CIV CASES SEPT 11

Benedicto v. De L7 R7m7

– WON the CFIs h-d jurisdiction over divorce c-ses instituted on August 13,
1898, -nd if they do, upon wh-t l-w - YES, the p-rtid-s.
– Civil Code - NO.
– By the rov-l decree of July 31, 1889, the Civil Code -s it existed in the
Peninsul- w-s extended to the Philippines. The "cumpl-se" of the
governor-gener-l w-s -ffixed to this decree on September 12, 1889.
The Code w-s published in the G-cet- de M-nil- on November 17,
1889, -nd took effect -s - l-w on December 8, 1889. On December
31, 1889, -n order w-s published in the G-cet- de M-nil- suspending
title 4 of the Civil Code (which the lower court ruled w-s b-sis for
their jurisdiction over divorce c-ses).
– Thus, the SC h-d to look for l-ws in force before 1889.
– Gener-l Orders No. 68 - NO.
– S-ys nothing -bout divorce.
– C-non L-w - NO.
– This doesnʼt h-ve binding force outside of the church. However, -ny
p-rt of the c-non l-w which by proper -ction of the civil -uthorities
h-d become - civil l-w stood upon the s-me footing -s -ny other l-w
of Sp-in. This h-ppened in the c-se of the decree of the council of
Trent. But even if the decree could extend its -pplic-tion to the PH,
the c-uses for divorce -re nowhere distinctly st-ted therein.
– Decret-l l-w - NO.
– Did not h-ve the effect of m-king the c-nons mentioned therein civil
l-ws. It simply decl-red th-t the church might try the c-ses referred
to -ccording to its own l-ws in its own courts -nd th-t the St-te
would enforce the decrees of the l-tter.
– P-rtid-s - YES.
– Divortium, in L-tin, me-ns, in common speech, sep-r-tion
(dep-rtimiento), -nd is the me-ns by which the wife is sep-r-ted from
the husb-nd, -nd the husb-nd from the wife, on -ccount of some
impediment existing between them, when it is properly proved in
court.
– The only ground for divorce now of import-nce here is -dultery. Also,
The divorce did not -nnul the m-rri-ge. Th-t either spouse h-s been
guilty of -dultery is - defense to his or her suit, so is the f-ct th-t he
h-s p-rdoned her. And if, -fter - divorce h-s been gr-nted to the
husb-nd, he commit -dultery, there is - w-iver of the judgment.
 – Were these provisions of the p-rtid-s in force in the Isl-nds prior to
1889?
– The gener-l rule w-s th-t l-ws of the Peninsul- did not rule in the
colonies unless they were expressly extended to them. As to
cert-in l-ws, this result w-s, however, -ccomplished in -nother
w-y. In the Recopil-cion de l-s Leyes Indi-s, it w-s provided th-t
-s to -ll m-tters not provided for by the l-ws of this compil-tion,
the l-ws of the compil-tions -nd the p-rtid-s of these Kingdom of
C-stile sh-ll be followed.
– The result is:
– (1) th-t Courts of First inst-nce h-ve jurisdiction to entert-in -
suit for divorce;
– (2) th-t the only ground therefor is -dultery;
– (3) th-t -n -ction on th-t ground c-n be m-int-ined by the
husb-nd -g-inst the wife, or by the wife -g-inst the husb-nd;
-nd
– (4) th-t the decree does not dissolve the m7rri7ge bond.

Alb7no v. G7pus7n

– WON - judge m-y be held guilty of gross ignor-nce of the l-w for h-ving
not-rized - document providing for the person-l sep-r-tion of husb-nd -nd
wife -nd the extr-judici-l liquid-tion of their conjug-l p-rtnership, before his
-ppointment to the bench - NO. He c-n be censured -s - member of the b-r,
but his not-riz-tion of th-t document does not w-rr-nt -ny disciplin-ry -ction
-g-inst him -s - municip-l judge especi-lly considering th-t his -ppointment
to the judici-ry w-s screened by the Commission on Appointments.
– Judge G-pus-n denied th-t he dr-fted the -greement. He expl-ined
th-t the spouses h-d been sep-r-ted for - long time when they
signed the sep-r-tion -greement -nd th-t the wife h-d begotten
children with her p-r-mour. He s-id th-t there w-s - stipul-tion in the
-greement th-t the spouses would live together in c-se of
reconcili-tion. His belief w-s th-t the sep-r-tion -greement
forest-lled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses.
– There is no question th-t the coven-nts cont-ined in the s-id
sep-r-tion -greement -re contr-ry to l-w, mor-ls -nd good customs.
"M-rri-ge is not - mere contr-ct but -n inviol-ble soci-l institution".
"The f-mily is - b-sic soci-l institution which public policy cherishes
-nd protects." M-rri-ge -nd the f-mily -re the b-ses of hum-n
society throughout the civilized world.
– To preserve the institutions of m7rri7ge 7nd the f7mily, the l7w
considers 7s void "7ny contr7ct for person7l sep7r7tion between
husb7nd 7nd wife" 7nd "every extr7judici7l 7greement, during
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the m7rri7ge, for the dissolution of the conjug7l p7rtnership.”

– A not-ry should not f-cilit-te the disintegr-tion of - m-rri-ge -nd the
f-mily by encour-ging the sep-r-tion of the spouses -nd
extr-judici-lly dissolving the conjug-l p-rtnership. Not-ries were
severely censured by this Court for not-rizing documents which
subvert the institutions of m-rri-ge -nd the f-mily.

In re Atty. Rufillo Buc7n7

– WON - not-ry public m-y be subject to -dministr-tive s-nction for h-ving

not-rized -n Agreement between spouses th-t "in c-se -nyone of them will
rem-rry both p-rties offer no objection -nd w-ive -ll civil -nd crimin-l -ctions
-g-inst them" -nd th-t the -fore-mentioned Agreement w-s "entered into for
the purpose of -greement to -llow e-ch -nd everyone of them to rem-rry
without objection or reserv-tion ..." - YES.
– Atty. Buc-n- -dmitted th-t he not-rized the -fore-mentioned document
-nd th-t the Agreement is "immor-l -nd -g-inst public policy", but in
mitig-tion he -sserted th-t the document in question w-s Prep-red by his
clerk, Luci- D. Doctolero without his previous knowledge; th-t when s-id
document w-s presented to him for sign-ture -fter it w-s signed by the
p-rties, he vehemently refused to sign it -nd informed the p-rties th-t the
document w-s immor-l; th-t he pl-ced the s-id document on his t-ble
-mong his files -nd more th-n - week l-ter, he -sked his clerk where the
document w-s for the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he
found th-t the s-me w-s not-rized by him -s per his file copies in the
office; th-t he disp-tched his clerk to get the copy from the p-rties, but
the -fore-mentioned p-rties could not be found in their respective
residences; th-t he must h-ve in-dvertently not-rized the s-me in view of
the numerous documents on his t-ble -nd -t th-t time he w-s emotion-lly
disturbed -s his f-ther (now dece-sed) w-s then seriously ill.
– There is no question th7t the 7fore-mentioned Agreement is contr7ry
to l7w, mor7ls 7nd good customs. M-rri-ge is -n inviol-ble soci-l
institution, in the m-inten-nce of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested for it is the found-tion of the f-mily -nd of society without
which there could be neither civiliz-tion nor progress. The contr7ct, in
subst7nce, purports to formul7te 7n 7greement between the
husb7nd 7nd the wife to t7ke unto himself 7 concubine 7nd the wife
to live in 7dulterous rel7tions with 7nother m7n, without opposition
from either one, 7nd wh7t is more, it induces e7ch p7rty to commit
big7my. This is not only immor7l but in effect 7bets the commission
of 7 crime. A not-ry public, by virtue of the n-ture of his office, is
required to exercise his duties with due c-re -nd with due reg-rd to the
provisions of existing l-w.
Tench7vez v. Esc7no

– Whether Philippine courts c-n recognize - foreign divorce decree between

Filipino spouses in order to dismiss - petition for leg-l sep-r-tion -nd
d-m-ges filed by one of the spouses - NO.
– At the time the divorce decree w7s issued, Vicent7 Esc7ño, like her
husb7nd, w7s still 7 Filipino citizen. She w7s then subject to
Philippine l7w, -nd Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep.
Act No. 386), -lre-dy in force -t the time, expressly provided:
– L-ws rel-ting to f-mily rights -nd duties or to the st-tus, condition
-nd leg-l c-p-city of persons -re binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living -bro-d.
– The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not 7dmit
7bsolute divorce, quo -d vinculo m-trimonii; -nd in f-ct does not even
use th-t term, to further emph-size its restrictive policy on the m-tter, in
contr-st to the preceding legisl-tion th-t -dmitted -bsolute divorce on
grounds of -dultery of the wife or concubin-ge of the husb-nd (Act 2710).
Inste7d of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for leg7l
sep7r7tion (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), 7nd, even in th7t c7se, it
expressly prescribes th7t "the m7rri7ge bonds sh7ll not be
severed" (Art. 106, subp-r. 1).
– For the Philippine courts to recognize 7nd give recognition or effect
to 7 foreign decree of 7bsolute divorce between Filipino citizens could
be 7 p7tent viol7tion of the decl7red public policy of the st7te,
speci7lly in view of the third p7r7gr7ph of Article 17 of the Civil Code
th-t prescribes the following:
– Prohibitive l-ws concerning persons, their -cts or property, -nd those
which h-ve for their object public order, policy -nd good customs,
sh-ll not be rendered ineffective by l-ws or judgments promulg-ted,
or by determin-tions or conventions -greed upon in - foreign country.
– Even more, the gr7nt of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign
divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to 7n irrit7ting 7nd
sc7nd7lous discrimin7tion in f7vor of we7lthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose me-ns do not permit
them to sojourn -bro-d -nd obt-in -bsolute divorces outside the
Philippines.
– From the preceding f-cts -nd consider-tions, there flows -s - necess-ry
consequence th-t in this jurisdiction Vicent- Esc-ño's divorce -nd second
m-rri-ge -re not entitled to recognition -s v-lid; for her previous union to
pl-intiff Tench-vez must be decl-red to be existent -nd undissolved. It
follows, likewise, th-t her refus-l to perform her wifely duties, -nd her
deni-l of consortium -nd her desertion of her husb-nd constitute in l-w -
 wrong c-used through her f-ult, for which the husb-nd is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither -n
unsubst-nti-ted ch-rge of deceit nor -n -nonymous letter ch-rging
immor-lity -g-inst the husb-nd constitute, contr-ry to her cl-im,
-dequ-te excuse. Wherefore, her m-rri-ge -nd coh-bit-tion with Russell
Leo Mor-n is technic-lly "intercourse with - person not her husb-nd" from
the st-ndpoint of Philippine L-w, -nd entitles pl-intiff--ppell-nt
Tench-vez to - decree of "leg-l sep-r-tion under our l-w, on the b-sis of
-dultery."

V7n Dorn v. Romillo

– WON the Nev-d- divorce of - Filipino -nd -n Americ-n, obt-ined by the

husb-nd who is - US citizen, c-n be recognized in the Philippine jurisdiction
so th-t the husb-nd would not h-ve leg-l st-nding to sue the wife in respect
of their conjug-l -ssets - YES.
– There c-n be no question -s to the v-lidity of th-t Nev-d- divorce in -ny
of the St-tes of the United St-tes. The decree is binding on priv-te
respondent -s -n Americ-n citizen. For inst-nce, priv-te respondent
c-nnot sue petitioner, -s her husb-nd, in -ny St-te of the Union. Wh-t he
is contending in this c-se is th-t the divorce is not v-lid -nd binding in
this jurisdiction, the s-me being contr-ry to loc-l l-w -nd public policy.
– It is true th7t owing to the n7tion7lity principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine n7tion7ls 7re covered by the policy
7g7inst 7bsolute divorces the s7me being considered contr7ry to our
concept of public policy 7nd mor7lity. However, 7liens m7y obt7in
divorces 7bro7d, which m7y be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they 7re v7lid 7ccording to their n7tion7l l7w. In this c-se,
the divorce in Nev-d- rele-sed priv-te respondent from the m-rri-ge
from the st-nd-rds of Americ-n l-w, under which divorce dissolves the
m-rri-ge. As st-ted by the Feder-l Supreme Court of the United St-tes in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
– The purpose -nd effect of - decree of divorce from the bond of
m-trimony by - court of competent jurisdiction -re to ch-nge the
existing st-tus or domestic rel-tion of husb-nd -nd wife, -nd to free
them both from the bond. The m-rri-ge tie when thus severed -s to
one p-rty, ce-ses to bind either. A husb-nd without - wife, or - wife
without - husb-nd, is unknown to the l-w. When the l-w provides, in
the n-ture of - pen-lty. th-t the guilty p-rty sh-ll not m-rry -g-in,
th-t p-rty, -s well -s the other, is still -bsolutely freed from the bond
of the former m-rri-ge.
– Thus, pursu-nt to his n-tion-l l-w, priv-te respondent is no longer the
husb-nd of petitioner. He would h-ve no st-nding to sue in the c-se
 –

below -s petitioner's husb-nd entitled to exercise control over conjug-l

-ssets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
v-lidly exercised jurisdiction over him, -nd whose decision he does not
repudi-te, he is estopped by his own represent-tion before s-id Court
from -sserting his right over the -lleged conjug-l property.
– To m7int7in, 7s priv7te respondent does, th7t, under our l7ws,
petitioner h7s to be considered still m7rried to priv7te respondent
7nd still subject to 7 wife's oblig7tions under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code c7nnot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect -nd fidelity, -nd render support to priv-te
respondent. The l-tter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjug-l property. She should not be discrimin7ted
7g7inst in her own country if the ends of justice 7re to be served.

Pil7pil v. Ib7y-Somer7

– WON - divorce between - Germ-n n-tion-l -nd - Filipino citizen, obt-ined by

the Germ-n, c-n be recognized in the Philippines so -s to b-r the Germ-n
from instituting -n -dultery c-se -g-inst the Filipino - YES.
– In the present c-se, the f-ct th-t priv-te respondent obt-ined - v-lid
divorce in his country, the Feder-l Republic of Germ-ny, is -dmitted. S-id
divorce -nd its leg-l effects m-y be recognized in the Philippines insof-r
-s priv-te respondent is concerned in view of the n-tion-lity principle in
our civil l-w on the m-tter of st-tus of persons.
– Thus, in the recent c-se of V"n Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et "l., -fter - divorce
w-s gr-nted by - United St-tes court between Alice V-n Dorn, - Filipin-,
-nd her Americ-n husb-nd, the l-tter filed - civil c-se in - tri-l court here
-lleging th-t her business concern w-s conjug-l property -nd pr-ying
th-t she be ordered to render -n -ccounting -nd th-t the pl-intiff be
gr-nted the right to m-n-ge the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstr-ted the error of such st-nce, thus:
– There c-n be no question -s to the v-lidity of th-t Nev-d- divorce in
-ny of the St-tes of the United St-tes. The decree is binding on
priv-te respondent -s -n Americ-n citizen. For inst-nce, priv-te
respondent c-nnot sue petitioner, -s her husb-nd, in -ny St-te of the
Union. ...
– It is true th-t owing to the n-tion-lity principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine n-tion-ls -re covered by the policy
-g-inst -bsolute divorces the s-me being considered contr-ry to our
concept of public policy -nd mor-lity. However, -liens m-y obt-in
divorces -bro-d, which m-y be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they -re v-lid -ccording to their n-tion-l l-w. ...
– Thus, pursu-nt to his n-tion-l l-w, priv-te respondent is no longer the
 –
husb-nd of petitioner. He would h-ve no st-nding to sue in the c-se
below -s petitioner's husb-nd entitled to exercise control over
conjug-l -ssets. ...
– Under the s7me consider7tions 7nd r7tion7le, priv7te respondent,
being no longer the husb7nd of petitioner, h7d no leg7l st7nding to
commence the 7dultery c7se under the imposture th7t he w7s the
offended spouse 7t the time he filed suit.

G7rci7-Recio v. G7rci7

– WON the respondentʼs divorce decree ipso f-cto clothed him with the leg-l
c-p-city to rem-rry, so th-t he is not required to -dduce sufficient evidence
to show the Austr-li-n person-l l-w governing his st-tus; or -t the very le-st,
to prove his leg-l c-p-city to contr-ct - second m-rri-ge - NO.
– The n-ture of the c-se is - Compl-int for Decl-r-tion of Nullity of
M-rri-ge on the ground of big-my.
– Before 7 foreign judgment is given presumptive evidenti7ry v7lue, the
document must first be presented 7nd 7dmitted in evidence. A
divorce obt7ined 7bro7d is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of - judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be - written -ct or record of -n -ct of -n offici-l body or
tribun-l of - foreign country.
– Under Sections 24 -nd 25 of Rule 132, on the other h-nd, - writing or
document m-y be proven -s - public or offici-l record of - foreign
country by either:
– (1) -n offici-l public-tion or
– (2) - copy thereof -ttested by the officer h-ving leg-l custody of the
document.
– If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
– (-) -ccomp-nied by - certific-te issued by the proper diplom-tic or
consul-r officer in the Philippine foreign service st-tioned in the
foreign country in which the record is kept -nd
– (b) -uthentic-ted by the se-l of his office.
– It is is well-settled in our jurisdiction th-t our courts c-nnot t-ke judici-l
notice of foreign l-ws. Like -ny other f-cts, they must be -lleged -nd
proved. Austr-li-n m-rit-l l-ws -re not -mong those m-tters th-t judges
-re supposed to know by re-son of their judici-l function. The power of
judici-l notice must be exercised with c-ution, -nd every re-son-ble
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the neg-tive.
– Moreover, divorces 7re of different types. The two b7sic ones 7re (1)
7bsolute divorce or 7 vinculo m7trimonii 7nd (2) limited divorce or 7
mens7 et thoro. The first kind termin7tes the m7rri7ge, while the
second suspends it 7nd le7ves the bond in full force. There is no
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showing in the c7se 7t b7r which type of divorce w7s procured by

respondent. Respondent presented 7 decree nisi or 7n interlocutory
decree -- 7 condition7l or provision7l judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the s7me 7s 7 sep7r7tion from bed 7nd bo7rd, 7lthough 7n
7bsolute divorce m7y follow 7fter the l7pse of the prescribed period
during which no reconcili7tion is effected.
– Even 7fter the divorce becomes 7bsolute, the court m7y under some
foreign st7tutes 7nd pr7ctices, still restrict rem7rri7ge. Under some
other jurisdictions, rem7rri7ge m7y be limited by st7tute; thus, the
guilty p7rty in 7 divorce which w7s gr7nted on the ground of 7dultery
m7y be prohibited from m7rrying 7g7in. The court m7y 7llow 7
rem7rri7ge only 7fter proof of good beh7vior.

Goiti7 v. C7mpos-Rued7

– WON - demurrer to evidence m-y be properly gr-nted in -n -ction filed by

the wife for support outside the conjug-l domicile, where the wife -lleged th-t
she fled the domicile bec-use her husb-nd dem-nded th-t she perform
unch-ste -nd l-scivious -cts on his genit-l org-ns - NO.
– It w-s urged in the first inst-nce, -nd the court so held, th-t the
defend-nt c-nnot be compelled to support the pl-intiff, except in his own
house, unless it be by virtue of - judici-l decree gr-nting her - divorce or
sep-r-tion from the defend-nt.
– The husb-nd who is obliged to support his wife m-y, -t his option, do
so by p-ying her - fixed pension or by receiving -nd m-int-ining her
in his own home. M-y the husb-nd, on -ccount of his conduct tow-rd
his wife, lose this option -nd be compelled to p-y the pension? YES.
The SC of Sp-in held th-t the option is not -bsolute, -nd this decision
w-s quoted with -pprov-l in United St-tes -nd De Jesus vs. Alvir (9
Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held th-t the rule l-id down in
-rticle 149 of the Civil Code "is not -bsolute -s to prevent c-ses
being considered wherein, either bec-use this right would be opposed
to the exercise of - preferenti-l right or bec7use of the existence of
some justifi7ble c7use mor7lly opposed to the remov7l of the
p7rty enjoying the m7inten7nce, the right of selection must be
understood -s being thereby restricted.”
– It is -rgued th-t to gr-nt support in -n independent suit is equiv-lent to
gr-nting divorce or sep-r-tion, -s it necessit-tes - determin-tion of the
question whether the wife h-s - good -nd sufficient c-use for living
sep-r-te from her husb-nd; -nd, consequently, if - court l-cks power to
decree - divorce, -s in the inst-nt c-se, power to gr-nt - sep-r-te
m-inten-nce must -lso be l-cking.
– The we-kness of this -rgument lies in the -ssumption th-t the power
 –
to gr-nt support in - sep-r-te -ction is dependent upon - power to
gr-nt - divorce. Th-t the one is not dependent upon the other is
-pp-rent from the very n-ture of the m-rit-l oblig-tions of the
spouses. The mere 7ct of m7rri7ge cre7tes 7n oblig7tion on the
p7rt of the husb7nd to support his wife. This oblig7tion is
founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contr7ct of m7rri7ge 7s on the n7tur7l 7nd leg7l duty of the
husb7nd; 7n oblig7tion, the enforcement of which is of such vit7l
concern to the st7te itself th7t the l7ws will not permit him to
termin7te it by his own wrongful 7cts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the p7rent7l home.
– A judgment for sep-r-te m-inten-nce is not due -nd p-y-ble either
-s d-m-ges or -s - pen-lty; nor is it - debt in the strict leg-l sense of
the term, but r-ther - judgment c-lling for the perform-nce of - duty
m-de specific by the m-nd-te of the sovereign. This is done from
necessity -nd with - view to preserve the public pe-ce -nd the purity
of the wife; -s where the husb-nd m-kes so b-se dem-nds upon his
wife -nd indulges in the h-bit of -ss-ulting her. The pro t-nto
sep-r-tion resulting from - decree for sep-r-te support is not -n
impe-chment of th-t public policy by which m-rri-ge is reg-rded -s
so s-cred -nd inviol-ble in its n-ture; it is merely - stronger policy
overruling - we-ker one; -nd except in so f-r only -s such sep-r-tion
is toler-ted -s - me-ns of preserving the public pe-ce -nd mor-ls
m-y be considered, it does not in -ny respect wh-tever imp-ir the
m-rri-ge contr-ct or for -ny purpose pl-ce the wife in the situ-tion of
- femme sole.

People v. Z7p7t7

– WON -dultery is - continuous crime, such th-t - second compl-int of -dultery

for -cts committed in the s-me ye-rs -s in the first compl-int would viol-te
the constitution-l prohibition on double jeop-rdy - NO.
– Adultery is 7 crime of result 7nd not of tendency; it is 7 inst7nt7neous
crime which is consumm7ted 7nd exh7usted or completed 7t the
moment of the c7rn7l union. E7ch sexu7l intercourse constitutes 7
crime of 7dultery (Cuello C-lon, Derecho Pen-l, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two
or more -dulterous -cts committed by the s-me defend-nts -re -g-inst
the s-me person — the offended husb-nd, the s-me st-tus — the union
of the husb-nd -nd wife by their m-rri-ge, -nd the s-me community
represented by the St-te for its interest in m-int-ining -nd preserving
such st-tus. But this identity of the offended p-rty, st-tus society does
not -rgue -g-inst the commission of the crime of -dultery -s m-ny times
-s there were c-rn-l consumm-ted, for -s long -s the st-tus rem-in
 unch-nged, the nexus undissolved -nd unbroken, -n encro-chment or
tresp-ss upon th-t st-tus constitutes - crime. There is no constitution-l
or leg-l provision which b-rs the filing of -s m-ny compl-ints for -dultery
-s there were -dulterous -cts committed, e-ch constituting one crime.
– Another re-son why - second compl-int ch-rging the commission of
-dulterous -cts not included in the first compl-int does not constitute -
viol-tion of the double jeop-rdy cl-use of the constitution is th-t, if the
second compl7int pl7ces the defend7nts twice in jeop7rdy of
punishment for the s7me offense, the 7dultery committed by the
m7le defend7nt ch7rged in the second compl7int, should he be
7bsolved from, or 7cquitted of, the first ch7rge upon the evidence
th7t he did not know th7t his codefend7nt w7s 7 m7rried wom7n,
would rem7in or go unpunished. The defense set up by him -g-inst the
first ch-rge upon which he w-s -cquitted would no longer be -v-il-ble,
bec-use -t the time of the commission of the crime ch-rged in the second
compl-int, he -lre-dy knew th-t this defend-nt w-s - m-rried wom-n
-nd he continued to h-ve c-rn-l knowledge of her. Even if the husb-nd
should p-rdon his -dulterous wife, such p-rdon would not exempt the
wife -nd her p-r-mour from crimin-l li-bility for -dulterous -cts
committed -fter the p-rdon w-s gr-nted bec-use the p-rdon refers to
previous -nd not to subsequent -dulterous -cts.

G7ndionco v. Pen7r7nd7

– WON - conviction for concubin-ge will h-ve to be first secured before the
-ction for leg-l sep-r-tion c-n prosper or succeed, -s the b-sis of the -ction
for leg-l sep-r-tion is the -lleged offense of concubin-ge - NO.
– A decree of leg7l sep7r7tion, on the ground of concubin7ge, m7y be
issued upon proof by preponder7nce of evidence in the 7ction for
leg7l sep7r7tion. No crimin7l proceeding or conviction is necess7ry.
To this end, the doctrine in Fr-ncisco vs. T-y-o h-s been modified, -s
th-t c-se w-s decided under Act. No. 2710, when -bsolute divorce w-s
then -llowed -nd h-d for its grounds the s-me grounds for leg-l
sep-r-tion under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such
former l-w, th-t the guilt of defend-nt spouses h-d to be est-blished by
fin-l judgment in - crimin-l -ction. Th-t requirement h-s not been
reproduced or -dopted by the fr-mers of the present Civil Code, -nd the
omission h-s been uniformly -ccepted -s - modific-tion of the stringent
rule in Fr-ncisco v. T-y-o.

Munoz v. del B7rrio

– WON the m-ltre-tment th-t Felicid-d suffered -t Joseʼs h-nds constituted -n

 –
-ttempt by Jose upon his spouseʼs life, such th-t there is ground for leg-l
sep-r-tion - NO.
– The Court -ssumed th-t the m-ltre-tments Felicid-d suffered before their
sep-r-tion in f-ct must not h-ve -mounted to -ttempts by Jose on her
life, since she did not institute -ny -ction upon the effectivity of the NCC.
This c-se w-s only brought to the court below in Oct. 1951, -fter she h-d
been -llegedly m-ltre-ted in Sept. 1951. (-pplic-ble l-w: Art. 97, NCC)
– A witness for Felicid-d, Jovit- F-ustino, one of their neighbors in
Meyc-u-y-n, testified th-t Jose h-d punched Felicid-d in the f-ce.
Another witness, the P-trolm-n who responded to the spousesʼ encounter
in 1950, -rrived when the -lterc-tion w-s -lre-dy over, but noticed th-t
Felicid-d w-s crying, there were scr-tches on her brow -nd cheeks, -nd
p-rts of her neck were bl-ckened with ecchymosis. Fin-lly, M-nuel
M-ci-s testified -s to the time when the spouses qu-rreled in his office:
Jose boxed his wife on the -bdomen, pulled her h-ir, -nd twisted her
neck, but Atty. M-ci-s -nd two others were -ble to sep-r-te them.
– An -ttempt on - personʼs life implies th-t the -ttempt is moved by
intention to kill, but the Court here decl-red th-t the -lleged
m-ltre-tments by Jose of his wife were not motiv-ted by intent to kill. The
intention to t7ke 7 life must be proved with the s7me degree of
cert7inty 7s is required with respect to other elements of the crime.
Homicid7l intent is shown through 7dequ7te 7cts, which, 7t the time
of their execution, were unmist7k7bly c7lcul7ted to produce the
de7th of the victim. In the -bsence of proof, it is not proper or just to
-ttribute to the delinquent - specific intent to commit the higher crime, in
order to justify such - conclusion.
– Felicid-d -rgues th-t since this is - civil c-se, it suffices to prove her right
of -ction only by - preponder-nce of evidence, -nd not by evidence
beyond re-son-ble doubt, -s is required in crimin-l c-ses.
– In so f7r 7s the intent to kill is concerned, it must be est7blished
with cle7r 7nd convincing evidence. In this c-se, Jose h-d -t most
used his b-re fists or h-nds -g-inst Felicid-d, only -t the spur of his
impulse, -nd he h-d desisted from further hurting her. Thus, intent to
kill h-s not been proved.

Contrer7s v. M7c7r7ig

– WON the period of one ye-r from cogniz-nce of the c-use in which - leg-l
sep-r-tion c-se should be instituted should be counted from September
1962, when the husb-nd w-s reported by the driver to then be living in
Sing-long with Lily Ann Alc-l-, or from December 1963, when the husb-nd
informed his wife th-t he could no longer le-ve Lily Ann - THE LATTER.
– Upon the undisputed f-cts it seems cle-r th-t, in the month of September
 –
1962, wh-tever knowledge -ppell-nt h-d -cquired reg-rding the infidelity
of her husb-nd, th-t is, of the f-ct th-t he w-s then living in Sing-long
with Lily Ann Alc-l-, w-s only through the inform-tion given to her by
Avelino Lubos, driver of the f-mily c-r. Much -s such he-rs-y inform-tion
h-d p-ined -nd -nguished her, she -pp-rently thought it best - -nd no
re-son-ble person m-y justifi-bly bl-me her for it - not to go deeper into
the m-tter herself bec-use in -ll prob-bility even up to th-t time,
notwithst-nding her husb-nd's obvious neglect of his entire f-mily,
-ppell-nt still cherished the hope however forlorn - of his coming b-ck
home to them.
– Indeed, when her husb-nd returned to the conjug-l home the following
October, she purposely refr-ined from bringing up the m-tter of his
m-rit-l infidelity "in her desire not to -nger nor drive defend-nt -w-y" -
quoting the very words of the tri-l court.
– True, -ppell-nt likewise he-rd in April 1963 rumors th-t her husb-nd w-s
seen with - wom-n on the f-mily w-y on D-sm-riñ-s street, but f-iled
-g-in to either bring up the m-tter with her husb-nd or m-ke -ttempts to
verify the truth of s-id rumors, but this w-s due, -s the lower court itself
believed, bec-use "she w-s so h-ppy th-t defend-nt -g-in returned to
the f-mily home in M-y 1963 th-t she once more desisted from discussing
the m-tter with him bec-use she did not wish to precipit-te - qu-rrel -nd
drive him -w-y". As - m-tter of f-ct, notwithst-nding -ll these p-inful
inform-tions - which would not h-ve been leg-lly sufficient to m-ke -
c-se for leg-l sep-r-tion - -ppell-nt still m-de br-ve if desper-te
-ttempts to persu-de her husb-nd to come b-ck home. In the words of
the lower court, she "entre-ted her f-ther-in-l-w, Lucilo M-c-r-ig, to in-
tercede with defend-nt -nd to convince him to return to his f-mily" -nd
-lso "requested the cooper-tion of defend-nt's older sister, Mrs.
Enriquet- M-jul" for the s-me purpose, but -ll th-t w-s of no -v-il. Her
husb-nd rem-ined obdur-te.
– The only time when -ppell-nt re-lly bec-me cogniz-nt of the infidelity of
her husb-nd w-s in the e-rly p-rt of December 1963. It w-s only on th-t
occ-sion when her husb-nd -dmitted to her th-t he w-s living with -nd
would no longer le-ve Lily Ann to return to his legitim-te f-mily th-t
-ppell-nt must be deemed to be under oblig-tion to decide whether to
sue or not to sue for leg-l sep-r-tion, -nd it w-s only then th-t the leg-l
period of one ye-r must be deemed to h-ve commenced.

L7puz v. Eufemio

– WON the de-th of the pl-intiff before fin-l decree, in -n -ction for leg-l
sep-r-tion, -b-tes the -ction - YES.
– An 7ction for leg7l sep7r7tion which involves nothing more th7n the
 –
bed-7nd-bo7rd sep7r7tion of the spouses (there being no 7bsolute
divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely person7l. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by -llowing only the innocent
spouse (-nd no one else) to cl-im leg-l sep-r-tion; -nd in its Article 108,
by providing th-t the spouses c-n, by their reconcili-tion, stop or -b-te
the proceedings -nd even rescind - decree of leg-l sep-r-tion -lre-dy
rendered. Being person-l in ch-r-cter, it follows th-t the de-th of one
p-rty to the -ction c-uses the de-th of the -ction itself — -ctio
person-lis moritur cum person-.
– “… When one of the spouses is de-d, there is no need for divorce,
bec-use the m-rri-ge is dissolved. The heirs c-nnot even continue the
suit, if the de-th of the spouse t-kes pl-ce during the course of the suit
(Article 244, Section 3). The -ction is -bsolutely de-d.”
– “ In the -bsence of - st-tute to the contr-ry, the de-th of one of the
p-rties to such -ction -b-tes the -ction, for the re-son th-t de-th h-s
settled the question of sep-r-tion beyond -ll controversy -nd deprived
the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the p-rties to the -ction
-nd of the subject-m-tter of the -ction itself. For this re-son the courts
-re -lmost un-nimous in holding th-t the de-th of either p-rty to -
divorce proceeding, before fin-l decree, -b-tes the -ction.”
– WON -b-tement -lso -pplies if the -ction involves property rights - YES.
– A review of the resulting ch7nges in property rel7tions between
spouses shows th7t they 7re solely the effect of the decree of leg7l
sep7r7tion; hence, they c7n not survive the de7th of the pl7intiff if it
occurs prior to the decree. The right to the dissolution of the conjug-l
p-rtnership of g-ins (or of the -bsolute community of property), the loss
of right by the offending spouse to -ny sh-re of the profits e-rned by the
p-rtnership or community, or his disqu-lific-tion to inherit by intest-cy
from the innocent spouse -s well -s the revoc-tion of test-ment-ry
provisions in f-vor of the offending spouse m-de by the innocent one, -re
-ll rights -nd dis-bilities th-t, by the very terms of the Civil Code -rticle,
7re vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; 7nd by their
n7ture 7nd intent, such cl7ims 7nd dis7bilities 7re difficult to
conceive 7s 7ssign7ble or tr7nsmissible.
– A further re-son why -n -ction for leg-l sep-r-tion is -b-ted by the de-th
of the pl-intiff, even if property rights -re involved, is th-t these rights -re
mere effects of decree of sep-r-tion, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so th7t
before the fin7lity of 7 decree, these cl7ims 7re merely rights in
expect7tion.

M7tubis v. Pr7xedes
 – WON - wife m-y file - compl-int for leg-l sep-r-tion even though she h-d
-lre-dy entered into -n -greement with her husb-nd th-t neither of them c-n
prosecute the other for -dultery or concubin-ge or -ny other crime or suit
-rising from our sep-r-tion - NO.
– Condon-tion -nd consent on the p-rt of pl-intiff -re necess-rily the
import of p-r-gr-ph 6(b) of the -greement. The condon-tion -nd consent
here -re not only implied but expressed. The l-w (Art. 100 Civil Code),
specific-lly provides th-t leg7l sep7r7tion m7y be cl7imed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there h7s been no condon7tion of or
consent to the 7dultery or concubin7ge. H7ving condoned 7nd/or
consented in writing, the pl7intiff is now undeserving of the court's
symp7thy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). Pl-intiff's
counsel even -grees th-t the compl-int should be dismissed. He cl-ims
however, th-t the grounds for the dismiss-l should not be those st-ted in
the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground th-t pl-intiff -nd
defend-nt h-ve -lre-dy been leg-lly sep-r-ted from e-ch other, but
without the m-rit-l bond h-ving been -ffected, long before the effectivity
of the new Civil Code" (-ppell-nts brief, pp. 7-8). Ag-in, we c-nnot
subscribed to counsel's contention, bec-use it is contr-ry to the
evidence.

Bug7yong v. Ginez

– WON the husb-nd's -ttitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his
-lleged belief th-t she w-s unf-ithful to him, -mount to - condon-tion of her
previous -nd supposed -dulterous -cts - YES.
– Condon7tion is the forgiveness of 7 m7rit7l offense constituting 7
ground for leg7l sep7r7tion or, -s st-ted in I Bouver's L-w Diction-ry, p.
585, condon-tion is the "condition-l forgiveness or remission, by -
husb-nd or wife of - m-trimoni-l offense which the l-tter h-s committed".
– A det-iled ex-min-tion of the testimony of the pl-intiff-husb-nd cle-rly
shows th-t there w-s - condon-tion on the p-rt of the husb-nd for the
supposed "-cts of r-nk infidelity -mounting to -dultery" committed by
defend-nt-wife. Admitting for the s-ke of -rgument th-t the infidelities
-mounting to -dultery were committed by the defend-nt, - reconcili-tion
w-s effected between her -nd the pl-intiff. The -ct of the l-tter in
persu-ding her to come -long with him, -nd the f-ct th-t she went with
him -nd consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro
Bug-yong -nd together they slept there -s husb-nd -nd wife for one d-y
-nd one night, -nd the further f-ct th-t in the second night they -g-in
slept together in their house likewise -s husb-nd -nd wife — -ll these
f-cts h-ve no other me-ning in the opinion of this court th-n th-t -
reconcili-tion between them w-s effected -nd th-t there w-s -
 condon-tion of the wife by the husb-nd. The reconcili-tion occurred
-lmost ten months -fter he c-me to know of the -cts of infidelity
-mounting to -dultery.
– “Condon7tion is implied from sexu7l intercourse 7fter knowledge of
the other infidelity. such 7cts necess7ry implied forgiveness. It is
entirely conson7nt with re7son 7nd justice th7t if the wife freely
consents to sexu7l intercourse 7fter she h7s full knowledge of the
husb7nd's guilt, her consent should oper7te 7s 7 p7rdon of his
wrong."
– Single volunt7ry 7ct of m7rit7l intercourse between the p7rties
ordin7rily is sufficient to constitute condon7tion, 7nd where the
p7rties live in the s7me house, it is presumed th7t they live on terms
of m7trimoni7l coh7bit7tion.

Y7ngco v. Rohde

– WON the court h-s jurisdiction to gr-nt -limony pendente lite to the pl-intiff-
wife in - divorce c-se - NO.
– The necessity of founding the -ction for support or -limony on - title, -nd
- title supported by document-ry evidence, is - consequence of the
precepts of -rticle 143 of the Civil Code cited by the respondent judge
himself. In this -rticle the right to support is gr-nted (1) to spouses inter
se; (2) to legitim-te descend-nts -nd -scend-nts inter se; (3) to p-rents
-nd cert-in legitim-ted -nd -cknowledged n-tur-l children; (4) to other
illegitim-te children, -nd (5) to brothers -nd sisters. In 7ll these c7ses it
is 7 civil st7tus or 7 juridic7l rel7tion which is the b7sis of the 7ction
for support the civil st7tic of m7rri7ge or th7t of rel7tionship.
– In the present c-se the -ction for the support or -limony is brought by -
wom-n who -lleges th-t she is - wife; therefore it is necess-ry for her to
prove possession of the civil st-tus of - spouse th-t is, - m-rri-ge,
without which one h-s no right to the title of husb-nd or wife. M-rri-ges
celebr-ted before the -doption of the Civil Code must be proven by the
me-ns est-blished by the former l-ws (-rt. 53). "M-rri-ges celebr-ted
before the oper-tion of the Code," s-ys Q. Mucius Sc-evol- "must be
proven by the c-nonic-l certific-te." (Vol. 2,'p. 137.) "Before the Council of
Trent," s-ys M-nres-, "no -bsolute provision of l-w required the p-rish
priests to m-ke entries in their books with reg-rd to the birth, m-rri-ge, or
de-th of their p-rishioners * * *. The council required the p-rish priests to
open books in which to record b-ptisms, m-rri-ges, -nd de-ths * * * The
St-te, the -ttention of which w-s c-lled for the first time to the
import-nce of the records est-blished by the provisions of the council,
g-ve evidence of its interest by issuing the roy-l order of M-rch 21, 1749,
-ccording to which the prel-tes of the Kingdom were directed to require
 the evidence referred to to be kept exclusively in the
churches." (Comment-ries, vol. 1, p. 262.)
– This evidence being l7cking, 7nd the civil st7tus of m7rri7ge being in
litig7tion, it is evident th7t nothing c7n be t7ken for gr7nted upon the
point in issue. There is no l7w or re7son which 7uthorizes the
gr7nting of 7limony to 7 person who cl7ims to be 7 spouse in the
s7me m7nner 7s to 7 person who conclusively est7blishes by leg7l
proof th7t he or she is such spouse, 7nd sues for divorce or
sep7r7tion. In this c-se the leg-l evidence r-ises - presumption of l-w;
in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but - mere
-lleg-tion - f-ct in issue -nd - simple f-ct in issue must not be
confounded with -n est-blished right recognized by - fin-l judgment or
b-sed upon - leg-l presumption. The civil st7tus of m7rri7ge being
denied, 7nd this civil st7tus, from which the right to support is
derived, being in issue, it is difficult to see how 7ny effect c7n be
given to such 7 cl7im until 7n 7uthorit7tive decl7r7tion h7s been
m7de 7s to the existence of the c7use. It is evident th-t there is of
necessity - subst-nti-l difference between the c-p-city of - person -fter
the rendition of - fin-l judgment in which th-t person is decl-red to be in
possession of the st-tus of m-rri-ge -nd his c-p-city prior to such time
when nothing exists other th-n his suit or cl-im to be decl-red in
possession of such st-tus of m-rri-ge. Any other view would render
useless -ll the leg-l effects which flow from the -uthority of res
ndjudic-t-.
– The court below h-d jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he w-s without
jurisdiction to gr-nt -limony when the right to cl-im -limony h-d not
-ccrued in -ccord-nce with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code
only gr7nts the right to 7limony to 7 wife. This st-tus not -ppe-ring by
- fin-l judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to m-ke -ny order in the
m-tter. Therefore m-nd-mus is the proper remedy upon the f-cts rel-ted.
It is not necess7ry to decide 7t this time if 7n exception could be
m7de with respect to 7 c7se in which the f7ct of the m7rri7ge is
7dmitted of record by the defend7nt. In the c7se before us this f7ct
w7s denied.
– Dissent (Cooper, J.):
– In divorce suits, -ccording to Americ-n pr-ctice, -limony is reg-rded -s
-n incident to the suit -nd the gr-nting of -limony -s -n -uxili-ry
proceeding. (Encl. PI. -nd Pr-c, 408, -limony; 2 Am. -nd Eng. Encl. L-w,
93.) Such - pr-ctice -s dividing up the suit -nd trying the issues in the
divorce suit in - sep-r-te -nd distinct -ction from the proceedings for
-limony would not be toler-ted in -n Americ-n court. (Bennett vs.
South-rd, 35 C-l., 691.) Nor would it be pr-ctic-ble to sep-r-te the two
proceedings. Alimony being - provision for the wife pendente lite, if the
 gr-nting of it w-s sep-r-ted from the m-in suit its -djudic-tion might not
re-ch - fin-l conclusion until long -fter the princip-l suit, in -id of which it
is supposed to be gr-nted, h-s been disposed of; besides, it would
require - multiplicity of suits without -ny compens-ting benefit wh-tever.
– But this court so construes the l-w -s to subst-nti-lly deprive her of this
benefit. She -sks for support while she c-rries on the litig-tion; she is told
th-t she must institute -n independent -ction to est-blish her st-tus -s -
wife, -nd th-t this -ction must be prosecuted to fin-l judgment. Upon her
is thus imposed the -ddition-l burden of -nother suit, in which no
provision h-s been m-de for -limony; -nd further, this second suit being
commenced subsequent to the divorce suit -nd: the judgment being -like
-ppe-l-ble, -ccording to the n-tur-l course of events, will prob-bly not
re-ch - fin-l determin-tion until the m-in suit h-s been settled; -s -
result -limony pendente lite is m-de impossible.
– She is -lso met by -nother objection, which is th-t she is tot-lly without
resources -nd will be un-ble to return the -mount of the -limony received
from the husb-nd in the event th-t she f-ils in the litig-tion unless she
gives security for it. We h-ve seen th-t the l-w -bsolutely prohibits her
from encumbering, without the license of her husb-nd, th-t p-rt of her
sep-r-te property which it h-s not t-ken from her -nd given to the
husb-nd.

De l7 Viñ7 v. Vill7re7l

– WON - wife m-y -cquire - residence or domicile sep-r-te from th-t of her
husb-nd during the existence of the m-rri-ge, -nd institute in the CFI therein
-n -ction for leg-l sep-r-tion - YES.
– It is true, -s - gener-l of l-w, th-t the domicile of the wife follows th-t of
her husb-nd. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person
-nd of interest between the husb-nd -nd the wife, -nd the presumption
th-t, from the n-ture of the rel-tion, the home of the one is th-t of the
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, -nd secure their interests in
this rel-tion, -s it ordin-rily exists, where union -nd h-rmony prev-il. But
the -uthorities -re un-nimous in holding th-t this is not -n -bsolute rule.
"Under modern l-ws it is cle-r th-t m-ny exceptions to the rule th-t the
domicile from of the wife is determined by th-t of her husb-nd must
obt-in. Accordingly, the wife m-y -cquire -nother -nd sep-r-te domicile
from th-t of her husb-nd where the theoretic-l unity of husb-nd -nd wife
is is dissolved, -s it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where
the husb-nd h-s given c-use for divorce; or where there is - sep-r-tion
of the p-rties by -greement, or - perm-nent sep-r-tion due to desertion
of the wife by the husb-nd or -ttribut-ble to cruel tre-tment on the p-rt
of the husb-nd; or where there h-s been - forfeiture by the wife of the
 benefit of the husb-nd's domicile."
– "Where the husb7nd h7s given c7use for divorce, the wife m7y
7cquire 7nother 7nd sep7r7te domicile from th7t of her husb7nd."
– If the wife c7n 7cquire 7 sep7r7te residence when her husb7nd
consents or 7cquiesces, we see no re7son why the l7w will not 7llow
her to do so when, 7s 7lleged in the present c7se, the husb7nd
unl7wfully ejects her from the conjug7l home in order th7t he m7y
freely indulge in his illicit rel7tions with 7nother wom7n. Under no
other circumst-nce could - wife be more justified in est-blishing -
sep-r-te residence from th-t of her husb-nd. For her to continue living
with him, even if he h-d permitted it, would h-ve been - condon-tion of
his fl-gr-nt bre-ch of fidelity -nd m-rit-l duty.
– WON - prelimin-ry injunction m-y be issued -g-inst the husb-nd prohibiting
him from -lien-ting or encumbering -ny p-rt of the conjug-l property during
the pendency of the divorce proceedings, in which the p-rtition of the
conjug-l property is -lso pr-yed for - YES.
– The l7w m7king the husb7nd the sole 7dministr7tor of the property of
the conjug7l p7rtnership is founded upon necessity 7nd convenience
7s well 7s upon the presumption th7t, from the very n7ture of the
rel7tion between husb7nd 7nd wife, the former will promote 7nd not
injure the interests of the l7tter. So long 7s this h7rmonious rel7tion,
7s contempl7ted by l7w, continues, the wife c7nnot 7nd should not
interfere with the husb7nd in his judicious 7dministr7tion of the
conjug7l property. But when th7t rel7tion ce7ses 7nd, in 7 proper
7ction, the wife seeks to dissolve the m7rri7ge 7nd to p7rtition the
conjug7l property, it is just 7nd proper, in order to protect the
interests of the wife, th7t the husb7nd's power of 7dministr7tion be
curt7iled, during the pendency of the 7ction, insof7r 7s 7lien7ting or
encumbering the conjug7l property is concerned.

Ar7net7 v. Concepcion

– WON the cooling off period required by Art. 103 of the Civil Code prohibits the
present-tion of evidence on the custody of children -nd support pendente lite
- NO.
– It is conceded th-t the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil
Code) is evidently intended -s - cooling off period to m-ke possible -
reconcili-tion between the spouses. The recit-l of their griev-nces
-g-inst e-ch other in court m-y only f-n their -lre-dy infl-med p-ssions
-g-inst one -nother, -nd the l-wm-ker h-s imposed the period to give
them opportunity for disp-ssion-te reflection. But this pr-ctic-l
expedient, necess-ry to c-rry out legisl-tive policy, does not h-ve the
effect of overriding other provisions such -s the determin-tion of the
 custody of the children -nd -limony -nd support pendente lite -ccording
to the circumst-nces. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The l-w expressly
enjoins th-t these should be determined by the court -ccording to the
circumst-nces. If these -re ignored or the courts close their eyes to
-ctu-l f-cts, r-nk injustice m-y be c-used.
– Why should the court ignore the cl-im of -dultery by defend-nt in the
f-ce of express -lleg-tions under o-th to th-t effect, supported by
circumst-nti-l evidence consisting of letter the -uthenticity of which
c-nnot be denied. And why -ssume th-t the children -re in the custody
of the wife, -nd th-t the l-tter is living -t the conjug-l dwelling, when ,it
is precisely -lleged in the petition -nd in the -ffid-vits, th-t she h-s
-b-ndoned the conjug-l -bode? Evidence of -ll these disputed
-lleg-tions should be -llowed th-t the discretion of the court -s to the
custody -nd -limony pendente lite m-y be l-wfully exercised.
– Thus the determin-tion of the custody -nd -limony should be given
effect -nd force provided it does not go to the extent of viol-ting the
policy of the cooling off period. Th-t is, evidence not -ffecting the c-use
of the sep-r-tion, like the -ctu-l custody of the children, the me-ns
conducive to their welf-re -nd convenience during the pendency of the
c-se, these should be -llowed th-t the court m-y determine which is
best for their custody.

Somos7-R7mos v. V7ment7

– WON Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the he-ring of -n -ction for leg-l
sep-r-tion before the l-pse of six months from the filing of the petition, would
likewise preclude the court from -cting on - motion for prelimin-ry m-nd-tory
injunction for the return to the wife of wh-t she cl-imed to be her p-r-phern-l
-nd exclusive property, -pplied for -s -n -ncill-ry remedy to such - suit - NO.
– A suit for leg-l sep-r-tion involves - rel-tionship on which the l-w for the
best re-sons would -tt-ch the qu-lity of perm-nence. Th-t there -re
times when domestic felicity is much less th-n it ought to be is not of
course to be denied. Griev-nces, whether f-ncied or re-l, m-y be
entert-ined by one or both of the spouses. There m-y be const-nt
bickering. The loss -ffection on the p-rt of one or both m-y be
discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the
welf-re of the husb-nd or the wife, to -llow them to go their respective
w-ys. Where there -re offspring, the re-son for m-int-ining the conjug-l
union is even more imper-tive. It is - m-rk of re-lism of the l-w th-t for
cert-in c-ses, -dultery on the p-rt of the wife -nd concubin-ge on the
p-rt of the husb-nd, or -n -ttempt of one spouse -g-inst the life of the
other,1 it recognizes, -lbeit reluct-ntly, th-t the couple is better off -p-rt.
A suit for leg-l sep-r-tion lies. Even then, the hope th-t the p-rties m-y
 settle their differences is not -ll together -b-ndoned. The he-ling b-lm of
time m-y -id in the process. Hopefully, the guilty p-rties m-y mend his or
her w-ys, -nd the offended p-rty m-y in turn exhibit m-gn-nimity. Hence,
the interposition of - six-month period before -n -ction for leg-l
sep-r-tion is to be tried.
– Th7t the l7w, however, rem7ins cogniz7nt of the need in cert7in c7ses
for judici7l power to 7ssert itself is discernible from wh7t is set forth
in the following 7rticle. It re-ds thus: "After the filing of the petition for
leg-l sep-r-tion, the spouse sh-ll be entitled to live sep-r-tely from e-ch
other -nd m-n-ge their respective property. The husb-nd sh-ll continue
to m-n-ge the conjug-l p-rtnership property but if the court deems it
proper, it m-y -ppoint -nother to m-n-ge s-id property, in which c-se the
-dministr-tor sh-ll h-ve the s-me rights -nd duties -s - gu-rdi-n -nd
sh-ll not be -llowed to dispose of the income or of the c-pit-l except in
-ccord-nce with the orders of the court." There would 7ppe7r to be
then 7 recognition th7t the question of m7n7gement of their
respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-
month period.

Lerm7 v. CA

– WON -dultery is - good defense -g-inst the respondent's cl-im for support
pendente lite t-ken from the conjug-l p-rtnership property - YES.
– We do not see th7t the distinction [between 7dultery 7s 7 defense in
7n 7ction for person7l support 7nd in 7n 7ction for support t7ken
from the conjug7l p7rtnership property] is m7teri7l in this c7se.
– ART. 292. During the proceedings for leg-l sep-r-tion, or for
-nnulment of m-rri-ge, the spouses -nd children sh-ll be supported
from the conjug-l p-rtnership property. After the fin-l judgment of
leg-l sep-r-tion, or of -nnulment of m-rri-ge, the oblig-tion of
mutu-l support between the spouses ce-ses. However, in c-se of
leg-l sep-r-tion, the court m-y order th-t the guilty spouse sh-ll give
support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of
such order.
– In the first pl7ce Article 292 is not in itself the source of the leg7l
right to receive support. It merely st7tes th7t the support, not only of
the spouses but 7lso of the children, sh7ll be t7ken from the conjug7l
property during the pendency of the leg7l sep7r7tion proceeding. It
does not preclude the loss of such right in cert7in c7ses.
– In the second pl7ce, the s7id 7rticle contempl7tes the pendency of 7
court 7ction 7nd, inferenti7lly 7t le7st, 7 prim& f&cie showing th7t the
7ction will prosper. For if the -ction is shown to be groundless the mere
filing thereof will not necess-rily set Article 292 in oper-tion. This is -lso
 –

the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61, supr", which requires, -mong other
things, when support pendente lite is -pplied for, th-t the court determine
provision-lly "the prob-ble outcome of the c-se."
– The prob-ble f-ilure of the respondent's suit for leg-l sep-r-tion c-n be
foreseen since she is not -n innocent spouse, h-ving been convicted of
-dultery by the Court of First Inst-nce. It is true th-t the judgment of
conviction is on -ppe-l in the Court of Appe-ls, but the s-me undoubtedly
s-tisfies the st-nd-rd of provision-l showing set by the -fores-id Rule.

People v. Sens7no

– WON the husb-nd consented to the -dultery committed by his wife by telling
her then th-t she could go where she w-nted to -nd do wh-t she ple-sed,
-nd by his f-ilure to t-ke -ny -ction for seven ye-rs notwithst-nding th-t he
w-s informed of s-id -dultery - YES.
– We c-nnot -ccept the -rgument of the Attorney-Gener-l th-t the seven
ye-rs of -cquiescence on his p-rt in the -dultery of his wife is expl-ined
by his -bsence from the Philippine Isl-nds during which period it w-s
impossible for him to t-ke -ny -ction -g-inst the -ccused. There is no
merit in the -rgument th-t it w-s impossible for the husb-nd to t-ke -ny
-ction -g-inst the -ccused during the s-id seven ye-rs.

People v. Schneckenburger

– WON the -greement between husb-nd -nd wife th-t they would h-ve
complete freedom of -ction in -ny -ct -nd in -ll concepts constitutes consent
which b-rs the wife from instituting - crimin-l prosecution for concubin-ge
-g-inst the husb-nd - YES.
– Upon the other h-nd, we believe -nd so hold th-t the -ccused should be
-cquitted of the crime of concubin-ge. The document executed by -nd
between the -ccused -nd the compl-int in which they -greed to be "en
complet" libert"d de "ccion en cu"lquier "cto y en todos conceptos,"
while illeg-l for the purpose for which it w-s executed, constitutes
nevertheless - v-lid consent to the -ct of concubin-ge within the
me-ning of section 344 of the Revised Pen-l Code. There c-n be no
doubt th-t by such -greement, e-ch p-rty cle-rly intended to forego to
illicit -cts of the other.
– As the term "p7rdon" unquestion7bly refers to the offense 7fter its
commission, "consent" must h7ve been intended 7gree7bly with its
ordin7ry us7ge, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No
logic7l difference c7n indeed be perceived between prior 7nd
subsequent consent, for in both inst7nces 7s the offended p7rty h7s
chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes
 unworthy to come to court 7nd invoke its 7id in the vindic7tion of the
wrong. For inst-nce, - husb-nd who believers his wife -nother m-n for
-dultery, is -s unworthy, if not more, -s where, upon -cquiring knowledge
of the -dultery -fter its commission, he s-ys or does nothing. We,
therefore, hold th-t the prior consent is -s effective -s subsequent
consent to b-r the offended p-rty from prosecuting the offense.

Bug7yong v. Ginez

– WON the husb-nd's -ttitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his
-lleged belief th-t she w-s unf-ithful to him, -mount to - condon-tion of her
previous -nd supposed -dulterous -cts - YES.
– Condon7tion is the forgiveness of 7 m7rit7l offense constituting 7
ground for leg7l sep7r7tion or, -s st-ted in I Bouver's L-w Diction-ry, p.
585, condon-tion is the "condition-l forgiveness or remission, by -
husb-nd or wife of - m-trimoni-l offense which the l-tter h-s committed".
– A det-iled ex-min-tion of the testimony of the pl-intiff-husb-nd cle-rly
shows th-t there w-s - condon-tion on the p-rt of the husb-nd for the
supposed "-cts of r-nk infidelity -mounting to -dultery" committed by
defend-nt-wife. Admitting for the s-ke of -rgument th-t the infidelities
-mounting to -dultery were committed by the defend-nt, - reconcili-tion
w-s effected between her -nd the pl-intiff. The -ct of the l-tter in
persu-ding her to come -long with him, -nd the f-ct th-t she went with
him -nd consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro
Bug-yong -nd together they slept there -s husb-nd -nd wife for one d-y
-nd one night, -nd the further f-ct th-t in the second night they -g-in
slept together in their house likewise -s husb-nd -nd wife — -ll these
f-cts h-ve no other me-ning in the opinion of this court th-n th-t -
reconcili-tion between them w-s effected -nd th-t there w-s -
condon-tion of the wife by the husb-nd. The reconcili-tion occurred
-lmost ten months -fter he c-me to know of the -cts of infidelity
-mounting to -dultery.
– “Condon7tion is implied from sexu7l intercourse 7fter knowledge of
the other infidelity. such 7cts necess7ry implied forgiveness. It is
entirely conson7nt with re7son 7nd justice th7t if the wife freely
consents to sexu7l intercourse 7fter she h7s full knowledge of the
husb7nd's guilt, her consent should oper7te 7s 7 p7rdon of his
wrong."
– Single volunt7ry 7ct of m7rit7l intercourse between the p7rties
ordin7rily is sufficient to constitute condon7tion, 7nd where the
p7rties live in the s7me house, it is presumed th7t they live on terms
of m7trimoni7l coh7bit7tion.
Brown v. Y7mb7o

– WON the court - quo erred in permitting the Assist-nt Fisc-l R-f-el Jose of
M-nil-, in def-ult of the defend-nt wife, to cross-ex-mine the husb-nd with
reg-rd to his m-rit-l rel-tion with Lili- Deito, since the power of the
prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion -
NO.
– Collusion in m7trimoni7l c7ses being "the 7ct of m7rried persons in
procuring 7 divorce by mutu7l consent, whether by preconcerted
commission by one of 7 m7trimoni7l offense, or by f7ilure, in
pursu7nce of 7greement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedi-
L-w Diction-ry; Nelson, Divorce -nd Sep-r-tion, Section 500), it w7s
legitim7te for the Fisc7l to bring to light 7ny circumst7nces th7t
could give rise to the inference th7t the wife's def7ult w7s c7lcul7ted,
or 7greed upon, to en7ble 7ppell7nt to obt7in the decree of leg7l
sep7r7tion th7t he sought without reg7rd to the leg7l merits of his
c7se. One such circumst7nce is obviously the f7ct of Brown's
coh7bit7tion with 7 wom7n other th7n his wife, since it b7rs him from
cl7iming leg7l sep7r7tion by express provision of Article 100 of the new
Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper
subject of inquiry -s they m-y justifi-bly be considered circumst-nti-l
evidence of collusion between the spouses.
– The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, c-lling for the intervention
of the st-te -ttorneys in c-se of uncontested proceedings for leg-l
sep-r-tion (-nd of -nnulment of m-rri-ges, under Article 88), is to
emph-size th-t m-rri-ge is more th-n - mere contr-ct; th-t it is - soci-l
institution in which the st-te is vit-lly interested, so th-t its continu-tion
or interruption c-nnot be m-de depend upon the p-rties themselves. It is
conson-nt with this policy th-t the inquiry by the Fisc-l should be -llowed
to focus upon -ny relev-nt m-tter th-t m-y indic-te whether the
proceedings for sep-r-tion or -nnulment -re fully justified or not.
– WON the f-ilure of the defend-nt wife to interpose prescription -s - defense
b-rs the court from dismissing the leg-l sep-r-tion c-se upon th-t ground -
NO.
– It is true th-t the wife h-s not interposed prescription -s - defense.
Nevertheless, the courts c7n t7ke cogniz7nce thereof, bec7use
7ctions seeking 7 decree of leg7l sep7r7tion, or 7nnulment of
m7rri7ge, involve public interest 7nd it is the policy of our l7w th7t no
such decree be issued if 7ny leg7l obst7cles thereto 7ppe7r upon the
record.

Oc7mpo v. Florenci7no
– WON collusion existed between the spouses merely bec-use the defend-nt
wife indic-ted her conformity to the leg-l sep-r-tion -nd -dmitted h-ving h-d
sexu-l rel-tions with - third p-rty, despite present-tion of independent
evidence of the -dultery by the husb-nd - NO.
– The decree m-y -nd should be gr-nted, since it would not be b-sed on
her confession, but upon evidence presented by the pl-intiff. Wh7t the
l7w prohibits is 7 judgment b7sed exclusively or m7inly on
defend7nt's confession. If 7 confession defe7ts the 7ction ipso f7cto,
7ny defend7nt who opposes the sep7r7tion will immedi7tely confess
judgment, purposely to prevent it.
– The mere circumst7nce th7t defend7nts told the Fisc7l th7t she "like
7lso" to be leg7lly sep7r7ted from her husb7nd, is no obst7cle to the
successful prosecution of the 7ction. When she refused to -nswer the
compl-int, she indic-ted her willingness to be sep-r-ted. Yet, the l-w
does not order the dismiss-l. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it t-kes
prec-utions -g-inst collusion, which implies more th-n consent or l-ck of
opposition to the -greement. Needless to s-y, when the court is informed
th-t defend-nt equ-lly desires the sep-r-tion -nd -dmitted the
commission of the offense, it should be doubly c-reful lest - collusion
exists.
– Collusion in divorce or leg7l sep7r7tion me7ns the 7greement
between husb7nd 7nd wife for one of them to commit, or to 7ppe7r to
commit, or to be represented in court 7s h7ving committed, 7
m7trimoni7l offense, or to suppress evidence of 7 v7lid defense, for
the purpose of en7bling the other to obt7in 7 divorce. This
7greement, if not express, m7y be implied from the 7cts of the
p7rties. It is 7 ground for denying the divorce. In this c-se, there would
be collusion if the p-rties h-d -rr-nged to m-ke it -ppe-r th-t -
m-trimoni-l offense h-d been committed -lthough it w-s not, or if the
p-rties h-d connived to bring -bout - leg-l sep-r-tion even in the
-bsence of grounds therefor.
– Here, the offense of -dultery h-d re-lly t-ken pl-ce, -ccording to the
evidence. (The pl"intiff presented his evidence consisting of the
testimony of Vicente Medin", Ernesto de Oc"mpo, Ces"r Enriquez, M"teo
D"mo, Jose de Oc"mpo "nd C"pt. Ser"fin Gub"t.) The defend-nt could
not h-ve f-lsely told the -dulterous -cts to the Fisc-l, bec-use her story
might send her to j-il the moment her husb-nd requests the Fisc-l to
prosecute. She could not h-ve pr-cticed deception -t such - person-l
risk. In this connection, it h-s been held th-t collusion m-y not be inferred
from the mere f-ct th-t the guilty p-rty confesses to the offense -nd thus
en-bles the other p-rty to procure evidence necess-ry to prove it.
– WON the husb-ndʼs f-ilure -ctively to se-rch for his wife -nd t-ke her home
-fter the l-tter h-d left him constituted condon-tion or consent to her
 –

-dulterous rel-tions - NO.

– It will be remembered th-t she "left" him -fter h-ving sinned with Arc-l-s
-nd -fter he h-d discovered her d-tes with other men. Consequently, it
w-s not his duty to se-rch for her to bring her home. Hers w-s the
oblig-tion to return.

M7tute v. M7c7d7eg

– WON the court - quo committed - gr-ve -buse of discretion when it ordered
the wife to deliver to her husb-nd the persons of their minor children, even
though the children (who were -ll 10 ye-rs old -nd -bove) intim-ted th-t they
w-nt to st-y with their mother - NO.
– Neither does the -forementioned order of June 29, 1955, involve - gr-ve
-buse of discretion for it merely enforces the -w-rd m-de in the decision
of November 6, 1952, which is -dmittedly fin-l -nd executory. It is true
th7t, insof7r 7s it refers to the custody of the minor children, s7id
decision is never fin7l, in the sense th7t it is subject to review 7t 7ny
time th7t the Court m7y deem it for the best interest of s7id minors. It
is no less true, however, th-t, unless -nd until reviewed -nd modified, s-id
-w-rd must st-nd. No such modific-tion h-ving been m-de, -t yet,
Respondent Judge h-d, not only the -uthority; but, -lso, the duty to
execute -nd implement s-id -w-rd.
– Furthermore, by virtue of s-id decision of November 6, 1952, Respondent
h-d, -dmittedly, the custody of s-id minors. Petitioner merely obt-ined
his permission to bring them to M-nil-, for the purpose of -ttending the
funer-l of their m-tern-l gr-ndf-ther, which took pl-ce in April, 1955.
Thus, Petitioner obt-ined -nd h-s the physic-l possession of the minors
in - prec-rious m-nner. She holds it in the n7me, on beh7lf 7nd by
7uthority of Respondent Medel, whose 7gent she, in effect, is. He
m7y, therefore, dem7nd their return 7t 7ny time, 7nd she is bound to
comply immedi7tely with such dem7nd. She c7nnot even question his
7uthority to m7ke it, 7lthough she is free to seek 7 review of the order
or decision 7w7rding the custody of the minors to him, 7nd to 7sk
th7t they be pl7ced under her ch7rge.
– Ag-in, it is conceded th-t children over ten (10) ye-rs of -ge, whose
p-rents -re divorced or living sep-r-tely, m-y choose which p-rent they
prefer to live with, unless the p-rent chosen is unfit to t-ke ch-rge of their
c-re by re-son of “mor-l depr-vity, h-bitu-l drunkenness, inc-p-city or
poverty” (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court). Without deciding whether
the -dultery committed by herein Petitioner with her own brother-in-l-w
involves mor-l depr-vity, it is cle-r to our mind th-t the -ffirm-tive
-ssumption implicit in the order compl-ined of c-nnot be ch-r-cterized
-s -n “-buse of discretion”, much less - “gr-ve” one.
 – L-stly, s-id order further decl-res:
– The f-cts rem-ins th-t Defend-nt-mov-nt is without me-ns of
livelihood -nd, -ccording to her own -dmission, she lives on the
ch-rity of her brothers. She h-s no home of her own to offer to her
children, but only she would shelter them under the roof of her
brothers.”
– The subst-nti-l -ccur-cy of this st-tement is not contested. We -re not
prep-red to hold, th-t - gr-ve -buse of discretion w-s committed when
the lower court impliedly deduced, from these circumst-nces, th-t
“poverty”, -mong other c-uses, rendered Petitioner unfit to t-ke ch-rge of
her children or m-de it unwise to pl-ce them under her c-re.

L7per7l v. Republic

– WON the wife m-y revert to her m-iden n-me -fter - decree of leg-l
sep-r-tion h-s been issued - NO.
– ART. 372., CC. When leg-l sep-r-tion h-s been gr-nted, the wife sh-ll
continue using her n-me -nd surn-me employed before the leg-l
sep-r-tion.
– Note th-t the l-ngu-ge of the st-tute is m-nd-tory th-t the wife, even
7fter the leg7l sep7r7tion h7s been decreed, sh7ll continue using her
n7me 7nd surn7me employed before the leg7l sep7r7tion. This is so
bec7use her m7rried st7tus is un7ffected by the sep7r7tion, there
being no sever7nce of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the l-w
th-t the wife should continue to use the n-me indic-tive of her
unch-nged st-tus for the benefit of -ll concerned.
– It is true th-t in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is
st-ted th-t -s the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the
continued used of her husb-nd surn-me m-y c-use undue confusion in
her fin-nces -nd the eventu-l liquid-tion of the conjug-l -ssets. This
finding is however without b-sis. In the first pl-ce, these were not the
c-uses upon which the petition w-s b-sed; hence, obviously no evidence
to this effect h-d been -dduced. Secondly, with the issu-nce of the
decree of leg-l sep-r-tion in 1958, the conjug-l p-rtnership between
petitioner -nd her husb-nd h-d -utom-tic-lly been dissolved -nd
liquid-ted.

Atil7no v. Chu7 Ching Beng

– WON - wife is entitled to received support from her husb-nd where she
refused to live with him on -ccount of some misunderst-nding she h-d with
the husb-nd's immedi-te rel-tives - NO.
– ART. 299. The person obliged to give support m-y, -t his option, fulfill his
 –
oblig-tion either by p-ying the -llow-nce fixed, or by receiving -nd
m-int-ining in his house the person who h-s - right to receive support.
The l-tter -ltern-tive c-nnot be -v-iled of in this c-se there is - mor-l or
leg-l obst-cle thereto;
– Art. 299 of the CC is cle-r enough not to require -ny further elucid-tion.
In giving the obligor the option to fulfill his duty, it provides for only
one occ7sion when the second 7ltern7tive could not be 7v7iled of i.e.,
when there is 7 mor7l or leg7l obst7cle thereto. The lower court found
th-t the root-c-use of -ll their differences could be tr-ced to
dis-greements common -mong rel-tives by -ffinity. Cert-inly, We do not
think th7t misunderst7nding with in-l7ws, who m7y be considered
third p7rties to the m7rri7ge, is the mor7l or leg7l obst7cle th7t the
l7wm7kers contempl7ted in the dr7fting of s7id provision. The l-w, in
giving the husb-nd -uthority to fix the conjug-l residence (Art. 110), does
not prohibit him from est-blishing the s-me -t the p-tri-rch-l home, nor
is it -g-inst -ny recognized norm of mor-lity, especi-lly if he is not fully
c-p-ble of meeting his oblig-tion -s such he-d of - f-mily without the -id
of his elders. But even gr-nting -rguendo th-t it might be "illeg-l" for him
to persist on living with his p-rents over the objection of his wife, this
-rgument becomes moot in view of defend-nt's m-nifest-tion th-t he is
willing to est-blish - residence, sep-r-te from his p-rents, if pl-intiff so
desires. We 7re 7w7re 7re th7t 7lthough the husb7nd 7nd the wife
7re, obliged to live together, observe mutu7l respect 7nd fidelity 7nd
render mutu7l help 7nd 7ssist7nce ( Art. 109), 7nd th7t the wife is
entitled to be supported, our l7ws cont7in no provision compelling
the wife to live with her husb7nd where even without leg7l
justific7tion she est7blishes her residence 7p7rt from th7t provided
for by the former, yet 7nd in such event We would see no pl7usible
re7son why she should be 7llowed 7ny support from the husb7nd. It
-ppe-ring th-t defend-nt husb-nd -v-iled of the option gr-nted him by
Article 299 of the Civil Code -nd there being no leg-l or mor-l hindr-nce
to the exercise of the second -ltern-tive -s elected by him, the -nswer to
the question presented by this -ppe-l is cert-inly obvious.

Arroyo v. V7squez de Arroyo

– WON the wife is entitled to received support from her husb-nd, where
-b-ndonment by her of the m-rit-l home w-s without sufficient justific-tion in
f-ct - NO.
– The interests of both p-rties -s well -s of society -t l-rge require th-t the
courts should move with c7ution in enforcing the duty to provide for
the sep7r7te m7inten7nce of the wife, for this step involves 7
recognition of the de f7cto sep7r7tion of the spouses — - st-te which
 –

is -bnorm-l -nd fr-ught with gr-ve d-nger to -ll concerned. From this
consider7tion it follows th7t provision should not be m7de for
sep7r7te m7inten7nce in f7vor of the wife unless it 7ppe7rs th7t the
continued coh7bit7tion of the p7ir h7s become impossible 7nd
sep7r7tion necess7ry from the f7ult of the husb7nd.
– WON the courts -re competent to order - wife to return to the m-trimoni-l
home -nd live with her husb-nd -s - dutiful wife - NO.
– M-ri-no B. Arroyo, h-s done nothing to forfeit his right to the m-rit-l
society of his wife -nd she is under -n oblig-tion, both mor-l -nd leg-l, to
return to the common home -nd coh-bit with him.
– It is not within the province of the courts of this country to 7ttempt to
compel one of the spouses to coh7bit with, 7nd render conjug7l
rights to, the other. If such - decree were entered, in unqu-lified terms,
the defend-nt would be li-ble to -tt-chment for contempt, in c-se she
should refuse to obey it. At best such -n order c-n be effective for no
other purpose th-n to compel the spouses to live under the s-me roof;
-nd the experience of these countries where the court of justice h-ve
-ssumed to compel the coh-bit-tion of m-rried people shows th-t the
policy of the pr-ctice is extremely question-ble.
– We -re therefore un-ble to hold th-t M-ri-no B. Arroyo in this c-se is
entitled to the uncondition-l -nd -bsolute order for the return of the wife
to the m-rit-l domicile, which is sought in the petitory p-rt of the
compl-int; though he is, without doubt, entitled to 7 judici7l
decl7r7tion th7t his wife h7s presented herself without sufficient
c7use 7nd th7t it is her duty to return.

R7mirez-Cu7derno v. Cu7derno

– WON the court m-y -dmonish spouses who -re sep-r-ted in f-ct to live
together -s husb-nd -nd wife - NO.
– It would be t-king -n unre-listic view for us to compel or urge them to live
together when, -t le-st for the present, they speci-lly the husb-nd -re
spe-king of impossibility of coh-bit-tion. For while m7rri7ge entitles
both p7rties to coh7bit7tion or consortium, the s7nction therefor is
the spont7neous, mutu7l 7ffection between husb7nd 7nd wife 7nd
not 7ny leg7l m7nd7te or court order. This is due to the inherent
ch7r7cteristic 7nd n7ture of m7rri7ge in this jurisdiction.

Abell7 v. COMELEC

– WON by le-sing -nd buying properties in M-h-w-n, Leyte, -nd regul-rly

st-ying in such properties, L-rr-z-b-l w-s -ble to est-blish residence in
K-n-ng-, Leyte, thus qu-lifying her to run for the position of Governor of
–

Leyte, even though her husb-nd resided in Ormoc City - NO.

– Mere -bsence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies,
eng-ge in business, or pr-ctice his -voc-tion, is not sufficient to
constitute -b-ndonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determin-tion
of - persons leg-l residence or domicile l-rgely depends upon intention
which m-y be inferred from his -cts, -ctivities -nd utter-nces. The p-rty
who cl-ims th-t - person h-s -b-ndoned or left his residence or origin
must show -nd prove pre-ponder-ntly such -b-ndonment or loss.
– BUT in the inst-nt c-se, there is no evidence to prove th-t the petitioner
tempor-rily left her residence in K-n-ng-, Leyte in 1975 to pursue -ny
c-lling, profession or business. Wh7t is cle7r is th7t she est7blished
her residence in Ormoc City with her husb7nd -nd considers herself -
resident therein. The intention of -nimus revertendi not to -b-ndon her
residence in K-n-ng-, Leyte therefor, is not present. The f-ct th-t she
occ-sion-lly visits K-n-ng-, Leyte through the ye-rs does not signify -n
intention to continue her residence therein.
– The petitioner did not present evidence to show th7t she 7nd her
husb7nd m7int7in sep7r7te residences, she 7t K7n7ng7, Leyte 7nd
her husb7nd 7t Ormoc City.
– The only indic-tions of - ch-nge of residence so f-r -s respondent is
concerned -re:
– The -ddress indic-ted in the -pplic-tion for c-ncell-tion filed by
respondent indic-ting her post-l -ddress -s K-n-ng-, Leyte
– The -nnot-tion in her Voter's -ffid-vit for Precinct No. 15 th-t her
registr-tion w-s c-ncelled due to l-ck of residence
– The testimony of An-st-ci- D-sig-n M-ngb-n-g th-t she entered
into - contr-ct of le-se with option to buy with the spouses
Emeterio -nd Ind-y L-rr-z-b-l over two p-rcels of l-nd the
witness owned in M-h-w-n, K-n-ng-, Leyte; th-t she sees the
spouses in the le-sed house in K-n-ng-, th-t she w-s informed
by Ind-y L-rr-z-b-l th-t the spouses h-d decided to buy their
property bec-use she w-nted to be-utify the house for their
residence.
– The written contr-ct signed by her -nd the spouses; -nd the
testimony of Adolfo L-rr-z-b-l Exh. "10" cousin of the spouses
th-t '-t - f-mily meeting ... the politic-l pl-n of the L-rr-z-b-l
cl-n w-s discussed, -mong which were (sic) the problem of
Terry's residence in Ormoc City' -nd th-t it w-s decided in s-id
meeting ... th-t Ind-y L-rr-z-b-l, wife of Terry, will tr-nsfer her
Ormoc Registr-tion -s - voter to K-n-ng-, Leyte (so) she will be
-ble to vote for Terry -nd -lso help me in my c-ndid-cy; th-t they
h-ve been st-ying in K-n-ng-, very often -s they h-ve properties
in Lonoy -nd - house in M-h-w-n.
 – For the purpose of running for public office, the residence
requirement should be re7d 7s leg7l residence or domicile, not
7ny pl7ce where 7 p7rty m7y h7ve properties 7nd m7y visit from
time to time.
– The Civil Code is cle7r th7t '[F]or the exercise of civil rights 7nd
the fulfillment of civil oblig7tions, the domicile of n7tur7l persons
is the pl7ce of their h7bitu7l residence.
– Arts. 68 7nd 69 of the F7mily Code, E.O. No. 209 7lso provide 7s
follows:
– Art. 68. The husb-nd -nd wife -re obliged to live together,
observe mutu-l love, respect -nd fidelity, -nd render mutu-l help
-nd support.
– Art. 69. The husb-nd -nd wife sh-ll fix the f-mily domicile. In
c-se of dis-greement, the court sh-ll decide. The court m-y
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the l-tter should
live -bro-d or there -re other v-lid -nd compelling re-sons for
the exemption. However, such exemption sh-ll not -pply if the
s-me is not comp-tible with the solid-rity of the f-mily.
– Husb7nd 7nd wife 7s 7 m7tter of principle live together in one
leg7l residence which is their usu7l pl7ce of 7bode.

M7t7buen7 v. Cerv7ntes

– WON the b-n on - don-tion between the spouses during - m-rri-ge -pplies
to - common-l-w rel-tionship - YES.
– While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers -s void - "don-tion between
the spouses during the m-rri-ge," policy consider7tions of the most
exigent ch7r7cter 7s well 7s the dict7tes of mor7lity require th7t the
s7me prohibition should 7pply to 7 common-l7w rel7tionship.
– If the policy of the l7w is, in the l-ngu-ge of the opinion of the then
Justice J.B.L. Reyes of th-t Court, "to prohibit don7tions in f7vor of the
other consort 7nd his descend7nts bec7use of fe7r of undue 7nd
improper pressure 7nd influence upon the donor, 7 prejudice deeply
rooted in our 7ncient l7w; then there is every re7son to 7pply the
s7me prohibitive policy to persons living together 7s husb7nd 7nd
wife without the benefit of nupti7ls. For it is not to be doubted th-t
7ssent to such irregul7r connection for thirty ye7rs bespe7ks gre7ter
influence of one p7rty over the other, so th7t the d7nger th7t the l7w
seeks to 7void is correspondingly incre7sed. Moreover, -s -lre-dy
pointed out by Ulpi-n (in his lib. 32 -d S-binum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be
just th7t such don7tions should subsist, lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.ʼ So long -s m-rri-ge
rem-ins the cornerstone of our f-mily l-w, re-son -nd mor-lity -like
 dem-nd th-t the dis-bilities -tt-ched to m-rri-ge should likewise -tt-ch
to concubin-ge."

Ko, et 7l. v. Ar7mburo, et 7l.

– WON the n-mes of Felix -nd Virgini- in the Deed of Cession were merely
descriptive of Cor-zon -nd Simeonʼs m-rit-l st-tus, so th-t the subject
properties -re the exclusive properties of Cor-zon -nd Simeon -nd not
conjug-l - NO.
– Art. 160 of the Civil Code provides th-t 7ll property of the m7rri7ge is
presumed to belong to the conjug7l p7rtnership, unless it be proved
th7t it pert7ins exclusively to the husb7nd or to the wife. This
presumption in f7vor of conjug7lity is rebutt7ble, but only with 7
strong, cle7r, 7nd convincing evidence; there must be 7 strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, 7nd the burden of proof
rests upon the p7rty 7sserting it.
– Cor-zon f-iled to -dduce -mple evidence th-t would convince this Court
of the exclusive ch-r-cter of the properties. Petitionersʼ -rgument th-t
Virgini-ʼs n-me w-s merely descriptive of Simeonʼs civil st-tus is
unten-ble. It be-rs stressing th-t if proof obt-ins on the -cquisition of the
property during the existence of the m-rri-ge, -s in this c-se, then the
presumption of conjug-l ownership rem-ins unless - strong, cle-r -nd
convincing proof w-s presented to prove otherwise. In f-ct, even the
registr7tion of 7 property in the n7me of one spouse does not destroy
its conjug7l n7ture. Wh7t is m7teri7l is the time when the property
w7s 7cquired.
– The records -re bereft of -ny proof th-t will show th-t the subject
properties indeed belonged to Simeon -nd Cor-zonʼs p-rents.
– The f-ct th-t the subject properties were not included in the c-ses for
sep-r-tion of properties between Simeon -nd Virgini- does not prove th-t
the s-me -re not p-rt of Simeon -nd Virgini-ʼs conjug-l properties.
Besides, We note respondentsʼ -lleg-tion in their Comment to this petition
th-t the c-se for sep-r-tion of properties between Simeon -nd Virgini-
w-s not resolved by the tri-l court on the merits -s Simeon died during
the pendency thereof, -nd -lso bec-use there w-s -ctu-lly -
dis-greement -s to the inventory of the properties included therein. This
could me-n th-t precisely, other properties m-y be p-rt of the s-id
spousesʼ conjug-l properties -nd were not included in the s-id c-se.
– WON Simeon v-lidly sold the one-third portion of his -nd Virgini-ʼs conjug-l
sh-re without the l-tterʼs consent to Cor-zon - YES.
– The -lien-tion without Virgini-ʼs conformity is merely void-ble. Art. 166 of
the CC explicitly requires the consent of the wife before the husb-nd m-y
-lien-te or encumber -ny re-l property of the conjug-l p-rtnership except
 –

when there is - showing th-t the wife is inc-p-cit-ted, under civil

interdiction, or in like situ-tions.
– Art. 173 CC g-ve Virgini- the right to h-ve the s-le -nnulled during the
m-rri-ge within ten ye-rs from the d-te of the s-le. F-iling in th-t, she or
her heirs m-y dem-nd, -fter dissolution of the m-rri-ge, only the v-lue of
the property th-t Simeon erroneously sold.
– Here, the inv-lid s-le w-s executed on December 14, 1974 while the
-ction questioning the s-me w-s filed in 1993, which is cle-rly w-y
beyond the 10-ye-r period prescribed. Virgini-ʼs recourse is, therefore, to
dem-nd only the v-lue of the property.

Spouses Abrenic7 v. L7w Firm of Abrenic7

– WON the two motor vehicles -s well -s the house -nd lot which were levied
upon formed p-rt of the conjug-l property of Joen- -nd Erl-ndo, so th-t
Joen- h-d - right to pursue - third p-rty cl-im in the c-se -g-inst Erl-ndo -
NO.
– *Petitioners were m-rried on 28 M-y 1998. The c-ses filed with the
Securities -nd Exch-nge Commission (SEC) on 6 M-y 1998 -nd 15
October 1998 were filed -g-inst petitioner Erl-ndo only. It w-s with the
filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 th-t Joen- joined Erl-ndo
-s - co-petitioner.
– it must be rec-lled th-t -fter she filed her Affid-vit of Third P-rty Cl-im
on 13 September 2007 -nd petitioner Erl-ndo filed his Urgent Omnibus
Motion r-ising the s-me issues cont-ined in th-t third-p-rty cl-im, he
subsequently filed two Motions withdr-wing his Urgent Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner Joen-, me-nwhile, no longer pursued her third-p-rty cl-im or
-ny other remedy -v-il-ble to her. Her f-ilure to -ct gives this Court the
impression th-t she w-s no longer interested in her c-se. Thus, it w-s
through her own f-ult th-t she w-s not -ble to ventil-te her cl-im.
– Furthermore, it -ppe-rs from the records th-t petitioner Erl-ndo w-s first
m-rried to - cert-in M-. Aline Lovejoy P-du- on 13 October 1983. They
h-d three children: P-trik Erl-ndo (born on 14 April 1985), M-ri- Monic-
Erline (born on 9 September 1986), -nd P-trik R-ndel (born on 12 April
1990).
– After the dissolution of the first m-rri-ge of Erl-ndo, he -nd Joen- got
m-rried on 28 M-y 1998. In her Affid-vit, Joen- -lleged th-t she
represented her stepchildren; th-t the levied person-l properties in
p-rticul-r, - pi-no with - ch-ir, computer equipment -nd - computer
t-ble were owned by the l-tter. We note th-t two of these stepchildren
were -lre-dy of leg-l -ge when Joen- filed her Affid-vit. As to P-trik
R-ndel, p-rent-l -uthority over him belongs to his p-rents. Absent -ny
speci-l power of -ttorney -uthorizing Joen- to represent Erl-ndoʼs
 children, her cl-im c-nnot be sust-ined.
– Petitioner Joen7 7lso 7sserted th7t the two (2) motor vehicles
purch7sed in 1992 7nd 1997, 7s well 7s the house 7nd lot covered by
TCT No. 216818 formed p7rt of the 7bsolute community regime.
However, Art. 92, p7r. (3) of the F7mily Code excludes from the
community property the property 7cquired before the m7rri7ge of 7
spouse who h7s legitim7te descend7nts by 7 former m7rri7ge; 7nd
the fruits 7nd the income, if 7ny, of th7t property. Neither these two
vehicles nor the house 7nd lot belong to the second m7rri7ge.

Vd7. de Delizo v. Delizo

– WON the C--n-w-n properties belong to the first m-rri-ge of Nicol-s Delizo
-nd Ros- Vill-sfer, or the second m-rri-ge of Nicol-s Delizo with Dorote- de
Oc-mpo, considering th-t Nicol-s -nd Ros- resided thereon before Ros- died
- 7pportioned to the p7rties in proportion to the extent to which the
requirements of the public l7nd l7ws h7d been complied with during the
existence of e7ch conjug7l p7rtnership. (20 hect7res for 1st m7rri7ge
7nd 47 hect7res for second m7rri7ge; the properties were 67 hect7res in
tot7l)
– Under Act 926, which w-s then the -pplic-ble l-w, the right of the
homeste-der to the p-tent does not become -bsolute until -fter he h-s
complied with -ll the requirements of the l-w. Until - homeste-d right is
est-blished -nd registered under Section 3 of Act 926, there is only -n
incho-te right to the property -nd it h-s not ce-sed to be - p-rt of the
public dom-in -nd, therefore, not susceptible to -lien-tion -s such.
Conversely, when - "homeste-der h-s complied with -ll the terms -nd
conditions which entitled him to - p-tent for - p-rticul-r tr-ct of public
l-nd, he -cquires - vested interest therein -nd h-s to be reg-rded -n
equit-ble owner thereof." The decisive f-ctor, therefore, in the
determin-tion of whether - p-rcel of l-nd -cquired by w-y of homeste-d
is conjug-l property of the first or the second m-rri-ge, is not necess-rily
the time of the issu-nce of the homeste-d p-tent but the time of the
fulfillment of the requirements of the public l-nd l-w for the -cquisition of
such right to the p-tent.
– H-ving received the homeste-d only in 1905, Nicol-s Delizo could not
h-ve perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the five-ye-r
occup-ncy -nd cultiv-tion requirement of the l-w, in 1909. Thus, the
Appell-te Court erred in holding th-t the entire C--n-w-n properties
belong to the conjug-l p-rtnership of Nicol-s Delizo -nd Ros- Vill-sfer.
Considering, however, th7t 7bout twenty (20) hect7res were
cultiv7ted 7nd rendered productive during the period from 1905 to
1909, judgment 7nd equity dem7nd th7t the rights to s7id properties
 be 7pportioned to the p7rties in proportion to the extent to which the
requirements of the public l7nd l7ws h7d been complied with during
the existence of e7ch conjug7l p7rtnership.
– WON the other properties belong to the first m-rri-ge of Nicol-s Delizo -nd
Ros- Vill-sfer, or the second m-rri-ge of Nicol-s Delizo with Dorote- de
Oc-mpo, given th-t these properties were -cquired from the produce of the
C--n-w-n properties -lthough such produce is the result of the l-bor -nd
industry of the spouses Nicol-s Delizo -nd Dorote- de Oc-mpo - The c7pit7l
of either m7rri7ge or the contribution of e7ch spouse c7nnot be
determined with m7them7tic7l precision, 7nd thus the tot7l m7ss of
these properties should be divided between the two conjug7l
p7rtnerships in proportion to the dur7tion of e7ch p7rtnership. (18 ye7rs
for 1st m7rri7ge 7nd 46 for second)
– While there is no controversy th-t these were -ll -cquired during the
existence of the second m-rri-ge of Nicol-s Delizo, there is the
est-blished f-ct th-t the produce of the C--n-w-n l-nds contributed
consider-bly to the -cquisition of these properties, -nd We h-ve held th-t
the children of the first m7rri7ge, 7s 7 m7tter of equity, should sh7re
in the C77n7w7n properties. To deny the respondents-7ppellees 7
sh7re in such properties would h7ve ex7cerb7ted discord inste7d of
enh7ncing f7mily solid7rity 7nd underst7nding.

B7ll7dos v. CA

– MISSING CASE

Jocson v. CA

– WON the f-ct th-t the properties sold to Agustin- Jocson-V-squez were
registered in the n-me of "Emilio Jocson, m-rried to Alej-ndr- Poblete," is
enough proof to show th-t the properties covered therein were -cquired
during the m-rri-ge of their p-rents, -nd, therefore, under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, presumed to be conjug-l properties - NO.
– The p7rty who invokes this presumption must first prove th7t the
property in controversy w7s 7cquired during the m7rri7ge. In other
words, proof of 7cquisition during the coverture is 7 condition sine
qu7 non for the oper7tion of the presumption in f7vor of conjug7l
ownership.
– It is thus cle-r th-t before Moises Jocson m-y v-lidly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof th-t the
disputed properties were -cquired during the m-rri-ge of Emilio Jocson
-nd Alej-ndr- Poblete. The certific-tes of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his cl-im is insufficient. The f7ct th7t the properties
 were registered in the n7me of "Emilio Jocson, m7rried to Alej7ndr7
Poblete" is no proof th7t the properties were 7cquired during the
spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title 7nd registr7tion thereof 7re
two different 7cts. It is well settled th7t registr7tion does not confer
title but merely confirms one 7lre7dy existing (See Torel- vs. Torel-,
supr-). It m7y be th7t the properties under dispute were 7cquired by
Emilio Jocson when he w7s still 7 b7chelor but were registered only
7fter his m7rri7ge to Alej7ndr7 Poblete, which expl7ins why he w7s
described in the certific7tes of title 7s m7rried to the l7tter.
– Contr-ry to petitioner's position, the certific-tes of title show, on their
f-ce, th-t the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered
owner. This is so bec-use the words "m-rried to' preceding "Alej-ndr-
Poblete' -re merely descriptive of the civil st-tus of Emilio Jocson. In
other words, the import from the certific-tes of title is th-t Emilio Jocson
is the owner of the properties, the s-me h-ving been registered in his
n-me -lone, -nd th-t he is m-rried to Alej-ndr- Poblete.

Ans7ldo v. Sheriff

– WON - joint s-vings -ccount -nd - joint current -ccount, in - b-nk, of -

husb-nd -nd his wife -re li-ble for the p-yment of the oblig-tion of the
husb-nd -s gu-r-ntor of - third p-rty - NO.
– It is undisputed th7t the sum of P636.80 which is now in controversy
w7s derived from the p7r7phern7l property of the 7ppellee,
M7rg7rit7 Quintos de Ans7ldo, the wife of the other 7ppellee Angel A.
Ans7ldo. It therefore belongs to the conjug-l p-rtnership of the s-id
spouses. (Civil Code, -rt. 1401.)
– The provision of 7rticle 1408 of the Civil Code to the effect th7t the
conjug7l p7rtnership sh7ll be li7ble for 7ll the debts 7nd oblig7tions
contr7cted during the m7rri7ge by the husb7nd must be understood
7s subject to the qu7lific7tions est7blished by 7rticle 1386 of the
s7me Code, which provides th7t:
– The fruits of the p7r7phern7l property c7nnot be subject to the
p7yment of person7l oblig7tions of the husb7nd, unless it be
proved th7t such oblig7tion were productive of some benefit to
the f7mily.
– No -ttempt h-s been m-de to prove th-t the oblig-tions contr-cted by
the -ppellee, Angel A. Ans-ldo, were productive of some benefit to his
f-mily. It is, however, cl-imed th-t, -s the sum of P636.80 h-s become
the property of the conjug-l p-rtnership, -t le-st one-h-lf thereof w-s
property levied on execution, -s the sh-re of the -ppellee Angel A.
Ans-ldo. This contention is without merit. The right of the husb7nd to
one-h7lf of the property of the conjug7l p7rtnership does not vest
 until the dissolution of the m7rri7ge when the conjug7l p7rtnership is
7lso dissolved.

C7stro v. Mi7t

– WON the P-co property is the c-pit-l property of Moises -nd w-s thus v-lidly
bought by the spouses C-stro from him -lone - NO.
– *The spouses Moises -nd Concordi- purch-sed the property on
inst-llment b-sis in 1977. It w-s Moises who p-id the b-l-nce of twelve
thous-nd (P12,000.00) pesos in 1984. At th-t time, Concordi- h-d long
been de-d. She died in 1978.
– Since Moises -nd Concordi- were m-rried before the effectivity of the
F-mily Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code -pply. Article 153(1) of
the New Civil Code provides -s follows:
– The following -re conjug-l p-rtnership property:
– (1) Those -cquired by onerous title during the m-rri-ge -t the
expense of the common fund, whether the -cquisition be for the
p-rtnership, or for only one of the spouses;
– Petitioners -lso overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides
th-t -ll property of the m-rri-ge is presumed to belong to the conjug-l
p-rtnership, unless it be proved th-t it pert-ins exclusively to the husb-nd
or to the wife. This -rticle does not require proof th-t the property w-s
-cquired with funds of the p-rtnership. The presumption -pplies even
when the m-nner in which the property w-s -cquired does not -ppe-r. In
the c-se -t b-r, Moises -nd Concordi- bought the P-co property during
their m-rri-ge Moises did not bring it into their m-rri-ge, hence it h-s to
be considered -s conjug-l.
– In the c-se -t b-r, Moises -nd Concordi- executed - Deed of S-le with
Mortg-ge. The contr-ct is one of s-le the title p-ssed to them upon
delivery of the P-co property. In fine, title w-s g-ined during the conjug-l
p-rtnership.

PNB v. Quintos

– WON the spouses -re solid-rily li-ble for the debt oblig-tion, considering th-t
there is nothing in such oblig-tion th-t expressly determines s-id ch-r-cter -
YES.
– It is not necess7ry to discuss whether the oblig7tion in question is
solid7ry or joint, bec7use in either c7se this debt is in the l7st
7n7lysis ch7rge7ble to the conjug7l p7rtnership of the defend7nt
spouses. According to 7rticle 1408 of the Civil Code, 7ll the debts
7nd oblig7tions contr7cted during the m7rri7ge by the husb7nd, 7s
well 7s those incurred by the wife in those c7ses in which she m7y
 leg7lly bind the p7rtnership, 7re ch7rge7ble to the conjug7l
p7rtnership. In the inst-nt c-se, the defend-nt M-rg-rit- Q. de Ans-ldo
joined her husb-nd in the execution of the document, evidencing the
oblig-tion in question, on June 20, 1918, Exhibit A.
– SC sentences the defend-nts to p-y the pl-intiff b-nk the sum of thirty-
one thous-nd seven hundred eighty-five pesos -nd ninety-six cent-vos
(P31,785.96) with interest thereon -t 8 per cent per -nnum from October
1, 1922, until full p-yment, with the costs; providing th-t, in def-ult of
p-yment, the certific-tes of sh-res described in Exhibit A must be sold,
-nd in c-se the proceeds of the s-le were not sufficient to cover the
whole -mount of the debt, -n execution sh-ll issue -g-inst the property
of the conjug-l p-rtnership of the defend-nts, -nd, if no such property
w-s found, then -g-inst -ny priv-te property of e-ch of them sufficient to
cover the whole -mount of the b-l-nce rem-ining unp-id.
– (ON MR) WON it is proper to hold spouses solid-rily li-ble with their priv-te
property in c-se of the insufficiency of their conjug-l property - NO, JOINTLY
ONLY.
– By express provision of the Civil Code, the conjug7l p7rtnership
begins to exist 7t the celebr7tion of the m7rri7ge, -nd the sep-r-tion
of the properties between the spouses sh-ll t-ke pl-ce (-rticle 1432) only
when it is expressly stipul-ted in the m-rri-ge settlement, or is judici-lly
decreed, or in the c-se provided in -rticle 50 of the Code. This conjug7l
p7rtnership however, is confined to the properties mentioned in
7rticle 1401 of the Civil Code, to wit: (-) Those -cquired by onerous title
during the m-rri-ge -t the expense of the common property whether the
-cquisition is m-de for the community or for only one of them; (b) those
obt-ined by the industry, s-l-ry or l-bor of the spouses or -ny of them;
(c) the fruits, rents or interest received or -ccruing during the m-rri-ge,
from the common or the priv-te property of e-ch of the spouses. The
p-rtnership does not produce the merger of the properties of e-ch
spouse. E-ch of them, notwithst-nding the existence of the p-rtnership,
continues to be the owner of wh-t he or she h-d before contr-cting
m-rri-ge, -s well -s of wh-t he or she m-y h-ve -cquired l-ter by
lucr-tive title, by right of redemption, or by exch-nge with his or her
property, or by purch-se with his or her money.
– The question submitted to our consider-tion presupposes the insolvency
of the conjug-l p-rtnership, -nd -s there is no presumption of solid-rity
of property between the spouses, the question m-y be -sked, Wh-t
li-bility do the p-rtners h-ve with respect to the debts of the p-rtnership?
The leg-l provisions -bout conjug-l p-rtnership, cont-ined in ch-pter 5,
title 3, book 4, of the Civil Code, do not give -n -dequ-te -nswer to this
question; so th-t we h-ve to resort to other sources for - solution thereof.
The c7se now before us is one of them, which requires, in order to be
 solved, 7 resort to the rule on the contr7ct of p7rtnership, prescribed
in 7rticle 1698, which provides th7t the p7rtners 7re not solid7rily
li7ble with respect to the debt of the p7rtnership, 7nd none c7n bind
the others by 7 person7l 7ct, if they h7ve not given him 7ny power
therefor.
– In oblig-tions cre-ted by the will of the p-rties, solid-rity will exist only
when it is expressly determined in the title thereof, giving them such -
ch-r-cter. Therefore if solid-rity exists only by stipul-tion, or by l-w, it is
evident th-t the p-rtner c-nnot be solid-rily li-ble for the debts of the
p-rtnership, bec-use, -s M-nres- s-ys, there is no leg-l provision
imposing such burden upon him, -nd bec-use the s-me is not only not
-uthorized by the contr-ct of p-rtnership, but is contr-ry to the n-ture
thereof, for g-in being the consider-tion of the oblig-tion, the l-tter
c-nnot be extended beyond the interest th-t the p-rtner m-y h-ve therein
which is proportion-l to his sh-re.
– T7king into 7ccount th7t the contr7ct of pledge signed by the
defend7nts does not show th7t they h7ve contr7cted 7 solid7ry
oblig7tion, it is our opinion, 7nd so decide, th7t the properties given
7s pledge being insufficient, the properties of the conjug7l
p7rtnership of the defend7nts 7re li7ble for the debt to the pl7intiff,
7nd in def7ult thereof, they 7re jointly li7ble for the p7yment thereof

L7per7l v. K7tigb7k

– WON the property is p-r-phern-l even though it w-s registered in the n-me
of "Evelin- K-l-w-K-tigb-k, m-rried to R-mon K-tigb-k" 2 ye-rs -fter the
celebr-tion of the m-rri-ge, considering th-t the husb-nd only h-d - monthly
s-l-ry P200.00 - YES.
– There is no denying th-t -ll properties -cquired during the m-rri-ge -re,
by l-w, presumed conjug-l. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption,
however, is not conclusive but merely rebutt-ble, for the s-me l-w is un
equivoc-l th-t it exists only "unless it be proved th-t it (the property)
belongs exclusively to the husb-nd or the wife." And, ex-mining the
records -nd evidence in this suit, We hold th-t this is 7 c7se where the
presumption h7s been sufficiently 7nd convincingly disproven.
– The deed to the disputed l7nd is in the n7me of the wife. At the time
of its purch7se, the property w7s 7lre7dy of such subst7nti7l v7lue
7s 7dmittedly, the husb7nd, by himself could not h7ve 7fforded to
buy, considering th7t singul7r source of income then w7s his P200.00
7 month s7l7ry from 7 M7nil7 B7nk. As in the C-si-no c-se, supr-, the
defend-nt herein testified, -nd w-s believe by the tri-l court, th-t the
purch-se price w-s furnish by her mother so she could buy the property
for herself. Furthermore, it w-s est-blished during the tri-l th-t it w-s -
 pr-ctice of defend-nt's p-rents to so provide their children with money to
purch-se re-lties for themselves.

Berciles v. GSIS

– WON the retirement premiums tot-lling P9,700.00 were c-pit-l property of the
judge, or conjug-l property of his m-rri-ge to Ilumin-d- - CONJUGAL.
– There is no proof th7t the premiums were p7id from the exclusive
funds of the dece7sed Judge (Article 160, New Civil Code). Such being
the c-se, one-h-lf of the -mount belongs to the wife -s her property in
the conjug-l p-rtnership -nd the other h-lf sh-ll go to the est-te of the
dece-sed Judge which sh-ll in turn be distributed to his leg-l heirs.
– Why is this import-nt? Judge h-d - leg-l wife -nd common l-w wife, both
with children. Determin-tion of n-ture of property would ch-nge the
-mount of succession-l rights of the leg-l wife, common l-w wife, -nd
children.

Veloso v. M7rtinez

– WON Luci- is entitled to recover the jewelry from the pl-intiff, to whom her
husb-nd h-d given the jewelry -s security, when it is -dmitted th-t before the
possession of the s-me w-s given to the pl-intiff, they belonged to the
defend-nt person-lly -nd she h-d inherited the s-me from her mother. - YES.
IT IS PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY
– In view of the f-ct, however, th-t the record shows th7t the jewels were
the sole 7nd sep7r7te property of the wife, 7cquired from her mother,
7nd in the 7bsence of further proof, we must presume th7t they
constituted 7 p7rt of her p7r7phern7l property. As such p7r7phern7l
property she exercised dominion over the s7me. (Article 1382, Civil
Code.) She h7d the exclusive control 7nd m7n7gement of the s7me,
until 7nd unless she h7d delivered it to her husb7nd, before 7 not7ry
public, with the intent th7t the husb7nd might 7dminister it properly.
(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record th-t she h-d
ever delivered the s-me to her husb-nd, in -ny m-nner, or for -ny
purpose. Th-t being true, she could not be deprived of the s-me by -ny
-ct of her husb-nd, without her consent, -nd without compli-nce with the
provisions of the Civil Code -bove cited.

Pl7t7 v. Y7tco

– WON the convey-nce by Am-li- Pl-t- of the property to Celso S-ld-ñ-, -nd
the reconvey-nce to her sever-l months -fterw-rd of the s-me property,
tr-nsformed it from p-r-phern-l to conjug-l property, such th-t Am-li- is
 –

bound by the det-iner judgment -g-inst G-udencio - NO

– Gr-nting th-t the evidence before us -g-inst the m-rri-ge of petitioner
Am-li- Pl-t- to G-udencio Begos- is we-k, considering the -dmissions of
m-rried st-tus in public documents (Answer, Exhs. 3 -nd 4); the well
known presumption th-t persons openly living together -s husb-nd -nd
wife -re leg-lly m-rried to e-ch other, -nd th-t the prior m-rri-ge of
Begos- to someone else does not necess-rily exclude the possibility of -
v-lid subsequent m-rri-ge to herein petitioner; still the respondents
Vill7nuev7 could not ignore the p7r7phern7l ch7r7cter of the
property in question, which h7d been unquestion7bly 7cquired by
Pl7t7 while still single, -s shown by Tr-nsfer Certific-te of Title No.
25855 of Riz-l (Art. 148 of the New Civil Code). The subsequent
convey7nce thereof to Celso S7ld7ñ7, 7nd the reconvey7nce of her
sever7l months 7fterw7rd of the s7me property, did not tr7nsform it
from p7r7phern7l to conjug7l property, there being no proof th7t the
money p7id to S7ld7ñ7 c7me from common or conjug7l funds (Civ.
Code, Art 153). The deed of mortg-ge in f-vor of respondents Vill-nuev-
-ctu-lly recites th-t the petitioner w-s the owner of the tenement in
question -nd so does the convey-nce of it by S-ld-ñ- to her.
– It is true th-t G-udencio Begos- signed the mortg-ge (Exh. 4) -s - co-
mortg-gor; but by itself -lone th-t circumst-nce would not suffice to
convert the l-nd into conjug-l property, considering th-t it w-s
p-r-phern-l in origin. As she w-s not m-de p-rty defend-nt in the
eviction suit, the petitioner-wife could v-lidly ignore the judgment of
eviction -g-inst her husb-nd, -nd it w-s no contempt of court for her to
do so, bec-use the writ of execution w-s not l-wful -g-inst her.

Lim v. G7rci7

– WON the three p-rcels of l-nd -re conjug-l p-rtnership property -nd should
thus be included in Hil-rioʼs est-te - NO.
– It -ppe-rs from the evidence, however, th-t these p-rcels of l-nd were
not -cquired by the -ppellee by convey-nce from her husb-nd, -nd th-t
they were in f7ct conveyed to her by third p7rties by w7y of exch7nge
for cert7in property inherited by her from her f7ther's est7te during
the coverture, 7nd they 7re, therefore, her sep7r7te property under
the provisions of p7r7gr7ph 3 of 7rticle 1396, which provides th7t
property 7cquired by exch7nge for other property belonging
sep7r7tely to one of the m7rried couple is the sep7r7te property of
the owner of the property for which it is exch7nged.

M7notok Re7lty v. CA
 – WON Don Vicente Leg-rd- v-lidly disposed of the lot to M-notok Re-lty, given
th-t the lot w-s the p-r-phern-l property of his wife - NO.
– Articles 136 -nd 137 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provide:
– Art. 136. The wife ret-ins the ownership of the p-r-phern-l property.
– Art. 137. The wife sh-ll h-ve the -dministr-tion of the p-r-phern-l
property, unless she delivers the s-me to the husb-nd by me-ns of -
public instrument empowering him to -dminister it. In this c-se, the
public instrument sh-ll be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for
the mov-bles, the husb-nd sh-ll give -dequ-te security.
– There is nothing in the records th7t will show th7t Don Vicente
Leg7rd7 w7s the 7dministr7tor of the p7r7phern7l properties of Don7
Cl7r7 T7mbunting during the lifetime of the l7tter. Thus, it c7nnot be
s7id th7t the s7le which w7s entered into by the priv7te respondent
7nd Don Vicente Leg7rd7 h7d its inception before the de7th of Don7
Cl7r7 T7mbunting 7nd w7s entered into by the former for 7nd on
beh7lf of the l7tter, but w7s only consumm7ted 7fter her de7th. Don
Vicente Leg7rd7, therefore, could not h7ve v7lidly disposed of the lot
in dispute 7s 7 continuing 7dministr7tor of the p7r7phern7l
properties of Don7 Cl7r7 T7mbunting.
– It is -lso undisputed th-t the prob-te court -ppointed Don Vicente
Leg-rd- -s -dministr-tor of the est-te only on August 28, 1950, more
th-n three months -fter the questioned s-le h-d t-ken pl-ce. We -re,
therefore, led to the inevit-ble conclusion th-t the s-le between Don
Vicente Leg-rd- -nd the priv-te respondent is void -b initio, the former
being neither -n owner nor -dministr-tor of the subject property. Such
being the c-se, the s-le c-nnot be the subject of the r-tific-tion by the
Philippine Trust Comp-ny or the prob-te court.

P7l7nc7 v. Smith-Bell

– WON the lower court erred in not -llowing -s proven the tr-nsfer of property
No. 16 by Emili-no in Alej-ndr-ʼs f-vor, -nd in not finding th-t she is the sole
-nd exclusive owner thereof - NO.
– Alej-ndr- P-l-nc- w-s the owner of cert-in property in the city of M-nil-,
which w-s given by her husb-nd Emili-no Bonc-n, with Alej-ndr-ʼs
consent, -s - gu-r-nty for the p-yment of the sum of P14,000, which
Emili-no Bonc-n borrowed from the Intern-tion-l B-nking Corpor-tion.
With the P14,000, Emili-no Bonc-n constructed the house known -s No.
16, -nd l-ter on conveyed the house to Alej-ndr- -s - gu-r-nty for the
p-yment of the debt to the Intern-tion-l B-nking Corpor-tion. Smith, Bell
& Co. obt-ined - judgment -g-inst Emili-no for - sum of money, -nd l-ter
on obt-ined -n execution of the judgment which w-s levied upon the
house. Alej-ndr- thus filed -n -ction -g-inst Smith, Bell & Co. -nd
 Emili-no, pr-ying th-t she be decl-red the owner of No. 16 with the
corresponding right to possess, -nd th-t the -tt-chment be dissolved.
She -lleged th-t the lower court erred in not -llowing -s proven the
tr-nsfer of property No. 16 by Emili-no in her f-vor, -nd in not finding th-t
she is the sole -nd exclusive owner thereof, Emili-no h-ving no interest
wh-tever in the property in question.
– The P14,000 borrowed by Emili-no upon the credit of the property of his
wife bec-me conjug-l property (p-r-gr-ph 3, -rt. 1401, Old Civil Code),
-nd when the s-me w-s reinvested in the construction of - house, the
house bec-me conjug-l property -nd w-s li-ble for the p-yment of the
debts of the husb-nd.

Lim Queco v. C7rt7gen7

– WON the 4 l-nds -nd the house were under the wifeʼs sole -dministr-tion -s
her p-r-phern-l properties, thus entitling her to the proceeds of the s-le
thereof - YES.
– AS TO 4 LANDS: Art. 1384 CC provides th-t the wife h7s the right to
7dminister her p7r7phern7l properties except when they h7ve been
delivered to the husb7nd before 7 not7ry public, with the intention of
7dministering them. In this c-se, no evidence w7s presented to show
th7t the wife delivered the s7me. Also, it c-n be inferred from the deed
of s-le -nd mortg-ge th-t the husb-nd -greed/consented th-t the wife
h-d right to -dminister the property -nd th-t she did not deliver them to
the husb-nd.
– AS TO HOUSE: Moreover, since the wife does not h7ve m7n7gement of
the conjug7l p7rtnership where the husb7nd is qu7lified, the lo7n
th7t she obt7ined constituted 7 tr7ns7ction th7t did not involve the
community property, 7nd the creditor could seek rep7yment
exclusively from her properties. The money lo-ned to the wife, -s well
-s the property -cquired thereby, should be deemed to be the wife's
exclusive property.
– Thus, the wife is entitled to the proceeds of the s-le.

Torel7 v. Torel7

– WON the l-nd is conjug-l property considering th-t it is registered in the

n-me of Felimon Torel-, m-rried to Gr-ci-n- G-llego - NO.
– While it is true th7t 7ll property of the m7rri7ge is presumed to be
conjug7l, 7s 7bove st7ted, nonetheless the p7rty who invokes the
presumption must first prove th7t the property w7s 7cquired during
the m7rri7ge. This proof is 7 condition sine qu7 non for the
7pplic7tion of the presumption.
 – In the inst-nt c-se there is nothing in the record to show th-t the lot in
question w-s -cquired during the m-rri-ge of Felimon Torel- -nd
Gr-ci-n- G-llego. On the contr-ry, the f-ctu-l finding of the Court of
Appe-ls is to the effect th-t Felimon 7cquired the l7nd through
inherit7nce -nd this conclusion is bolstered by th7t f7ct th7t one of
the petitioners herein, Cl7r7 Torel7, g7ve her conformity to her
f7ther's Ex-P7rte Motion of M7rch 5, 1958, wherein it w7s recited,
inter 7li7, th7t Felimon Torel7 h7d 7cquired the property by w7y of
inherit7nce prior to his m7rri7ge to his first wife, Gr7ci7n7 G7llego.
– The circumst7nce th7t Decree No. 440157 of the Court of First
Inst7nce of Negros Occident7l which confirmed the ownership of
Felimon Torel7 over the l7nd in question described him 7s m7rried to
Gr7ci7n7 G7llego w7s merely descriptive of his civil st7tus 7t th7t
time 7nd c7nnot be t7ken 7s proof th7t the l7nd w7s 7cquired during
their coverture. The further circumst7nce th7t the l7nd w7s
registered during their m7rri7ge c7nnot in itself constitute proof th7t
it w7s 7cquired during their m7rri7ge for l7nd registr7tion under Act
No. 496, 7s 7mended, does not confer title; it merely confirms 7 title
7lre7dy existing 7nd which is register7ble.

PNB v. CA

– WON the presumption of conjug-lity of properties -cquired by the spouses

during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code -pplies to
property covered by - Torrens certific-te of title in the n-me of the widow -
NO
– In processing the lo-n -pplic-tions of Don-t- Montem-yor, the PNB h-d
the right to rely on wh-t -ppe-rs in the certific-tes of title -nd no more.
On its f-ce the properties -re owned by Don-t- Montem-yor, - widow.
The PNB h-d no re-son to doubt nor question the st-tus of s-id
registered owner -nd her ownership thereof. Indeed, there -re no liens
-nd encumbr-nces covering the s-me.
– The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is th-t - person de-ling with -
registered l-nd h-s - right to rely upon the f-ce of the torrens certific-te
of title -nd to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the
p-rty concerned h-s -ctu-l knowledge of f-cts -nd circumst-nces th-t
would impel - re-son-bly c-utious m-n m-ke such inquiry.
– When the property is registered in the n7me of 7 spouse only 7nd
there is no showing 7s to when the property w7s 7cquired by s7id
spouse, this is 7n indic7tion th7t the property belongs exclusively to
s7id spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
c-nnot prev-il when the title is in the n-me of only one spouse -nd the
rights of innocent third p-rties -re involved.
M7g7llon v. Montejo

– WON the presumption of conjug-lity of properties -cquired by the spouses

during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code -pplies to
property covered by - Torrens certific-te of title in the n-me of the widow -
NO
– In processing the lo-n -pplic-tions of Don-t- Montem-yor, the PNB h-d
the right to rely on wh-t -ppe-rs in the certific-tes of title -nd no more.
On its f-ce the properties -re owned by Don-t- Montem-yor, - widow.
The PNB h-d no re-son to doubt nor question the st-tus of s-id
registered owner -nd her ownership thereof. Indeed, there -re no liens
-nd encumbr-nces covering the s-me.
– The well-known rule in t