrust the issue into the spotlight
again. While assassination operations are often merged in Western analysis,
the Russian government does not define them all in one category.
Russia divides assassination operations into three groups of targets: mil-
itary, political, and traitors. It also divides the venues for assassination oper-
ations into two general locations: inside Russia and everywhere else. Russia’s
approach to eliminating opponents in the three categories differs significantly

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inside Russia from outside Russia (see Figure 21). Inside Russia, military tar-
gets are by far the largest category, with assassination operations in the North
Caucasus region of Russia far outweighing every other group. Military tar-
gets are also the largest category outside Russia, although the overall num-
bers are smaller than inside Russia. Political targets come next, although most
of them also occur inside Russia; very few political assassination operations
occur elsewhere. The third category, traitors, is exclusively external because
Russia has other state security tools to deal with traitors inside Russia.

Figure 21. Russian Assassination Types

Internal External
Political Oppositionists, critical Small number of anti-Putin
journalists political activists
Military During counterterrorist Syrian opposition, Ukrainian,
operations and Chechen military leaders
Traitors Dealt with through state Small number of special cases
security mechanisms

The Russian calculus for assassinating someone inside Russia is much

different than doing so outside Russia. Although the instrumentality of
assassination, such as the use of a bullet to the head or a certain type of poi-
son, might cross the boundaries of internal and external operations, the sen-
sitivity of operations outside the country is much greater than it is inside.
This difference became clear following the assassination of Zelimkhan
Khangoshvili, a Chechen militant leader, in Germany in August 2019,456
which led to a German legal investigation and expulsion of Russian dip-
lomats. That external-internal dynamic makes it especially surprising that
the Russian government allowed Aleksey Navalny to be taken abroad for
medical treatment after he was poisoned in Russia in 2020.457 Navalny is an
internal threat; when he returned to Russia in January 2021, the Russian
government arrested him immediately upon arrival in Moscow and soon

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sentenced him to three and a half years in prison. Allowing Navalny to have
treatment abroad that confirmed his poisoning may turn out to have been an
error in Russia’s assassination calculus.

Internal Assassinations
Russia views assassination operations inside Russia as a state security neces-
sity, not an extreme act. Using violence to resolve internal political opposi-
tion is a natural trait of an authoritarian regime. The primary objective of
an authoritarian regime is to retain control of the political environment by
whatever means necessary, including by physically eliminating threats.
Internal Political. During the Soviet era, assassinations for political
crimes were uncommon inside the Soviet Union; they were not seen as nec-
essary because other methods were available to neutralize those who crossed
a political line. In the early Soviet era, OGPU “troikas” (­three-person extra-
judicial teams of state security personnel) had the authority to order execu-
tions, and later simply making someone disappear was enough. Neutralizing
internal opposition could be done using various methods, including sen-
tencing dissidents to inhuman conditions in corrective labor camps or psy-
chiatric hospitals. Although not overtly assassination, it often amounted to
a death sentence.
More recently, the deaths of leading opposition figures, anticorruption
activists, and critical journalists have become a common occurrence inside
Russia, although the Russian government targets only leading oppositionists
and the most vocal journalists for assassination. These include people like
liberal politician Boris Nemtsov, journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and most
recently opposition leader Aleksey Navalny. Although numerous journalists
have been killed in Russia, their deaths have often come not at the hand of
the central government, but probably instead by the order of individual pow-
erful elites or criminal leaders—for example, when a journalist was getting
too close to the truth regarding a criminal or corrupt enterprise. Journalists
killed covering events in Chechnya are in yet another category, viewed inside
Russia not as political targets but as the victims of war.

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The threshold of activities that warrant a state security response is not

absolutely clear, but there are activities that fall below those that would trigger
an assassination operation (see Figure 22). Assassination is a relatively rare tool
reserved for the most prominent oppositionists and critical journalists, those
who become too popular for the ruling regime to tolerate. Navalny is the most
recent, and his actions clearly crossed red lines in the Kremlin’s analysis.

Figure 22. Russian Calculus for Action Against Internal Oppositionists

Level of Oppositionist Activity Russian Government Response

5 Become a symbol of the opposition Arrest and sentence to extended prison

and draw a major following time, but consider assassination

4 Lead an opposition group; gain Arrest and sentence to extended

prominence as an oppositionist prison time
figure or critical journalist

3 Join an oppositionist group or actively Arrest and hold for a short time in
participate in oppositionist activities; custody
write critical material about the Putin
regime

2 Participate in oppositionist Initiate monitoring

discussions online or in person

1 Read oppositionist material No immediate reaction

Source: Figure derived from work completed by National Intelligence University student, MAJ
Teresa Haltom, in pursuit of the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree in 2019. 

Short of assassinations, internal political oppositionists are handled in

various ways based on the degree of their perceived malfeasance. Some pas-
sive oppositionist actions do not even meet the threshold for an overt state
security response but could attract increased monitoring of communication
channels. People in this category are probably among the thousands whose
personal information Russian government entities request from Russian
Internet service providers (see Chapter 3). This level of opposition activity
could also predicate a counterintelligence operation to recruit an individual
as a double agent or an agent provocateur. A person must cross a threshold

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to be considered for arrest, including participating in oppositionist activi-

ties, like mass demonstrations, although these are not invariably the cause
for arrests, as seen in Khabarovsk in 2020 when a crackdown did not imme-
diately follow anti-Kremlin protests against the arrest of a popular regional
governor. In contrast, mass demonstrations that followed the January 2021
arrest of Navalny crossed the threshold and led to thousands of arrests.
Assassinations are considered only in the most extreme cases.
Internal Military. For Russia, leaders of anti-Russian militant or terrorist
organizations are justifiable assassination targets wherever they are. They are
not treated the same as, and are much more frequently attacked than, political
targets. Internal military assassination operations are divided into those that
occur in the North Caucasus specifically and those that occur elsewhere in
Russia. In the North Caucasus, Russian state security forces have routinely
targeted specific militant leaders for assassination, viewing them as legitimate
military targets. Between 1996 and 2017, over 60 Chechen and Dagestani
militant leaders were directly targeted for assassination in the North Cau-
casus. That is the largest number of Russian assassination operations of any
category. In the rest of Russia, militants have been killed in counterterrorism
operations, sometimes when terrorists have conducted hostage-taking oper-
ations, such as in the Nord-Ost theater siege in 2002 and the Beslan school
siege in 2004.458 One of Putin’s early statements as prime minister in the Boris
Yeltsin administration was to promise that Russia would eliminate terrorists
wherever they were, even using vulgar terms regarding targeting them in their
outhouses.459 Although observers outside Russia have criticized the Russian
government’s heavy-handed response to terrorist attacks inside its borders,
this stance was one of Putin’s initial attractions for the Russian people.

External Assassinations
Assassinations outside Russia are less common than equivalent operations
inside Russia probably because they are potentially more politically dam-
aging to Russia and must be conducted more carefully. By definition, state-­
sponsored assassinations outside the state’s own borders are covert operations.

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The prominence that Russian covert assassinations have received outside Rus-
sia depends on the country-venue’s willingness to openly criticize Russia: a
covert assassination in the United Kingdom, for example, is more likely to
receive public attention than a covert assassination in Turkey or Austria.
Unlike inside Russia, where the Russian government controls the envi-
ronment, the hand of the Russian government in assassination operations
outside Russia is supposed to remain hidden. However, Russian government
involvement has often been identified in extraterritorial assassinations either
because of poor tradecraft or because the Russian government intended for
its reach to be known. In 2006, the Russian government adopted a new law
authorizing extrajudicial killings abroad.460 That law states:

It is lawful to deprive the life of a person who commits a terrorist

act, as well as causing harm to the health or property of such a per-
son or other legally protected interests of the individual, society or
the state in the suppression of a terrorist act or the implementation
of other measures to combat terrorism by actions prescribed or per-
mitted by the legislation of the Russian Federation.461

When commenting on such assassinations, Putin has disclaimed any

knowledge of them, while also asserting that the victims deserved to be
killed.462 His denials are questionable.
External Political. Russia does weigh the consequences of being caught
assassinating someone abroad, and political assassinations outside Russia are
relatively rare. During the Cold War, the Soviet government balanced exter-
nal political assassinations against possible political fallout, and operations
targeted only those individuals who were deemed sufficiently problematic to
justify the potential blowback. Georgy Markov, a vocal anti-communist, was
probably among these. His assassination, by stabbing with a poison-tipped
umbrella in London in 1978, was conducted by the Bulgarian government
with KGB assistance and advice.463
More recently, external Russian political assassinations have been alleged,
but, in each case, there are doubts about the circumstances. Russian business

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oligarch Boris Berezovsky’s 2013 death under suspicious circumstances in the

United Kingdom may fall into this category; his death was ruled a suicide, but
questions remain.464 Several suspicious shootings in the United States also raise
questions of Russian involvement, such as an attack on American security ana-
lyst Paul Joyal in February 2007, not long after Joyal accused Putin of involve-
ment in the assassination of FSB defector Aleksandr Litvinenko the previous
year. Although Joyal claims the Russian government was behind his shooting,
the perpetrators have not been identified, and Joyal would be a relatively unim-
portant target, out of character for a Russia external covert operation.465
According to a New York Times investigative article in October 2019
GRU Unit 29155 was reportedly involved in several covert actions that have
become public. The article associated GRU officers from Unit 29155 with
events including the suspected 2015 Emilian Gebrev assassination attempt
(see below); a failed attempt to launch a coup in Montenegro in 2016,
accompanied by a reported attempt to kill the Montenegrin prime minis-
ter; and the 2018 Sergey Skripal assassination attempt in the United King-
dom.466 Members of the unit were also reportedly active during the 2014
takeover of Crimea and in destabilization activities in Moldova in 2014—
other covert activities that did not involve assassinations.
The political objective behind external assassination operations usu-
ally clearly aligns with Russian foreign policy objectives. If the report of an
assassination attempt on the Montenegrin prime minister is true, it would
probably be related to the country’s NATO accession.467 Montenegro was
formally invited to join NATO in December 2015 and was accepted into
the alliance in June 2017. The coup attempt occurred in October 2016, on
the same day as parliamentary elections were held in Montenegro that pre-
pared the way for its NATO accession.
External Military. The largest category of external assassination targets
are militant leaders. During the Soviet era, these could be any leader of an
anti-Soviet military insurgent group, which the Soviet government viewed
as legitimate military targets, such as White Army generals Aleksandr Kute-
pov in the 1920s and Yevgeniy Miller in the 1930s. During the Cold War,
targets included Ukrainian nationalist leaders Georgiy Okolovich, Lev

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Rebet, and Stepan Bandera, all of whom were residing in Germany when
they were marked for assassination.468 These victims were different from
political targets because they led anti-Soviet militant movements outside
the Soviet Union and were thus military targets in the Soviet calculus.
In the post-Soviet era, military targets have most prominently included
Chechen militant leaders, who in Russia’s assessment are all terrorists (see
Figure 23). Between 2004 and 2019, at least 20 Chechen separatist lead-
ers and their supporters have been the targets of assassination operations
outside the Russian Federation, including 12 in Turkey, three in Ukraine,
two in Austria, and one each in Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
Germany. Three of these attempts failed. The first Putin-era assassination
of a Chechen militant took place in 2004 in Qatar, perpetrated by GRU
operatives. Since 2008 FSB Alfa and Vympel special operations units were
probably behind most of the operations, although supporters of Ramzan
Kadyrov, who is Moscow’s chosen leader of Chechnya and is accused of kill-
ing his opponents, probably targeted some of them with FSB support.

Figure 23. Chechen External Assassinations Targets in the Putin Era

2004: Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Chechen rebel leader; assassinated

in Qatar; GRU officers arrested in Doha, Qatar
2008: Gaji Edilsultanov, Chechen military leader; assassinated in
Istanbul, Turkey
2008: Islam Janibekov, Chechen military leader; assassinated in
Istanbul, Turkey
2009: Umar Israilov, former bodyguard of Chechen leader Ramzan
Kadyrov who accused Kadyrov of ordering torture; assassinated in
Vienna, Austria
2009: Musa Atayev (aka Ali Osayev), Chechen military leader: assas-
sinated in Istanbul, Turkey
2009: Salim Yamadayev, Chechen political leader and rival to K
­ adyrov:
assassinated in Dubai, UAE

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 Covert Activities

2011: Berg-Hazg Musayev, Rustam Altemirov, and Zaurbek Amriev,

Chechen military members: assassinated in Istanbul, Turkey; one of
the assassins was identified as a Russian criminal; the weapon was a
type known to be used by Russian special forces
2011: Shamsuddin Batukayev, Chechen rebel cleric; assassination
attempt in Turkey
2013: Medet Ünlü, Chechen rebel representative in Turkey; assassi-
nated in Ankara, Turkey
2014: Abdullah Bukhari, Uzbek cleric; assassinated in Turkey; FSB
connections to the assassins, as a favor to the Uzbekistani security
service
2015: Kaim Saduyev, Chechen military commander; assassinated in
Istanbul, Turkey
2015: Abdulvahid Edelgiriev, Chechen oppositionist who plotted to
resume jihad on Russian territory, suspected in Moscow of having
played a key role in a plot to kill Putin; assassinated in Istanbul, Turkey
2016: Ruslan Israpilov, Chechen oppositionist; assassinated in
Kocaeli Province, Turkey
2017: Adam Osmayev and Amina Okuyeva, husband and wife
Chechen activists; attacked in Kiev, Ukraine, but returned fire on
assailants and survived; Moscow accused Osmayev of plotting to
assassinate Putin; Okuyeva killed in an ambush later in 2017
2017: Timur Makhauri (aka Ali Timaiev), Chechen military leader;
assassinated in Kiev, Ukraine
2019: Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, Chechen military leader who defected
and supported Georgian intelligence; assassinated in Berlin, Germany
2020: Mamikhan Umarov, Chechen political activist and blogger;
killed in Austria

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including “Russia Assassinated at
Least 13 Chechens Abroad Before Victim Returned Fire in Kyiv,” EuroMaidan Press, June 21,
2017, http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/06/21/russia-assassinated-at-least-14-chechens-
abroad-before-it-failed-on-osmayev/; “Have Russian Hitmen Been Killing with Impunity in Tur-
key?,” BBC, December 13, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38294204.

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Syrian militant leaders have frequently been the targets of Russian military
operations inside Syria. Additionally, at least four Ukrainian military leaders
have been assassinated inside Ukraine, probably targeted by Ukrainian sepa-
ratists with FSB or GRU support. Just as the Soviet Union viewed anti-Soviet
insurgent leaders during the Cold War, the Russian government views these
oppositionists as legitimate military targets, not political targets.
Another possible type of military assassination emerged when the Czech
government reported in 2021 the results of its investigation into explosions
at two military weapons storage sites in 2014.469 About six months after the
explosions, a Bulgarian arms dealer, Emilian Gebrev, was the target of an
assassination attempt, which Bellingcat convincingly showed was conducted
by GRU officers. At the time, the motive for the assassination was unclear;
even Bellingcat did not attempt to assert a motivation.470 Ukrainian officials
reported in April 2021 that Gebrev was involved in acquiring the weapons
that were destroyed in Czechia, and the attempt on Gebrev’s life may be
related to his supplying weapons to Russia’s military adversary, Ukraine, or
to another Russian military target, Georgia.471 Gebrev denies any connec-
tion to arms shipments to Ukraine or Georgia.472 However, if the reports are
true, this appears to be a case of multiple converging Russian covert opera-
tions—seeking to destroy an enemy weapons shipment in a foreign country
and to assassinate the individual responsible for selling the weapons.
External Traitors. Russian assassinations of former intelligence and
state security officers are a special category, manifesting the Russian phrase
“бывших чекистов не бывает” (“there is no such thing as a former chek-
ist”). In other words, once a person is given the special trust of being an
intelligence or state security officer, there is no turning back without conse-
quences. During the Soviet era, the KGB had the mission of tracking down
and neutralizing intelligence officer defectors. The act of neutralization
could come in several forms: re-recruiting them to support Soviet interests;
kidnapping or luring them back to the Soviet Union to face justice; or, in the
most extreme cases, assassinating them.
The KGB monitored the whereabouts of defectors and approached
them about returning to the Soviet Union, often using family members or

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friends who, under KGB direction, wrote letters imploring the defector to
come back. This was the case with Georgiy Salimanov, who defected in May
1950 but was lured back to Soviet-controlled East Germany after only three
months, probably with the assistance of his German girlfriend. He was exe-
cuted in 1952.473 A series of young defectors in the early 1970s also returned
to the Soviet Union after only a short time in the United States, although it
is unclear whether they did so on their own or were induced to return. Either
way, redefection could be a major propaganda victory. According to KGB
defector Oleg Kalugin, the KGB attempted to persuade Alexander Orlov to
redefect for propaganda purposes in 1969, although Orlov refused.474
Just as desirable as luring defectors back to the Soviet Union was to re-­
recruit them, either through coercion using family members still in the Soviet
Union, or by convincing them that their life in the West was not as meaning-
ful as it would be if they were working for the Soviet Union. A re-­recruitment
operation depended partially on what accesses the defector had obtained.
A job in certain high-priority organizations drew special efforts to attract a
defector to work for the Soviet Union again. This was the case with a small
number of intelligence office defectors, like Aleksandr Kopatskiy, who, after
defecting during World War II, was re-recruited as a penetration of the CIA in
Germany in the late 1940s.475 Yuriy Pyatakov, who defected in 1966 and took
the name Yury Michael Marin in the West, was re-recruited after he began
working at Radio Liberty in Germany. Pyatakov later redefected, along with a
series of other Radio Liberty employees from Eastern European countries.476
Assassinations of intelligence officer defectors were typically the last
resort, reserved for the most damaging and vulnerable individuals. Repre-
sentative examples include Vladimir Nestorovich (assassinated in 1925),
Georgiy Agabekov (disappeared in 1937, presumed assassinated), Ignace
Reiss (assassinated in 1937), Walter Krivitsky (a Soviet hand is suspected in
his suspicious death in 1941), Mikhail Mondich (assassination attempted in
the mid-1950s), and Nikolai Khokhlov (assassination attempted in 1957).
Although it is not always obvious why a particular intelligence officer was
targeted for assassination, some defectors had been particularly damaging
to Soviet intelligence operations. Khokhlov, for example, exposed Soviet

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assassination operations when he defected in 1954. After several KGB assas-

sinations became publicly known, especially through revelations by Khokh-
lov and Bogdan Stashynsky, another KGB assassin who defected in 1961, the
Soviet leadership was more careful about approving assassinations, focusing
only on the most damaging targets. Oleg Kalugin claims to have proposed in
the 1970s the assassination of two KGB defectors from the 1950s, but the
KGB leadership did not approve them. He writes that KGB Director Yuriy
Andropov told him: “Leave these geezers alone. Find Oleg Lyalin and Yuri
Nosenko and I will sanction the execution of those two.” The KGB did not
locate them, and interest in their execution eventually faded.477 In some cases,
defectors’ prominence was actually their salvation, since it would be harder
to target a well-known person without the Soviet hand being revealed.
Assassination operations targeting intelligence officer defectors have
occurred twice in the post-Soviet era: in 2006 against former KGB/FSB offi-
cer Aleksandr Litvinenko and in 2018 against former GRU officer Sergey
Skripal. UK investigators identified FSB officers involved in the Litvinenko
operation,478 and the UK government and Bellingcat identified GRU offi-
cers involved in the Skripal operation.479 The Russian government may have
played on the fear of assassination in 2019, when Russian press identified
the city in which Oleg Smolenkov, a Russian who had defected in 2017, was
residing in the United States.480 Smolenkov’s status as an intelligence officer
is not confirmed, but the Kremlin aide did allegedly have high-level accesses.
Coming just one year after the Skripal assassination attempt, the publication
of Smolenkov’s address was possibly an FSB leak to send an ominous mes-
sage to Smolenkov and other defectors: we know where you are.

CONCLUSION: COVERT ACTIVITIES SUPPORT

POLITICAL AND MILITARY AIMS
Russia has gained global notoriety for its covert operations, particularly since
the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These operations have a Soviet-era
flavor, applying political warfare and assassination methods that have long
been in the Soviet/Russian toolkit. Covert political operations have drawn

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extensive foreign media attention, giving Russia a reputation for manipulat-

ing other countries’ political systems. These operations have sometimes been
accompanied by covert insertions of military forces, either those directly
under Russian government command or private military corporations that
use military means to enforce Russia’s foreign policy objectives.
That Russia’s hand has so easily been established in these operations—
including all three categories of political operations, undeclared military
operations, and assassination operations—is an indicator either that Russia’s
covert tradecraft has deteriorated since the Cold War or that Russia is less
concerned about hiding its responsibility. Either way, the steady stream of
Russian covert activities especially since 2014 has earned Russia the repu-
tation of ignoring international norms, punishing its rivals, and supporting
pariah regimes.

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 SECTION III
HOW

k k k
Russian intelligence services have at their disposal a variety of platforms
from which to conduct political, economic, S&T, and military collection
and covert operations. These platforms divide into two broad categories:
human based and technology based. The next two chapters explain those
two categories.
Human-based platforms include intelligence officers dispatched under
various covers depending on mission, target, and the counterintelligence
environment. Technical platforms range from ground-based to satel-
lite-based and computer-based. In many cases, these two types of platforms
support each other, such as by providing SIGINT security for HUMINT
operations or targeting human code clerks seeking information that will sup-
port SIGINT collection. Although modern technology has made clandes-
tine HUMINT more challenging, Russia has clearly not abandoned or even
diminished its efforts to use clandestine human officers abroad. At the same
time, technical operations are becoming more prevalent in Russian intelli-
gence collection, especially computer-based collection, although technical
platforms cannot reach all of the information that Russian intelligence ser-
vices desire to access. Russia, therefore, continues to use a full spectrum of
platform types, at times in concert with each other.

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 CHAPTER 8

HUMAN PLATFORMS

k k k
Overall, HUMINT consists of three groups of people: case officers, sup-
port personnel, and agents. Russia dispatches case officers abroad under a
variety of covers, and each type of cover has advantages and disadvantages,
depending on the counterintelligence environment, diplomatic relation-
ships, acceptance of or suspicion toward Russians in society, and the finan-
cial cost of placing certain types of officers abroad. The choice of which type
of officer to deploy is also guided by the need for diplomatic immunity, com-
munications channels, funding channels, ease of seeing through the cover,
and access to people who possess the targeted information. Case officers
need support personnel to communicate with headquarters, keep track of
paperwork, and maintain vehicles and equipment. Finally, the officer cannot
collect information without an agent who has placement in the right organi-
zation and access to the targeted information.

LEGAL COVER
The best known type of cover for a Russian intelligence officer is legal cover.
Russian intelligence organizations use the term “legal” cover because the offi-
cer enters the assigned country through a legal process on a valid visa, albeit
often under an assumed name. Thus, the term refers only to how the officer

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enters the country, not whether the officer conforms to host-country laws
when conducting operations. Usually, an intelligence officer is covered as a
diplomat, but the cover could also be as a press correspondent, a member of
an international organization, a staff member of a cultural center, or a mem-
ber of any other organization that has a formal tie to the Russian government.
On a few occasions, Russian intelligence services, particularly the FSB,
declare an officer to a local government for liaison purposes. This occurs in
countries where the Russian government sees the need to share intelligence
with the host government, either for legitimate cooperation or for influence.
When declared to the host government, the officer does not usually conduct
clandestine operations, although he or she might spot and assess potential
recruitment candidates for another officer to cultivate.
The main advantage of legal cover is that it grants diplomatic immunity,
which is governed by international standards for the treatment of diplomats;
that is, a diplomat cannot be put in jail or prosecuted in a court, no matter
what they do. Exceptions have been made to diplomatic immunity in rare
cases when a diplomat is involved in an extreme crime, like vehicular homi-
cide. But even in such extreme cases, both governments must agree to the
exception, which is never automatic.
For a charge of espionage, governments never make an exception to dip-
lomatic immunity. Espionage is a political crime, not a physical crime, mean-
ing that one country does not necessarily accept another country’s definition
or allegations of espionage. Additionally, because the country whose officer
is conducting espionage benefits from that activity, no country will allow
one of its diplomats to be prosecuted for espionage. The only recourse that
remains to a host government is to declare a diplomatically covered intelli-
gence officer persona non grata, or to expel him or her for “activities incom-
patible with diplomatic status.” The officer is removed from the country but
is not put in jail first, and no court case ensues. Sometimes an officer expelled
from one country can appear in another country as a diplomat if the two
host countries do not share information about intelligence officer identifi-
cations or if the second government does not politically oppose a Russian
intelligence officer operating on its territory.

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 Human Platforms

Hundreds of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic

cover have been declared personae non gratae, sometimes publicly and
sometimes quietly just between the expelling country and the Russian gov-
ernment. Mass public expulsions have occurred several times: in 1971, the
British government expelled 90 Soviet officials and disallowed the diplo-
matic visas of 15 others after Oleg Lyalin, a KGB officer under diplomatic
cover, defected. France expelled 47 Soviet officials in 1983 after KGB officer
Vladimir Vetrov’s revelations about technical collection in France. In 1986,
the United States expelled over 80 Soviet officials to protest the recruitment
of several U.S. citizens arrested in 1985 for espionage, plus 50 more Rus-
sian officials in 2001 to protest Robert Hanssen’s espionage activities. In
late 2016, the United States also expelled 35 Russian officials in retaliation
for Russian meddling in the U.S. elections. About 150 Russian officers were
publicly expelled from 30 countries in 2018 in response to the attempted
assassination of Sergey Skripal in the United Kingdom, including over 60
from the United States. In 2021, Czechia expelled nearly 80 Russians after
confirming allegations of Russian involvement in explosions at two weapons
storage facilities in 2014.481 Those mass expulsions are by far not the only
ones in the past decade. Since the 2018 mass expulsions, at least Greece,
Hungary, Slovakia, Germany, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Italy have expelled
Russian officers under diplomatic cover for various reasons.
Diplomatically covered officers have the advantage of natural access to
many government officials, including those whose job is to determine and
conduct another government’s foreign and military policy—both high pri-
ority intelligence targets for Russia. This interaction opens many opportu-
nities to seek agents with useful access, either in the host government or
among fellow diplomats. Many Soviet/Russian diplomatically covered offi-
cers have recruited other countries’ diplomats serving in the same foreign
capital. Afanasiy Shorokhov (aka Vladimir Petrov) told Australian officials
that he had targeted other diplomats in Canberra during his tenure there in
the 1950s, including Indonesian, French, and Israeli.482 More recently, SVR
defector Sergey Tretyakov reported that his rezidentura at the Russian Mis-
sion to the United Nations in New York targeted diplomats from multiple

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countries in the 1990s, often for the knowledge they could provide about
their countries’ plans for relations with Russia or the United States.483 These
recruitments were heavily focused on political collection.
Communication between the officer and headquarters is easier for dip-
lomatically covered officers because they can use their own government com-
munication channels and encryption systems, as well as diplomatic pouches,
without raising suspicion of the host government. Legal cover can also be
less expensive, because it does not require establishing a separate reason for
the officer to be in the country, such as a cover business or new cover identity.
Disadvantages include the officer’s overt affiliation with a foreign gov-
ernment, which for some people is an inhibitor to beginning a relationship,
especially if antagonistic relations exist between the two countries. Some
people, often including those who work in intelligence agencies, which are
an important target of Russian intelligence, have an innate suspicion of for-
eign government representatives, making it difficult to approach them. Dip-
lomatically covered officers are also easier to identify, because their names are
published in diplomatic protocol lists. Some countries immediately assume
that a foreign diplomat is an intelligence officer, especially Russian diplo-
mats, until they can prove otherwise. Russia operates the same way, assuming
that foreign diplomats posted to Russia are intelligence officers. Monitoring
the finite number of foreign diplomats is easier than watching everyone who
enters the country.
Sometimes, when relations between countries are particularly tense, a
government will impose a travel restriction on accredited diplomats, mean-
ing that diplomats are required to ask permission to travel beyond a certain
radius around the city where they are assigned. In addition to limiting for-
eign diplomats’ ability to visit restricted areas, this constraint makes surveil-
lance of their movements easier. During the Cold War, Soviet diplomats had
a 25-mile travel radius around their assigned cities in the United States; U.S.
diplomats were similarly restricted in the Soviet Union.
Probably the biggest strategic disadvantage of diplomatically covered
officers is that, if diplomatic relations are severed, the host government will
expel all diplomats of the affected country. Should this occur during wartime,

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when intelligence is most needed, it would leave no diplomatic positions

under which to cover intelligence officers. A different type of officer who can
remain in place is required during periods of extreme tension, like wartime.

NONOFFICIAL COVER
Nonofficial cover (NOC) means an individual is sent abroad using legal
immigration channels but without official government affiliation. A Rus-
sian NOC officer often represents a Russian entity of some kind, although
not the Russian government itself. Cover might be as a banker, businessman,
student, researcher, or representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, or
any other position that allows for legal travel.
NOC officers, or NOCs, have the advantage of being able to enter dif-
ferent social circles than diplomats or formal government representatives
can. They may develop relationships with other businesspeople who have
access to economic or technological information or may exploit common
interests to be introduced to individuals with access to military or political
information. NOCs are harder to identify because they enter a country with
the regular flow of foreigners, not with special diplomatic or official visas.
The disadvantage has been manifested in several cases over the past
decade: NOCs can be arrested and prosecuted for espionage or for conduct-
ing foreign influence campaigns because they do not enjoy diplomatic immu-
nity. Russian NOCs have been compromised in several locations. In 2010,
a Russian businessman was arrested in Poland after living there for about
10 years and running a company that sold hunting equipment, including
optical sights for hunting rifles. He reportedly developed close relationships
with Polish military officials who were also hunting enthusiasts. The Polish
government alleged that his company had been established with GRU funds
as cover for the officer’s intelligence activities.484 He was initially referred
to in the media as an illegal, but he was probably a Russian NOC instead,
as he was openly living as a Russian national. In another example, Yevgeniy
Buryakov arrived in the United States in 2010 as an employee of the Russian
bank, VneshEconomBank; he was handled by SVR officers posted under

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diplomatic cover at the Russian UN Mission.485 These two Russian NOCs

were working in long-term assignments in their target countries when they
were arrested. Not as many NOCs have been identified publicly as other
types of officers because they may travel on short-term TDY assignments
and are thus not visible for extended periods.

ILLEGAL COVER
The Soviet Union established the illegals program in 1922, primarily because
the Bolshevik regime had not obtained diplomatic recognition by any coun-
try in the world to that point. Legally covered intelligence officers were not a
possibility because there were no Soviet embassies. According to SVR Direc-
tor Sergey Naryshkin, speaking in 2017 about the illegals program: “The
concern at the time was about the very existence of the RSFSR [Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The political and military leadership
needed foundational information about enemies’ plans.”486 Illegals were sent
abroad without any connection to the Bolshevik regime, which was raising
suspicion throughout Europe and Asia for its support for revolutions. This
supposed separation from the Soviet Union provided the opportunity to
gain information on “enemies” who were seen as intent on attacking Russia.
These officers are called нелегал (illegal) because they enter a country
using false documents in a fictitious name. They typically present a persona
that is completely different from their real identity. Their assumed identity is
usually not Russian and has no overt connection to Russia at all.
Russia chooses illegals from two broad pools of people: Russian natives
and non-Russians. Each group has advantages and disadvantages. If one
of the goals of an illegal is to portray someone who is not Russian, then
non-Russians start with an advantage. They can naturally portray a non-­
Russian in language, culture, mannerisms, and often in their experience
abroad. Non-Russians do not need as much training and can portray a
non-Russian without as much risk of compromise. Over the years, Soviet
and Russian services have chosen numerous non-Russians as illegals from
among the many nationalities of people who have emigrated or traveled to

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the Soviet Union. Some famous illegals have come from among this pool
of people, such as Walter Krivitsky, who was born as Samuel Ginzberg in
what was then the Austro-Hungarian Empire; Richard Sorge, who was Ger-
man; the person known as Rudolf Abel, who was actually William Fisher
from England; Morris and Lona Cohen, who were born and raised in the
United States and became Soviet officers in the 1940s; and a woman named
Afrika de las Heras, who was from a Spanish enclave in Morocco and lived
for over 20 years as an illegal in South America. A comparable non-Russian
pool of illegals and prospective illegals exists today. Russia has access to large
non-Russian populations among the many individuals who travel to Russia
from former Soviet republics for jobs. Russian services can easily choose can-
didates from among these individuals to become illegals.
The disadvantage of non-Russian illegals, however, is that they do not
have the same level of loyalty to Moscow as Russian natives do. Although
there have been some deeply loyal officers among this non-Russian group,
non-Russian illegals have been more inclined to defect than Russian natives.
The first Soviet illegal to defect, Aleksandr Sipelgas, was ethnically Estonian
and was sent to Finland as an illegal in the 1920s.
Russian-ethnic candidates have just the opposite advantages and dis-
advantages—they take longer to train, but they are less likely to defect.
­Russia-born individuals are selected for illegal positions for a variety of rea-
sons. Some possess a special skill or ability that Russian intelligence services
need for operational purposes. They may have studied and shown particular
aptitude for a foreign language or exhibited valor or clandestine skills during
war or in internal operations. This was the case with Yevgeniy Khokhlov,
who operated behind German lines during World War II and became an
illegal in the 1940s. He was said to have been able to pass easily as a German.
Illegals candidates may be Russians with family connections abroad
around which they could build an identity. Alexander Kouzminov, an ille-
gals-handling officer who defected in the 1990s, described a number of
illegals who were born into Greek families in the Soviet Union but who con-
nected with relatives in Greece when they were dispatched abroad as illegals.
Soviet intelligence also sought particular areas of expertise beyond foreign

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language capability. Kouzminov, who was responsible for handling agents

who could report on biological weapons programs, visited Soviet universi-
ties looking for promising candidates with degrees in biological sciences.487
Whatever the qualification, a person does not volunteer to be an illegal.
A volunteer would appear to be too eager and may have ulterior motives. A
Russian intelligence service invites promising candidates to be illegals and,
even then, puts them through rigorous testing and training to determine
whether they possess the required characteristics of loyalty, courage, and abil-
ity to think independently. Russian-born illegals require much more training
to be able to portray someone other than who they really are, usually under-
going years of language and cultural training so they can plausibly portray a
non-Russian identity. One German agent, Hede Massing, claimed that she
was tasked to meet Russian officers traveling through Germany en route to
foreign assignments and “attempt to rub off some of the obviously Russian
characteristics” so they more could successfully fit into Western society.488 The
Soviet services often sought Russian candidates who had lived abroad and
already had at least the beginnings of an education about how non-Russians
lived, although these individuals were difficult to find during the Soviet era,
when the Soviet government prevented most citizens from traveling abroad.
More than anything else, an illegal needs to operate independently
and remain loyal while being surrounded by people and ideas that may be
opposed to the illegal’s mission. Russian-born illegals have proven themselves
to be more loyal than non-Russians, and few among them have chosen to
defect. Most of the illegals arrested in the United States in 2010 were trained
Russians. One of them, Yelena Vavilova, published a fictionalized book in
2019 that presented an autobiographical portrayal of the selection, training,
and handling of illegals in Belgium, Canada, and the United States.489
Russian services today are experimenting with a new breed of illegals
who are Russian ethnically but who do not try to portray another national-
ity, as seen among the group of illegal officers arrested in the United States in
2010. Three of the illegals identified at that time were young Russians who
did not try to hide their Russianness, but who were handled using tradi-
tional illegals tradecraft. The SVR may have experimented to see whether, in

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an era when Russians can travel freely around the world, they could operate
as Russians without raising suspicion. In a tradeoff that the SVR may have
made to conduct its experiment, these illegals were less trained in clandestine
tradecraft, so they were not as capable of keeping their missions secure.490
Regardless of the pool from which an illegal comes, those who persevere
often become heroes. Illegals have been recognized as Heroes of the Soviet
Union or Heroes of the Russian Federation, including a group of seven ille-
gals whose identities were made public in January 2020.491 Vladimir Putin has
openly been a great supporter of the illegals program, stating in 2017, “Not
everyone can deny themselves their current life, give up friends and relatives
and leave the country for many, many years, and devote their life to serving the
Fatherland. I say that without any exaggeration. But illegal intelligence officers
live with such an approach to work, with such an approach to country and
towards their people. They are unique people.”492 Putin further noted that year
that he had handled illegals operations himself during his one foreign assign-
ment as a KGB officer in Dresden, Germany. The Russian government has used
that high-level advocacy to its advantage, creating an aura of greatness around
illegals that makes them seem to be the highest form of intelligence. A Russian
writer on intelligence topics claimed in 2017 that Western countries look with
envy at Russia’s illegals program and wish they had something like it.493
From 2000 to 2010, the United States had an unusual opportunity to
observe illegals in action. In 1999, the CIA recruited an SVR officer named
Aleksandr Poteyev, who worked in Department S, which runs the SVR ille-
gals program. Poteyev provided information that led to the identification of
numerous individuals who were operating as illegals around the world. Most
of those illegals whose identities have been made public were either operat-
ing inside the United States or traveled to the United States, although oth-
ers were in Germany and Spain. The FBI monitored their activities for 10
years in an operation codenamed Ghost Stories, through which the FBI col-
lected detailed information about their targets, communications, funding,
and cover lives. The illegals consisted of four married couples who arrived
in the United States at various times from the late 1980s to the early 2000s
and three unmarried individuals who arrived between 2006 and 2009. The

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officers also included one individual who occasionally traveled to the United
States to support the resident illegals.494
Ten of these illegals were arrested in the United States in June 2010 and
subsequently traded for four Russians who had cooperated with U.S. and
British intelligence and were serving sentences in Russian prisons. Another
was arrested on an international warrant in Cyprus, but he skipped bail and
disappeared. Yet another worked at Microsoft Corporation in Washington
state and was detained on an immigration violation and deported.
After the arrested officers returned to Russia, several of them received
awards for their service as illegals. One of them, Mikhail Vasenkov, was among
the seven illegals recognized publicly in 2020.495 Andrey Bezrukov became
prominent in Russia for running a political consulting company that provides
information about the United States based on his more than 15 years living
there. As noted above, Vavilova published a book that provided details about
her and her husband’s time in Belgium, Canada, and the United States as ille-
gals. Anna Chapman has become a celebrity in Russia and hosts a TV show
about mysteries of the world, which reveals and advances conspiracy theories.
Three of the illegals arrested or deported in 2010 (Anna Chapman,
Mikhail Semenko, and Aleksey Karetnikov) represent the new trend in ille-
gals operating as Russians. These three traveled abroad under real Russian
identities and did not try to hide their Russianness while they operated.
However, they were handled as illegals through clandestine and impersonal
communications and by receiving funds from Moscow clandestinely, etc.496
These three illegals arrived in the United States between 2006 and 2009, and
all were young Russians in their 20s. Although they may mark the beginning
of a new type of Russian illegal, their arrests and public compromise may
also give the SVR some concern about their effectiveness.
Within the year following the arrests in the United States, illegals oper-
ations in at least two other countries were also compromised and ended:
an individual named Sergey Cherepanov suddenly departed Spain in 2010,
and a married couple, known publicly as Andreas and Heidrun Anschlag,
was arrested in Germany in 2011. According to an investigative journalist,
Cherepanov was pitched on the same day that the Ghost Stories subjects

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were arrested in the United States, although he refused the pitch and disap-
peared.497 The Anschlags were running a Dutch diplomat, Raymond Poeteray,
who had access to EU and NATO political information (see Chapter 4).498
Some observers have downplayed the usefulness of the illegals arrested in
2010-11, claiming that they were bumblers who accomplished little. British
journalist Gordon Corera, in his book Spies Among Us, quotes an SVR officer
who even wondered about the return on investment for illegals.499 But the
FBI’s decade of monitoring the illegals revealed that they were getting close
to their objective of penetrating sensitive circles. Semenko had finished a mas-
ter’s degree and was seeking a job in Washington policy think tanks. Lidiya
Guryeva had made the acquaintance of Alan Patricof, a friend of Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. Mikhail Kutsik and Natalya Perevezeva had moved to
an apartment near the Pentagon, where many of their neighbors held sensi-
tive government positions. Yelena Vavilova claims she and her husband were
beginning to cultivate valuable contacts, including an assistant to President
Barack Obama.500 Andrey Bezrukov was developing an acquaintance affili-
ated with George Washington University, who might have been able to rec-
ommend students aspiring to government jobs. On the West Coast, Aleksey
Karetnikov was already working at Microsoft Corporation.501 Outside the
United States, illegals had made even more progress: the Anschlags in Ger-
many were already running Dutch diplomat Raymond Poeteray and Sergey
Cherepanov in Spain may have made contacts in NATO.
The French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, citing information from
France’s counterintelligence service, the General Directorate for Internal
Security, claimed in 2014 that 10 to 20 Russian illegals were operating from
French territory based on intercepted clandestine radio signals.502 These Rus-
sian operatives apparently continued to operate even after the arrests and pub-
lic exposure of illegals in 2010 and 2011 in the United States and Germany.

AGENTS
Human intelligence operations cannot proceed without agents. An agent
is not a member of the intelligence service, but someone the intelligence

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service has recruited as a source of information. Only infrequently are offi-

cers the actual sources of information. Case officers usually handle someone
else who is the source. Nevertheless, officers and agents are often confused in
popular media, especially when officers are called agents.
Russian services, like any HUMINT service, seek agents with place-
ment, which means the agent occupies a potentially useful position, and
access, which means the agent can gain valuable information. To recruit an
agent, the officer uses his or her cover position to identify, or spot, people
with placement and access who have exploitable vulnerabilities that a case
officer can use to persuade the agent to cooperate.
The officer’s cover allows him or her to join the circles where interac-
tion with people of potential interest is possible. Such opportunities might
include the diplomatic circuit, military-to-military engagements, think tank
events, business events, trade shows, military exhibitions, sports clubs, and
consular interviews. Yuriy Rastvorov, a Soviet MVD officer who defected in
1954, joined the Tokyo Lawn Tennis Club so he could make acquaintances
with foreign diplomatic personnel in an informal environment.503 Vlad-
imir Rezun (pen name Viktor Suvorov) wrote about an operation where
he and his fellow GRU officers targeted vendors at a telecommunications
trade show.504 Mikhail Repin circulated in think tanks and among politi-
cal consultants from 2009 to 2011.505 Rastvorov, Rezun, and Repin were all
under legal, diplomatic cover. Yevgeniy Buryakov, a nonofficial cover officer,
interacted with businessmen and bankers from 2010 to 2015, based on his
cover as a banker, and he attempted to target university students who might
eventually obtain positions of influence, although he reported little success.
Illegal officers offer even broader circles of acquaintances through their cov-
ers as photographers, artists, businessmen, journalists, seamstresses, political
consultants, students, and real estate agents, etc. Whatever the target, the
circles in which the officer operates must be natural for the cover position.
Volunteers pose a different set of challenges. If a person volunteers to
an intelligence service and offers to become an asset, the service’s first step
is to check the person’s bona fides to make a preliminary determination of
whether to follow up on the offer. Volunteers are risky because they can be

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double agents or frauds. Thus, Russia often initially suspects volunteers of

being provocations unless their placement can be sufficiently confirmed and
the information they offer is of sufficient quality that a foreign counterintel-
ligence service would not likely approve it as passage material. Despite this
caution and the effort Soviet and Russian officers put into spotting potential
agents, many of the U.S. assets that the Soviet Union ran during the Cold
War began as volunteers. These assets included most of the people who
provided information about U.S. intelligence and security services, such
as Aldrich Ames and Edward Lee Howard (CIA), Robert Hanssen (FBI),
Christopher Boyce (NRO), William Martin and Bernon Mitchell (NSA),
and John Walker (Navy cryptological information). Other American spies
who did not volunteer themselves were often recruited not by a Soviet or
Russian intelligence officer, but by a friend who had previously volunteered.

Use of Non-Intelligence Personnel

Russia also recruits Russian personnel who are not staff officers of a Russian
intelligence service, but who are abroad as representatives of a non-intelligence
organization: as diplomats, as private Russian citizens, or sometimes as reli-
gious representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. During the Soviet era,
the KGB expected non-intelligence diplomats to support intelligence tasks and
provide information to the intelligence services if approached. Some “clean”
diplomats bristled at this requirement, and a few decided to reject it outright.
However, many cooperated, sometimes working after hours for their unofficial
intelligence taskings after working all day fulfilling their regular duties.
A young Soviet diplomat named Aleksandr Kaznacheyev was unusual
in the Soviet government as a proficient Burmese linguist, and the KGB
rezidentura in the embassy in Rangoon recruited him as a translator, since
none of the KGB officers were as proficient as he was; he defected to the
U.S. Government in Burma in 1959. Although Kaznacheyev was not a KGB
officer, he was included in KGB operations while in Burma, and he pub-
lished a book in 1962 detailing Soviet influence activities in Southeast Asia.
Kaznacheyev claimed in his book that, when his Burma assignment ended,

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he was to return to Moscow to formally become a KGB officer, but he chose

to defect.506 Another co-opted Russian diplomat was Arkadiy Shevchenko,
a senior official in the United Nations in New York. He defected to the
U.S. Government in 1978, and, in 1985, he published a book about Soviet
intelligence activities at the UN.507 Shevchenko also revealed details of the
signals intercept station located on the roof of the Russian facility on Long
Island, New York, during an interview in 1981 about Russian intelligence.508
Russia also targets private Russian citizens abroad to persuade them to
support intelligence activities. The targeted Russians may travel abroad for
legitimate business or they may have defected. Either way, Soviet and Russian
intelligence can use them. In 1972, an Armenian KGB officer defected and
brought with him a book, dated 1969, that listed the names of people who
had left the Soviet Union illegally; during the Soviet era, it was illegal to leave
the country without government authorization. Copies of the book had been
distributed to KGB rezidenturas around the world to inform them of Soviet
citizens in their areas of responsibility whom they should locate and target.
The targeting could take several possible forms to include luring the defec-
tors back to the Soviet Union to face justice or, in extreme cases, targeting
them for assassination (see Chapter 7). The more likely KGB course of action
was to target them for recruitment into intelligence cooperation, often using
threats against their family members still living in the Soviet Union. The list
included a broad range of people, such as journalists, teachers, merchant sea-
men, soldiers stationed abroad, and a few intelligence officers. In a few cases,
a KGB rezidentura was successful in re-recruiting a defector.509
One such defector who was recruited abroad by the KGB was Oleg
Tumanov, who jumped from a Soviet merchant ship off the coast of Libya in
1965. After a few years in the West, he was hired as a researcher by Radio Free
Europe, a high-priority Soviet intelligence target whose European headquar-
ters was in Munich, Germany. A KGB officer approached him in Germany,
and he agreed to work for the KGB for over a decade until he was identified
as a Soviet penetration agent in 1986 and redefected. The presence of his
name on a 1969 KGB list indicates that he had not yet been recruited at
that time. Tumanov also published a book about his experiences, although

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it appeared after his redefection and contained a heavy dose of anti-U.S.

propaganda.510
Several instances of Russia targeting its own citizens traveling abroad
have come to light in the past decade. Two young women whose cases became
prominent in 2011 and 2017, Mariya Butina in the United States and Katia
Zatuliveter in the United Kingdom, respectively, are probably among this
kind of operative. Neither is believed to have been a staff intelligence officer,
but the Russian government probably used both for their accesses, and both
probably agreed (see Chapter 4). This kind of operative offers opportunities
to penetrate different social circles, including the Russian émigré community
to which Russia is eager to gain access. Like Tumanov, these operatives can
be hired into positions where a Russian government official would never be
considered; they can hide among the crowd more easily and be less visible to a
host country’s counterintelligence service. Butina and Zatuliveter had access
to political circles without suspicion.
The disadvantage of these Russian operatives is that sometimes they
cooperate out of duty or coercion, not out of a belief in their Russian intelli-
gence tasks. They can become resentful that they are forced to fulfill tasks for
which they did not volunteer, resulting in either faulty work or defection.
These operatives are also not trained intelligence personnel, so it is risky to
assign them sensitive tasks because they may not understand the particulars
of clandestine operations and security.

REZIDENTURA ORGANIZATION
A Russian intelligence rezidentura is made up of various roles, from the rezident,
who manages the office, to case officers, who conduct operations, and support
personnel, who provide communications, clerical, and maintenance services:

■ Rezident, the chief of a Russian intelligence rezidentura, is supreme

in his domain. He is the main contact between the rezidentura and
headquarters in Moscow and thus has a great deal of political author-
ity among the case officers.

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■ Deputy Rezident runs the day-to-day affairs of the rezidentura. One

such deputy was Sergey Tretyakov, an SVR officer who defected in
1999 and described his role as including covering for a rezident who
was politically connected but operationally incompetent.
■ Case Officers are divided within an SVR rezidentura into “lines”
according to their specialization (see Figure 24). The number of offi-
cers in each line varies depending on the rezidentura. These begin-
ner- to mid-level officers run the operations of the rezidentura.

Figure 24. Officer Lines Within an SVR Rezidentura

Line PR: Political intelligence, the largest portion of most rezidenturas

Line X: Scientific and technical intelligence, large in some rezidenturas
where S&T information is especially accessible, such as at the former
San Francisco consulate
Line N: Support to illegals, tasked with identifying dead drop sites,
supporting the delivery of instructions and funds, and collecting infor-
mation to support the development of legends (birth and death infor-
mation; forms and requirements to support legalization)
Line KR: Counterintelligence and security, responsible for penetrating
local security services
Line SK: Security and surveillance of the Soviet diplomatic community,
responsible for monitoring Russians abroad
Line EM: Intelligence on émigrés, a Cold War-era function to penetrate
émigré communities

In addition to these case officer roles, rezidenturas also require a variety

of support personnel to maintain operational readiness and security:

■ Code clerks encrypt and decrypt communications between head-

quarters and the rezidentura. Several code clerks defected during
the Soviet era, including Igor Gouzenko in Canada in 1945 and

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Yevdokiya Kartseva (aka Petrova) in Australia in 1954. Code clerks

have access to nearly all of the rezidentura’s communications, making
them lucrative targets for recruitment. Russian intelligence services
also target code clerks, and several people who were the U.S. equiva-
lent—such as James MacMillan in Moscow in 1948 and John Walker
(1968–85)—defected to or spied for the Soviet Union during the
Cold War and caused significant damage (see Chapter 9).
■ Secretaries keep track of files and personnel. As defectors, they also
can be the source of valuable intelligence, as was Raya Kiselnikova
who defected in Mexico City in 1970.
■ Electronic surveillance monitors (Line OT) scan local counter-
intelligence radio traffic to determine whether an officer is under
surveillance. This radio monitoring differs from strategic SIGINT
collection (see Chapter 9).
■ Radio operators assigned to illegal rezidenturas maintain commu-
nications with headquarters on behalf of their rezidents. In other
situations, an illegal conducts his or her own radio communications
or—if deployed in a pair, such as a husband and wife—one will be
the communicator.
■ Personnel to maintain computers (Line I)
■ Drivers/auto mechanics are responsible for one of the potentially
most identifiable pieces of equipment that an intelligence officer uses,
a car. The car can also become a tracking device if a local counterin-
telligence service can emplace a tracker in it. A driver/auto mechanic
keeps the cars running, drives securely to avoid surveillance, and mon-
itors the vehicle to ensure it is free of tracking devices.

CONCLUSION: HUMINT OPERATIONS

REMAIN ESSENTIAL
Russian intelligence services, particularly the SVR and GRU, rely heavily
on HUMINT operations worldwide, using all three types of covers—legal,
nonofficial, and illegal—to access information that technical collection

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systems cannot reach. Although modern technology has made clandestine

HUMINT operations riskier and more difficult, Russian leaders, including
Vladimir Putin himself, continue to heap public praise on Russian intelli-
gence officers.
Illegal cover is particularly affected by technologies that secure bor-
ders and identify travelers. However, the foundational reason for Russian
illegals—the need to retain an intelligence presence even when legally cov-
ered officers cannot operate as freely—still exists. Since 2014, Russian dip-
lomatic relations have suffered numerous setbacks, leading to hundreds of
­legally-covered Russian officers being expelled from countries around the
world. The United States leads in the number of those expulsions, with over
100 Russian officers forced to leave since 2016, and four diplomatic estab-
lishments in the United States closed. Even countries that are typically seen
as friendly to Russia, such as Greece, Austria, and Hungary, have expelled
Russian officers. Tense diplomatic relations have also led to increasingly hos-
tile counterintelligence environments for Russian services. Illegals continue
to be a tool that Russian intelligence services use, despite public exposures
and embarrassments.
As in the early Bolshevik days, the Russian government still sees ene-
mies attacking Russia from all sides, now especially from the United States
and NATO. With Putin’s personal support, Russia is not likely to reduce its
emphasis on HUMINT operations, which have brought much success in
the past, are the object of much pride and adulation, and remain necessary
in an uncertain world.

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 CHAPTER 9

TECHNICAL PLATFORMS

k k k
The second major category of collection platforms includes those that
acquire information through technical collection systems rather than
directly from humans. Russian technical collection comes in three primary
forms: SIGINT, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and computer-based
collection (often called cyber). These collection capabilities support all intel-
ligence operational areas: political, economic/S&T, military, and covert
operations. They are also connected to and cooperative with HUMINT,
sometimes through the recruitment of foreign personnel who have access to
code and cipher material, which facilitates SIGINT collection, or through
intelligence officers’ clandestine travel to locations around the world to con-
duct close access technical operations.
Russian SIGINT collection can be divided into six main platform types:

■ Ground-based in Russia or in Russian-controlled territory

■ Embassy-based
■ Close access
■ Sea-based
■ Airborne
■ Satellite-based

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The GRU exclusively runs several of those platforms (sea-based, airborne,

and satellite-based), and they focus predominantly on military intelligence
and combat support. The GRU also controls Russia’s space-based GEOINT
system that provides optical and radar imagery, cartographic imagery, and
infrared early warning capabilities; GEOINT is derived from analysis of
images and data associated with a particular geographic location. Global
media have publicized numerous Russian-sponsored computer-based col-
lection operations. Much information about that collection capability can
be derived from the vast number of attributed cases.

SIGINT
During the Cold War, several Soviet officers who had SIGINT experience
defected to the West and shared their critical knowledge about Soviet
SIGINT capabilities and targets (see Figure 25). Although post-Soviet
Russian SIGINT has gone through several organizational changes (see
Chapter 2), the basic forms of Russian SIGINT collection remain similar
to those of the Cold War Soviet era.  

Ground-based SIGINT
The Soviet Union established an extensive ground-based SIGINT collec-
tion and direction-finding capability. Most of that capability, and the larg-
est element of the Soviet Union’s SIGINT establishment overall, was inside
the former Soviet Union. The GRU’s Sixth Directorate operated some of
these facilities, and various KGB elements ran others. The KGB conducted
civilian intelligence collection and counterintelligence operations, includ-
ing electronic penetrations of foreign embassies and monitoring of Soviet
citizens’ communications for dissent and foreign connections. Foreign
intelligence communications intercepts and communications security were
both managed by the KGB Eighth Chief Directorate until 1972, when the
KGB created a new directorate, the Sixteenth, called Радиоэлектронная
разведка (Radio-electronic Intelligence), which took responsibility for

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Figure 25. Cold War-era SIGINT Defectors

Yuriy Rastvorov worked in a Japanese decryption unit in the Soviet Far

East in 1943–44. He defected in 1954.
Yevdokiya Kartseva (aka Petrova) worked as a Russian SIGINT transla-
tor from the 1930s to 1942. She was assigned to the Japanese section
in an NKVD unit responsible for decrypting the codes used by foreign
diplomatic missions in Moscow. Kartseva defected in 1954 in Australia.
Ivan Ovchinnikov was a junior officer in the Group of Soviet Forces
Germany (GSFG). He provided useful information on the Soviet military
and GRU intercept operations and activities, as well as the mission of
the KGB signal battalion in Stanhnsdorf, East Germany, which moni-
tored official radio traffic of the Allied military and foreign diplomatic
transmissions. Ovchinnikov defected in 1955 but re-defected to East
Germany in October 1958; he published a book in 2000.
Yuriy Pyatakov jumped from the Soviet intelligence collection ship
Deflektor in 1966 off the west coast of the United States. He reset-
tled in the United States; however, he was contacted by the KGB
and recruited as a source. Pyatakov later worked at Radio Liberty in
Munich, Germany, and redefected in 1973.
Viktor Sheymov was a SIGINT operator at KGB headquarters in Mos-
cow until he defected in 1980. He published a book, Tower of Secrets,
about Soviet SIGINT in 1993.

Sources: Figure created by author from multiple sources, including U.S. Army, G2, U.S. Forces Far
East, “RASTVOROV, Yurii Alexandrovitch,” March 25, 1954, National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627; “Mrs. Petrov’s Statement Concerning Her Past Intelligence
History,” May 15, 1954, National Archives of Australia, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675,
37-41; Frank J. Rafalko, ed., CI Reader: American Revolution Into the New Millennium, vol 3. (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004), 67-68; Ivan Vasilyevich
Ovchinnikov, Исповедь Кулацкого Сына (Confession of a Kulak’s Son) (Moscow: Desnitsa, 2000);
Richard Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe,
1950-1989 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 2009), 176-78; Victor Sheymov, Tower of Secrets:
A Real Life Spy Thriller (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993); Matt Schudel, “Victor Sheymov,
KGB Officer Who Defected From Soviet Union, Dies at 73,” Washington Post, December 5, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/victor-sheymov-kgb-officer-who-defected-from-so-
viet-union-dies-at-73/2019/12/05/e773a22c-16b5-11ea-a659-7d69641c6ff7_story.html.

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communications intercepts and left communications security and cryptog-

raphy to the Eighth Directorate. According to an assessment from the late
Cold War, the Sixteenth Directorate had about 2,000 personnel in 1989 and
was growing in personnel and importance within the KGB when the Soviet
Union dissolved.511 During the Soviet era, the KGB’s collection of foreign
embassy communications was handled jointly by the Sixteenth Directorate
for intelligence purposes and the Second Chief Directorate for counterin-
telligence purposes.
Separate from the Sixteenth Directorate was Department Sixteen of the
First Chief Directorate, which targeted foreign communications personnel
and code clerks specifically. The recruitment of a foreign code clerk is always
a high priority HUMINT effort, and the KGB’s HUMINT directorate
had an element dedicated to that specifically.512 If an intelligence service can
recruit a code clerk or communicator, that person may provide the keys to
decrypt and decode his or her own country’s communications, which would
facilitate the intelligence service’s SIGINT operations.
The Soviet Union had considerable success recruiting foreign person-
nel with access to codes and ciphers. The Ministry of State Security (MGB)
recruited James MacMillan, a cipher clerk at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in
1948. He defected and provided details of the code room where he worked.
Others subsequently recruited by the KGB and Eastern Bloc intelligence ser-
vices include John Walker, a Navy warrant officer, who provided the Soviet
Union with U.S. Navy cryptographic materials for 18 years until his arrest
in 1985. His materials, which covered much of the Vietnam War period,
allowed the Soviets to warn the North Vietnamese about U.S. military activ-
ities, probably leading to the deaths of U.S. personnel fighting in Vietnam.513
U.S. Air Force airman Jeffrey Carney defected to East Germany in 1985 and
subsequently worked for the East German intelligence service, translating
English-language materials. For him, the fall of the Berlin Wall was a cri-
sis, as it suddenly meant he was accessible to Western counterintelligence
agencies. When East German Stasi files were opened, Carney’s internal file
showed the value of his work for the Stasi and the KGB, earning praise from
General Mikhail Zaitsev of the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany and

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KGB Director Viktor Chebrikov. Carney was arrested in Germany in 1991

and prosecuted for espionage and desertion.514
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian government cre-
ated the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Informa-
tion (FAPSI), combining the Eighth Main Directorate and the Sixteenth
Directorate into a single organization from 1993 to 2003 (see Chapter 2).515
During that decade, Russia had a separate, dedicated SIGINT organization
for the only time in its history; at all other times SIGINT has been subordi-
nated to other intelligence or security agencies, such as the KGB or FSB. In
2003, FAPSI was dissolved as an independent agency, and most of what were
previously the Eighth and Sixteenth KGB directorates were transferred into
the FSB, which has assumed the KGB’s earlier responsibility for electroni-
cally penetrating foreign embassy communications and global SIGINT col-
lection. The responsibility for the security of government communications,
a remnant of the old Eighth Chief Directorate, was folded into the Federal
Protective Service (FSO).516
The GRU is responsible for military SIGINT. The GRU Sixth Direc-
torate, or радиотехническая разведка (Radio-Technical Intelligence Direc-
torate), collects military- and political-related communications intelligence
(COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). During the Cold War,
the Sixth Directorate ran a series of ground-based collection facilities across
the Soviet Union and in other countries, some of which continue to exist
today. These sites collect various types of signals, and massive high frequency
direction finding sites direct the collectors toward desired signals.
The GRU also maintains vehicle-mounted mobile SIGINT sensors for
tactical environments. A 2019 advertisement from a Russian high-tech com-
pany, Rostec, touts the importance of SIGINT:

Currently, when military forces cannot function without using

radio-­electronic systems, SIGINT has taken on greater significance.
In fact, radio-electronic emanations are the unique “handwriting”
of military technology, and the analysis of them allows for a precise
determination of the type of emanating entity and the nature of its

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activity. SIGINT data allows for timely warning to a commander of

security threats to counter them in time.517

Because the company is trying to sell its product, this advertisement

contains an element of salesmanship. Nevertheless, the GRU does have a
tactical SIGINT mission using ground-based platforms such as the one Ros-
tec sells, and thus is a ready buyer.
The end of the Cold War significantly limited Russia’s ground-based
SIGINT capability. The Soviet Union had SIGINT sites spread throughout
the Warsaw Pact, especially in East Germany, to which the Russian Feder-
ation lost access when the Soviet Union dissolved. Advantageously for the
West, two Cold War defectors from those units had shared their insights
into Soviet SIGINT activities: one in 1948 from Soviet occupation forces
in Hungary and one in 1955 from the Group of Soviet Forces in East Ger-
many. The latter defector, Ivan Ovchinnikov, provided significant informa-
tion about the organization and targets of both GRU and KGB SIGINT in
East Germany. The Soviet Union had other ground-based SIGINT facilities
in Soviet-allied countries around the world, including in Vietnam, South
Yemen, Burma, Mongolia, and Nicaragua, as well as in Afghanistan where
Soviet troops were stationed from 1979 to 1989.
The largest Soviet SIGINT facility outside the Soviet Union was at
Lourdes, Cuba. The Lourdes site initially opened in the early 1960s after
the Cuban missile crisis and became a point of contention in U.S.-Soviet
relations. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan complained:

This Soviet intelligence collection facility less than 100 miles from
our coast is the largest of its kind in the world. The acres and acres
of antennae fields and intelligence monitors are targeted on key
U.S. military installations and sensitive activities. The installation in
Lourdes, Cuba, is manned by 1,500 Soviet technicians [it later grew
to over 2,000], and the satellite ground station allows instant com-
munications with Moscow. This 28-square mile facility has grown by
more than 50 percent in size and capability during the past decade.518

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A joint State-Defense Department statement in 1985 assessed: “From

this key listening post, the Soviets monitor U.S. commercial satellites, U.S.
military and merchant shipping communications, and NASA space program
activities at Cape Canaveral. Lourdes also enables the Soviets to eavesdrop on
telephone conversations in the United States.”519 According to Russian author
Aleksandr Kolpakidi, in 1985, approximately 70 percent of the Soviet Union’s
intelligence about the United States came from Lourdes.520 Lourdes closed
in 2001 when Russia was unable to continue to fund it; however, since 2014
Russian commentators have made tangential statements that the site should
be reopened. The Russian government has made no formal announcement,
although it has offered to return military support to Cuba, as well as to Viet-
nam, as provided during the Cold War.521
The Soviet Union also operated a series of ground-based early warning
radar sites—long-distance airspace monitoring radars for ballistic missile
and air defense warning—across the Soviet Union. A current system is also
spread across Russia and in three foreign sites: one each in Armenia, Belarus,
and R­ ussian-occupied Crimea.522 Russia has lost several similar radars since
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one in Latvia in 1998 and one in Azer-
baijan in 2012.523
The GRU continues to benefit from another Cold War-era facility in
Tajikistan that conducts space surveillance and monitoring of foreign satellites.
The facility is called Okno, which means “window.” The Okno Outer-Space
Control System (Russian acronym SKKP) was upgraded in 2014 to give it
the capability to detect objects in space to a distance of 50,000 kilometers.
Okno is part of a complex of radiolocation and electro-optical sensors located
around Russia for space surveillance, which the Russian Ministry of Defense
claims offers a capability to catalogue and monitor space-based objects and
maintain constant visibility on activities in space.524
The FSB also conducts SIGINT inside Russia, directed at foreign diplo-
matic facilities for both intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, similar
to earlier KGB activities. The FSB has access to communications through-
out Russia via the Система оперативно-разыскных мероприятий (System
for Operational Investigative Measures), or SORM in its Russian acronym.

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Through that access, the FSB can collect counterintelligence and security infor-
mation, including information for counterterrorism and anti-dissident opera-
tions and for positive intelligence purposes. SORM allows access to Internet
communications activity throughout Russia, and numerous oppositionists
have been apprehended based on the collection of their internal communica-
tions. The FSB also has an organization called Center 16 (also called “Military
Unit 71330”) that collects signals for positive intelligence purposes. Accord-
ing to an Estonian study, Center 16 can collect radio, satellite, mobile phone,
and data communications.525 Like the KGB before it, the FSB controls Russia’s
information environment, and signals collection is a major part of that control.

Figure 26. SIGINT Collection Room in the Hotel Viru in Tallinn, Estonia

Source: Photo by author.

Note: The Hotel Viru was built to Western quality standards and was thus quite different from
most hotels in the Soviet Union. Numerous foreign dignitaries stayed at the hotel, and the KGB
wired it for SIGINT collection, both through telephone intercept and recording the personal con-
versations of residents. In this room, on the top floor of the hotel, KGB personnel would record
the communications. This room is now a museum.

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Collection from Diplomatic Establishments

A portion of Russia’s ground-based SIGINT collection capability is housed in
Russian embassies and other official establishments abroad. At the end of the
Cold War, Russia had SIGINT facilities in over 60 countries, with multiple
sites in many countries, bringing the total number of SIGINT collection plat-
forms to about 100. These platforms were used, and in many cases continue to
be used, for political, economic, and S&T collection, as well as for counterin-
telligence and operational security monitoring in support of Russian human
operations. A late Cold War estimate counted over 1,000 Soviet SIGINT per-
sonnel working at these facilities.526 The number of embassy-based SIGINT
facilities probably dropped after the dissolution of the Soviet Union but, judg-
ing from other Russian intelligence activities, SIGINT facilities have proba-
bly returned to or exceeded their Cold War level during the Putin era. These
sites house GRU and SVR SIGINT collection capabilities.
Materials from KGB defector Vasiliy Mitrokhin indicate that the KGB
installed the first embassy-based SIGINT platform in Mexico City in 1963,
targeted primarily at the U.S. Embassy and CIA Station in the city. Although
Mitrokhin claimed that the platform was not particularly successful at that
point,527 the effectiveness of embassy-based SIGINT platforms apparently
improved over time. As Oleg Kalugin, a KGB officer who worked in Wash-
ington, DC, from 1965 to 1970, wrote:

In 1967, we placed antennas on the roof of our embassy and sud-

denly we were able to overhear the communications of the Pentagon,
the FBI, the State Department, the White House, the local police,
and a host of other agencies… Transcripts of the conversations, when
compared with classified sources of information at our disposal,
enabled us to piece together everything from the secretary of state’s
travel schedule to the latest crimes being investigated by the FBI.528

Until 2016, at least four such facilities were operating inside the United
States. The U.S. Government had a rare opportunity to get an inside look
at a SIGINT collection facility in 2016, when the United States ordered

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Russia to close its San Francisco Consulate and Russian-government owned

recreation facilities in New York and Maryland. The San Francisco Consul-
ate was well-positioned for line-of-sight SIGINT collection of much of the
San Francisco Bay area, and it housed an assortment of antennas on the roof.
A 2017 article by journalist Zach Dorfman quoted a U.S. official as saying,
“It was almost like everyone they had there was a technical guy.”529 Russian
diplomatic compounds in Maryland and New York had a similar purpose.
Arkadiy Shevchenko, a Soviet diplomat who defected in New York City in
1978, claimed that the top floors of the Soviet embassy residential compound
in the Bronx, New York were “full of sophisticate equipment… to intercept
all the conversations on anything which was going on. At least 15 to 17 tech-
nicians were working to do all this job [sic].”530 An equivalent compound on
Maryland’s Eastern Shore, closed in 2016, was also used for intelligence pur-
poses. According to a U.S. official, the New York and Maryland compounds
were “basically being used as signals intelligence facilities.”531 In addition to
those compounds, the new Russian embassy compound, situated on one of
the highest points in Washington, DC, has line-of-sight access to much of
the DC area, including about five-mile, line-of-site visibility directly onto
the Pentagon. Completed in 1985, its roof is also covered with antennas,532
similar to Kalugin’s description above of the earlier Soviet embassy.
Kalugin asserted that the KGB used these facilities for political collec-
tion. A Canadian documentary produced in 1981 also indicated their use
for economic collection. The documentary claimed that conversations inter-
cepted from the Soviet embassy’s SIGINT platform in Washington, DC,
gave the Soviet government the upper hand when the United States and the
Soviet Union were negotiating a grain sale in 1972.533
SIGINT facilities such as these require the ability to both intercept and
interpret the signals. Kalugin noted that the Washington KGB rezidentura
had the in-house capability to fuse HUMINT and SIGINT to improve tar-
geting and provide a complete intelligence picture.534 That capability may
not be at every facility—Australian defense expert Desmond Ball wrote in
1989 that SIGINT facilities in Washington and New York sent materials
to Lourdes, Cuba, for processing, while most facilities sent materials to

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Moscow to be interpreted and reported.535 The advent of large-volume dig-

ital communications has probably made the fusion of different intelligence
streams faster and easier.
Another focus of this SIGINT collection is the signals of U.S. coun-
terintelligence surveillance teams. Special technicians in SVR Line OT
perform this function, which intelligence writer Nigel West has referred to
by the Russian code names Impuls and Zenit.536 Mitrokhin reported that
the KGB rezidenturas in Washington, New York, and San Francisco all had
SIGINT posts, for which he used the code name Raketa, whose respon-
sibility was to provide “a picture of the operational environment and the
FBI’s conduct of operations... if necessary an operations officer can be given
a danger signal prior to his going out to the site when an operation is to be
conducted, [or told] to back off from an operation if he has been detected
by surveillance.”537 KGB defector Sergey Tretyakov described using what he
called the Impulse signaling system to avoid surveillance during his time in
New York.538
In 2019, U.S. journalists revealed a Russian program that targeted FBI
surveillance communication, which provided Russian intelligence officers
forewarning of FBI counterintelligence activities and identified potential
gaps in surveillance coverage. An SVR rezidentura could use this informa-
tion to operate with less risk of compromise. As a U.S. intelligence official
was quoted in 2019: “When we found out about this, the light bulb went
on—that this could be why we haven’t seen [certain types of ] activity” from
known Russian officers in the United States.539

Close Access Technical Operations

Some signals are not easily accessible remotely but can be collected more
readily through direct, close access to a network. In that vein, Russia sends
officers around the world, as TDY travelers or based at embassies, to get
closer to the signals that Russia is trying to collect. Sometimes these oper-
ations involve emplacing, inside a building, listening devices that transmit
to a receiver outside, and sometimes the operations collect emanations, like

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cell phone or wi-fi signals. Close access technical operations, therefore, are
another example of the crossover between human and technical platforms,
as Russia applies clandestine tradecraft typically used in HUMINT opera-
tions, whether for international travel or by diplomatically-covered intelli-
gence officers, to support technical collection.
As noted in Chapter 4, Russian embassy officer Stanislav Gusev was
arrested in December 1999 while sitting in a vehicle outside the U.S.
Department of State building in Washington, DC. He was receiving the sig-
nals from a listening device installed in the U.S. State Department Oceans
and International Environmental Scientific Affairs (OES) conference room.
After Washington, DC, police observed Gusev sitting in a vehicle out-
side the State Department multiple times, they informed the FBI, which
approached him and discovered his activity.
Several examples of close access technical collection operations have been
reported during the Putin era. Four Russians arrived in the Netherlands in
April 2018, and police caught them with signal intercept equipment at a hotel
located next to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) headquarters in The Hague. At the time, the OPCW was testing
the substance used the previous month in the attempted assassination of Ser-
gei Skripal and his daughter Julia in the United Kingdom. The OPCW was
also analyzing a chemical used in an attack in Douma, Syria, just a few days
previously. The four Russians subsequently planned to travel to a laboratory
in Spiez, Switzerland, that the OPCW uses to analyze chemical weapons sam-
ples.540 The laptop of one of the officers showed that it had recently been in
Brazil, Switzerland, and Malaysia. The Malaysia trip was related to the inves-
tigation of the MH17 flight; the Switzerland travel was linked to the hacking
of a laptop belonging to the World Anti-Doping Agency.541
In September 2018, Norwegian police arrested Russian Mikhail Boch-
karev for a close access SIGINT operation while attending a conference at
Norway’s Parliament building. Bochkarev was later released, although prob-
ably because of the sensitivity of the investigation, not because of the absence
of nefarious activity, as the Russian government claimed (see Chapter 4).542
Bochkarev was probably conducting a survey of signals in the facility and

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among other attendees at the event to facilitate future SIGINT collection.

Then, in August 2019, Swiss police arrested two Russian men, one of whom
was posing as a plumber; Swiss police and federal officials suspected the two
Russians were intelligence operatives preparing to conduct electronic sur-
veillance. The men claimed diplomatic immunity but had never officially
registered as diplomats. Their travel coincided with the annual World Eco-
nomic Forum, where political leaders from around the world meet to discuss
major international economic and political issues.543 These recent incidents
in the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland all involved officers from
GRU Unit 26165, dedicated to SIGINT collection, and all appeared to be
for political intelligence purposes.
Additionally, as noted in Chapter 6, U.S. officials have observed Rus-
sian intelligence officers traveling to remote locations with packages in their
hands or wearing backpacks, pushing strollers, or driving by in vehicles. U.S.
officials have concluded that these activities are probably related to collect-
ing intelligence on critical infrastructure sites, possibly mapping them or
characterizing the signals that emanate from them.544 If their analysis is cor-
rect, this would be related to contingency military intelligence collection in
preparation for future war, in which Russia would target critical infrastruc-
ture sites as part of SODCIT.

Sea-based SIGINT
For Russia, sea-based SIGINT has primarily a military intelligence mission,
monitoring foreign threat forces and supporting Russian military warning,
planning, and operations. Russia maintains a fleet of as many as 60 sea-
based intelligence collection platforms known as auxiliary general intelli-
gence ships (AGIs). At least one GRU officer deployed aboard a Soviet AGI
defected to the United States during the Cold War: Yuriy Pyatakov (also
known as Yuri Marin) was a linguist aboard the Soviet intelligence collec-
tion ship Deflektor until February 18, 1966, when he jumped overboard and
was picked from the water by a U.S. Navy vessel. Pyatakov was debriefed
about his duties on board the SIGINT collection ship.545

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According to Desmond Ball, Soviet-era AGIs fulfilled a series of rou-

tine missions, several of which have been observed publicly during the
Putin era:546

■ Patrol near U.S. nuclear missile submarine bases. Ball has noted
that Soviet AGIs regularly patrolled off the coast of Rota, Spain;
Kings Bay, Georgia; Apra Harbor, Guam; and Holy Loch, Scot-
land—all of which were U.S. submarine bases. Russia has reinvig-
orated this patrol operation since at least 2014. In December 2019,
the U.S. Coast Guard issued a warning to ships navigating off the
coast of South Carolina and Georgia due to what it called unsafe
practices of the Russian AGI Viktor Leonov. The Russian ship was
operating without lights and ignoring calls from passing ships that
were trying to steer clear of it. The same ship had also been observed
near Kings Bay in 2018, and probably as far back as 2014.547
■ Monitor naval exercises. Soviet AGIs routinely loitered in the area
of U.S. naval exercises, probably to collect command and control sig-
nals that could be used to recognize those signals during wartime,
as well as to monitor U.S. naval doctrine and capabilities. More
recently, in 2015 and 2016, Russian ships, including an AGI, mon-
itored NATO exercise BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea. Russian ships
had previously been invited to be overt participants in BALTOPS
until the 2014 annexation of Crimea; since then, they have loitered
on the margins of the exercise.548 A Russian AGI was reported off the
coast of Hawaii monitoring exercise RIMPAC 2016, although none
was detected in 2020.549 The Russian news service TASS reported
that Russian intelligence collection ships deployed in reaction to
NATO’s Sea Shield-2019 exercise in the Black Sea.550
■ Monitor maritime chokepoints. Soviet AGIs regularly patrolled in
maritime chokepoints around the world looking for the passage of
military vessels. Russian AGIs similarly patrol in chokepoints, such
as the Sea of Japan, the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, and the Medi-
terranean Sea.

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■ Shadow naval vessels during normal operations. In 2017, the

AGI Viktor Leonov was spotted 70 miles off the coast of Delaware, a
major shipping lane for U.S. ships coming from Norfolk Navy Base.
The AGI sailed on to the Connecticut coast, near the U.S. subma-
rine base at New London.551

Other Soviet-era AGI missions included monitoring U.S. naval ship and
missile trials to collect telemetry and communications wherever the AGI
was operating. Since 2015, Russian AGIs have also rotated into the eastern
Mediterranean Sea on a regular basis as part of Russian military operations
in Syria. AGIs even participated in a Russian Navy Day celebration off the
coast of Tartus, Syria, in 2017. That year, the Russian AGI Liman collided
with a cargo ship in the Black Sea, as the AGI was on its way to Syria. The
Liman was built in 1970 and was in use from then until it sank after the
2017 encounter.552 The same ship sat in the Adriatic Sea during the NATO
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and monitored NATO air activity, probably
to relay information to the Serbian forces. Soviet/Russian AGIs also report-
edly supported North Vietnam during the Vietnam War and now support
Syria in the Syria civil war.
In more modern times, Russian ships have been observed reconnoiter-
ing undersea communications cables. The Russian undersea ship Yantar has
loitered off the coast of Florida and in the North Atlantic Ocean in areas
where undersea cables are present (see Chapter 6). That technical collection,
combined with human collection on the shoreline, gives Russia an accurate
picture of the potential targeting locations of undersea communications
infrastructures and is another example of the collaborative relationship
between Russian HUMINT and technical collection platforms.553

Airborne SIGINT
Russia’s SIGINT aircraft are mostly focused on ELINT, ISR targeting,
and jamming missions in direct support to military operations. They have
operated in several Russian military campaigns since 2014, particularly

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in Ukraine and Syria. For example, in 2015, Russia deployed its IL-20
SIGINT aircraft—the Russian air force’s primary reconnaissance aircraft—
to Syria. The IL-20 is an ELINT platform that is equipped with a wide array
of antennas, infrared and optical sensors, a side-looking airborne radar, and
satellite communication equipment for real-time data sharing.554
The Russian Tu-214R SIGINT collection and targeting aircraft also
deployed to Syria in 2016. The Tu-214R is Russia’s most modern ISR air-
craft, equipped with sensors to perform ELINT and COMINT missions,
and with all-weather radar systems and electro-optical GEOINT sensors.
The aircraft usually loiters in uncontested airspace at high altitude and a
safe distance from the targets of interest, rather than entering combat areas,
and its sensors can intercept and analyze signals emitted by targeted systems
(e.g., radars, aircraft, radios, combat vehicles, mobile phones, etc.) while col-
lecting imagery that can identify and pinpoint enemy forces, even if they
are camouflaged or hidden. The Tu-214R can build an electronic order of
battle, which is an inventory of an adversary’s electronic emitters, and com-
municate that information to targeters for kinetic attack.555 One military
journalist has surmised that the presence of the Tu-214R in Syria might be
serving not only in support to combat operations, but also for gathering
information for Russia about U.S. aircraft signals in the theater.556
In 2017, Russia reportedly deployed a third SIGINT aircraft—the
IL-22PP SIGINT/electronic warfare platform—to Syria. The IL-22PP is
an airborne electronic jammer that can detect and block all types of signals,
particularly digital ones used by Western warplanes and radars like those
used by AWACS aircraft.557 In 2020, the IL-22PP was involved in an inci-
dent between a Turkish and Syrian aircraft. Reportedly, an IL-22PP jammed
the targeting signals of a Turkish F-16 that was trying to engage a Syrian
Air Force jet; when the Turkish aircraft fired missiles guided by an AWACS
aircraft, the missiles missed their target.558
Syria has become a testing ground for Russian military equipment,
including SIGINT and jamming aircraft. While the Tu-214R had previ-
ously seen action in the Ukraine conflict, both it and the IL-22PP are being
heavily tested in Syrian operations as Russia increases its electronic warfare

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and ISR targeting capabilities. These capabilities support what Russia calls
the “reconnaissance-strike complex,” which feeds high-precision, long-range
weapons with real-time intelligence data and accurate targeting information
to increase the accuracy and throughput of airstrikes.559 Combat situations,
however, can be tragically unpredictable. An IL-20 was shot down over Syria
in September 2018 by what was believed to be Syrian air defense forces. As
the Syrian forces were shooting at Israeli aircraft that were striking a facility
in Syria linked to Syria’s chemical weapons program, the IL-20 mistakenly
crossed the path of the Syrian air defense missiles and was destroyed.560
Outside Syria, Russian maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft from Russia’s Northern Fleet were reported in
early 2020 to be flying much further south into the so-called Greenland-­
Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap than normal. The GIUK gap forms a chokepoint
in the northern Atlantic that is critical for the Russian navy in case of a con-
flict, and Russian Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance and ASW planes con-
ducted at least three flights into the gap in February and March 2020. The
main mission of these planes is to identify NATO submarines and conduct
ELINT collection.561
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union reportedly used non-military
aircraft, such as Aeroflot airliners and airliners from other Warsaw Pact
countries, to collect SIGINT as they overflew European countries and pos-
sibly the United States. The airliners would collect SIGINT from facilities
along their flight path and would occasionally veer from their planned flight
path to overfly specific facilities.562 There has been no public reporting of
this activity since the end of the Cold War, although the intensity of Rus-
sian intelligence collection operations and the resurrection of Cold War-
era methods under the Putin presidency suggest the possibility that Russia
could consider doing it again.

Satellite-Based ELINT
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union launched its first ELINT satellite under the
Tselina program. The Tselina collectors were capable of geolocating and

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characterizing electronic emitters, such as radars and communications sys-

tems, particularly those used in anti-missile, anti-aircraft, and air force and
navy electronic systems. This information can be used to target those emit-
ters in case of war, especially to remove threats to Russian military forces,
and to identify the specific characteristics of radars in order to develop
radar countermeasures, such as jamming or blinding radars. This collec-
tion enables the development of an electronic order of battle, which allows
Russia’s military to develop countermeasures or to circumvent the foreign
military’s radars if necessary. Before Tselina, the Soviet Union had to use air-
borne platforms, like the IL-20, to collect information about U.S. air defense
and missile defense radars, but these airborne platforms could not overfly
U.S. territory and so could not see far into the U.S. mainland. The Soviet
Union needed a system that could cover a broader range.
Initially, the Soviet Union launched two versions of the Tselina, a broad
view satellite (Tselina-O) and a more detailed view collector (Tselina-D).
The early versions did not have real-time data downlinks, and they stored
data until a downlink could be established with a Soviet-based ground sta-
tion. A later version, the Tselina-2, first launched during the 1980s, was
capable of real-time data transmission via a series of relay satellites. In addi-
tion to collecting on radars, Tselina satellites were used as an alert system
to observe the intensity of communications—if military communications
became more frequent or concentrated, it could be an early warning indi-
cator of pending military activity. Tselina was never a COMINT system,
however, meaning it never collected voice communications—that was done
and is probably still done by ground-based systems. Thus, the Tselina system
was used almost exclusively for military purposes. Over 130 Tselina satel-
lites were launched throughout the history of the program, and they were
expected to operate for about six months. The last three Tselina-2 satellites
were launched in 2000, 2004, and 2007, and the program was phased out.563
A complication of the Tselina system was that both the satellite and the
launch vehicle that put it into space were manufactured in Ukraine. Addi-
tionally, the satellites were launched from the Baykonur launch complex in
Kazakhstan. The dissolution of the Soviet Union slowed the program and

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forced Russia to recreate these capabilities internally. By the late 1990s, Rus-
sia was transitioning the system manufacturing and launching components
to Russian territory. Tselina was eventually phased out in favor of a fully
Russian program.564
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union launched another series of ELINT sat-
ellites called US-P (Russian acronym for Passive Guided Satellite), which
was a passive ELINT satellite specifically focused on maritime targets.
Soviet/Russian forces used US-P satellites to locate and target ships at sea,
which a satellite, situated at the vantage point of hundreds of miles from the
Earth, can do more effectively than another ship on the Earth’s surface. Each
US-P satellite remained in orbit for one to two years, and the last one was
launched in 2010. Also part of that maritime program was an active radar
satellite, called US-A (Active Guided Satellite, later known as RLS). The
active radar made it possible to pinpoint large metal naval vessels at sea. An
active radar needed high amounts of electrical power to send out an active
radar pulse and receive the echoes, however, and the US-A active radar was
powered by a small nuclear reactor to generate enough electricity. The US-A
satellites lasted only three or four months before they ran out of fuel, and the
last US-A satellite was launched in the late 1980s. Both the US-A and the
US-P systems have been phased out.565
In 2009, Russia launched the first of four ELINT satellites, called
Lotos-2, under the new Liana program. The program began in 1993, but
numerous funding and technical issues delayed the first satellite’s launch for
16 years. The first Lotos-2 satellite lasted about three years, and three addi-
tional satellites have since been added to the Lotos constellation—launched
in 2014, 2017, and 2018—leaving three currently in orbit. Liana is more
capable than the Tselina system, giving Russia increased visibility on elec-
tronic emitters, especially radars, which are a very important intelligence
target given Russia’s anxiety about theater missile defense. The Liana system
consolidates and replaces the formerly separate collection of both land and
maritime targets.566
Russia’s ELINT satellites are run by the GRU Sixth Directorate, the
same directorate that manages Unit 26165, which conducted intrusions

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into the German Bundestag in 2015 and the U.S. Democratic National
Committee in 2016, as well as many other computer-based collection oper-
ations. All of the GRU’s SIGINT capabilities, whether space-based, ground-
based, sea-based, airborne, computer-based, or close access, are run from the
Sixth Directorate.

SATELLITE-BASED GEOINT
Russia maintains a varied set of GEOINT and early warning satellites. These
satellites provide photographic and radar imagery, infrared warning, and
cartographic capabilities. For most of the Soviet era, the GRU ran the Zenit
program, which consisted of small imagery satellites that stayed in orbit for
an average of one to two weeks. Over 650 Zenit satellites were launched
from 1962 to 1994. The Zenit program was eventually supplemented in the
1970s by the Yantar program, which had a better camera and could remain
on station longer—over four weeks. The program continued to improve
over time until it was replaced by the Persona series in the 2000s.
Beginning in 1981, the Yantar series also included a cartographic capa-
bility that allowed the Military Topographic Division of the General Staff
to produce detailed maps of the Earth’s surface, including elevation data
developed from space. As a result, practically any area of the Earth’s sur-
face could be mapped, including countries that were out of reach of the
Soviet military. Yantar cartographic satellites, later known as Kometa, were
launched about one per year from 1981 to 1994.567 The dissolution of the
Soviet Union slowed the production of these satellites; between 1995 and
2005 only three more were launched. The last Yantar cartographic satel-
lite was replaced by a new series, known as Bars-M1 and -M2, which was
launched in 2015 and 2016.568
The Araks satellite (also called Arkon-1) reportedly carries panchro-
matic and near-infrared sensors with a one-meter resolution. Program
development began in 1984 but experienced long development delays; the
first satellite was launched in 1997 and the second in 2002. Only these two
satellites were launched, each with a lifespan of about four years. According

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to a RussianSpaceWeb report, the system was highly successful, and the

ground station could not keep up with all the high-quality imagery coming
from the Araks-2.569
The current Russian imagery satellite series is the Persona system. Three
Persona satellites were launched in 2008, 2013, and 2015, with a seven-year
life expectancy. The program was conceived in the 1970s as a long-life sat-
ellite to replace the short-lived Yantar. Many program delays occurred
and, even after initial launch in 2008, the first Persona satellite failed after
less than a year. The satellite flies in a sun-synchronous orbit, meaning it
moves around the Earth so it is always directed where the sun is shining.
Consequently, it is capable of imaging virtually any point on Earth. Persona
imagery was released publicly for the first time after the MH17 airliner
shootdown, with the Russian government claiming the images proved that
Ukraine was at fault.570
Russia also has a radar imaging satellite called the Kondor, first launched
in 2013. The Kondor program took about ten years from initiation to launch,
with technical difficulties and funding shortages slowing the system’s deliv-
ery. Only one satellite has been launched so far.571
Additionally, the Soviet Union operated an infrared early warning
satellite, originally called the US-K (Russian acronym for Continental
Guided Satellite), to detect missile launches based on their heat signatures.
The US-K program, also known as the Oko system, ran from 1981 until
the last satellite in the series was launched in 2012.572 As with other sat-
ellite programs, the US-K series slowed in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
but was eventually replaced by the Единая космическая система (Unified
Space System; EKS Kupol) series, three of which were launched from 2015
to 2019. This satellite capability continues to operate in conjunction with
ground-based anti-aircraft radar systems that monitor the air approaches
to Russia573 and is important for Russian intelligence because it would give
warning of a U.S. missile attack.
Russian space-based technical collection programs are focused almost
entirely on military missions. While ground-based collection systems are
used for various missions, including political, economic, and military

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collection, the GRU’s satellite programs are focused on locating and mon-
itoring military movements, characterizing radar and communications sys-
tems, and missile early warning.

COMPUTER-BASED COLLECTION
Previous chapters have discussed the use of computer intrusions (often
called cyber activities) in multiple Russian intelligence missions, including
political and military intelligence collection and covert operations. Russian
computer intrusion operations follow a typical pattern employed by what
are called advanced persistent threats (APTs), sophisticated network intru-
sion teams that can maintain their presence unnoticed for extended periods,
waiting for the right moment to act or the right information to collect.
The typical pattern for intruding into a system has several steps. The
specific tactics used in each step differ by each APT, just as one burglar uses
a different type of lock-picking method than another. Computer security
companies have identified specific intrusion teams based on the specific
tools and methods they use.
An APT follows a general pattern of activity when identifying and pen-
etrating a target system. The steps include:

■ Reconnaissance/research: An APT team studies a targeted entity

in depth and finds the weak links in the network before attempting
to penetrate it. The weak links might come from an organization
not keeping patches up to date, from network users who are not suf-
ficiently trained to identify suspicious emails, or from thumb drives
that are used to move information from one computer to another.
The research phase identifies those vulnerabilities.
■ Preparation: An APT team might develop and test tools and tech-
niques specific to the targeted network. This may require writing or
acquiring new code to elude a specific security system.
■ Incursion: The APT team finds a point of entry into the targeted
network. The entry point might be facilitated by a phishing email

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containing malware that embeds a back door into the system as soon
as someone clicks on it. Entry might also involve a password cap-
turing system that records passwords for later use, or when an APT
team uses newly developed software to take advantage of the specific
system’s vulnerabilities. Additionally, entry might involve exploit-
ing what is called a “zero-day” vulnerability, which is a flaw in the
system software that a manufacturer has not previously identified.
An APT will hide the tracks toward that entry point by penetrating
a string of compromised third-party computer systems, called hop-
points, along the path, making it look like the intrusion is coming
from somewhere else.
■ Establish presence: The software that the APT team installs will
“call home” to a command-and-control server when it is inserted
into the target computer system, reporting where it is in the system
architecture and opening the path for further instructions.
■ Discovery: Once safely in the system, the APT team searches for
data and assets of value, exploiting insider accesses to a targeted
computer system either to collect data directly or as a stepping-stone
toward other accesses within the system.
■ Capture: The APT team will remotely move through the network
collecting information. Usually, the ultimate goal of an intrusion is
to collect intelligence, and, once on the inside, a hacker can find the
desired information.
■ Exfiltration: To take advantage of the collected information, the
APT team needs to find a way to communicate it out of the targeted
network to headquarters. Exfiltration is the hardest part of an oper-
ation, because it involves moving sometimes large amounts of data
out of the system, which can be seen by system administrators.

What the Russian government does with the exfiltrated information

may vary, from applying it to other intelligence operations, such as using it
to identify potential HUMINT targets; using it for political or economic
decisionmaking; leaking it to facilitate a disinformation operation; or using

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it to sabotage the system itself. In Russia, the information is usually passed

from a collection organization to another element within the intelligence or
security service to execute the operation.574
Russian computer-based intelligence activity has become much more
prevalent since around 2008, and it has especially increased in use to fulfill
internal security and political collection requirements. Although the United
States is prominent in Russia’s targeting, Russian intelligence activities
have shown a wide diversity of interests and target countries over the past
decade. Any country that is developing policy toward Russia is of interest to
Russian intelligence, especially if that policy involves NATO. Attribution
of computer-based collection is always difficult. But, as noted in previous
chapters, numerous reported Russian-sponsored computer intrusion events
since 2014 show that Russian computer-based operations are not always as
stealthy as they are professed to be. Computer security companies have suc-
cessfully attributed dozens of incidents directly to Russia’s intelligence ser-
vices—mostly the FSB and GRU, and more recently, with the SolarWinds
operation, the SVR. Some attacks have successfully penetrated the targeted
entity, while others have been caught and thwarted, and then publicly
announced so that other potential targets could close vulnerabilities.

CONCLUSION: TECHNICAL COLLECTION IN

COOPERATION WITH HUMAN PLATFORMS
Two general themes emerge from Russian technical collection systems and
provide insights into the threat they pose and the challenges they face. The
first theme relates to the impact that the dissolution of the Soviet Union has
had on technical systems. After the Russian Federation became an indepen-
dent country separate from the 14 other former Soviet republics, Russian
technical collection programs experienced a series of setbacks. The first was
that Russia’s economy suffered greatly, making high-cost programs like sat-
ellite reconnaissance systems difficult to afford. Consequently, research and
fielding of technical collection systems were significantly delayed through-
out the 1990s. However, Russia’s economic growth in the 2000s, fueled by

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oil sales, pushed these long-delayed systems to completion. Modernized

versions of satellite-based collection platforms began to appear around the
2010 timeframe, and several of the systems have begun operation since 2015.
Russia’s economic downturn was also accompanied by a brain drain,
which limited the number of highly trained specialists needed to conduct
research and manufacture highly technical intelligence collection systems.
According to research done by the Russian Presidential Academy of National
Economy and Public Administration in 2018, an increasing number of edu-
cated Russians are leaving the country for economic and political reasons.575
The Russian government is attempting to combat this trend through patri-
otic messaging to its people.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union also deprived Russia of manufactur-
ing and launch sites for satellite-based systems and foreign sites for ground-
based systems that had previously been integrated into the Soviet-era
intelligence system. These included rocket engine and electronics manu-
facturers in Ukraine and a launch site in Kazakhstan, along with collection
sites in Soviet-allied countries around the world. These changes have forced
Russia to either negotiate agreements with new allies or relocate capabilities
to Russian soil. For example, although Russia still has access to the Baykonur
launch complex in Kazakhstan from which it has traditionally launched its
reconnaissance satellites, that site is now located in a foreign country. Since
2005 Russia has pursued a launch site in the Russian Far East to “confirm
Russia’s leading technological status;” the Vostochniy Launch Site in Rus-
sia’s Amur Region launched its first unmanned vehicle in 2015 and its first
manned vehicle in 2018.576 The situation in Ukraine is more complicated,
especially since Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014 and Ukraine cut off
commercial ties with Russia’s space development ventures. Russia has been
forced to replace Ukraine-based manufacturing capabilities.
The second theme relates to the integration of technical and human
collection capabilities. While Russian computer-based operations have
increased in quantity and aggressiveness in the past decade, Russian intel-
ligence incidents that have been revealed publicly show a continued mix
of HUMINT, close access technical operations, open-source intelligence,

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satellite-based collection, air- and sea-based collection, and computer intru-

sions. No tool is off the table, and the various platforms at Russia’s disposal are
often used in concert with each other. For example, code clerks are recruited
as human sources who can provide information to support SIGINT collec-
tion. SIGINT systems monitor local counterintelligence surveillance com-
munications to support HUMINT operations. HUMINT tradecraft is used
to deploy close access SIGINT collectors, and human sources are dispatched
abroad to collect information to use in computer-based covert operations.
The systems are often mutually supportive.

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 CHAPTER 10

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN

INTELLIGENCE

k k k
In a monograph titled Putin’s Hydra, Russian state security expert Mark
Galeotti has presented a range of options for how a country’s intelligence
and security services manage their operations: either well or poorly, and in
a manner that is either aggressive and offensive or passive and defensive (see
Figure 27).577 While there is little question that Russia’s services are aggres-
sive, the evidence is less clear that they are well managed. An aggressive and
well-managed service would be a formidable instrument of statecraft, and
Russia’s aggressive covert operations in Ukraine have shown themselves to
be tools for Russia to achieve its strategic objectives. However, an aggressive
and poorly managed service would be a detriment to Russia and could even
be counterproductive. At times, Russian actions have appeared to exhibit
bad tradecraft and operational security that have revealed Russia’s involve-
ment in operations that the government probably intended to remain clan-
destine or covert.
Galeotti points out that Russian services have performed well at the tac-
tical level against targets within easy reach, especially in Ukraine. At the stra-
tegic level, however, Russian intelligence services either did not inform the
Russian leadership about the intensity of the Western reaction that Russia’s

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 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

covert operations in Ukraine or Western Europe could face, or Russian lead-

ers did not pay attention to these intelligence assessments.578 Russian intelli-
gence collection and covert operations have been revealed publicly time after
time since 2010, including foreign arrests of illegals, Russian arrests of officers
for fraud and robbery, the attribution of dozens of Russian ­computer-based
operations, the exposure of an unmistakably Russian hand behind assassi-
nations and government manipulation, the arrests and expulsions of large
numbers of officers under diplomatic cover, and continuing defections from
the ranks of Russian services.

Figure 27. Management of Security Services

Well Managed Poorly Managed

Aggressive Formidable instrument of Dangerously
statecraft counterproductive
Defensive Strong shield against Do little harm in times of
enemies peace but no protection in
hostile conditions

Source: Figure created by author from array of management approaches described in Mark
Galeotti, Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services (London: European Council on
Foreign Relations, 2016), 14-15, https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR_169_- _PUTINS_HYDRA_
INSIDE_THE_RUSSIAN_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_1513.pdf.

With that mix of well-managed and poorly managed forces, what will
drive Russian intelligence in the future? Russian services face both advan-
tages and challenges. Advantages include Russia’s ability to portray its intel-
ligence services as invulnerable and heroic. However, the challenges are
significant; some of which have been with Russia for a long time, while oth-
ers result from technological and demographic changes.
We can assess the threat of Russian intelligence by applying the threat
equation—threat=intent x capability x opportunity—and looking at how
each factor might change over time. Intent is an agency’s will to perform an act;
it is based on the policies and strategies of the government that stands behind

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the agency, as well as the mindset of the officers in the agency. Capability is
the agency’s physical means to perform an act, including its manpower and
technology assets. Opportunity is the spatial-temporal relationship between
the agency’s assets and the targets, including the reach and accesses that the
agency enjoys.579 This final chapter will apply these factors to Russian intelli-
gence and state security services and to the threat that Russian services pose.

THREAT EQUATION: INTENT

Russian intent is informed by its threat perceptions, which drive actions, and
by its perceptions of success, which remove inhibitions and create a sense of
invulnerability. In Russia’s threat perception, the country is under siege by a
Western system that is trying to prevent Russia from regaining its rightful
place in the world. In that perception, the United States is a destabilizing
factor in the world. When Russian leaders discuss intelligence and covert
activities, they invariably do so in terms of a threat to Russia, unless they are
heroizing a past officer or exploit. As Russia articulates threats to its national
security, it employs its national security tools—like intelligence and state
security services—to mitigate those threats. Russia views itself as being at
political war, as opposed to military war, with the West, especially with the
United States. Thus, it uses its intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert
action capabilities to their full extent to fight that political war.
Russia’s relationship of distrust with the West is not likely to change
soon. Some U.S. commentators assert that Russia has had preferred candi-
dates for President of the United States and has manipulated the U.S. public
to ensure the victory of its preferred candidate. Although Russia may dislike
one candidate more than it dislikes another, it is unlikely that any Russian
leader trusts any U.S. president. Putin has seen a steady stream of U.S. pres-
idents who began their presidency saying positive words about Russia but
subsequently made decisions contrary to Russian interests.
In the 1990s, U.S. President Bill Clinton developed a close personal rela-
tionship with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and the leaders claimed to be
able to pick up the phone and discuss issues at any time. President Clinton,

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however, supported NATO enlargement into former Warsaw Pact coun-

tries and authorized the bombing of Russia’s ally Yugoslavia, directly against
Russia’s vocal opposition. In the early 2000s, when the United States faced
a severe terrorist threat, new Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first
world leader to express condolences and support for the United States. Sev-
eral months before that, U.S. President George W. Bush said, “I looked the
man in the eye. I found him very straightforward and trustworthy—I was able
to get a sense of his soul.”580 Then, President Bush authorized the deployment
of theater missile defense systems, supported the membership processes for
Baltic republics to join NATO, and oversaw a U.S. Government that openly
criticized Russia’s brutal methods in Chechnya. When “color revolutions”
occurred in the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan
during the Bush Administration, Russian suspicions that the United States
was trying to encircle Russia with anti-Russian regimes grew.
Later in the decade, President Barack Obama said positive things about
Putin during their first meeting and initiated a “reset,” promising to improve
relations that had frayed under the previous U.S. President. A few years later,
President Obama authorized NATO military action in Libya that forcibly
and humiliatingly removed Moammar Qadhafi from power. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, who had initiated the reset with Russia, spoke pos-
itively about Russian protesters who were demonstrating against Putin’s
return to the presidency in 2012—and later became a candidate for the U.S.
presidency. President Obama also authorized sanctions against Russia for
annexing Crimea. He expelled 35 Russian officers from the United States
in retaliation for meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, after the
U.S. Intelligence Community issued a rare public analysis of Russian gov-
ernment interference in the U.S. election. Finally, President Donald Trump
promised to improve relations with Russia, claiming to be able to work well
with Putin. President Trump subsequently increased sanctions on Russia,
ordered a Russian consulate and recreational facilities to be closed, and then
expelled 60 more Russians after the assassination attempt on Sergey Skripal
in the United Kingdom. Former Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev
called the Trump Administration a “period of disappointment.”581

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Putin has learned from these experiences. He has no illusions that any
U.S. president will support Russia or benefit Russian interests. Putin will
authorize clandestine collection operations and covert action to protect
Russia from what he views as an American-led Western political assault on
Russia, led by a series of U.S. presidents who, in the Russian leader’s view,
have betrayed Russia.
Russian intent is also informed by its perceptions of its own successes,
which embolden Russia and increase the likelihood that it will use its intelli-
gence and covert operations capabilities. Russia benefits when it can portray
its intelligence and covert operations as victorious, and it further benefits
when its adversaries perceive Russian operations in the same light. One of
the most significant successes of Russian intelligence is that it has manufac-
tured a mythos of an unstoppable, irreversible force that is futile to fight—a
mythos that serves Vladimir Putin well. As part of this mythos, Russian
intelligence leaders claim that Russian illegals are envied by Western intel-
ligence services. As long as Russia can maintain that mythos, both with its
own people and abroad, its intelligence services will continue to have success.
Russian leaders have heroized their intelligence officers to the point that
many in Russia now see them as a force for good—a significant change from
the early post-Soviet era. In January 2020, the SVR director declassified the
identities of seven retired KGB/SVR illegals, several of whom had operated
against the United States. In each case, the announcement claimed that the
named former illegal had done exceptional work in collecting highly sensi-
tive information in support of Russia’s interests.582 Since 2012, the Russian
government has minted postage stamps honoring 18 MVD officers, 11 FSB
officers, 5 military intelligence and special operations officers, 2 military coun-
terintelligence officers, and a former SVR director, along with commemorative
stamps for Soviet-era illegals, and the founding of the SVR, GRU, FSB, Border
Guards, and SIGINT collection.583 The Russian government has also awarded
numerous FSB and GRU officers the title Hero of the Russian Federation
during that time. These types of announcements are intended to make the
Russian population proud of their intelligence officers, while also giving the
Russian government an opportunity to portray itself as invariably successful.584

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The life of a state security worker is popular among some Russians for a
variety of reasons: reputedly being a good paying job with solid job security and
offering the feeling of being in a position of power. Government propaganda
unceasingly trumpets patriotic messaging that portrays state security officers as
honorable, the cream of society, self-sacrificing, and thinking only of interests
of the state. On the other hand, these efforts may occasionally fall short due to
Russians’ perceptions of corruption within the state security services, a con-
tinuing fear of state security, and disagreements with agencies’ methods, like
assassinations and Internet monitoring,
Polls inside Russia are mixed regarding the popularity of Russia’s intelli-
gence services and the success of these public relations efforts. A 2018 survey
found that 45 percent of parents and grandparents wanted their children to
work for security services, reportedly up from 29 percent in 2001. The survey
also claimed that 50 percent of young Russians (up to 30 years old) wanted
to work for security services.585 However, a different survey in October 2019
claimed that only 20 percent of parents or grandparents would welcome
their children or grandchildren joining an intelligence organization.586
Despite the positive image that the Russian government portrays of the
life of security service workers, those workers’ lives are far from glamorous.
Although security service workers enjoy some privileges, such as long vaca-
tions and free passes for public transport, in the words of one Russian jour-
nalist, “The FSB, GRU, FSO and the SVR… are not gods.” Security service
workers’ travel is restricted: they can only take vacations within the borders
of the Russian Federation and cannot leave the country for ten years after
they leave the service. Their salaries are not high—35,000 to 80,000 rubles
($400-1,000) per month—making it difficult for some officers to meet
economic needs. Rank-and-file workers live in normal, rundown Russian
housing, while senior leaders enjoy huge riches. With reportedly little com-
radeship, mistrust is rife among staff. Post-traumatic stress is a reality for
security staff personnel who have served in special operations units, with
little psychological support offered.587
Targets of Russian operations need to be careful not to exaggerate the
success of Russian operations, thereby feeding into Russian intelligence

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services’ own narrative of being all-powerful and unstoppable. Disinforma-

tion operations have created room for Russian maneuvering of external per-
ceptions; for example, Russia has gained a reputation for causing discord
and deepening divides in its adversaries’ political systems. Thomas Rid, in
his 2020 book Active Measures, assesses to the contrary that Russia’s elec-
tion manipulation activities in the United States have not been particularly
successful, despite the media attention they have received. Reports often
use social media “impressions” as a measure of Russian success; however,
“impressions” may grossly exaggerate real impact. As Rid concludes: “Online
metrics, in short, created a powerful illusion, an appealing image—the met-
rics created an opportunity for more, and more convincing, disinformation
about disinformation. Willfully exaggerating the effects of disinformation
means exaggerating the impact of disinformation.”588 The resulting effect
could make Russia’s narrative a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Russian intelligence and security services’ track record is far from perfect,
despite their positive self-portrayal. Russian intelligence and covert activities
have experienced some successes but also many failures. Covert operations
have been regularly revealed publicly, including disinformation operations
(e.g., those that followed the athlete doping scandal, MH17 shootdown, U.S.
election interference, Skripal attack), foreign government manipulation (e.g.,
United States, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Montenegro, North Mace-
donia), undeclared military operations (e.g., Ukraine, Libya, Central Afri-
can Republic, Mozambique), and attempted and successful assassinations
(Navalny and Skripal among the former and multiple Chechen militants in
the latter). Russia has experienced a number of intelligence setbacks, such as
diplomatically covered officers expelled in large numbers; illegals operations
compromised in multiple countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Germany,
Spain), reportedly leading some Russians to question the value of illegals;589
and computer-based collection and sabotage operations regularly attributed
to Russia publicly, despite Russian intelligence services’ attempts to conceal
their involvement. These revelations damage Russia’s credibility in the world.
The perception of Russia among Americans and Europeans is at its low-
est since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to a large extent due to Russia’s

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own aggressive intelligence and covert operations. The downward trend

began about the time that Edward Snowden appeared in Moscow and was
granted political asylum. Subsequent events, like the Russian annexation
of Crimea, revelations of election meddling, and the Skripal assassination
attempt, have pushed Russia’s reputation among Americans further down.590
Since 2015, Russia has been perceived as first or second on the list of the
United States’ greatest enemies, according to a Gallup poll. Russia has either
led the pack or trailed behind only North Korea since 2015.591 A similarly
negative trend has occurred across Europe.592
This downturn damages Russia’s ability to conduct intelligence opera-
tions, making it harder for Russian officers to find people willing to coop-
erate and develop relationships. Because many Americans and Europeans
suspect the veracity of any messages coming from Russia, Russian disinfor-
mation messages may resonate less with them. Western targets need to keep
a balanced perspective about Russian intelligence activities. While Russia’s
operations should not be underestimated, they should also not be exagger-
ated, because expanding them beyond reality plays into Russia’s narrative of
an unstoppable intelligence force.

THREAT EQUATION: CAPABILITY

Capability is a mix of manpower and technology. Russia has experienced
some disadvantages in the area of manpower, while technology has been
both a blessing and a curse.
Russia’s overall demographic decline is trending toward fewer young
people being trained in technological fields, and some of those are choos-
ing to emigrate due to a lack of both economic and political opportunities,
leaving fewer young people to take the new positions. In addition, the FSB
has experienced several waves of disparaging news that make FSB officers
look like corrupt egotists. In 2015, for example, a group of graduates of the
FSB academy paraded through the streets of Moscow in dozens of expen-
sive Mercedes SUVs, honking their horns, cheering, and posing for a group
photo. A video of this behavior elicited a highly negative reaction from the

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public and from Russian officers, who considered it a gross violation of pro-
fessionalism.593 The stunt—a possible indicator of the caliber of available
recruits—did not sit well with the FSB leadership. The FSB announced a
few weeks later: “Principled personnel decisions have been taken toward
the guilty individuals, changing the condition of their service. Severe dis-
ciplinary measures against the leadership of the Academy, including the
demotion of several leaders [and] their firing, will be taken.”594
The FSB has also been the target of several high-profile corruption
investigations in the past several years, further tarnishing the agency’s public
image and damaging the FSB’s ability to perform its mission. An officer in
an FSB counter-corruption unit was arrested in May 2019 with $185 mil-
lion cash in his apartment. His arrest was probably the result of infighting
within the FSB, but it painted a picture of the FSB as part of the corrup-
tion problem rather than the solution.595 In July 2019, seven FSB officers
were arrested for armed robbery, possibly targeting corrupt government offi-
cials; the FSB officers had reportedly been tipped off that a corrupt official
was planning to deposit a large amount of cash, and they robbed him as he
entered the bank.596
Demographic factors also impede Russia’s ability to find appropriately
skilled individuals for specialized roles in its intelligence and security ser-
vices. Russia struggles to identify reliable, loyal people to work as illegals
abroad, and the heroizing of its illegals program is at least in part designed to
attract the most patriotic and motivated people to become illegals. Individu-
als with special skills are also needed to drive improvements in remote sens-
ing technology and satellites. Russia has encountered difficulties in training
enough people in the highly technical fields that support satellite-based
intelligence operations.
Technology itself is another part of the capability factor. In some ways,
technological improvements have increased Russian intelligence and coun-
terintelligence capabilities. Biometrics technology facilitates counterintelli-
gence and internal security operations. Increased installation of cameras in
public places, accompanied by facial recognition technology, improves Rus-
sian counterintelligence capabilities. The Russian government has used the

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COVID-19 pandemic to increase the monitoring of its own people using a

variety of tracking technologies. Russia is also implementing improvements
in Internet and communications tracking. Technology can also support
intelligence and covert operations by allowing remote access to some com-
puter systems and making bulk exfiltration of data more possible.
Modern technology, however, can also make intelligence operations
less capable. Biometrics technology, originally invented to inhibit terrorist
travel, makes Russian clandestine operations more challenging when the
technology is applied abroad. Sharing databases across borders enables the
identification of false travelers, making it more difficult to travel clandes-
tinely. As former CIA officer Robert Grenier and others have noted, clan-
destine operations cannot be conducted today as they used to be.597 Russia
has probably responded to this challenge by changing who it selects to be
illegals, selecting some people who operate openly as Russians, albeit with-
out overt connections to the Russian government.

THREAT EQUATION: OPPORTUNITY

Several factors increase the opportunities and reach of Russian intelligence
and covert activities. However, the factors that provide Russia with greater
opportunities each have corresponding measures that can reduce those
opportunities.
Russia’s placement of officers in various types of covers—diplomatic,
nonofficial, and illegal—offers opportunities for Russia to access a variety of
people and data. Each has advantages that allow Russian intelligence services
to operate in different social circles, opening the possibility for placement
and access to a wide spectrum of information. The very purpose for those
options is that each offers different advantages for access. However, mass
expulsions and public arrests of Russian intelligence officers at least tempo-
rarily reduce opportunities to engage with sources or to operate embassy-­
based SIGINT collection platforms. When the United States closed the
Russian consulate in San Francisco and Russian diplomatic resorts in Mary-
land and New York in 2016, the threat equation element of opportunity

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 The Future of Russian Intelligence

was reduced; the facility closures both reduced the number of officers in
the country and removed accesses to electronic signals that Russian services
cannot otherwise reach. Additionally, the United States pulled out of the
Open Skies Treaty in 2020 presumably, at least in part, to reduce Russian
collection opportunities.
Global computer connectivity also provides opportunities for Rus-
sian intelligence activities, although those opportunities can be thwarted.
Russia can use the accessibility that computer networks provide to collect
intelligence in some places where it cannot easily or securely send collec-
tors in person. However, as intrusions are discovered, defensive efforts, like
patches and threat awareness, reduce Russian collection opportunities and
make remote intrusions more difficult. Additionally, not all information
can be accessed remotely via the Internet, and sometimes a human insider
is required to provide access to internal data. At other times Russia needs to
dispatch close access SIGINT collectors and computer intrusion specialists
to gain access to signals that cannot be reached remotely, which is riskier.
Efforts to reduce Russian collection opportunities can force Russia to use
riskier and more expensive measures.
Combining and collaborating across intelligence disciplines offer
increased opportunities to access sources that might otherwise be inaccessi-
ble. As Russian intelligence services use one intelligence discipline to tip and
cue another, they extend the reach of the intelligence system overall. This
collaboration might include, for example, tasking a HUMINT source to
gather information that facilitates SIGINT or computer-based operations,
or collecting signals that warn of counterintelligence operations targeting
HUMINT operations. Russian intelligence services are notorious, however,
for interagency battles and rivalries. Clashes between intelligence and coun-
terintelligence organizations, or between civilian and military intelligence
organizations, reduce both capabilities and opportunities.
At a more strategic level, anti-U.S. sentiment around the world creates
opportunities for Russian intelligence. As long as there are populations in
the world that oppose the United States, whether politically, militarily, or
economically, Russian intelligence and covert information operations will

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have fertile ground in which to operate. People who already are willing to
act against U.S. and Western interests are easier to persuade to cooperate
with Russian intelligence operations than those who favor the West. The
Soviet Union and Russia have relied on anti-U.S. sentiments for intelligence
activities since the Cold War. Counteracting that Russian opportunity
extends far beyond the intelligence or counterintelligence realm, requiring
the United States and the West to develop effective international relations
and to increase positive views of democratic ideals around the world.
Finally, an open, democratic society offers opportunities for exploita-
tion by an aggressive Russia—covert disinformation operations are hard to
stop in an open society. Christopher Walker of the National Endowment
for Democracy describes the advantage that Russia potentially enjoys in the
information realm, defining Russia’s use of what he calls “sharp power” as:

An approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at

censorship or the use of manipulation to sap the integrity of inde-
pendent institutions. This approach takes advantage of the asymme-
try between free and unfree systems, allowing authoritarian regimes
both to limit free expression and to distort political environments
in democracies while simultaneously shielding their own domestic
public spaces from democratic appeals coming from abroad.598

Using these methods simultaneously, Russia can protect itself from for-
eign infiltration, as envisioned in the mythical Dulles Plan, by taking advan-
tage of the freedom of expression afforded by democratic systems. Russia’s
approach has changed little since the Cold War, when Soviet services rou-
tinely disseminated falsified information and counterfeit documents and
cast Western society in a negative light to prevent the Soviet population
from viewing it as attractive. However, the opportunity that open societ-
ies provide for access is also the very characteristic that strengthens them.
It would be to the West’s detriment to diminish its openness just to reduce
Russian or other countries’ intelligence or covert operations opportunities.
A democratic society needs to recognize and play to its strengths, allowing

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freedom of all positions to be voiced, including positions that highlight

injustices elsewhere, not just in its own society.

FINAL ANALYSIS
While it would be wrong to dismiss Russian intelligence as a threat, it would
also be wrong to view Russian intelligence as “10 feet tall and bullet proof.”
Russian intelligence and state security services look in many ways like they
did during the Andropov era: still run by leaders raised in the chekist mind-
set, who view the West as an eternal and unchanging threat and who con-
nect that external threat to manifestations of popular dissatisfaction inside
Russia. That dynamic sets the foundation for the “intent” factor of the threat
equation. Russia retains highly proficient collection and covert action capa-
bilities, both human and technical. Russian intelligence platforms are located
worldwide, inside computer networks, and in space, giving Russia global
intelligence reach and opportunities. Nevertheless, Russian intelligence has
weaknesses that can be exploited. Probably among the worst of those weak-
nesses is its own hubris—a sense that it is invulnerable. If Russia can portray
its successes as being the result of a well-managed, powerful, patriotic system,
and simplistically explain away its failures as nothing but “Russophobia,” it
can weather failures and capitalize on successes. Similarly, if the victims of
Russian intelligence activities and covert activities focus only on Russia’s
strengths and ignore its weaknesses, the victim itself grants those activities
greater potency and effectiveness. However, publicly revealing Russian opera-
tions as aggressive, antagonistic, and in some cases inept can diminish Russia’s
self-manufactured lustrous intelligence reputation.
The purpose of this book is to provide the analytic tools with which to
assess that threat in a balanced way, to break the threat down to its compo-
nent parts of who, why, and how, and to view each component within its
own context, along with its strengths and weaknesses. Russian intelligence is
a formidable adversary, but it is not invulnerable. Targets of Russian intelli-
gence activities need experts who see those activities in a balanced way. This
book is designed to begin the process of building that expertise.

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 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

k k k
Kevin Riehle is an associate professor at the University of Mississippi, Cen-
ter for Intelligence and Security Studies. He spent over 30 years in the U.S.
Government as a counterintelligence analyst studying foreign intelligence
services, finishing his government career as an associate professor of strategic
intelligence at the National Intelligence University. He received a Ph.D. in
war studies from King’s College London, an MS of strategic intelligence from
the Joint Military Intelligence College, and a BA in Russian and political sci-
ence from Brigham Young University. Dr. Riehle has written on a variety of
intelligence and counterintelligence topics, focusing on the history of Soviet
and Eastern Bloc intelligence services. In 2020, he published Soviet Defec-
tors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924-1954. His articles
have appeared in Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Cold War History, Journal of Intelligence
History, and he has been interviewed by the International Spy Museum for its
Spycast podcast series.

275
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k k k
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315
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316
 ENDNOTES

k k k
1 Russian SVR Archives, Operational Record File No. 76659, vol. 1, 245–58, quoted in John
Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin’s Master
Spy (New York: Crown, 1993), 308–12.
2 Alexander Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (New York: Random House, 1953).
3 Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1963).
4 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Comments of Alexander Orlov about Walter
Krivitsky’s Book In Stalin’s Secret Service,” FBI Memo, October 13, 1954, The National
Archives, Kew London, UK, KV 2/2879, serial 45b, 10-12.
5 Alexander Orlov, “The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 7,
no. 1 (Spring 1963): 45.
6 For a description of this equation as it is applied to foreign intelligence activities, see Kevin
P. Riehle, “Assessing Foreign Intelligence Threats,” American Intelligence Journal 31, no. 1
(2013): 96-101, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26202049.
7 Ben B. Fischer, ed., Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police (Washing-
ton, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997).
8 Esther B. Fein, “Soviets Confirm Nazi Pacts Dividing Europe,” New York Times, August 19,
1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/19/world/soviets-confirm-nazi-pacts-­dividing-
europe.html.
9 Aleksandr Yakovlev Database, https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/db-docs.
10 See, for example, A. M. Plekhanov and A. A. Plekhanov, Ф.Э. Дзержинский—Председатель
ВЧК—ОГПУ. 1917–1926 [F. E. Dzerzhinskiy—Chief of the VChK-OGPU 1917-1926]
(Moscow: International Democracy Foundation, 2007); V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov,
and N. S. Plotnikova, Лубянка. Сталин и МГБ. Март 1946 – март 1953: Документы

317
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

высших органов партийной и государственной власти [Lubyanka. Stalin and the MGB,
March 1946 – March 1953: Documents of the Higher Organs of Party and State Power]
(Moscow: International Democracy Foundation, 2007); V. A. Gavrilov, Военная Разведка
Информирует: Документы Разведуправления Красной Армии. Январь 1939 – июнь
1941 г. [Military Intelligence Informs: Documents from the Red Army Intelligence Director-
ate, January 1939 – June 1941] (Moscow: International Democracy Foundation, 2008); N.
V. Petrov and Ya. Foytsik, Аппарат НКВД-МГБ в Германии. 1945–1953 [The NKVD-
MGB Apparatus in Germany, 1945-1953] (Moscow: International Democracy Founda-
tion, 2009).
11 Alexander Vassiliev Notebooks, Wilson Center Digital Archive, https://digitalarchive.­
wilsoncenter.org/collection/86/vassiliev-notebooks.
12 Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood (New York: Modern Library,
2000); John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of
the KGB in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
13 Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions.
14 Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB
Archives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
15 Philip Knightley, “Disinformation,” London Review of Books, July 8, 1993, https://www.
lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v15/n13/phillip-knightley/disinformation; see also Andrei Soldatov
and Irina Borogan, The Compatriots: The Brutal and Chaotic History of Russia’s Exiles, Émi-
grés, and Agents Abroad (New York: Public Affairs, 2019), 161-67.
16 Yevgeniy Primakov, ed., Очерки Истории Российской Внешней Разведки [Essays on the
History of Russian Foreign Intelligence], six volumes, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniya Otnosh-
eniya, 1997-2006).
17 Sergey A. Korenkov, ed., Военная Контрразведка ФСБ России 1918–2003 [Military
Counterintelligence of the FSB of Russia, 1918–2003] (Moscow: Moskovskiy Poligrafich-
eskiy Dom, 2004).
18 V. Vinogradov, A. Litvin, and V. Khristoforov, eds., Архив ВЧК: Сборник документов
[The VChK Archive: A Collection of Documents] (Мoscow: Kukovo Pole, 2007).
19 Vladimir Dolmatov, ed., Служба Внешней Разведки Российской Федерации 100 Лет:
Документы и Свидетельства [The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation
at 100 Years: Documents and Testimonies] (Moscow: Komsomolskaya Pravda, 2020); see
also A. A. Zdanovich and A. G. Bezverkhniy, eds., Труды Общества Изучения Истории
Отечественных Спецслужб [Works of the Society for Studying the History of Domestic Spe-
cial Services], three volumes (Moscow: Kuchkove Pole, 2006 and 2007).
20 KGB Documents Online, https://www.kgbdocuments.eu/kgb-journals-and-books/.
21 Dmitriy Prokhorov, Сколько стоит продать Родину? [What is the Cost of Betraying One’s
Homeland?] (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2005).
22 Vitaliy Karavashkin, Кто Предал Россию [Who Betrayed Russia] (Moscow: AST, 2008).

318
 Endnotes

23 See Filip Kovacevic, “Nikolay Dolgopolov: The Storyteller of Soviet Intelligence History,”
Intelligence and National Security, published online August 13, 2020, https://www.tandf
online.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2020.1805167.
24 Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994).
25 Pavel Sudoplatov, Спецоперации. Лубянка и Кремль 1930–1950 годы [Special Operations:
Lubyanka and the Kremlin, 1930-1950] (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 1997).
26 See, for example, Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-two Years in Intelligence and Espio-
nage Against the West (New York: Basic Books, 2009); Victor Cherkashin, Spy Handler:
Memoir of a KGB Officer. The True Story of The Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen &
Aldrich Ames (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Yuriy Drozdov, Записки начальника
нелегальной разведки [Notes of a Chief of Illegal Intelligence] (Moscow: Russian Biograph-
ical Institute, 1999); Andrey Bronnikov and Yelena Vavilova, Женщина, которая умеет
хранить тайны [The Woman Who Knows How to Keep Secrets] (Moscow, Eksmo, 2019).
27 Robert Legvold, “Review of Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, A Soviet Spy-
master, by Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold Schechter,” Foreign Affairs,
July/August 1994, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1994-07-01/
special-tasks-memoirs-unwanted-witness-soviet-spymaster.
28 See, in particular, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the
Central Intelligence Agency (Record Group 263); U.S. Army Staff, Investigative Records
Repository (Record Group 319).
29 See, for example, David Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground
Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Cees
Wiebes and Przemysław Gasztold, “Polish Intelligence in the Netherlands and Dutch
Counter-Intelligence, 1947-1962,” International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and
Public Affairs, published online November 3, 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/23800992.2020.1839726?journalCode=usip20.
30 “Ottawa Denies Soviet Spy Defected Here,” The Gazette (Montreal), March 27, 1972, 3.
31 Gordon Corera, Russians Among Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories, and the Hunt for Putin’s
Spies (New York: William Morrow, 2020).
32 National Security Agency, Venona, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-
documents/venona/.
33 See Kevin Riehle, Soviet Defectors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924-1954
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).
34 Russian Federation, Указ Президента Российской Федерации oт 22.10.2007 No. 1404,
“О Присвоении Звания Героя Российской Федерации Ковалю Ж.А.” [Order of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 1404, October 22, 2007, “Awarding the Rank
of Hero of the Russian Federation to Koval Zh. A.”], https://rulaws.ru/president/Ukaz-
Prezidenta-RF-ot-22.10.2007-N-1404/; see also Michael Walsh, “George Koval: Atomic

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Spy Unmasked,” Smithsonian Magazine, May 2009, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/

history/george-koval-atomic-spy-unmasked-125046223/.
35 For the website of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), see www.fsb.ru; for the website
of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), see www.svr.gov.ru.
36 Fischer, ed., Okhrana, p. 6, n10.
37 Vladimir Putin, “Поздравление с Днём работника органов безопасности” [“Congratu-
lations on Security Service Workers’ Day”], Kremlin.ru, December 20, 2020, http://www.
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64681.
38 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin
Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 24.
39 Fedor Pavlovich Drugov, “С Дзержинским в ВЧК: Исповедь раскаявшегося чекиста”
[“With Dzerzhinskiy in the VChK: The Confession of a Repentant Chekist”], Illustrated
Russia, February 7, 1931, 1.
40 Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, ed., История Советских Органов Государственной
Безопасности: Учебник [The History of Soviet State Security Agencies: A Textbook] (Moscow:
Dzerzhinskiy Higher Red Banner School of the Committee of State Security, 1977), 8.
41 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations
from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1990), 22; Oleg Dani-
lovich Kalugin, Вид с Лубянки: “Дело” бывшего генерала КГБ [Thе View from Lubyanka:
The “Case” of a Former KGB General] (Moscow: PIK, 1990) (online publication).
42 Fischer, ed., Okhrana.
43 Chebrikov, ed., The History of Soviet State Security Agencies, 14.
44 Fischer, ed., Okhrana, 36-38.
45 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 25-26.
46 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 41.
47 Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 91.
48 British Home Office Warrant, July 25,1930, The National Archives, Kew, London, KV
3/2398, serial 12a.
49 Korenkov, ed., Military Counterintelligence of the FSB, 1.
50 Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. Schedule A, Vol. 11, Case 144 (interviewers
A.P., and R.B., type A4), 24-25.
51 See, for example, Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 314.
52 Fischer, ed., Okhrana, 77-78.
53 Peter Pavlonovsky (aka Sumarokov), biography submitted as a statement in his trial in
July 1929, Hoover Institution Archive, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 217, Folder 6
(Microfilm 187).
54 Richard B. Spence, “Senator William E. Borah: Target of Soviet and Anti-Soviet Intrigue,
1922–1929,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 1 (2006):
134-55.

320
 Endnotes

55 Prokhorov, What is the Cost of Betraying One’s Homeland?, 28.

56 Spence, “Senator William E. Borah,” 135.
57 Vasili Mitrokhin, ed., KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook (London:
Frank Cass, 2002), 13.
58 Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Soviet History of Disinformation ad Political Warfare
(New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2020), 123-41, 201-02, 206-08, 313.
59 Rid, Active Measures, 210.
60 Fischer, ed., Okhrana, 8.
61 V. I. Savalyev, “Многоликость Разведки” [“The Many Faces of Intelligence”], in Yevgeniy
Primakov, ed., Очерки Истории Русской Внешней Разведки (Essays on the History of Russian
Foreign Intelligence), Vol. 1, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya, 1996), 212-13.
62 S. M. Golubev, “Операция ‘Трест’” [“Operation ‘Trust’”], in Yevgeniy Primakov, ed.,
Очерки Истории Российской Внешней Разведки [Essays on the History of Russian Foreign
Intelligence], vol. 2 (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1997), 111-28.
63 Vladimir Burtsev, “Police Provocation in Russia,” The Slavonic Review 6, no. 17 (December
1927): 247-67, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4202167?seq=1.
64 John Dziak, Chekisty: A History of the KGB (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988).
65 Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “20 Декабря 1920 года” (“20
December 1920”), http://svr.gov.ru/calendar/6191.htm.
66 “Российской контрразведке исполнилось 80 лет” [“Russian Counterintelligence Has
Turned 80 Years Old”], RIA Novosti, May 5, 2002, https://ria.ru/20020506/135030.html.
67 Georgiy Agabekov, ЧК за работой [The Cheka at Work] (Berlin: Strela, 1931), 62-63.
68 Agabekov, The ChK at Work, 50-54; Georgiy Agabekov, OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror,
trans. Henry W. Bunn (New York: Brentano’s, 1931), 35-36, 44.
69 Peter Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia (New York:
Kodansha International, 1984).
70 Calculation based on “… in 1917, 100 rubles would buy $9” (Egorova and Zubachevya)
and U.S. dollar inflation since 1917 (Dollar Times): Kira Egorova and Ksenia Zubacheva,
“The Ruble’s Journey Through Time, from the Middle Ages to the Present Day,” Russia
Beyond, May 14, 2020; https://www.rbth.com/business/332176-history-russian-rubl;
“Calculate the Value of $1.00 in 1917: What Is $1 in 1917 Worth in Today’s Money?,” Dol-
lar Times, accessed on March 11, 2021, https://www.dollartimes.com/inflation/inflation.
php?amount=1&year=1917.
71 David W. McFadden, Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 19-21.
72 Lev Davydovich Trotsky, Моя Жизнь [My Life], vol. 2 (Berlin, Granit, 1930), 62-64.
73 The Comintern, also known as the Third International, was an international association of
communist parties. For a discussion of Moscow’s control over the Comintern, see David W.
Lovell and Kevin Windle, eds., “Piecing Together the Past: The Comintern, the CPA, and

321
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

the Archives,” in Our Unswerving Loyalty: A Documentary Survey of Relations between the
Communist Party of Australia and Moscow, 1920-1940 (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), 1–17.
74 See, for example, Petr Karpov, Организация ГПУ [The Organization of the GPU], undated
typescript, Hoover Institution Archives, Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 217, Folder 6
(Microfilm reel 187); Report by Yevgeniy Kozhevnikov titled “Work of the Representatives
of the ‘U.S.S.R.’ in China,” forwarded by Shelley to the War Office on June 20, 1927, The
National Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/1895, serial 15b; “Дело Советских Шпионов в
Латвии” [“The Case of Soviet Spies in Latvia”], Vozrozhdenie, July 24, 1928; Andrey Pav-
lovich Smirnov, “Записки агента Разведупра” [“Notes of a Razvedupr Agent”], Vozrozh-
denie, March 28, 1930, 3; MI5, Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings, “Information
Obtained from General Krivitsky During His Visit to This Country, January-February
1940,” The National Archives, KV 2/805, serial 55x.
75 Georgiy Agabekov, Секретный Террор [Secret Terror] (Moscow: Terra, 1998).
76 F. E. Dzerzhinskiy to I. S. Unshlikht, Telegram dated September 5, 1922, Alexander Yakov-
lev Archive, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1019506.
77 Alastair Kocho-Williams, Engaging the World: Soviet Diplomacy and Foreign Propaganda in
the 1920s, University of the West of England, December 2007, https://www2.uwe.ac.uk/
faculties/CAHE/HPP/staff/stafflist/A_Kocho-Williams_sovietdiplomats1920s.pdf.
78 Quoted in David W. McFadden, “After the Colby Note: The Wilson Administration and
the Bolsheviks, 1920-21,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 741-50.
79 McFadden, Alternative Paths, 19.
80 U.S. Embassy Havana to Department of State, Despatch 1437, May 25, 1926, National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1910-1929, Box 7330,
Serial 811.00B/585; see also Mikhail Hendler letter to Congressman Hamilton Fish, dated
November 23, 1930, Richard J. O’Melia Collection, Hesburgh Libraries, University of
Notre Dame, Correspondence Box XVI, item 55.
81 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London:
Allen Lane, 2009), 154.
82 MI5, Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings. “Information Obtained from General
Krivitsky.”
83 British Embassy Washington Memo, September 13, 1940, The National Archives, Kew,
London, FO 371/24845, 2.
84 Kevin Riehle, “Soviet Intent at the Dawn of the Cold War: Igor Gouzenko’s Revelations
about GRU Intelligence Taskings,” Journal of Intelligence History, February 25, 2021, https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/16161262.2021.1892997?journalCode=rjih20.
85 See, for example, Barton Whaley, Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets: Notes for a History
of the Structures of the Intelligence Services of the USSR (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for Inter-
national Studies, 1969), 1; Evgenia Lezina, “Dismantling the State Security Apparatus Trans-
formations of the Soviet State Security Bodies in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Nikolai Bobrinsky et

322
 Endnotes

al., Memory of Nations: Democratic Transition Guide: the Russian Experience (Prague: CEVRO,
2017), 7; Thomas Polgar, The KGB: An Instrument of Soviet Power (McLean, VA: Association
of Former Intelligence Officers, 1989), 8; Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2002), 91; Kathryn S. Olmsted, Red Spy Queen: A Biography of Elizabeth
Bentley (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 210.
86 “Да здравствует ВЧК-ОГПУ, верный и могущественный страж пролетарской
диктатуры” [“Long Live the VChK-OGPU, the Faithful and Powerful Guardian of the
Proletarian Dictatorship”], Pravda, December 18, 1927, 3.
87 Mondich’s book was first published in Russian under the pen name N. Sinevirskiy,
СМЕРШ: Год в Стане Врага [SMERSH: A Year in the Enemy’s Camp] (Limburg an der
Lahn, Germany: Possev, 1948). It was published in English as Nicola Sinevirsky, SMERSH
(New York: Henry Holt, 1950).
88 Ian Fleming, From Russia with Love (London: Penguin, 1957), 6.
89 Korenkov, ed., Military Counterintelligence of the FSB.
90 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Report, “The Committee of Information
(‘KI’), 1947–1951,” November 17, 1954, National Archives of Australia, A6283, folder
16, item number4104677, 1.
91 See also Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 144-46.
92 Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, 28-29.
93 As quoted in David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955),
viii.
94 Kevin Riehle, “The Defector Balance Sheet: Westbound Versus Eastbound Intelligence
Defectors from 1945 to 1965,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
33, no. 1 (2020): 68-96, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850607.2019.
1670021?journalCode=ujic20.
95 Подвиг Разведчика [The Intelligence Officer’s Deed], 1947, released in 1949 in the United
States as Secret Agent, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0039716/. Some historians assert
that the prototype for the hero in this movie was not Khokhlov but Nikolay Kuznetsov,
a Soviet illegal intelligence officer who penetrated the German government during World
War II and who is now portrayed in heroic terms in Russian historical narratives; see, for
example, Viktoriya Sukovata, “Evolution of Trauma: Memories of War in Russian Spy Cin-
ema,” Baltic Worlds 2, no. 2 (2019): 29-36; also email correspondence from Dr. Filip Kova-
cevic, University of San Francisco, January 12, 2021.
96 Tennant Bagley, Spymaster: Startling Cold War Revelations of a Soviet KGB Chief (New
York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013), 153-64; Henry Sakaida and Christa Hook, Heroes of the
Soviet Union 1941–45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 32.
97 Семнадцать Мгновений Весны, 1973 [Seventeen Moments of Spring], https://www.imdb.
com/title/tt0069628/; see also Isabelle de Keghel, “Seventeen Moments of Spring, a Soviet
James Bond Series? Official Discourse, Folklore, and Cold War Culture in Late Socialism,”

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Euxeinos 8, no. 25-26 (2018): 82-93; Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy, “The Block-
buster Miniseries on Soviet TV: Isaev-Shtirlits, the Ambiguous Hero of Seventeen Moments
of Spring,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, no. 29 (2002): 257-76; Jeremy Dwyer, “Mas-
culinities and Anxieties in the Post-Soviet Boevik Novel,” Australian Slavonic and Eastern
European Studies Journal 22, no. 1-2 (2008): 1-21; Erik Jens, “Cold War Spy Fiction in
Russian Popular Culture: From Suspicion to Acceptance via Seventeen Moments of Spring,”
Studies in Intelligence 62, no. 2 ( June 2017): 31-41.
98 Jeff Trimble, “Spreading The Word: The KGB’s Image-Building Under Gorbachev,” Discus-
sion Paper D-24, The Joan Shorenstein Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, February 1997.
99 Lezina, “Dismantling the State Security Apparatus,” 9.
100 “Торжественное мероприятие по случаю 100-летия ГРУ” [“Celebration for the 100th
Anniversary of the GRU”], Kremlin.ru, November 2, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/
president.news/59032.
101 MI5, Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings. “Information Obtained from General
Krivitsky,” 2.
102 Elizabeth Poretsky, Our Own People (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan University Press,
1969), 2.
103 MI5, Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings. “Information Obtained from General
Krivitsky.”
104 Alexander Barmine, Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat (London: Lovat Dickson, 1938), ix-x.
105 Aleksandr Salikhov, “От Региступра до ГРУ: путь длиной в 88 лет” [“From Registupr to
GRU: The 88-year Journey”], Chekist.ru, March 31, 2006, http://chekist.ru/article/1326.
106 MI5, Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings. “Information Obtained from General
Krivitsky,” 9.
107 Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived: The Life Story of a Russian Under the Soviets (New
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1945), 7.
108 Walter Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939), 245-47.
109 Ismail Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU: A Tatar’s Escape from Red Army Intelligence
(Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 137.
110 Salikhov, “From Registupr to GRU.”
111 Оleg Nazhestkin, “Предисолвия” [“Foreword”], in Yevgeniy Primakov, ed., Очерки
истории российской внешней разведки [Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelli-
gence], vol. 3 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya, 2003), 9.
112 Salikhov, “From Registupr to GRU.”
113 Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, “Положение о Комитете
государственной безопасности при Совете Министров СССР и его органах на местах”
[“Resolution on the Committee of State Security of the USSR Council of Ministers and Its
Local Bodies”], January 9, 1959.

324
 Endnotes

114 Petr Deryabin and Frank Gibney, The Secret World (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 63.
115 Vladimir Soldatkin and Christian Lowe, “Russia Orders Out 60 U.S. Diplomats Over
Spy Poisoning Affair,” Reuters, March 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­
russia-diplomats/russia-orders-out-60-u-s-diplomats-over-spy-poisoning-affair-idUSKB
N1H52MN.
116 Julie Fedor, “Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature,” Intelligence
and National Security 26, no. 6 (December 2011): 842-63.
117 Jens, “Cold War Spy Fiction in Russian Popular Culture,” 31-41.
118 “В МИД России пожаловались на ‘план Даллеса’” [“Complaints about the ‘Dulles Plan’
at the MFA”], Lenta.ru, May 14, 2020, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/05/14/dalles/.
119 “K.G.B. Passes Secrets Back to U.S.,” New York Times, December 14, 1991, 1
120 Martin Ebon, KGB: Death and Rebirth (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 61-62.
121 Andrey Kozyrev, “Stand By Us,” Editorial, Washington Post, August 21, 1991, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/08/21/stand-by-us/54b27a33-96b7-
4bf2-b8a4-113ddb03f38b/.
122 James Sherr, “Yet Another Reorganization,” Janes Intelligence Review, August 1, 1995.
123 Maria Lipman, “How Putin Silences Dissent,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016):
38-46, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/how-putin-silences-
dissent.
124 Valeriy Velichko, От Лубянки до Кремля: Секретные Миссии [From Lubyanka to the
Kremlin: Secret Missions] (Moscow: Akva-Term, 2013), http://nastural.ru/uploadedFiles/
files/biblioteka/Ot_Lubyanki_do_Kremlya._V.Velichko.pdf.
125 Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services (London: European Council
on Foreign Relations, 2016), 5, https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR_169_-_PUTINS_
HYDRA_INSIDE_THE_RUSSIAN_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_1513.pdf.
126 Vyacheslav Fronin, “ФСБ расставляет акценты” [“The FSB Sets the Accents”], Rossiys-
kaya Gazeta, December 19, 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/12/19/aleksandr-bortnikov-fsb-­
rossii-svobodna-ot-politicheskogo-vliianiia.html.
127 Lezina, “Dismantling the State Security Apparatus,” 12.
128 Sherr, “Yet Another Reorganization,” citing a press conference by then-FSK Director
Sergey Stepashin.
129 Ilan Berman and J. Michael Waller, eds., Dismantling Tyranny: Transitioning Beyond Total-
itarian Regimes (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 23.
130 Anna Nemtsova, “A Chill in the Moscow Air,” Newsweek, February 5, 2006, https://www.
newsweek.com/chill-moscow-air-113415.
131 Russia Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) website, www.svr.gov.ru.
132 “Рогозин опубликовал фото с бойцами ‘Заслона’ в Сирии” [“Rogozin Published a Photo
with ‘Zaslon’ Soldiers in Syria”], Vzglyad, May 24, 2014, https://vz.ru/news/2014/5/24/
688286.html.

325
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133 “Спецназ СВР” [“SVR Spetsnaz”], Agentura.ru, http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/

svr/specnaz/.
134 “Глава СВР Нарышкин подтвердил, что в советские времена работал в Брюсселе”
[“SVR Chief Confirmed That During the Soviet Times He Worked in Brussels”], RIA
Novosti, September 5, 2020, https://ria.ru/20200905/naryshkin-1576816627.html.
135 David Remnick, “KGB Targeted for Major Reform,” Washington Post, August 27, 1991.
136 Korenkov, ed., Military Counterintelligence of the FSB, 36.
137 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital
Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 125-27;
see also Yuriy Sinodov, “Грязные руки” [“Dirty Hands”], Roem.ru, July 18, 2011, https://
roem.ru/18-07-2011/120190/gryaznye-ruki/.
138 U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their Criminal Con-
spirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts,” Press Release, March 15,
2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officers-and-their-criminal-
conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions.
139 Scott Shane, David E. Sanger, and Andrew E. Kramer, “Russians Charged With Trea-
son Worked in Office Linked to Election Hacking,” New York Times, January 27, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/world/europe/russia-hacking-us-election.html.
140 Charlie Osborne, “Russian APT Turla Targets 35 Countries on the Back of Iranian Infra-
structure,” Zero Day, October 21, 2019, https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-
turla-targets-35-countries-on-the-back-of-iranian-infrastructure/.
141 CrowdStrike, 2019 Global Threat Report: Adversary Tradecraft and the Importance of Speed
(Sunnyvale, CA: CrowdStrike, 2020), 36.
142 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 389.
143 “‘V’ for ‘Vympel’: FSB’s Secretive Department ‘V’ Behind Assassination of Georgian
Asylum Seeker In Germany,” Bellingcat, February 17, 2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/
news/uk-and-europe/2020/02/17/v-like-vympel-fsbs-secretive-department-v-behind-­
assassination-of-zelimkhan-khangoshvili/.
144 Russian Federation, “Questions of Federal Service of the Protection of the Russian Feder-
ation,” Order of the President of the Russian Federation, August 7, 2004, N 1013, http://
www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_48778/.
145 “ФСО” [“FSO”], Voenpro.ru, October 22, 2013, https://voenpro.ru/infolenta/fco.
146 “Новый глава ФСО Кочнев служит в органах госохраны 14 лет” [“New FSO Chief
Kochnev Has Served in the State Protection Organs for 14 Years”], TASS, May 26, 2016,
https://tass.ru/politika/3317285.
147 Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian National Guard: A New Oprichnina, ‘Cyber Police’ or Some-
thing Else?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 38 (March 21, 2017): https://jamestown.org/
program/russian-national-guard-new-oprichnina-cyber-police-something-else-2/.

326
 Endnotes

148 Olga Vetrova, “Росгвардия усмотрела схожесть протестов в РФ с ‘цветными’

революциями” [“The Russian National Guard Sees a Similarity between Protests in
the RF and ‘Color’ Revolutions”], New Day, June 16, 2017, https://newdaynews.ru/­
moskow/606096.html.
149 “Ex-FSB chief: Russian National Guard Creation Important Amid Nato’s Eastward Expan-
sion,” TASS, May 17, 2016, https://tass.com/politics/876141.
150 Sergey Khazov-Kassia, “Человек за Спиной” [“The Man Behind the Back”], New Times,
November 17, 2014, https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/90102.
151 Aleksandr Kudryavtsev, “Генерал Армии Виктор Золотов: ‘Росгвардия Работает Для
Людей’” [“Army General Viktor Zolotov: ‘Rosgvardiya Works for the People’”], Voenniy, no.
4 (2017), https://rosguard.gov.ru/ru/page/index/zhurnal-voennyj-4-general-armii-­viktor-
zolotov-rosgvardiya-rabotaet-dlya-lyudej; see also Peter Earley, Comrade J: The Untold Secrets
of Russia’s Mystery Spy in America After the End of the Cold War (New York: Berkley Books,
2007), 298-301.
152 “CrowdStrike’s Work with the Democratic National Committee: Setting the Record
Straight,” CrowdStrike, June 5, 2020, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-
intrusion-democratic-national-committee/.
153 Sergey Operov and Ivan Safronov, “Министерство чрезвычайных полномочий:
Готовится реформа правоохранительных и силовых структур” [“Ministry of Emer-
gency Powers: A Reform of Law Enforcement and Power Structures is Being Prepared”],
Kommersant, June 19, 2016, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3093174.
154 Dmitriy Abzalov, “У ФСО достаточно широкие возможности” [“The FSO Has Broad
Enough Opportunities”], Kommersant, September 25, 2016, https://www.kommersant.
ru/doc/3154835.
155 Vyacheslav Polovinko and Lilit Sarkisyan, “The FSB Gathers Up the Keys to ‘Yandex,’”
Novaya Gazeta, June 5, 2019, 2.
156 Ivan Nechepurenko, “New Spies Went for a Joyride in Moscow. Russia Isn’t Happy,” New
York Times, July 14, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/europe/russia-fsb-­
security-service.html; “Rookie FSB agents Are Punished for ‘Indecent’ Graduation Jinx in
Moscow,” Siberian Times, August 2, 2016, https://siberiantimes.com/home/sent-to-siberia/
s0025-rookie-fsb-agents-are-punished-for-indecent-graduation-jinx-in-moscow/.
157 Filip Kovacevic, “How Russia Trains its Spies: The Past and Present of Russian Intelligence
Education,” in Liam Francis Gearon, ed., The Routledge International Handbook of Univer-
sities, Security and Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2019), 187-95.
158 Christo Grozev, “FSB Team of Chemical Weapon Experts Implicated in Alexey Navalny
Novichok Poisoning,” Bellingcat, December 14, 2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/
uk-and-europe/2020/12/14/fsb-team-of-chemical-weapon-experts-implicated-in-­alexey-
navalny-novichok-poisoning/; Daria Litvinova, “Navalny Releases Recording of Call to

327
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his Alleged Poisoner,” AP News, December 21, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/alexei-

navalny-poisoning-underpants-202f470c2d1c19151b9deb564d94e8f9.
159 Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare.
160 “Заседание коллегии ФСБ России” [“Conference of the FSB Collegium of Russia”],
Kremlin.ru, February 24, 2021, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65068.
161 “Заседание коллегии ФСБ” [“Conference of the FSB Collegium”], Kremlin.ru, February
20, 2020, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62834.
162 Nathan Hodge et al., “Russia Detains US citizen Paul Whelan on Suspicion of Spying,”
CNN, December 31, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/31/us/russia-detains-us-­
citizen/index.html.
163 Katelyn Polantz, Veronica Stracqualursi, and Marshall Cohen, “Alleged Russian Spy Maria
Butina Pleads Guilty To Engaging in Conspiracy Against US,” CNN, December 13, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/13/politics/maria-butina-guilty-plea/index.html.
164 Committee for State Security, “The KGB’s 1967 Annual Report,” May 6, 1968, Center for
Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), f. 89, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 1-14. Trans-
lated by Vladislav Zubok for the Wilson Center Cold War Intelligence History Project,
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/110403.
165 Cable to Foreign Office reporting initial interrogation of Aleksandr Zhigunov, dated
August 27, 1942, in “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” 8, 16, German file num-
ber EAP 3-a-11/2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 242, Entry UD
282AV, Box 18.
166 “Testimony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” 15-16; see also Zhigunov article, “English
Intelligence in the USSR and the Activity of the English Embassy in Moscow,” in “Testi-
mony of the NKVD Official Zhigunov,” 129-30.
167 Yuri Rastvorov, “Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East,” Life, December 6, 1954, 182.
168 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Memo, April 14, 1954, National Archives of
Australia, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, 96.
169 Bagley, Spymaster, 4-8.
170 David Easter, “Soviet Bloc and Western Bugging of Opponents’ Diplomatic Premises
During the Early Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security 31, no. 1 (2016): 28-48,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2014.926745.
171 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector,” Feb-
ruary 1968, 310; available in National Archives and Records Administration, JFK Assassi-
nation Archives, document number 104-10150-10136.
172 Karavashkin, Who Betrayed Russia, 600.
173 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., “Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment,” in H. Bradford Westerfield,
Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency`s Internal Journal, 1955-
1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 408.

328
 Endnotes

174 “Spies Without Borders—How the FSB Infiltrated the International Visa System,” Belling-
cat, November 16, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/16/
spies-without-borders-fsb-infiltrated-international-visa-system/.
175 Nick Hopkins, “Suspected Russian Spy Found Working at US Embassy in Moscow,” Guard-
ian, August 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/02/suspected-
russian-spy-us-embassy-moscow-secret-service.
176 Sean Lyngaas, “Russian Intelligence-Backed Hackers Go After Armenian Embassy Web-
site with New Code,” Cyberscoop, March 12, 2020, https://www.cyberscoop.com/turla-
fsb-eset-armenia/.
177 Alberto Nardelli, “The EU’s Embassy in Russia Was Hacked but the EU Kept It a Secret,”
BuzzFeed, June 5, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/eu-
embassy-moscow-hack-russia.
178 Andrew Blake, “Russia-linked Hacking Group Targeting North Americans and European
Diplomats: Report,” AP News, February 28, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/574b
09ffc262cb2edbfce7c4c0f9cd46.
179 U.S. Department of State, “Department of State Actions in Response to Russian Harass-
ment,” December 29, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/266145.
htm; Antonio and Jonna Mendez, The Moscow Rules: The Secret CIA Tactics that Helped
America Win the Cold War (New York: Hatchette Book Company, 2019).
180 “Russia ‘Ends Chechnya Operation,’” BBC, April 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/8001495.stm.
181 “Заседание коллегии ФСБ России” [“Conference of the FSB Collegium of Russia”],
Kremlin.ru, February 24, 2021, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65068.
182 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
Federation, December 1, 2016.
183 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Policy Concept.”
184 “US Provided Information on Terrorist Plotters in Russia, Says FSB Chief,” TASS, October
17, 2019, https://tass.com/politics/1083742.
185 Steffany A. Trofino, “Dagestan: Moscow’s Risk Versus Gain,” International Journal of Intel-
ligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 2 (2011): 253–67.
186 Tony Halpin, “Gunmen Kill Seven Women in Russian Sauna,” Times (London), August 14,
2009.
187 Yevgeniy Krutikov “Российская нелегальная разведка остается предметом зависти
Запада” [“Russian Illegal Intelligence Remains an Object of Envy in the West”], Vzglyad,
July 29, 2017, https://vz.ru/politics/2017/6/29/876627.html.
188 Oliver Stone, The Putin Interviews (New York: Hot Books, 2017), 36.
189 Deryabin and Gibney, The Secret World, 63.
190 Egbert Jahn, “The Castling of Presidential Functions by Vladimir Putin,” in International
Politics: Political Issues Under Debate, vol. 1 (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 107-22.

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191 Egor Vinogradov, “Движение ‘За честные выборы’ начало новую серию протестов”
[“The ‘For Honest Elections’ Movement Began a New Series of Protests”], Deutsche Welle
(in Russian), March 6, 2012.
192 Ellen Barry and Michael Schwirtz, “Arrests and Violence at Overflowing Rally in Moscow,”
New York Times, May 6, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/world/europe/
at-moscow-rally-arrests-and-violence.html.
193 Mischa Gabowitsch, Protest in Putin’s Russia (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 11.
194 “Yarovaya Law Obliges Operators and Internet Companies To Store User Correspon-
dence,” TASS, July 1, 2018, https://tass.com/politics/1011585.
195 “Russia: ‘Big Brother’ Law Harms Security, Rights,” Human Rights Watch, July 12, 2016,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/12/russia-big-brother-law-harms-security-rights.
196 “‘Яндекс’ подтвердил наличие решения по ключам шифрования для ФСБ” [“Yandex
Confirmed Having Reached a Solution to Encryption Keys for the FSB”], RBC, June 7,
2019, https://www.rbc.ru/society/07/06/2019/5cfa2a169a7947affada5b1a.
197 “Who’s Asking? ‘Yandex’ Releases First-ever Transparency Report on Requests for User
Data From the Russian Authorities,” Meduza, October 26, 2020, https://meduza.io/en/
feature/2020/10/26/who-s-asking.
198 Jane Wakefield, “Russia ‘Successfully Tests’ Its Unplugged Internet,” BBC, December 24,
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50902496.
199 Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, 14.
200 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files
on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 9.
201 Jason Lewis, “Russian Spy Targeted MPs and Whitehall Officials,” Telegraph, December 10,
2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8948359/Russian-spy-
targeted-MPs-and-Whitehall-officials.html.
202 U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and integrated intel-
ligence Enterprise (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Vision_2015.
pdf.
203 Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, 17.
204 Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, 17.
205 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept, 3.
206 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Why Russia Needs To Rebuild Its Military,” Foreign Policy,
February 21, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/21/being-strong/.
207 Quoted in Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers
of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 661.
208 Council on Foreign Relations, Cyber Operations Tracker, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/
cyber-operations.

330
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209 Earley, Comrade J, 224-39.

210 Earley, Comrade J, 228.
211 Corera, Russians Among Us, 220-21.
212 Ben Smith, “Clinton Friend Was Spy’s Target,” Politico, June 29, 2010, https://www.­
politico.com/blogs/ben-smith/2010/06/clinton-friend-was-spys-target-027850.
213 Corera, Russians Among Us, 270.
214 Pablo Gorondi, “Hungarian Politician on Trial for Spying on EU for Russia,” AP News, July
10, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/3fa4f9b515034ab196dbb49fa6e9056e.
215 “Bulgaria Charges Former Lawmaker With Spying for Russia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, September 10, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-charges-former-lawmaker-
with-­spying-for-russia/30157289.html; “Bulgarian NGO Official Charged With Spying
for Russia,” Reuters, September 10, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-russia-
espionage/bulgarian-ngo-official-charged-with-spying-for-russia-idUSKCN1VV1W7.
216 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Russian Intelligence Activities
Directed at the Department of State, 106th Congress, Second Session, February 10, 2000
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000).
217 “How Russian Spies Bugged the US State Department,” CNN, October 23, 2019, https://
www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/us/spyhunter-russia-bug-us-state-department-declassified/
index.html.
218 “Swiss Police ‘Exposed Russian Spies in Davos,’” BBC, January 21, 2020, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-51196659; Chris Baynes, “Russian Spies Found ‘Posing
as PLUMBERS’ in Davos, Report Says,” Independent, January 21, 2020, https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/davos-2020-russia-spies-plumbers-switzerland-
wef-a9295076.html.
219 Mirek Tóda, “A Russian Spy’s Manual: Send a Secret Message to the Strela-3 Satellite and
Betray NATO Allies,” Dennik N, October 11, 2020, https://dennikn.sk/2082755/russian-
spys-manual-send-a-secret-message-to-the-strela-3-satellite-and-betray-nato-­allies/.
220 “Former Official Arrested for Treason,” Baltic Times, September 22, 2008, https://www.
baltictimes.com/news/articles/21387/.
221 U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, “USA v. Peter Rafael Dzibinski Deb-
bins, aka ‘Ikar Lesnikov’,” August 20, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/
file/1307186/download.
222 Nova Scotia Department of Justice, Pre-Sentence Report, “Queen v. Jeffrey Paul Delisle,”
December 28, 2012, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/602196/delisles-pre-­
sentence-report.pdf; “Russian mole had access to wealth of CSIS, RCMP, Privy Council files,”
The Globe and Mail, October 22, 2012, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
russian-mole-had-access-to-wealth-of-csis-rcmp-prive-council-files/article4627659/.
223 “Russian Spy Raymond Poeteray Jailed by Dutch,” BBC, April 23, 2013, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-22265494; “Dutch Diplomat Gets 12 Years for Spying for

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Russia,” Moscow Times, April 22, 2013, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/04/22/

dutch-diplomat-gets-12-years-for-spying-for-russia-a23551.
224 “Media: podejrzany o szpiegostwo na rzecz Rosji pracował w Agencji Mienia Wojskowego”
[“Media: The Person Arrested for Espionage for Russia Worked in the Agency of Military
Property”], Polskie Radio, October 28, 2019, https://­polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/Artykul/
2392622,ABW-zatrzymala-Piotra-S-Jest-podejrzany-o-­szpiegostwo-na-rzecz-Rosji; Edyta
Żemła, “Piotr Ś. mógł przekazać Rosji plany NATO-wskiej dywizji w Polsce” (“Piotr Ś.
Could Provide Russia the Plans for a NATO Division in Poland”), Onet News,
November 2, 2019, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/piotr-s-mogl-przekazac-rosji-plany-
nato-wskiej-dywizji-w-polsce/q0dxdyn.
225 Corera, Russians Among Us, 127, 216-17.
226 Robert S. Mueller, The Mueller Report: Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference
in the 2016 Presidential Election (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2019).
227 Kellock-Taschereau Commission, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed under Order
in Council P.C. 411 of February 5, 1946 to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circum-
stances Surrounding the Communication by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions
of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power (Ottawa: Privy
Council, 1946), 115-16.
228 Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Ottawa to
Moscow, GRU Telegram number 209, dated July 12, 1945; The National Archives, Kew,
London, KV 2/1247, item 73.
229 “Register of Materials Sent to the Director,” dated January 1945, The National Archives,
Kew, London, KV 2/1427, serial 8a, item 108.
230 Kalugin, Spymaster, 100-02.
231 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and
the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 19.
232 “Germany Fighting Off Spy Onslaught,” New York Herald Tribune, October 8, 1961.
233 Jason Lewis, “The Traitor in a Headscarf: How Czech Spy Agent Hammer Worked Secretly
Inside Parliament for Years,” Daily Mail, November 15, 2008, https://www.­dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-1086187/The-traitor-headscarf-How-Czech-spy-Agent-Hammer-
worked-secretly-inside-Parliament-years.html.
234 Glen Owen, “Labour MP Pulled Before Chief Whip for Inviting ‘Russian Spy’ to Tea in the
Commons,” Daily Mail, June 28, 2008, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/­article-1030235/
Labour-MP-pulled-chief-whip-inviting-Russian-spy-tea-Commons.html.
235 Jason Lewis, “Mikhail Repin: The Perfect Party Guest Who Was Whitehall Spy for the
Russians,” Telegraph, December 10, 2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/russia/8948357/Mikhail-Repin-the-perfect-party-guest-who-was-Whitehall-spy-
for-the-Russians.html; Lewis, “Russian Spy Targeted MPs and Whitehall Officials.”

332
 Endnotes

236 “Russian ‘Spy’ Katia Zatuliveter: MP Lover Paid for Trips,” BBC, October 27, 2011,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15476077; Lewis, “Russian Spy Targeted MPs and White-
hall Officials.”
237 “U.S. Hits Russian Oligarchs and Officials with Sanctions Over Election Interference,” NPR,
April 6, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/06/600083466/u-s-
hits-russian-oligarchs-and-officials-with-sanctions-over-election-interferen.
238 Mike McIntire, “Billionaire Backer of Maria Butina Had Russian Security Ties,” New
York Times, September 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/us/politics/
maria-butina-russian-oligarch.html.
239 Josh Meyer, “Accused Russian Agent Met with Suspected Kremlin Spy,” Politico, July 28, 2018,
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/28/mariia-butina-russia-kremlin-suspected-
spy-746043.
240 “Public Diplomacy’s 90th Anniversary at RCSC,” Russian Beyond, November 20, 2015,
https://www.rbth.com/arts/culture/2015/11/20/public-diplomacys-90th-anniversary-
at-rcsc_542417.
241 See for example, Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet-Sponsored Societies of Friendship
and Cultural Relations,” October 1957, CIA FOIA Reading Room; Aleksandr Y. Kaz-
nacheyev, “Soviet ‘Operation Burma,’” The New Leader, January 18, 1960, 41-42.
242 “Maria Butina: The Russian Gun Activist Who Was Jailed in the US,” BBC, October 25,
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44885633.
243 Gordon Corera, “Russia Report: What Would Tougher Spy Laws Mean for UK?,” BBC,
July 22, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53502905.
244 “From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm’s Activities over the Past Two Years,”
TrendMicro, April 25, 2017, https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-
attacks/espionage-cyber-propaganda-two-years-of-pawn-storm; “German Media: Cyber
Attack Carried Out on Bundestag,” Deutsche Welle, May 15, 2015, https://www.dw.com/
en/german-media-cyber-attack-carried-out-on-bundestag/a-18452770; “Germany Admits
Hackers Infiltrated Federal Ministries, Russian Group Suspected,” Deutsche Welle, February
28, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-admits-­hackers-infiltrated-federal-ministries-
russian-group-suspected/a-42775517; “The Labor Party Exposed to Hostile Hacker Attacks,”
TV2.no, February 2, 2017, https://www.tv2.no/nyheter/8902520/.
245 “German Man Charged with Giving Bundestag Floor Plans to Russian Intelligence,” Reu-
ters, February 25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-russia/
german-man-charged-with-giving-bundestag-floor-plans-to-russian-intelligence-idUSKB
N2AP11E.
246 Jan M. Olsen, “Norway Says Russia Was Behind Hacker Attack on Parliament,” AP
News, October 14, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/technology-oslo-russia-denmark-
hacking-4c177f74287ab69816b954f8793e26c1.

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247 “Матвиенко назвала задержание Бочкарева в Норвегии провокацией” [“Matvienko

Called Bochkarev’s Arrest in Norway a Provocation”], RIA Novosti, October 22, 2018.
248 Atle Staalesen, “Mikhail Bochkarev Is Released, Norwegian Security Police Might Drop
Espionage Charges,” Barents Observer, October 19, 2018, https://thebarentsobserver.com/
en/life-and-public/2018/10/mikhail-bochkarev-released-norwegian-security-police-drops-
espionage-charges.
249 Ivo Juurvee and Lavly Perling, Russia’s Espionage in Estonia: A Quantitative Analysis of
Convictions (Tallinn, Estonia: International Centre for Defense and Security, 2019).
250 Ian Cobain, “Boris Berezovsky Inquest Returns Open Verdict on Death,” Guardian, March
27, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/boris-berezovsky-inquest-
open-verdict-death.
251 Feike Hacquebord, “Pawn Storm Targets MH17 Investigation Team,” Trendmicro,
October 22, 2015, https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-
storm-targets-mh17-investigation-team/.
252 “Belling the BEAR,” Threat Connect, September 28, 2016, https://threatconnect.com/
blog/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation/.
253 Chris Bing, “APT28 Targeted Montenegro’s Government Before It Joined NATO,
Researchers Say,” Cyberscoop, June 6, 2017, https://www.cyberscoop.com/apt28-targeted-
montenegros-government-joined-nato-researchers-say/.
254 Costas Kantouris and Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Greece: Russians Expelled Over Cash-for-
Protests Allegation,” AP News, July 12, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/aaf032985e
7341d3a7968f6ff6b95ce0.
255 U.S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, “USA v. Aleksei Sergeyevich More-
nets et al.,” Case 2:18-cr-00263-MRH, March 10, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/
page/file/1098481/download; “Dutch Government Says It Disrupted Russian Attempt
To Hack Chemical Weapons Watchdog,” CNBC, October 4, 2018, https://www.cnbc.
com/2018/10/04/dutch-government-disrupted-russian-attempt-to-hack-chemical-­weapons-
watchdog.html.
256 Zack Whittaker, “Bellingcat Journalists Targeted by Failed Phishing Attempt,” Tech
Crunch, July 27, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/27/bellingcat-targeted-failed-
phishing-attempt/.
257 World Anti-Doping Agency, “WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage
Group,” Press Release, September 13, 2016, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/media/news/
2016-09/wada-confirms-attack-by-russian-cyber-espionage-group.
258 U.S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, “USA v. Aleksei Sergeyev-
ich Morenets, et al;” Catalin Cimpanu, “German Authorities Charge Russian Hacker
for 2015 Bundestag Hack,” Zero Day, May 5, 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/
german-authorities-charge-russian-hacker-for-2015-bundestag-hack/.

334
 Endnotes

259 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary
during the Cold War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 74-94.
260 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept, 1.
261 Putin, “Being Strong.”
262 National Counterintelligence Center, Annual Report to Congress on Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage (Washington, DC: NACIC, 1995).
263 Defense Security and Counterintelligence Agency, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Report of
Foreign Targeting of Cleared Industry (Washington, DC: DSCA, 2019).
264 Gary Kern, A Death in Washington (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), 34.
265 Brian R. Sullivan, “Soviet Penetration of the Italian Intelligence Services in the 1930s,” in
Tomaso Vialardi di Sandigliano and Virgilio Ilari, eds., The History of Espionage: Italian
Military Intelligence, Electronic Intelligence, Chinese Intelligence (Biella, Italy: Associazione
Europea degli Amici degli Archivi Storici, 2005), 87.
266 MI5, Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings. “Information Obtained from General
Krivitsky,” 16.
267 Cross-reference from MI6 Intelligence Reports dated May 23 and May 24, 1933, The
National Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/1898, serial 2a; “Ignace Reiss Personal History,”
dated October 17, 1949, The National Archives, KV 2/1898, serial 15a.
268 Barmine, One Who Survived, 173.
269 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Iosif Volodarsky,” Investigative Summary, The National
Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/2881, serial 115a, 53.
270 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Iosif Volodarsky,” Investigative Summary, 23.
271 Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, 384, citing
Volodarsky’s FBI interrogation.
272 Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, 32. The NKVD (People’s Commis-
sariat of Internal Affairs) housed the Soviet Union’s civilian foreign intelligence apparatus
at the time.
273 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 218.
274 Viktor Suvorov, Aquarium: The Career and Defection of a Soviet Military Spy (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1985), 139-58.
275 Gus W. Weiss, “The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets,” Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5
(1996).
276 Amy Knight, Spies without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001), 121-22.
277 Sue Somers, “Ik vind nietdat ik iets anti-Belgisch heb gedaan” [“I Don’t Think I’ve Done
Anything Anti-Belgian”], DeMorgen, July 16, 2011, https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/
ik-vind-nietdat-ik-iets-anti-belgisch-heb-gedaan~b95a6b30/; Adam Zagorin, “Still Spying
After All These Years,” Time, June 29, 1992.

335
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278 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 218.
279 Zach Dorfman, “The Secret History of the Russian Consulate in San Francisco,” Foreign
Policy, December 14, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/14/the-secret-history-
of-the-russian-consulate-in-san-francisco-putin-trump-spies-moscow/; see also Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, “The KGB Connections: An Investigation in Soviet Operations
in North America,” Documentary, 1982, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=diT9oQj
b8Ik, which also claimed the San Francisco consulate was capable of intercepting microwave
communications in Silicon Valley and in New York.
280 National Intelligence Council, The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Ser-
vices, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, June 1982, 3, referencing CIA Crest Program.
281 Zach Dorfman, “How Silicon Valley Became a Den of Spies,” Politico, July 27, 2018, https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/27/silicon-valley-spies-china-russia-219071.
282 Carl Schreck, “FBI Wary Of Possible Russian Spies Lurking In U.S. Tech Sector,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 17, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/fbi-wary-of-possible-
russian-spies-in-lurking-in-us-tech-sector/25388490.html.
283 U.S. Department of Justice, “Brooklyn Resident and Two Russian Nationals Arrested in
Connection with Scheme to Illegally Export Controlled Technology to Russia,” Press
Release, October 6, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/brooklyn-resident-and-two-­
russian-nationals-arrested-connection-scheme-illegally-export; U.S. Department of Justice,
“Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, and Sanctions-Related
Criminal Cases ( January 2016 to the present: updated January 2019),” January 2019, 34-35,
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=825543.
284 U.S. Department of Justice, “Exporter Of Microelectronics To Russian Military Sentenced
To 135 Months In Prison Following Convictions On All Counts At Trial,” Press Release,
February 28, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/exporter-microelectronics-­
russian-military-sentenced; U.S. Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export
Enforcement, Economic Espionage, and Sanctions-Related Criminal Cases,” 35-36.
285 ABN Universal Company website, accessed on March 11, 2021, http://www.abnuniversal.
ru/content/page/company.htm.
286 U.S. Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espi-
onage, and Sanctions-Related Criminal Cases,” 6-7.
287 Jan M. Olsen and Desmond Butler, “Russian Diplomat Accused of Espionage Quietly
Leaves Sweden,” US News and World Report, March 28, 2019.
288 U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio, USA v. Alexander Yuryevich Korshunov,
August 21, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2019/intell-1909
05-doj01_korshunov_complaint.pdf.
289 “Объединенная двигателестроительная корпорация подтвердила задержание своего
сотрудника” (“United Engine Corporation Confirms the Arrest of its Employee”), Inter-
fax, September 5, 2019.

336
 Endnotes

290 “Russian ‘Spy’ Moved from Prison to House Arrest,” The Italian Insider, December 3, 2019.
291 Fredrik Westerlund, Russian Intelligence Gathering for Domestic R&D—Short Cut or Dead
End for Modernisation? (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2010).
292 Sergey A. Vorontsov, Спецслужбы России [Special Services of Russia] (Rostov-na-Donu:
Feniks, 2018), 412.
293 Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, 20.
294 Orlov, “The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence,” 53-54.
295 Cross-reference from MI6 Intelligence Reports dated May 23 and May 24, 1933; “Ignace Reiss
Personal History,” dated October 17, 1949, The National Archives, KV 2/1898, serial 15a.
296 Contact Report written by Marcus Weinstein, dated October 4, 1932, Volodarsky File, The
National Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/2880, serial 19a; Contact Report written by Marcus
Weinstein, dated October 12, 1932, Volodarsky File, The National Archives, KV 2/2880,
serial 21a.
297 Aleksandr Brazhnev, Школа Опричников [Oprichniki School] (Kiev: Diokor, 2004), 65-66.
298 “George Kennan Telegram to Secretary of State,” February 22, 1946, Document 475, in
Rogers P. Churchill and William Slany, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet
Union, Vol. VI (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969); “Russians Warned
To Keep Vigilant; ‘Capitalist Encirclement’ Still Continues, Says Pravda in Urging Stronger
Defenses,” New York Times, March 19, 1953.
299 Aleksandr Khrolenko, “Военный бюджет США: что достанется Латвии” [“The US
Defense Budget: What does Latvia Get”], Sputniknews.ru, February 12, 2020; see also
Alexander Vershbow, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Speech in Trakai, Lithuania, Jan-
uary 15, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127099.htm.
300 Karpov, The Organization of the GPU, 16-18.
301 Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent, 135-58.
302 “Flood of Fake Bills Is Traced to Russia,” New York Times, February 24, 1933; see also MI5
File on Valentine Gregory Burtan, The National Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/2673;
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Valentine Gregory Burtan, Internal Security–R,”
Investigative Summary, FBI file 100-262352, portions of which are cited in files stored in
the FBI Vault.
303 Feldbin/Orlov discusses the counterfeit operation in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
the Judiciary. Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, 85th Congress, First Session, Part
50, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), 3441-42.
304 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “USA v. Evgeny Buryakov, aka
‘Zenya,’ Igor Sporyshev, and Viktor Podobny,” January 23, 2015, 5, https://storage.court
listener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.438190/gov.uscourts.nysd.438190.1.0.pdf.
305 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “USA v. Evgeny Buryakov et al.,” 14.
306 U.S. Department of Justice, “Evgeny Buryakov Pleads Guilty In Manhattan Federal
Court In Connection With Conspiracy To Work For Russian Intelligence,” Press Release,

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March 11, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/evgeny-buryakov-pleads-guilty-

manhattan-federal-court-connection-conspiracy-work.
307 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “USA v. Evgeny Buryakov et al.,” 17.
308 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “USA v. Evgeny Buryakov et al.,” 24.
309 “Russia’s Rostec in Joint Venture Talks with Bombardier,” Reuters, February 15, 2013,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-rostec-bombardier/russias-rostec-in-joint-
venture-talks-with-bombardier-idUSBRE91E0BW20130215.
310 Matthew Bodner, “Russian Spies May Have Pressured Canadian Union to Get Aircraft
Deal,” Moscow Times, January 27, 2015, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/01/27/
russian-spies-may-have-pressured-canadian-union-to-get-aircraft-deal-a43303.
311 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “USA v. Evgeny Buryakov et al.,”
18-20.
312 “Bombardier Sees Delays in Joint-Venture with Russia’s Rostec,” Reuters, March 21, 2014,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bombardier-rostec-idUSBREA2K1ZQ20140321;
Jon Ostrower and Paul Vieira, “Bombardier Shelves Plans for Russian Assembly Line,”
Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/bombardier-shelves-
plans-for-russian-assembly-line-1414699181.
313 “Ex-SoftBank Employee Arrested Over Alleged Leak of Proprietary Information to Russian
spies,” Japan Times, January 26, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/26/
national/softbank-employee-arrested-leak-proprietary-information-russia-spies/#.XoyqWt
NKgWo.
314 U.S. Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espi-
onage, and Sanctions-Related Criminal Cases,” 98.
315 U.S. Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espi-
onage, and Sanctions-Related Criminal Cases,” 48.
316 U.S. Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espi-
onage, and Sanctions-Related Criminal Cases,” 7-8.
317 Earley, Comrade J, 210-17.
318 “EU Targets Syrian Middleman It Says Bought Oil From Islamic State,” Reuters, March 8,
2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-crisis-eu-idUSL5N0WA05R20150308#1uix
RjmfedAEC25e.97.
319 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Networks Providing Support to the
Government of Syria, Including for Facilitating Syrian Government Oil Purchases from
ISIL,” Press Release, November 25, 2015, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-­
releases/Pages/jl0287.aspx.
320 Anna Nemtsova and Thomas Seibert, “Russia’s ISIS Money Men Exposed,” The Daily Beast,
June 26, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/russias-isis-money-men-exposed?ref=scroll.
321 Nina Khrushcheva, “Последний силовик?” [“The Latest Silovik?”], Inosmi.ru, December
4, 2017, https://inosmi.ru/politic/20171204/240916440.html.

338
 Endnotes

322 Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian Activ-
ities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attri-
bution, Intelligence Community Assessment, January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
323 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “U.S.A. vs. Evgeny Buryakov
et al.”
324 “Lithuanian court upholds sentence for man convicted of spying for Russia,” LRT.lt, January
17, 2020, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1134237/lithuanian-court-upholds-
sentence-for-man-convicted-of-spying-for-russia.
325 Dirk Banse et al., “Circles of Power: Putin’s Secret Friendship with ex-Stasi Officer,”
Guardian, August 13, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/13/
russia-putin-german-right-hand-man-matthias-warnig.
326 Andrea Shalal, “Russia-Germany Gas Pipeline Raises Intelligence Concerns—U.S. Official,”
Reuters, May 17, 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-germany-russia-pipeline/
russia-germany-gas-pipeline-raises-intelligence-concerns-u-s-official-idUKKCN1II0V7.
327 L. Nikolayev, “Суд и Жизнь: ‘Судебные Деятели’” [“The Court and Life: ‘Judicial Offi-
cials’”], Soviet Justice Weekly, April 19, 1923, 349.
328 L. Nikolayev, “Суд и Жизнь: ‘Следователь’ Гершуни” [“The Court and Life: ‘Inspector’
Gershuni”], Soviet Justice Weekly, May 19, 1923, 444-45.
329 Karpov, The Organization of the GPU.
330 See, for example, Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), “Спецсправка Секретно-
политического отдела ОГПУ СССР “О ходе хлебозаготовок в Дальне-Восточном
крае” по состоянию на 1 января 1933 г.” [“Special Report of the Secret Political Sec-
tion of the USSR OGPU ‘On the Process of Bread Making in the Far Eastern Territory’
on Conditions as of 1 January 1993”], January 13, 1933, Alexander Yakovlev Archive,
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1025509; People’s Commissariat for
Internal Affairs (NKVD), “Спецсообщение Н.И. Ежова И.В. Сталину с приложением
протокола допроса М.Л. Рухимовича [“Special Report of N. I. Yezhov to J. V. Stalin
enclosing the interrogation protocol of M. L. Rukhimovich”], Alexander Yakovlev Archive,
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/61283.
331 Deryabin and Gibney, The Secret World, 63.
332 U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, “Semper Vigilans: History of the USCGC Vigilant (WMEC-
617),” https://www.atlanticarea.uscg.mil/Area-Cutters/CGCVIGILANT/History/.
333 Vladislav Krasnov, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institu-
tion Press, 1985), 88.
334 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee
on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, Attempted Defection by Lithu-
anian Seaman Simas Kudirka, 91st Congress, Second Session (Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1970), 45.

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335 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Comments by Alexander Orlov Regarding Infor-
mation Furnished by Walter Krivitsky,” FBI Memo, The National Archives, Kew, London,
KV 2/2879, serial 64b, 13.
336 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Iosif Volodarsky,” Investigative Summary.
337 Nick Paton Walsh, “Russia Says ‘Spies’ Work in Foreign NGOs,” Guardian, May 13, 2005,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/may/13/russia.nickpatonwalsh.
338 Simon Saradzhyan and Carl Schreck, “NGOs a Cover for Spying in Russia,” Globasresearch.
ca, May 13, 2005, https://www.globalresearch.ca/ngos-a-cover-for-spying-in-russia/139.
339 Andrey Ostroukh, “Russia’s Putin Signs NGO ‘Foreign Agents’ Law,” Reuters, July 21, 2012,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-ngos/russias-putin-signs-ngo-foreign-
agents-law-idUSBRE86K05M20120721.
340 “Profile: Mikhail Khodorkovsky,” BBC, December 22, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-12082222.
341 “Лубянская Федерация: Как ФСБ определяет политику и экономику России” [“The
Lubyanka Federation: How the FSB Determines the Politics and Economics of Russia”],
Dossier Center, 2020, https://fsb.dossier.center/.
342 Joshua Yaffa, “How Bill Browder Became Russia’s Most Wanted Man,” The Atlantic,
August 13, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/20/how-bill-browder-
became-russias-most-wanted-man.
343 Howard Amos, “Sergei Magnitsky’s Posthumous Trial Gets Under Way in Russia,”
Guardian, March 22, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/sergei-
magnitsky-posthumous-trial-russia.
344 “Russian ex-minister Ulyukayev Gets Eight Years for Bribery,” BBC, December 15, 2017,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42365041; Polina Nikolskaya and Darya Kor-
sunskaya, “Russian Ex-minister Ulyukayev Jailed for Eight Years over $2 Million Bribe,”
Reuters, December 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ulyukayev-­verdict/
russian-ex-minister-ulyukayev-jailed-for-eight-years-over-2-million-bribe-idUSKBN1E90SN.
345 “Alexei Navalny: Russian Opposition Leader Found Guilty,” BBC, February 8, 2013,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38905120.
346 “Russia Considers Stronger Secrecy Laws,” Financial Times, October 30, 2015, https://
www.ft.com/content/fc155bca-7f25-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.
347 Anna Baraulina, Evgenia Pismennaya, and Irina Reznik, “The Great Moscow Bank
Shakedown,” Bloomburg, December 10, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-12-10/russia-s-fsb-has-distorted-markets-and-sapped-investment.
348 “Were Top FSB Officials Jailed over Oligarchs’ Struggle?” Warsaw Institute, April 27, 2019,
https://warsawinstitute.org/top-fsb-officials-jailed-oligarchs-struggle/.
349 “The Rise and Fall of an FSB-Run Money Laundering Empire,” The Moscow Times,
August 3, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/03/the-rise-and-fall-of-an-
fsb-run-money-laundering-empire-a67226.

340
 Endnotes

350 Janosh Neumann, interview by Andrew Hammond, Historian of the International Spy
Museum, November 12, 2020.
351 Baraulina, Pismennaya, and Reznik, “The Great Moscow Bank Shakedown.”
352 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic
Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espi-
onage, 2009-2011 (Washington, DC: ONCIX, 2011).
353 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyber-
space (Washington, DC: NCSC, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/
news/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf.
354 U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hack-
ing and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations,” Press Release, October 4, 2018,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-gru-officers-international-hacking-
and-related-influence-and.
355 FireEye, APT28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations? (Milpitas, CA: Fire-
Eye, 2014), 3.
356 Huib Modderkolk, “Dutch Agencies Provide Crucial Intel about Russia’s Interference in
US-Elections,” deVolkskant, January 25, 2018, https://www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/
dutch-agencies-provide-crucial-intel-about-russia-s-interference-in-us-elections~b4f8111b/.
357 Ellen Nakashima and Craig Timberg, “Russian Government Hackers are Behind a Broad
Espionage Campaign That Has Compromised U.S. Agencies, Including Treasury and
Commerce,” Washington Post, December 14, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/russian-government-spies-are-behind-a-broad-hacking-campaign-that-has-
breached-us-agencies-and-a-top-cyber-firm/2020/12/13/d5a53b88-3d7d-11eb-9453-fc
36ba051781_story.html.
358 Adam Meyers, “Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS
BEAR,” CrowdStrike, March 12, 2018, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowd
strikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/; Osborne, “Russian APT Turla
Targets 35 Countries.”
359 Andy Greenberg, “Your Guide to Russia’s Infrastructure Hacking Teams,” Wired, July 12,
2017, https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hacking-teams-infrastructure/.
360 Defense Security and Counterintelligence Agency, Targeting U.S. Technologies, 5.
361 Defense Security and Counterintelligence Agency, Targeting U.S. Technologies, 7, 9.
362 Bundesamt für Verfassungsshutz, “Hinweis auf aktuelle Angriffskampagne” (“Report on
Current Attack Campaign”), Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2016, March 3, 2016, 2, https://www.
verfassungsschutz.de/embed/broschuere-2016-03-bfv-cyber-brief-2016-01.pdf.
363 Chris Fox and Leo Kelion, “Coronavirus: Russian Spies Target Covid-19 Vaccine Research,”
BBC News, July 16, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53429506.
364 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyber-
space, 14.

341
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365 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyber-
space, 8.
366 Belousova posted her resume online in about 2007 to https://www.weblancer.net/users/
eas7/. Her personal website is http://eas7.ru/, which was active in 2009-11.
367 Vice TV Twitter Feed, December 6, 2016.
368 Patrick Reevell, “How Russia Is Using Facial Recognition To Police Its Coronavirus Lock-
down,” ABC News, April 30, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-facial-­
recognition-police-coronavirus-lockdown/story?id=70299736; “Russia To Install ‘Orwell’
Facial Recognition Tech in Every School,” Moscow Times, June 16, 2020, https://www.­
themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/16/russia-to-install-orwell-facial-recognition-tech-in-­
every-school-vedomosti-a70585; Anna Baydakova, “Facial Recognition Tech May Be Being
Used Against Russian Protestors,” Coindesk, February 1, 2021, https://www.yahoo.com/
finance/news/facial-recognition-tech-may-being-213701268.html.
369 Corera, Russians Among Us, 81-82; Mark Urban, The Skripal Files (London: Pan Books,
2019).
370 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia’s Imperial General Staff,” Perspective XVI, no. 1 (October-­
November 2005): www.bu.ed./iscip/vol16/felgenhauer.
371 Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Mos-
cow to Ottawa, GRU Telegram number 11273, dated August 11, 1945, The National
Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/1427, item number 98; British Embassy in New York to
Foreign Office, Telegram dated September 10, 1945, The National Archives, KV 2/1419,
serial 3a.
372 MI6, “The Corby Case,” Secret Intelligence Service Summary of Gouzenko Interrogations,
The National Archives, Kew, London, KV 2/1420, 17.
373 See, for example, General Valery Gerasimov, “Ценность науки в предвидении: Новые
вызовы требуют переосмыслить формы и способы ведения боевых действий” [“The
Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and
Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations”] Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, February
26, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.
374 Michael Kofman, “Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgian War Revisited,” War on
the Rocks, September 4, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-
in-the-russo-georgian-war-revisited/.
375 “Georgia Says Russian Hackers Block Govt Websites,” Reuters, August 11, 2008, https://
uk.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-hackers/georgia-says-russian-hackers-block-govt-
websites-idUKLB2050320080811.
376 Scott Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020), 36-40.
377 “Georgia Accuses Russia of Widespread Cyber Attack,” Agenda.ge, February 20, 2020,
https://agenda.ge/en/news/2020/535; Ryan Browne, “US and UK Accuse Russia of Major

342
 Endnotes

Cyber Attack on Georgia,” CNN, February 20, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/

politics/russia-georgia-hacking/index.html.
378 Scott Neuman, “Ukraine To Expel Russian Diplomat Caught Taking Classified Info,”
NPR, May 1, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/05/01/308605849/
ukraine-to-expel-russian-diplomat-caught-taking-classified-info.
379 Matthias Williams, “Russian Diplomats Expelled from Moldova Recruited Fighters–
Sources,” Reuters, June 13, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-russia-­
expulsions/exclusive-russian-diplomats-expelled-from-moldova-recruited-fighters-sources-
idUSKBN1941DA.
380 Robert Windrem, “Timeline: Ten Years of Russian Cyber Attacks on Other Nations,” NBC
News, December 18, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hacking-in-america/
timeline-ten-years-russian-cyber-attacks-other-nations-n697111.
381 “Use of Fancy Bear Android Malware in Tracking of Ukrainian Field Artillery Units,”
CrowdStrike, March 23, 2017, https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/
FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf.
382 Patrick Tucker, “Russia Launched Cyber Attacks Against Ukraine Before Ship Sei-
zures, Firm Says,” Defense One, December 7, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/
technology/2018/12/russia-launched-cyber-attacks-against-ukraine-ship-seizures-firm-
says/153375/.
383 Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj, eds., Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine (Wash-
ington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2019), 11, 19.
384 Missy Ryan, “Russian, Syrian partnership poses a new challenge for U.S. in Iraq,” Washing-
ton Post, September 28, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
russian-syrian-partnership-poses-a-new-challenge-for-us-in-iraq/2015/09/28/b1190982-
65ee-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html.
385 Igor Gouzenko, “I Was Inside Stalin’s Spy Ring,” Cosmopolitan, March 1947.
386 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Memo, May 12, 1954, National Archives of
Australia, A6283, folder 1, item number 4104669, 99; duplicate in National Archives of
Australia, A6283, folder 14, item number 4104675, 34. The U.S. VENONA decryption
program had identified the code word ENORMOZ at least by the late 1940s as referring
to the U.S. Manhattan Project. Kartseva remembered the same code word as describing the
equivalent Australian program.
387 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 447-48.
388 Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, 18.
389 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 392-93.
390 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 214.
391 Booz Allen Hamilton, Bearing Witness: Uncovering the Logic Behind Russian Military
Cyber Operations (McLean, VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2020), 15.
392 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept, 21.

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393 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept, 9.
394 Lesley Kucharski, Russian Multi-Domain Strategy Against NATO: Information Confron-
tation and U.S. Forward-Deployed Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Livermore, CA: Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, 2018), 23.
395 Dave Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and
Nuclear Thresholds, Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 3, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research, February 2018, 52-54; Michael
Kofman, Anya Fink, Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolu-
tion of Key Concepts (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 2020), 61-63.
396 Russian Federation, “О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон ‘О защите населения
и территорий от чрезвычайных ситуаций природного и техногенного характера’”
[“Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On the Defense of the Population and Territory from
Extreme Natural or Technological Situations’”], Federal Law No. 38-FЗ, March 8, 2015,
http://base.garant.ru/70885212/#ixzz6eHSZ0hDq.
397 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 360-61.
398 “Defection of KGB Officer,” September 16, 1971, British government document contained
in FBI file number 105-216642, serial 7, received by FOIA.
399 Kalugin, Spymaster, 147.
400 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 173-74.
401 Security Service of Ukraine, “SSU Successfully Counteracts Hacker Attacks of Russian
Special Services,” Press Release, March 13, 2015, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/en/
publish/article?art_id=138949&cat_id=35317.
402 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-
16-056-01): Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure,” February 25, 2016,
https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01.
403 U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with
Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyber-
space,” Press Release, October 19, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-­gru-
officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and.
404 Adam Meyers, “CrowdStrike’s January Adversary of the Month: VOODOO BEAR,”
CrowdStrike, January 29, 2018, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-
adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/; Andy Greenberg, “Your Guide to Rus-
sia’s Infrastructure Hacking Teams.”
405 “CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations,” Dragos, June
2017, https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CrashOverride-01.pdf; Pavel Polityuk,
“Ukraine Investigates Suspected Cyber Attack on Kiev Power Grid,” Reuters, December 20,
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber-attacks-idUSKBN1491ZF.
406 Pavel Polityuk and Alessandra Prentice, “Ukrainian Banks, Electricity Firm Hit by Fresh
Cyber Attack,” Reuters, June 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-­cyber-

344
 Endnotes

attacks-idUSKBN19I1IJ; Andrew Griffin, “‘Petya’ Cyber Attack: Chernobyl’s Radiation

Monitoring System Hit by Worldwide Hack, Monitoring Is Now Being Performed Man-
ually, Ukrainian Authorities Said,” Independent, June 27, 2017, https://www.­independent.
co.uk/news/world/europe/chernobyl-ukraine-petya-cyber-attack-hack-nuclear-power-
plant-danger-latest-a7810941.html; Lizzie Dearden, “Ukraine Cyber Attack: Chaos as
National Bank, State Power Provider and Airport Hit by Hackers: Russian Energy Firms
and Danish Shipping Company also Hit by Hackers,” Independent, June 27, 2017, https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-cyber-attack-hackers-national-bank-
state-power-company-airport-rozenko-pavlo-cabinet-a7810471.html.
407 Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in
History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-
ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.
408 John Leyden, “Ukraine Claims It Blocked VPNFilter Attack at Chemical Plant,” theregister.
co.uk, July 13, 2018, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/07/13/ukraine_vpnfilter_attack/;
“SBU Thwarts Cyber Attack from Russia Against Chlorine Station in Dnipropetrovsk
Region,” Interfax-Ukraine, July 11, 2018, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/517337.
html.
409 Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of the 2018 Olympics Cyberattack, the Most
Deceptive Hack in History,” Wired, October 17, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/
untold-story-2018-olympics-destroyer-cyberattack/.
410 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent
Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” originally pub-
lished October 20, 2017, updated March 15, 2018, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/
TA17-293A; Jim Finkle, “U.S. Warns Businesses Of Hacking Campaign against Nuclear,
Energy Firms,” Reuters, June 30, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-­energy/
u-s-warns-businesses-of-hacking-campaign-against-nuclear-energy-firms-idUSKBN19L2Z9;
Pete Williams, “Russian Hackers Targeted Control Systems for Electric Utilities, Homeland
Security Says,” NBC News, July 24, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/
russian-hackers-targeted-control-systems-electric-utilities-­homeland-security-says-n894226;
“Russian Hackers Reach U.S. Utility Control Rooms, Homeland Security Officials Say,” Wall
Street Journal, July 23, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/­russian-hackers-reach-u-s-utility-
control-rooms-homeland-security-officials-say-1532388110.
411 Nicole Perlroth, “Russians Who Pose Election Threat Have Hacked Nuclear Plants and
Power Grid,” New York Times, October 24, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/
us/politics/energetic-bear-russian-hackers.html.
412 Bundesamt für Verfassungsshutz, “Hinweis auf aktuelle Angriffskampagne” [“Report
on Current Attack Campaign”], Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2018, June 7, 2018, https://www.
­verfassungsschutz.de/embed/broschuere-2018-06-bfv-cyber-brief-2018-01-neu.pdf;
Andrea Shalal, “German Intelligence Sees Russia Behind Hack of Energy Firms: Media

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Report,” Reuters, June 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-­cyber-russia/

german-­intelligence-sees-russia-behind-hack-of-energy-firms-media-report-idUSKBN1
JG2X2; Catalin Cimpanu, “Two More Cyber-attacks Hit Israel’s Water System,” Zero Day,
July 20, 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/two-more-cyber-attacks-hit-israels-water-
system/.
413 Dorfman, “The Secret History of the Russian Consulate in San Francisco.”
414 John Mooney, “Russian Agents Plunge to New Ocean Depths in Ireland To Crack Trans-
atlantic Cables,” Sunday Times, February 16, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/­
russian-agents-plunge-to-new-ocean-depths-in-ireland-to-crack-transatlantic-cables-fnq
smgncz.
415 Peter Cooney, “U.S. Concerned by Russian Operations Near Undersea Cables: NY
Times,” Reuters, October 25, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-
russia/u-s-­concerned-by-russian-operations-near-undersea-cables-ny-times-idUSKCN0
SK02G20151026.
416 Steffan Watkins, “We Will Bury You (in Data)—Russian Navy Yantar Backgrounder and
Summer 2016 Trip Report,” vesselofinterst.com, November 3, 2018, https://www.vesselof
interest.com/2018/11/we-will-bury-you-in-data-russian-navy.html.
417 Andrew Chuter, “Russia’s Naval Updates Threaten Undersea Comms Network, Says
Top British Military Officer,” DefenseNews, December 15, 2017, https://www.defense
news.com/naval/2017/12/15/russias-naval-updates-threaten-undersea-comms-­network-
says-top-british-military-officer/.
418 Gregory Hinck, “Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables,” Lawfare Blog, March
5, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables.
419 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense
Budget Overview: Irreversible Implementation of the National Defense Strategy, United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, February 2020).
420 Ukrtelekom, “Укртелеком офіційно повідомляють про блокування невідомими
декількох вузлів зв’язку на півострові” [“Ukrtelekom officially reports blocking of com-
munications nodes on peninsula by unknown actors”], Press Release, February 28, 2014,
http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327, cited in Keir Giles, “Rus-
sia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise
of Power” (London: Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, March 2016), 64.
421 Mitrokhin, ed., KGB Lexicon.
422 Yevgeniy Primakov, “Разведка в современном мире” [“Intelligence in the Modern
World”], speech given to the Journalism Faculty, Moscow State University, October 14,
1992, in Yevgeniy Primakov (ed.), Очерки истории российской внешней разведки [Essays
on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence], vol. 6 (Moscow: Mezdunarodniya Otnosh-
eniya, 2014), 213.

346
 Endnotes

423 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Disinformation: A Primer in Rus-
sian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Testimony of Thomas Rid, 115th Congress,
March 30, 2017, 2, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
os-trid-033017.pdf.
424 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Disinformation: A Primer in Rus-
sian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, 1.
425 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet “Active Measures”: Forgery,
Disinformation, Political Operations, Special Report No. 88, October 1981, 4.
426 U.S. Department of State, Soviet “Active Measures”: Forgery, Disinformation, Political
Operations.
427 U.S. Department of State, Soviet “Active Measures”: Forgery, Disinformation, Political
Operations, 4.
428 Thomas Boghardt, “Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS
Disinformation Campaign,” Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (December 2009): 1-24.
429 Todd Leventhal, “Traffic in Baby Parts Has No Factual Basis,” New York Times, February
26, 1992.
430 See, for example, the Russian-manufactured false report claiming CIA involvement in
the MH17 shoot down in Caleb Gilbert (pseudo), “David L. Stern’s Phone Talks before
Malaysian Airlines 17 Plane Crash,” pressbox.co.uk, July 17, 2015.
431 Rikard Jozwiak, “EU Lawmakers Say Russia Using Coronavirus Crisis for Political Ben-
efit,” RFE/RL, April 3, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-lawmakers-say-russia-using-
coronavirus-­crisis-to-gain-political-benefits/30529085.html.
432 John B. Emerson, “Exposing Russian Disinformation,” Atlantic Council UkraineAlert, June 29,
2015, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/exposing-russian-disinformation/.
433 Leonid Bershidsky, “Putin’s Latest Obsession: A New World War II Narrative,” Bloomberg,
January 10, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-10/putin-s-
latest-obsession-rewriting-world-war-ii.
434 Ben Nimmo, “How MH17 Gave Birth to the Modern Russian Spin Machine,” Foreign Pol-
icy, September 29, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/29/how-mh17-gave-birth-
to-the-modern-russian-spin-machine-putin-ukraine/.
435 “Russian Hackers Leak Simone Biles and Serena Williams Files,” BBC, September 13,
2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-37352326.
436 Karoun Demirjian, “Putin Denies Russian Troops Are in Ukraine, Decrees Certain Deaths
Secret,” Washington Post, May 28, 2015, https://www.­washingtonpost.com/world/putin-­
denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092-
0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html; Carl Schreck, “From ‘Not Us’ To ‘Why Hide
It’?: How Russia Denied Its Crimea Invasion, Then Admitted It,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, February 26, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/from-not-us-to-why-hide-it-how-­
russia-denied-its-crimea-invasion-then-admitted-it/29791806.html.

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437 Andrew Roth, “Vladimir Putin Calls Sergei Skripal a Scumbag and a Traitor,” Guardian,
October 3, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/03/vladimir-putin-
calls-sergei-skripal-a-scumbag-and-traitor.
438 Neil MacFarquhar, “A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories,” New York
Times, August 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-
sweden-disinformation.html.
439 Rid, Active Measures, 377-96.
440 “The Dreadful Eight: GRU’s Unit 29155 and the 2015 Poisoning of Emilian Gebrev,” Bell-
ingcat, November 23, 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/11/
23/the-dreadful-eight-grus-unit-29155-and-the-2015-poisoning-of-emilian-gebrev/.
441 “Remarks of Aleksandr Yurievich Kaznacheyev before the Overseas Press Club, New York
City,” December 17, 1959, 4, CIA FOIA Reading Room.
442 Gilbert (pseudo), “David L. Stern’s Phone Talks before Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Plane
Crash.”
443 U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hack-
ing and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations.”
444 U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with World-
wide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace”;
Andy Greenberg, “Here’s the Evidence That Links Russia’s Most Brazen Cyberattacks,”
Wired, November 15, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/sandworm-russia-cyberattack-
links/; Greenberg, “The Untold Story of the 2018 Olympics Cyberattack.”
445 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Gov-
ernment’s Attempts to Influence U.S. Elections,” Press Release, April 15, 2021, https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0126.
446 Anton Troianovski, Ellen Nakashima, and Shane Harris, “How Russia’s Military Intel-
ligence Agency Became the Covert Muscle in Putin’s Duels with the West,” Wash-
ington Post, December 28, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/
how-russias-­military-intelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-
the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html.
447 Mitch Prothero, “‘Unit 29155’: Putin’s Assassination Squad—Suspected of Killings All
Over Europe—Received Diplomatic Cover from the Russian Mission in Switzerland,” Busi-
ness Insider, March 16, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/unit-29155-assassination-
squad-diplomatic-russia-mission-switzerland-2020-3; “An Officer and A Diplomat: The
Strange Case of the GRU Spy With a Red Notice,” Bellingcat, February 25, 2020, https://
www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/02/25/an-officer-and-a-diplomat-the-strange-case-of-the-
gru-spy-with-a-red-notice/.
448 Viktor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: MacMillan, 1984); Viktor
Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces (New York; London: Norton,
1988); Suvorov, Aquarium: The Career and Defection of a Soviet Military Spy.

348
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449 Boris Egorov, “5 Legendary Russian Special Forces Units,” Russia Beyond, November 30,
2018, https://www.rbth.com/science-and-tech/329610-5-legendary-russian-special-forces.
450 Steven Rosenberg, “Ukraine Crisis: Meeting the Little Green Men,” BBC, April 30, 2014,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27231649.
451 Schreck, “From ‘Not Us’ To ‘Why Hide It?’”
452 Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries: Wagner, the Elusive Private Military Com-
pany, Has Made Its Way to Africa—with Plenty of Willing Young Russian Volunteers,” The
Atlantic, August 27, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/
russian-mercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/.
453 Pierre Vaux, “Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying for Putin in Syria and
Ukraine,” The Interpreter, March 29, 2016, https://www.interpretermag.com/fontanka-
investigates-russian-mercenaries-dying-for-putin-in-syria-and-ukraine/.
454 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S.
Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html.
455 Pjotr Sauer, “In Push for Africa, Russia’s Wagner Mercenaries Are ‘Out of Their Depth’
in Mozambique,” The Moscow Times, November 19, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.
com/2019/11/19/in-push-for-africa-russias-wagner-mercenaries-are-out-of-their-depth-
in-mozambique-a68220; Daniel Sixto, “Russian Mercenaries: A String of Failures in
Africa,” Geopolitical Monitor, August 24, 2020, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/
russian-mercenaries-a-string-of-failures-in-africa/.
456 “Berlin Murder: Germany Expels two Russian Diplomats,” BBC, December 4, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50659179.
457 “Alexei Navalny: Putin Critic Arrives in Germany for Medical Treatment,” BBC, August
22, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53871617.
458 “Gas ‘Killed Moscow Hostages,’” BBC, October 27, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/2365383.stm; “Timeline: The Beslan School Siege,” Guardian, September 6, 2004,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/06/schoolsworldwide.chechnya.
459 Mike Eckel, “Two Decades On, Smoldering Questions About The Russian President’s
Vault To Power,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 7, 2019, https://www.rferl.
org/a/putin-russia-president-1999-chechnya-apartment-bombings/30097551.html.
460 Steven Eke, “Russia Law on Killing ‘Extremists’ Abroad,” BBC, November 27, 2006, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6188658.stm.
461 Russian Federation, “On Countering Terrorism,” Article 22, “Lawful Causing of Harm,”
Federal Law No. 35-F3, June 3, 2006, available at http://www.consultant.ru/document/
cons_doc_LAW_58840/.
462 Nathan Hodge, Emma Burrows, and Tara John, “Putin: Sergei Skripal Is a Scumbag and Trai-
tor Who Betrayed Russia,” CNN, October 4, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/03/
europe/putin-calls-skripal-scumbag-intl.

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463 Christopher Nehring, “Umbrella or Pen? The Murder of Georgi Markov. New Facts and
Old Questions,” Journal of Intelligence History 16, no. 1 (November 22, 2016): 47-58,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2016.1258248.
464 Cobain, “Boris Berezovsky Inquest Returns Open Verdict on Death.”
465 J.J. Green, “Assassins Inc.: The Kremlin’s Secret Squad of Killers,” WTOP.com, October
22, 2018, https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2018/10/assassins-inc-the-kremlins-secret-
squad-of-killers/.
466 Michael Schwirtz, “Top Secret Russian Unit Seeks to Destabilize Europe, Security Offi-
cials Say,” New York Times, October 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/
world/europe/unit-29155-russia-gru.html.
467 “Montenegro Jails ‘Russian Coup Plot’ Leaders,” BBC, May 9, 2019, https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-48212435.
468 U.S. Army, Counterintelligence Corps File, “Hans Kukowitsch,” National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 443. Kukowitsch was Khokhlov’s
assistant in the Okolovich operation. Serhii Plokhy, The Man with the Poison Gun (Lon-
don: Oneworld, 2016).
469 Loveday Morris, Ladka Bauerova, and Robyn Dixon, “Accusations of Spying and Sabotage
Plunge Russian-Czech Relations into the Deep Freeze,” Washington Post, April 19, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-diplomats-expulsions-czech/
2021/04/19/ef7f6178-9fbb-11eb-b2f5-7d2f0182750d_story.html.
470 “Emilian Gebrev Assassination Attempt Investigation, 2015,” Bellingcat, September 4,
2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/09/04/gebrev-survives-
poisonings-post-mortem/.
471 Mike Eckel, Ivan Bedrov, Olha Komarova, “A Czech Explosion, Russian Agents, a Bul-
garian Arms Dealer: The Recipe for a Major Spy Scandal in Central Europe,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, April 18, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/czech-expulsions-­bulgaria-
gebrev-russia-gru-intelligence-explosion-spy-scandal/31209960.html.
472 Loveday Morris and Robyn Dixon, “Bulgaria Alleges Russian Links to Arms Depot Blasts,
Widening European Probes into Moscow Agents,” Washington Post, April 28, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/bulgaria-russia-arms-explosions-czech-­
republic/2021/04/28/ba2e7004-a812-11eb-a8a7-5f45ddcdf364_story.html.
473 O. S. Smyslov, Генерал Абакумов. Палач или жертва? [General Abakumov: Executioner
or Victim] (Moscow: Veche, 2012), http://www.e-reading.me/chapter.php/1015673/54/
Smyslov_-_General_Abakumov._Palach_ili_zhertva.html.
474 Kalugin, Spymaster, 108.
475 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 149.
476 Richard Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting
in Europe, 1950-1989 ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 2009), 176-78; Разведчики
Разоблачают… Эта Кинга о Шпионской и Подрывной Деятельности Радиостанций

350
 Endnotes

“Свобода” и “Свободная Европа” [Intelligence Officers Reveal… This Book Is About the Espi-
onage and Underground Activity of the Radio Stations “Liberty” and “Free Europe”] (Mos-
cow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1977).
477 Kalugin, Spymaster, 275.
478 “Alexander Litvinenko: Profile of Murdered Russian Spy,” BBC, January 21, 2016, https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-19647226.
479 James Masters, “Theresa May’s Full Statement on Russian Spy’s Poisoning,” CNN,
March 13, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/13/europe/theresa-may-russia-spy-
speech-intl/index.html; “Skripal Suspect Boshirov Identified as GRU Colonel Anatoliy
Chepiga,” Bellingcat, September 26, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-­
europe/2018/09/26/skripal-suspect-boshirov-identified-gru-colonel-anatoliy-chepiga/;
“Full Report: Skripal Poisoning Suspect Dr. Alexander Mishkin, Hero of Russia,” Belling-
cat, October 9, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/10/09/
full-report-skripal-poisoning-suspect-dr-alexander-mishkin-hero-russia/.
480 “Семья шпиона Смоленкова сбежала из своего дома в США” [“The Family of Spy
Smolenkov Disappeared from their Home in the USA”], Lenta.ru, September 11, 2019,
https://lenta.ru/news/2019/09/11/runaway/.
481 Siegfried Mortkowitz, “Czechs Expel More Russian Embassy Staff Over Bombing Claims,”
Politico, April 22, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/czech-republic-russia-embassy-
staff-bombing-claims/.
482 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Investigative Memo, April 13, 1953,
National Archives of Australia (NAA), A6117, folder 8, item number 12077929, serial
154; “Statement by Petrova,” October 14, 1954, NAA, A6283, folder 15, item number
4104676, 80; “Moscow Instructions to Canberra,” January 2, 1952, NAA, A6283, folder 1,
item number 4104669, 1-2.
483 Earley, Comrade J, 224-68.
484 Vladimir Vanin, “Ай да мы: взяли русского Джеймса Бонда!” [“Oh My: A Russian
James Bond Is Arrested!”], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, January 22, 2010.
485 U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, “USA v. Evgeny Buryakov
et al.”
486 “Сергей Нарышкин: нелегалы—золотой фонд внешней разведки” [“Sergey Nary-
shkin: Illegals Are the Golden Reserve of Foreign Intelligence”], TASS, June 27, 2017,
https://tass.ru/interviews/4366965.
487 Alexander Kouzminov, Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and Russian
Foreign Intelligence Services in the West (London: Greenhill Books, 2005).
488 Personal History of Hede Massing, Hoover Institution Archive, Hede Massing Papers, Box
1, Folder 1, 15-17.
489 Bronnikov and Vavilova, The Woman Who Knows How to Keep Secrets.
490 Corera, Russians Among Us, 209-12.

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491 “‘Штучные люди’: СВР рассекретила выдающихся разведчиков-нелегалов” [“‘Extraor-

dinary People’: The SVR Declassified Outstanding Illegal Intelligence Officers”], RIA
Novosti, January 28, 2020, https://ria.ru/20200128/1563982674.html.
492 “Путин рассказал, что его работа в КГБ была связана с нелегальной разведкой”
[“Putin Related that His Work in the KGB Was Connected to Illegal Intelligence”], RIA
Novosti, June 6, 2017, https://ria.ru/20170624/1497218985.html?in=t.
493 Krutikov, “Russian Illegal Intelligence Remains an Object of Envy in the West.”
494 Corera, Russians Among Us.
495 Nikolay Dolgopolov, “В разведку на всю жизнь” [“Into Intelligence for Life”], Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, December 20, 2020, https://rg.ru/2020/03/24/istoriia-razvedchika-­mihaila-
vasenkova-rassekrechennogo-v-2020-godu.html.
496 U.S. Department of Justice, Southern District of New York, “USA vs. Anna Chapman
and Mikhail Semenko,” June 27, 2010, 3, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/
legacy/2010/06/28/062810complaint1.pdf.
497 Pierre Briançon, “The Spanish Story of a Russian ‘Illegal,’” Politico, June 16, 2016, https://
www.politico.eu/interactive/the-spanish-story-of-a-russian-illegal-russian-spy-moscow/.
498 Corera, Russians Among Us, 325.
499 Corera, Russians Among Us, 307.
500 Bronnikov and Vavilova, The Woman Who Knows How to Keep Secrets, Chapter 30.
501 Corera, Russians Among Us, 212.
502 Vincent Jauvert, “Révélations sur les espions russes en France” [“Revelations about Russian
Spies in France”], L’Obs.com, July 24, 2014.
503 U.S. Army, 441st Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment Investigative Summary,
“REILLY, James Arthur,” March 13, 1945, National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 319, Entry A1 314B, Box 627.
504 Suvorov, Aquarium: The Career and Defection of a Soviet Military Spy, 139-58.
505 Lewis, “Russian Spy Targeted MPs and Whitehall Officials.”
506 Alexander Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy (New York: Lippincott, 1962).
507 Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985).
508 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “The KGB Connections.”
509 Krasnov, Soviet Defectors.
510 Oleg Tumanov, Tumanov: Confessions of a KGB Agent (Chicago, IL: Edition Q, 1994).
511 Desmond Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (Canberra: Australian National Uni-
versity, 1989), 3-4.
512 Victor Sheymov, Tower of Secrets: A Real Life Spy Thriller (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1993), 419.
513 John Prados, “The Navy’s Biggest Betrayal,” Naval History Magazine 24, no. 3 ( June
2010), https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2010/june/navys-biggest-
betrayal.

352
 Endnotes

514 Frank J. Rafalko, ed., CI Reader: American Revolution Into the New Millennium, vol. 3,
(Washington, DC: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004), 409; Jür-
gen Dahlkamp, “No Country More Beautiful,” New York Times, July 14, 2003, https://
www.nytimes.com/2003/07/14/international/europe/no-country-more-beautiful.html.
515 Lezina, “Dismantling the State Security Apparatus,” 4, 8.
516 “ФСО” (“FSO”), Voenpro, October 22, 2013, https://voenpro.ru/infolenta/fco.
517 Rostec, “Ростех презентует станцию радиотехнической разведки ПОСТ-3М” (“Ros-
tec Presents the POST-3M SIGINT Station”), Press Release, June 24, 2019, https://rostec.
ru/news/rostekh-prezentuet-stantsiyu-radiotekhnicheskoy-razvedki-post-3m/.
518 Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 26.
519 U.S. Departments of State and Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America
and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1985), 4.
520 Aleksandr Kolpakidi, Империя ГРУ (The GRU Empire) (Moscow: Olma-Press, 1999),
https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=107721.
521 Victor Robert Lee, “Satellite Images: A (Worrying) Cuban Mystery,” The Diplomat, June
8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/satellite-images-a-worrying-cuban-mystery/;
“Russian Official: We Are Working on Reopening Cuba, Vietnam Bases,” Voice of Amer-
ica, October 7, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/europe/russian-official-we-are-working-
reopening-cuba-vietnam-bases.
522 Keir Giles, Russian Ballistic Missile Defense: Rhetoric and Reality (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 2015), 13-14; “Увидеть футбольный мяч с 8000 км: как устроена ПВО
России” [“To See a Football from 8,000 km: That is How the PVO of Russia Works”], TVZ-
vezda, May 17, 2015; “Russian Long-range Radar in Belarus To Track U.S. Missile Defense
System in Europe,” Belta.by, February 15, 2012, https://eng.belta.by/society/view/russian-
long-range-radar-in-belarus-to-track-us-missile-defense-system-in-europe-137481-2021/.
523 “Russia’s Decision To Close Down Gabala Radar Station Is Final–Lavrov,” Interfax, January
23, 2013, https://www.rbth.com/news/2013/01/23/russias_decision_to_close_down_
gabala_radar_station_is_final_-_lavrov_pa_22129.html.
524 “’Окно’ в Таджикистане ‘увидит’ объекты в космосе на расстоянии 50 тысяч км” [“The
‘Okno’ in Tajikistan ‘Sees’ Objects in Space at a Distance of 50 Thousand km”], RIA Novo-
sti, November 27, 2016, https://news.rambler.ru/science/35393642-okno-v-tadzhikistane-
uvidit-obekty-v-kosmose-na-rasstoyanii-50-tysyach-km/.
525 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, “How the FSB Signal Intelligence Gathers Infor-
mation on Foreign Citizens,” in International Security and Estonia 2019 (Tallinn, Estonia:
Välisluureamet, 2019), 54-58.
526 Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 38.
527 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 343.
528 Kalugin, Spymaster, 102.
529 Dorfman, “The Secret History of the Russian Consulate in San Francisco.”

353
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530 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “The KGB Connections.”

531 Missy Ryan, Ellen Nakashima, and Karen DeYoung, “Obama Administration Announces
Measures To Punish Russia for 2016 Election Interference,” Washington Post, December 29,
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-
announces-measures-to-punish-russia-for-2016-election-interference/2016/12/29/311db
9d6-cdde-11e6-a87f-b917067331bb_story.html.
532 William Safire, “Who Lost Mount Alto,” New York Times, September 22, 1985; Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, “The KGB Connections.”
533 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “The KGB Connections.”
534 Kalugin, Spymaster, 102.
535 Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 43.
536 Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Signals Intelligence (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press,
2012), 126, 251.
537 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 349.
538 Earley, Comrade J, 255-59.
539 Zach Dorfman, Jenna McLaughlin, and Sean D. Naylor, “Russia Carried Out a ‘Stunning’
Breach of FBI Communications System, Escalating the Spy Game on U.S. Soil,” Yahoo News,
September 16, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-russia-carried-out-a-stunning-
breach-of-fbi-communications-system-escalating-the-spy-game-on-us-soil-090024212.html.
540 “Dutch Government Says It Disrupted Russian Attempt To Hack Chemical Weapons
Watchdog.”
541 “How the Dutch Foiled Russian ‘Cyber-Attack’ on OPCW,” BBC, October 4, 2018, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45747472#share-tools. Although the media referred to
this incident as a “cyber-attack,” it was most likely a close access SIGINT operation.
542 Olsen, “Norway Says Russia Was Behind Hacker Attack on Parliament.”
543 Emma Tucker, “Swiss Police Suspect Russian Spies Posed as Plumbers to Surveil
Davos: Report,” Daily Beast, January 21, 2020, https://www.thedailybeast.com/
swiss-police-suspect-russian-spies-posed-as-plumbers-to-surveil-davos-report-says.
544 Ali Watkins, “Russia Escalates Spy Games After Years of U.S. Neglect,” Politico, June 1, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003;
Dorfman, “The Secret History of the Russian Consulate in San Francisco.”
545 Cummings, Cold War Radio, 176-77.
546 Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 95-107.
547 Sam LaGrone, “Coast Guard: Russian Surveillance Ship Operating in ‘Unsafe’ Manner
off East Coast,” USNI News, December 17, 2019, https://news.usni.org/2019/12/17/
coast-guard-russian-surveillance-ship-operating-in-unsafe-manner-of-east-coast.
548 “On the Horizon: Navigating the European and African Theaters—Episode 14,” interview
with Admiral James Foggo, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Commander Sixth
Fleet Public Affairs, December 6, 2019, https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Media/­transcripts/

354
 Endnotes

Article/2043849/on-the-horizon-navigating-the-european-and-african-theaters-episode-
14/.
549 Mallory Shelbourne, “No Russian or Chinese Presence at First Week of RIMPAC,”
USNI News, August 24, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/08/24/no-russian-or-chinese-
presence-at-first-week-of-rimpac.
550 “Russia’s Ships, Missile Systems Put on Duty Due to NATO Exercise in Black Sea,” TASS,
April 8, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1052558.
551 Dan Mcquade, “Russian Spy Ship Spotted Off Coast of Delaware,” Phillymag.com, February
14, 2017, https://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/02/14/russian-spy-ship-delaware-coast/.
552 “Full Analysis of the Sinking of Liman,” Plansandstuff, May 29, 2017, https://planesand
stuff.wordpress.com/2017/05/29/full-analysis-of-the-sinking-of-liman/.
553 Cooney, “U.S. Concerned by Russian Operations Near Undersea Cables;” Mooney, “Rus-
sian Agents Plunge to New Ocean Depths in Ireland to Crack Transatlantic Cables.”
554 Joseph Trevithick, “Russia’s Electronic Spies Are Hard at Work in Syria: Signal Spooks
Search for Targets and Follow up on Strikes,” Warisboring.com, October 7, 2015, https://
warisboring.com/russias-electronic-spies-are-hard-at-work-in-syria/; Seth Jones, ed., Moscow’s
War in Syria (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), 20-22.
555 David Cenciotti, “Russia’s Most Advanced Spyplane Has Deployed to Syria Again,” Business
Insider, August 1, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/russias-most-advanced-spyplane-
has-deployed-to-syria-again-2016-8.
556 David Cenciotti, “After the First Tour of Duty in February 2016, the Tu-214R Has
Returned to Latakia. To Spy on Daesh (and also on the U.S. F-22s?),” The Aviationist, July
31, 2016, https://theaviationist.com/2016/07/31/russias-most-advanced-spyplane-has-
deployed-to-syria-again/.
557 “Electronic Weapons: Yet Another New Russian EW Aircraft,” Strategy Page, August 28,
2017, https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20170818.aspx.
558 “How Russia Air Force Jammed Turkish F-16 Aircraft Fighter Jets over Idlib, Syria,” Eur-
asian Times, March 9, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/how-russian-air-force-jammed-
turkish-f-16-fighter-jets-over-idlib-syria/.
559 Jones, ed., Moscow’s War in Syria, 67-68.
560 “Russia Blames Israel After Military Plane Shot Down off Syria,” BBC, September 18, 2018,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45556290.
561 Thomas Nilsen, “Video: Norway’s New F-35 Filmed From Russian Anti-submarine Plane,”
Barents Observer, March 10, 2020, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/03/
video-norways-new-f-35-filmed-russian-anti-submarine-plane.
562 Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 117-18.
563 Bart Hendrickx, “Snooping on Radars: A History of Soviet/Russian Global Signals Intel-
ligence Satellites,” Space Chronicle, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 58, Supple-
ment 1 (2005).

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564 Anatoly Zak, “Lotos-S Spacecraft for the Liana system,” Russian Space Web, October 25,
2018, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/images/spacecraft/military/elint/liana/lotos_m_
silo_1.jpg.
565 Anatoly Zak, “US-A and US-P Military Satellites,” Russian Space Web, last updated January
2, 2020, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/us.html.
566 “Liana Electronic Intelligence Program,” SpaceFlight101.com, 2020, http://spaceflight
101.com/spacecraft/liana-electronic-intelligence-program/.
567 Stephen Thompson, “History and Historiography of National Security Space,” in Stephen
Dick and Roger Launius, eds., Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight (Washington, DC:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006), 481-548; Peter Gorin, “Zenit-The
First Soviet Photo-Reconnaissance Satellite,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 50
(November 1997): 441-48; Peter Gorin, “Black ‘Amber’: Russian Yantar-Class Optical Recon-
naissance Satellites,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 51 (August 1998), 309-20.
568 Anatoly Zak, “Bars-M: Russia’s First Digital Cartographer,” Russian Space Web, last updated
February 5, 2020, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/bars-m.html.
569 Anatoly Zak, “Araks (11F664) Military Spacecraft,” Russian Space Web, January 3, 2018,
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/araks.html.
570 Anatoly Zak, “Persona (14F137) Spy Satellite,” Russian Space Web, August 29, 2017,
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/persona.html.
571 “Kondor Spacecraft Overview,” SpaceFlight101.com, 2020, https://spaceflight101.com/
spacecraft/kondor/.
572 Anatoly Zak, “US-K and US-KMO Constellations,” Russian Space Web, last updated
November 25, 2019, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/oko.html.
573 Anatoly Zak, “The EKS Kupol Network Design,” Russian Space Web, last updated Decem-
ber 28, 2019, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/eks-network.html.
574 Kevin Riehle and Michael May, “Human-cyber Nexus: the Parallels Between ‘Illegal’ Intel-
ligence Operations and Advanced Persistent Threats,” Intelligence and National Security 34,
no. 2 (2018): 189-204, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2018.
1534642.
575 “Russia’s Brain Drain on the Rise over Economic Woes—Report,” The Moscow Times,
January 24, 2018, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/01/24/russias-brain-drain-
on-the-rise-over-economic-woes-report-a60263.
576 “Putin Stresses Importance of New Far East Space Center,” RIA Novosti, August 28, 2010;
Matthew Brodner, “The Long Road to Vostochny: Inside Russia’s Newest Launch Facility,”
Space News, January 30, 2019, https://spacenews.com/the-long-road-to-vostochny-inside-
russias-newest-launch-facility/; Anatoly Zak, “Origin of the Vostochny (formerly Svo-
bodny) Launch Site,” Russian Space Web, September 8, 2018, http://www.russianspaceweb.
com/svobodny.html.
577 Galeotti, Putin’s Hydra, 14-15.

356
 Endnotes

578 Galeotti, Putin’s Hydra, 14-15.

579 Riehle, “Assessing Foreign Intelligence Threats.”
580 George W. Bush, “User Clip: Bush Saw Putin’s Soul,” CSPAN, June 16, 2001, https://
www.c-span.org/video/?c4718091/user-clip-bush-putins-soul.
581 Louise Hall, “Former Russian PM Describes Trump’s Presidency as ‘Period of Disappoint-
ment,’” Independent, February 1, 2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/us-politics/dmitry-medvedev-trump-presidency-russia-disappointment-b1795
684.html.
582 “‘Штучные люди’: СВР рассекретила выдающихся разведчиков-нелегалов” [“‘Extraor-
dinary People’: The SVR Declassified Outstanding Illegal Intelligence Officers”].
583 Yuriy Logvinenko, История российского шпионажа и сыска глазами филателиста [The
History of Russian Espionage and Investigation through the Eyes of a Philatelist] (Moscow:
OLMA Media Group, 2012).
584 See, for example, the books of Nikolay Dolgopolov; Kovacevic, “Nikolay Dolgopolov: Sto-
ryteller of Soviet Intelligence History.”
585 Andrey Kolesnikov, “ФСБ, Устремленная в Будущее” [“The FSB, Looking to the
Future”], New Times, February 19, 2018, https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/147619.
586 “Опрос показал, хотят ли россияне карьеры разведчика для своих детей” [“Survey
Shows Whether Russians Want an Intelligence Officer Career for Their Children”], RIA
Novosti, November 5, 2019, https://ria.ru/20191105/1560570969.html.
587 “ФСБ, ГРУ, ФСО, СВР... не боги” [“The FSB, GRU, FSO, SVR…Are Not Gods”],
Glagolurfo.com, December 16, 2020, http://glagolurfo.com/newsitems/2020/12/16/
fsb-gru-fso-svr-ne-bogi/.
588 Rid, Active Measures, 431.
589 Corera, Russians Among Us, 301-03.
590 Lydia Saad, “Majority of Americans Now Consider Russia a Critical Threat,” Gallup,
February 27, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/247100/majority-americans-consider-­
russia-critical-threat.aspx.
591 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Fewer in U.S. Regard China Favorably or as Leading Economy,” Gal-
lup, March 2, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/287108/fewer-regard-china-favorably-­
leading-economy.aspx.
592 Christine Huang, “Views of Russia and Putin Remain Negative Across 14 Nations,” Pew
Research Center, December 16, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/
12/16/views-of-russia-and-putin-remain-negative-across-14-nations/.
593 The video can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=liohDIOc8Fo&feature
=youtu.be.
594 “Russia’s FSB Disciplines Future Officers Over SUV Parade Stunt,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, July 14, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-fsb-future-officers-disciplined-
parade-stunt/27858804.html.

357
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595 “Record $185M in Cash Seized From Russian Official in Sting Operation,” Moscow
Times, May 20, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/05/20/185m-seized-
from-ex-fsb-official-in-corruption-scandal-a65658.
596 “Seven FSB Officials Have Been Arrested in a Robbery Case. They May Have Also Stolen
Money during Searches of corrupt Officials,” Meduza, July 5, 2019, https://meduza.io/en/
feature/2019/07/05/seven-fsb-officials-have-been-arrested-in-a-robbery-case-they-may-
have-also-stolen-money-during-searches-of-corrupt-officials.
597 Robert Grenier, “Spies, Lies and Sneaky Guys: Human INTelligence in the Digital Age,”
presentation made for the University of Delaware Global Agenda Speaker Series, March
21, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfIxarRLMDo.
598 Christopher Walker, “What is ‘Sharp Power’?,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 ( July 2018):
9-23, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-is-sharp-power/.

358
 INDEX

k k k

A Ames, Aldrich, 15, 229

Abel, Rudolf. See  Fisher, William Amtorg Trading Company, 33, 137, 155
Able Archer, Exercise, 176 Andropov, Yuriy, 44, 44–45, 53, 87, 98,
active measures, 83, 145, 190–197 212, 273
advanced persistent threat. See  APT “Anonymous Bulgaria”, 196
Agabekov, Georgiy. See  Arutyunov, Anschlag, Andreas and Heidrun, 115, 226,
Georgiy 227
agents provocateurs, 24–25 APT (advanced persistent threat), 68,
AGI. See  auxiliary general intelligence 256–258
ship APT28 (aka Fancy Bear), 161
al-Assad, Bashar, 96 APT29 (aka Cozy Bear), 161
Aleksandr III, Tsar, 21, 24 Araks satellite (also called Arkon-1), 254
Aleksandr II, Tsar, 21 ARCOS. See  All-Russian Cooperative
All-Russian Cooperative Society (ARCOS), Society
33 Artamonov, Aleksey (aka Janosh
All-Russian Extraordinary Commission Neumann), 158
for Combating Counterrevolution Arutyunov, Georgiy (aka Georgiy
and Sabotage (VChK), 12, 22, 29, Agabekov), 25, 31, 32, 211
37, 153 Aulska chlorine plant, 182
All-Union Society for Cultural Relations auxiliary general intelligence ship (AGI),
with Foreign Countries (VOKS), 247–249
124 Avio Spa, 142

359
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

B C
Badin, Dmitry Sergeyevich, 129 Carney, Jeffrey, 238
Bakatin, Vadim, 45, 54–55, 60, 61 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 9, 11,
BALTOPS, 248 14, 15, 23, 57, 89, 95, 125, 194, 211, 225,
Bandera, Stepan, 208 243, 270
Barmine, Alexander. See  Graff, Aleksandr Chapman, Anna, 124, 226
Bashneft, 157 Chayka, Yuriy, 56
Basmachis, 31 Chebrikov, Viktor, 239
Baykonur launch complex, 252, 259 Chechnya, 50, 55, 68, 91, 92, 96, 188, 189,
Bellingcat, 69, 128, 129, 210, 212 203, 205, 208, 264
Belousova, Alisa (aka Eas7), 163 chekist, 19, 38, 43, 53–58, 60, 65, 72, 75,
Berezovsky, Boris, 122, 127, 207 77, 96, 210, 273
Beriya, Lavrentiy, 38, 39, 43, 53 Cherepanov, Aleksandr, 89
Berzin, Yan, 48 Cherepanov, Sergey (aka Henry Frith),
Beslan, Chechnya, 68, 93, 205 226, 227
Bezrukov, Andrey (aka Donald Heathfield), Cherkalin, Kirill, 158
57, 226, 227 Chizhov, Vasiliy, 54
Bianchi, Maurizio Paolo, 142 Clinton, Hillary, 109, 121, 197, 227,
Bittman, Ladislav, 191 264
Bochkarev, Mikhail, 125 close access technical operations, 110,
Bombardier (Canadian aircraft 121, 235, 245–247, 259
manufacturer), 149 Cohen, Morris and Lona, 223
Borah, William, 26 Colby, Bainbridge, 33
Bortnikov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, “color revolutions”, 54, 57, 189, 264
58, 69 Committee for State Security.
Botyan, Aleksey, 187 See  KGB
Boyce, Christopher, 229 Committee of Information (KI), 41, 75
Brazhnikov, Aleksandr, 142 communications intelligence (COMINT),
Browder, William, 157 239, 250
Budennovsk, Stavropol Krai, 60 Communist International (Comintern),
Bundestag, 122, 124, 129, 254 32–34, 47
Bureau of Revolutionary Propaganda, 31 computer-based attacks, 159, 180–182
Burtsev, Vladimir, 28 computer-based collection, 117–118, 159,
Buryakov, Yevgeniy, 15, 147–149, 151, 162, 180, 256–258
221, 228 Council of People’s Commissars, 31, 37,
Bush, George, 264 38, 39
Butina, Mariya, 87, 123, 123–124, Counterintelligence Directorate (UKR)
231 SMERSH, 40, 67

360
 Index

cover, illegal, 222–227, 234 Extraordinary Commission for Combating

cover, legal, 139, 217–221 Counterrevolution and Sabotage (ChK),
cover, nonofficial (NOC), 221–222 21
Cozy Bear. See  APT29
cyber. See  computer-based attacks or F
computer-based collection Fancy Bear. See  APT28
Farewell Dossier, 139
D Federal Agency for Government
DCLeaks, 196 Communications and Information
Deflektor, 237, 247 (FAPSI), 58, 60, 68, 239
de las Heras, Afrika, 223 Federal Border Guard Service. See  FPS
Delisle, Jeffrey, 114, 115, 116, 127 Federal Protective Service. See  FSO
Democratic National Committee, 75, 120, Federal Security Service. See  FSB
121, 129, 197, 254 Federal Tax Police, 75
demokratizatsiya, 45 Fisher, William (aka Rudolf Abel), 223
Deryabin, Petr, 51, 97, 154 Fitin, Pavel, 41
Director of National Intelligence, 79, 80 Foreign Intelligence Service. See  SVR
disinformation, 26–27, 107, 119, 145, 159, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
189, 191–197, 198, 267, 272 Federation, 96, 104, 177
diversionary intelligence group (DRG), FPS (Federal Border Guard Service), 58, 65
179, 183, 188, 198 Frenzel, Alfred, 122
Dmitrievski, Kristian, 142 Frith, Henry. See  Cherepanov, Sergey
double agent, 27–29, 40 Frolov, Dmitry, 158
Drugov, Fedor, 22 FSB (Federal Security Service), 12, 58, 60,
Dulles Plan, 54, 272 65–69, 73, 75, 76, 86, 89, 98, 155–159,
Dutch Safety Board, 128, 197 239, 241, 268
Dzerzhinskiy, Feliks, 33 Alfa, 68, 208
Border Guard Service, 67
E Center 16 (Military Unit 71330), 68,
Eas7. See  Belousova, Alisa 242
economic counterintelligence, 82, 152 Center for Information Security
economic intelligence, 63, 82, 144–159 (TsIB), 68
elections targeting, 118–121, 197 Counterintelligence Service, 66
electronic intelligence (ELINT), 239, Department K, 153, 158
249–254 Department P, 153
Energetic Bear, 161 Department T, 153
“ENORMOUS”, 174 Economic Counterintelligence
European Union, 106, 109, 194 Service, 152

361
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Economic Security Service, 67 Unit 29155, 198, 207

Military Counterintelligence Service, Unit 54777 (72nd Special Service
40, 67 Center), 198
Service for the Defense of the Unit 74455 (Main Center for Special
Constitutional Order and Fight Technologies, GTsST), 197
Against Terrorism, 66, 91 GUGB (Main Directorate for State
Vympel, 68, 208 Security), 38
FSK (Federal Counterintelligence Service), GU (Main Directorate of the General
58 Staff ), 73–75
FSO (Federal Protective Service), 60, GUO (Main Administration of Protection),
69–71, 73, 100 58, 60
Fuchs, Klaus, 174 Guriyev, Lidiya and Vladimir (aka Cynthia
and Richard Murphy), 57, 109
G Gusev, Stanislav, 110, 246
Gebrev, Emilian, 210
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), H
254–256 Haftar, Khalifa, 201
Gidis, Jose Maria, 28 Hanssen, Robert, 15, 127, 219, 229
Ginzberg, Samuel (aka Walter Krivitsky), Haswani, George, 151
32, 34, 46, 47, 48, 136, 147, 223 Heathfield, Donald. See  Bezrukov, Andrey
glasnost, 11, 45 Helfand, Leon, 35
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 44–45, 56, 130 Hendler, Mikhail (aka Mikhail Stein), 33
Gordievsky, Oleg, 23, 103, 104 Hero of the Russian Federation, 17, 75, 187,
Gouzenko, Igor, 170, 174, 232 265
GPU. See  State Political Directorate Hoover Institution Archives, 11
Graff, Aleksandr (aka Alexander Barmine), Howard, Edward Lee, 15, 229
47 human intelligence (HUMINT), 108–110,
Great Purge (Yezhovshchina), 17, 29, 38, 113–117, 122–124, 132, 142, 217–234
40, 43, 51
Greenglass, David, 174 I
GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the IG Farbenindustrie, 137
Soviet Armed Forces General Staff ), 42, IL-20 SIGINT aircraft, 250, 251
46–50, 75, 113–117, 136, 138, 165–173, IL-22PP SIGINT/electronic warfare
181, 236, 254 platform, 250
6th Directorate, 236, 239, 253 Impuls, 245
Spetsnaz, 199 InfoRos, 198
Unit 26165 (85 Special Service Main Intelligence Department. See  Razvedupr
Center), 197, 253 International Democracy Foundation, 11

362
 Index

International Department (INO), 30, 34, Kondor program, 255

61 Konoplev, Vladimir, 139
Islamic State, 151, 196, 200 Kopatskiy, Aleksandr, 211
ITAR-TASS news agency, 148 Korobov, Igor Valentinovich, 74
Korshunov, Aleksandr, 15, 142
J Kostyukov, Igor Olegovich, 74
Jeffries, Randy Miles, 15 Kouzminov, Alexander, 223
Jobbik Party, 109 Kovacs, Bela, 109
Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), Kovalev, Nikolay, 71
25, 26, 30, 32, 38, 147, 203 Koval, George, 17
Joyal, Paul, 207 Kozyrev, Andrey, 55
Krivitsky, Walter. See  Ginzberg, Samuel
K Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 45, 61, 104, 130,
Kalugin, Oleg, 23, 122, 180, 211, 212, 243, 176
244 Kudirka, Simas, 154
Karetnikov, Aleksey, 226, 227 Kutepov, Aleksandr, 25, 207
Karpov, Petr Mikhailovich, 26–27, 147, Kutsik, Mikhail, 227
154
Kaznacheyev, Aleksandr, 196, 229 L
KGB (Committee for State Security), 12, Lazaro, Juan. See  Vasenkov, Mikhail
13, 22–24, 23, 44–45, 51, 53–61, 54, 73, Lenin, Vladimir, 34, 48
87, 89, 106, 138, 139, 179, 190, 210, 212, Liana program, 253
229, 236, 239, 241 Liman, 249
1st Chief Directorate, 61, 75, 136 Line EM, 232
1st Chief Directorate, Department 16, Line KR, 63, 232
238 Line N, 232
3rd Chief Directorate, 25, 30, 67 Line OT, 233, 245
5th Directorate, 25, 29, 54, 58, 67, 98 Line PR, 63
9th Directorate, 69 Line SK, 232
13th Department, 179 Line X, 63, 139, 142
Directorate T, 63, 138 Litvinenko, Aleksandr, 122, 127, 207, 212
Khangoshvili, Zelimkhan, 69, 202 Lotos-2, 253
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 156 Lourdes, Cuba, 240, 244
Khokhlov, Yevgeniy, 43, 223 Lyalin, Oleg, 179, 182, 219
Khudaverdyan, Tigran, 100
Kiselnikova, Raya, 233 M
Kochnev, Dmitriy Viktorovich, 70 MacKinlay, Andrew, 122
Kometa, 254 MacMillan, James, 89, 233, 238

363
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Maersk shipping line, 182 Möller, Martin, 113

Magnitsky, Sergey, 157, 158 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 11, 35, 48
Magomedov, Ali, 97 Monarchist Organization of Central Russia
Main Administration of Protection. (MOTsR), 28
See  GUO Mondich, Mikhail, 40, 211
Main Directorate of the General Staff. Morozova, Anna, 187
See  GU Murphy, Cynthia and Richard. See  Guriyev,
main enemy concept, 35, 42, 54 Lidiya and Vladimir
Main Intelligence Directorate of the MVD. See  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Soviet Armed Forces General Staff. See 
GRU N
Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, 127, 195, Naryshkin, Sergey Yevgenyevich, 65, 69,
197 222
Malinov, Nikolai, 110 National Guard of the Russian Federation
Manhattan Project, 17 (Rosgvardiya), 71–73
Marin, Yuri Michael. See  Pyatakov, Yuriy National Intelligence Priorities Framework
Markov, Georgy, 206 (NIPF), 80
Martin, William, 229 National Security Council, 79
Massing, Hede, 224 NATO. See  North Atlantic Treaty
MB (Ministry of Security), 58 Organization
McCarthy, Joseph, 42 Navalny, Aleksey, 98, 157, 158, 202, 203
measures of support, 63, 145, 149, 191 Nazi party, 35, 43, 44, 48, 187
MGB. See  Ministry of State Security Near Abroad, 54, 75, 106
MI5, 103 Nemtsov, Boris, 98, 203
military intelligence, 27, 46–50, 82, Nestorovich, Vladimir, 211
165–186 Neumann, Janosh. See  Artamonov,
Military Topographic Division of the Aleksey
General Staff, 254 Nicholson, Harold, 15
Mills, Patricia. See  Perevezeva, Natalya Nikolayev, Lev. See  Orlov, Alexander
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 41, 57 Norris, George, 26
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), 40, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
71, 100 (NATO), 73, 104, 106, 109, 113–117,
Ministry of Security. See  MB 127, 128, 139, 176, 185, 194, 207, 248,
Ministry of State Security (MGB), 25, 40, 249, 264
238 Norwegian Parliament Building, 125, 246
Mitchell, Bernon, 229 Nosenko, Yuriy, 89
Mitrokhin, Vasiliy, 27, 138, 175, 178, 180, NotPetya, 181, 182, 188
190–191, 243 Nunn May, Alan, 174

364
 Index

O Petrova, Yevdokiya (aka Kartseva), 41, 233

Obama, Barack, 227, 264 Petrov, Vladimir. See  Shorokhov, Afanasiy
OGPU. See  Joint State Political Directorate Pitts, Earl, 15
Okhrana, 11, 19, 21–29 Podobniy, Viktor, 148
Okno Outer-Space Control System Poeteray, Raymond, 115, 227
(SKKP), 241 political intelligence, 63, 81, 103–130
Okolovich, Georgiy, 207 Politkovskaya, Anna, 203
“Olympic Destroyer”, 183, 198 Polyakov, Dmitriy, 169
Open Skies Treaty, 184, 271 Popov, Petr, 168
Operation INFEKTION, 192, 196 Poretskiy, Ignatiy (aka Ignace Reiss), 32, 47,
Operation RYaN (nuclear missile attack), 137, 146
175 Poteyev, Aleksandr, 225
Operation Trest (Trust), 28, 30 Presidential Security Service, 70
Opperput, Eduard. See  Upeninsh, Primakov, Yevgeniy, 12, 191
Aleksandr Putin, Vladimir, 21, 44, 46, 53–54, 56,
Organization for the Prohibition of 60–61, 65, 69, 72, 86–88, 91, 97, 98,
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 111, 129, 106, 122, 130, 131, 143, 155, 156, 195,
246 200, 205, 225, 263–265
Orlov, Alexander, 9–10, 81–83, 138, 153, Pyatakov, Yuriy (aka Yury Michael Marin),
211 211, 247
Orlov, Vladimir, 26 Pyatnitskiy, Osip, 32
Ovakimyan, Gaik, 137
Ovchinnikov, Ivan, 240 Q
Qadhafi, Moammar, 189, 264
P
Palaez, Vicky, 57 R
Patricof, Alan, 227 Radio-electronic Intelligence, 236
Patrushev, Nikolai, 156 Radio Free Europe, 230
Pelton, Ronald, 15 radio-technical intelligence. See  signals
Penkovsky, Oleg, 169 intelligence
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs Raketa, 245
(NKVD), 9, 38 Rastvorov, Yuriy, 88, 228
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs razvedka, 46, 187, 198
(Narkomindel), 31 Razvedupr, 32, 46, 47
perestroika, 11, 45 Rebet, Lev, 207
Perevezeva, Natalya (aka Patricia Mills), Registupr (Registration Department), 46
227 Reilly, Sydney, 24
persona non grata, 218 Reiss, Ignace. See  Poretskiy, Ignatiy

365
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Repin, Mikhail, 122, 228 Shorokhov, Afanasiy (aka Vladimir Petrov),

Rezun, Vladimir (aka Viktor Suvorov), 138, 89, 219
199, 228 signals intelligence (SIGINT), 110–111,
RIMPAC, 248 139, 197, 236–251
Rose, Fred, 121 Simm, Herman, 113
Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 174 Sipelgas, Aleksandr, 223
Roskomnadzor, 100 Skripal, Sergey, 129, 169, 195, 212, 219, 267
Rosneft, 65, 151, 157 SMERSH. See  Counterintelligence
Rostec, 142, 149, 239 Directorate (UKR)
Round the World Trading Company, 155 Smolenkov, Oleg, 212
RUNET, 101 Snowden, Edward, 127, 268
Rusnano, 141 Society for Social Reform, 156
Russian Oil Products, 146 SODCIT. See  Strategic Operation for
Russian Orthodox Church, 221, 229 the Destruction of Critically Important
Russophiles National Movement, 110 Targets
Russophobia, 8, 189, 273 SoftBank, 150
SolarWinds, 161, 163, 258
S Sorge, Richard, 43, 223
Sabca, 139 SORM. See  System for Operational
sabotage, 41–45, 179–180, 181 Investigative Measures
Sabotka, Anton, 15 Sovfracht, 150
Salimanov, Georgiy, 211 Spanish Civil War, 9, 48
San Francisco Russian Consulate, 139, 244, spearphishing, 90, 128, 181
270 Special Section (OO), 25, 30, 40
Saracoğlu, Sukru, 88 Sporyshev, Igor, 148, 151
Saudi Red Crescent, 156 Stalin, Iosif, 9, 28, 34, 35, 38, 39, 43, 47–49,
SAVAK (Iran), 180 51, 53, 106, 130, 137, 138, 147, 179
science and technology (S&T) intelligence, Stashynsky, Bogdan, 212
63, 136–144 State Duma, 98, 100, 157
Sechin, Igor, 151, 157 State Political Directorate (GPU), 38
Semenko, Mikhail, 226, 227 State Security Workers Day (Chekists Day),
Semyonov, Yulian, 44 57
Sergun, Igor Dmitriyevich, 74 Stein, Mikhail. See  Hendler, Mikhail
Šešelis, Romanas, 151 Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), 176
Seventeen Moments of Spring, 44, 54 Strategic Operation for the Destruction of
Shelaputin, Vadim, 25 Critically Important Targets (SODCIT),
Shevchenko, Arkadiy, 230, 244 177, 178, 181, 247
Sheymov, Viktor, 237 Strauss, Robert, 54

366
 Index

Sudmalis, Imant, 187 United Engine Corporation (UEC), 142

Sudoplatov, Pavel, 13, 41 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer
Suvorov, Viktor. See  Rezun, Vladimir Group (UNIIMOG), 113
SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), 12, Upeninsh, Aleksandr (aka Eduard
61–65, 73, 81, 108, 113–117, 144, Opperput), 28
150–151 US-A (Active Guided Satellite), 253
Directorate ER, 63 U.S. Department of State, 192, 246
Directorate KR, 63 U.S. Peace Corps, 156
Directorate MS, 63 US-P (Passive Guided Satellite), 253
Directorate NTR, 63
Directorate OT, 64 V
Directorate PR, 62 Vasenkov, Mikhail (aka Juan Lazaro), 57,
Directorate S, 63 226
Zaslon, 64 Vasilyev, Andrey, 158
System for Operational Investigative Vassiliev, Aleksandr, 12
Measures (SORM), 99, 241 Vavilova, Yelena (aka Tracy Lee Foley), 57,
224, 226, 227
T VChK. See  All-Russian Extraordinary
Telegram, 100 Commission for Combating
The Intelligence Officer’s Deed, 43 Counterrevolution and Sabotage
TLSContact, 89 Venomous Bear (aka Turla), 68, 161
Torshin, Aleksandr, 123, 124 Venona program, 16
Tretyakov, Sergey, 108, 150, 232 Vetrov, Vladimir, 139, 219
Trilisser, Mikhail, 32 Viktor Leonov, AGI, 248
Trotsky, Lev, 31, 47 VneshEconomBank, 148, 221
Trump, Donald, 264 Volodarsky, Iosif, 137, 146
Tsarev, Oleg, 12 Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics,
Tselina program, 251–254 139
Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance, 251 Von Stierlitz, Max Otto, 44
Tu-214R SIGINT collection and targeting Voodoo Bear, 181
aircraft, 250 Vorontsov, Sergey, 145
Tukhachevskiy, Mikhail, 40, 48 Vostochniy Launch Site, 259
Tumanov, Oleg, 230 Vyugin, Oleg, 158
Turla. See  Venomous Bear
W
U Wagner Group, 201
Umerenko, Yevgeniy, 142 Walker, John, 15, 229, 233, 238
Unified Space System (EKS Kupol), 255 Warnig, Matthias, 152

367
 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE

Warsaw Pact, 106, 174, 240, 251, 264 Yantar (undersea research ship), 184, 249
Westinghouse Electric Company, 160 Yarovaya Law, 100
Whelan, Paul, 87 “Year of the Spy”, 15, 125
Wikileaks, 196 Yeltsin, Boris, 54, 56, 58, 263
Workers and Peasants Red Army (RKKA), Yezhov, Nikolay, 38
30 Yezhovshchina. See  Great Purge
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Yukos, 156
183, 197, 246 Yurchenko, Vitaliy, 15
World Economic Forum (WEF), 110,
247 Z
Zaitsev, Mikhail, 238
Y Zatuliveter, Katia, 123, 124, 231
Yagoda, Genrikh, 38 Zenit (counterintelligence intercept
Yakovlev, Aleksandr, 11 program), 245
Yakushev, Aleksandr, 28 Zenit (satellite program), 254
Yandex, 100 Zhiganov, Oleg, 123
Yantar (cartographic satellite program), Zhigunov, Aleksandr, 88
254–255 Zolotov, Viktor Vasilyevich, 71, 72

368