Balangiga - Massacre (Reading in The Philippine History

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B1:

Balangiga massacre

Gen. Jacob Smith and his staff inspect the ruins of Balangiga in October 1901, a few weeks after the US retaliation

The Balangiga massacre was an incident in 1901 during the Philippine-American War where
more than forty American soldiers were killed in a surprise attack by several hundred
townspeople allegedly augmented by guerrillas in the town of Balangiga on Samar island. This
incident was described as the United States Army's worst defeat since the Battle of the Little
Bighorn in 1876. Filipinos regard the attack as one of their bravest acts in the war.

The subsequent retaliation by American troops resulted in the killing of 2000–3000 Filipinos on
Samar. The heavy-handed reprisal earned a court-martial for Gen. Jacob H. Smith, who had
ordered the killing of everyone ten years old and over. Reprimanded but not formally punished,
Smith was forced into retirement from the service because of his conduct.

The attack and the subsequent retaliation remains one of the longest-running and most
controversial issues between the Philippines and the United States. Conflicting records from
both American and Filipino historians have confused the issue. Demands for the return of the
bells of the church at Balangiga, taken by the Americans as war booty and collectively known as
the Balangiga bells, remain an outstanding issue of contention related to the war. One church bell
remains in the possession of the 9th Infantry Regiment at their base in Camp Red Cloud, South
Korea, while two others are on a former base of the 11th Infantry Regiment at F.E. Warren Air
Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming.

According to some nationalist Filipino historians, the true "Balangiga massacre" was the
subsequent American retaliation against the Samar population.
Interpretations and retelling of the Balangiga incidents, the Samar pacification campaign and the
Philippine-American War have been heavily influenced by the writing of left-wing polemicist
Renato Constantino and Marxist historian Teodoro Agoncillo.

Prelude to attack
In the summer of 1901 Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, who commanded the Department of
the Visayas and was responsible for Samar, instigated an aggressive policy of food deprivation
and property destruction on the island. The objective was to force the end of Filipino resistance.
Part of his strategy was to close three key ports on the southern coast, Basey, Balangiga and
Guiuan.

Samar was a major centre for the production of Manila hemp, the trade of which was financing
Filipino forces on the island. At the same time United States interests were eager to secure
control of the hemp trade, which was a vital material both for the United States Navy and
American agro-industries such as cottom.

On August 11, 1901, Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry Regiment, arrived in Balangiga—the
third largest town on the southern coast of Samar island—to close its port and prevent supplies
reaching Filipino forces in the interior, which at that time were under the command of General
Vicente Lukban. Lukban had been sent there in December 1898 to govern the island on behalf of
the First Philippine Republic under Emilio Aguinaldo.

Relations between the soldiers and the townspeople were amicable for the first month of the
American presence in the town; indeed it was marked by extensive fraternization between the
two parties. This took the form of tuba drinking among the soldiers and male villagers, baseball
games and arnis demonstrations. However, tensions rose due to several reasons: Captain Thomas
W. Connell, commanding officer of the American unit in Balangiga, ordered the town cleaned up
in preparation for a visit by the U.S. Army's inspector-general. However, in complying with his
directive, the townspeople inadvertently cut down vegetation with food value, in violation of
Lukban's policies regarding food security. As a consequence, on September 18, 1901, around
400 guerrillas sent by Lukban appeared in the vicinity of Balangiga. They were to mete sanctions
upon the town officials and local residents for violating Lukban's orders regarding food security
and for fraternizing with the Americans. The threat was probably defused by Captain Eugenio
Daza, a staff member of Lukban's and the parish priest, Father Donato Guimbaolibot.

A few days later, Connel had the town's male residents rounded up and detained for the purpose
of hastening his clean-up operations. Around 80 men were kept in two Sibley tents unfed
overnight. In addition, Connel had the men's bolos and the stored rice for their tables confiscated.
These events would have sufficiently insulted and angered the townspeople; and without the
sympathy of Lukban's guerrillas, the civilians were left to their own devices to plan their course
of action against the Americans.

A few days before the attack, Valeriano Abanador, the town's police chief and Captain Eugenio
Daza met to plan the attack on the American unit. To address the issue of sufficient manpower to
offset the Americans' advantage in firepower, Abanador and Daza disguised the congregation of
men as a work force aimed at preparing the town for a local fiesta, which incidentally, also
served to address Connell's preparations for his superior's visit. Abanador also brought in a group
of "tax evaders" to bolster their numbers. Much palm wine, locally called tuba, was brought in to
ensure that the American soldiers would be drunk the day after the fiesta. Hours before the
attack, women and children were sent away to safety. To mask the disappearance of the women
from the dawn service in the church, 34 men from Barrio Lawaan cross-dressed as women
worshippers. These "women", carrying small coffins, were challenged by Sergeant Scharer of the
sentry post about the town plaza near the church. Opening one of the coffins with his bayonet, he
saw the body of a dead child, whom he was told, was a victim of a cholera epidemic. Abashed,
he let the women pass on. Unbeknownst to the sentries, the other coffins hid the bolos and other
weapons of the attackers.

The issue of children's bodies merits further attention since there is much conflict between
accounts by members of Company C. That day, the 27th, was the 52nd anniversary of the
founding of the parish, an occasion on which an image of a recumbent Christ known as a Santo
Intierra would have been carried around the parish. In modern times these Santo Intierras are
enclosed in a glass case but at the time were commonly enclosed in a wooden box.

The attack

Between 6:20 and 6:45 in the morning of September 28, 1901, the villagers made their move.
Abanador, who had been supervising the prisoners' communal labor in the town plaza, grabbed
the rifle of Private Adolph Gamlin, one of the American sentries and stunned him with a blow to
the head. This served as the signal for the rest of the communal laborers in the plaza to rush the
other sentries and soldiers of Company C, who were mostly having breakfast in the mess area.
Abanador then gave a shout, signaling the other Filipino men to the attack and fired Gamlin's
rifle at the mess tent, hitting one of the soldiers. The pealing of the church bells and the sounds
from conch shells being blown followed seconds later. Some of the Company C troopers were
attacked and hacked to death before they could grab their rifles; the few who survived the initial
onslaught fought almost bare-handed, using kitchen utensils, steak knives, and chairs. One
private used a baseball bat to fend off the attackers before being overwhelmed.

The men seemingly detained in the Sibley tents broke out and made their way to the municipal
hall. Simultaneously, the attackers hidden in the church broke through to the convent and killed
the officers there. An unarmed Company C soldier was ignored, as was Captain Connell's
Filipino houseboy. The attackers initially occupied the convent and the municipal hall; however,
the attack at the mess tents and the barracks failed, with Pvt. Gamlin recovering consciousness
and managing to secure another rifle, causing considerable casualties among the Filipinos. With
the initial surprise wearing off and the attack degrading, Abanador called for the attackers to
break off and retreat. The surviving Company C soldiers, led by Sergeant Frank Betron, escaped
by sea to Basey and Tanauan, Leyte. The townspeople buried their dead and abandoned the
town.
Of the 74 men in Company C, 36 were killed in action, including all its commissioned officers;
Captain Thomas W. Connell, First Lieutenant Edward A. Bumpus and Major Richard S.
Griswold. Twenty-two were wounded in action and four were missing in action. Eight died later
of wounds received in combat; only four escaped unscathed. The villagers captured about 100
rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition and suffered 28 dead and 22 wounded.

Retaliation

General Jacob H. Smith's infamous order "Kill Everyone Over Ten" was the caption in the New
York Journal cartoon on May 5, 1902. The Old Glory draped an American shield on which a
vulture replaced the bald eagle. The caption at the bottom proclaimed, "Criminals Because They
Were Born Ten Years Before We Took the Philippines"

The next day, Captain Edwin Victor Bookmiller, the commander in Basey, sailed with Company
G, 9th Infantry Regiment for Balangiga aboard a commandeered coastal steamer, the SS
Pittsburgh. Finding the town abandoned, they buried the American dead and set fire to the town.

Coming at a time when it was believed Filipino resistance to American rule had collapsed, the
Balangiga attack had a powerful impact on Americans living in Manila. Men started to wear
sidearms openly and Helen Herron Taft, wife of William Howard Taft, was so distraught she
required evacuation to Hong Kong.

The Balangiga incident provoked shock in the US public, too, with newspapers equating the
massacre to George Armstrong Custer's last stand at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876.
Major General Adna R. Chaffee, military governor of the Philippines, received orders from US
President Theodore Roosevelt to pacify Samar. To this end, Chaffee appointed Brigadier General
Jacob H. Smith to Samar to accomplish the task.

General Smith instructed Major Littleton Waller, commanding officer of a battalion of 315 US
Marines assigned to bolster his forces in Samar, regarding the conduct of pacification:

I…want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn; the more you kill and burn, the better it
will please me... The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.

— Gen. Jacob H. Smith

As a consequence of this order, Smith became known as "Howling Wilderness Smith." He


further ordered Waller to have all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and in actual
hostilities against the United States. When queried by Waller regarding the age limit of these
persons, Smith replied that the limit was ten years of age.

However, it was known that Smith earned his sobriquet, "Hell-Roaring Jake" not due to his
violence in war, but because of his penchant for making outrageous oaths and the extravagance
of his language. Waller therefore, did not execute Smith's orders. Instead, Waller applied the
rules of civilized warfare and the rules provided under General Orders No. 100 of 1863 dealing
with irregular warfare, which stated that if enemy units gave no quarter and became treacherous
upon capture, it was lawful to shoot anyone belonging to that captured unit.

Food and trade to Samar were cut off, intended to starve the revolutionaries into submission.
Smith's strategy on Samar involved widespread destruction to force the inhabitants to stop
supporting the guerrillas and turn to the Americans from fear and starvation. He used his troops
in sweeps of the interior in search for guerrilla bands and in attempts to capture Philippine
General Vicente Lukban, but he did nothing to prevent contact between the guerrillas and the
townspeople. American columns marched across the island, destroying homes and shooting
people and draft animals. Littleton Waller, in a report, stated that over an eleven-day period his
men burned 255 dwellings, shot 13 carabaos and killed 39 people.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army observed that only the good sense and restraint of the
majority of Smith's subordinates prevented a complete reign of terror in Samar. However, the
abuses were still sufficient to outrage anti-Imperialist groups in the United States when these
became known in March 1902.

The exact number of Filipinos killed by US troops will never be known, A population shortfall of
about 15,000 is apparent between the Spanish census of 1887 and the American census of 1903
but how much of the shortfall is due to a disease epidemic and known natural disasters and how
many due to combat is difficult to determine. Population growth in 19th century Samar was
amplified by an influx of workers for the booming hemp industry, an influx which certainly
ceased during the Samar campaign.

Exhaustive research in the 1990s made by British writer Bob Couttie as part of a ten year study
of the Balangiga Massacre tentatively put the figure at about 2,500; David Fritz used population
ageing techniques and suggested a figure of a little more than 2,000 losses in males of combat
age but nothing to support widespread killing of women and children. Some Filipino historians
believe it to be around 50,000, for which there is no evidence. The rate of Samar's population
growth slowed as refugees fled from Samar to Leyte, yet still the population of Samar increased
by 21,456 during the war.

The earliest reference to a 50,000 plus death toll is American historian Kenneth Ray Young.
Young, however, confused Batagangas with Samar.

American military historians' opinions on the Samar campaign are echoed in the February 2011
edition of the US Army's official historical magazine, Army History Bulletin: "...the
indiscriminate violence and punishment that U.S. Army and Marine forces under Brig. Gen.
Jacob Smith are alleged to have unleashed on Samar have long stained the memory of the United
States’ pacification of the Philippine Islands."
Commanding officers' courts-martial
Events in Samar resulted in prompt investigations. On April 15, 1902 the Secretary of War sent
orders to relieve officers of duty and to court-martial General Smith. "The President (Theodore
Roosevelt) desires to know and in the most circumstantial manner all facts, nothing being
concealed, and no man being for any reason favored or shielded. For the very reason that the
President intends to back up the Army in the heartiest fashion in every lawful and legitimate
method of doing its work, he also intends to see that the most rigorous care is exercised to detect
and prevent any cruelty or brutality, and that men who are guilty thereof are punished."

Both Jacob H. Smith and Littleton Waller faced courts martial their heavy-handed treatment of
Filipinos; Waller specifically for the execution of twelve Filipino bearers and guides. Waller was
found not guilty, a finding that senior military officials did not accept. Smith was found guilty,
admonished and forced to retire.

A third officer, Captain Edwin Glenn, was court-martialled for torturing Filipinos and was found
guilty.

B2. EXPLAIN:

1. Was the story an encounter?


 Yes it is an encounter during the Philippine American War where more
than forty American soldiers were killed in a surprise attack by several
hundred towns allegedly augmented by Guerillas in the town of
Balangiga on Samar Island.

2. Was it an incident?
 Yes The Balangiga Massacre of September 28, 1901, is considered as one
of the bloodiest events and incident during the Philippine-American war.

3. Was it an massacre?
 The Filipinos call the “Balangiga Massacre” is one of the most fascinating
battles of the Philippine-American War, which began in 1898 after the U.S.
won control of Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines from Spain. The
events could be turned into a screenplay for a classic war drama.

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