TOPIC: Neglect of duty in not retaining copy of marriage contract AUTHOR: Ynares-Santiago, J.

TITLE: Beso vs. Daguman CASE NO.: A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211

TICKLER: DATE: January 28, 2000
DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
-Zenaida Beso charged Judge Juan Daguman Jr. with 1) solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and 2) negligence in not retaining a copy of marriage contract and also not registering such
marriage contracts with the office of the civil registrar
-Beso alleges that on August 23, 1997, her marriage with Bernardito Yman was solemnized by Judge Daguman in his residence in Calbayog City, Samar
-That after her wedding, her husband abandoned her and so she went to the civil registrar to inquire regarding her marriage contract but to her surprise their marriage was not registered;
-Petitioner Beso wrote Judge Daguman to inquire of the incident but she was informed by the same that all the copies were taken by Oloy and no copy was retained by him

Respondent averred he solemnized the Beso and his spouse outside his residence since he was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita and the spouses came to
him only unexpectedly reguesting that the marriage celebration happen immediately because petitioner is scheduled to fly to abroad (OFW)
-That this will potentially cause the lapse of the marriage license and would necessitate the spouses to cause publication of notice and also for other impracticable reasons as to the expense and
finding other date and venue;
-That during the time he solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
That on the issue that he failed to register the duplicate and triplicate copies of marriage cert, he explained that circumstances was out of his control since he left the remaining three copies on the
top of his desk in his private office but a few days following the wedding he gathered all his paper but the copies were missing.

OCA declared that respondent judge is only authorized to solemnize marriage at Sta Margarita Tarangan, Pagsanjan Samar and not allowed outside of this jurisdiction. Moreover, respondent judge
neglected his duty when he failed to register marriage of petitioner to Bernardito Yman.
OCA- committed malfeasasnce in office, fined 5,000.00
Court finds findings of OCA well taken
ISSUE/S:
WON there was neglect of duty in the part of respondent judge in failing to retain copies of the marriage contract

RULING:
Yes. The act of respondent judge constituted to neglect of duty. The court held that judges are commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in
accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that—

ART. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the cote and
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local
civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of
the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.

The court agreed with the evaluation of the OCA, that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the
records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge’s part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of
his official functions.
Courts adopted the fine recommendation of OCA- P5,000 and sternly warned that repetition will warrant a more severe penalty.

TOPIC: Divorce decree; Absolute Divorce in a foreign country AUTHOR: Melencio-Herrera, J

TITLE: Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. CASE NO.: 39 SCRA 239

TICKLER: effect of divorce on parties and conjugal properties in PH DATE:

DOCTRINE: "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
(In accordance with Art. 26, FC)

FACTS:
-Petition for certiorari and prohibition
-Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside orders in civil case no. 1075-P issued by respondent judge which denied her motion to dismiss said case and motion for reconsideration of
dismissal order, respectively.
-Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines
-Private respondent (ex husband) is a citizen of United States
-They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after marriage they established residence in PH and begot 2 children and divorced in NEVADA, US and petitioner remarried in Nevada to
Theodore Van Dorn.
- private respondent (ex husband) filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property.
-Petitioner then moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement of divorce before the Nevada court where it was pronounced that they had
“no community property”
-The court by herein respondent judge Romillo, Jr. denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property is located in PH and Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Contention of private respondent:

- avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy and that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction

Contention of petitioner:
-Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law

ISSUE/S:
WON the Nevada divorce decree is valid and may be recognized here in PH?
RULING:
Yes.  There can be no question as to the validity of Nevada Divorce in any of the state.The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.

Owing to the nationality principle, only PH nationals are covered by policy against absolute divorce. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad which may be recognized in PH provided they
are valid according to their national law.

In this case, Nevada divorce decree released private respondent from marriage and dissolves the marriage.
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

TOPIC: Cohabitation; Exemption from marriage license requirement; exclusivity AUTHOR: Ynares-Santiago, J.
TITLE: Ninal vs Bayadog CASE NO.: GR no. 13378
TICKLER: DATE: March 14, 2000
DOCTRINE:
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party
as being one as “husband and wife.”

FACTS:
-Pepito Niñal married Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
-Out of their marriage herein petitioners.
-Teodulfa was shot by pepito resulting to her death and after a year and 8 mos. Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
-In lieu thereof, they have executed an affidavit stating that they lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and exempt from securing marriage cert.
-Pepito died of car accident and after his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between pepito to norma alleging that such marriage was void for lack of
marriage and to that effect, the petitioners successional rights will be affected.
-Norma filed a motion to dismiss contending that due to their cohabitation, they are within the persons exempted within the contemplation of law stating that  wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
RTC-dismissed

ISSUE/S: WON the cohabitation of Pepito and Norma is within the contemplation of Art 34?

RULING:
No. Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated
in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-ear period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law.

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.

Order of RTC is reversed and set aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Case is ordered REINSTATED.

TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity; Void Marriages AUTHOR: Brion, J.

TITLE: So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009 CASE NO.: G.R. No. 150677
TICKLER: DATE: June 5, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Under art 35 (Void marriages)

FACTS:
-Petition for review on Certiorari on a decision dated July 4, 2012 by CA
-Petitioner and respondent met at a party on 1973. At that time petitioner was 17 yr old highschool student while respondent was 21 yr old college student.
-They had common law relationship for 19 years until getting married on 1991.
-Their marriage bore them 3 children.
-Petitioner filed with RTC petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with respondent. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of essential and formal requisites and
claims that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise essential obligations of marriage.
-That sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a b blank application for marriage license and the petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that the
documents will be signed only when they get married.
-Also, he enumerated some of alleged behavior of respondent constituting to his claim of phychological incapacity.

-She influenced him to take marijuana when they were just sweethearts
-did not pass her dental board exam and had extra marital affairs with a classmate
-she quit her dental practice and joined him in the business and always interfered with his decisions and was strict with employees
-gambles with employees when they were no clients
-overreacts and shouts when he comes home after celebrateing with clients and closes a deal
-threw his things out when he came home late and drunk

RTC-nullified; declared void

CA- declares valid

ISSUE/S:
WON the marriage between the spouses is void

RULING:
-No. The marriage is deemed valid. The court denied the petition for lack of merit and holds that no sufficient basis to annul marriage since 1) No case of lack of essential and formal requisites
of marriage has been proven or ruled upon by the trial court and 2) pursuant to art 36 of family code.

On the first, the trial court did not clearly express that there were indeed deficiencies in the essential and formal requisite specifically on the marriage contract and license. It was the
petitioner himself who offered the marriage contract as evidence. As a public document, it has the presumption of regulatity. To contradict this presumption, there must be an independent
evidence showing physical impossibility or forgery and not just his testimony as witness.
On the second, the totality of evidence failed to establish psych incapacity to perform essential marital obligation. As anchored  on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. n examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate
with one
another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were,
snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough
to be reliable. Psychologist testimony failed to show that the adjustment disorder that manifested through impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility was medically or clinically
permanent and incurable.
“Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,”“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

Petition is denied and ruling of CA Affirmed. Costs against Petitioner.