J. Leonen QnA

Q&A of J.
Leonen’s Cases
by Paul Tan
Table of Contents
POLITICAL LAW ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ................................................................................................................................ 3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II ............................................................................................................................ 15
ELECTION LAW ................................................................................................................................................. 29
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 31
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW .................................................................................................................. 32
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.................................................................................................................................. 32
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 34
LABOR LAW ............................................................................................................................................................. 38
LABOR LAW I ...................................................................................................................................................... 38
LABOR LAW II .................................................................................................................................................... 43
SOCIAL LEGISLATION .................................................................................................................................... 60
CIVIL LAW ................................................................................................................................................................ 63
CONFLICT OF LAWS ........................................................................................................................................ 63
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS ......................................................................................................... 64
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS .............................................................................................................. 69
SPECIAL CONTRACTS ..................................................................................................................................... 75
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS ........................................................................................................................... 78
PROPERTY LAW ................................................................................................................................................ 81
TORTS AND DAMAGES (CHECK TRANSPO CASES BECAUSE THE DISCUSSIONS THEREIN
ARE INTERTWINED WITH THIS TOPIC) .................................................................................................. 87
TAXATION LAW .................................................................................................................................................... 93
TAXATION LAW I ............................................................................................................................................. 93
TAXATION LAW II ............................................................................................................................................ 94
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION........................................................................................................... 98
REAL PROPERTY TAX ................................................................................................................................... 100
SPECIAL LAWS ................................................................................................................................................. 101
COMMERCIAL LAW ............................................................................................................................................ 102
CORPORATION LAW ..................................................................................................................................... 102
BANKING LAW ................................................................................................................................................ 106
SPECIAL LAWS ................................................................................................................................................. 109
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ............................................................................................................. 109
SECURITIES LAW ............................................................................................................................................ 113
Page 1 of 213
Q&A of J. Leonen’s Cases
by Paul Tan
TRANSPORTATION LAW ............................................................................................................................. 115
INSURANCE LAW ............................................................................................................................................ 118
SPECIAL LAWS ................................................................................................................................................. 119
CRIMINAL LAW .................................................................................................................................................... 122
CRIMINAL LAW I ............................................................................................................................................. 122
CRIMINAL LAW II ........................................................................................................................................... 125
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS .................................................................................................................................. 132
REMEDIAL LAW................................................................................................................................................... 137
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................................................. 137
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE............................................................................................................................... 142
CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................................................................................................................ 149
EVIDENCE......................................................................................................................................................... 178
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 186
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS .............................................................................................................................. 194
ARBITRATION .................................................................................................................................................. 202
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS & PRACTICAL EXERCISES ................................................................ 203
LEGAL ETHICS................................................................................................................................................. 203
JUDICIAL ETHICS ........................................................................................................................................... 209
RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE............................................................................................................. 212
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by Paul Tan
POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
PROBLEM:
M sent a letter to the Supreme Court, asking it to invoke judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy; and, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In his letter, M alleges that he is a
Filipino citizen and a concerned taxpayer who wants to defend and uphold the Constitution.
He is concerned about issues which transpired after the Court’s decisions annulling the
PDAF and the DAP. He alleges that several legislators have filed bills to require the Court to
remit its funds to the national treasury.
(a) What are the requisites for judicial review?
The Supreme Court has enumerated these requisites as: (a) an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and, (d) that the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
(b) Does M’s letter comply with such requisites?
No, it does not. First, there is no actual case or controversy. The Supreme Court has explained that
an actual case or controversy must involve a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy which
is ripe for adjudication. Here, M is assailing mere bills. The Court cannot speculate on the validity of
a bill which may not even become law. Second, M has no locus standi – one who has a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result. Here,
M has not shown such injury. Though his concern for judicial independence is laudable, the acts he is
concerned of here are merely speculative and conjectural. Therefore, the letter does not comply with
the requisites for judicial review (In re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement, UDK-15143 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Sps. M appealed a case from the CA to the SC. This case was raffled to then Chief Justice De
Castro (CJ De Castro). However, despite the lapse of more than 5 years, CJ De Castro still has
not decided on their appeal. This led Sps. M to file a petition alleging that DJ De Castro’s
failure to act on their appeal violates their right to speedy disposition of their cases and
violates the periods set forth in the Constitution for resolving their case. Decide.
I will rule against Sps. M. Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that cases must be
resolved within 25 months from the date of submission to the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme
Court has explained that this provision is merely directory in nature. Leeway must be given to
magistrates for them to thoroughly review and reflect on the cases assigned to them. It would be
unjust if cases were hastily decided on at the risk of erroneously dispensing justice. Moreover, the right
to the speedy disposition of cases is not a mere mathematical reckoning. As explained, the mere fact
of delay here was not proven to be unreasonable (Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Elvira Enalbes, A.C.
No. 18-11-09-SC (2019), unanimous decision).
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by Paul Tan
PROBLEM:
JL, the Secretary of Education, issued a Department Order (DO) governing the Parents-
Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the school level. The DO sought to address several issues
such as malpractices by officers and members of the PTA such as but not limited to misuse
of funds. The DO further provides that the school head’s approval is a pre-requisite for the
PTA’s organization. The DO also provided that all Parents-Teachers Community
Associations (PTCAs) only have until the end of that year to wind-up their activities since
they would be required to file for reorganization.
The QC PTCA Federation (QC PTCA) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Supreme Court, arguing that the DO was an invalid exercise of the DepEd’s rule-making
powers since it infringes upon the independence of the PTAs. Moreover, QC PTCA argues
that direct resort to the Supreme Court is valid because it affects all PCTAs and PTAS across
the country.
(a) Is this case a valid exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts? Explain.
No, it is not. The Supreme Court has ruled that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
is appropriate only when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify it. Here, QC PTCA’s
argument that the DO affects all PTCAs and PTAs across the country does not satisfy this threshold.
The petitioner’s concern can be addressed by recourse to the Court of Appeals whose territorial
jurisdiction also extends throughout the country. Therefore, the QC PTCA should have filed the case
there (Quezon City PTCA Federation v. Department of Education, G.R. No. 188720 (2016), J. Brion
and J. Leonardo-de Castro dissented).
[N.B. In any case, the Supreme Court still held that the issuance of the Department Order was a valid
exercise of police power because public interest underlies the conduct of PTAs and PTCAs.]
PROBLEM:
In July 2012, The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tagum City’s Committee on Finance
conducted a public hearing for the approval of a proposed ordinance. This ordinance sought
to adopt a new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in the city.
CM and FJ (the petitioners) filed an opposition before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Davao del Norte, arguing that the market values were fixed without taking into consideration
the actual use of the properties therein. The Sanggunian of Davao Del Norte ruled in their
favor, but a few months after, the Sanggunian of Tagum declared the ordinance as valid.
Impending implementation of the ordinance, the petitioners filed an original action for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus before the Supreme Court. They argue that the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tagum City enacted the ordinance with grave abuse of
discretion. They argue that allowing the collection of exorbitant real property taxes will greatly
prejudice them and the thousands of inhabitants in Tagum City. On the other hand, Tagum
City argues that their petition violates the doctrines of hierarchy of courts and the exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
(a) Does the case constitute as an exception to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts?
Explain.
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by Paul Tan
No, it does not. The Supreme Court has ruled that a direct resort to the Supreme Court is only
warranted in highly exceptional cases. Moreover, the landmark case of Gios-Samar v. DOTC explains
that only questions of law may be raised when invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction. In this case,
the petitioners are alleging that the actual use of properties was not taken into account. This is clearly
factual in nature which would require the parties to introduce evidence to prove whether or not actual
use was indeed used as the basis of the valuation. Unfortunately, the initial reception and appreciation
of evidence are functions that the Supreme Court cannot perform. Therefore, the case should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts (Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781
(2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. This decision was issued 2 years before the decision of Gios Samar. However, given that the
latter is the more appropriate case to cite now, I decided to use it. KNOW THE CASE OF GIOS
SAMAR BY HEART!
Take note as well that in another case penned by J. Leonen – Parcon-Song v. Parcon, G.R. No. 199582
(2020), unanimous decision – the Court reminds us that the constitutionality of a law, regulation,
ordinance, or act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds.]
(b) Did the petitioners violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Explain.
Yes, they did. Under the Local Government Code (LGC), aggrieved taxpayers who question the
validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to file an appeal before the Secretary of Justice before
they seek intervention from the courts. Though the Supreme Court provides that there are several
exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, this case does not fall
into any one of them. First, this case involves factual matters which still need to be addressed by the
proper bodies. Second, the LGC provides that local taxes shall accrue on the first day of January of
each year, which means that since the ordinance was passed in July, the resort to the Supreme Court
was not urgent. Third, taxpayers are also not required to pay before protest in this case since they are
questioning the legality of the ordinance. All-in-all, it is clear that petitioners violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies (Id.).
PROBLEM:
A case was pending between A and B. C, the judge handling the case issued a decision which
narrated the factual background of the case. After the long narration is the dispositive portion
which ruled in favor of A. If you were the lawyer of B, what issue would you raise on appeal?
I will raise the issue of the judgment’s unconstitutionality. Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This constitutional requirement goes into the
essence of due process since it guarantees the that judge reached the decision through legal reasoning,
and it allows the losing party to know why he lost so that he may file a proper appeal if permitted.
Here, the judge only contained narrated the facts and did not properly cite his legal bases. Therefore,
as B’s lawyer, I will raise the judgment’s unconstitutionality on appeal (PNB v. Heirs of Entapa, G.R.
No. 215072 (2016), unanimous decision).
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by Paul Tan
PROBLEM:
Atty. JF, an openly homosexual person, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the Supreme Court, seeking to declare Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code.
According to him, these articles violate his right to due process and equal protection, right to
decisional and marital privacy, and right to found a family. He claims that same-sex couples
are equally capable of having their own families and fulfilling essential martial obligations.
He asserts that these provisions impair his ability to enter into monogamous same-sex
relationships and his plans to have a companion for life in the Philippines. To support his
allegations, Atty. JF extensively referenced a quoted the separate and concurring opinion of
retired Chief Justice Puno in the Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC case, without citing any annexes,
studies, etc.
(a) The respondent in his case was the Civil Registrar General. However, during the oral
arguments, several Justices of the Supreme Court pointed out that he had not even
attempted to acquire a marriage license. Is there an actual and justiciable controversy?
Explain.
There is no actual and justiciable controversy in this case. The Supreme Court has explained that even
if a statute if assailed on its face, there must be sufficient facts to enable to Court to adjudicate the
issues. The plaintiff must show that the assailed act had a direct adverse effect on him. These are
crucial points that Atty. JF failed to demonstrate. The substantive portion of his petition merely
parrots the separate opinion of retired CJ Puno. Even first year law students know that a separate
opinion is without binding effect. His petition also neither cites nor annexes any credible studies,
statistics, etc. Moreover, the choice of respondent – the Civil Registrar General – shows the lack of
an actual controversy. The respondent is not involved in the formulation or enactment of the Family
Code. In addition to this, Atty. JF never applied for a marriage license. In short, no discretion
whatsoever was exercised by his chosen respondent (Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No.
217910 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) Does Atty. JF have legal standing? Explain.
No, he does not. The Supreme Court has ruled that even for exceptional suits where the Court has
relaxed the requisite of standing e.g. concerned citizens, the party must still claim some kind of injury-
in-fact. Atty. JF’s supposed personal stake in the outcome of this case is not the direct injury
contemplated in jurisprudence. His mere assertions as stated in the facts are not enough. Atty. JF
presents no proof at all to the immediate and inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him.
The definitions presented in the Family Code as the cause of his inability to find a partner is non
sequitur. It must be remembered that anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury (Id.).
(c) Did Atty. JF avail of the proper remedy? Explain.
No, he did not. Section 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are both for addressing jurisdictional
excesses of bodies exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, and additionally for prohibition, ministerial
functions. Since the presentation of his case is lacking in an actual or imminent breach of his rights, it
is obvious that the proper remedy is a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63. Therefore, he did
not avail of the proper remedy (Id.).
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(d) Was his resort to the Supreme Court proper? Explain.
No, it was not. As explained in the landmark case of Gios-Samar v. DOTC, the hierarchy of courts is
not only for the sake of efficiency – it goes into the requirements of due process itself. By immediately
elevating evidentiary matters to the Supreme Court, parties are deprived of the chance to properly
substantiate their respective claims and defenses, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Furthermore, the invocation of transcendental importance is not an exception that automatically
dispenses with the hierarchy of courts – this only applies when the issues raised are purely legal. In
this case, it would be more prudent to let the trial courts ventilate certain factual matters such as
psychological studies, statistics on how successful same-sex couples are in raising children, and the
like. Therefore, Atty. JF’s direct to the Supreme Court was improper (Id.).
[N.B. Read the landmark case of Gios-Samar v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158 (2019) in the original. In
that case, the Court, through J. Jardaleza painstakingly explained the doctrine of the hierarchy of
courts. It has become the “case-to-cite” for decisions and petitions seeking to dismiss a case for the
violation of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts. In Gios-Samar, the Court ruled that the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts serves as a “constitutional filtering mechanism” which enables the Supreme
Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the Constitution.
Moreover, in the case of Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, Atty. Falcis subsequently got a
homosexual couple to intervene in the proceedings. However, the Court dåismissed the petition for
intervention since it had the same infirmities that Atty. Falcis’s petition had. In fact, the petition-in-
intervention was substantially the same as his own petition.]
PROBLEM:
News outlets reported that a shootout occurred between the PNP and the AFP. Because of
this, President Aquino ordered the NBI to investigate the encounter. While the investigation
was going on, DOJ Secretary De Lima made public pronouncements based solely on what
was discovered in the investigation, reportedly mentioning HM’s name. Alarmed by SOJ De
Lima’s statements, HM filed a motion in the DOJ, praying that the records of the case be
transferred to the Ombudsman. According to HM, De Lima’s statements showed that she
was biased. The DOJ subsequently found probable cause to charge HM with the crime of
multiple murder. This led HM to file a petition with the Supreme Court, praying that the DOJ
be prohibited from proceeding with the preliminary investigation; and, arguing that the DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to transfer the cases to the Ombudsman.
Does HM’s case constitute as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts? Explain.
No, it is not an exception. The Supreme Court has ruled that there must be special and important
reasons for the direct invocation of the Its jurisdiction. Therefore, the rule on hierarchy of courts may
be relaxed when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice. Here, public welfare, public policy, or the broader interest of justice will
not be served. If HM really believes that the DOJ committed an act characterized by grave abuse of
discretion, then he should have filed his petition to the Court of Appeals which also has concurrent
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Therefore, HM’s case is not an exception
to the rule on hierarchy of courts (Marantan v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 206354 (2019),
unanimous decision).
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by Paul Tan
PROBLEM:
During the 2022 national elections, the Parish Priest of UP, a non-candidate in the election,
posted a 12x12 ft tarpaulins outside the Parish of the Holy Sacrifice located inside the school’s
campus. It contains the heading “JUNK TERROR LAW” and lists candidates as
“TAGAPAGLIGTAS” and “BERDUGO” according to their vote on the adoption of R.A.
11479 known as the Anti-Terror Law. A few days after it was posted, Atty. M of the COMELEC
issued a notice to the Priest, stating that the tarpaulin violated a COMELEC Resolution
prescribing the size requirement of 2x3 ft for campaign materials; and, that failure to remove
it will result in the filing of an election case. This led the Priest to file a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the SC.
(a) COMELEC argues that the SC does not have jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution which mandates that cases be brought to the
COMELEC en banc before it is brought to the SC. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the Bishop. The Supreme Court has clarified that this general rule only applies
to COMELEC decisions which were issued pursuant to the latter’s adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. Here, the COMELEC was acting pursuant to its regulatory power – its power to enforce
election laws. Moreover, this case involves the Bishop’s fundamental right to expression, and it is not
an election contest filed by a losing candidate against the winner. Therefore, I will rule in favor of the
Bishop (The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728 (2015), J. Velasco, J. Bersamin,
and J. Brion dissented).
(b) COMELEC further argues that it was merely exercising its Constitutional power to
ensure equal space to all candidates with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. Decide.
I will rule against the COMELEC. The Supreme Court has explained that the tarpaulin is not a mere
campaign material for the purpose of soliciting votes for a candidate – it involves the Priest’s
constitutional rights of free speech and expression. Here, the priest is a non-candidate who posted the
tarpaulin as part of his advocacy. This is a part of political speech which enjoys a high degree of
protection. Moreover, the COMELEC cannot violate such right in the guise of merely regulating the
size of campaign materials because the Supreme Court has held that the means of conveying the
message is as important as the message itself. Here, the size of the tarpaulin ensures that the Priest’s
advocacy reaches even motorists and joggers merely passing by the Church. Therefore, the
COMELEC’s order to have the tarpaulin taken down was unconstitutional for violating the Priest’s
fundamental rights to free speech and expression (Id.).
[N.B. Read this case in the original. This is landmark case when it comes to drawing the line between
the freedoms of speech and expression vis-à-vis the regulatory powers of the COMELEC. Moreover,
the Court, through J. Leonen, gave an extensive discussion on the requisites of judicial review, the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, and the rights to freedom of speech and expression.]
PROBLEM:
A case was pending before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) between A
and B. The RARAD eventually ruled in favor of A. Aggrieved, B filed a petition for certiorari
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before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which the latter
granted. A filed a petition in court, arguing that the DARAB’s action was improper. Decide.
I will rule in favor of A. The Supreme Court has ruled that administrative agencies like the DARAB
are inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari because this is a function which is inherently
judicial. The determination of whether or not a lower court or body acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction is an exercise of legal interpretation which is a matter than only courts are
competent to engage in. Therefore, the DARAB’s act of granting a petition for certiorari is not only
ultra vires but is also violative of the principle of separation of powers. Therefore, A’s allegation was
correct (Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 205128 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) issued a department order
wherein the Compulsory Third Party Liability Insurance is automatically issued upon
registration of a motor vehicle or its renewal in the LTO. The issuance and payment of the
insurance is integrated with the LTO’s information technology system created by Stradcom
Corp. Subsequently, several organizations filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the SC alleging that the department order is ultra vires since DOTC does not have the power
to regulate the insurance business.
(a) Did petitioners avail of the correct remedies? Explain.
Yes, they did. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The Supreme Court
has explained that courts have the jurisdiction to resolve actual cases or controversies involving
administrative actions done in the exercise of their administrative functions. Here, the DOTC issued
the department order in exercise of its quasi-legislative functions and are alleged to be ultra vires.
Therefore, the remedies availed of are correct (Alliance of Non-Life Insurance Workers of the
Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 206159 (2020), unanimous decision).
(b) DOTC alleges that the case should be dismissed for failure to follow the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It argues that petitioners should have given it
the opportunity to reconsider its own issuance first. Decide.
I will rule against DOTC. The Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies finds no application when a questioned act was done in the exercise of quasi-
legislative powers. This doctrine applies only where the act of the agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. Since the department order was issued pursuant to DOTC’s
quasi-legislative powers, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to the
case (Id.).
(c) What are the requirements of legal standing where associations may bring a case on
behalf of its members?
The Supreme Court has explained that in order for an association to have legal standing, it must
establish the identity of its members and present proof of its authority to bring suit for an on behalf
of its members (Id.).
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[N.B. In this case, the Court held that the associations did not have legal standing because upon a
reading of their certificates of incorporation, there was no showing that they were authorized to
represent their members. Moreover, they did not present any authority to from their members
allowing them to file the suit. Finally, the case was rendered moot and academic since while it was
pending, the DOTC issued a new set of rules which had already addressed the issues raised by the
petitioners.]
PROBLEM:
The Social Security Commission (The Commission) issued Resolution No. 262-s which
provided an increase in the SSS members’ contribution rate and the maximum monthly salary
credit. KMU, and other groups filed a petition with the Supreme Court, arguing that the
assailed issuances were issued by virtue of an unlawful delegation of power granted by the
Social Security Act. KMU et al. argued that Section 18 offers vague and unclear standards.
This meant that The Commission could easily increase rates as they wish, subject to the
president’s approval. They also argue that the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise
of police power since it is not reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose of the
law.
On the other hand, the OSG, on behalf of the government, argues that Section 18 of the Social
Security Act provides for a comprehensive table which gives the proper ranges for monthly
contribution rate and the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits based on a
member’s contribution. Moreover, the law provides that actuarial calculations and the rate of
benefits must also be considered by the Commission.
(a) Is there an actual case or controversy? Explain.
There is none. The Supreme Court has held that there must be a conflict of legal rights and opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The petitioners of a case before the Supreme Court must
establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable right under the Constitution. Here, KMU
et al. merely cited Constitution constitutional rights without specifying how these rights translate to
being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of SSS contributions. Therefore, petitioners
fail to show a right that is enforceable and legally demandable in this case (KMU v. Aquino III, G.R.
(b) Is the case ripe for adjudication? Explain.
No, it is not. The Supreme Court has ruled that a case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged
governmental act is a completed action, such that there is a direct, concrete, and adverse effect on the
petitioner. In connection with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Here, the petitioners failed to exhaust such remedies.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that The Commission has jurisdiction over any
dispute arising from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. Moreover,
petitioners did not sufficiently prove any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion. Therefore,
the petitioners have prematurely invoked the Court’s jurisdiction (Id.).
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(c) Do the parties have legal standing? Explain.
Yes, they do. Jurisprudence is replete with instances when a liberal approach to standing has been
taken by the Court. It has allowed citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality of laws and rules. Here, petitioners are assailing that an issuance
that affects millions of Filipinos working here and abroad because a substantial portion of their salaries
go to the SSS fund. Therefore, the requisite of legal standing for the petitioners in this case must be
relaxed (Id.).
(d) State the two requisites for a valid delegation and explain each one.
According to the Supreme Court, the delegating statute must be complete and must contain a
sufficient standard. The Completeness Test requires that all the terms and provisions of the law must
leave nothing for the delegate to do except to implement it. Therefore, what is being delegated is not
the discretion of what the law is but only discretion as to how it shall be enforced. The Sufficient
Standard Test requires that the law must map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority to prevent
it from running riot (Id.).
(e) Should the law be struck down for being an undue delegation of legislative power?
Explain.
No, it should be upheld. From the facts, the Social Security Act satisfies both the completeness and
sufficient standard tests. By giving the range of the monthly contribution rate and the monthly salary
credits, the legislature has set limits to The Commission’s power to fix the minimum and maximum
amounts of the contribution rate and salary credits. The Commission has nothing to do but implement
the law here. Moreover, the actual calculations and rate of benefits add an additional limit to The
Commission’s exercise of its power. This Court cannot go into the wisdom of why actuarial
calculations are used. Therefore, the law is valid (Id.).
PROBLEM:
President XYZ passed an Executive Order which designated ABC city as the regional center
of Region XII. As a result of this, the Department of Agriculture directed transfer of the
regional office in Region XII to ABC city from its current location in MNO city. The
employees of the regional office filed a case to oppose this transfer, arguing that there will be
substantial operational costs incurred and that it will significantly disrupt the lives of the
employees residing in MNO.
The court where the case was pending issued an injunction to stop the transfer. Was the
judge’s action proper?
No, the judge’s action was improper. The Supreme Court has ruled that the President’s power of
general supervision over local governments as provided in the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code includes the power to merge administrative regions. Moreover, in DENR v.
DENR Region 12, the Supreme Court has also ruled that grounds such as untimeliness and
inconvenience of the transfer of an administrative office are issues of wisdom, not legality. Therefore,
in line with the principle of separation of powers, the courts cannot inquire into the wisdom of the
executive’s actions (Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492 (2013), unanimous).
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PROBLEM:
The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), through its president ML, wrote to
then Health Secretary AR and PhilHealth. In his letter, ML requested that it be authorized to
establish a health maintenance program in a private health maintenance organization, in lieu
of the annual medical check-up provided for by law. Both AR, PhilHealth, and even the
Department of Budget Management (DBM) had no objection to this request. However, ML
was informed that since the medical checkup program was made through an administrative
order, it must likewise seek an exemption from the President. The Office of the President,
through Executive Secretary E, approved ML’s request. However, upon post-audit of the
Commission of Audit (COA), the health program of PIDS was disallowed.
(a) COA argues that ML did not get a valid exception since it was supposed to be the
president himself who should have granted it. Decide.
I will rule in favor of PIDS. The Supreme Court has ruled that the executive secretary wields such
power that enables him to act on behalf of the president, as part of what is known as the doctrine of
qualified political agency. This is corollary to Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which contains
the faithful execution clause. Therefore, the exemption granted by Executive Secretary E, as the
president’s alter ego, is valid. It remains so unless disapproved or reprobated by the President
(Philippine Institute for Development Studies v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 212022 (2019),
(b) What if it was the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary who issued the exemption? Will
your answer be the same? Explain.
No, my answer will be different. As explained by the Supreme Court, the Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary has no power or authority to declare the exemption. The doctrine of qualified political
agency extends only to the executive secretary and other Cabinet secretaries. It does not extend to
deputy executive secretaries or assistant deputy secretaries (Id.).
PROBLEM:
ABC, a party-list, vied for a seat in the House of Representatives in the 2010 elections.
Unfortunately, ABC did not reach the votes required pursuant to the jurisprudential and legal
guidelines for party-list representation. ABC filed a protest in the HRET questioning the
COMELEC’s resolution of the winning party-lists. ABC argued that the COMELEC
erroneously excluded the following votes from the divisor of the BANAT v. COMELEC
formula: (a) those cast for party-lists that were disqualified before the elections and (b) those
cast for party-lists that were disqualified after the elections.
(a) Is ABC’s contention correct? Why/why not?
ABC’s contention is partially correct – votes cast for party-lists disqualified after the elections should
be included in the divisor. The Supreme Court has declared that to do otherwise would disenfranchise
voters who believed in good faith that the ballot only contained qualified candidates. The finality of a
party-list’s disqualification post-elections should not affect the validity of the vote. This necessarily
means that votes cast in favor of party-lists who were proclaimed by the COMELEC to be disqualified
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before the elections should be excluded (ARARO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192803 (2013). J. Velasco,
Jr. wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion).
(b) What if ABC argued that invalid votes, regardless of reason, should also be included
in the divisor? Will you rule in favor ABC or not?
I will rule against ABC. The Supreme Court has held that the phrase “total votes cast for the party-list
system” in Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 does not include invalid votes. Therefore, votes which were
improperly shaded, had tears and extraneous marks for example, are to be excluded since these
exclusions are attributable to the voter’s own actions (Id.)
PROBLEM:
CMC filed a case for cancellation of adverse claims against LWMP, a duly registered
cooperative. Summons was served on LWMP’s official address as indicated in its registration
with the Cooperative Development Authority. LWMP did not file its answer and a judgment
was eventually rendered against it. Now, LWMP argues in court that summons was invalidly
served because it was not done in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. LWMP says
that the summons was still served on its registered address, despite CMC’s actual knowledge
that the former has changed its address. On the other hand, CMC argues that the service of
summons was in accordance with the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, as amended – a
substantive and specific law which governs cooperatives like LWMP. Decide.
I will rule that the summons was invalidly served. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution vests
in the Supreme Court the exclusive power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. Being a
procedural rule, the determination of the validity of the service of summons is determined by the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and cannot be trumped by substantive laws passed by the legislature.
Therefore, the summons not being in accordance with the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, it is
immaterial that it was valid under the Cooperative Code (Cathay Metal Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. G.R. No. 172204 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos enacted Ordinance No. 123 which allows an
additional levy on real property taxes for the special education fund (SEF) at the rate of 0.5%.
On post-audit, the Commission on Audit declared that they should have used the rate of 1%
as provided for in the Local Government Code. Decide on the propriety of COA’s declaration.
COA’s declaration is erroneous. The Supreme Court has ruled that setting the rate for the SEF at less
than 1% is within the constitutional principle of local autonomy and is therefore valid. First, the 1987
Constitution not only gives local government units the power to tax, but it also institutionalizes that
they be given local autonomy. Second, Sec. 235 of the Local Government Code which prescribes the
rate of 1% actually uses the word “may” – a word which connotes that the rate is merely discretionary.
This is a recognition that all local government units face different factual circumstances which they
need to consider when prescribing such rate. Therefore, COA was mistaken in declaring that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos must use the rate of 1% (Demaala v. COA, G.R. No. 199752
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PROBLEM:
Governor RO permanently appointed HM as a Cooperative Development Specialist II, 5 days
before the end of his term as governor. Subsequently, the newly elected governor MP
rescinded the appointment, alleging that it violated the rule against midnight appointments.
(a) In whose favor will you decide? Explain.
I will rule in favor of HM. The Constitution provides that two months immediately preceding the next
presidential elections, a President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments when
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, the Supreme Court
has explained that this prohibition strictly applies to presidential appointments and not those made by
local chief executives. Therefore, I will rule in favor of HM (Provincial Government of Aurora v.
Marco, G.R. No. 202331 (2015), unanimous decision).
[N.B. In this case however, Marco’s appointment was still disallowed because of a CSC Resolution
prohibiting appointments right before the end of a governor’s term. The Court ruled that pursuant to
its mandate to ensure effective and efficient personnel administration in civil service, the CSC
resolution was valid and should have been followed.]
PROBLEM:
CPF, a 100% Thai-owned company, submitted applications to the Board of Investments
(BOI) as a new producer of different products and services. First, it sought to be a new
producer of aqua feeds on a pioneer status. This was approved by the BOI. Its second
application was to be a producer of hog parent and slaughter hogs. This was also approved
by the BOI.
A few months after, NFH and other several agricultural groups filed a petition with the
Supreme Court, arguing that the applications were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
They argued that the approvals violated their constitutional right to be protected against
unfair competition and trade practices; and, the constitutional mandate to develop a self-
reliant economy. They also argued that they will sustain injury as CPF will get more incentives
that they are currently enjoying.
(a) Do NFH and the other groups have locus standi? Explain.
No, they do not. The Supreme Court has explained that for organizations to become real parties in
interest, the following criteria must be met so that actions may be allowed to be brought on behalf of
the third parties: (a) that the party bringing the suit must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (b) that the
party must have a close relation to the third party; and, (c) that there must exist some hindrance to the
third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests. Here, NFH et al. did not show that their
members were hindered from personally asserting their own interests. Therefore, they did not comply
with the requisites of locus standi for organizations (National Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc, et al. v.
Board of Investments, et al., G.R. No. 205835 (2020), unanimous decision).
(b) Rule on NFH’s argument that they will suffer from unfair competition.
I will rule that this argument is still premature. To be determine whether there is unfair competition
or not, NFH et al. would have to prove the relevant market and to show that the entry and the means
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and methods used by CPF are indeed unfair. However, these are matters of fact which have to be duly
substantiated. This is not something that can be done in a direct petition to the Supreme Court.
Therefore, this argument is still premature (Id.).
(c) Rule on NFH’s argument that the application violates the Constitutional mandate to
develop a self-reliant economy.
I will rule that it is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the policy of
economic independence is not a self-executing provision. Moreover, the Constitution allows foreign
participation in certain industries and it is only in very specific cases where foreign investors may not
be allowed to take part in. Lastly, since the Court cannot take cognizance of the case at the first
instance, it should not make a ruling on this issue at this point in time (Id.).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PROBLEM:
The Department of Labor and Employment, realizing that the boundary system is indirectly
causing so many road accidents, issued rules governing the employment and working
conditions of drivers and conductors in the Public Utility Bus (PUB) Transport Industry. The
rules provided that all PUB drivers and conductors shall be compensated based on a part-
fixed-part-performance-based system where the fixed component shall not be lower than the
minimum wage in the region. Moreover, the rules provided that the PUB’s Certificates of
Public Convenience shall not be granted or renewed without showing compliance with the
rules.
This led several bus associations to file a case in the Supreme Court, alleging that the rules
violate their right to due process and the right against the non-impairment of obligation of
contracts.
(a) To justify its direct resort to the Supreme Court, the petitioners argue that the rules
have far-reaching consequences and a wide area of coverage. Decide.
The petitioner’s direct resort to the Supreme Court is improper. The Supreme Court has explained
that to constitute a valid exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the petitioners must allege
and sufficiently show that there are exceptional circumstances present which require the Court to rule
on the matters immediately. In this case, the allegation of far-reaching consequences and a wide area
of coverage is not enough. With these allegations, they could have filed their petition before the Court
of Appeals whose writs are also nationwide in scope. Therefore, their direct resort to the Supreme
Court is improper (Provincial Bus Operators v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No.
(b) To prove that there is an actual case or controversy present in this case, the petitioners
argue that the rules may result in the diminution of their income. Decide.
There is no actual and justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court has explained that for there to be
an actual case or controversy, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine
whether there has been a breach of constitutional text. This is because allegations of abuse must be
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anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable. In this case, the petitioners did not present actual facts for
the Supreme Court to infer the supposed unconstitutionality of the rules. The petitioners’ allegation
that the rules may result in the diminution of their income is based on speculation as clearly shown by
the use of the word, “may.” Therefore, there is no actual case or controversy in this case (Id.).
(c) To support their argument that the rules violate its right to due process, the petitioners
allege that their Certificates of Public Convenience can be taken away due to mere
non-compliance with the rules. Decide.
I will rule against the petitioners. First, the Supreme Court has ruled that in the exercise of quasi-
legislative powers, notice and hearing are not required for their validity. Second, the rules are valid
police power issuances since the DOLE has seen that the boundary system i.e. payment by results,
causes dangers not only to the bus drivers and conductors but to the public as a whole. The boundary
system prioritizes profit over safety since the employees’ earnings are dependent on the number of
trips that they make. This enforces the scarcity mindset which pushes drivers to improve their
performance by any means possible. This has even led some drivers to take illegal drugs like shabu to
get additional trips. Furthermore, certificates of public convenience are franchises which are always
subject to amendment, repeal, or cancellation. Therefore, the rules do not violate the petitioners’ right
to due process (Id.).
(d) To support their argument that the rules violate their right against non-impairment of
contracts, the petitioners allege that the rules will force them to abandon their time-
honored employment contracts and collective-bargaining agreements with their
drivers and conductors. Decide.
I will rule against the petitioners. The Supreme Court has ruled that the non-impairment clause’s
purpose is to protect purely private agreements from state interference. However, contracts whose
subject matters are so related to the public welfare are always subject to the police power of the State.
Moreover, contracts which cannot be considered as property, such as franchises, are also not protected
under this provision. This case involves labor relations which are impressed with public interest, while
the rules being assailed grant bus drivers and conductors minimum wages and social welfare benefits.
Lastly, the certificates of public convenience, as discussed, are subject to amendment pursuant to the
police power of the state. Therefore, the petitioners’ argument of non-impairment must fail (Id.).
[N.B. The Court also discussed that the petitioners did not have legal standing because of their failure
to comply with the requisites of third party standing (see the discussion on National Federation of Hog
Farmers, Inc, et al. v. Board of Investments, et al. above). Here, the petitioners failed to establish who
their members are and the fact that their members allowed them to sue on their behalf i.e. no board
resolutions or articles of incorporation shown to prove that they are authorized to represent their for
the purposes of bringing suit. Moreover, some of the entities who sued here already had their
certificates of incorporation revoked by the SEC.
The petitioners also raised an argument on equal protection, but the Court said that they did not
proffer any explanation to support it.
Lastly, the Court also repeated the well-settled rule that generally, prior notice and hearing is not
required when an administrative agency exercises its quasi-legislative power because it makes no
determination of past events or facts.]
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PROBLEM:
Several gun associations and groups filed petitions in the Supreme Court assailing the
Constitutionality of the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and its
corresponding IRR.
(a) They mainly assail the constitutionality of the law and the IRR, arguing that these
violate their right to bear arms since it requires them to undergo strict requirements
for the usage of their gun e.g. requiring a gun license and acquiring a permit to carry
the weapon outside of residence. Decide.
I will rule against the petitioners on this ground. The Supreme Court has explained that unlike the
United States Constitution, the Philippine Constitutions have never given its people the right to bear
arms. In short, the bearing of arms remains as a statutory privilege. There is no vested right in the
continued ownership and possession of firearms – it is neither a property nor a property right.
Under the rational basis test, all that is required is that the interest of the public generally, require the
exercise of police power and that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of its purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the case of gun
regulation, the maintenance of peace and order and the protection of people from violence are
fundamental duties of the State which have to be fulfilled. Moreover, the means employed such as
requiring a license for gun ownership and a permit for carrying their guns outside of the residences
are reasonably necessary. Therefore, there is no merit that the law and the IRR violate their right to
bear arms (Acosta, et al. v. Ochoa et al., G.R. No. 211559 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) All applications for a new firearm registration included a paragraph indicating the
Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection to be signed by the applicant. This
paragraph states… “I voluntarily give my consent and authorize the PNP to inspect
my firearm/s described above at my residence/address as indicated in my
application.” The petitioners now state that this violates the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the petitioners. First, the Supreme Court has ruled that the signing of the Consent
Form in this case is not a true valid and consented search. Laying down the genealogy of U.S.
jurisprudence regarding administrative searches, the Supreme Court held that true test for determining
the constitutionality of administrative searches is the reasonableness of such search. In this case, the
law gives government officials the unbridled discretion to conduct searches whenever they want to.
Second, for a waiver to be valid, the provision allowing for inspection must be informative as to detail
its scope and extent. From the facts of the case, the applicant cannot intelligently consent to the
inspection because of the utter lack of parameters as to how the inspection shall be conducted.
Therefore, the petitioners are correct in arguing that the requirement to sign the Consent for
Inspection violates their right against unreasonable searches and seizures (Id.).
[N.B. Read this case in the original if you want a detailed explanation on how the reasonableness of
administrative searches has been determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in several instances.]
PROBLEM:
ZD, a domestic corporation, mortgaged a parcel of land to IE Bank as security for its loan.
ZD defaulted and IE exercised its option to foreclose the mortgage extrajudicially. ZD
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subsequently filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the sale and to declare Sec. 47 of
R.A. 8791 as unconstitutional. ZD argues the General Banking Law of 2002 violates its right
to equal protection since law provides a shorter period for redemption of 3 months or earlier
to juridical entities compared to the 1 year given to natural persons. Decide.
I will rule against ZD. The Supreme Court has explained that the difference in the treatment between
juridical persons and natural persons is based on the nature of the properties foreclosed. Natural
persons usually mortgage residential properties and thus, a more liberal one-year redemption is
retained. On the other hand, juridical persons usually mortgage properties of commercial nature.
Therefore, a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership
of the asset. Not to mention, juridical entities enjoy more benefits such as limited liability. Equal
protection does not demand absolute equality – it merely requires that all persons must be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Therefore, the classification is proper in this case (Zomer Development v. CA, G.R. No. 194461
PROBLEM:
Police Officer A received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that a certain
person would be transporting marijuana from Brgy. Lun-Oy to Brgy. Poblacion which are
both in La Union. A organized checkpoints to intercept this trip. A passenger jeepney
approached one of these checkpoints whose driver disembarked and pointed to the police
officers stationed therein, Mr. B who was allegedly transporting marijuana. T, one of the
officers, approached B and asked him to open the bags. B did as he was told and the officers
saw several bricks of dried marijuana leaves therein. B was then charged under the Dangerous
Drugs Act. During his trial, B argued that the search conducted on him was illegal which
should result to the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered and eventually, his acquittal.
(a) The prosecution first argued that the search conducted falls under the the “Stop and
frisk” exception and is therefore valid. Decide.
I will rule in favor of B. The Supreme Court has explained that Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution
provides the general rule that no person can be searched unless the individuals doing so are armed
with a valid search warrant duly issued by a judge. One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is the
“stop and frisk” exception which requires that there be a genuine reason, in light of the officer’s
experience and the surrounding conditions to warrant the belief that gives rise to a reasonable
inference of criminal activity. In this case, the officers merely relied on an anonymous tip and the
subsequent identification by the jeepney driver to search B. B was merely sitting and holding his bag
– circumstances do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was doing something criminal.
Therefore, the supposed “stop and frisk” search was invalid (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334,
(b) The prosecution then argued that the search conducted could also be considered as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest because he was caught in flagrante delicto. Decide.
I will still rule in favor of B. Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as explained by the
Supreme Court, requires that for a warrantless arrest done in flagrante delicto, two elements must occur:
(a) that the accused must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit a crime; and (b) that the overt act be done in the presence of the arresting officer.
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From the facts given, neither of these elements were present because B was merely sitting while
holding his bag. Again, this innocent act cannot be considered as an overt act that indicates the
presence of criminal activity (Id.).
(c) Lastly, the prosecution argues that this can also be characterized as a consented search
since B did not object to the command that he open his bags. Decide.
I will still rule in favor of B. The Supreme Court has explained that silence or lack of aggressive
objection of a person under a coercive environment brought about by a police officer’s intrusion into
his personal space is only a natural reaction. It is not sufficient that the officer introduces himself as
such, but there should be an explanation that inaction will amount to a waiver of his rights. This must
be communicated clearly to the person about to make a waiver. The factual circumstances do not
show that B had fully waived his rights. He was merely ordered to open his bags and it can be presumed
that he only did so because he felt intimidated by the police (Id.).
[N.B. This case is very important because the doctrines found herein were reiterated in the case of
People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045 (2020) which was penned by J. Caguioa and was dissented to by J.
M. Lopez, J. Lazaro-Javier, and J. Carandang. There, the Court reconciled seemingly conflicting
decisions and reiterated that police officers cannot conduct warrantless searches on the basis of
unverified tips alone.
J. Leonen says that he will only use cases wherein the members of the Court were not divided. Be that
as it may, this case of People v. Cogaed is a unanimous decision and as expected, J. Leonen wrote a
separate concurring opinion in People v. Sapla. I have a very strong feeling that this will come out in
the bar.]
PROBLEM:
One morning, a concerned citizen informed the police that a certain alias “Baho,” who was
later identified as MV, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. The police
officers who personally knew MV acted immediately and they set-up a checkpoint in a
baranggay. A few hours after, they chanced upon MV who was riding a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo. The police officers commanded all the passengers to remove the
contents of their pockets. True enough, a tea bag containing dried leaves, which were later
on proven to be marijuana, was recovered from MV. MV was subsequently charged and
convicted for illegal possession of marijuana. Subsequently, MV appealed the case, arguing
that he was illegally arrested, and that the tea bag was inadmissible in evidence. On the other
hand, the prosecution argues that he was caught in flagrante delicto and therefore, both the
arrest and the search incidental to the lawful arrest were valid. In any case, the prosecution
argues that there was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
(a) Was the arrest valid? Explain.
No, it was invalid. In arrests made in flagrante delicto under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, there must be compliance with the overt act test: (a) that the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit a crime and (b) that the overt act was done within the presence or view of the arresting
officer. In this case, MV was not committing any crime when he was inspected at the checkpoint – he
was merely sitting down inside the jeep. It is clear that the police officers relied solely on the tip they
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received. However, this cannot be the sole basis for a warrantless arrest. Be that as it may, MV validly
waived the invalidity of his arrest since he only raised this issue on appeal (Verdiano v. People, G.R.
(b) Was there a search incidental to a lawful arrest? Explain.
No, there was none. Since the arrest was invalid, it necessarily follows that there was no search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In other words, the search done on MV who was merely sitting down in
the jeep, was done in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that the failure to challenge the validity of the arrest does
not come with the waiver on the inadmissibility of the evidence. With all these considerations, the
search made on MV was clearly invalid and the tea bag obtained from him is inadmissible in evidence
(Id.).
(c) Was there a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle? Explain.
No, there was none. The Supreme Court has ruled that the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify
all kinds of searches because law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. Moreover, a
checkpoint search is only valid when they are limited to a visual search, unless there is probable cause
which allows a more extensive one. Here, the intrusive search done on the passengers like MV was
unreasonable. As discussed, MV was not committing any overt act to indicate that he was committing
a crime. Furthermore, it was clear that the checkpoint was set-up here because of the informant’s tip
that MV was carrying drugs. As seen from these circumstances, the search conducted herein was
invalid (Id.).
PROBLEM:
During the election’s gun ban period, Police Chief Inspector RB received a tip that a certain
LM was standing outside a government office with a gun tucked in his waistband. RB
immediately organized a team and went to where LM was. As RB approached LM, the former
saw a bulge on the latter’s waist which the former deduced to be a gun due to its distinct
contour. RB then patted LM down and a .45 caliber handgun was recovered from the latter.
LM was then charged for violating the gun ban. LM argues that the search conducted on him
was unconstitutional. Decide.
I will rule against LM. From the facts, the search conducted on LM falls under the stop and frisk
exception. Jurisprudence explains that stop and frisk searches are reasonable as long as the arresting
officer personally observes two or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would create
a reasonable inference of criminal activity. Here, RB received a tip that LM was carrying a gun during
the gun ban; and, saw a bulge appearing to be a gun when he approached the latter. These two
circumstances led to a reasonable suspicion that LM was indeed violating the gun ban. Therefore, the
stop and frisk search conducted was valid (Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214 (2019), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
One night, PO2 MM was filling up his motorcycle’s gas tank. Behind him was GT who was
also putting gasoline in his motorcycle. When GT was done, he pulled out his wallet from his
right back pocket. This cause his shirt to be slightly lifted, revealing a part of his waist. PO2
MM saw a small metal object which he thought might be a hand grenade. This prompted him
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to call for back-up. Thereafter, PO2 MM and his fellow officers tailed GT up to a mall. 30
minutes later, PO2 MM approached GT and patted him down. He then pulled out the metal
object and confirmed that it was a hand grenade. Upon further frisking, they also recovered 3
small plastic sachets of white crystalline substance which were later confirmed to be shabu.
GT was then charged with illegal possession of drugs. During trial, GT argued that the search
done to him was unconstitutional. On the other hand, the police officers argue that it was a
valid stop and frisk. Decide.
(a) What is a stop and frisk search?
As explained by the Supreme Court, a stop and frisk search is done to deter the commission of a
crime. The test to a reasonable stop and frisk search is not probable cause but also not mere suspicion
– a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be searched has weapons concealed. There must
be at least two or more suspicious circumstances which create this reasonable belief. (Telen v. People,
G.R. No. 228107 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) Was the search done on GT valid? Explain.
The search was invalid. From PO2 MM’s own allegation, he only saw a metal object which he
suspected to be a grenade. This lone circumstance is inadequate to lead him to a genuine reason which
would justify a stop and frisk search. This is even bolstered by the fact that PO3 Mazo had to tail GT
and pat his waist before he could confirm his suspicion. As stated in the doctrine above, a mere
suspicion is not enough to defeat GT’s constitutional right to privacy (Id.).
[N.B. It was also emphasized by J. Leonen here the highly suspicious fact that the prosecution failed
to prove the existence of the hand grenade since no evidence was proffered in its chain of custody.
Telen was not even charged for the illegal possession of the supposed grenade.]
PROBLEM:
DF was charged with violating the Anti-Hazing Law. Before trial even started, she filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that she did not commit the crime.
Second, she also argued that the provision of the anti-hazing law stating that, “one’s presence
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as a principal…” is unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional presumption of innocence and for being a bill of attainder.
Third, she argues that the law violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments since the law imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Lastly, she
prays that the information against her be quashed.
(a) Is the case ripe for adjudication? Explain.
No, it is not. The Supreme Court has explained that an issue is ripe for adjudication when an assailed
act has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government and that the challenged
act must have directly adversely affected the party challenging it. When matters are still pending before
some other competent court, then those matters are not yet ripe for the Supreme Court’s adjudication.
Since trial has not yet even started, it would be premature to rule on whether or not DF actually
committed the crime charged (Fuertes v. Senate, et al., G.R. No. 208162 (2020), unanimous decision).
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(b) Was the doctrine of hierarchy of courts complied with? Explain.
No, it was not complied with. The Supreme Court has ruled that a direct resort to the Supreme Court,
when there is a perfectly competent trial court before which her constitutional question may be raised,
violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. From her last allegation, DF herself recognizes that the
issue of the law’s constitutionality is not incompatible with the quashal of the information. Therefore,
DF should have filed her case first with the Regional Trial Court which not only has the power to
declare the unconstitutionality of a law, but to rule on her motion to quash as well (Id.).
(c) Does the anti-hazing law violate the accused’s right to be presumed innocent?
Explain.
No, the law does not violate this right. The Supreme Court has, in several cases, upheld the
constitutionality of disputable presumptions in criminal laws. The constitutional presumption of
innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed. Moreover, the existence of a disputable presumption does not dispense with the
prosecution’s duty to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has also
recognized that the secrecy and concealment involved in initiation rites makes it difficult to prosecute
perpetrators of the anti-hazing law. Therefore, the Court has held that presence during hazing is prima
facie evidence of participation since it related to the conspiracy in the crime. Therefore, the law does
not violate the right to be presumed innocent (Id.).
(d) Does the law violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unjust
punishments? Explain.
No, it does not. The Supreme Court has held that the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua does not violate this prohibition. As the Court has explained, this prohibition is directed
against extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of his or her humanity
e.g. burning at the sake, disemboweling, and the like. If the severe penalty has a legitimate purpose,
then the punishment is proportionate. The anti-hazing law’s intent is to deter fraternities from making
hazing a requirement for admission. By making the act malum prohibitum, the law rejects the defense
that one’s desire to belong to a group gives that group the license to injure him or even cause his death
(Id.).
(e) Is the law a bill of attainder? Explain.
No, it is not. The Supreme Court has ruled that a bill of attainder is a law which inflicts punishment
on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. In this case, the mere filing of
an information against DF is not a finding of her guilt for the crime charged. Moreover, she is not
being charged as a mere member of a sorority, but as an alleged perpetrator of the crime of hazing.
These are matters which have to be decided upon by the court before she is actually punished (Id.).
PROBLEM:
What is the Barker balancing test in determining the existence of inordinate delay in
connection with the right to the speedy disposition of cases?
The Barker test provides that the courts must consider the following factors when determining the
existence of inordinate delay: (a) the length of delay; (b) reason for delay; (c) defendant’s assertion or
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non-assertion of his right; (d) the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay (Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, and 210141-210142 (2018), J. Caguioa and J. Bersamin
dissented).
Is the period for fact-finding investigations before the filing of the criminal complaint counted
in the determination of whether or not there was inordinate delay? Explain.
No, this period is not counted. The Supreme Court has ruled that fact-finding investigations are not
yet adversarial proceedings against the accused. Even if the accused is invited to attend the
investigations, the period involved herein is merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint.
This means that a case is only deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint
and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. Therefore, the period for fact-finding
before the filing of the criminal complaint is not yet counted for the purpose of determining whether
or not there was inordinate delay (Id.).
[N.B. In this case, the accused was alleging that there was inordinate delay in terminating the
Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation almost seven years after the complaint was filed. However,
the Court ruled that there was no violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases. First, the
Court held that there was no inordinate delay. As explained by the Court, the determination of
inordinate delay is not a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved – the court must determine
whether or not the delay was vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified.
In this case, the complaint against Cagang was filed on February 10, 2003. On August 11, 2004, the
Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable cause against him. However, this was modified by
a resolution dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigation
against some of the other respondents in the case. This further fact-finding was resolved on April 12,
2005. On August 8, 2011 – 6 years after probable cause was initially determined – the recommendation
to file informations against Cagang was issued. Finally, the informations were only filed on November
17, 2011.
The Court noted, however, that Cagang only invoked his right to the speedy disposition of cases when
the informations were filed on November 17, 2011. For seven years, Cagang did not assert his right.
The case also involved complex and numerous transactions which required more time for the
investigation.]
PROBLEM:
KL was charged for estafa for allegedly failing to return to EPCI the amount which the latter
erroneously deposited to its account. KL was arraigned and trial proceeded. The first
prosecution witness was AR. On March 16, 2007, date of AR’s initial cross-examination, Atty.
DB appeared as a collaborating counsel for KL and moved for the resetting of the hearing.
This was granted. On April 19, 2007, the hearing was again reset on the instance of KL
because one of KL’s counsels, Atty. JP, was the fraternity brother of the private prosecutor. In
February 2009, Atty. DB failed to appear in court. The cross-examination was again reset to
August 27, 2009 where DB once again failed to appear.
This led the private prosecutor to move that KL be declared to have waived his right to cross-
examine AR. This was granted by the court. Now, the KL appeals his case, arguing that this
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court’s order violated his constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Decide.
I will rule against KL. The right of confrontation is granted by Article III, Section 14 of the
Constitution. However, when an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine his witnesses but
fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived the right. In this case, KL was clearly
given more than enough opportunities to cross-examine DR. However, the cross-examination was
cancelled several times because of his own doing. Therefore, he is properly deemed to have waived
his right to cross-examine AR. (Liong v. People, G.R. No. 200630 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
WP and LB were members of ALIMANGO, a duly registered cooperative. One morning, they
were harvesting nipa palm when DP, a barangay official, approached them and asked them
as to who gave them the authority to harvest there. WP and LB replied that they were
ALIMANGO members who had been allowed to get nipa palm therein. Despite this, DP
pushed WP and LB into a paddle boat. When asked why he arrested WP and LB, DP replied
that a Barangay Resolution enacted the day before ordered barangay officials to surveil the
nipa area because of complaints of illegal cutting of mangroves and nipa leaves. Was the arrest
made by DP valid?
No, it was not. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when
warrantless arrests are lawful: (a) an arrest in flagrente delicto; (b) an arrest in hot pursuit; and (c) an arrest
of an escapee. From the facts of this case, the arrest of WP and LB does not fall into any one of these.
Upon hearing a reasonable explanation as to why WP and LB were harvesting, DP had no reason to
suspect any wrongdoing. The mere act of harvesting nipa is not itself a crime. If DP really doubted
the authority of WP and LB, then he should have conducted an investigation and should have secured
a warrant if he finds out that WP and LB were not authorized to harvest the nipa (Duropan v. People,
PROBLEM:
EDC placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine as he entered the Cebu Domestic Port.
CPF, the operator on duty, saw what appeared to be 3 firearms inside EDC’s bag. When the
former asked the latter if he owned the bag, EDC answered in the affirmative and consented
to the manual inspection of its contents. CPF then found 3 revolvers therein. A criminal
information was subsequently filed against EDC for illegal possession of firearms. During
trial, EDC argued that the search on his bag was done in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
(a) CPF argues that the Bill of Rights does not operate against acts done by private
individuals. Therefore, since he was merely acting in a private capacity, EDC’s
argument must fail. Decide.
I will rule against CPF. The Supreme Court has explained that actions of port personnel during routine
security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function. Therefore, CPF is considered as an
agent of the government which puts him under the ambit of the Bill of Rights. (Dela Cruz v. People,
(b) Was the search valid? Explain.

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Yes, it was valid. The circumstances show that it falls under the exception of a consented search. Its
requisites are as follows: (a) that a right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge of its
existence; and (c) that he had an actual intention to relinquish it. First, EDC voluntarily submitted his
bag for x-ray scanning which then gave probable cause for the search of his bag. Moreover, the facts
showed that he also voluntary agreed to such search when he was asked by CPF. Clearly, EDC validly
consented to the search (Id.).
(c) Does this fall under the exception of customs searches as well? Explain.
No, it does not. For there to be a valid customs search, the following requisites must be complied
with: (a) the person was exercising police authority under customs law; (b) the search was for the
enforcement of customs law; and (c) the place searched was not a dwelling place or house. Here, the
search was merely done as part of the routine port security measures and was not conducted by
persons authorized under customs law. Therefore, it does not fall under the ambit of a valid customs
search (Id.).
PROBLEM:
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9674 directing all survey firms to submit to
COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published during the
campaign period, including their subscribers.
(a) The survey companies challenged this, stating that it violates their freedom of speech
and expression i.e. to publish their findings. Decide.
I will rule against the petitioners. The Supreme Court has ruled that the O’Brien test is used for
content-neutral regulations. As seen from the facts, this test is the appropriate one to use since the
resolution does not suppress the publication of the surveys nor operate as a prior restraint. The
freedom to publish the surveys remains and all that Resolution No. 9674 regulates is the manner of
publication i.e. the disclosure of the commissioners, payors, and subscribers.
In line with the O’Brien Test, a content-neutral regulation is justified if: (a) it is within the
constitutional power of the government; (b) it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (c) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (d) the
incidental restriction on alleged freedom of speech and expression is no greater than what is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
Here, all requisites are complied with. First, Resolution No. 9674 is anchored on the Fair Election Act
which supports the inclusion of subscribers among the persons who paid for the survey. Second, one
of the constitutional mandates of the COMELEC is to guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service. This constitutes as the compelling state interest which justifies this resolution. Third,
as stated above, while it regulates expression, all that it regulates is the manner of the publication i.e.
it does not suppress the desired expression itself. Lastly, the third point also shows that the incidental
restriction is no greater than that essential to further the governmental interest since, again, it only
regulates the manner of the publication and not the publication itself. (Social Weather Stations, Inc.
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062 (2015), unanimous decision).
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[N.B. I slightly modified the doctrine by stating that the O’Brien Test should be used since the
Supreme Court did not explicitly say it but nonetheless, the Court discussed its elements. Moreover,
remember that this test is used for content-neutral regulation. As explicitly stated by the Court in this
case, “All Resolution No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the manner of publication.”
See pp. 187 – 188, Ateneo Blue Notes for Political Law.]
(b) Petitioners also argue that this resolution violates the constitutional guarantee against
the non-impairment of contracts. Decide.
I will rule against the petitioners. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State; and, that the law is deemed
written into the contract of the parties. What Art. III, Sec. 10 of the Constitution contemplates is a
prohibition against impairments which are capricious, whimsical, unjust, or unreasonable. As
explained, the resolution passes is constitutional and reasonable. Therefore, this resolution is deemed
written into the petitioners’ existing contracts (Id.)
PROBLEM:
SO Placement Agency published an ad for a quality control job in Taiwan. JC applied and
was accepted, so she signed a one-year employment contract with a monthly salary of
NT$15,360. She was then deployed to work for Taiwan WCL company where she only worked
as a cutter. Within 3 weeks from starting employment, JC was given a letter, informing her
that she has been terminated and she is to be immediately repatriated. Upon arriving in the
Philippines, she filed a complaint with the NLRC, arguing that she was illegally dismissed.
However, she was only awarded 3 months’ worth of salary because of Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8042,
which states, that an OFW invalidly terminated “shall be entitled to salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.”
(a) If you were the lawyer of JC, what argument will you raise to invalidate this provision?
I will argue that this provision violates the equal protection clause and the right to due process. Art.
III, Sec. 1 requires that first and foremost, a reasonable classification must rest on substantial
distinctions. Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8042 invalidly distinguishes between fixed-period OFWs and fixed-
period local workers and, between OFWs with employment contracts of less than 1 year and those
with at least 1 year. Labor being afforded with special protection, there is no substantial distinction
that would justify different treatments between them. OFWs are also entitled to security of tenure,
especially since their situation is more burdensome due to their separation from their families and the
increased abuses that they may face while staying in a foreign land. Upholding this provision would
also encourage foreign employers to hire for at least 1 year, because they will have a smaller liability if
they choose to illegally dismiss their employees. This oppresses the OFWs who are in need of more
protection. Therefore, this provision should be struck down for being unconstitutional (Sameer v.
Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139 (2014), J. Brion wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion).
(b) Assume that the provision challenged was held to be unconstitutional, can Congress,
in the exercise of its plenary powers, choose to reenact the same provision in a different
law? Why/why not?
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No, Congress cannot enact the same provision unless circumstances have changed to justify its
validity. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution is supreme – it cannot be trumped by any
other laws because all laws must be read in its light. Therefore, when a law or a legal provision is held
to be unconstitutional, its nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment. It remains to be
unconstitutional unless there are compelling circumstances already which justify its validity (Id.).
[N.B. The doctrine in question (b) was once again repeated in another J. Leonen ponencia: Aldovino v.
Gold and Green Manpower, G.R. No. 200811 (2019), unanimous decision]
PROBLEM:
EP filed an administrative complaint against Judge AE for immorality. EP alleged that AE
was first married to TT in 1987. They bore a daughter, but their marriage was later declared
void in January 1992. EP alleged that before AE and TT’s marriage was declared void, AE
entered into another marriage with RV. In her defense, AE argued that her marriage with RV
was only done under Catholic rights, and that the priest who officiated their marriage had no
authority to solemnize it under civil law.
(a) EP argues that Judge AE committed a crime under Article 350 of the RPC – marriage
contracted against provisions of law. Should Judge AE be held administratively liable?
Explain.
No, Judge AE should not be held administratively liable. Under the test of benevolent neutrality,
religious freedom is weighed against a compelling state interest. Here, there is no compelling state
interest that may limit Judge AE’s right to participate in a mere ceremonial act with no legally binding
effect. Therefore, the institution of marriage is not threatened when Judge AE’s freedom to participate
in such ceremony is upheld even if this has secular counterparts under the law. (Perfecto v. Esidera,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 (2015), unanimous decision).
(b) What if EP alleges that Judge AE should be held administratively liable for having
sexual relations with RV? Will your answer change?
Yes, my answer will change. Benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield Judge
AE from liability for having sexual relations with RV while her first marriage was subsisting. Their
sexual relations cannot be excused as a mere exercise of religious expression. Therefore, in holding
her liable, the Court only protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice – something
which AE marred by violating her marriage obligations with TT (Id.).
PROBLEM:
XYZ company filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation with the RTC which the latter
granted. However, CBC, a creditor of XYZ, elevated the case to the CA, arguing that the
rehabilitation plan impaired the obligation of contracts and that the dacion en pago provision
therein did not come with its consent. BPI, another creditor of XYZ, filed a separate petition
with the CA, alleging that its right against the impairment of obligation of contracts was also
violated. Decide.
I will rule in favor of XYZ. The Supreme Court has repeatedly brushed aside invocations of the non-
impairment clause to give way to a valid exercise of police power. Successful rehabilitation of a
distressed corporation will benefit not only the debtors and the creditors, but the whole economy as
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well. Therefore, the rehabilitation plan provided by statute is a valid exercise of police power which
should not be struck down by the invocation of the non-impairment of contracts clause in the
Constitution (Pryce Corp. v. CBC, G.R. No. 172302 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One evening, AAA, who was then 12 years old, drank alcoholic beverages with her neighbor,
BU. Soon after, AAA became intoxicated. Taking advantage of the situation, BS, BU’s father,
carried AAA into a dark room and forcefully had carnal knowledge with AAA. Subsequently,
BS was charged with rape under the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Republic
Act No. 7610. In his defense, BS argues that charging him with the two crimes in the
information for one act violates his right against double jeopardy. Decide.
BS’ argument is unmeritorious. Under Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, what is
prohibited is the punishment for the “same offense” which has been interpreted by the Court to mean
offenses having essential elements. In this case, rape under the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse
under R.A. 7610 do not have the same elements, nor is one necessarily included in the other. For
sexual abuse under R.A. 7610, consent is immaterial because the law punishes the mere act of having
sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse. On the other
hand, consent exonerates an accused from a rape charge except if the woman was under 12 years of
age. Clearly, the argument of BS must fail (People v. Udang, G.R. No. 210161 (2018), unanimous
decision).
[N.B. In any case, the Court ruled that based on the allegations in the information, Udang was actually
charged with sexual abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and not even rape under the Revised Penal
Code.]
PROBLEM:
QWE company owned a large parcel of land in Pasig City. Upon the request of DPWH, QWE
segregated the property into separate lots for the road widening of C5. However, only a
portion of one lot was used in the project so QWE filed a petition for authority in the RTC to
sell the portion actually used. The RTC ruled in favor of QWE. The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) however, filed an opposition alleging that the property
can only be conveyed by donation as provided under Sec. 50 of P.D. No. 1529. Decide.
I will rule in favor of QWE. The Constitution provides that when there is taking of private property
for some public purpose, the owner is entitled to just compensation. The elements of taking are as
follows: (a) government must enter the private property; (b) the entry must be indefinite or permanent;
(c) there is color of legal authority; (d) the property is devoted for public use or purpose; (e) the owner
is removed from all beneficial enjoyment of the property. These are all present here. The Republic
constructed a road for the use of the general public which was done through the authority of the
DPWH. Because of this, QWE cannot anymore enjoy the property as it did before. Sec. 50 of P.D.
No. 1529 does not apply because the roads involved herein are not subdivision roads for the benefit
of the owners of the surrounding properties. Therefore, QWE must be allowed to sell the property
for it to receive just compensation (Republic v. Ortigas Co., G.R. No. 171496 (2014), unanimous).
PROBLEM:
MGP was a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was
abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was found by EM and registered her with
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the Local Civil Registrar. She was subsequently adopted by Sps. P who raised her and
provided her needs. Decades later, MGP ran for a seat in the Senate and won. Subsequently,
RD, a losing candidate, filed a petition for Quo Warranto with the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
arguing that MGP was disqualified to run since she is not a natural-born citizen. According
to RD, a foundling is not among those listed in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
In her defense, MGP argues that when she was found by EM, there was no international
airport in Jaro, Iloilo. Moreover, she stands at 5 feet, 2 inches tall, with brown almond-shaped
eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair, and an oval-shaped face. Lastly, she submitted
statistics of recorded births showing that in 1968, there is a 99.8% probability that she was a
Filipino. Decide.
I will rule in favor of MGP. Article IV, Section 2, explicitly states that natural-born citizens are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Between Section 2 and Section 1, it is the former which applies to this case.
Being a foundling, MGP did not commit any positive act to acquire or perfect her citizenship.
Moreover, though they may be circumstantial, the evidence proffered by MGP shows that she is most
probably a natural-born Filipino. These pieces of evidence are considered reasonable since identifying
her parents after several decades may be impossible.
Lastly, a reading of the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines
are born to at least either a Filipino father or mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise. This presumption is also in line with the State’s international obligations,
such as those found in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Therefore, MGP is deemed a natural-born citizen (David v.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221537 (2016), J’s Perlas-Bernabe and Reyes dissented).
[N.B. The Court enumerated the obligations of state-parties in the UNCRC in relation to treating
foundlings as natural-born citizens. These obligations are to protect: (a) children’s rights to immediate
registration and nationality after birth, (b) children against statelessness, and (c) children against
discrimination on account of their birth status.]
ELECTION LAW
PROBLEM:
AC filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila
during the 2013 elections. The District is entitled to 6 seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
After the elections, AC garnered the 6th highest number of votes, so she was proclaimed by
the Board of Canvassers. However, on the date of her proclamation, IF filed a petition
captioned “To deny due course and/or cancel Chua’s COC.” IF alleged that AC, though a
natural born Filipino, became a naturalized American citizen and is thus disqualified to run
for her position. In her defense, AC argues that 2 years before she filed her COC, she took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which effectively takes away the
disqualification.
(a) Differentiate a petition to deny due course or cancel COC and a petition for
disqualification as to their grounds.
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According to the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) have different grounds on which they stand. First,
a petition to deny due course or cancel COC is filed exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 of the OEC is false. This requires
material representation involving the eligibility or qualifications for the office sought by the person
who filed the certificate. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification can be filed on the grounds
provided for in Section 68 of the OEC and in Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC). An
example of a ground provided therein is the commission of terrorism to enhance his candidacy.
Ultimately, the proper remedy to file depends on the petitioner’s grounds (Chua v. COMELEC, G.R.
(b) What remedy did IF avail of? Explain.

From the facts of the case, IF actually availed of a petition for disqualification and not a petition to
deny due course or cancel COC. As IF alleges, AC is a dual citizen and is thus disqualified to run for
her position. IF did not allege that AC made a false material representation in her COC. Therefore,
despite the caption used, IF availed of a petition for disqualification (Id.).
(c) Rule on the merits of IF’s petition.
I will rule in IF’s favor. According to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines must not only take an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic but must also execute a sworn and personal renunciation of their foreign citizenship. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requirement to be qualified to run for public office.
Here, AC did not comply with this requirement. In accordance with Section 40 of the LGC, AC was
disqualified to run for Councilor (Id).
[N.B. The Court also ruled that since Arlene Chua is disqualified to run due to her citizenship, her
COC was void ab initio. This means that she is effectively considered as non-candidate. Therefore, all
votes casted for her were stray and the person legal entitled to the position is the candidate with the
next highest number of votes among eligible candidate – Krystle Bacani.]
PROBLEM:
A and B ran for the position of Representative of the First Legislative District of Makati City.
A won with only a margin of 242 votes. This prompted B to file an election protest before the
HRET. B argued that there were votes which had accidental, unnecessary marks such as stray
lines and dots. She then cited law and Supreme Court decisions stating that such unnecessary
writings nullify these ballots. Is B correct?
No, B is incorrect. The distinguishing marks which the law forbids are those which were placed with
the intention of identifying the ballot, which in turn defeats the secrecy of suffrage. Unless it is proven
that these marks were specifically for identification, then the ballots should be upheld (Locsin v.
HRET, G.R. No. 204123 (2013), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Alfred Zapanta (AZ), an incumbent councilor of the 2 nd District of Antipolo and a member of
Aksyon Partylist filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the 2016 elections. On the same
day, Reynaldo S. Zapanta (RZ), a member of Lakas Partylist, also filed his COC and indicated
that his name be indicated as “Alfred” in the official ballots. This led AZ to file a petition to
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deny due course and/or to cancel COC of RZ since the latter was allegedly a nuisance
candidate. AZ argued that RZ never identified himself as “Alfred” until he filed his COC, and
that the latter had no campaign materials using the name “Alfred Zapanta.”
The names of AZ and RZ in the official ballots are indicated as follows:

21. Zapanta, Alfred (AKSYON)
22. Zapanta, Alfred (LAKAS)
(a) Should RZ be declared as a nuisance candidate? Explain.
Yes, RZ should be declared as a nuisance candidate. The Supreme Court has defined a nuisance
candidate as one who has no bona fide intention to run, and whose sole purpose is to reduce the votes
of a strong candidate. In this case, the only way to distinguish AZ from RZ is their numbers on the
ballot and their affiliations. Clearly, a voter would be expected to be confused when he only knows
his preferred candidate as “Alfred Zapanta” without knowledge as to his political affiliation. Moreover,
AZ is more recognized as “Alfred Zapanta” since he is the incumbent city councilor who is running
for another term. Lastly, the lack of RZ’s campaign materials under the name “Alfred Zapanta” just
shows further that he had no bona fide intention to run. Therefore, RZ should be declared as a
nuisance candidate (Zapanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 233016 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) RZ argues that his bona fide intention to run for office is shown by his membership in
a political party. Decide.
I will rule against RZ. The Supreme Court has explained that mere association to a political party per
se does not necessarily equate to a candidate’s bona fide intention to run. More than his affiliation, he
must show that he or she is serious in running for office. In this case, RZ failed to demonstrate such
intent. (Id.).
(c) Assuming that RZ is declared as a nuisance candidate, what will happen to the votes
cast in his favor?
The Supreme Court has ruled that in a multi-slot office, the votes cast for the nuisance candidate
should not be merely credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall automatically
receive 2 votes from 1 voter. What the law requires is that the COMELEC inspect the ballots. In the
ballots which contain votes for both the nuisance and legitimate candidate, only one vote must be
credited to the legitimate candidate (Id.).
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
PROBLEM:
The Treasurer of the City of Lapu-Lapu demanded Php 32M in real property taxes from PEZA
for the latter’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. Can PEZA be taxed by the
City of Lapu-Lapu? Explain.
No, PEZA cannot be taxed by the City of Lapu-Lapu. The Supreme Court has held that PEZA is a
government instrumentality and cannot be taxed by local government units. Moreover, the Local
Government Code explicitly exempts real property owned by the Republic or any of its political
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subdivisions. Since PEZA has been declared to be a government instrumentality whose properties are
owned by the State, it falls within such exemption. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that PEZA
has assumed the tax-exempt status of its predecessor, EPZA, by virtue of the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995 and Executive Order No. 282. (City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA, G.R. No. 184203 (2014),
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROBLEM:
JL, filed a criminal complaint against SP who killed his brother. Unfortunately, JL’s counsel
was unable to comply with several procedural rules which led to the dismissal of the case. JL
now comes to court asking his procedural mistakes be excused, invoking the Philippine’s
obligations under the Article 2(3) of the ICCPR to provide accessible and effective remedies
through proper mechanisms. Decide.
I will rule against JL. Article 2(3) of the ICCPR mandates State Parties to ensure that individuals have
accessible and effective remedies to vindicate their rights. This is done by establishing judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing violations of rights under domestic law. The Supreme Court
has explained that disregarding criminal rules of procedure cannot be excused by merely invoking
human rights especially if there are no justifiable reasons for the non-compliance. It is not only the
victim who enjoys the protection of their rights, but the accused as well (Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde et al.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PROBLEM:
APM, Inc. filed its VAT returns and monthly remittance returns of income tax withheld.
Subsequently, APM received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) for deficiency
assessments. APM filed a protest against the PAN. Without ruling on APM’s protest, the BIR
Commissioner sent APM a Final Assessment Notice and a Formal Letter of Demand
(FAN/LD) which contained the same amounts in the PAN. APM also protested the
FAN/LD. A conference was then held where APM informed the revenue officers that all
documents necessary to support its defense had already been submitted. However, the BIR
recommended the enforcement and collection of the assessments on the sole justification that
APM failed to submit supporting documents within the period prescribed by the Tax Code.
Thereafter, APM was served with a collection letter. APM requested for reconsideration and
argued that the BIR has not even acted on its protest against the FAN/LD. Thus, APM
already treated the collection letter as a denial of its protest.
Before the Court of Tax Appeals, APM argues that the BIR failed to observe administrative
due process which renders the assessments void.
(a) What are the requirements of administrative due process?
As explained in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, the requirements are as follows: (a)
the party interested must be able to present his or her own case and submit evidence in support of it;
(b) the administrative tribunal or body must consider the evidence presented; (c) there must be
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evidence supporting the tribunal’s decision; (d) the evidence must be substantial; (e) the decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (f) the decision must be based on the deciding authority’s own independent consideration of
the law and facts governing the case; and (g) the decision is rendered in a manner that the parties may
know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision. (CIR v. Avon Products
Manufacturing, G.R. Nos. 201398-99 and 201418-19 (2018), unanimous decision).
[N.B. These safeguards were subsequently simplified into four basic rights: (a) the right to notice, be
it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right; (b)
reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported
by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to
the parties.]
(b) Rule on APM’s argument before the CTA.
The argument is meritorious. The Supreme Court has ruled that the affected party must not only be
given an opportunity to present his case and adduce evidence – the tribunal must also consider the
evidence presented. The facts undeniably demonstrate that APM was deprived of due process. The
BIR, in its rigor to collect the supposed deficiency taxes, did not even comment or address the
defenses and documents submitted by APM. This was highlighted when the BIR recommended the
collection of the taxes on the ground that APM failed to submit the required documents. However,
as APM has been vehemently arguing, it has already presented the required evidence even in its protest
against the PAN. Therefore, APM was clearly deprived of administrative due process and the BIR’s
assessments are null and void (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CPF, a 100% Thai-owned company, submitted applications to the Board of Investments
(BOI) as a new producer of different products and services. First, it sought to be a new
producer of aqua feeds on a pioneer status. This was approved by the BOI. Its second
application was to be a producer of hog parent and slaughter hogs. This was also approved
by the BOI.
A few months after, NFH and other several agricultural groups filed a petition in the Supreme
Court, arguing that the applications were issued with grave abuse of discretion. They argued
that the approvals violated their constitutional right to be protected against unfair competition
and trade practices. They also argued that they will sustain injury as CPF will get more
incentives that they are currently enjoying.
(a) What is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court has explained when a court is faced with a case that is within an administrative
agency’s exclusive jurisdiction, the court is behooved to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. Otherwise,
any action it renders on a subject matter over which it has no jurisdiction will be void (National
Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc, et al. v. Board of Investments, et al., G.R. No. 205835 (2020),
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[N.B. In Star Special Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 225366 (2020), unanimous decision, the
Court, speaking through J. Leonen, ruled that generally, the court may raise the issue of primary
jurisdiction motu proprio and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it. An
exception to this rule is if there was already estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine
(basically same doctrine with regard to jurisdiction of courts).]
(b) Was it proper for NFH et al. to file their petition with the Supreme Court at the first
instance? Explain.
No, it was improper. Upon a reading of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, the quasi-judicial
power to assess and approve applications for registration was bestowed exclusively on the Board of
Governors, owing to its expertise over industries which need the added boost of investments and its
in-depth knowledge on the requirements for registration. Under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction over the approval of registration lies exclusively with the Board of
Investments, subject to appeal to the Office of the President. Therefore, the NFH should have sought
recourse with the BOI first, then with the Office of the President (Id.).
PROBLEM:
State Auditor HC investigated irregularities in Sarangani Province’s grant of financial
assistance. There, HC discovered that Governor ME approved disbursement vouchers and
the release of checks for an alleged financial assistance project to NT, the team leader of the
market vendors association. However, it was discovered that NT never received the money
and that the amount disbursed was actually used for the wedding celebration of one of the
employees of the province. Because of this, an information for estafa through falsification of
public documents was filed against ME and other officials of the Province. In his defense,
ME argued that he had no hand in the preparation of the documents he signed and, that he
merely relied on the acts of his subordinates in good faith. On the other hand, the prosecution
argues that there were several discrepancies in the disbursement vouchers and the checks e.g.
that the names of the recipient on these documents were not the same. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the prosecution. The Supreme Court has ruled that all the heads of government
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. However, this doctrine does not apply
when there are circumstances which should have prompted the head of the office to go beyond what
their subordinates have prepared. Here, the discrepancy in the names indicated in the voucher and the
check should have prompted ME to investigate the irregularity. By failing to do this, he should be
made liable (Escobar v. People. G.R. No. 205576 (2017), unanimous decision).
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
PROBLEM:
Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision with commercial establishments operating
within it. Because of these establishments, customers could freely come and go within
Diamond. This has led to several incidents of robbery, prostitution, rape, loud music, and
noise. The Homeowners Association of Diamond wrote about their concerns to the City
Council. As a result, the City Council issued an ordinance reclassifying Diamond as an
exclusively residential subdivision and prohibited the putting up of more establishments
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therein. To safeguard the whole subdivision, the Homeowners Association adopted a policy
which required customers of the commercial establishments to surrender their IDs upon
entering the subdivision. WK, an owner of several motels in the subdivision, went to the
HLURB, arguing that the policy was invalid. This is because the subdivision roads have been
donated to the City and are therefore public roads which must be freely open for public use.
Was the policy valid? Decide.
Yes, it is. First, it cannot be denied that under the Local Government Code, local governments have
the power to govern the welfare of those within its territorial jurisdiction, along with the express power
to close and open roads. While ownership of public spaces is with the local government, enjoyment,
possession, and control are with the residents. As seen from the questioned policy, the public nature
of the roads is maintained since the public is not prevented from using them. One must merely
surrender an ID card to ensure the security of the residents. The policy neither denies nor impairs the
local government’s rights of ownership. As stated in the Constitution, the use of property bears a
social function, and the State may regulate its use for the common good. Therefore, public interest is
served by the questioned policy (Kwong Management v. Diamond Homeowners Assoc., G.R. No.
[N.B. Might be asked in Civil Law – under the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners’
Associations, a homeowners’ association still has the power to regulate passage in and out of the village
even if the roads are already public.
Moreover, in Republic v. Llamas, G.R. No. 194190 (2017), unanimous decision, the Court, speaking
through J. Leonen reminds us that Section 31 of P.D. 957, as amended, cannot be a valid basis for the
government to compel subdivision owners to donate open spaces to the former. To force such
donation is unconstitutional since it is tantamount to taking without the payment of just
compensation.]
PROBLEM:
The CFI was incorporated by different government officials under the SEC and was tasked to
maintain and preserve war relics in Corregidor in an effort to boost tourism therein. It
subsequently executed a memorandum of agreement with the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA) to centralize the planning. The PTA then released to CFI its operating funds based on
a budget for its approval. In return, CFI agreed to submit quarterly reports on receipts in
disbursements to PTA. 99.66% of its budget comes from the PTA, Department of Tourism,
and Duty-Free Philippines. The members of its Board of Trustees are different Cabinet
Secretaries, and other government officials who shall hold their position therein by virtue of
their office.
Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) noted that several personnel of the PTA who
were concurrently rendering services in CFI received honoraria and cash gifts. The COA then
informed the CFI that this violated the prohibition against double compensation. On the
other hand, CFI argued that it was not under the audit jurisdiction of COA.
(a) What attributes must be present for an entity to be properly characterized as a

government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC)?
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According to the Administrative Code and as explained by the Supreme Court, the following attributes
must be present: (a) the entity is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; (b) its functions are
public in character; and, (c) it is owned or, at the very least, controlled by the government (Oriondo
v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211293 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) Is CFI a GOCC? Explain.
Yes, CFI is a GOCC. From the facts, it can be seen that the attributes enumerated above are all
present. First, CFI was organized as a corporation under the SEC and it is non-stock since the facts
use the term “Board of Trustees”. Second, its main task of maintaining and preserving war relics in
Corregidor to boost tourism is undoubtedly a public function. Lastly, government control is seen from
the fact that all of its Trustees are government officials who hold their positions by reason of their
office. This last fact shows that the government has substantial participation in the selection of CFI’s
governing Board. Therefore, CFI is a GOCC (Id.).
(c) CFI argues that it is not a GOCC because it was not organized under a special law or
original charter. Decide.
CFI’s argument is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has ruled that there is nothing in the law which
requires GOCCs to be created under an original charter or a special law. All that is required is that the
three attributes enumerated above are present. It is not even required that the employees of the GOCC
are under the Civil Service Commission to be qualified as such (Id.).
(d) Is CFI under COA’s audit jurisdiction? Explain.
Yes, CFI is under COA’s audit jurisdiction. Article IX-D, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
the COA shall have the power, authority and duty to audit all accounts pertaining to the expenditures
of the Government, including GOCC’s. Being a GOCC, CFI is directly under COA’s audit
jurisdiction. Even assuming that CFI is not a GOCC, it is also stated in the Constitution that even
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from the government are under the audit
jurisdiction of COA. Since 99.66% of CFI’s budget comes from the government, then it can be audited
by COA (Id.).
[N.B. In Star Special Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 225366 (2020), unanimous decision, the
Court, speaking through J. Leonen, ruled that the Commission on Audit has no jurisdiction to reverse
and set aside a final judgment of the RTC. This may also be asked in remedial law.]
PROBLEM:
In 1971, MWSS was created as a corporation without capital stock by R.A. No. 6234. It was
mandated to supply water to Metro Manila. It is an attached agency of the Department of
Public Works and Highways but exercises corporate functions and maintains operational
autonomy. In 1974, President Marcos issued a presidential decree, authorizing it to have
capital stock worth Php 1B. However, the shares shall only be subscribed by the government
and they were prohibited from being transferred or encumbered. MWSS was subsequently
privatized and by virtue of the National Water Crisis Act of 1995. The law also mandated that
any contract that it undertakes with private concessionaires must be assessed for its market
competitiveness.
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In 2007, the Local Government of QC served MWSS with delinquency notices, asking it to
pay real property tax on the real properties it owns.
(a) What is a government instrumentality?
The Supreme Court, citing Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code, has explained that a government
instrumentality is an agency of the National Government, not integrated within the departmental
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter
(Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. The Local Government of Quezon City, G.R. No.
(b) Is MWSS is a government instrumentality? Explain.
Yes, it is but only by express provision of law. The Constitution requires that unlike government
instrumentalities, government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) must meet the tests of
common good and economic viability. Here, MWSS had to provide water to Metro Manila. Therefore,
its creation was for the benefit of the common good. Moreover, because of the National Water Crisis
Act of 1995, its contracts with private concessionaires must already be assessed for market
competitiveness which is another term for economic viability. Hence, by jurisprudential standards,
MWSS is a GOCC. However, Executive Order No. 596 issued by Former President Macapagal-
Arroyo and R.A. 10149 both explicitly characterize the MWSS as a government instrumentality with
corporate powers. Therefore, the Court must respect the characterization made by both the Executive
and the Legislative (Id.).
(c) Is the MWSS liable for real property taxes?
No, MWSS is not. Under R.A. No. 6234, government instrumentalities are exempt from the payment
of real property taxes, unless beneficial use of the properties has been transferred to a taxable person.
Here, there is no allegation whatsoever of such beneficial use. Therefore, MWSS is not liable for real
property taxes (Id.).
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LABOR LAW
LABOR LAW I
PROBLEM:
SO Placement Agency published an ad for a quality control job in Taiwan to which JC applied.
JC was accepted and she signed a one-year employment contract with a monthly salary of
NT$15,360. She was then deployed to Taiwan WCL company where she only worked as a
cutter. Within 3 weeks from starting employment, JC was given a letter, informing her that
she has been terminated and that she is to be immediately repatriated. Upon arriving in the
Philippines, she filed a complaint with the NLRC, arguing that she was illegally dismissed.
In its defense, SO argued that JC was terminated due to inefficiency, negligence in her duties,
and failure to comply with the work requirements of WCL.
(a) Was there a valid cause for her dismissal?
JC’s dismissal was not based on a valid cause. Art. 282(b) of the Labor Code provides that gross and
habitual neglect of duties can be a valid cause of dismissal. However, the Supreme Court has explained
that first, the employer has to set standards of conduct and workmanship which must be
communicated to the employee at a reasonable time prior to his performance of the work. Here, SO
merely alleged that JC was inefficient in her work without showing any evidence to support such
claims. There was no effort to even show what requirements were not complied with or violated, nor
the acts which constitute inefficiency. Clearly, JC’s dismissal did not have a valid cause (Sameer v.
Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139 (2014), J. Brion wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion).
(b) Assuming there was a valid cause for dismissal, was the dismissal valid? Why/why
not?
Even assuming that there was a valid cause, the dismissal was still illegal for failing to accord JC due
process. Jurisprudence has repeatedly explained the Labor Code’s twin-notice rule – that the employee
be informed of (a) the acts which may cause the dismissal; and, (b) the employer’s decision after the
employee is given an opportunity to be heard. Here, the facts show that after only working for 3
weeks, JC was terminated and repatriated on the same day, with only the letter of termination given.
This abruptness shows not only the failure to give her the proper notice, but more importantly, the
opportunity to even be heard. Under these facts, JC was invalidly dismissed because she was not
accorded the right to due process (Id.).
(c) Can SO raise the argument that even if the Labor Code provisions were not followed,
it is immaterial because the laws of Taiwan, where JC was employed, allowed her
termination?
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No, SO cannot. The Supreme Court has explained the principle of lex loci contractus i.e. the law of the
place where the contract is made, governs the employment contracts of OFWs. Therefore, the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other local laws affecting labor apply even if the
employee is rendering service abroad. This rule applies not only to the causes for dismissal but also
with the twin-notice rule. Since SO’s employment contract was entered into in the Philippines, then
the laws of the latter will govern (Id.).
PROBLEM:
AE was hired by FTN Broadcasting Network as a news correspondent for a salary of $19,000
yearly. AE’s contract initially provided for a term of 1 year but was successfully renewed on a
yearly basis. After 4 years of working for FTN, AE was diagnosed with lung cancer. This led
FTN to immediately inform her that her contract will not be renewed since it would be
difficult for her to continue the performance of her functions. AE filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, arguing that she was a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure. FTN,
on the other hand, argued that she was an independent contractor. AE presented evidence to
prove that FTN owned all of the equipment that she uses; that FTN gave her explicit
instructions on what to report on; and that FTN even had a say on her mode of transportation.
Moreover, AE showed that she was required to report to work for 8 hours a day, though the
hours are flexible.
(a) Is AE a regular employee? Explain.
Yes, AE is a regular employee. Jurisprudence provides that the four-fold test shall be used to determine
the presence of an employee-employer relationship between the parties. The elements of this test are:
(a) power to select and engage the employee; (b) payment of wages; (c) power of dismissal; (d) power
of control over the means and methods of the work, and not just the result. All the elements are
present here. AE was hired, paid, and dismissed by FTN as stated in the facts. Moreover, the power
of control is clearly seen from FTN’s ownership of all her equipment and that she can only report in
accordance with the latter’s instructions. She was even required to report to work for 8 hours a day.
This goes to show that AE was not hired for her unique skills and talent but was hired as a mere
employee.
An important factor to look at as well is whether or not the duties of the purported employee are
necessary and desirable to the business of the supposed employer. The facts indicate that AE was
tasked to report on matters in accordance with FTN’s directives. This is clearly necessary and desirable
to the latter’s business since FTN is a broadcasting network. Moreover, the successive 4 renewals of
AE’s contract indicated such necessity and desirability. Therefore, AE is a regular employee with the
right to security of tenure (Fuji Television Network v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944-45 (2014),
(b) Was AE illegally dismissed? Explain.
Yes, she was illegally dismissed. The Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations allow the
dismissal of an employee on the ground of disease. However, two requirements must be met for its
validity: (a) that the disease cannot be cured within 6 months and his continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health and to the health of his co-employees; (b) and, that there
is a certification issued by a competent public health officer that even with proper medical treatment,
the disease cannot be cured within the 6 months. Here, there is nothing in the facts which shows that
these requisites were complied with. Therefore, AE was illegally dismissed (Id).
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[N.B. Read this case in the original. The Court, through J. Leonen, reiterated the rules in determining
not only the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship, but the elements of each type
of employment relationship as well. There was also a review of relevant decisions which showed
crucial factual distinctions in determining the type of relationship present.]
PROBLEM:
AG and her fellow workers (the employees) were hired by LN Farms on a pakyaw basis as
maintenance personnel to perform the needed repairs in the latter’s chicken coops. After
serving for a period ranging from 3 to 17 years, the employees were not rehired by LN. This
led them to file an illegal dismissal case against the latter arguing that they were regular
employees. In its defense, LN argued that the employees were hired only on a pakyaw basis
i.e. as the need arose. Moreover, LN argues that the work they performed was not necessary
and desirable to its business. Were the employees regular? Explain.
Yes, the employees were regular. First, the Supreme Court has explained that a pakyaw or task basis
arrangement merely defines the manner of payment of wages and does not determine the relationship
between the parties. Moreover, Article 280 of the Labor Code explains that a regular employee is one
who has rendered at least 1 year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect
to the activity for which is employed. In this case, the facts show that the employees have rendered
service from periods ranging from 3 to 17 years. Therefore, by virtue of their length of service alone,
they are already considered regular. Nonetheless, the work performed by the employees are also
necessary and desirable to LN’s business. As a company engaged in farm operations, it cannot be
denied that the continued maintenance of the chicken coops is necessary for its business. Therefore,
there can be no doubt that the employees here are regular (Abuda v. L. Natividad, G.R. No. 200712
PROBLEM:
HP, along with 30 of his co-employees were hired as camera operators by GMA, a TV
Network. GMA provided them service fees of around Php 750 whenever they worked. HP et
al. had to follow GMA’s work schedules, and they were never given discretion on their
recordings and shoots. After several months, they were dismissed on the ground that their
projects had ended.
HP et al. filed an illegal dismissal case arguing that they were regular employees. On the other
hand, GMA argued that they were merely hired as relievers who were engaged when there
was a need for additional workers. GMA also argues that HP et al. failed to render at least 1
year of service which makes them ineligible to become regular employees. Finally, GMA
argued that it merely exercised supervision over the performance of their work and not control
of the means exercised by HP et al.
(a) Is there an employer-employee relationship? Explain.
Yes, there is. As ruled by the Supreme Court, the four-fold test is used in determining whether or not
the relationship exists: (a) power to select and engage; (b) payment of wages; (c) power of dismissal;
and, (d) power of control the means and methods of the work to be accomplished. All elements of
the test are present in this case. First, the first and third tests are clearly present since GMA hired them
and dismissed them after a few months. The second element is also present since they were given
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compensation, though denominated as service fees. The control test is also present since GMA gave
them strict work schedules; and, they were not given discretion with regard to the performance of
their tasks. With these considerations, an employer-employee relationship is present in this cae
(Paragele, et al. v. GMA Network (2020), unanimous decision).
(b) Are HP et al. regular employees? Explain.

Yes, they are. Article 295 of the Labor Code provides that employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer. Here, there can be no doubt that HP et al.’s functions
as camera operators are necessary and desirable in GMA’s business. Being a TV network, most, if not
all, of the output they provide requires recording and processing through cameras. There is also no
merit to GMA’s argument that they were required to render 1 year of service since that only applies
to casual employees i.e. employees who perform functions which are not necessary and desirable to
the employer’s business. When one is engaged in functions necessary and desirable, the employee need
not comply with the 1-year rule since he is deemed to be a regular employee from the date of hiring,
unless he is proven to be a project or seasonal employee (Id.).
PROBLEM:
NTRCI, a business engaged in the flue-curing and redrying of tobacco leaves, hired ZP in
1974 as a seasonal sorter and was paid Php 185 daily. NTRCI rehired her every tobacco season
since then. In 2003, when PZ was already 63 years old, NTRCI informed her that she was
considered retired under company policy and would receive Php 12,487.5 as retirement pay.
PZ filed a complaint for payment of retirement benefits.
(a) NTRCI and PZ were arguing as to what type of employee the latter is since this is a
factor in the computation of retirement benefits. Decide.
PZ is a regular seasonal employee. Jurisprudence recognizes that an employee who only works during
a specific season can still be deemed a regular employee if the latter performs services necessary and
desirable to the employer’s business and if he/she is hired yearly to work in the same season. Here,
these circumstances are present. ZP was hired as a seasonal sorter whose services necessary and
desirable in the business of flue-curing and redrying of tobacco leaves. ZP was also rehired for 29
years in the same function. These indicate the regularity of ZP’s employment, despite the fact that she
only worked for a specific season (Paz v. Northern Tobacco Redrying Co. G.R. No. 199554 (2015),
(b) During trial, NTRCI was not able to prove its alleged retirement policy for people who
reach 60 years old. On the other hand, PZ was able to prove that her work periods
range from 3 – 7 months in a year. Is PZ entitled to backwages? If so, how much?
Yes, PZ is entitled to backwages in the amount of Php 22,200. Since NTRCI was not able to prove a
valid company retirement policy, Art. 287 of the Labor Code, as amended, applies where the
compulsory retirement age is 65. In other words, PZ was illegally dismissed for being forced to leave
work before she reached that age. Therefore, PZ is entitled to 2 years of backwages. Since there is no
specific period wherein she works every year, it would be fair to use the minimum of 3 months per
year as basis. Therefore, her salary of Php 185 should be multiplied by 20 working days, then by 3
months, and finally by 2 years i.e. 185*20*3*2 = Php 22,200 (Id.).
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(c) During trial, PZ was able to prove that she was only able to work for 6 months in the
years 1993, 1995, and 2000. Is PZ entitled to retirement pay? If so, how much?
Yes, she is entitled to retirement pay. Again, since NTRCI was not able to prove a valid retirement
policy, Art. 287 of the Labor Code, as amended, applies. In this provision, a retiring employee is
entitled to at least ½ month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least 6 months being
considered as 1 year. Moreover, it provides that ½ month pay shall mean 15 days, plus 1/12 of 13 th
month pay i.e. 2.5 days, and 5 days of service incentive leaves. Since PZ only proved that she worked
for 6 months in 3 years, then those are the only years to be considered. She is entitled to Php 12, 487
which was computed as such: Php 185 * 22.5 days * 3 years (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CB was a utility man in UDMC. In UDMC’s CBA with its rank-and-file employees, the latter
were provided with optional retirement benefits which are available to those who have
rendered at least 20 years of service. After serving for 23 years, CB died from a freak accident
while working. This led his wife, LB to file a complaint for retirement benefits against UDMC
on behalf of his husband. In its defense, UDMC argued CB should have applied for the
optional retirement benefits for him to be entitled to them. Since he died before he applied, it
means that the recovery for these benefits is already barred.
(a) What are the three types of retirement plans available to employees in our jurisdiction?
Jurisprudence has enumerated and explained these retirement plans. The first type is compulsory and
contributory. This is embodied in Republic Act No. 8282 for the private sector, and Republic Act No.
8291 for those in government. These require a mandatory contribution from both the employer and
an employee. This is not considered as mere gratuity but actually forms part of the employee’s
compensation thus giving the latter a vested right to receive the benefits.
On the other hand, the second and third types are voluntary. The second is by agreement between the
employer and the employee, usually embodied in the CBA between them. The third one is voluntarily
given by the employer in the form of an expressly announced company policy or impliedly through a
failure to contest the employee’s claim for retirement benefits. The second and third types are
provided for in Article 287 of the Labor Code and are understood to be in addition to those provided
for by law (United Doctors Medical Center v. Bernadas, G.R. No. 209468 (2017), unanimous
decision).
(b) Rule on the merits of LB’s complaint.
I will grant LB’s complaint. Section 4 of the Labor Code provides that doubts must be resolved in
favor of labor. In this case, CB was already qualified to receive the optional retirement benefits because
he has been serving in UDMC for 23 years. CB’s optional retirement is premised on length of service
and not upon any other condition. Therefore, it would be the height of inequity to withhold these
benefits simply because he died before he could apply for it. Lastly, there is nothing stated in the facts
which state that an application is a condition sine qua non before CB could receive them. Therefore, I
will grant LB’s complaint (Id.).
PROBLEM:
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S company entered into a CBA with the employees’ bargaining agent, NAFLU. A stipulation
contained therein allowed employees A, B, and C to live in a village owned by S, on the
condition that the latter could ask the former to vacate at any time. A few years later, the
owners of S decided to close down; and at the same time, recognized their obligation to give
A, B, and C their separation pay and other benefits. Along with this, S informed A, B, and C
that they would have to vacate the company property where they were staying. The latter
refused to comply, so S withheld the payment of their separation pay and benefits until the
premises were vacated. This led A, B, and C to file a complaint in the Labor Arbiter, asking
that S be ordered to pay them what they are due. On the other hand, S argues that they were
entitled to withhold payment until their employees are occupying the property.
(a) A, B, and C argue that the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction to rule on the issue
of their possession over the property raised by S because it is a civil issue which can
only be resolved by regular courts. Decide.
I will rule against A, B and C. The Supreme Court has explained that claims under Art. 217 of the
Labor Code are not limited to those of the employees – it also covers the claims of the employer
which arise from the same relationship. All that is needed is that a claim is sufficiently connected to
the labor issue and must arise from the employment relationship for the Labor Arbiter to have
jurisdiction. Here, S is arguing that A, B, and C’s possession was only a result of the employment
relationship which has now been severed by the business’ closure. Therefore, the Labor Arbiter may
rule on this issue (Milan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 202961 (2015), unanimous decision).
(b) Was S legally allowed to withhold the payment of separation pay and benefits until A,
B, and C vacated the premises? Explain.
Yes, S was legally allowed to do so. Art. 113 of the Labor Code provides that an exception to the
general rule of non-diminution of benefits is one which is authorized by law. Art. 1706 of the Civil
Code allows the withholding of wages for a debt due. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that
“debt” refers to any obligation due from the employee. Therefore, the return of the property became
an obligation on the part of A, B, and C when the employment relationship ceased; and, that S had
the right to withhold separation pay and benefits as long as the obligation subsisted (Id.).
LABOR LAW II
PROBLEM:
A Corp. and B Corp merged where B became the surviving corporation. The employees of A,
who were absorbed, asked for separation benefits. They argued that the merger effectively
terminated their employment, thus requiring the payment of these benefits. Decide.
I will rule that the argument of the employees is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has explained
that the surviving corporation in a merger takes over the rights, privileges, and other liabilities and
obligations of the absorbed corporation. This rule of absorption includes the employment contracts
of the absorbed corporation, such that its employees become part of the surviving corporation.
Therefore, these contracts subsist and are not deemed terminated. With these considerations, the
argument of the employees must fail (PGIEU v. Unocal Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 190187 (2016),
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PROBLEM:
A, B, and C were hired in 1985 by LS, Inc. In 1991, they filed an illegal dismissal case before
the NLRC. On 2003, A, B, and C were ordered to be reinstated by the Labor Arbiter, along
with the payment of all their monetary claims from 1985 to 1991, except separation pay.
Subsequently, they executed an agreement with LS, Inc., where the latter reinstated them to
different positions since the factory that they were previously assigned to has already closed.
However, LS Inc, reckoned the date of their employment from 2003 and not 1985. A, B, and
C argued that their employment should be reckoned from 1985, not 2003.
(a) Rule on the argument of A, B, and C.
I will rule that their argument is meritorious. The Supreme Court has explained that service to an
employer is presumed continuous unless there is evidence that employer-employee relations were
validly severed in the interim. Here, there was no valid termination since the labor arbiter ruled for
their reinstatement. Reinstatement presupposes the illegality of dismissal and the employee is deemed
to have remained under the employ of the employer from the date of illegal dismissal to reinstatement.
There is no prior employment to speak of. Therefore, A, B, and C’s start of employment should be
deemed to have started from 1985 (Cuadra, et al. v. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No. 194467 (2020),
(b) What if A, B, and C resigned in 1991 because they were going to take further studies
and returned only in 2003. Will your answer be the same?
No, my answer will be different. I will now reckon the start of their employment from 2003. In
accordance with the doctrines discussed above, it can be seen that in this situation, there was a valid
termination which severed the employer-employee relationship. Therefore, since they returned after
such termination, they shall be considered as new hires (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Atty. C was hired as a part-time employee of FSU University to teach commercial law subjects.
When he 62 years old, he applied for early retirement, saying that he has served the school of
28 years. However, the HR officer of the school told him that part-time employees are not
eligible to receive retirement benefits under the law. Decide.
I will rule in favor of Atty. C. Republic Act No. 7641 states that “any employee” may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age. From the text of the law itself, no exception is made for part-time
employees. Even in the implementing rules of the Labor Code which expressly enumerates those who
are excluded from the law’s coverage, it can be seen therein that part-time employees were not among
the ones listed therein. Clearly, Atty. C is entitled to retirement benefits despite being a part-time
employee (FSUU v. Atty. Curaza, G.R. No. 223621 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
In 1998, Philippine Airlines (PAL) filed for corporate rehabilitation before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC approve the rehabilitation plan which stated that its
10th priority should be the potential sale PAL’s non-core activities, including the Maintenance
and Engineering Departments. PAL immediately sold these departments to LTP Corp.
Thereafter, due to alleged retrenchment and/or redundancy, PAL severed the employment of
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A, B, and C who were part of those departments. They were rank-and-file employees who
were members of the PAL Employee’s Association (PALEA). PAL then gave the affected
employees separation packages worth more than the minimum required by law. PAL
subsequently created a new engineering department – the Technical Services Department.
This led PAL to rehire some of the dismissed employees.
A, B, and C filed an illegal dismissal case against PAL. In its defense, PAL argued that the
spin-off was impelled by the heavy losses it incurred. This was supposedly evidenced by the
fact that they sold the Maintenance and Engineering Departments to LTP. Moreover, PAL
introduced photocopied but allegedly duly audited financial statements from 1997 to 1999 to
establish the business losses it suffered. In connection with this, PAL argues that liberal
application in labor cases allows them to introduce the photocopies of these statements.
(a) Assuming that procedural requirements under the Labor Code were complied with,
was PAL able to show that A, B, and C’s termination was valid on the ground of
redundancy? Explain.
No, PAL was unable to do so. In accordance with Article 298 of the Labor Code, the Supreme Court
has ruled that redundancy requires good faith in abolishing the redundant positions. This is done by
showing proof that it is actually overmanned. Here, when PAL sold the facilities to LTP, it created a
new engineering department. To make matters worse, PAL even offered to rehire the retrenched
employees. This goes to show that PAL was not overmanned since it could even rehire the same
employees. Therefore, it is clear that PAL did not exercise good faith in dismissing A, B, and C (PAL
v. Dawal, et al., G.R. No. 173921 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Assuming that procedural requirements under the Labor Code were complied with,
was PAL able to show that A, B, and C’s termination was valid on the ground of
retrenchment? Explain.
No, PAL was unable to do so as well. Jurisprudence explains that redundancy under Article 298 of
the Labor Code requires that it must be sufficiently proven that there are existing or imminent
substantial losses which are serious, actual, real, and not merely de minimis. In this case, the
photocopied statements are not sufficient. First, the rule of liberal application in Article 4 of the Labor
Code applies to the workers since they are the ones being given special protection by this law. The
capacity to submit the original statements were entirely in the hands of PAL. Second, the spin-off was
only the 10th priority in the rehabilitation plan. Therefore, PAL had to show that retrenchment here
was the remedy of last resort. Therefore, PAL could not have validly dismissed A, B, and C on the
ground of retrenchment (Id.).
PROBLEM:
In 2000, Dr. VP was hired as a part-time physician by LC College. By 2008, she was already
serving as a full-time employee. In 2011, VP was informed that she would be terminated
pursuant to a retrenchment scheme that LC was implementing. LC showed VP that the school
has indeed been suffering heavy losses for the past few years. VP then asked LC why she was
being dismissed when her colleague, Dr. VD, a part-time physician who was more junior than
her, was being retained. VP also noted that rather than dismissing her outright, LC should
have asked her to revert to part-time status first. In its reply, LC informed VP that she was the
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highest paid employee in the health services staff and that her salary comprised 26% of the
total payroll of her department. Was Dr. VD legally dismissed? Explain.
No, she was illegally dismissed. As ruled by the Supreme Court, retrenchment as a ground for dismissal
requires that the employer must use fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed
and who would be retained. In this case, LC clearly failed to consider VP’s status and seniority. It is a
well-settled rule that seniority is a crucial facet of a fair and reasonable criterion in retrenchment. Here,
VP was dismissed merely because she was the highest paid employee in the payroll of her department.
By choosing to retain Dr. VD, a doctor more junior than VP without even giving the latter the option
to revert back to part-time status, shows that the criterion used was unfair and unreasonable.
Therefore, she was illegally dismissed (La Consolacion College v. Pascua, G.R. No. 214744 (2018),
PROBLEM:
NM, CN, and LP were officers of PPP Inc. MA was the President, CN was the Business
Manager, while LP was the Finance officer. On the other hand, DC was the Chairman of the
Board while DB was the Executive Vice President.
(a) NM alleged that he was one of the incorporators of PPP, along with DC and DB. A
few years after however, DC started to make NM’s job difficult. NM took a leave but
upon his return, DC said that he was already deemed to have resigned. Moreover,
NM’s salary was allegedly lowered, and his benefits were withheld. Because of this,
NM resigned. NM subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor
Arbiter against PPP, DC, and DB. Rule on NM’s complaint.
NM’s complaint must be dismissed. The Supreme Court has explained that there must first be an
employer-employee relationship between the parties before the Labor Arbiter can have jurisdiction
over the case; and, that cases involving a corporate officer’s termination is an intra-corporate case
which is cognizable only by the Regional Trial Courts. NM, serving as the President of PPP, was
among the corporate officers listed in the Revised Corporation Code. Therefore, NM should have
filed his complaint with the RTC and not with the Labor Arbiter. Here, the Labor Arbiter must dismiss
NM’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction (Malcaba v. ProHealth Pharma, G.R. No. 209085 (2018),
(b) On March 24, 2008, CN applied for a vacation leave for the dates April 24, 25, and 28
which DB approved. When he left for Malaysia on April 23, PPP sent him a
memorandum asking him to explain his absence. He replied through email, saying
that he tried to call PPP to inform them that his flight was scheduled on April 22 but
was unable to connect on the phone. CN was eventually terminated on the ground of
fraud and willful breach of trust. CN filed a case for illegal dismissal, arguing that that
in his 10 years of service, this was his first infraction and that despite taking a leave, he
was still able to produce his quotas. On the other hand, PPP argues that CN lost the
corporation’s trust and confidence by failing to report to work during a crucial sales
period. Decide.
I will rule in favor of CN. The Supreme Court has ruled that an employer may validly discipline errant
employees who fail to report during crucial periods as an exercise of its management prerogative.
However, the Court has also explained that dismissal is the most severe among the employer’s
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penalties and must be exercised properly. In this case, CN, despite taking a leave, was able to still reach
his sales quota. Moreover, his infraction here was his first in his 10 years of service. Therefore, CN
should have been given a less severe penalty (Id.).
(c) In 2007, DC instructed LP to give Php 3k from the training funds to JG, a district
business manager. However, when JG went to LP, the latter informed him that she
was busy, and that he should just return the following day. However, when JG told her
that the money was necessary for car repairs, she told him that he should just get the
cash from the revolving fund and she would just reimburse him afterwards. When DC
found out about what happened, he dismissed LP on the ground of willful
disobedience. Assuming the notice requirements were complied with, was LP validly
dismissed? Explain.
No, she was not. The Supreme Court has ruled that the dismissal of an employee under Article 297
of the Labor Code, requires that the employee intentionally and willfully disobeyed the valid order of
a superior as to amount to insubordination. In this case, LP’s failure to give the cash advance was
merely because she was busy when JG went to her. She also did not profit from her failure to give the
advance, nor did DC or PPP Inc. suffer any damage from what she did. Therefore, just like CN, LP
may be punished for her actions, but dismissal is too severe (Id.).
PROBLEM:
From 1996 to 2002, PLDT experienced a decreasing demand for their long-distance services.
In this period, the total demand shrunk by a total of 72% and the revenues for these services
have declined by as much as Php 8B. PLDT states that this decline was caused by various
technological advancements which have allowed patrons to directly contact their loved ones
abroad. Because of this, PLDT declared 323 employees of the long-distance service division
as redundant. This led the employees to file a notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging that PLDT’s act of dismissing them was tainted with
bad faith and that it constitutes as an unfair labor practice.
(a) Assuming that PLDT followed the rules on notice and separation pay, did it validly
dismiss the employees on the ground of redundancy? Explain.
Yes, PLDT’s dismissal was valid. Under Article 298 of the Labor Code, redundancy is one of the
authorized causes for termination. One of its requisites is good faith in abolishing the positions. This
is established by substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what is required
by the company. Here, the data presented by PLDT shows that its long-distance business has greatly
declined. This was shown through statistics on demand and even revenue shrinkage. In this case,
redundancy was a valid exercise of management prerogative and the employees’ dismissal was valid
(Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. PLDT, G.R. No. 190389 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) While the case pending, the employees went on strike. In the meantime, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a
return-to-work order to preserve the status quo ante. Because of this, the employees
validly dismissed due to redundancy claimed that this was tantamount to a
reinstatement which allows them to claim backwages. They proffer this argument
despite being given separation pay. Decide.
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I will rule against the employees. Jurisprudence explains that a return-to-work order issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment is interlocutory in nature and is merely meant to maintain status
quo while the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum. On the other hand, an order of
reinstatement is a judgment on the merits handed down by the Labor Arbiter. Therefore, there is no
order of reinstatement in this case as the employees allege (Id.).
PROBLEM:
YB was the school’s comptroller in FSU University. As the comptroller, he was asked with
handling the salary adjustments of all the employees. In the meantime, the school formulated
a ranking system for non-academic employees. YB recommended that the position of
comptroller should be classified as middle management because it was informally merged
with the position of VP for Finance. YB also recommended that his salary be adjusted because
of his new responsibilities. This suggestion, however, was initially agreed upon but was not
formally approved.
A year after, a committee was tasked to review the ranking system implemented. In its report,
the committee found that there were salary distortions among several employees, including
YB. The committee also discovered that YB’s office deviated from protocol when it solely
prepared and implemented the salary adjustment schedule without prior approval from the
HR department. Because of this, FSU terminated YB on the ground of serious misconduct
and loss of trust and confidence. This led YB to file a case for illegal dismissal, arguing that
the cause for the distortions was his belief in good faith that his salary adjustment was
approved. Moreover, YB argues that he is an ordinary rank-and-file employee who cannot be
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
(a) Assuming that the notice requirements were complied with, was YB properly
dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct? Explain.
No, the dismissal on this ground is improper. The Supreme Court has explained that in termination
due to serious misconduct, the act done must not only relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties, but it must have been performed with wrongful intent as well. In this case, YB believed in good
faith that his salary adjustment was accepted and approved by FSU. This negates the element of
wrongful intent. As a result, YB should not have been dismissed on the ground of willful misconduct
(Bravo v. Urios College, G.R. No. 198066 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Differentiate the two types of employees who may be terminated on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence.
The Supreme Court has explained that there are two types of positions in which trust and confidence
are reposed by the employer – managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
Managerial employees are considered to occupy positions of trust because they are entrusted with
confidential and delicate matters. On the other hand, fiduciary rank-and-file employees are those who,
in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of the
employer’s money or property. The Dismissal of fiduciary rank-and-file employees on the ground of
loss of trust and confidence requires proof of their involvement in the allegedly dubious actions. On
the other hand, the dismissal of managerial employees on the same ground requires only a mere
existence of a basis for believing that he or she has breached the employer’s trust (Id.).
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(c) Assuming that the notice requirements were complied with, was YB properly
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence? Explain.
Yes, he was validly dismissed on this ground. First, YB was a fiduciary rank-and-file employee because
his position required him to handle delicate financial matters, and this entailed a substantial amount
of trust from FSU. As seen from the facts, the entire payroll account depended on the accuracy of the
classifications he made. Moreover, YB’s act of distorting his own salary rate without proper
authorization is a clear breach of the trust reposed in him. This was further aggravated by the fact that
he solely prepared and implemented the salary schedule in deviation from the established protocol.
With these considerations, YB was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
(Id.).
PROBLEM:
HP was employed as an accounting clerk by SL Inc. in the latter’s Davao branch. Some of her
duties were to receive statements and billings for payments, prepare vouchers and checks for
approval of the manager, and to release checks for payment.
One day, SL uncovered several anomalous transactions in its Davao branch. SL saw that
certain checks have been altered, along with several instances of double disbursements. This
prompted an investigation where HP was interviewed because she was the one who was duty-
bound to prepare the cash vouchers and checks for the approval of her superiors. In one of
the panel interviews, HP walked out. Subsequently, she was admitted to the hospital due to
depression and stress. Eventually, HP stopped reporting to work.
HP filed a complaint against SL for constructive dismissal. She argued that SL’s acts were
tantamount to harassment and that she could no longer continue working because of what
SL is making her undergo. Decide.
I will rule against HP. The Supreme Court has ruled that the valid exercise of management prerogative
allows the employer to conduct investigations following the discovery of misdeeds. In these situations,
the employer is not being abusive by exerting due diligence in trying to find out the persons responsible
for the acts done. Here, the facts show that SL had the right to include HP in the investigations since
her duties put her squarely in the middle of the alleged anomalous transactions. Though this may have
resulted to HP feeling stressed, SL cannot be penalized for validly exercising its management
prerogative (Philippine Span Asia v. Heidi Pelayo, G.R. No. 212003 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Sps. A and B hired LR as a nutritionist in their fast-food business, VPI. When VPI closed, LR
was hired in the Sps.’ construction business. When this business became slow, they hired LR
again in another business, PnR. Sps. A and B trusted LR so much that she was made more
senior than her other employees. LR was also given access to their finances and was even the
signatory in their bank accounts. However, LR was emotionally sensitive and was prone to
the occasional “tampo” when she would be reprimanded for tasks unaccomplished. One day,
A reprimanded LR for not doing an important task long overdue, where the former said,
“Kung ayaw mo na ng ginagawa mo, we can manage!” A few days later, LR tendered his
resignation.
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A few days later, LR, who served Sps. A and B for 25 years, filed an illegal dismissal case
against PnR and the Sps. She alleged A constructively dismissed as shown by what A said to
her.
(a) Was LR constructively dismissed?
No, she was not. The Supreme Court has explained that constructive dismissal exists when the
employer indirectly compels resignation through harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions which he
sets. In this case, this circumstance is absent. From how LR has been treated from the start, it is clear
that Sps. A and B have given her full trust and confidence – she was even given access to sensitive
matters such as their financial and banking concerns. Moreover, this is a case of resignation, and not
constructive dismissal. What allegedly prompted her – A’s statement – cannot be taken as a badge of
constructive dismissal since it was just a spontaneous outburst of feelings resulting from LR’s failure
to do an important task long overdue. Therefore, LR just resigned, and she was not constructively
dismissed (Rodriguez v. Park N Ride, G.R. 222980 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) LR also prayed for her unpaid service incentive leave (SIL) pay which has accumulated
for the past 25 years. On the other hand, Sps. A and B argue that she can only be
entitled for her SIL for the three years prior to when she filed her complaint because
the SIL from the previous years are already barred by prescription. Decide.
I will rule in favor of LR. The Supreme Court has ruled that the SIL is a “curious animal” in relation
to the other benefits granted by law to the employee. This is because it is commutable to its yearly
equivalent if not used. In such a case, an employee may collect its monetary value. The three-year
prescriptive period commences not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the
SIL but from the time the employer refuses to pay after demand of commutation or upon termination
of the employee’s services. From this discussion, it is clear that LR’s claim for her SIL had not yet
prescribed because she filed the case only a few days after her termination (Id.).
PROBLEM:
PP was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing, with an annual
salary of Php 2.2M. After two years of serving in this capacity, PVB purchased Bankwise’s
entire outstanding capital stock. This led to PVB electing new members of the Board and
appointing new officers. PP was then informed by RB, Bankwise’ president, that he must
tender his resignation as a part of the merger. PP, however, wrote a letter, pleading that he be
allowed to stay until the end of the year along with a prayer for several money claims as a
result of his resignation. Upon subsequent demand, PP eventually tendered his unconditional
resignation.
PP once again asked for his money claims, but his demand fell on deaf ears. PP decided to
file a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of money claims against Bankwise.
Rule on PP’s complaint.
I will rule against PP. As ruled by the Supreme Court, the general rule is that the employer and
employee are on unequal footing which requires the State to protect the latter. However, where the
employee possesses special qualifications for his employment, he is in a better position to bargain with
the employer. Here, PP, as the EVP for marketing, obviously needed special qualifications especially
since he was literally earning millions from the company. Moreover, it can be presumed that PP has
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handled several employees who have tendered their own resignations to him. The logical conclusion
here is that PP was completely aware of signing an unconditional resignation letter. Lastly, it is well-
settled that an employee who resigns cannot claim severance pay unless it was previously stipulated in
the employment contract or has become an established company policy. Here, none of the exceptions
are present. With all these circumstances, PP’s claims must fail (Pascua v. Bankwise, G.R. Nos. 191460
and 191464 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
DJ sought employment with FS Manpower Services as a household worker. She signed a two-
year contract in Saudi Arabia, where she was required work for Mr. AM. One day, while DJ
was washing the dishes, she felt a hard object rubbing against her buttocks and was surprised
to see her male employer attempting to rape her. She immediately went upstairs to her female
employer. However, the latter did not believe her and started abusing in the days after. DJ
escaped from AM’s employ. Upon reaching the agency, BQ, another OFW therein, told DJ
that there was a good chance that they would be sold to their Arab employers. Desperate to
save their lives, DJ and BQ decided to escape through the 2 nd floor window. Unfortunately,
DJ broke her spine and had to get surgery. Before being repatriated, DJ signed a quitclaim.
Upon being repatriated, DJ filed a case for illegal dismissal against FS and Mr. AM. DJ argued
that she was constructively dismissed. On the other hand, FS argued that DJ resigned as
evidenced by her quitclaim. Decide.
I will rule in favor of DJ. The Supreme Court has explained that a constructive dismissal does not
always entail a forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit and privileges.
Sometimes, it can be seen through acts of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by the employer
that it becomes unbearable for the employee; and, she sees no other option but to sever her
employment. Here, DJ was subjected to physical, verbal, and sexual abuse. It led to a point where DJ
was so desperate to leave her employment where she even risked her life just to escape. Any reasonable
person in that situation would be impelled to surrender his or her post. Therefore, DJ was
constructively dismissed (Jacob v. First Step Manpower, G.R. No. 229984 (2020), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
MP was hired as a customer associate for LBC. On several occasions, her team leader AB
flirted with her which made her uncomfortable. Later on, AB started to sexually harass her by
acts such as but not limited to kissing her without her consent and pulling the strap of her
bra. On May 1, 4 days after the last incident, MP reported the incident to the head office. The
head office told her that they would investigate on the matter. On May 8, MP submitted a
formal complaint against AB then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. On
May 14, MP decided to quit since nothing was being done by management. On June 15, AB
was served a notice to explain; and on July 20, LBC held a hearing for the incident. On the
same day of the hearing, MP filed an illegal dismissal case against LBC with the Labor
Arbiter. It is only on September 27 where LBC Management decided to suspend AB.
Was MP illegally dismissed by LBC? Explain.
Yes, she was. The Supreme Court has ruled that the test of constructive dismissal is whether or not a
reasonable person would feel constrained to resign from his employment because of the
circumstances, conditions, and environment created by the employer. In this case, there was no doubt
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that AB’s acts of sexual harassment caused MP to feel threatened for her safety. This eventually led
her to resign. Even if LBC did not authorize AB’s acts, LBC’s liability lies in failing to take prompt
action which reinforced the hostile work environment created by the former. There was unreasonable
delay on LBC’s part in acting on MP’s complaint. The formal investigation was deemed to have
commenced only 41 days after the incident was reported and it took them another 2 months to resolve
it. Clearly, this shows LBC’s disregard for MP’s welfare (LBC v. Palco, G.R. No. 217101 (2020),
[N.B. J. Leonen also explained that the Safe Spaces Act, which did not yet apply in this case, has
added to the duties of an employer with regard to the prevention, deterrence, and punishment of
gender-based sexual harassment. The act explicitly requires that complaints be investigated and
resolved within 10 days or less upon its reporting.]
PROBLEM:
RSB was a thrift bank organized in 1969. At that time, its employees already had an employee’s
union. However, all of RSB’s shares were transferred to the GSIS. RSB eventually became
GSIS Family Bank (GFB), a non-chartered government financial institution (GFI). Despite
this, it continued to execute collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the employees. In
2012, EB, the president of GFB sought the opinion of Secretary CLV of the Governance
Commission on whether or not it can continue entering into CBAs with its employees. Sec.
CLV stated that GFB was unauthorized to enter into CBAs since the compensation and
positions of a GFI’s employees are covered by law and are therefore not subject to private
bargaining.
Was Sec. CLV’s opinion, correct? Explain.
Yes, Sec. CLV’s opinion was correct. Republic Act No. 10149 categorically states that any law to the
contrary notwithstanding, no GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and
Position Classification System. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that instead of a CBA,
government employees must course their petitions for a change in the terms and conditions of their
employment through Congress who has the power to issue new laws which would address their
concerns. Therefore, Sec. CLV’s opinion was correct – GFB, a non-chartered GFI – cannot enter into
CBAs with their employees (GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Secretary Villanueva, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
In July 2010, CS School hired MS as a filing clerk at the HR department. MS’ children are
scholars of CS and her husband, WS, was a longtime driver of the school. In April 2011, she
was posted back as a releasing clerk and held this position until July of the same year. Before
her job as releasing clerk expired, MS applied at CS’ technical-vocational training center. In
July of 2011, she started work as secretary. In May 2013, CS asked her to sign a Probationary
Employment Contract covering the period of January 2013 to July 2013. When the contract
expired, the head of HR informed her that she would be let go. Subsequently, MS filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, arguing that the jobs she performed were necessary and
desirable in the usual business of CS. On the other hand, CS argues that she was a fixed-term
employee – a fact that she was fully aware of. Decide.
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I will rule in favor of MS. The landmark case of Brent v. Zamora recognized that the Labor Code also
allowed the execution of fixed-term contracts. However, to be valid, these two requisites must be
present: (a) that the parties knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon a fixed period of employment; and
(b) that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms. In this case,
neither of the requisites are present. The facts show that MS’s whole family depended on CS. Given
this circumstance, MS was not in a position to bargain on the terms of her employment i.e. there is no
genuine freedom to contract since the fixed-term employment is used as a vehicle to exploit her
economic advantage. This necessarily means that they are not on equal terms. Therefore, MS was
illegally dismissed because she was not a fixed-term employee (Claret School v. Sinday, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
PSN employed GA as section editor and column writer of its newspaper. On Nov. 15, 1999,
PSN decided to remove GA’s column and since then, he has never returned to work. On Nov.
15, 2002, GA filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, actual, exemplary,
and moral damages, along with atty’s fees and full backwages. He argued that being a regular
employee, the removal of his column was tantamount to an illegal dismissal. On the other
hand, PSN argued that first, all his money claims have already prescribed because the Labor
Code only provides a period for 3 years for which to file then. Moreover, PSN alleged that GA
just suddenly absented from work and never returned, despite calls and beeper messages.
(a) Rule on PSN’s argument of prescription.
Out of GA’s claims, only the claim for unpaid salaries has prescribed while everything else has not.
The Supreme Court has explained that Art. 291 of the Labor Code which provides for a 3-year
prescriptive period for money claims does not cover a complaint for illegal dismissal and the money
claims consequent to it, nor does it cover the damages caused by such dismissal. These are covered
by Art. 1146 of the Civil Code which provides a 4-year prescriptive period for injuries to the rights of
the plaintiff. Here, since GA filed his complaint 3 years and 1 day from his dismissal, the damages,
along with atty’s fees and backwages can still be claimed (Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, G.R. No.
(b) Was GA illegally dismissed? Why/why not?
GA was not illegally dismissed. The Supreme Court has ruled that unless the facts show otherwise,
the removal of a section editor’s column is not tantamount to the termination of the employment
itself. This removal is covered by management prerogative because the company has a right to
determine what it publishes. What is present in this case is abandonment – a clear, deliberate, and
unjustified refusal to continue employment without an intention of returning. GA stopped reporting
for work and took 3 years and 1 days to remedy his supposed dismissal – this shows his clear intention
to sever his employment with PSN (Id.).
PROBLEM:
ODR was a professor and assistant chairperson of a department at Adamson University. He
was also the president of the faculty union, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
faculty of the school. One day, an administrative complaint was lodged against him by PMP,
a student. According to the latter, as she was about to enter the faculty room, she held the
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doorknob of the entrance while ODR held the doorknob on the other side. When PMP
stepped aside, ODR exclaimed the words “anak ng puta” and walked on.
(a) Can ODR be dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct? Explain.
No, he cannot be dismissed on this ground. From the facts, it can be seen that uttering “anak ng puta”
was a mere expression of annoyance on ODR’s part. The Supreme Court has ruled that uttering an
expletive out loud in the spur of the moment is not grave misconduct per se. For someone to be
dismissed for serious misconduct, the act must be done with wrongful intent, which was not the case
here (Adamson Faculty Union v. Adamson University, G.R. No. 227070 (2020), unanimous decision).
(b) Assume that after being charged, ODR refused to apologize for the act and even filed
a counter-complaint against PMP for tarnishing his reputation. Moreover, it was
discovered during the administrative hearing that there have been complaints against
him lodged by fellow faculty members before for his rude attitude. Will you answer
change? Explain.
Yes, my answer will change – he could now be dismissed for serious misconduct. The Supreme Court
has ruled that while uttering an expletive without ill intent is not grave misconduct per se, the refusal
to acknowledge this mistake and the attempt to cause further damage and distress cannot be mere
errors of judgment. ODR’s subsequent acts of refusing to own up to his mistakes and even being
aggressive towards PMP are willful acts which negate his professionalism. Moreover, the principle of
totality of infractions shows that offenses committed by the petitioner should not be taken separately.
Therefore, his acts against PMP, along with the several complaints lodged against him, are sufficient
to dismiss him for serious misconduct (Id.).
(c) Assume that he was dismissed by the company. He now argues that the school
committed an unfair labor practice against him since he is the president of the faculty
union. Decide.
I will rule against ODR’s argument. The Supreme Court has ruled that unfair labor practices of the
employer are acts which infringe on the constitutional right of the workers to self-organize. Moreover,
it is settled that a dismissal of a union officer is not necessarily discriminatory, especially when such
officer committed an act of misconduct. This holds true especially because union officers are held to
higher standards by virtue of their positions. Here, ODR’s dismissal was based on a just cause – serious
misconduct – which was his own doing. He cannot argue now that the school dismissed him only to
infringe his right to self-organization (Id.).
PROBLEM:
UR Corp. and TUCP, the sole exclusive bargaining representative (SEBA) of UR’s rank-and-
file employees, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective from January 1, 2002
to December 31, 2006 (2002 CBA). The CBA granted the employees several wage increases to
be implemented throughout its effectivity. 11 days after the CBA was signed, a certification
election was conducted where WFLU replaced TUCP as the SEBA. TUCP questioned the
results of the certification election. During the pendency of TUCP’s challenge, UR
consistently refused to meet and negotiate a new CBA with WFLU, allegedly due to the 2002
CBA. In December of 2006, WFLU filed a certification election which it won. The 2002 CBA
expired with no new CBA being signed. In July of 2007, the Supreme Court held that WFLU
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is the rightful SEBA. In August of 2007, UR informed the employees that they would be
granting several economic benefits to those who sign an acknowledgment receipt
acknowledging negotiations for a new CBA. Not all the employees signed it so not everyone
was given benefits. In 2008, the same scheme was implemented by UR. Finally, a new CBA
was signed in 2009.
Did UR commit unfair labor practices? Decide.
Yes, UR did. Article 259 of the Labor Code enumerates the unfair labor practices of employers. Based
on this provision, UR clearly violated the duty to bargain collectively. The pendency of the 2002 CBA
is not a reason for refusing to negotiate with WFLU. The Supreme Court has ruled that the CBA
signed by the old SEBA does not preclude the commencement of negotiations by the new SEBA
since the CBA is deemed temporary. Therefore, WFLU had the option to adopt the existing CBA or
to negotiate a new one. Moreover, its refusal to negotiate with WFLU, coupled with its act of granting
benefits to those who waive negotiations for the CBA shows that UR had the intention to limit
WFLU’s bargaining power. Therefore, URC clearly committed unfair labor practices (SONEDCO-
WFLU v. Universal Robina Corp., G.R. No. 220383 (2016), unanimous decision).
[N.B. Atty. Marlon Manuel argues that the case of SONEDCO does not expressly abandon the
substitutionary doctrine. Therefore, he suggests that if a question involving the substitutionary
doctrine comes out in the bar, mention it then mention the case of SONEDCO as well.
In the MR which was also penned by J. Leonen, the Court allowed the imposition of the wage increase
and the recovery for the deficiencies these increases caused which were not given to the employees
who refused to sign the acknowledgment receipts. (SONEDCO-WFLU v. Universal Robina Corp.,
Atty. Manuel also reiterated in his lecture that the employer’s act of dealing with the employees directly,
instead of the SEBA, via the signing of the acknowledgement receipts is also an unfair labor practice.]
PROBLEM:
PM, a security agency, hired CF as a security guard and assigned him to a building owned by
PRI company. During one of CF’s shifts, the building was ransacked by members of the NPA.
After an initial investigation, CF was detained for being an alleged co-conspirator to the crime
that happened. However, after 6 months, the cases against him were dismissed due to lack of
evidence. When CF was finally released from detention, he reported back to work.
Unfortunately, he was barred from entering the premises and was informed that he had
already been replaced. CF filed a case for illegal dismissal against PM. On the other hand,
PM argued that CF actually abandoned his employment for failure to report in the past few
months. Decide.
I will rule in favor of CF. The Supreme Court has explained that for there to be a proper dismissal on
the ground of abandonment, 2 requisites must be present: (a) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the employment relationship
through overt acts. Here, both requisites were absent. First, CF’s failure to report to work was justified
– he was detained due to a criminal charge which was eventually dismissed. Second, CF’s act of
immediately reporting to work from his release showed that he had no intention to sever the
employment relationship. Lastly, there is nothing in the facts which even established that PM tried to
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comply with the twin-notice rule. Under these circumstances, CF was illegally dismissed (Protective
Maximum Security Agency v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 169303 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
MP was hired by ASS Inc. as a security guard. He was then assigned to CAV Corp. His
services therein ended on June 15, 2009. On July 27, 2009, he allegedly received a letter from
ASS directing him to report for assignment and deployment. However, when he called the
office, he was told that there was no specific assignment yet. On September 9, 2009, he
received another report-to-work letter. However, upon replying to it, he was informed that
ASS was having a hard time finding an assignment for him since he was already over 38 years
old. On February 23, 2010, MP filed a case for illegal dismissal against ASS for the latter’s
failure to give it an assignment in 6 months from the termination of his last one. In its defense,
ASS alleges that it had sent MP 2 report-to-work letters already which shows compliance with
the 6-month period. Decide.
I will rule in favor of MP. The Supreme Court has ruled that the practice of placing guards on floating
status is a valid exercise of management prerogative so long as it does not exceed 6 months. In the
event that it exceeds this period, the security guard is already deemed constructively dismissed.
Moreover, the Court has also ruled that within this period, the security guard must be given a new and
specific assignment; and, that a general return-to-work order does not suffice. In this case, MP’s
assignment ended on June 15, 2009. ASS sent him return-to-work letters, but he was never given a
specific assignment, even 7 months after he has filed his complaint. Therefore, MP was deemed to
have been constructively dismissed (Padilla v. Airborne Security Service, G.R. No. 210080 (2017),
PROBLEM:
RL was hired as a weaver by DR Inc. Sometime on June 28, 2006, RL was suddenly dismissed
on the ground that he was allegedly instigating a campaign to remove the company’s foreman.
A few days after, RL did not report for work. The next day, he filed a case against DR for
illegal dismissal. In its defense, DR argued that RL’s failure to report to work should be
deemed as abandonment. To prove its claim, DR alleges that it sent RL a return-to-work
notice on July 5, 2006. 2 days after that, DR sent another return-to-work notice. Despite these
notices, RL still chose to stop reporting to work so DR sent him a notice of termination.
Decide.
I will rule in favor of RL. The Supreme Court has ruled that to justify abandonment as a ground for
dismissal, the employee must fail to report to work without any valid reason and that there must be a
clear intention to sever the employment relationship. Here, the second requisite is not present. As the
facts show, RL already filed an illegal dismissal case against DR the day after he was invalidly dismissed.
Therefore, DR’s act of sending the return-to-work notices is clearly a mere afterthought after receiving
RL’s complaint. Moreover, the facts show that DR failed to comply with the two-notice rule. In this
case, it can be seen that the notice for termination was only sent after RL had been actually dismissed.
With these considerations, I will rule in favor of RL (Demex Rattancraft v. Leron, G.R. No. 204288
PROBLEM:
RR was employed by GTSI as a bus conductor. One day, he was dismissed by GTSI because
of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on his bus ticket receipts. According to GTSI, he
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only reported the amount of Php 198 when the correct amount was actually Php 394. RR
responded that it was an honest mistake which he was unable to correct because the bus
encountered mechanical problems.
Was RR terminated for just cause? Explain.
No, he was not. The Labor Code provides misconduct and breach of trust as just causes for
terminating employment. However, the Supreme Court has explained that this must be attended by
such gravity as would leave the employer with no other viable recourse but to dismiss the employee.
The Court has taken judicial notice of a bus conductor’s duties which require him to constantly
multitask. Therefore, it is understandable that RR may have made an innocent mistake involving a
measly amount of Php 196. There was no other proof to show any ill-motive or even gross negligence
on his part. A lone, isolated instance of a wrongdoing of this character is not enough for him to be
dismissed (Rivera v. Genesis Transport, G.R. No. 215568 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
M was working as a flight attendant of PAL. In Hawaii, M, along with her other crew
members were searched by the US Customs authorities who found and inventoried dozens of
pilfered items from the aircraft, without specifically stating which items were taken from each
person.
Because of this, M, along with her other crew members, were administratively charged by
PAL. When M got a notice of the administrative charged, she saw that there was no specific
citation of what law or policy she allegedly violated. Upon raising this issue to PAL, the latter
replied that insisting to get a detailed charge will be a waiver of her right to a clarificatory
hearing. M backed off. After due notice and hearing conducted by PAL, she was suspended
for a year.
This caused her to file a case for illegal suspension with damages and attorney’s fees with the
Labor Arbiter. There, she argued that PAL never introduced evidence which showed the
specific items supposedly recovered from her. This, according to her, indicated that there was
no just cause for her suspension, and that her sanction was imposed oppressively and in bad
faith.
(a) Was M’s suspension valid?
No, her suspension was invalid. The Constitutional protection of labor elevates work to the status of
a vested right which may only be impaired with after observing due process and for just or authorized
causes. Here, PAL not only violated M’s right to due process but also imposed the sanction without
just cause.
First, although M was given 2 notices by PAL, the first notice given does not satisfy the procedural
due process requirement under the law. M was not given a chance to clarify the contents of the
administrative charge. To make things worse, PAL even threatened her with a waiver of a clarificatory
hearing if she insisted on a specific notice. This clearly impaired her right to be informed of the charges
against her.
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Second, M’s right to substantive due process was also violated because PAL suspended her despite
the want of substantial evidence to show that M actually pilfered items from the plane. Again, the
inventory submitted by the U.S. Customs officials did not specifically state which items were taken
from any specific crew member. Therefore, this does not conclusively show that M was actually
involved in the pilferage that happened.
With all of these circumstances, M’s suspension was clearly illegal (Montinola v. PAL, G.R. No.
(b) Assuming that her suspension was illegal, is M entitled to damages and atty’s fees
apart from backwages? If she is, what type of damages is she entitled to?
M would be entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court has
ruled that an employee is entitled to moral damages when the employer acted in bad faith, fraud, in a
manner oppressive to labor, or in a manner contrary to morals, good faith, customs, or public policy.
The facts show that M was implicated and penalized with clearly insufficient evidence – an act which
constitutes bad faith. Moreover, giving her improper notice and threatening her with a waiver of the
clarificatory hearing shows oppressiveness on the part of PAL. With these, M is entitled to moral
damages because the deprivation of her compensation has caused M serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, and wounded feelings.
She is also entitled to exemplary damages because Art. 2332 of the Civil Code provides that they may
be awarded in breaches of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. The Supreme Court has ruled that this applies to dismissals done
in an oppressive manner as well.
Lastly, she is entitled to attorney’s fees because this situation covers 3 instances in the enumeration of
Art. 2208 of the Civil Code: (a) when exemplary damages are awarded; (b) when the act or omission
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; and,
(c) in actions for recovery of wages of laborers (Id.).
PROBLEM:
PHI company had a collective bargaining agreement with the employees’ exclusive
bargaining representative, PWU. In the CBA, step increases in salary were provided in case
of an employee’s promotion. L and I were promoted but they were not given the proper
increase in salary. This led PWU to submit the grievance to the grievance machinery. PHI
and PWU failed to amicably settle the grievance so they filed a submission agreement with
the NCMB and agreed to designate RJ as voluntary arbitrator.
On Aug. 13, 1999, RJ ruled in favor PWU. PHI received this decision on Aug. 16, 1999 and filed
an MR on Aug. 26, 1999. In a resolution, RJ denied the MR on July 7, 2000, and this was
received by PHI on Aug. 11, 2000. On Aug 29, 2000, PHI filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that RJ gravely abused his discretion.
In the CA, PWU argues that RJ’s Aug. 13, 1999 decision is already final and executory.
Therefore, the court should not entertain PHI’s petition. Decide.
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I will rule in PWU’s favor. PHI availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 – the proper remedy to reverse a Voluntary Arbitrator (VA)’s decision is to appeal it before
the CA through Rule 43. The Supreme Court has explained that the VA is a quasi-judicial agency
which puts it under the scope of Rule 43. Moreover, the Labor Code provides that the VA’s decision
shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy by the parties. Even if Rule
43, Sec. 4 provides a 15-day reglementary period, the Labor Code, giving a substantive right, should
prevail. Here, even assuming that PHI filed the proper petition to the CA, it was only filed 18 days –
8 days late – after its receipt of the decision. Therefore, RJ’s Aug. 13 decision is already final and
executory (PHILEC v. CA, G.R. No. 168612 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
MSAS, a French company, executed a Consulting Agreement with MA who was to serve as
its technical consultant for 12 months. This is because MSAS had a shipment contract in the
Philippines that had to be fulfilled. Under his employment, MA was tasked to, among other
things, monitor supplies, follow and prepare reports, evaluate billings, etc. 4 years after, MSAS
sent MA a letter informing him that his contract will officially end on July 31, 2013 since one
of MA’s main projects has ended. In other words, MSAS dismissed him because his function
for monitoring the delivery of supplies became unnecessary. Subsequently, MSAS informed
the DOLE that as a result of a big project ending, MA was to be dismissed along with 4 other
workers. MSAS then offered MA his separation pay but the latter refused. Thereafter, MA filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against MSAS, alleging that he was dismissed despite being
the most senior engineer, while the other junior engineers remained. In its defense, MSAS
argued that it had an authorized cause to dismiss him – redundancy. Decide.
(a) What are the requirements of a valid redundancy program?
The Supreme Court, explaining Article 298 of the Labor Code, enumerated the following
requirements: (a) a written notice served on both employees and the DOLE at least 1 month prior to
the intended date of retrenchment; (b) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month
pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (c) good faith in abolishing
the redundant positions; and, (d) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be
declared redundant and accordingly abolished (Acosta v. Matiere SAS, G.R. No. 232870 (2019),
(b) Was MA validly dismissed? Explain.
No, he was illegally dismissed. In accordance with the requisites enumerated above, it is clear that
MSAS failed to comply with the 3rd and 4th requisites. MSAS allegedly dismissed MA because his duty
to monitor the delivery of supplies became unnecessary upon the completion of shipments. However,
it can be seen from the facts that he had other functions aside from monitoring the supplies e.g. to
prepare reports. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the facts to show that MSAS used fair and
reasonable criteria in determining what positions to abolish. As seen here, the rule on seniority was
not even followed. Therefore, MA was illegally dismissed (Id.).
PROBLEM:
GJT, a single proprietorship, hired RR as a machinist. In 1996, a fire razed GJT’s building and
destroyed half of everything that was inside. Despite this, the business continued running for
a year until the owners decided to close down the business. The owners then informed RR
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that he will lose his job due to the closure, but he cannot be given separation pay due to
serious business losses that the fire caused. RR then filed a case with the Labor Arbiter, asking
that he be paid his separation pay. To prove the serious business losses, GJT presented its
income statements for 1996, showing that it occurred a net loss of Php 300,000. Decide.
In whose favor will you decide? Explain.
I will rule in favor of RR. The Supreme Court has ruled that the burden of proving serious business
losses is with the employer. The latter must show a continuing pattern of loss within a sufficient period
of time and that its financial standing will unlikely improve in the future. The Court has ruled that one
year is not enough to prove this. Moreover, the business continued running for a year despite the fire
incident. This only shows that the closure was not done due to serious business losses, but due to the
owners’ desire to prevent them. Therefore, RR must be paid 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher (GJT Rebuilders v. Ambos, G.R. No. 174184 (2015),
SOCIAL LEGISLATION
PROBLEM:
M was employed by MEC as a seafarer for a 6-month period. While on the ship, M was treated
and diagnosed to have suffered a stroke. He was treated and was examined by Dr. OS, the
company-designated physician, for 1 month. Dr. OS then reported her finding that the
condition is non-work related. M admitted that he has had a family history of hypertension
and that he smoked a pack of cigarettes a day for about 30 years. Despite this finding, MEC
continued to provide him with medical assistance. M then sought a second opinion from Dr.
V who examined him for 1 day and declared after the illness was work-related and that he was
unfit to resume work. This led M to file disability and illness pay under the POEA contract.
(a) What are the requisites for an occupational disease to qualify as a work-related illness
under the POEA Contract?
Under Sec. 32-A of the POEA contract, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) the seafarer’s
work must involve the risks described herein; (b) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s
exposure to the described risks; (c) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such factors necessary to contract it; and (d) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer (Sec. 32-A, Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships).
(b) Should Dr. V’s declaration prevail over Dr. OS’s finding? Why/why not?
In this case, Dr. V’s declaration should not prevail over Dr. OS’s finding. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled that a doctor who has personal knowledge of the patient’s actual medical condition
and actually treated the seafarer’s illness is more qualified to assess the disability. Here, the facts show
that it was Dr. OS who actually treated M for a month, as opposed to Dr. V who only saw him for a
day. This shows that it was Dr. OS who is more familiar with M’s medical history and condition which
now gives more weight to her findings (Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement and Manning Corp.,
GR. No. 196122 (2014), unanimous decision).
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[N.B. In this case, the first issue was whether or not Monana’s stroke was work-related. However, I
decided not to include it because it was heavily factual and was dependent on specific medical findings.
Moreover, the Court just stated that the NLRC’s findings, when confirmed by the CA, should be given
great weight; and that Monana did not show the presence of any exception to this rule. So, there was
nothing really doctrinal on that issue, in my opinion. Just know the requisites of compensability: (a)
that the injury/illness must be work-related and (b) that it must have occurred/existed during the term
of the seafarer’s contract. The seafarer must be able to show a causal connection between the
disease/illness and the work done.]
PROBLEM:
OP accepted a 6-month employment contract with MSS Crew Management where he was
employed as a Chief Mate of a vessel. Prior to his deployment, OP underwent a medical
examination where he disclosed that he had high blood pressure. Despite this, he was still
declared fit for duty. A few months into his employment, OP began feeling overly fatigued
and he started noticing blood in his feces. On January 12, 2012, OP was rushed to an ICU in
Spain. He was repatriated and was diagnosed with heart disease. On March 5, 2012, Dr. MQ,
the company-designated physician, noted that he was a candidate for open heart surgery. Dr.
MQ also requested that OP wait for MSS’ go signal on the procedure. On June 11, 2012, OP
filed a complaint for medical expenses and other money claims against MSS. He argued that
the illness he contracted was work-related since it was brought about by stressful nature of
his job and because of the fact that they were always served high-cholesterol food. In its
defense, MSS argued that OP failed to prove the causal connection between his heart disease
and his work since his condition was a result of his poor lifestyle choices.
(a) Was OP’s heart disease work-related? Explain.
Yes, it was work-related. The POEA Standard Employment Contract defines work-related illness as
any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the Contract. OP’s
heart ailment is classified under a cardiovascular event as stated in the contract. Moreover, despite
being hypertensive, OP was declared to fit to work before his employment. It is not necessary that the
nature of the employment is the sole reason for the illness – only a reasonable connection between
the illness and the work undertaken is sufficient. There could be no doubt that working as a Chief
Mate is stressful. Moreover, this was aggravated by the type of food served in the ship – a circumstance
that OP had no control over. Therefore, OP’s heart disease was work-related (Paringit v. Global
Gateway Crewing Services, G.R. No. 217123 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) State the rules for the entitlement to disability benefits under the POEA Contract.
The rules are: (a) the 120 days provided in the POEA-SEC is the period given to the employer to
determine fitness to work and when the seafarer is deemed to be in a state of total and temporary
disability; (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a maximum of 240
days should the seafarer require further medical treatment; and (c) the disability becomes permanent
when so declared by the company-designated physician within the 120 or 240 days or upon expiration
of the periods without a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability (Id.).
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[N.B. As discussed in another case penned by J. Leonen – Magsaysay v. Atraje, G.R. No. 229192
(2018), unanimous decision – if a doctor appointed by the seafarer agrees with the assessment, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. In this case, the third doctor’s
decision shall be final and binding on both parties. This assessment refers to the declaration of fitness
to work or the degree of disability of the employee. This also presupposes that the company-
designated physician came up with a valid, final, and definite assessment on the seafarer’s fitness or
unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120/240-day period. In the absence of a definite
disability assessment from the company-designated physicians, the third-doctor referral rule does not
apply.]
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CIVIL LAW
CONFLICT OF LAWS
PROBLEM:
Q Air is an airline corporation established under the laws of Qatar and it also has a Philippine
office located in Makati. Q Air hired A, B, and C, all residents of the Philippines, as flight
attendants (“the attendants”). However, after years of working with Q Air, the attendants
were dismissed because they became pregnant. According to Q Air, their contracts of
employment provided that pregnancy automatically rescinds them. This led the attendants to
file a case for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter in the Philippines. When summons was
served on Q Air, it filed a responsive pleading and argued that the case should be dismissed
on the ground of forum non conveniens since the case requires the application of Qatar Law
as regards the employment contracts.
(a) What are the situations which may warrant a court’s desistance from exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the doctrine of forum non conveniens?
According to jurisprudence, these situations are as follows: (a) the matter can be tried and decided
elsewhere either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material
witnesses reside therein; (b) the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum merely to secure procedural
advantages or to harass the defendant; (c) the unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-
residents or aliens when the docket is overcrowded; (d) inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for
effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and, (e) the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
In short, what is considered by the court is the availability and adequacy of recourse to a foreign
tribunal, and the question of where, between the forum and foreign court, the balance of interest
inhering in a dispute weighs more heavily. (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587
(b) Rule on Q Air’s argument.
I will rule that the argument is unmeritorious. In accordance with the circumstances enumerated
above, the labor arbiter can properly take cognizance of the case. First, Q Air is doing business in the
Philippines through its local office and all the attendants are also residing herein. Second, there is
nothing in the facts which show that the attendants filed the case here to merely vex Q Air. Third,
there is also nothing which shows the unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to aliens. In
contrast to this, Q Air is given its right to due process by having access to the proper remedies. Fourth,
summons being properly served on Q Air and allowing it to file responsive pleadings show that the
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local judicial machinery is adequate to effectuate the right being disputed. Lastly, Philippine law
governs the current controversy because matters of public policy like the right to fundamental equality
between the sexes, is deemed written into law. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the law
of Qatar applies, it does not automatically mean that proper forum is found therein. Therefore, the
Labor Arbiter can properly take cognizance of the case (Id.).
[N.B. Read this case in the original. The Court, through J. Leonen, engaged in a lengthy discussion
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens and how it plays with other doctrines such as choice of law, loci
celebrationis, and other issues concerned with conflict of laws. Obviously, the Court held that the
dismissal of the attendants was illegal and that even the laws of Saudi Arabia prohibited what Saudia
did.]
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
PROBLEM:
MT and RJ were college sweethearts. While they were still studying, MT noticed that Rodolfo
was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. They eventually got married and had two children.
Despite having a family already, RJ was still extremely jealous and would even skip work just
to stalk her. He even poked a gun at his own minor cousin who was staying at their house
because he thought the latter was MT’s lover. RJ was also a sex addict who would convince
MT to have sex with him four to five times a day.
This led MT to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that RJ was
psychologically incapacitated. She even presented Dr. AL, a psychologist. Dr. AL alleged that
he conducted interviews with MT and RJ’s best friend. After conducting these interviews, Dr.
AL diagnosed RJ with a paranoid personality disorder manifested by his extreme jealousy.
According to Dr. AL, this was caused by a pathogenic parental model since his father was a
psychiatric patent and RJ might have developed symptoms similar to his father. Dr. AL
further added that a person with this disorder would refuse to admit that there was something
wrong and there was a need for treatment.
Will you grant MT’s petition? Explain.
Yes, I will. Jurisprudence explains that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that such incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Here, all elements are present. First, due to his paranoid personality disorder, RJ was extremely
distrustful, and this even led him to commit acts which threatened the life of MT. This shows an
incapacity to fully comprehend and assume the essential marital obligations. Next, juridical
antecedence is seen from RJ’s personality even before he was married, and that the root cause of his
disorder was hereditary in nature. Lastly, incurability is seen from Dr. AL’s statement that a person
with this disorder usually refused to admit that there was something wrong and that he needed
treatment. With all these considerations, I will grant MT’s petition (Tani-De la Fuente v. De la Fuente,
Jr., G.R. No. 188400 (2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. VERY IMPORTANT! In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359 (2021),
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court, speaking through J. Leonen, held that psychological
incapacity contemplated under Article 36 should be incurable, not in the medical sense, but in the
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legal sense. This means that “the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific
partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage.”
To summarize the modifications that the were made to the doctrines on psychological incapacity, the
Court held that:
“To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of
understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic
causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion
is not needed.
As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s
personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown
[that it was] caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party
must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.]
PROBLEM:
A and B claimed to be children of the late JAA but had different fathers. A, however, argues
that she is the only child of JAA because this was evidenced by a duly accomplished Birth
Certificate. B sought partition of the properties left by JAA which were in A’s possession, but
the latter refused. This led B to file a complaint in court, arguing that his filiation can be
proved through his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
(a) What are the different types of evidence by which filiation can be established?
According to Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation may be established by the following: (a) a record
of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment; or (b) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws (Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Rule on B’s complaint.
I will rule against B. Jurisprudence has declared that a person who seeks to establish illegitimate
filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so by presenting a record of birth appearing in
the civil register, a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation. In other words, after the
death of the putative parent, proving filiation through open and continuous possession of the status
as a child and the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws are therefore barred. In
this case, B filed his complaint after JAA had already died. Since he wanted to prove his filiation
through open and continuous possession of the status of a child, then his action is now barred (Id.).
[N.B. In other words, you can only use the open and continuous possession of the status of a child
and the means allowed by the Rules and special laws when the putative parent is still alive.]
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(c) What if B presents a certificate of live birth which was registered late, showing that he
was born to a certain C and JAA. B also argues that during the hearing on the delayed
registration, no one appeared to oppose it despite notice of the hearing. Will your
answer change? Explain.
No, my answer will not change. Jurisprudence states that this situation is analogous to a case where a
putative father’s name is written on a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child, without showing
that he participated in preparing the certificate. In other words, a delayed registration of birth, made
after the death of the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation. Therefore, this is inadequate to
prove that B was indeed a child of JAA (Id.).
PROBLEM:
RR, a Filipina, and RT, a Japanese national, were married in Metro Manila. After living
together for nine years in Japan, they filed for divorce by agreement which the Japanese
authorities granted. RR subsequently secured a Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese
Consulate. Thereafter, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of
Capacity to Marry with the RTC. The OSG opposed her petition, stating that Article 26 of the
Family Code strictly requires that the divorce decree must be validly obtained by the alien
spouse. Therefore, the OSG argues that a divorce by agreement between the spouses should
not be allowed. Decide.
I will rule against the OSG. The Supreme Court has already ruled that a divorce validly obtained
abroad even by the Filipina spouse can be recognized in the Philippines. This is because regardless of
who initiated the divorce proceedings between the Filipino and Foreign citizen, the result will be the
same: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a spouse. Therefore, as long as the validity of the
divorce decree is proven, it does not matter who obtained the decree abroad. In light of these
doctrines, OSG’s argument must necessarily fail (Racho v. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515 (2018),
[N.B. Yes, the case cited by the Court is Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029 (2018) which was
issued a few months before this decision.]
PROBLEM:
EM and Col. FO were married and had 5 children. Due to FO’s infidelity, they eventually
separated. EM filed a complaint before the Provost Marshall Division of the AFP, asking that
a monthly support of 75% of FO’s salary and retirement benefits be given to her. Eventually,
FO executed a deed of assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and benefits. A few
months later, Col. FO retired. Three years later, the Armed Forces of the Philippines decided
not to honor the agreement and informed EM that a court order was required for the
recognition of the assignment. Because of this, OM filed an action for support with the RTC.
In its defense, the AFP argued that both P.D. No. 1638 and the Rules of Court exempt Col.
FO’s pension from execution. The RTC granted the petition for support.
(a) Can the AFP be directed to automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the
EM and her children? Explain.
Yes, the AFP may be directed to do so. Article 6 of the New Civil Code provides that rights may be
waived as long as they are not contrary to law, public order, public policy, good customs, or prejudicial
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to a third person with a right recognized by law. Here, Col. FO effectively waived the exemption of
his benefits when he executed the deed of assignment with EM. The assignment done was not contrary
to law and was actually in accordance with the Family Code. Therefore, the AFP can be directed to
automatically deduct the support needed from Col. FO’s retirement benefits (Mabugay v. Otamias,
(b) Can Col. FO’s pension be executed upon for EM and her children’s support? Explain.
Yes, it can be executed upon. The Supreme Court has explained that even the Constitution has given
special importance to the family. This importance is also manifested through the passage of the Family
Code. In several decisions, the Supreme Court has given primary consideration to the right to receive
support, especially that given to children. Therefore, since Col. FO validly waived the exemption, the
execution on his pension must be allowed (Mabugay v. Otamias, G.R. No. 189516 (2016), unanimous
decision).
[N.B. The Court here did not rule on whether or not the right to receive support would constitute as
an exception to P.D. No. 1638. The Court said that since Col. Otamias waived the exemption, the
issue of whether the Family Code provisions trump the exemption under P.D. No. 1638 should be
resolved in a more appropriate case.]
PROBLEM:
RA filed a complaint for support against PC. According to RA, PC sexually abused her which
resulted to her getting impregnated. 9 months after, her daughter MA, was born. PC denied
sexually abusing RA or having any sexual relations with her of any kind. The RTC dismissed
RA’s complaint, stating that filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted
to ascertain MA’s paternity. According to the RTC, the action for filiation is a condition for
an action for support. Is the RTC’s ruling, correct? Explain.
No, the ruling was incorrect. True, jurisprudence provides that an action for compulsory recognition
or filiation may be filed ahead of an action for support. However, jurisprudence also provides that
there is an equally valid alternative: the direct filing of an action for support where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. Therefore, the RTC should not have
dismissed the case. It should have just integrated the filiation proceedings in RA’s action for support.
Therefore, the RTC’s ruling was incorrect (Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647 (2017), unanimous
decision).
[N.B. The Court explained that the situation herein is very similar to an action to compel recognition
being allowed to be integrated with an action to claim inheritance.]
PROBLEM:
PG and AG were validly married. However, PG abandoned his wife and children. A few years
later, a friend informed AG that PG had contracted a second marriage with a certain JB. AG
subsequently filed a complaint against PG for bigamy. In his defense, PG argued that his
marriage contract with AG was void since it did not bear the solemnizing officer. Should PG
be convicted for bigamy? Decide.
Yes, he should be convicted for Bigamy. The Supreme Court has explained that a declaration of nullity
is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage. Since PG did not obtain a declaration of nullity, it is
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immaterial whether or not his marriage with AG was void. Therefore, he should be convicted for
bigamy (De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. 224742 (2019), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
VR married LR (Sps. R) before the Family Code and they acquired three parcels of land. VR,
by himself, obtained a loan from PNB and he mortgaged the properties to the latter. VR then
used the money as additional working capital for his business. VR subsequently failed to pay
the loan so PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. Sps. R then filed a case in court, claiming that
the mortgage should be declared void because encumbered properties were conjugal and
therefore, LR’s consent was indispensable.
(a) Was the mortgage void? Explain.
Yes, it was void. Article 124 of the Family Code provides that when the property regime is conjugal
partnership of gains, and one of the spouses encumbers or disposes of the properties, the written
consent of the other spouse is required. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. Here, Sps. R were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
which meant that their property regime is the conjugal partnership of gains. Moreover, there is no
dispute that it was solely VR who mortgaged the properties to PNB. Therefore, the mortgage was
void (PNB v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Assuming that the mortgage was void, can the principal debt still be recovered from
the conjugal properties? Explain.
Yes, it can still be recovered. Article 122 provides that the payment of personal debts contracted by
one spouse during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Jurisprudence further provides that when a loan is taken out
to be used for the family business, there is no need to prove actual benefit since the law presumes it.
Here, the facts showed that VR used the money as additional working capital for his business.
Therefore, the legal presumption of benefit applies in this case. This means that the conjugal
partnership is liable and that the spouses are solidarily liable if any unpaid balance remains (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CJ was married to RS in 1980. On June 15, 2007, RS was able to obtain a declaration of absence
or presumptive death for the purposes of remarriage from the RTC. He alleged that his wife,
CJ, left their residence in Tarlac to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong and ever since
then, she was never heard of again. He said that he tried contacting CJ’s relatives, but they
too did not know where she was. RS married PT on September 17, 2008.
On Nov. 17, 2008, 1 month after she found out about what her husband did, CJ hired a lawyer,
saying that she was deprived her day in court when RS misrepresented that they were
residents of Tarlac City. According to her, they resided in Quezon City. Moreover, it was
actually Ricardo who left in 2008 and that she never left their place of residence.
(a) What are the conditions for the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance of the former spouse?
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As explained by jurisprudence, Art. 42 of the Family Code, requires these following conditions to be
met: (a) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio;
(b) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the
sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (c) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (d) the fact of reappearance must either be
undisputed or judicially determined (Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) If you were CJ’s lawyer, what remedy would you avail of? Why?
I would file a petition for annulment of judgment, and not a sworn affidavit of her reappearance. First,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the previous spouse’s reappearance does not automatically terminate
the subsequent marriage because all the conditions in Art. 42 of the Family Code must be met. Second,
by filing a petition for annulment of judgment, CJ would now be arguing that she never disappeared,
and that her husband’s second marriage is void ab initio for being bigamous. If she only files an affidavit
of reappearance, then the second marriage is valid until such reappearance. In other words, by filing a
petition for annulment of judgment, she would be avoiding the effects of reappearance such as the
possible legitimacy of the children of the second marriage and the problems of property relations (Id.).
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
PROBLEM:
PEZA entered into a contract with PS Corp. where the latter was to deliver two firetrucks
within 45 days from the receipt of a purchase order from the former. A stipulation in the
contract provided that failure to deliver the trucks on the specified date will subject PS to a
penalty of 0.1% of the total contract price for each a day of delay. Thereafter, PEZA eventually
failed to deliver the trucks. The contract was therefore declared as rescinded by the RTC.
PEZA now asks the court to grant damages based on the penalty clause provided for in the
contract. On the other hand, PS argues that the penalty stipulation cannot be recognized since
the contract was rescinded, and therefore, only mutual restitution is required. Decide.
I will rule in favor of PEZA. Jurisprudence has explained that Article 1191 of the New Civil Code
provides for mutual restitution in case a contract is rescinded. However, the Supreme Court has held
that the concept of mutual restitution does not automatically negate liquidated damages. If the parties
freely agree on the payment of liquidated damages despite rescission, then the courts will not strike
their agreement down. Lastly, even Article 1191 itself provides that the injured party may choose
between fulfillment and rescission with the payment of damages in either case. Therefore, the
stipulation for liquidated damages must be upheld (PEZA v. Pilhino Sales Corp., G.R. No. 185765
PROBLEM:
In 1996, CJH Corp constructed hotels in Baguio. In 2001, CJH Corp. entered into a
contractor’s agreement with CC Corp. CC was to complete the interior and exterior painting
works of unit 2E of CJH’s hotel for the price of Php 15.5M. This is inclusive of the price of
two studio-type units at the hotel. The agreement contained no date of the units’ turnover,
but it allowed CC to choose the units for offsetting. CC chose units 102 and 104. In 2003, CC
completed the painting works. CJH was only able to pay the price, minus the value of the
units. Therefore, CC demanded the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of titles of
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the units which CJH complied with. However, come 2008, CJH was still experiencing
construction delays and were therefore unable to actually transfer the units. CC filed a petition
in court asking the latter to declare the contract as rescinded. On the other hand, CJH argues
that the court should just fix a period. Decide.
I will rule in favor of CC. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code provides that the power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him. Here, rescission is proper. CJH and CC have reciprocal obligations since CC
has to complete the painting works while CJH has to pay a certain price and transfer the units.
However, despite repeated demands, CJH failed to deliver the units because construction was not yet
completed. Moreover, the obligation to fix a period under Article 1197 does not apply because the
law requires that it can be inferred, from the nature and circumstances, that a period was intended. In
this case, it is clear that the obligation to build the hotels has been dragging on for years and no period
was intended by the parties since CC had been repeatedly demanding for the transfer of the units.
Therefore, the contract should be rescinded (Camp John Hay Development v. Charter Chemical, G.R.
PROBLEM:
A, B, C, D, E were major stockholders (the stockholders) of GS Corp. It took out several loans
which were guaranteed by DBP. The stockholders guaranteed DBP’s potential liabilities.
Eventually, President Ferdinand Marcos issued a letter of authority ordering the National
Development Company (NDC) to acquire 100% of GS’ shareholdings for the amount of Php
46.7M. Pursuant to this, the stockholders and F, the NDC’s Chairman of the Board, entered
into a contract. This contract provided that within 60 days, the parties will execute the share
purchase agreement for Php 46.7M. However, the 60-day period was not followed because the
NDC delayed its review of GS’ financial accounts.
Thereafter, the NDC took over GS’ operation without the share purchase agreement being
formally executed. Because of this, the shareholders filed a complaint with the RTC, arguing
that NDC took over the company without ever executing the purchase agreement. Thus,
NDC must already pay them the Php 46.7M. On the other hand, NDC argues that it is the
execution of the share purchase agreement which entitles them to payment. Since, there was
no agreement yet, then it has no obligation to pay. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the stockholders. Article 1186 of the New Civil Code states that the condition
shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. In this case, NDC’s
obligation to pay was conditioned on the execution of the share purchase agreement. However, the
facts state that its reason for non-execution is NDC’s delayed review of GS’ financial accounts.
Moreover, Article 1198(4) states that the debtor even loses the right to make use of the period when
the condition is violated, thereby making the obligation immediately demandable. Considering the
deliberate delay caused, the execution of the share purchase agreement is deemed fulfilled and NDC
must pay the shareholders (DBP v. Sta. Ines, et al., G.R. No. 193096 and 193099, February 1, 2017).
PROBLEM:
GP, Inc., as borrower, and IBank as lender, executed a Credit Agreement. As security, GP
executed a real estate mortgage over one of its properties. GP defaulted so IBank foreclosed
the mortgage. GP filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure. However, GP and IBank
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executed a compromise agreement which restructured GP’s indebtedness. One of the
stipulations in the agreement was an acceleration clause which allowed IBank to demand the
whole amount of the debt in case GP was unable to pay one of the installments. GP defaulted
again so IBank filed a Motion for Execution with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the
Motion for Execution and found the action premature, alleging that the 10-year term loan has
not yet ended. Was the RTC’s action proper? Explain.
The RTC’s action was improper. Jurisprudence has explained that even when there is a fixed term for
the loan, the creditor may invoke the contract’s acceleration clause when the debtor fails to pay the
stipulated installments. This right will be rendered meaningless if the obligation is made demandable
only when the term expires. Therefore, the RTC was mistaken in denying the motion for execution
on the ground that the 10-year term has not yet expired (Gotesco Properties v. International Exchange
Bank, G.R. No. 212262 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A approached his brother B, a doctor-businessman, and told the latter that he was operating
a new shipping business. A promised to give B shares worth Php 1M and the position of
director in the company, along with the prerogative to participate in its operations. In return,
all that A asked was that B sign as a solidary debtor in a business loan that he was going to
get from DBP. B agreed and got the shares. The company was unable to pay its loan and this
prompted DBP to collect against B. In his defense, B said that he was defrauded because he
was deliberately excluded from participating in the affairs of the corporation and had never
been compensated as a director and stockholder – contrary to what was promised to him.
(a) Identify and differentiate the two types of fraud in contracts.
The two types of fraud in contracts are dolo causante i.e. causal fraud and dolo incidente i.e. incidental fraud.
As provided in Art. 1338 of the Civil Code, dolo causante is deception or misrepresentation of a serious
character, employed by one party and without which the other party would not have entered into the
contract. This is used prior to or simultaneous with the contract in order to secure the consent of the
other. On the other hand, dolo incidente in Art. 1344 is a misrepresentation which is not of serious
character and only pertains to some particular or accident of the obligation. Dolo causante results to the
nullity of the contract and indemnification of damages, while dolo incidente only obliges the payment of
damages (Tankeh v. DBP, G.R. No. 171428 (2013), unanimous decision).
(b) Is A guilty of dolo causante? Why/why not?
No, A is not guilty of dolo causante. Jurisprudence dictates that Dolo causante is present when the fraud
is so serious or sufficient to impress and lead an ordinarily prudent person to error. This is determined
by the personal conditions and factual circumstances of the case as a whole. B was given the shares
without him contributing any monetary amount in return. This should have alerted him of the
irregularity of the transaction. This is further highlighted by the fact that he is a doctor and a
businessman. He had every opportunity to become aware of the facts that came with signing the
promissory note. Therefore, A is not guilty of dolo causante in this case (Id.).
(c) Is A guilty of dolo incidente? Why/why not?
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Yes, A is guilty of dolo incidente. Jurisprudence states that incidental fraud is one which is not serious in
character and without which, the other party would have still entered into the contract. B voluntarily
entered into the contract with full consent, and therefore, it was incumbent upon A to fulfill his
promise of including B in the operations of the company. Since B was a director on paper anyway,
there was no reason for him to be excluded from performing his duties. Clearly, A is guilty of dolo
incidente in excluding B from the affairs of the company (Id.).
(d) Is B entitled to damages? If yes, what kind?
B is entitled to moral damages and exemplary damages. First, jurisprudence provides that moral
damages may be awarded in an action for breach of contract wherein the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith. In this situation, A clearly abused his right in pursuing business operations by failing
to be transparent to B and by excluding the latter in the company’s operation. This entitles B to relief
pursuant to Art. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Exemplary damages should also be awarded. In accordance with Art. 2233 of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court has held that exemplary damages may be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied
by bad faith, and only if the defendant acted a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or malevolent manner.
Again, being guilty of dolo incidente, it is clear that A acted contrary to propriety, good morals, and
prudence. (Id.)
PROBLEM:
AL entered into a contract of sale with KP. The terms of the contract were as follows: (a) that
KP was to deliver 3 units of Minilab Equipment to 3 branches of AL’s store; (b) that a purchase
price of Php 1.7M was to be paid by KP in installments; and, (c) that a 19% multiple order
discount was to be applied to the purchase price. Is this a divisible or an indivisible
obligation? Explain.
It is an indivisible obligation. Article 1225 of the New Civil Code states that even if the object may be
physically divisible, an obligation is indivisible if provided by law or if intended by the parties. Here,
the terms of the agreement show AL and KP’s intention to make the obligation indivisible. First, there
was one agreement covering the 3 units of equipment and for the single purpose of delivering the
equipment to AL’s branches. Moreover, there was only a single purchase price to be paid, along with
a discount on all three units. Clearly, AL and KP intended the obligation to be indivisible (Sps. Lam
v. Kodak Phils, G.R. No. 167615 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
EA loaned Php 250k to FV. As security for the loan, FV mortgaged his property in Tondo
which was subject of a conditional Contract to Sell between him and the National Housing
Authority (NHA). This was annotated on the title of the property. FV defaulted in the
payment of the loan which caused EA to foreclose on the mortgage.
As a defense, FV argued that the Contract to Sell prohibited him from constituting a mortgage
on the property without NHA’s consent. In other words, FV is alleging that the mortgage is
void since he did not secure NHA’s prior consent. Decide.
I will rule that FV’s defense must fail. The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on dispositions
does not divest an owner of his ownership rights. Therefore, FV had every right to dispose of the
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property, subject only to the rights that may accrue to the NHA. NHA’s restriction does not make the
mortgage void ab initio – it only makes the contract voidable, subject to NHA exercising its right to
have the contract annulled. Since NHA did not exercise such option here, FV has no actionable right
or cause of action based on this restriction (Vitug v. Abuda, G.R. No. 201264 (2016), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
QPE company delivered Php 7m worth of scrap papers to ACI company, which agreed that
it would either pay QPE the value of the papers or deliver to it the finished products of
equivalent value. ACI subsequently issued a post-dated check for the supposed payment but
it was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. On the same day of the issuance
of the check, ACI through its CEO, Ms. S, and a certain Mr. E executed a contract where the
former bound itself to deliver the finished materials to MCC company owned by the Mr. E. It
was stipulated therein that the raw materials would be from the materials supplied by QPE.
(a) QPE filed a collection case with the RTC. ACI argued that the obligation to pay QPE
was novated by the subsequent novation brought about by the contract with Mr. E.
Decide.
I will decide in favor of QPE. As explained by the Supreme Court, novation as found in Art. 1291 of
the New Civil Code, can never be presumed. First, there was nothing in the contract which expressly
novated ACI’s obligation to pay QPE. Moreover, Art. 1292 requires that in implied novation, the old
and new obligations must be incompatible with each other on every point. However, ACI’s contract
with Mr. E merely stated that the former will deliver finished products to the latter. Lastly, novation
by substitution of the creditor requires the original creditor’s express consent – something which was
not complied with. Therefore, ACI’s obligation to pay QPE subsists (Arco Pulp v. Lim, G.R. No.
(a) Is QPE entitled to damages? If yes, what kind?
QPE is entitled to moral damages and exemplary damages. First, jurisprudence dictates that moral
damages may be awarded in an action for breach of contract wherein the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith. In this situation, ACI clearly acted in bad faith by issuing a check on a closed account,
and by attempting to shift its obligation to a third party without QPE’s consent. These acts even show
ACI’s oppressive dealing with the latter. This entitles QPE to relief pursuant to Art. 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code.
Exemplary damages should also be awarded. In accordance with Art. 2233 of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court has held that exemplary damages may be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied
by bad faith, and only if the defendant acted a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or malevolent manner. As
explained, since ACI was clearly in bad faith and acted in an oppressive manner towards QPE, the
latter is entitled to exemplary damages. (Id.)
PROBLEM:
M, who owns a construction company, alleged that L invited him to advance Php 2M for a
river-dredging project. M was promised by L that he would make arrangements to SCD
company, the lowest bidder who would then make M a subcontractor. M accepted L’s
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invitation and he advanced the Php 2M. SCD was eventually awarded the project but did not
subcontract M.
(a) Does M have a cause of action against L for the return of his Php 2M?
Yes, M has a cause of action against L under the principle of unjust enrichment. Art. 22 of the Civil
Code, as explained by the Supreme Court, provides that unjust enrichment has two conditions (a) that
a person benefitted without valid justification; (b) and that such benefit was derived at another
person’s expense. Here, L promised M that he will be the subcontractor of a project for the price of
Php 2M. However, this promise never came into fruition. Therefore, M has a right to be reimbursed
for the amount he paid (Loria v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 187240 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) Assuming M has a cause of action against L, the latter now argues that since the
contract is void for being contrary to law, they are in pari delicto. Therefore, recovery
should be barred. Decide. [N.B. Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1594 provides that a contractor shall
not subcontract a part/interest in a government project without approval of the
relevant department secretary.]
I will still rule in favor of M. First, the subcontracting arrangement never came into fruition which
caused M to file this case. Therefore, this law was never proven to have been violated. Second, in any
case, the Supreme Court has allowed recovery under a void subcontract as an exception to the in pari
delicto doctrine since this may be allowed when its application contravenes public policy. Since the
prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the state, recovery may be allowed
here (Id.).
PROBLEM:
In 1983, Sps. R faced financial difficulties, so they borrowed money from CZ. By way of
security, they verbally agreed that CZ would take possession of a piece of land owned by Sps.
R, cultivate it, then use the earnings to pay the loan and taxes. Upon payment of the loan, CZ
would return it to Sps. R. Then in 1979, without Sps. R’s knowledge, CZ filed a fictitious
contract of sale which allowed her to register the property in her name. CZ subsequently sold
it to Sps. S.
In 1995, Sps. R were surprised when they were found out that a land registration case filed by
Sps. S. They also saw the contract of sale with their forged signatures. Within 9 months, Sps.
R filed a complaint for the annulment of sale and transfer of title over their property against
CZ.
CZ first argues that the claim is already barred by laches because 16 years have passed from
the time that the fictitious contract of sale was registered. Decide.
I will rule in favor of Sps. R. Jurisprudence has explained that one of the requirements for laches to
apply is the delay on part of the complainant in asserting his rights despite knowledge or notice of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit. Here, upon finding out
that their property was fraudulently sold to another, they instituted suit within 9 months. Therefore,
they cannot be considered to have been sleeping on their rights. Moreover, laches can only apply in
the absence of statutory law. Here, the 1410 of the Civil Code applies – the declaration of the
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inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Hence, the defense of laches is unmeritorious (Cotoner-
Zacarias v. Sps. Revilla, G.R. No. 190901 (2014), unanimous decision).
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
PROBLEM:
BC owned a parcel of land covered by title, which was also being claimed by the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA), claiming to have its own title. BC entered into a contract of
conditional sale with ORC corporation for a total price of Php 19M. They agreed on the
following stipulations: (a) that ORC will give a down payment of Php 5M and the balance to
be paid in installments; (b) that ORC will initiate the action against PTA to cancel the latter’s
title, with the full assistance of BC; (c) that ORC will pay disturbance compensation to the
current tenants of the land; (d) that BC will clear these tenants from 6 months from the signing
of the deed of conditional sale and failure to do so will give ORC the right to suspend the
payment of installments. BC reserved his title and undertook to execute a deed of absolute
sale once ORC pays the purchase price in full.
4 months after they signed the contract, BC filed a complaint for recission of contract against
ORC in the RTC, arguing that the latter only paid Php 2.5M for the down payment, and that
ORC neither filed a case against the PTA nor paid the tenants disturbance compensation. BC
argues that ORC’s actions constituted a substantial breach of contract based on Art. 1191 of
the civil code.
(a) Compare and contrast a contract of conditional sale from a contract to sell.
Jurisprudence has explained that in both these contracts, title to the property remains with the seller
until the buyer fully pays the purchase price – a positive suspensive condition. However, in a contract
of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the property upon full payment and this
occurs by operation of law without any further act required. On the other hand, a contract to sell
requires the seller to convey title through a deed of conditional sale after the purchase price has been
paid in full. This distinction is important because in conditional contracts of sale, the Civil Code
provisions on sales apply, while in contracts to sell, the Civil Code provisions on conditional
obligations apply (Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251 (2014), unanimous decision).
(a) What contract is present here and is BC entitled to the relief sought?
Here, the contract the parties entered into was a contract to sell and BC is entitled to cancel the
contract. The facts explicitly state that BC reserved his title and undertook to execute a deed of
absolute sale once ORC pays the full price. As explained, this reservation shows the existence of a
contract to sell. However, jurisprudence has explained that in contracts to sell, Art. 1191 of the Civil
Code does not apply – the contract is not rescinded but is cancelled, and the parties stand as if the
obligation never existed. Since ORC did not fulfill its obligations, BC is entitled to cancel their contract
(Id.).
PROBLEM:
Unionbank placed an advertisement in the newspaper for a condominium unit in Makati
which the former acquired through disclosure. Unionbank stated therein that the
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condominium unit had a floor area of 95 square meters. This ad was seen by JPB who thought
that the area is just right for his residential needs. On the day of the auction, JPB acquired the
unit for PHP 3 million. He immediately occupied the unit and contacted a carpenter to install
several improvements therein. To JPB’s surprise, the carpenter informed him that upon
measuring his unit, he discovered that the area was only 75 square meters – not 95 as stated
in Unionbank’s advertisement.
JPB immediately filed a case for rescission of contract and damages against Unionbank in
the RTC. Unionbank, in its answer, gave two arguments to resist the rescission of the
contract. First, that the unit was sold on an as-is-where-is basis which meant that JPB waived
the errors in the measurement when he bought the unit. Second, Unionbank argued that the
area of 95 square meters included JPB’s share in the common areas.
(a) Rule on Unionbank’s argument.
I will rule that the as-is-where-is principle does not apply in this case. Jurisprudence has laid down the
rules for its application: first, a stipulation absolving the seller of liability for hidden defects can only
be invoked by one who does not have any knowledge of their existence. Here, Unionbank knew, or
at the very least, should have known, that the unit’s area was smaller than 95 square meters. Second,
the as-is-where-is principle applies only to the readily perceptible physical state of the object being
sold. It cannot encompass matters which require specialized scrutiny such as the object’s legal status.
Here, what is involved is a technical matter perceptible only by a person with technical competence
such as the carpenter who discovered the discrepancy after using his specialized knowledge. Therefore,
Unionbank’s argument must fail. (Poole-Blunden v. Unionbank, G.R. No. 205838 (2017), unanimous
decision).
(b) Should the contract be rescinded? Explain.
Yes, the contract should be rescinded. Article 1390 of the New Civil Code provides that a contract
may be voided where consent is vitiated by fraud. Fraud, to annul the contract must causal – it must
be so material that if it had not been present, the defrauded party would not have entered into it. In
this case, Unionbank is guilty of causal fraud. First, Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifically
states that areas of common use are not part of the unit. Second, it can be seen that the moving cause
of JPB’s acquisition is that he deemed the 95 square meter area sufficient for his needs. Therefore,
Unionbank’s false advertisement of the wrong area is causal fraud which allows JPB to rescind the
contract (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Sps. A and B took out a loan from iBank to purchase a new BMW sportscar. The monthly
amortization was for two years. Sps. B then took out an insurance policy on the vehicle,
making the proceeds payable to iBank. In that policy, iBank was designated as Sps. B’s
attorney-in-fact with an irrevocable authority to file the insurance claim in case of loss or
damage to the sportscar. These stipulations were consented to by iBank. A few months later,
the car was stolen so A immediately informed iBank which instructed them to pay the next
three monthly installments as a sign of good faith. The spouses complied. Thereafter, iBank
sent them a demant letter, asking for the full payment of the car. This led Sps. A and B to file
a claim with the insurance company which the latter denied due to the delayed reporting.
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(a) What are the elements of an agency contract?
According to jurisprudence, its elements are: (a) there is consent, express or implied, of the parties to
establish the relationship; (b) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
(c) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and (d) the agent acts within his scope of
authority (iBank v. Sps. Briones, G.R. No. 205657 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Can iBank claim the payment of the car from Sps. A and B? Explain.
No, it cannot. Under Article 1884 of the New Civil Code, the agent is bound by his acceptance to
carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal
may suffer. In this case, Sps. A and B explicitly designated iBank as their agent who had the authority
to file a claim with the insurance company and was even designated as the beneficiary. However,
iBank, despite knowledge of the loss, did not comply with its duty to file the claim. Therefore, iBank
has no right to claim the amounts which were lost due to its own doing (Id.).
(c) iBank argues that Sps. A and B effectively revoked the agency when they filed the
claim with the insurance company. Decide.
I will rule that iBank’s argument is unmeritorious. Under Article 1924 of the Civil Code, revocation
only applies in cases of incompatibility, such as when the principal disregards or bypasses the agent in
order to deal with a third person in a way that excludes the agent. In this case however, Sps. A and B
immediately informed iBank when the car was lost. What led them to file a claim with the insurance
company is iBank’s demand for payment. Moreover, this agency contract is irrevocable since it is an
agency coupled with interest. Here, the agency was established not only for the benefit of Sps. A and
B, but for iBank’s benefit as well since it was the beneficiary of the policy. Therefore, the acts of Sps.
A and B here cannot be considered as a revocation of the agency (Id.).
PROBLEM:
MM Corp. hired BJ as a supervisor for one of its cruise ships. Two months after BJ
disembarked from the ship due to the expiration of his contract, he was diagnosed with aortic
aneurysm. 11 days later, he died. Subsequently, CJ, BJ’s widow, filed a case for payment of
death benefits and other monetary claims against MM. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor;
and the NLRC affirmed his decision. MM appealed to the CA. While the appeal was pending,
MM paid CJ a conditional satisfaction of the judgment award, without prejudice to MM’s
pending appeal. The payment also included a quitclaim and waiver on CJ’s part – that she
has no further claims whatsoever against MM. Because of the conditional satisfaction of the
award, the CA dismissed MM’s appeal for being moot and academic. Was the CA’s action
proper? Explain.
The CA’s action was proper. Article 2028 of the New Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as
a contract whereby parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one
already commenced. Moreover, jurisprudence explains that a conditional satisfaction of judgment can
be deemed as a compromise agreement when it is highly prejudicial to the employee. This prejudice
can be seen in the quitclaim and waiver that CJ was required to sign – this effectively put her at a grave
disadvantage because the CA could have still reversed the LA and NLRC’s decision. Therefore, the
CA was correct for dismissing MM’s appeal on the ground of being moot and academic (Magsaysay
Maritime Corp. v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 203943 (2017), unanimous decision).
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PROBLEM:
MG was a natural-born Filipino who later became an Australian citizen. Prior to reacquiring
her citizenship, she financed the purchase of a house and lot in Zambales. The lots were
registered in the name of her niece, RD since MG knew that she could not yet own the land
due to her citizenship. From then on, RD declared herself as the owner. After reacquiring her
Filipino citizenship, MG demanded that the properties be transferred to her name. Decide.
I will rule in favor of MG. Article 1448 of the Civil Code expressly provides there is an implied trust
when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party, but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. In this situation, the one to whom the
estate was granted – RD – is the trustee while the one who provided the payment – MG – is the
beneficiary. Since the facts state that the price for the house and lot was provided for by MG and was
merely titled in the name of RD, the former has a right to demand that the property be transferred to
her name (Sps. Devisfruto v. Greenfell, G.R. No. 227725 (2020), unanimous decision).
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
PROBLEM:
Sps. D claimed that they were the owners of the parcel of land and whose predecessors-in-
interest have possessed even before 1945. They declared the property in their names for tax
purposes and have planted crops therein since 1952. In 1982, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) forcibly took possession of a portion of the property. Because the NHA refused to pay
them the value of the land taken, Sps. D filed a complaint with the RTC. In its defense, the
NHA alleged that the property was part of a military reservation area. For its basis, the NHA
cited Proclamation No. 2143 which, however, also stated that this is an alienable and
disposable parcel of public land. The same PD also recognized that possible landowners who
have perfected their titles may be compensated. In its reply, Sps. D that they are already the
owners of the property by virtue of prescription under P.D. No. 1529 since in 1988, the
Executive Secretary sent an endorsement to the Director of Land Management Bureau that
the property was no longer needed for any public purpose.
(a) Are Sps. D correct in saying that they have acquired the property through prescription?
Explain.
No, they are incorrect. Under section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, two requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
property is private in character; and (b) the applicable prescriptive period has passed. The Supreme
Court has clarified that for public property to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be
an express declaration in a law passed by congress or a presidential proclamation when the president
is authorized by law; and, that the land must be patrimonial or private at the onset. In this case, a mere
endorsement from the Secretary is not the law nor the presidential proclamation required. This means
that regardless of length of Sps. D’s possession, no title was vested on them by way of prescription
(Heirs of Delfin v. NHA, G.R. No. 193618 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Though Sps. D cannot claim title by virtue of prescription, is there any other way by
which they can claim it? Explain.
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Yes, they may claim title pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Under this provision, two
requisites must be satisfied: (a) that the land subject of the claim is agricultural land; and (b) open,
continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since June 12, 1945. The land to be
alienable and disposable, must be agricultural land. Therefore, since Proclamation No. 2143 states that
the parcel of land is alienable and disposable, then the first requisite is deemed complied with.
Moreover, even Proclamation No. 2143 itself recognizes that private rights, if vested, may be
compensated. Lastly, Sps. D have been possessing the land even before 1945 which now satisfies the
second requisite. Being able to acquire a title over their land, Sps. D must be compensated by the
NHA (Id.).
[N.B. Very important point: here, Proclamation No. 2143 expressly recognized private rights which
may have been vested. This is crucial because the Proclamation reserves the area of a military
reservation. Therefore, this is not the typical positive act of government which classifies the land as
alienable and disposable with no further restriction. Thus, part of the ruling states that prescription is
not possible regardless of how long Sps. D have been possessing the land. However, Proclamation
No. 2143’s express recognition of perfected private rights impliedly acknowledges the provisions of
the Public Land Act as regards acquiring an imperfect title.
I made this discussion because I was initially confused when the Court stated that “… regardless of
the length of petitioners’ possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription.” If this is the
case, doesn’t it also preclude the acquisition by way of imperfect title which also requires a positive
act from the executive or the legislative which Proclamation No. 2143 apparently does not satisfy?
Upon reading the case again, however, I realized that the exceptional character of Proclamation No.
2143 allows this distinction.]
PROBLEM:
Sps. G bought a parcel of land in 2000. They subsequently registered the property in their
names for taxation purposes. Thereafter, they filed an application for registration where they
claimed that their predecessors-in-interest – the persons who sold them the land – have been
occupying the land since 1944. To prove the character of the land, they attached a report of
Special Land Investigator BH and the Certification of FM of the Batangas City Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). The Republic opposed Sps. G’s
application stating that the land remains to be a part of the public domain. According to the
Republic, Sps. G needed to submit a copy of the original classification map which bears the
DENR Secretary’s approval. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the Republic. Jurisprudence explains that to acquire an imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, there has to be a positive act from the government declassifying
the land from the public domain and converting it to alienable and disposable land through a positive
act of the government. To prove this, the applicant must present a certification which shows that the
DENR Secretary has approved such classification. Here, the CENRO officer’s certification is not
equivalent to the DENR Secretary’s certification. Therefore, Sps. G have failed to prove that the land
being registered is already alienable and disposable (Republic v. Sps. Go, G.R. No. 198297 (2017),
[N.B. In another case penned by J. Leonen – Kawayan Hills v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 203090
(2018), unanimous decision – the Court also reminds us of the doctrine that inasmuch as tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership in an application for judicial confirmation of
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an imperfect title, the payment of real property taxes is nevertheless good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner. When coupled with continuous possession, it constitutes strong evidence of
title.
Also, in Republic v. Jabson, G.R. No. 200223 (2018), unanimous decision, the Court, through C.J.
Leonardo de Castro, ruled as follows: “…a certification alone is not sufficient in proving the subject
land's alienable and disposable nature. We have already ruled that a PENRO and/or CENRO
certification must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification, certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records, which: (a) released the subject land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and (b) was approved by the DENR Secretary.”]
PROBLEM:
RSB is a government corporation with original charter. In 1997, it filed an application for
original registration of a parcel of land in Cavite. RSB was able to prove that it validly acquired
the land from A, whose family has been occupying the land since 1912. The Republic of the
Philippines filed its opposition, stating that since the land was only declared alienable and
disposable in 1982, then RSB’s predecessor-in-interest could not have possessed it in the
concept of an owner. Therefore, according to the Republic, RSB has not been occupying the
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by P.D. No. 1529. Decide.
I will rule in favor of RSB. The Supreme Court has conclusively settled that what the law requires is
that the land be already declared as alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration. If this is met, then the computation for the period of possession may include the period
prior to such declaration. Therefore, even if the land was only declared alienable and disposable in
1982, then the possession of RSB, tacked from its predecessors-in-interest, should be counted in its
favor (AFP-RSBS v. Republic, G.R. No. 180086 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
C applied for an original registration of title over a parcel of land in Rizal. She proved in the
RTC that through her predecessors-in-interest, she has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1900. She cites that these acts show such
possession: declaring the property in their names, paying taxes due, having the land surveyed,
allowing excavation of soil for the making of clay pots, and farming. Lastly, she presented a
report from the DENR to prove that the land was part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain.
The OSG filed an appeal, arguing that C was not able to prove proper possession because the
property was irregularly taxed since they were only paid in 2003.
(a) Distinguish the Sec. 14(1) and Sec. 14(2) of P.D. 1529 as modes for acquiring a title
under this law.
The Supreme Court has explained the differences between these modes. Under Sec. 14(1) which C
uses as her basis here, the right to register depends on the length and quality of possession. Here, what
is required is mere possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier and does not require that land should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. The possessor is entitled to
register for the title as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable by the State.
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On the other hand, Sec. 14(2) is governed by the Civil Code provisions for prescription. Here, lands
must not only be declared to be alienable or disposable but must also be expressly declared to be
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover,
the prescriptive period only starts to run once the land is officially patrimonial (Canlas v. Republic,
(b) In the present case, in whose favor will you rule? Explain.
I will rule in favor of C. Under Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, two requisites must be proven by the
applicant: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of public domain, and (b)
that he/she has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious (OCEN) possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Here, the first requisite
was sufficiently proven through the DENR’s report. Also, the acts done by C and her predecessors-
in-interest, together with the fact that together with the fact that they have been possessing the land
from 1900, satisfy the second requisite under the law. The Supreme Court has held that acts such as
farming and even excavating soil are acts which show OCEN possession. Moreover, the irregularity
of tax payments does not automatically contradict C’s right. What needs to be shown are the specific
acts that show OCEN possession and occupation which C has done here (Id.).
PROPERTY LAW
PROBLEM:
In 1992, CA Corp. bought a parcel of land in Cebu. 10 years after acquiring it, CA decided to
construct a commercial building on it. The City Zoning Board required CA to construct a
parking lot which then required the latter to make a deep excavation first. In the process, it
discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground which had been placed there
by PLDT sometime in 1983. CA filed an ejectment case against PLDT, asking the court to
require the latter to take out its lines. Assuming the court rules in favor of CA, can PLDT
argue that it was a builder in good faith since the land was underneath the public sidewalk?
Decide.
I will rule against PLDT. Article 448 of the New Civil Code requires that to be builder in good faith,
the assertion of right over the property must be in the concept of an owner. By alleging that the land
was believed to be part of the sidewalk, PLDT recognized the fact that it had no ownership rights
over the property where they laid their cables. Moreover, land rights are indivisible because Article
437 of the New Civil Code states that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of everything under
it as well. However, since PLDT is granted the power of eminent domain, the resolution of this case
is without prejudice to the filing of a separate case for expropriation to allow PLDT to keep on using
the land (PLDT v. Citi Appliance, G.R. No. 214546 (2019), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
PZ bought a residential lot from FL Inc., payable on installments over a period of seven years.
From 2001 to 2004, PZ paid an amount equivalent to 21 months’ worth of installments.
However, PZ was unable to make further payments because of financial difficulties. This led
FI to send a notice of cancellation with an accompanying jurat, stating that PZ has still failed
to pay despite demands and despite being given 60 days to update her account. Therefore, FI
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stated that it is cancelling the contract within 30 days from PZ’s receipt of the notice.
Thereafter, PZ found out that the lot had been sold to a certain RY. This led PZ to file a
complaint for refund with the HLURB, arguing that she has been paying for 3 years.
According to her, this entitles her to a cash refund under the Maceda Law. On the other hand,
FL argues that PZ failed to make 24 installment payments which precludes her from being
entitled to the refund benefit under the said law.
(a) What are the rights of a defaulting buyer under the Maceda Law?
The rights of a defaulting buyer are laid down in Sections 3 and 4 of the Maceda Law. Section 3
governs a buyer who has paid at least 2 years of installments. Here, the buyer is entitled to pay, without
additional interest, unpaid installments due within the total grace period earned by him, fixed at the
rate of one month for every one year of installments payments made. This right can only be exercised
once every five years. Moreover, if the contract is cancelled, the seller is mandated to refund to the
buyer the cash surrender value of the payments, equivalent to 50% of the total payments made, with
an additional of 5% every year after five years of installments but not to exceed 90%. Lastly, the actual
cancellation of the contract shall only take place 30 days from the receipt of the buyer of the notice
of cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender
value to the buyer.
On the other hand, Section 4 governs the rights of a buyer who has made installment payments of
less than 2 years. Here, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than 60 days from the
date the installment became due. If the buyer still fails to pay, the seller may cancel the contract after
30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the
contract by a notarial act (Orbe v. Filinvest Land, G.R. No. 208185 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Is PZ entitled to a refund? Explain.
No, she is not. Jurisprudence has explained that the phrase “at least two years of installments” under
the Maceda Law pertains to the aggregate value of 24 monthly installments, and not only to the
number of months that the contract has been in effect. In this case, the facts state that PZ has paid
only 21 months’ worth of installments. Therefore, she is not entitled to a refund under Section 3 of
the Maceda Law; and it is Section 4 which governs her rights (Id.).
(c) Was FL’s notice of cancellation valid? Explain.
No, it was not. Jurisprudence explains that the notarial act contemplated by the Maceda Law is not a
mere jurat but an acknowledgment. This is because an acknowledgment requires individuals acting as
representatives to declare that they are duly authorized to act as such. This is particularly crucial
because most sellers of real estate are juridical entities who act through its representatives. Here, the
notice of cancellation came with only a jurat. Therefore, it was invalid for not having been
acknowledged before a notary public (Id.).
[N.B. The Court also explained that even if a jurat were to be considered the appropriate notarial act,
it still would not have been valid because Filinvest’s signatory used a community tax certificate as his
proof of identity. In the Notarial Rules, a community tax certificate is not anymore considered as
competent evidence of identity.]
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PROBLEM:
MS executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, CS over two lots. In 1978, CS
subsequently sold the lots to VP. VP immediately started declaring the lots under his name
for taxation. 12 years later, VP discovered that CS had executed a quitclaim, stating that he
was renouncing his interest as the owner of the lot in one of the lots sold in favor of RA.
Thereafter, the other lot was also sold to RA who developed the lots as a part of a subdivision.
Subsequently, RA filed an application for the issuance of an original certificate of title which
was granted by the court in 1993.
In 1996, VP filed a complaint to recover the land and declare the nullity of RA’s title with
damages before the RTC. VP argues that RA was able to secure the title through fraudulent
means. In his defense, RA argues that VP’s cause of action has prescribed because 10 years
have lapsed from the time CS sold the lots to the latter.
(a) Has the claim prescribed? Explain.
No, the claim has not prescribed. Jurisprudence provides that an action for reconveyance prescribes
in 10 years, counted from the date of the issuance of the title over the property. This is because Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes an implied
trustee of the property’s true owner. Therefore, the 10-year prescriptive period starts to run only from
the trustee’s registration since this signifies that he has repudiated the implied trust. In this case, VP
filed his complaint only 3 years after RA registered the property. Therefore, VP’s cause of action has
not yet prescribed (Sps. Aboitz v. Sps. Po, G.R. No. 208450 and 208497 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) RA states that in the issuance of his title, the court declared that CS merely held the
property in trust and could not have validly sold the lots to VP. RA now alleges that
this should bar VP’s action under the principle of res judicata. Decide.
I will rule against RA. Jurisprudence provides that res judicata could not be a defense in an action for
reconveyance based on fraud where the complainant had no knowledge of the application for
registration. The reason for this is to prevent the unjust deprivation of rights over the real property.
Here, VP alleges that RA secured his title through fraud. Moreover, as discussed, VP’s present action
does not question the court’s decision on RA’s title – an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust seeks to compel the registered owner to transfer the property to the true owner. Therefore, RA’s
allegations must fail (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Sps. P bought a parcel of land and had the title transferred to their names. 20 years after, they
discovered that A, B, and C constructed their houses on the lot. Sps. P made several demands
on the latter and asked them to pay monthly rentals, but they all refused to do so. This led
Sps. P. to file a case for recovery of possession. In their answer, A, B, and C said that they
believed in all honesty that the lot belonged to TDM, a stranger, who gave them the right to
build their houses therein. They also alleged that they paid TDM a monthly rental.
(a) Who can be considered as a builder in good faith?
Jurisprudence provides that a builder in good faith is one who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his
or her title when he or she introduced improvements on a lot which turns out to be owned by another.
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The essence of good faith is an honest belief of the strength and validity of one’s right while being
ignorant of another’s superior claim at the same time (Padilla, Jr. v. Malicsi, G.R. No. 201354 (2016),
(b) What are the two available options to the landowner when a builder in good faith erects
a structure on his land?
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides the following options: (a) to appropriate the building; or
(b) to sell his land to the builder, as long as the land is not worth considerably more than the
improvement (Id.).
(c) Are A, B, and C builders in good faith? Explain.
No, they are not builders in good faith. Here, Sps. P had the title registered in their names 20 years
before A, B, and C entered the property. Therefore, a quick check with the Register of Deeds would
have shown them that the property in question was actually registered in the name of Sps. P. They
should not have blindly relied on the promise of TDM since she was a stranger to them. Moreover,
aside from the assertion that TDM made such promise, they introduced no other evidence to show
that TDM’s promise was credible and that they really believed in good faith that she owned the land.
Therefore, they cannot be considered as builders in good faith (Id.)
[N.B. The Court held that Toribia De Mossessgeld’s (TDM) alleged promise was a self-serving
assertion especially since the builders never even presented her as a witness.]
(d) What are the three available options to the landowner when a builder in bad faith erects
a structure on his land?
According to Articles 449 to 451 of the New Civil Code, the landowner has these options: (a) to
appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor; (b) to demand the
builder demolish what he had built; and (c) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. In any
case, the landowner is entitled to damages (Id.)
PROBLEM:
Sps. B were the owners of a parcel of land. They sold the parcel of land to Sps. G and the latter
have been occupying the land since 1986. In 1992, Sps. S, who lived near the parcel of land,
filed a case of recovery of ownership against Sps. G, arguing that Sps. B sold them the property
in 1991. Moreover, Sps. S argue that they were able to register the property first in their names
with the Registry of deeds.
(a) Who has a better right to the parcel of land – Sps. G or Sps. S? Decide.
Sps. G have a better right. Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides the rules in double sales – if
the propertly involved is immovable, the ownership shall belong to the buyer who first recorded the
sale in the Registry of Property in good faith. In this case, the circumstances show that despite being
the first to register the property in their names, Sps. S were not in good faith. As seen from the case,
Sps. G have been occupying the land since 1986 – 5 years before Sps. S even bought the land.
Moreover, the facts show that Sps. S lived near the parcel of land. Buying real property near them
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without even checking its condition is negligent and careless. This negates good faith on their part
(Sps. German v. Spouses Santuyo, et al., G.R. No. 210845 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A, B, and C were the co-owners of a parcel of land they inherited from their parents, Sps. Y.
A needed money and offered to sell a large portion of the property, adjoining the highway, to
D. However, since a part of B and C’s land would be included, A warned D that the sale would
only proceed if his co-heirs agreed to it. D accepted A’s offer. However, after several attempts
to give the payment to A, the latter was not in his residence. This led to D filing a case for
specific performance to compel A to execute a formal deed of sale. During the trial, B and C
intervened and informed the court that they never agreed to the sale of their portions.
Was there a valid contract of sale?
No, the contract was void ab initio. The Civil Code provides that when a thing is owned in common,
all co-owners must give consent before the sale of the property is made. If the alienation proceeds
partition, then the seller cannot sell a definite portion – he can only sell his undivided interest. Selling
a definite portion without the co-owners’ consent will be void. Here, A was already selling a definite
portion of the land as evidenced by the statement that the property to be sold was to adjoin the
highway without B and C’s consent. Therefore, the contract is void ab initio (Cabrera v. Ysaac, G.R.
PROBLEM:
A filed a complaint for easement of right of way against Sps. R. A alleged that her property
was enclosed and that the shortest way to a public highway was through a 113 sqm portion
through Sps. R’s property. She says that there is a longer path but there is an irrigation canal
blocking the way. Therefore, the only way that she can pass through that route is if she
constructs a bridge first. On the other hand, Sps. R argued that the proposed right of way will
result to the demolition of several improvements – their garage, grotto, and garden.
(a) What are the requisites of a compulsory easement of right of way?
According Art. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the requisites are as follows: (a) an immovable is
surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable; (c) isolation
is not due to its owner’s acts; and (d) that the proposed easement is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as inconsistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 649 and 650, New Civil Code).
(b) In whose favor will you rule? Explain.
I will rule in favor of Sps. R. Here, two requisites are wanting – that there is no adequate outlet to a
public highway, and that the easement be at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. First, A
already admitted that there is another outlet through the irrigation canal. Second, even if it will have
the shortest distance, the proposed easement will be very prejudicial to Sps. R since several of their
improvements will be destroyed. Jurisprudence explains that heavy inconvenience of another outlet
to the public road does not justify a compulsory easement. What must be considered is the prejudice
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of the servient estate, not the dominant estate (Reyes v. Valentin, G.R. No. 194488 (2015), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
Sps. G agreed to sell the leasehold rights over a housing unit they owned to Sps. N via contract
to sell. The agreed upon price was $175,000, which was to be paid as follows: $10,000 as partial
payment, then the balance to be paid 30 days after. After satisfying the partial payment, Sps.
N moved their furniture and appliances into the houses and assigned a house helper to act as
caretaker. 3 months thereafter, Sps. N were only able to pay an additional $30,000. Despite
being given numerous extensions, Sps. N were unable to pay the balance. 2 months after, the
parties just agreed to cancel the contract. Should Sps. G give back the $40,000 that Sps. N has
paid? Decide.
Sps. G should only give back $17,075 out of the $40,000. The Supreme Court has explained that when
the contract to sell is cancelled, the general rule is that the purchase price should be returned. However,
jurisprudence also carves out an exception: when partial payments are converted into rentals such as
when the seller delivered possession to the buyer from the very start. In this case, Sps. N immediately
put their furniture and appliances inside the house when the contract to sell was executed. Therefore,
Sps. G were unable to enjoy the use of their property since Sps. N had already exercised possession.
Therefore, it is just fair that 13.1% of the whole contact price be considered as reasonable rentals (Sps.
Godinez v. Sps. Norman, G.R. No. 225449 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
RRN leased her property to Sps. M for 1 year. The contract had a stipulation that Sps. M will
be given the right of first refusal when RRN decides to sell her property. After 1 year, the lease
contract lapsed with no express renewal. However, Sps. M continued using the premises and
paying the rentals without any objections from RRN. A few months later, Sps. M were
informed that RRN had sold the property to RMC. Sps. M filed a case in court, arguing that
their right to first refusal was violated by RRN since they were not informed of the sale. Sps.
M argued that the implied renewal of their lease contract included the renewal of the right to
refusal stipulation as well. If you were the judge deciding this case, would you rule in favor of
Sps. M? Explain.
No, I will rule against Sps. M – their right to first refusal was not renewed. The Supreme Court has
held that when a lease contract is impliedly revived, only those terms which are germane to the lessee’s
right of continued enjoyment are considered revived. Therefore, the right of first refusal – a term not
germane to Sps. M’s possession of the property – cannot be considered to have been revived in this
case. Therefore, there was no right to first refusal that was violated when RRN sold the property to
RMC (Sps. Mañas v. Nicolasora, G.R. No. 208845 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Before PN died, he appointed his daughter, VR, to administer his house and lot. A few years
after, Sps. J offered to purchase the property but indicated that they could not pay the price
of Php 3.5M so they asked if they could lease it first as they raised funds for the acquisition.
VR agreed to their request. The lease was month-to-month, with a rent of Php 10k/month. A
year later, Sps. J informed VR that they were willing to buy the property and even promised
to pay Php 100k to buy them more time for paying the purchase price. Subsequently, Sps. J
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tendered Php 78k as “initial payment of goodwill money,” and stipulated with VR that the
latter will retain the ownership until they have paid the full price.
In the meantime, they continued to lease to property but eventually started defaulting on the
rental payments. This led VR to inform them that she has decided to terminate the lease
contract and to sell the property to others. VR also demanded that they vacate the property
and that the Php 78k is deemed forfeited. Despite several demands to vacate, Sps. J failed to
do so. This led VR to cause the disconnection of the electricity, and to file an ejectment case
against Sps. J.
(a) First, Sps. J argue that they have the right to suspend the payment of rent because VR
disconnected the electricity while they were still occupying the property. Decide.
I will rule against Sps. J. Under Article 1658 of the New Civil Code, a lessee is allowed to postpone
the rental payment if the lessor fails to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
property leased. However, the Supreme Court has explained that this provision only applies if it is
legal possession that is disturbed. In this case, the facts show that the VR caused the disconnection of
the electricity after the lease contract was terminated. Necessarily, this means that VR had no more
obligation to maintain Sps. J’s peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property. Therefore, Sps. J’s
argument must fail (Racelis v. Sps. Javier, G.R. No. 189609 (2018), unanimous decision).
(b) Second, Sps. J admit their liability to pay for the unpaid rentals. However, they argue
that the Php 78k they advanced should be deemed as advanced rentals to be applied
to their outstanding balance. Decide.
I will rule against Sps. J. The Supreme Court has explained that a contract to sell is one where the
seller reserves ownership over the property until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition
which gives rise to his obligation to convey title – the buyer’s full payment of the purchase price.
Moreover, earnest money given in a contract to sell is for the seller’s benefit; and absent proof to the
contrary, it is forfeited in his favor if the sale does not push through without the seller’s fault.
Here, the facts show that Sps. J and VR entered into a contract to sell because VR retained ownership
until Sps. J was able to pay the full price. However, the sale did not push through because of the latter’s
failure to pay. Since Sps. J did not present any proof to show that the earnest money was to be returned
in case the sale fails to push through, the Php 78k should be forfeited in favor of VR and should not
be deemed as advanced rentals (Id.).
TORTS AND DAMAGES (CHECK TRANSPO CASES BECAUSE THE DISCUSSIONS

THEREIN ARE INTERTWINED WITH THIS TOPIC)
PROBLEM:
Journalist RT wrote a scathing piece on MG, a businessman. According to RT, MG was being
investigated by the Department of Finance’s Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-
RIPS). To escape liability, MG allegedly went to Finance Secretary JA’s house to ask for help.
Right then and there, Secretary JA supposedly called the head of the DOF-RIPS and directed
the latter to surrender all of MG’s files to her. This led MG to file a complaint against RT for
the crime of libel with payment of damages.
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To support his claim for damages, he argues that he could probably earn Php 50M in 10 years.
Moreover, he alleges that he lost business partners which amounted to lost income. To prove
this, he presented one of his clients, JM, who testified that he was not immediately convinced
by the article and called him before terminating business with him. Despite this, JM executed
transactions with MG again a year later. Furthermore, MG alleged that RT’s article caused
his mother to castigate him for disgracing their family; and his children to be interrogated in
school about the article. The RTC eventually held that RT is guilty of the crime of libel.
(a) Should the judge award actual damages? Explain.
No, the judge should not. The Supreme Court has explained that actual damages constitute
compensation for sustained pecuniary loss. A party may only be awarded actual damages when the
pecuniary loss suffered was duly proven. Here, MG was unable to prove any actual pecuniary loss.
First, he merely argued that he could earn Php 50M in 10 years, but he never introduced evidence to
show that he actually lost income due to RT’s article. Therefore, this is a speculative claim which
cannot be the basis of actual damages. Second, he only introduced one lost client – JM – who said
that he eventually went back to business with MG. Even on this ground, actual pecuniary loss was not
shown. Therefore, actual damages should not be awarded (Guy v. Tulfo, G.R. No. 213023 (2019),
(b) Should the judge award temperate damages? Explain.
No, the judge should not. In the New Civil Code, temperate damages may be awarded should the
court find that he has suffered some pecuniary loss even if its amount cannot be determined with
exact certainty. As explained above, MG was unable to prove not only the amount of loss, but also
the fact of pecuniary loss itself. Therefore, the court should not award temperate damages to MG (Id).
(c) Should the judge award moral damages? Explain.
Yes, the judge should. Under the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel.
The Supreme Court has also explained that moral damages may be awarded even if the injured party
failed to prove that he has suffered pecuniary loss. He, however, has to prove the factual basis of the
damages and its causal connection to the guilty party’s acts. Here, MG testified that members of his
family were displeased with him because of the allegations in RT’s article. Therefore, moral damages
should be awarded for his mental anguish and wounded feelings (Id.).
(d) Should the judge award exemplary damages despite the absence of any aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime? Explain.
Yes, the judge should award exemplary damages. The Supreme Court has explained that exemplary
damages may be awarded even in the absence of aggravating circumstances. Moreover, the New Civil
Code states that exemplary damages are imposed by way of example for the public good. Here, RT
published the article without verifying the truth of the allegations against MG. Moreover, the DOF-
RIPS only investigates officials of the DOF and its attached agencies. Therefore, it has no jurisdiction
over businessmen such as MG. Therefore, exemplary damages should be awarded in this case (Id.).
PROBLEM:
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EA lived near an and beside ML’s pawnshop which had a signboard. Because of a road
widening project, VECO Inc., the city’s electricity provider, had to move its electric posts.
One of the posts was moved eight inches away from ML’s signboard. This post however, had
a hanging wire which kept on hitting the signboard. One evening, this wire was eventually
cut and it ended up hitting the roof of EA’s house. EA was awakened and he saw that his
house was already burning. This led him to file a case for damages against VECO. In its
defense, VECO argues that it was ML who caused the damage which EA suffered. Decide.
I will rule in favor of EA. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code states that whoever causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has explained that the negligence or fault of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. In this case, it was VECO’s negligence that caused the burning of EA’s house.
VECO, a public utility, has the duty to ensure that its posts are properly and safely installed. It is
presumed to have the engineers who ensure that their wires moved will not cause any hazard. In this
case, VECO installed its post merely eight inches away from ML’s signboard. This shows VECO’s
failure to act with the proper diligence under these circumstances. Therefore, it is liable for the
damages EA suffered (VECO v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 209910 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One Sunday afternoon in Antipolo, a van owned by RI, driven by his family driver, WL,
crashed into a tricycle that Sps. B were riding. As a result, Sps. B sustained multiple injuries
for which they had to undergo treatment.
Sps. B subsequently filed a complaint for damages against RI and WL. In his defense, RI
argued that WL was not acting within the scope of his duties when the accident happened.
First, RI alleges that lent the van to RP, a repairment who was supposed to repair water pipes
and a greenhouse in Antipolo which the former owned. Second, the accident happened on a
Sunday which was WL’s day off. Third, assuming WL was acting within the scope of his
authority, RI nonetheless exercised proper diligence because he sponsored the former’s
driving lessons. Assuming that the court rules that WL’s negligence was the proximate cause
of the accident, should RI be held liable? Decide.
Yes, RI should be liable. Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
employers are deemed liable for the negligence of their employees who cause damage while acting
within the scope of their authority. Here, the accident happened in Antipolo – the place where RI’s
water pipes and greenhouse were located. Since the van was lent to RP for the repair RI’s properties,
the logical conclusion is that WL was driving the van in furtherance of RI’s interests. Second, since
WL was a family driver, it could be reasonably concluded that there would be some days wherein RI
would still ask WL to perform to a specific task on his day off. Lastly, the mere sponsoring of WL’s
driving lessons is not enough to show that he exercised due diligence in selection and supervising WL.
With these considerations, RI should be liable (Imperial v. Heirs of Bayaban, G.R. No. 197626 (2018),
[N.B. The Court explained that as ruled in the case of Castillex v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266 (1999),
unanimous decision, the plaintiff must first prove that there exists an employer-employee between the
parties to be held liable, and that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
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Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts to the employer to prove that he exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of his employee.]
PROBLEM:
RT, who was 48 years old, arrived at the municipal wharf of Jetafe, Bohol. As he was looking
for a way to get to the población, he saw people boarding a cargo truck, driven by FC who
was accompanied by GA. CS was the owner of the truck and FC and GA were his employees.
After being informed that there was no other way of transportation to the población, RT
decided to board the truck as well, along with 30 other passengers who were either just
standing or sitting on their bags due to the lack of chairs of benches therein. Before the truck
left, FC allowed GA, who only had a student’s permit, to drive the truck along the narrow road
full of potholes. As he was driving, GA lost control of the truck and they fell off the wharf. As
a result, RT died.
This led VT, RT’s wife, to file a complaint for damages against CS, FC, and GA.
(a) Are FC and GA liable for damages? Explain.
Yes, they are. Article 2176 states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Here, it can be seen that FC and
GA’s negligence was the proximate cause of RT’s death. As seen from the facts, GA was negligent in
even attempting to drive the truck despite only having a student’s permit. FC, on the other hand,
knowing that the road is narrow and full of potholes, allowed GA to drive despite his lack of
experience. Moreover, the cargo truck had 30 passengers who were just standing or sitting on their
bags. Therefore, the exercise of proper diligence and even common sense, should have prompted
both FC and GA to let FC, the more experienced driver, take the wheel. Therefore, they are liable for
the damaged caused by their gross negligence (Torreon v. Aparra, Jr., G.R. No. 188493 (2017),
(b) In his defense, CS argues that he should not be held liable for FC and GA’s acts
because he never authorized the latter to board passengers in his truck. Is CS liable for
damages? Explain.
Yes, he is. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers shall be liable for damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Jurisprudence explains that when an
employee’s negligence causes injury to another, a presumption of negligence against the employer
arises which can only be rebutted by proving that he exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employees. In this case, CS failed to discharge that burden. CS should have been
more diligent in ensuring that FC and GA acted within the parameters of their job. His failure to
control their behavior makes him liable for the consequences of their actions. Therefore, CS is
solidarily liable with FC and GA (Id.).
(c) One of VT’s claims was that she had to be compensated for RT’s loss of earning
capacity. To prove her claim, she presented FA, RT’s employer, who testified that RT
was earning more or less Php 15,000 per month. In their defense, CS, FC, and GA
argued that VT’s claim should fail since she was required by law to present
documentary evidence to prove loss of earning capacity. Was VT required to present
documentary evidence? Explain.
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No, she was not. Jurisprudence explains that the court is not required to consider only documentary
evidence in determining the deceased’s loss of earning capacity. In fact, the Supreme Court has allowed
the testimony of the deceased’s co-workers to establish his income before death. Since the testimonies
of co-employees are allowed, it follows that an employer’s testimony should be allowed as well.
Therefore, VT was not required to present documentary evidence to prove loss of earning capacity
(Id.).
(d) Give the formula for computing loss of earning capacity and compute RT’s loss of
earning capacity.
According to jurisprudence, the formula is as follows: [2/3 x (80 – age)] x [gross annual income –
necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of gross annual income (i.e. 50% of gross annual income)]. Here,
RT’s loss of earning capacity is as follows: [2/3 x (80 – 48)] x [(15,000 x 12)/2] = [2/3 x 32] x [90,000]
= 21.33 x 90,000 = Php 1,919,700 (Id.).
(e) Apart from the loss of earning capacity, what types of damages is VT entitled to?
She is also entitled to moral, exemplary, and attorney’s fees –with a 6% interest on the whole amount
of the award. First, moral damages are granted by the New Civil Code in addition to the award of civil
indemnity. Moral damages are awarded to compensate for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs
due to the loss of their loved one. Next, exemplary damages are awarded in quasi-delicts where the
defendant acted with gross negligence since this is imposed by way of example or to correct wrongful
conduct. As discussed, CS, FC, and GA were all negligent in attending to their responsibilities.
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded if exemplary damages are
imposed. Lastly, in accordance with jurisprudence, legal interest at the rate of 6% should be imposed
on the judgment award (Id.).
PROBLEM:
KE Inc. entered into an agreement with MS where the former would provide trucking services
to the latter. KE subsequently subcontracted the services to OF Inc. One day, MS called KE’s
sales manager about a column which the former saw in a newspaper tabloid, narrating the
police interception of a stolen truck filled with MS’ products. KE subsequently asked OF
about the incident. In its reply, OF simply said that the news report blew the incident out of
proportion because the truck simply broke down and had to be towed.
Dissatisfied with OF’s reply, KE independently investigated the incident. During its
investigation, KE discovered that the truck had gone missing and that the thieves became the
subject of a manhunt. Confronted with these findings, OF admitted that its previous report
was erroneous, and that pilferage was proven. Thereafter, MS pre-terminated its agreement
with ES on the ground of loss of confidence. This led KE to file a case against OF for
damages. The judge ruled in favor of KE, stating that OF should be held liable under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code.
(a) Explain the differences between tort and breach of contract.
Their differences are as follows: first, negligence is direct, substantive, and independent in tort while
in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the pre-existing contractual
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obligation. Second, in tort, the defense of a “good father of a family” is complete insofar as parents,
guardians, and employers are concerned while this is not a complete defense in breach of contract.
Third, there is no presumption of negligence in tort and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove
the negligence of a defendant while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed from the breach
itself and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in carrying out its
obligations (Orient Freight v. Keihin-Everett, G.R. No. 191937 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Was the judge correct in ruling that OF should be held liable under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code? Explain.
No, the judge was incorrect. Jurisprudence explains that when there is a pre-existing contractual
obligation between the parties, the breaching party may not be held liable for tort but for breach of
contract. The only exception is when the breach of the contractual duty would also give rise to an
extra-contractual liability had there been no contract. In this case, it is the general rule that applies. As
can be properly inferred from the facts, OF’s duty to investigate and arose because of its
subcontracting agreement with KE. In other words, OF’s negligence did not create the vinculum juris
with KE which would have given rise to the tort – OF’s duty existed prior to its negligent act.
Therefore, OF should be held liable for breach of contract and not for tort (Id).
(c) Assuming that OF is held liable, can KE recover the profits it lost from MS? Explain.
Yes, KE can recover lost profits. Article 2200 of the New Civil Code provides that indemnification
for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered but also that of the profits which
the oblige failed to obtain. Moreover, in accordance with Article 2201 of the same Code, it could have
been reasonably been foreseen that OF’s failure to disclose the true facts of the incident would lead
to a loss of trust and confidence in the party who was bound to disclose them. True enough, OF’s
negligence led to MS prematurely ending its contract with KE. Therefore, KE should be allowed to
recover the profits it lost from its contract with MS (Id.).
[N.B. The Court here reminds us of the landmark case of Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438
(1966), unanimous decision, where It allowed liability based on tort despite the presence of a contract
between the parties.]
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TAXATION LAW
TAXATION LAW I
PROBLEM:
AC, a Canadian Corporation, was authorized to operate as an offline carrier here in the
Philippines. Being an offline carrier, it does not have flights originating from or coming to
the Philippines and does not operate any airplane therein. AC engaged the services of ALC
as its general sales agent in the Philippines.
(a) Is AC considered as a resident foreign corporation for purposes of regular corporate

income tax?
Yes, it is. Jurisprudence has explained that a foreign corporation engaged in business through its local
sales agent is considered a resident foreign corporation. This is covered as well by the Foreign
Investments Act which states that “doing business” includes acts which imply a continuity of
commercial dealings for commercial gain. One such act is appointing a sales agent herein to
continuously sell its tickets. Therefore, AC’s income from the sale of its tickets is considered as income
derived from sources within the Philippines and AC should be considered as a resident foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines. (Air Canada v. CIR, G.R. No. 169507 (2016),
[N.B. This case has been asked several times in the bar and the question usually is, “Is Air Canada’s
operations taxable?” As you can see from the discussion above, the answer is a resounding “Yes”
because the income derived is from selling tickets in the Philippines. Despite Air Canada being an
offline carrier, the proceeds derived from selling tickets here is considered as income from sources
within the Philippines and is therefore subject to corporate income tax. However, a preferential tax
rate was applied due to a tax treaty between Canada and the Philippines.]
PROBLEM:
PAL, a corporation exempt from income taxes by virtue of law, filed a refund claim for final
taxes withheld on its interest income from its peso and dollar deposits with several banks.
However, the claim was denied by the BIR which stated that PAL failed to prove the
remittance of the final withholding tax on its interest income. Was BIR’s argument, correct?
Decide.
No, the BIR was incorrect. Under the Tax Code, as amended, interest income from bank deposits is
subject to a final withholding tax which means that a withholding agent will withhold the tax due from
the income earned to remit it to the BIR. Thus, the liability for remitting the tax is on the withholding
agent. Because of this, even if the banks failed to remit the amounts, PAL’s entitlement to the refund
is not affected since the BIR’s cause of action is against the banks, not PAL. This also means that to
claim a refund, PAL only needs to prove that the taxes were withheld. Therefore, the BIR’s argument
was incorrect (Philippine Airlines Inc. v. CIR, G.R. Nos. 206079-80 and 206309 (2018), unanimous
decision).
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TAXATION LAW II
PROBLEM:
PNB filed a claim tax refund or the issuance of a tax credit certificate for its alleged
overpayment of over Php 26M for the taxable year of 2000 with the BIR. To prove the validity
of its claim, PNB presented the duly executed creditable withholding tax certificates. BIR
denied PNB’s claim, stating that PNB should have presented the testimonies of the
withholding agents who issued the certificates and made the entries therein. Moreover, BIR
also stated that PNB should have also proved its actual remittance of the withheld taxes.
Aggrieved by the BIR’s denial, PNB appealed to the CTA.
If you were one of the CTA Justices handling this case, in whose favor would you rule?
Explain.
I will rule in favor of PNB. First, the Supreme Court has ruled that the certificate of creditable tax
withheld at source is competent proof to establish the fact that taxes were withheld. It is not necessary
to present the person who executed and prepared such certificate. Once this is presented, the burden
shifts to BIR to prove that such certificates were incomplete, false, or irregularly issued – and none of
these were shown. Second, the Supreme Court has also ruled that proof of actual remittance is not a
condition for a refund of tax credits since it is the payor-withholding agent who is vested with the
responsibility of withholding and remitting. With these considerations, I will rule that PNB is entitled
to a refund (CIR v. PNB, G.R. No. 180290 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) received a letter from the City Assessor of Davao for
the assessment and collection of real property taxes against some of its properties. The PPA
appealed the assessment to the LBAA which dismissed the appeal. The PPA then appealed
to the CBAA which upheld the decision of the LBAA. The PPA then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, arguing that the taxation of its properties constituted a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the local government.
If you were one of the CA justices handling the case, how would you rule? Explain.
I will dismiss PPA’s petition. Under R.A. No. 1125, as amended, the CTA is given the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of the CBAA. Moreover, jurisprudence has recognized
the CTA’ power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion in cases falling
within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, along with its power to issue writs of certiorari. Therefore, I
will dismiss PPA’s petition for lack or jurisdiction (Philippine Ports Authority v. The City of Davao,
PROBLEM:
CEC, a corporation operating hydro-electric power plants, filed its quarterly VAT returns on
April 25, 2006, July 25, 2006, October 25, 2006, and January 25, 2007. It also filed amended
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VAT returns for these quarters on Feb 22, 2007 and July 25, 2007. On September 26, 2007, CEC
filed an administrative claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate for the excess or
unutilized input VAT. Subsequently, it filed a Petition for Review on March 24, 2008, due to
the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim.
If you were one of the CTA Justices handling this case, will you rule in favor of CEC? Explain.
I will deny CEC’s petition. Section 112(c) National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, requires that
judicial claims must be filed within 30 days from the failure of the BIR Commission to act
administrative claim from the day the claim was filed with the latter. Here, the administrative claim
was filed on September 26, 2007, so the 120 days lapsed on January 24, 2008. In accordance with this,
CEC had until February 23, 2008 to file the judicial claim, but it only filed such claim on March 14 –
19 days late. This is a jurisdictional issue which must be properly complied with. Therefore, CEC’s
petition must be denied. (CE Casecnan v. CIR, G.R. No. 203928 (2015), unanimous decision).
[N.B. In other decisions penned by J. Leonen such as Steag State Power v. CIR, G.R. No. 205282
(2019), unanimous decision, and CE Luzon Geothermal v. CIR, G.R. Nos. 197526 and 199676-77
(2017), unanimous decision, he once again emphasized that the 120+30-day periods are jurisdiction
and are therefore mandatory. Moreover, he emphasized that the two-year prescriptive period applies
only to the refund filed with the CIR and not to appeals made before the CTA. Therefore, as long as
the administrative claim is filed within 2 years after the close of the taxable quarter when sales were
made, the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA can go beyond such 2-year period.
In another decision penned by J. Leonen – Team Energy v. CIR, G.R. No. 197663 (2018), unanimous
decision – the Court clarified that to support a claim for a VAT refund, the taxpayer must submit
VAT invoices for the purchase of goods or properties while the purchase of services must be
supported by VAT official receipts. THEY ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE e.g. using VAT
invoices to support VAT refunds for the purchase of service is fatal! Th Court said that the clear
mandate to treat invoices and receipts as non-interchangeable can be clearly seen from Sections 106
and 108 of the Tax Code, as amended.
VERY IMPORTANT: THE 120-DAY PERIOD FOR THE CIR TO DECIDE HAS BEEN
REDUCED TO 90 DAYS BY TRAIN!]
PROBLEM:
On April 11, 1996, FBD Inc. filed its annual income tax return for 1995. At this time FBD was
still in its pre-operating stage where it imported equipment and distributed them for market
testing without earning profit. On June 9, 2004, FBD received a final assessment notice (FAN)
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). According to the BIR, it received a tip which
prompted them to make the investigation. The FAN contained the supposed tax liabilities of
FBD, along with a paragraph that reads as follows:
“The complete details covering the aforementioned discrepancies established during the
investigation of this case are shown in the accompanying Annex 1 of this Notice. The 50%
surcharge and 20% interest have been imposed pursuant to Sections 248 and 249(B) of the
[National Internal Revenue Code], as amended. Please note, however, that the interest and
the total amount due will have to be adjusted if paid prior or beyond April 15, 2004.”
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FBD filed a protest on time, arguing that the period to assess had already prescribed and that
the FAN is invalid.
(a) Was the FAN filed within the prescriptive periods provided by law? Explain.
No, it was not. The National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, provides the period for 3
years from the date of actual filing or from the last day prescribed by law for filing. However, in a case
of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, the NIRC provides a period of 10 years from
the discovery of the fraud. Here, the BIR’s investigation was based on a mere tip. It was not able to
offer any evidence to disprove FBD’s allegation that it was still at the pre-operation stage. This means
that fraud was not proven, and the general period of 3 years applies. Since the assessment was only
made 8 years after the return was filed, the period for assessment has already prescribed (CIR v. Fitness
by Design, Inc., G.R. No. 215957 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Was the FAN valid? Explain.
No, it was invalid. Jurisprudence explains that a final assessment notice must not only contain the
amount of taxes allegedly due – it must also contain a definite demand of a specific amount. In this
case, there was nothing in the quoted paragraph which satisfies as a proper demand. The last sentence
of the quoted paragraph shows that the demand is indefinite because interest and the total amount
due can still be adjusted. Therefore, the FAN was invalid for not satisfying the requirements provided
for by law (Id.).
PROBLEM:
On April 28, 2006, TOP Inc. received a letter of authority for the purposes of an examination
of its books. On October 9, 2007, the parties allegedly executed a waiver of the defense of
prescription (first waiver) where the prescriptive period for the assessment of TOP’s taxes for
the year 2004 was extended to June 20, 2008. This document was signed by PA, TOP’s Finance
Manager, and ML, the BIR’s Revenue District Officer. This was followed by another Waiver
(second waiver) which extended the same period to November 30, 2008.
Thereafter, the CIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) dated November 11, 2008.
This led TOP to file a written protest on November 26, 2008. Next, the CIR, sent a Final
Assessment Notice and a Formal Letter of Demand (FAN/LD) which was mailed to TOP on
December 2, 2008. In its protest letter against the FAN, TOP alleged that the taxes had
already prescribed.
On January 24, 2012, the BIR held TOP liable for deficiency taxes amounting to Php 19.7M.
This led TOP to file a petition for review before the CTA where it argued that the waivers
were void for not having been accompanied by a notarized written authority from the BIR,
authorizing its representatives to act on its behalf.
(a) Is TOP’s argument meritorious? Explain.
No, it is not. Though TOP is correct in arguing that the waivers were void, it is now estopped from
raising this argument. Jurisprudence explains that the doctrine of estoppel is recognized in waivers
where both the taxpayer and the BIR were in pari delicto. When this happens, the taxpayer’s act of
impugning the waivers after benefitting from them was considered as an act of bad faith.
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In this case, both TOP and CIR are in pari delicto. First, the BIR was at fault when it accepted the
waivers despite its own non-compliance with what the law requires. Second, TOP’s acts also show its
implied admission of the validity of the waivers. TOP never raised the invalidity of the waivers at the
earliest opportunity – it only raised this issue in the CTA. Therefore, TOP’s argument is unmeritorious
because he is now estopped from raising this argument at this late stage (CIR v. Transitions Optical
Philippines, G.R. No. 227544 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Has the period for collection prescribed? Explain.
Yes, they have. As stated in the facts, the Final Assessment Notice (FAN) and the Formal Letter of
Demand was mailed to TOP only on December 2, 2008 – 3 days after the second waiver had lapsed.
Moreover, jurisprudence explains that it is the FAN which must be issued within the prescriptive
period and not merely the PAN. Therefore, since the FAN was issued after the period indicated in
the waivers, the taxes have already prescribed (Id.).
PROBLEM:
In 1998, GMCC, through its President JG, executed two dacion en pago agreements to pay for
the obligations of its sister companies to RCBC. GMCC failed to declare the income it earned
from these agreements for taxation purposes in 1998 but it subsequently declared the
transaction in its 2000 Financial Statement. On December 8, 2003, the BIR issued a
Preliminary Assessment Notice which was ignored by GMCC. Thereafter, the BIR issued a
Final Assessment Notice and Demand Letter to which GMCC argued that the period of
assessment had already prescribed. On the other hand, the BIR argued that the claim had not
yet prescribed because GMCC filed a fraudulent return with the intent to evade taxes when it
failed to declare the income from the dacion en pago transactions. Subsequently, BIR also
filed a criminal complaint against GMCC and JG for tax evasion.
(a) If you were the prosecutor handling the BIR’s complaint, what action would you take?
Explain.
I will dismiss the tax evasion case because there is no probable cause. Jurisprudence provides that for
a person to be guilty of tax evasion, there must be a clear showing of a deliberate intent on the part of
the taxpayer to evade the payment of taxes. Here, though GMCC failed to report the transactions in
the taxable year of 1998, it subsequently reported them in its 2000 Financial Statements. This belated
act of recording the transactions belie the allegation that they intended to evade paying the tax liability.
Therefore, I will dismiss the complaint (Republic v. GMCC, G.R. No. 181856 (2016), unanimous
decision).
(b) What is the applicable prescriptive period here – three years or ten years? Explain.
The three-year period applies in this case. The National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended,
provides that in case of a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, the assessment can be made within
10 years after the discovery of fraud. However, as explained above, GMCC’s error does not show that
it had the intent to evade payment. If GMCC really intended to evade payment, then it would not
have reported the transactions at all. Since the three-year period applies in this case, BIR only had until
2002 to assess since the last day prescribed for the filing of the 1998 tax return was on April 15, 1999.
Since the BIR only assessed GMCC in 2003, the claim has prescribed (Id.).
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by Paul Tan
PROBLEM:
SMI is a PEZA-registered corporation which constructed buildings and purchased
machineries and equipment. However, it failed to commence operations, so it sold its
buildings and some of its machineries and equipment to another PEZA-registered enterprise.
SMI was eventually dissolved.
In its quarterly income tax return, it subjected the entire gross sales of its properties to the 5%
preferential tax under the Special Economic Zone Act. SMI then filed for an administrative
claim for allegedly overpaid taxes.
The BIR did not act on the claim, so SMI filed a petition for review before the CTA. The court
ruled that the 5% preferential tax was not applicable and that they should have been subjected
to another category of tax.
(a) SMI now argues that the CTA should not have subjected it to the appropriate category
of tax in its decision because it has no power to make an assessment. Decide.
SMI is mistaken. Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, gives the CTA jurisdiction over the BIR
Commissioner’s inaction in a case submitted to him or her. Here, the CTA did not make an assessment
here – it was only ruling on the SMI’s petition for review which was brought about by the BIR’s
inaction on its claim. Therefore, by determining the proper category that SMI should be assessed
under, it was just deciding on an incidental matter necessary for the resolution of the principal issue
of whether or not SMI is entitled to the refund (SMI-ED Phil. V. CIR, G.R. No. 175410 (2014),
(b) Should SMI be subjected to the 5% preferential tax rate? Explain.
SMI is not entitled to the 5% preferential under the Special Economic Zone Act. This rate, as
explained by the Supreme Court, is only available to operating business – those which have entered
into commercial transactions for the purposes of business. Since SMI never started its operations, it
cannot use the preferential tax rate (Id.).
(c) Assume that SMI is not eligible for the 5% preferential tax rate. Under what kind of
tax should the sale of its properties be assessed?
Its machineries and equipment are subject to normal corporate income tax, while the building is
subject to capital gains tax. The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, imposes capital gains
tax for a corporation’s sale of land and/or buildings – this is different for the capital gains for
individuals whose sale of all real properties classified as capital assets are subject to this kind of tax.
This means the gain from the sale of its machineries and equipment must be subjected to normal
corporate income tax (Id.).
[N.B. In this case, there was no tax imposed on SMI because it suffered a net loss.]
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION
PROBLEM:
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Company A operates a resort with swimming pools, a spa, and function halls located in
Province B. Subsequently, the Provincial Board of Province B passed a tax ordinance which
contained the following provision: “A tax of (10%) of gross receipts from admission fees for
boxing, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is likewise
levied.” Company A then filed a petition for declaratory relief, assailing that this provision is
invalid for levying a percentage tax which the province is not allowed to impose.
(e) Define “percentage tax.”
The Supreme Court defined percentage tax as a "tax measured by a certain percentage of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of goods sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or
earnings derived by any person engaged in the sale of services.” (Pelizloy Realty v. Province of
Benguet, G.R. No. 183137 (2013), unanimous decision).
(f) Province B presented the counter argument that although Sec. 133 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) prohibits the levying of percentage taxes, the same provision
provides that the LGC may provide otherwise. Therefore, since Sec. 140 of the LGC
expressly allows the imposition of amusement taxes as an exception, the assailed
provision in its tax ordinance is valid. Is Province B correct?
No, Province B is incorrect. Yes, Sec. 140 of the LGC provides an exception to Sec. 133 - provinces
may levy an amusement tax on places of amusement. However, Sec. 131(c) of the LGC also provides
a clear definition of what amusement places are: “… where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performances.” From this, there can be no doubt that Company A’s
resort cannot fall under the exception because it is not an amusement place. Though there may be
venues therein where people are visually engaged, resorts are not primarily used to display, stage, or
present shows and/or performances (Id.).
PROBLEM:
IC Corp, with its principal place of business in Manila, renewed its business license for 1999.
It was assessed for two business taxes: (a) a local annual business tax for contractors based
on its gross receipts which it was already paying and (b) a newly assessed business tax which
was also based on its gross receipts.
IC paid for the additional assessment but filed a protest before the City Treasurer. The
Treasurer failed to decide on the protest within 60 days, so IC filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the Treasurer, so IC appealed the
case to the CTA. While this was pending, the City of Manila continued to impose the
additional business tax and its payment was a condition for the renewal of IC’s business
permit. IC filed additional protests which were all denied by the City Treasurer.
(a) Differentiate Sections 195 and 196 of the Local Government Code as regards the
remedies of a taxpayer for taxes assessed locally.
Section 195 is triggered by an assessment made by the local treasurer or his duly authorized
representative for the nonpayment of the correct taxes. Should the taxpayer find the assessment to be
erroneous or excessive, he may contest it by filing a written protest before the local treasurer 60 days
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from receipt of the notice. The local treasurer has 60 days to decide and in case of denial or inaction,
the taxpayer may appeal to the proper court.
On the other hand, Section 196 is invoked by a taxpayer who claims to have erroneously paid a tax,
fee, or charge. This provision requires the taxpayer to bring both the administrative claim and the
judicial claim within two years from the date of payment. Necessarily, unlike Section 195, Section 196’s
applicability does not depend upon the existence of an assessment notice.
However, in situations where there is an assessment and the taxpayer pays the tax believing it to be
erroneous or illegal, he may still avail of the remedy under Section 196. On the other hand, if the
taxpayer receives an assessment and does not pay the tax, his remedy is strictly confined to Section
195. (International Container v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 185622, (2018), unanimous decision).
(b) What remedy did IC avail of – protest under Section 195 or claim for refund under 196?
Explain.
IC filed a claim for refund under Section 196. Jurisprudence explains that for Section 195 to be
triggered, there must be a notice of assessment upon a finding that the correct taxes, fees, or charges
have not been paid. The notice of assessment must state the nature of the tax, fee, or charge, the
amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests, and penalties. In this case, IC was not assessed for
deficiencies because it immediately paid the taxes albeit under protest. Therefore, IC is simply asking
for a refund of the taxes it has paid – the remedy available under Section 196 (Id.).
(c) For the taxes it paid while the case was pending, IC filed its protests directly with the
court. In its defense, the treasurer argued that the protests should be dismissed for
failure to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Decide.
I will rule in favor of IC. One of the exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is when resort to the administrative remedy would be an idle ceremony such that it will be
absurd and unjust for it to continue seeking a relief that will evidently not be granted to it. In this case,
all the subsequent protests of IC were denied by the Treasurer. Moreover, the main case is still pending
which meant that the Treasurer still had the discretion to deny subsequent protests. Therefore, filing
protests with the Treasurer is considered an idle ceremony which may be disregarded by IC at this
point in time (Id.).
REAL PROPERTY TAX
PROBLEM:
FPO Inc. is a private organization engaged in palm oil plantation owning a parcel of land. It
harvests fruits from palm trees then converts them into oil. Due to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, this parcel of land, along with all the roads, bridges, culverts, pipes,
and canals, was transferred to NGPI-NGEI, a duly registered cooperative under Republic Act
No. 6938. Because of this, FPO entered into a lease contract agreement with NGPI-NGEI.
Thereafter, the Provincial Assessor assessed FPO’s property found within the land for real
property tax: (a) plantation roads, bridges, culverts, pipes, and canals; and (b) haulers and
other pieces of road equipment. FPO argued that (a) should not be taxed because these are
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properties owned by NGPI-NGEI. Moreover, FPO also argued that the items under (b) are
movable properties under the New Civil Code.
(a) Are the roads, bridges, culverts, pipes, and canals taxable? Explain.
No, they are not taxable. Under Section 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), all real property
owned by duly registered cooperatives under Republic Act No. 6938. NGPI-NGEI, as the owner of
the land being leased by FPO, falls under this exemption. Jurisprudence explains that the lease of the
real property to a private individuals or corporation is not a ground for withdrawal of the tax
exemption. Under Article 440 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, whatever is built on the land
belongs to the owner. Since NGPI-NGEI is the owner of the land, then these properties should not
be subject to real property tax (Provincial Assessor v. Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation, Inc., G.R. No.
(b) Are the haulers and other pieces of road equipment taxable? Explain.
Yes, they are taxable. Under Section 199(o) of the LGC, machinery as real property as defined includes
mobile equipment and those not permanently attached which are actually, directly, and exclusively
used to meet the needs of the business. Jurisprudence explains that when it comes to real property
taxation, the definition in the LGC prevails over the New Civil Code. Here, FPO is engaged in palm
oil plantation, and they would need to haul the ingredients from one place to the other. Therefore, the
haulers and the road equipment are necessarily actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the
business needs of FPO. Therefore, they can be subject to real property tax (Id.).
SPECIAL LAWS
PROBLEM:
JPM Bank entered into an agreement with PS Inc. PS Inc. is a PEZA-registered IT enterprise
which enjoys an income tax holiday. Under the agreement, PS would provide and lease
transmission facilities to JPM for a fee. During the period of the agreement, JPM paid PS its
rentals and withheld tax amounting to Php 2.8M. However, JPM reimbursed PM the same
amount because the latter enjoys the income tax holiday.
This led JPM to file an application before the BIR arguing that the withholding tax it remitted
should be refunded because PS enjoys a tax holiday. To contest JPM’s claim, the BIR argued
that the lease of transmission facilities was outside PS’ registered activities with PEZA. In
support of its argument, BIR presented PS’ certification which states that PEZA was
registered to provide outsourced customer care services and business process outsourcing
services. Decide.
I will decide in favor of the BIR. It is a well-settled rule that tax refunds are construed strictly against
the taxpayer, and they will only be granted by a clear and unequivocal provision of law. The
implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act No. 7916 explicitly provides that PEZA-granted
incentives shall apply only to registered operations of the enterprise. As the facts state, PS’ certification
is limited to providing outsourced services, and not to the lease of its facilities which is a separate
activity that has to be registered as well. Therefore, the activities covered in the agreement between
JPM and PS Inc. are not covered by income tax holiday granted to the latter (CIR v. J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank, G.R. No. 210528 (2018), unanimous decision).
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COMMERCIAL LAW
CORPORATION LAW
PROBLEM:
PASAR Corp. filed a case for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction against its
shareholders A, B, and C who wanted to inspect its books. According to PASAR Corp., it has
the right to enjoin the latter since they may use the information contained therein in matters
which may be inimical to the company. The RTC granted the preliminary injunction.
(a) Was the RTC’s action proper? Explain.
No, it was improper. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
grant for a preliminary injunction requires that the plaintiff’s right is clear and unmistakable. In this
case, the Revised Corporation Code provides that a stockholder has the right to inspect the records
of the corporation and that a refusal to allow such will hold the person preventing the same to liability.
However, the defendant may raise the defense that the person demanding to inspect has improperly
used information secured through prior examination or that he was not acting in good faith. As
explained by the Supreme Court, these grounds are only matters of defense. The corporation must
first disallow the inspection and these matters are raised only when the shareholder files the case
against it. It was therefore improper to preempt the case of the shareholders by filing an action for
injunction (PASAR v. Lim, G.R. No. 172948 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
QPE company delivered Php 7M worth of scrap papers to ACI company, which agreed that
it would either pay QPE the value of the papers or deliver to it the finished products of
equivalent value. ACI’s CEO, Ms. S, subsequently issued a post-dated check for the supposed
payment but it was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. On the same day of
the issuance of the check, ACI through Ms. S, and a certain Mr. E executed a contract where
the former bound itself to deliver the finished materials to MCC, a company owned by Mr. E.
It was stipulated therein that the raw materials would be from the materials supplied by QPE.
QPE filed a case against ACI and Ms. S, arguing that they should be held solidarily liable for
ACI’s outstanding debt. Ms. S counters that she cannot be held personally liable for ACI’s
obligation. Decide.
I will rule in favor of QPE. The Supreme Court has explained, that generally, an officer of a
corporation cannot be held personally liable for the corporation’s obligation, because the latter has its
own separate personality. However, the Court has repeatedly upheld the exception of fraud piercing
where the officer is guilty of bad faith. In this case, Ms. S, in her capacity as CEO, issued the bouncing
check and entered into a contract with Mr. E in an attempt to shift ACI’s obligation to a third person.
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These clearly show bad faith which allows the piercing of the corporate veil (Arco Pulp v. Lim, G.R.
PROBLEM:
In 2000, IATA, a Canadian corporation, entered into a Passenger Sales Agency Agreement
(Agreement) with MS, a Philippine Corporation where the latter must report all ticket sales
and remit them to the former. However, MS defaulted with around Php 300M accounts
overdue. As a result, IATA filed a case against MS and its stockholders, EW and MW. To
justify the inclusion of EW and MW, IATA alleges that the debt was incurred without any
intention to pay since MS had no assets and were suffering huge losses a few years before the
agreement was entered into. Moreover, a new travel agency called MS-TPI now operates at
MS’s former principal place of business with the children of EW and MW as its stockholders,
directors, and officers.
Should EW and MW be held solidarily liable with MS?
No, they should not be held solidarily liable. The Supreme Court has explained that Section 30 of the
Revised Corporation Code requires that bad faith of the stockholders should be clearly and
convincingly established before they are held solidarily liable with the debts of the corporation. Here,
that burden was not met. First, IATA only showed losses and insufficiency of assets for the years
before the agreement was entered into. This does not in any way show that MS was still heavily
indebted when the agreement was perfected. Second, the mere allegation of MS-TPI’s existence does
not, by itself, establish bad faith or fraud. As held by the Court, the mere existence of interlocking
directors alone is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil. (Pioneer Insurance v. Morning Star, G.R.
PROBLEM:
PPC had rights to a parcel of land and which it leased to MPD. PPC’s board of directors
issued a resolution waiving all its rights, interests, and participation in the lease contract in
favor of Atty. V, for which the former received no consideration. Atty. V then leased the
property to MCH which issued 20 post-dated checks to him for the rental payments. Atty. V,
however, did not turn over these checks or their equivalent to PPC.
This led B, a stockholder and director of PPC, to write a letter to the board asking the latter
to have Atty. V deliver the checks to the company. The board did not act on the matter and
this caused B to file a complaint in the RTC, in his own name. He alleged that PPC’s directors
was resorting to devices and schemes amounting to fraud and was detrimental to the interest
of the corporation and stockholders. B prayed that he be appointed as receiver and that a
management committee be created. The RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed
the RTC’s decision and considered the complaint as a derivative suit.
(a) What are the requisites for filing a derivative suit?
According to the Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, the 5 requisites are: (a) That
the plaintiff is a stockholder at the time the acts complained of occurred and at the time the action
was filed; (b) that plaintiff exerted all reasonable efforts, and alleges the same with particularity in the
complaint, to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies; (c) that no appraisal rights are available; (d) that the
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suit is neither a nuisance suit nor a harassment suit; and (e) that the action brought must be in the
name of the corporation which requires that it be made a party to the case (Sec. 1, Rules of Procedure
for Intra-Corporate Controversies; Villamor, Jr. v. Umale, G.R. No. 172843 (2014), unanimous
decision).
(b) Was the CA correct in characterizing the complaint as a derivative suit? Why/why not?
The CA was incorrect. Jurisprudence has explained that the action must be brought in the name of
the corporation and that it be made a party to the case because the corporation is the real party in
interest and the stockholder filing is merely a nominal party. In other words, it is the corporation who
is supposedly injured and who ultimately has the cause of action. As the facts state, B filed the case in
his own name. Moreover, B also did not allege that he exerted all reasonable efforts to exhaust all
intra-corporate remedies and that appraisal rights were not available. Therefore, the CA should not
have considered his complaint as a derivative suit (Id.).
PROBLEM:
TC Corp. planned to develop a housing project. To finance it, TC, H Insurance Corp., and
PD Bank agreed to raise funds through the issuance of bonds. BF Bank purchased bonds
worth Php 100M. BF asked for additional interest of 15.5% per annum – a rate higher than the
guaranteed 8.5% per annum – which was promised by TC’s vice president, AE. In partial
fulfillment of this, TC has already paid the 15.5% per annum to BF twice. However, the Asian
Financial Crisis hit and TC experienced economic difficulties. When the bonds matured, the
asset pool funds were insufficient to pay the bond holders. As a result, H Insurance was the
one who paid BF the interest earnings of 8.5% per year. BF however sent a demand letter to
TC, alleging that it was entitled to the full 15.5% as promised by AE. In its reply, TC argues
that AE did not have the authority to promise a rate higher than the 8.5%. Is TC’s argument
meritorious? Explain.
No, it is not. Jurisprudence explains that a corporation exercises its power through its board of
directors. This power of an officer is derived from law, the bylaws, authorization from the board,
either expressly or impliedly through habit, custom, or acquiescence. Regardless of AE’s actual
authority, TC is deemed to have ratified his acts since it subsequently paid BF the additional interest
twice. Therefore, TC’s argument is unmeritorious (Terp Construction v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
RD Corp. was a family corporation engaged in the business of renting out real estate. Its
president was MS. MS, acting on RD’s behalf as its president, took out a Php 4M loan from
AC which was secured by a real estate mortgage over one of RD’s properties. To prove her
authority, MS presented a Board Resolution along with a Secretary’s Certificate purporting to
authorize what she did. She also presented a duly authenticated copy of the property’s title.
Eventually, RD failed to pay the loan so RC extrajudicially foreclosed the property.
Thereafter, RD filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and sale. According to RD, MS
was given neither the authority to contract the loan nor to execute the mortgage. The
documents of authority she showed were allegedly falsified. RD’s Board Secretary testified
that she never signed these documents and that she would regularly sign blank documents
and would subsequently leave them with MS. Decide.
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I will rule in favor of AC. Jurisprudence provides an exception to Section 22 of the Revised
Corporation Code: apparent authority. Here, even when no actual authority has been conferred to an
agent, his acts bind the corporation as long as it is within his apparent scope of authority. From the
facts provided, it can be seen that MS had the apparent authority to contract the loan and execute the
mortgage. First, she had possession of the title over the property. Second, her broad authority was
seen from the Board Secretary’s statement where she would only sign blank documents and give it to
MS. Third, MS was no ordinary officer but was the president of the corporation. Lastly, there was also
nothing in the facts which shows that AC knew about MS’ lack of authority. All these circumstances
show that MS had the apparent authority to take out the loan and RD is now estopped from rebuking
her authority (Calubad v. Ricarcen Development Corporation, G.R. No. 202364 (2017), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
GT was an incorporator and the president of FISLAI, a thrift bank. Upon GT’s request, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued a Php 1.9M standby emergency credit to FISLAI.
The promissory note was signed by GT. Subsequently, UM, a university whose Board is
chaired by GT, executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of BSP over UM’s property
in Cagayan de Oro. The deed was executed by UM’s vice president, SP to secure FISLAI’s
debts to BSP. To show his authority in executing the deed, SP showed a Secretary’s Certificate
signed by UM’s Corporate Secretary.
(a) Eventually, FISLAI defaulted and BSP tried to foreclose on UM’s mortgage. However,
UM put up the defense that the mortgage executed by SP was ultra vires. Decide.
I will rule in favor of UM. Jurisprudence has explained that a corporation may only exercise powers
expressly defined by law and their articles of incorporation. The only exception are acts which are
necessary and incidental to carry out the corporation’s purposes, the powers conferred by the
Corporation Code or the articles of incorporation. Here, UM is an educational institution whose
purpose is limited to developing human capital through formal instruction; and, does not have any
power whatsoever to secure the loans of other persons. Securing FISLAI’s loans does not appear to
have even the remotest connection to UM’s operations. Therefore, the mortgage was clearly ultra vires
(University of Mindanao v. BSP, G.R. No. 194964-65 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) UM also argues that it did not authorize SP to mortgage the properties on its behalf.
It was able to prove during trial that the Secretary’s Certificate was fictitious. Decide
on UM’s argument.
I will rule that UM’s argument is meritorious. According to the Revised Corporation Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised by its Board. This is what is known as the
doctrine of Centralized Management. Here, since the Secretary’s Certificate was proven to be fictitious,
UM has clearly shown that SP was not authorized to execute the mortgage. Therefore, since the act
was not authorized, it does not bind the corporation. There was also nothing in the facts to show that
UM had ratified SP’s acts (Id.).
PROBLEM:
BFC and SL entered into a contract where the former would construct a multilevel parking
structure for the latter. However, after a few years, SL started defaulting in its payment. This
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led BFC to file a collection case against SL and its directors, A, B, and C. BFC alleged that
SL had misrepresented that it had funds to pay the obligation and that upon completion of
the project, SL immediately took possession even with an outstanding balance. BFC also
argued that SL’s directors were managing the corporation’s affairs in bad faith and should be
held solidarily liable. In response, SL filed a motion to suspend proceedings in view of a
previous agreement between BFC and SL to submit project-related disputes to arbitration.
In the arbitration proceedings, A, B, and C, argued that they should not be forced to
participate therein for 2 main reasons. First, SL has a separate juridical personality and the
agreement with BFC was entered to by the corporation itself. Second, it has already been
settled by jurisprudence that arbitration stipulations are contractual and bind only the parties
therein. Since the only parties to the contract were BFC and SL, they should not be deemed
to be included in such agreement.
(a) Rule on A, B, and C’s first defense.
I will rule that this defense is unmeritorious. Jurisprudence has long recognized that the separate
personality of a corporation can be disregarded if the court finds it was used by directors to perpetuate
fraud i.e. fraud piercing. When the corporate veil is pierced, the corporation and the persons acting on
its behalf are treated as one and the latter become liable as if they were the corporation itself. Piercing
the corporate veil is done on a case-to-case basis and when there are allegations of bad faith or malice
against directors, it becomes the duty of the courts to determine if these persons and the corporation
should be treated as one. Here, BFC alleges that A, B, and C were guilty of bad faith and malice. Since
the A, B, and C’s personalities and that of the corporation may be found to be indistinct, then they
should be compelled to participate in the arbitration proceedings. (Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corp., G.R. No.
(a) Rule on A, B, and C’s second defense.
I will also rule that this defense is unmeritorious. Though only parties to an arbitration agreement may
be compelled to submit to it, the Supreme Court has explained that this obligation is transferred to an
entity’s heirs and assignees. In the same way, the corporation’s obligations are treated as the
representative’s obligations when the corporate veil is pierced. Moreover, the policy behind promoting
arbitration is the expeditious resolution of disputes. Therefore, by including A, B, and C in the
arbitration proceeding, the tribunal can immediately rule not only on whether or not the corporation
veil shall be pierced, and in the case that it is pierced, the specific liabilities of A, B, and C (Id.).
[N.B. This may also be asked in Remedial Law.]
BANKING LAW
PROBLEM:
The closure of Banco Filipino was ordered by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and it
was placed under receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
Banco Filipino filed a claim for damages against BSP for the allegedly wrongful closure and
receivership. However, Banco Filipino suffered financial losses again which led it applied for
financial assistance from BSP. The BSP agreed on the condition that that Banco Filipino
submit a rehabilitation plan first and must have the case for damages dismissed. Because of
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this, Banco Filipino filed another case against BSP, arguing that the latter’s condition of
having the case for damages dismissed was improper. In its defense, BSP argued that Banco
Filipino, a closed bank under receivership, did not have the authority to file the case. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the BSP. The Supreme Court has explained that pursuant to Republic Act No.
3591, the PDIC as the receiver of an insolvent bank, conserves and manages the assets of the bank to
prevent the dissipation of its assets. Though the legal personality of the bank is not ipso facto dissolved
upon insolvency, it is the PDIC, as a representative party, who has the power to bring and defend any
action on behalf of the bank. Therefore, Banco Filipino improperly filed the case, because it was done
without the participation of the PDIC (Banco Filipino v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 200678
PROBLEM:
Sps. A and B owned a piece of land who had 9 children and among them were Uno and Dos.
After A died, B and her children agreed to extrajudicially divide the land. However, to
accommodate for Uno’s loan with his wife, Nana, they provided in a document for self-
adjudication that all heirs have decided to waive their rights in favor of Uno. When a new title
was issued in the name of Uno and Nana, they mortgaged the property to PNB who eventually
acquired title to it.
Dos filed a complaint for cancellation of title with reconveyance against PNB. He alleged that
Uno falsified a document of self-adjudication as sole heir where he falsely claimed that there
were no other heirs to the land. Therefore, since the title from which PNB acquired its right
was void, then the subsequent title of the latter should also be nullified.
PNB alleged that it sent Mike, its appraiser and investigator to conduct an ocular inspection
of the property. Mike also went to the government offices to verify the ownership status such
as the registry of deeds to ensure that the title is clean. He also required Uno and Nana to
present tax declarations which the latter complied with. Therefore, PNB alleges that it is a
mortgagee in good faith.
If you were the judge handling this case, in whose favor will you decide? Explain.
I will rule in favor of PNB. Jurisprudence explains that banks are businesses vested with public interest
and are expected to exercise extraordinary diligence when it comes to their affairs. Therefore, they
cannot merely rely on the titles of the properties they are dealing with, but they must conduct an ocular
inspection and must exert extra efforts when verifying their genuineness. Here, this requirement was
satisfied by PNB. PNB conducted the required ocular inspection and even went to different
government offices to ensure that Uno and Nana had a clean title. Therefore, PNB is considered to
be a mortgagee in good faith and its right over the property is upheld (Andres v. PNB, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
Unionbank placed an advertisement in the newspaper for a condominium unit in Makati
which it acquired through disclosure. Unionbank stated therein that the condominium unit
had a floor area of 95 square meters. This ad was seen by JPB who thought that the area is
perfect for his residential needs. On the day of the auction, JPB acquired the unit for PHP 3
million. He immediately occupied the unit and contacted a carpenter to install several
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improvements therein. To JPB’s surprise, the carpenter informed him that upon measuring
his unit, he discovered that the area was only 75 square meters – not 95 as stated in
Unionbank’s advertisement. When JPB asked Unionbank about the discrepancy, the latter
replied that upon rechecking, the area of 95 square meters included the common areas.
Did Unionbank exercise proper diligence in this case? Explain.

No, YBC did not. According to jurisprudence, banks are duty-bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence because their business is imbued with public interest. This doctrine is applicable even in their
dealings with mortgaged real properties that they acquire through foreclosure. When the purchaser is
a bank, the rule on purchasers for value is applied more strictly i.e. they cannot merely rely on the face
of the title. Unionbank’s predicament shows its lack of care in dealing with the property since it could
have easily confirmed the unit’s area before it recklessly advertised the unit for sale. Therefore,
Unionbank clearly failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in this case (Poole-Blunden v. Unionbank,
PROBLEM
A, B, and C were the heirs of CS who had a deposit of Php 1.7M with PNB at the time of his
death. A, B, and C went to PNB and asked that they be allowed to withdraw the amount. In
reply, L, the bank manager, informed them that they will be only allowed to do so upon the
submission of certain documents. Upon completion of the documents, A, B, and C went back
to the bank but they were surprised to find out that a certain Mr. M had already withdrawn
the money. L told them that he authorized the withdrawal because Mr. M submitted the
following documents: (a) a supposed affidavit of self-adjudication of B, (b) a photocopy of
CS’s death certificate, and (c) a supposed letter of authority by B authorizing M to withdraw
the amount.
A, B, and C filed a case for collection of sum of money with damages, alleging that L and
PNB should be held liable for the amount withdrawn. Decide.
I will rule in favor of A, B, and C. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that banks are businesses
vested with public interest and are expected to attend to their affairs with extraordinary diligence.
Here, the facts show that L and PNB were grossly negligent in allowing M to withdraw the amount.
First, the withdrawal was allowed with an affidavit of self-adjudication of B, when several heirs already
approached them regarding CS’s account. Second, only a photocopy of CS’s death certificate was
presented – a diligent bank manager would have at least asked for the original. Third, L should have
checked with B if the latter really authorized M to withdraw the amount. Lastly, the withdrawal was
allowed without a certificate of, or exemption, from estate tax issued by the BIR – a document required
by law. Putting all of these together, one can safely conclude that both L and PNB were grossly
negligent in allowing the withdrawal of CS’s money (PNB v. Santos, G.R. No. 208293 (2014),
PROBLEM:
LM was the compulsory heir of JM who owned a lot in Tarlac. LM filed a complaint for
reconveyance of land against Sps. S and Land Bank. According to LM, Sps. N falsified a Deed
of Sale and caused the transfer of title of the lot in their name and subsequently mortgaged
the lot to Land Bank to secure a loan. However, Sps. N defaulted and Land Bank foreclosed
the property. In its defense, Land Bank countered that it was a mortgagee in good faith since
there was a Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Decision which
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awarded the title in favor of Sps. N. On the other hand, LM points out that the DARAB
decision only came two months after the title was issued. Decide.
I will rule in favor of LM. The Supreme Court has ruled that the mortgagee in good faith doctrine is
applied more strictly to mortgagee banks which are businesses vested with public interest. In this case,
banks are required to go beyond the title and to investigate the true status of the property, especially
when there are circumstances which would put doubt in the mind of a reasonable and prudent person.
In this case, Land Bank should have conducted further investigation when it saw that the DARAB
Decision came after the title was supposedly issued. This should have aroused suspicion the bank’s
suspicion there may be something irregular about Sps. N’s acquisition of the land. Therefore, Land
Bank is not a mortgagee in good faith (Land Bank v. Musni, G.R. 206343 (2017), unanimous decision).
SPECIAL LAWS
PROBLEM
LS Corp. wanted to transform several parcels of land it owns into housing subdivisions, so it
entered a contract with PD Bank for the latter’s issuance of credit certificates. These credit
certificates were then sold to the public who held them until they were fully paid. HGC
undertook to guarantee the payment of these certificates. As a security for the possible
payment of HGC, a conditional mortgage was instituted on the parcels of land which LS
owns. This conditional mortgage had a stipulation which allows a prompt assignment and
conveyance of the properties of all the mortgaged properties to HDC if it ends up paying for
the certificates.
Unfortunately, the Asian Financial Crisis rendered LS Corp. unable to pay for the certificates.
HGC made good on its guarantee and subsequently asked for the prompt assignment of all
the mortgaged properties. This led LS Corp. to file a case in court, asking that the assignment
be declared null and void. Decide.
I will rule in favor of LS Corp. Art. 2137 of the Civil Code states that a creditor does not acquire the
ownership of the real estate for non-payment of the debt within the period agreed upon, and that any
stipulation to the contrary is void. This is what is known as the prohibition against pactum commissorium.
The Supreme Court has explained stipulations such as this are against public policy and that proper
foreclosure proceedings must be first undertaken to vest valid ownership with the creditor. Here, since
the contract provided for an automatic assignment of all mortgaged properties to HGC, it is clearly
void for violating the rule against pactum commissorium (Home Guaranty Corp. v. La Savoie
Development Corp. G.R. No. 168616 (2015), unanimous decision).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PROBLEM
ABS-CBN conducted a live-video coverage of the arrival of Juan Dela Cruz, an OFW
kidnapped by Iraqi militants, in NAIA. ABS-CBN then allowed Reuters to air the footage
which the former took under a special embargo agreement. In this agreement, no other
Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use the video without ABS’s consent.
Subsequently, GMA 7, a Philippine subscriber of Reuters who was completely unaware of the
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special embargo agreement, used ABS’ footage in a subsequent news report. This led ABS to
file a complaint for copyright infringement against GMA 7.
(a) GMA argues that the news footage is not copyrightable. Decide.
GMA is mistaken – the news footage is copyrightable. The Supreme Court has explained that though
the Intellectual Property Code considers news and news events as not copyrightable, their expressions
are. News footage which involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects is not merely news itself
but already an expression of such. Moreover, the Intellectual Property Code also gives broadcasting
organizations the right to prevent rebroadcasts or reproductions of their work – another provision
which recognizes ABS’ ownership not of the news event itself, but of its coverage and footage.
Therefore, the news footage is copyrightable (ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956 (2015),
(b) What is fair use and what is the four-factor test?
The Supreme Court has explained that fair use is the privilege to use copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without the consent of the copyright owner where the user merely copies the
themes and ideas of the work rather than its expression. Section 185 of the Intellectual Property Code
lists the four-factors in determining whether there was fair use or not: (a) the purpose and character
of the use – whether its nature is commercial or non-profit educational; (b) nature of the copyrighted
work; (c) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (d) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work
(Id and Sec. 185.1 of the Intellectual Property Code).
(c) GMA argues that it used the clip in good faith since it did not know about ABS and
Reuters’ special embargo agreement. Decide.
GMA’s argument must fail. The Supreme Court has explained that copyright infringement as punished
under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. In other words, what the law punishes is not
the intent to commit the crime but the intent to perpetuate the act punished. Here, GMA does not
dispute the fact that they used ABS’ news footage without the latter’s consent. Therefore, they can be
charged for copyright infringement even if they used the footage in good faith (Id.).
[N.B. Read the case in the original. The Court, through J. Leonen, engaged in a lengthy discussion on
the difference between patent and copyright and between idea and expression. Also, I decided to put
the criminal aspect of the case under Comm. Law because the Intellectual Property Code is not among
the laws listed under Criminal Law. Lastly, there was a discussion on certain remedial law issues but
all you have to remember are fundamental doctrines/concepts which ALL bar takers should know by
heart: (a) the landmark case of Crespo v. Judge Mogul where the Court held that once a criminal action is
filed in court, the control and direction of the case is within the court’s hands, and not anymore with
the prosecutor; (b) exceptions to the general rule of requiring an MR before filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65; and (c) the difference between error of jurisdiction and error of judgment.]
PROBLEM
EI Corp. is an American Corporation. In 1987, EI filed a Philippine Patent Application before
the Bureau of Patents for Iosartan, an invention related to the treatment of hypertension and
heart failure. The application was handled by Atty. NM. In 2000, EI appointed new counsel
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– Atty. DC – who sent the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) a letter requesting that an office
action be issued on EI’s application. The IPO’s Patent Examiner replied and stated that an
office action was mailed a month after Atty. NM filed the application but was eventually
declared abandoned when the latter failed to respond within the period prescribed. Atty. DC
filed a petition for revival arguing that EI was not aware that Atty. NM had died – EI only
found out about his death in 1996, when EI followed-up on the status of the application.
Moreover, Atty. DC argued that EI only had actual notice of the abandonment at the time the
patent examiner replied to his letter.
In the meantime, TP Inc, filed a motion to intervene. TP had filed its own application with
the Bureau of Food and Drugs for its Iosartan product. TP argued that it made a search for
patent applications for similar products, but it didn’t find any.
(a) EI argues that the secrecy in patent applications prevents any intervention from other
interested parties. Decide.
EI’s argument is unmeritorious. Section 44 and 45 of the Intellectual Property Code provides that all
patent applications must be published in the Intellectual Property Office Gazette and that any
interested party may inspect all documents submitted to the IPO. The patent application is only
confidential before its publication. Therefore, the confidentiality in patent applications is not absolute
and an interested party may already intervene after the publication of the application (E.I. Dupont v.
Velasco, G.R. No. 174379 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Was EI’s petition for revival filed on time? Decide.
No, it was filed out of time. Section 133.4 of the Intellectual Property Code provides that an
abandoned application may be revived within 3 months from the date of abandonment. On the other
hand, the Revised IRR for Patents provides a period of 4 months if the failure was due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. In this case, regardless of which period the court chooses
to use, EI’s petition for revival will still be deemed to have been filed out of time due to its own
negligence. First, Atty. NM was negligent in failing to respond to the first office action. Second, EI
was also negligent in only requesting a status update 8 years after the application was filed. Lastly,
despite knowledge of Atty. NM’s death, EI only appointed its new counsel in 2000 – 4 years after it
discovered the death. Therefore, EI petition was clearly filed out of time (Id.).
(c) Explain the Right of Priority in relation to the First to File Rule under the Intellectual
Property Code.
Under Section 31 of the Intellectual Property Code, a right of priority is given to any patent applicant
who has previously applied for a patent in a country that grants the same privilege to Filipinos. In
accordance with the First to File Rule in Section 29 of the same Code, a patent applicant with the right
of priority is given preference in the grant of a patent when there are two or more applicants for the
same invention. This is because in the First to File Rule, the right to the patent belongs to the applicant
who has the earliest filing or priority date (Id.).
(d) EI argues that it had the right of priority in this case since it filed a patent application
in the Philippines within 12 months from the prior filing of the U.S. patent application
in 1986. Decide.
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EI’s argument is unmeritorious. Jurisprudence explains that the right of priority does not immediately
entitle a patent applicant the grant of a patent because it only applies when there are conflicting patent
applications with the IPO. In this case, the right of priority has no bearing since EI’s application was
deemed abandoned. Therefore, EI’s argument must fail (Id.).
PROBLEM
Citigroup Inc. is a U.S. corporation engaged in banking and financial services. In 1984, it
began the development of its domestic ATM network in the Philippines. In 1995, it registered
the trademark “CITICARD” with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO). In 1997, a
consortium named Citystate Savings Bank, Inc., (Citystate) was established. In the same year,
Citystate opened its ATM branch in Makati and expanded its operations since then.
Thereafter, Citystate applied for the registration of its trademark “CITY CASH WITH
GOLDEN LION’S HEAD” with the IPO. Citigroup opposed this, arguing that Citystate’s
mark is confusingly similar to its own.
The marks of Citigroup and Citystate are as follows:
(a) What are the two tests for determining whether confusion between two marks is likely?
Jurisprudence provides for the dominancy test and the holistic test. The dominancy test focuses on
the similarity of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion and
deception, thus constituting infringement. Here, exact duplication or imitation is not required.
On the other hand, the holistic test entails a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to
the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. Focus must not
be given only to the predominant words but also to other features appearing on both marks in able to
determine if one is confusingly similar to the other (Citigroup, Inc. v. Citystate Savings, G.R. No.
(b) Are the marks confusingly similar? Explain.
No, they are not. In using the dominancy test, the main, essential, and dominant features of the marks
are examined. Here, a simple visual comparison reveals no likelihood of confusion. First, the most
noticeable part of Citystate’s mark is the lion’s head device which is followed by the words “CITY”
and “CASH.” On the other hand, Citigroup’s mark can be best described as consisting of the word
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“CITI”, along with the arc above it. In accordance with the dominancy test, Citystate’s lion’s head
device is not present at all in Citygroup’s mark.
Moreover, the mere similarity of the words “CITY” and “CITI” are not enough to give rise to a
confusing similarity between the marks since their main features are very distinct. Considering that
they provide ATM services, their patrons could only secure such services in premises where the
companies’ names are prominently shown. Furthermore, obtaining an ATM card comes with a prior
bank application which shows that the patrons are already well-acquainted with the companies they
are transacting with. With these considerations, the marks of Citystate and Citigroup are definitely not
confusingly similar (Id).
SECURITIES LAW
PROBLEM:
PR Corp. is a Philippine Corporation which, according to its articles of incorporation, only
provides administrative and support services. One day, its former employees, MA and JR,
executed affidavits stating that the company was engaged in boiler room operations i.e. the
sale of non-existing stocks to investors abroad. They alleged that once the scheme was
discovered, the operations would just be shut down and a new corporation would
subsequently be put up. The police authorities applied for and was granted a search warrant
authorizing it to conduct a search in PR’s office. Some of the documents gathered were as
follows: several confirmations of trade of shares with varying amounts, ranging from a few
hundred to a few thousand dollars. The state agents then filed a complaint with the
prosecutor, alleging that the officers of the corporation should be held criminally liable for
violations of the Securities Regulation Code. If you were the prosecutor handling this case,
what action will you take? Explain.
I will file an information in court for the violation of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). Section
28 of the SRC states that no person shall engage in the business of buying or selling securities in the
Philippines unless registered with the Commission. First, PR Corp.’s lack of registration can be
presumed from its declared purpose – to merely provide administrative and support services. Second,
the documents gathered from PR’s offices show that there is probable cause to believe that they
engaged in the sale of stocks despite not being properly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. With these considerations, I will file an information against the officers of PR for
engaging in the unlawful sale of securities (SEC v. Price Richardson, G.R. No. 197032 (2017),
[N.B. I decided to include this case here because the SRC is not part of the coverage for Criminal
Law.]
PROBLEM
FV bought shares from SBGCCI, a corporation developing a golf course and country club.
He was promised several amenities such as an 18-hole golf course and many more. However,
these promises were not delivered so FV sent a letter of complaint to the SEC’s Corporation
Finance Department (SEC-CFD), asking that SBGCCI refund his payment. Subsequently,
SEC-CFD ruled in favor of FV stating that SBGCCI violated the Securities Regulation Code
and its IRR by failing to comply with its promises to FV – an act amounting to fraud. The
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SEC-CFD also imposed the following sanctions on SBGCCI: (a) the suspension of the latter’s
Certificate of Registration and Permit to Sell Securities to the Public issued by the SEC; and
(b) the refund of FV’s payment for the shares.
(a) What are the tests used to determine if a dispute is intra-corporate or not?
Jurisprudence explains that for a dispute to be “intra-corporate” it must satisfy both the relationship
and nature of controversy tests. The relationship test requires that the dispute be between the
following: (a) a corporation/partnership/association and the public; (b) a
corporation/partnership/association and the state, regarding the former’s franchise, permit, or
license to operate; (c) a corporation/partnership/association and its stockholders, partners, members,
or officers; and (d) stockholders, partners, or associates of the entity. On the other hand, the nature
of controversy test requires that the action must involve the enforcement of corporate rights and
obligations (SEC v. SBGCCI, G.R. No. 179047 (2015), unanimous decision).
(b) SBGCCI argues that the SEC had no jurisdiction to impose the sanctions that it did
because it is only the RTC which can do so. Decide.
I will rule partially in favor of SBGCCI. In accordance with the intra-corporate and nature of
controversy tests, this case involves an intra-corporate dispute. First, the dispute is between the
corporation and a shareholder. Second, it involves corporate rights and obligations – a demand for a
refund based on SBGCCI’s failure to abide by their promises. Therefore, the SEC improperly ruled
on the propriety of FV’s refund because R.A. No. 8799 transferred the jurisdiction over intra-
corporate cases to the RTC.
Be that as it may, the Securities and Regulation Code still gives regulatory and administrative powers
to the SEC which includes the power to suspend or revoke a corporation’s registration of securities
for violations of the law, fraud, and other misrepresentations. Therefore, since FV alleged that
SBGCCI’s failure to comply with its promises amounted to fraud, there was nothing improper with
SEC making an administrative determination if whether or not SBGCCI’s registration of securities
should be suspended (Id.).
PROBLEM:
BMG, Inc., received a request from JS for the inspection of its corporate records. JS claims
that he was a registered shareholder and a co-owner of some of his former wife’s shares. BMG
denied his request, alleging that he only wanted to get the company’s trade secret because he
owned HOB, one of BMG’s competitors. His former wife, VB who owns 90% of BMG, wrote
to BMG saying that JS merely held the shares in trust and that JS did not pay for them. BMG
then filed a complaint for interpleader alleging that JS and VB should be compelled to litigate
among themselves to resolve the issue of the true ownership of the shares. The complaint was
raffled to a special commercial court and was classified as an intra-corporate case. VB argued
that the proceedings should not have been classified as intra-corporate because the issue of
ownership is based on civil law, not corporate law. Decide.
I will rule against VB. In accordance with the relationship and nature of controversy tests provided
for by jurisprudence, the case was properly classified as an intra-corporate dispute. First, the parties
herein are both shareholders on paper of BMG. As to the nature of the controversy, it can be seen
from the facts that despite the issue of ownership being the crux of the controversy, the ultimate goal
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of VB and BMG is to prohibit JS from inspecting corporate books. Because of this, the controversy
shifts from a mere question of ownership to the exercise of a registered stockholder’s right to inspect
corporate books. Therefore, the proceedings were properly characterized as intra-corporate (Belo
Medical Group v. Santos, G.R. No. 185894 (2017), unanimous decision).
TRANSPORTATION LAW
PROBLEM:
EA owned a condominium unit in New York (NY), United States. In 2003, EA was in the
Philippines, so she sent several checks to VS who was based in NY. These checks were to be
used in paying the charges of the unit. FedEx PH handled the delivery of the checks where
VS was clearly indicated as the recipient. However, VS did not receive them and the unit was
foreclosed three weeks from when the checks were supposed to be delivered. When VS learned
of the foreclosure, she informed EA about what happened. EA immediately called FedEx PH
to ask the latter why the checks were not delivered. FedEx PH merely said that their records
show that FedEx NY received the package. EA then asked VS to contact FedEx NY who told
her that the package was delivered to her neighbor despite the fact that there was no signed
receipt.
This led EA to file a case for damages against FedEx. In its defense, FedEx argued that EA
failed to file a written notice of claim within 45 calendar days from the receipt of shipment as
indicated in their Air Waybill. Decide.
The argument is unmeritorious. Article 1186 of the New Civil Code states that the condition shall be
deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. The Supreme Court has further
explained that there is substantial compliance with the period for a notice of claim when the defendant
merely gives the claimant a “run-around” when the former informs the latter of the loss. In this case,
FedEx just kept on insisting that it had performed its obligation without even assisting EA on her
claim. This shows that EA’s non-compliance with the 45-day period was due to FedEx’s own doing.
Therefore, EA is deemed to have substantially complied with this period (Federal Express v.
Antonino, G.R. No. 199455 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One day, JR was walking, and he was hit by a van driven by JB. Unfortunately, JR died. Upon
investigation, it was discovered that CTTI, a corporation, owned the van that JB was driving;
and, that JB was the former’s employee. Moreover, it was discovered that JB only carried a
non-professional driver’s license at the time the accident happened. AR, JR’s paternal aunt
and the person who raised her, filed a complaint for damages under Article 2176 and 2180 of
the New Civil Code against CTTI. AR had no parents, grandparents, nor siblings.
(a) CTTI first argues that since AR is only a paternal aunt, her complaint should be
dismissed for not being a real party in interest. Decide.
I will rule that AR is a real party in interest. Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the child’s actual
custodian over 21 years of age as a person who exercises substitute parental authority in the default of
parents. Moreover, Article 233 of the Family Code states that a person exercising substitute parental
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authority has the same authority as the parents. Therefore, AR’s right to proceed against CTTI is based
on two grounds: (a) that she suffered actual personal loss since she suffered the same anguish that a
natural parent experiences for the loss of a child and, (b) she is capacitated to do what JR’s actual
parents would have been capacitated to do. Therefore, she is a real party in interest for the complaint
for damages (Caravan Travel and Tours v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) What is the appropriate approach in a case where Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
and the registered owner rule both apply?
According to jurisprudence, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner
of the vehicle in question. Once ownership is properly proven, there arises a disputable presumption
that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof now
shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. In this case, since CTTI’s
ownership over the van was properly proven, it now had to present proof of any of the following to
avoid liability: (a) that there was no employment relationship; (b) that JB acted outside the scope of
his assigned tasks; and (c) that CTTI exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of employees (Id.).
(c) Should CTTI be held liable? Explain.
Yes, CTTI should be held liable. In accordance with the jurisprudential guidelines stated above, CTTI
was unable to set up any of the meritorious defenses available to it. First, it was clearly stated in the
facts that JB was CTTI’s employee. Second, there was nothing in the facts to show that CTTI was
able to prove that JB was acting outside of his authority. Again, the burden of proof is now on CTTI
to prove its defense. Third, negligence in the selection of JB can be seen from the fact that he was
holding a non-professional driver’s license at the time of the accident. This was not merely negligence
but an actual violation of law. Therefore, CTTI should be held liable (Id.).
[N.B. This can also be asked under Civil Law.]
PROBLEM:
JEA Corp. imported 72 aluminum steel sheets in coil from South Korea. Upon their arrival at
the ports of Manila, the coils were discharged and stored under the custody of the arrastre
contractor, AT Inc. The coils were then loaded on the truck of MO and were delivered to
JEA’s steel plant. Upon arrival, JEA noted that 11 of the coils were damaged. 17 days after,
JEA sent a letter informing AT about the damage but the latter just ignored it. This led JEA
to file a claim with its insurer OA Corp who paid the former pursuant to the policy.
OA subsequently filed a complaint for collection of money against AT. In its defense, AT
argues that OA’s claim was barred because it failed to file a formal notice of claim within the
15-day period provided for in the management contract which JEA has signed. In the
management contract, the consignee had 30 days from receipt of the cargo to request a
certificate of loss from the arrastre operator. Upon receipt of the request, the arrastre operator
would have 15 days to issue a certificate of loss. From the issuance of this certificate, the
consignee would then have 15 days to file a formal request.
To rebut OA’s defense, it argued that it was not bound by the period provided for in the
management contract.
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(a) Is OA bound by the management contract? Decide.
Yes, OA is bound. The Supreme Court has explained that the provisions of an arrastre management
contract are binding on an insurer-subrogee even if the latter is not a party to it. This is supported by
Article 2207 of the New Civil Code which provides that after paying the indemnity, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer. This means that upon
paying JEA, OA stepped into the former’s shoes and acquired all those rights which the former had.
Therefore, OA is bound by the management contract (Oriental Assurance v. Ong, G.R. No. 189524
(b) Has OA’s claim prescribed? Decide.
No, it has not. Here, the management contract states that the consignee had 30 days from receipt of
the cargo to request a certificate of loss and JEA sent AT a letter informing the latter of the damage
within 17 days from the former’s receipt of the goods. The Supreme Court has liberally construed the
requirement for filing a formal claim if a provisional claim has been filed within the time provided.
This is because the provisional claim serves the same purpose of a formal claim – to inform the arrastre
operator of the damage while the facts are still fresh and to give it ample time to investigate. In line
with this doctrine, the letter JEA sent within to AT serves as the provisional claim allowed in
jurisprudence. Since it was filed within the 30 days provided for in the management contract, OA’s
claim has not yet prescribed (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CJ planned a trip to Palawan with his 19 balikbayan relatives. Excited for the trip, CJ went to
CP Airlines’ branch office 37 days before the planned date of departure and purchased 20
promo tickets. He specified to AB, the customer assistant, that they were going to leave
Manila on July 20 and that their preferred time for departure in Palawan was on 4:15 pm on
July 22. Thereafter, AB printed the tickets consisting of 3 pages and recapped the details to
him. This fact was indicated on the tickets themselves. On the afternoon of July 22, 9 of CJ’s
relatives could not be admitted since their tickets were scheduled for 10:05 am earlier that day.
This led them to pay for rebooking fees and lodging for an extra night.
Subsequently, CJ filed a complaint for damages with the MTC. He alleged that CP Airlines
violated its duty of exercising extraordinary diligence when it failed to book the correct
departure flight for his relatives. Moreover, CJ argued that AB only recapped the first page to
him.
(a) CP Airlines argues that its duty of extraordinary diligence only applies in the actual
transportation of people/goods and not in the issuance of a contract of carriage.
Decide.
I will rule against CP. CP, an airline company, is a common carrier which is required to observe
extraordinary diligence under the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court further explains that the
obligation of the airline to exercise this level of diligence commences upon the issuance of the contract
of carriage. Therefore, ticketing, as the act of issuing the contract, is necessarily included in the duty
to exercise extraordinary diligence (Manay, Jr. v. Cebu Air, Inc., G.R. No. 210 621 (2016), unanimous
decision).
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(b) Should CP be held liable for damages? Explain.
No, CP should not be held liable for damages. First, the tickets themselves state that the flight details
were recapped to CJ. Therefore, this trumps CJ’s argument that AB only recapped the first page to
him. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is incumbent upon the purchaser of tickets to
check the information before making the purchase. Inasmuch as the common carrier is duty-bound
to exercise extraordinary diligence, the passengers themselves have the duty to exercise ordinary care
in the conduct of their affairs. Here, CJ bought the tickets 37 days before the trip. If he had only read
them at least once, he would have easily discovered that the details on the return flight were wrong.
Because CJ was negligent, he is not entitled to damages (Id.).
PROBLEM:
GH Corp. hired AT, a common carrier, to transport bags of soya from Port Area, Manila to
SF in Novaliches, QC. AT’s employee, RC, delivered the goods to SF. However, at SF, the
shipment was rejected so GH instructed RC to deliver the bags to its warehouse in Malabon.
However, the truck and the shipment never arrived. It was subsequently discovered that the
truck had been cannibalized and that the cargo it contained had all been taken. GH filed a
complaint for Sum of Money against AT, stating that she breached their contract. In her
defense, AT argued that she cannot be held liable for her driver’s theft.
Should AT be liable for GH’s cargo? Explain.
Yes, she should be liable. Under Article 1733 of the New Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods it carries. Furthermore, Article 1734 of the
same code specifically enumerates the exceptions for which common carriers will not be held liable.
Nothing in the facts show that any of these exceptions caused the loss. RC’s act of stealing the goods
cannot relive AT’s liability. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that there must be grave
or irresistible threat, violence or force which accompanies the act of stealing the goods. Here, RC’s
theft of the goods was not shown to be attended by these circumstances. Therefore, AT is liable for
the goods (Tan v. Great Harvest, G.R. No. 220400 (2019), unanimous decision).
INSURANCE LAW
PROBLEM:
JA owned a residential lot located in Caloocan. In 1997, JA applied for and was granted a
housing loan by Unionbank. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over the lot, and
a mortgage insurance taken on the life of Alvarez with Unionbank as beneficiary. This was
done pursuant to a Group Mortgage Redemption Insurance (GMRI) that Unionbank had
with Insular Life.
A year after, JA passed away so Unionbank filed a death claim under Alvarez’s name pursuant
to the GMRI. However, Insular denied the claim, saying that Alvarez was ineligible for the
coverage as he was already more than 60 years old at the time of the loan’s approval. This led
to the non-payment of the loan and the subsequent foreclosure of the lot.
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JA’s heirs then filed a complaint for specific performance against Insular Life and Unionbank.
In its defense, Insular Life argued that the insurance policy is deemed rescinded because JA
gave a false birth year to show that he was eligible for the insurance policy when in fact, he
was not. To prove this, Insular Life presented a Health Statement form where JA wrote a false
birth year which purported that he was only 55 years old. Moreover, Insular Life also argued
that it also relied on a background checking report accomplished by a Unionbank employee.
(a) Is the proof of fraudulent intent required in both concealment and false
representation? Explain.
No, the proof of fraudulent intent is only required in false representation. The Supreme Court has
ruled that in concealment under Section 27 of the Insurance Code, proof of fraudulent intent is not
required since the act of concealing material facts is inherently fraudulent. Therefore, concealment,
regardless of actual intent to defraud, is automatically deemed to be a false representation. On the
other hand, proof of fraudulent intent is required in false representation because once the insured
makes a representation, the burden shifts to the insurer to check the veracity of what the insured has
stated since it has adequate resources to undertake this duty (Insular Life v. Heirs of Alvarez, G.R.
(b) Did Insular Life have a valid ground to rescind the policy? Explain.
No, it did not. First, since JA actually indicated his supposed birth year, what applies is the concept of
false representation and not concealment. Because of this, the burden was on Insular Life to prove
that the false representation was material, and that JA had an intent to defraud. In proving JA’s
supposed false representation, Insular only presented the Health Statement form which is insufficient
because this can be regarded as an isolated mistake which does not in itself show a consistent intent
to defraud. Moreover, it is quite suspicious that Insular did not even present the most basic document
that JA accomplished – his insurance application form. In accordance with the rules of evidence,
evidence willfully suppressed is presumed to be adverse when produced. Lastly, reliance on the
background checking report was also improper because JA was not even the one who made it. With
all of these circumstances, it is clear that Insular did not have a valid ground to rescind the policy (Id.).
SPECIAL LAWS
PROBLEM:
VSL, a shipping corporation, filed a petition for Corporate Rehabilitation before the RTC.
According to the petition, it only owned two maritime vessels which were a part of its total
Php 147M in free assets. Its liabilities however, amounted to Php 220M. To support its
rehabilitation, VSL proposed to sell its old and barely serviceable vessels and some lots owned
by SDSL, its sister company. It also proposed to convert one of its properties into a hotel.
Before the initial hearing, several of its creditors, along with some of VSL’s former employees,
filed their respective oppositions, arguing that the rehabilitation of VSL is no longer feasible.
The RTC dismissed VSL’s petition staying that the latter failed to show its viability and
feasibility for rehabilitation.
(a) Aggrieved, VSL filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the CA. However, it
only impleaded the presiding judge of the RTC that rendered the decision. It did not
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implead any of the creditors but served copies of the petition on their counsels. VSL
however failed to serve the petition to the counsels of its former employees and to the
RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the procedure under
Rule 43. On the other hand, VSL argued that there was substantial compliance when
it served the petitions on its creditors’ counsels. Was VSL’s petition properly
dismissed? Decide.
Yes, VSL’s petition was properly dismissed. The Supreme Court has ruled that resort to the liberal
construction of procedural rules must be rational and well-grounded, and its factual bases must be so
clear that they outweigh the intent of the apparent reading of the rules. As seen from the facts, VSL
failed to comply with several rules. First, VSL did not implead its creditors as respondents – instead,
it only impleaded the RTC judge, which is also contrary to what the rules provide. Second, VSL did
not serve copies of the petition to its former employees and to the RTC. Taking these into
consideration, the CA correctly dismissed VSL’s petition since Sec. 7 of Rule 43 states that failure to
comply with the requirements therein shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Moreover,
the mistakes made by VSL is not merely a matter of procedure but strike at the heart of due process
itself (Viva Shipping Lines v. Keppel, et al., G.R. No. 177382 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Procedural rules aside, should VSL’s petition for corporate rehabilitation be granted?
Decide.
No, it should be dismissed. The Supreme Court has ruled that for corporate rehabilitation to be
proper, there must be economic feasibility and that rehabilitation should provide for a better present
value recovery for its creditors. Here, both factors are absent. First, the vessels which VSL uses are
already old and are barely serviceable. In fact, VSL actually plans on selling them. However, disposing
the assets of the main business cannot result in rehabilitation. In other words, a business primarily
engaged as a shipping line cannot anymore operate without it ships. Moreover, its plan to sell
properties is also infeasible since it will require conformity from its sister company. Even assuming
that they both have the same officers, they are still two separate juridical entities. All these
circumstances indelibly show that VSL’s rehabilitation plan is almost impossible to implement (Id.).
[N.B. Subproblem (a) can also be asked in Remedial Law.]
PROBLEM:
LCB Corp. obtained various credit and loan accommodations from Metrobank. These
obligations were secured by mortgages executed in favor of the latter. LBC defaulted on the
loans when they matured so it filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation with the RTC. LBC
claimed that it could not meet its obligations to Metrobank because of the Asian Financial
Crisis. Metrobank filed an opposition, arguing that, the pertinent laws and rules require an
element of foresight when it comes to the failure to meet obligations. In other words,
Metrobank argues that the debts of the corporation applying for rehabilitation should not
have matured yet. Is Metrobank’s argument meritorious? Explain.
No, it is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has explained that a corporation which may seek
rehabilitation is characterized not by its debt but by its capacity to pay such debt. This is because the
purpose of rehabilitation is to provide meritorious corporations an opportunity for recovery.
Therefore, there is no reason why corporations with debts that have matured should not be given the
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opportunity to recover and pay their debtors in an orderly fashion. Clearly, Metrobank’s argument is
unmeritorious (Metrobank v. Liberty Corrugated, G.R. No. 184317 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Differentiate a private surety and a corporate surety.
According to the Supreme Court, their differences are as follows: first, a corporate surety agrees to be
bound in order to make profit and to charge premiums while a private surety agrees to be bound for
noble purposes like friendship. Second, the corporate surety, like an insurance company, prepares the
instrument, which is a type of a contract of adhesion, while a private surety usually does not prepare
the surety contract he signs. Third, the obligation of the private surety is often assured simply on the
basis of the debtor’s representations while a corporate surety does not bind itself until a full
investigation has been made. Because of these differences, the Supreme Court has ruled that the rule
of strict construction of the surety contract is not extended in favor of a compensated corporate surety
(Erma Industries v. Security Bank, G.R. No. 191274 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Sps. R entered into a construction contract with RD and PT Bank. PT Bank was obligated to
finance the cost of the materials to the extent of Php 900,000 while RD undertook the
construction for Php 300,000 for a period of 150 days. Pursuant to the agreement, RD secured
a surety bond worth Php 450,000 from FGU. Here, FGU and RD bound themselves solidarily
to pay Sps. R and PT in the event of RD’s non-performance of his obligations. Subsequently,
RD was unable to perform its obligations within the stipulated time period. This led Sps. R
to sue RD and FGU for the whole amount of the Php 450,000 as stipulated in the surety bond.
(a) FGU contends that the Php 450,000 face amount simply indicates its maximum
potential liability and that it should be liable for actual damages or the cost overrun as
a result of RD’s default. Decide.
I will rule against FGU. Here, the facts show that FGU’s bond contained no limitations, and it is only
conditioned upon the non-performance by RD of his obligations. This means that what FGU
guaranteed to pay is the face amount in the event of RD’s breach. Though this may be more than the
actual costs pending, this is a valid stipulation since it is not contrary to law, morals, or public order.
If FGU intended to limit its liability to the actual costs unpaid, then it should have included a
stipulation to that effect. Therefore, Sps. R can sue FGU for the face amount of the bond (FGU
Insurance v. Sps. Roxas, G.R. Nos. 189526 and 189656 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) FGU however alleges that Sps. R also had unpaid obligations to RD. Therefore, FGU
argues that it should be allowed to compensate Sps. R’s claims against its own liability.
Decide.
I will rule in favor of FGU. Article 1280 of the Civil Code provides that the guarantor may set up
compensation as regards what the creditor may owe the principal debtor. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has explained that this provision applies to sureties as well. Therefore, FGU should be allowed
to set up compensation against Sps. R’s claims (Id.).
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CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW I
PROBLEM:
A was playing a card game with his friends when B arrived and asked him for money. A replied
that he should just keep quiet. C, one of the card players, also told B to just go home. This
angered B and a heated exchange of words ensued between him and C. Suddenly, A felt that
he was stabbed on his back. C ran but B was able to catch up to him and was able to stab
him. The wounds caused severe bleeding for A and C. Fortunately, they were rushed to the
hospital and they survived. Two informations for frustrated murder were filed. The prosecutor
argued that B’s sudden act of stabbing constituted treachery which qualifies the crime from
frustrated homicide to frustrated murder. Was the prosecution’s argument correct? Explain.
No, the prosecution’s argument was incorrect. Jurisprudence has repeatedly explained that for
treachery to be appreciated, it must be proven to have been consciously taken or reflected on to ensure
the attacker’s unfair advantage. The mere unexpectedness of the attack cannot be the sole basis for
the finding of treachery if the victim’s position was merely accidental. In this case, the facts show that
the attack was done on impulse by B because of the way A and C treated him. Therefore, this type of
provocation was not a product of B’s premeditation, and treachery was clearly not present in this case.
Therefore, B should only be charged with 2 counts of frustrated homicide (Cirera v. People, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
One evening, FN was drunk and saw YR along the street. FN then punched YR because the
latter refused to buy marijuana from him. YR immediately went home and told his brother
RM and the latter’s common-law wife, PR, about what FN had done. When PR heard about
what happened, she went out along with her minor daughter, AB, to confront FN. During the
confrontation, FN punched PR in the face and kicked AB. RM also went out, but FN started
hitting him with a piece of wood. Due to FN’s attack, RM grabbed a knife and stabbed him
on his buttocks and on his side. RM was charged with frustrated homicide. In his defense,
RM argued that he was only acting in the defense of his common-law wife and the latter’s
daughter. To rebut RM’s argument, FN argues that the means he used to repel the attack
were not reasonable. Decide.
I will decide in favor of RM. Jurisprudence explains that the state of mind of the accused during the
alleged act of defense must be considered in determining whether the means used of repelling the
aggressor were reasonable. This is because one who acts in defense does not have the time nor
sufficient tranquility of mind to calculate the means to be used. In this case, the circumstances show
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that RM’s act of stabbing was reasonable. First, FN was drunk. Second, he attacked PR and even AB
who was a minor. Third, he continuously hit RM with a piece of wood. Therefore, it is reasonable to
believe that RM, at that time, could only protect his family by using a strong weapon such as a knife.
Therefore, I will rule in favor of RM (Mariano v. People, G.R. No. 224102 (2017), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
One day, A was drinking with B, and C. D approached them, trying to sell a cellphone for Php
400. A got mad, claiming that D has sold him a fake phone before. Because of this, A and D
started hitting each other. They were pacified by barangay officials and were asked to go
home. However, A followed D to the place where the latter lived. A caught up to him and they
started talking again. However, E, D’s brother, suddenly intervened and started stabbing A
with a knife. Three days after, A died. E was charged with murder.
In his defense, E argued that it was A who tried to stab him, and he just stabbed back in self-
defense and in defense of d.
(a) What are the requisites for self-defense and defense of a relative?
According to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the requisites of self-defense are as follows: (a)
unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For defense of a relative, the same
article states that the first two requisites must be present, and the third requisite is that in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. A
relative is the attacker’s spouse, ascendant, descendant, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree (People v. Pableo, G.R. No. 229349 (2020), unanimous decision).
(b) The RTC convicted him for murder, stating that treachery and evident premeditation
were present. Do you agree? Explain.
I partially agree with the RTC. Treachery was present, but evident premeditation was not. Treachery’s
requisites are as follows: (a) that the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. Here,
the facts explicitly state that E just suddenly intervened and started stabbing A. Therefore, treachery
was present since it was a surprise attack that A did not expect. On the other hand, in proving evident
premeditation, it must be clearly shown that deliberate planning was resorted to for the killing. Here,
the facts show that the killing was a spur of the moment that arose originally from A and D’s
altercation. Therefore, evident premeditation was absent (Id.).
[N.B. J. Leonen reminded the readers that when the accused alleges self-defense or defense of a
relative, the prosecution is freed from the burden of proving the act charged. The burden now shifts
to the accused to prove that his act was justified.]
PROBLEM:
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A was looking to sell her jewelry so her friend introduced her to C who agreed to sell it for her.
On June 9, C, accompanied by her maid D, went to A to get the pieces of jewelry. A and C
agreed that the proceeds of the sale and/or the unsold pieces of jewelry were to be returned
in the afternoon. To secure C’s obligation, she issued checks in the same amount as the pieces
of jewelry. However, C did not return that afternoon which led A to encash the checks. The
checks were dishonored by reason of being drawn on a closed account. After a few weeks, A
was informed that the pieces of jewelry were on display inside a pawnshop. Upon asking the
attendant, she saw that the pieces of jewelry were pawned on June 6 under the name of “LC,”
who allegedly turned out to be D.
(a) Was there a crime committed?
Yes, the crime of estafa through misappropriation was committed. Art. 315 par. 1(b) establishes the
elements of the crime: (a) the offender’s receipt of goods under any obligation to deliver or return the
same, (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the goods received, (c) it was done to the
prejudice of another, and (d) demand by the offended party for the return of the goods received. All
elements were present here. C received the goods with the obligation to return the proceeds or the
jewelry in the afternoon. When she failed to do so at the agreed upon time, the demand was dispensed
with and A was presumed to have misappropriated the goods. Lastly, the misappropriation caused
prejudice to A. Therefore, the crime of estafa through misappropriation was committed (Benito v.
People, G.R. No. 204644 (2015), unanimous decision).
(b) Assume that C and D were both charged of the crime on the basis of conspiracy.
During trial, C admitted to committing the crime and that D had no participation
therein. On the other hand, the People argued that D’s presence during the negotiation
showed that she is liable as well. Decide.
I will decide in favor of D. Jurisprudence explains that conspiracy under Art. 8 of the Revised Penal
Code must be proven also with proof beyond reasonable doubt. Here, several instances show that this
burden was not met. First, C admitted during trial that D had no participation therein – this is a
declaration against interest which should be given weight. Second, the date of the alleged pawning of
the items came before C even received them. This shows great doubt as to D’s liability because she
could not have pawned these items at the given date. Lastly, jurisprudence explains that there can be
no conspiracy to commit a crime that has been consummated. Here, the crime of estafa was
consummated when C failed to return the proceeds and the jewelry at the specified time. Therefore,
even if D actually pawned the items after, she could not be held as a co-conspirator (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Mr. Bean was walking one afternoon and suddenly, Teddy tapped him on the shoulder and
continuously hacked him with a bolo until he died. Teddy was then charged with murder.
During trial, Teddy proved that Mr. Bean, for months on end, has been insulting him publicly
by saying that Teddy had an incestuous relationship with his mother. Teddy argues that the
mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation must be considered by the court. On
the other hand, the prosecution argues that this mitigating circumstance is not present
because Mr. Bean’s insults did not immediately precede Teddy’s attack. Decide.
I will rule in favor of Teddy. Jurisprudence explains that for passion and obfuscation to be considered,
the accused must be able to prove that (a) there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition in the mind and (b) said act was not far removed from the commission of the crime
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by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
Moreover, jurisprudence also explains that passion may linger and build up over time as repressed
anger enough to obfuscate reason and self-control. Here, it was proven that Mr. Bean has been
publicly accusing Teddy of having incestuous relations with his mother. Therefore, Mr. Bean’s act can
be considered to have produced passion and obfuscation on the mind of Teddy which led him to
commit the crime (People v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159 (2015), unanimous decision).
CRIMINAL LAW II
PROBLEM:
One evening, ED was sitting on one of the benches at the town plaza. Suddenly 3 men – A,
B, and C – approached him. As they were a few inches away from ED, A punched him and
attempted to grab his cellphone. B simultaneously pulled a knife and stabbed ED on the right
thigh. C subsequently joined in the beating of ED. ED eventually died. What crime was
committed, if any, by A, B, and C?
The crime committed was the special complex crime of robbery and homicide. Under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, this crime is perpetrated when, by reason or on occasion of robbery, homicide
is committed. Jurisprudence further explains that in this crime, the offender’s original intent must be
to commit robbery since the killing is merely incidental. From the facts of the case, it is clear that A,
B, and C were attempting to steal ED’s phone when they attacked him. Since ED died because of the
beating he suffered under their hands, A, B, and C committed the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide (People v. Palema, et al., G.R. No. 228000 (2019), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
(Bear with me, the facts of this case are straight out of a telenovela) As AAA was arriving home, BC held a
knife to her back and dragged her into his room. He undressed AAA and inserted his penis
into her vagina. Shortly after, a police vehicle arrived. The police demanded that BC release
AAA since people heard the latter’s cries for help. In response, BC demanded that police
produce the men who raped his girlfriend, MP. While the policemen were outside, BC once
again inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Eventually, the policemen were able to enter BC’s
room. BC was then charged with serious illegal detention and two counts of rape. BC argues
that the charge for serious illegal detention was improper. Decide.
I will rule in favor of BC. He should have been charged with slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code. What separates serious illegal detention and slight illegal detention is that
the latter is not accompanied by the following circumstances: (a) the kidnapping lasted more than
three days; (b) if it was done simulating public authority; (c) if serious injuries were inflicted upon the
victim or if threats to kill have been made; (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is a
parent, a female, or a public officer.
In this case, the rape preceded the detention. Moreover, the BC kept on detaining AAA even after the
rape was committed. Therefore, the detention after the rape, not being attended by any of the
circumstances in Article 267, should only be slight illegal detention (People v. Concepcion, G.R. No.
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PROBLEM:
JG was approached one day by MO, an agent of Philam Life. Thereafter, MO offered JG
insurance coverage to which the latter agreed. She then started paying premiums to MO. A
few months after the insurance policy was executed, MO offered her an investment
opportunity with Philam Fund Management. MO told JG that the time deposit scheme would
earn 20% annually, and that the proceeds of her investment can be channeled to pay for her
premiums. Enticed by the offer, JG tendered Php 200k for the investment.
A few months after, JG discovered that her insurance policy had lapsed due to non-payment
of premiums. When she confronted MO about the matter, MO told her that she decided to
invest JG’s money in PMIAM which had a higher return of investment. This was evidenced
by PMIAM vouchers in JG’s name. MO was then subsequently charged with estafa under
Article 315(2)(a). Should MO be convicted? Decide.
Yes, MO should be convicted but for other similar deceits. Under Article 315(2)(a), the accused must
fraudulently represent that he possesses power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business, or imaginary transactions. Here, the facts show that MO never misrepresented possessing
any of this to induce JG to part with her money. However, this falls under “other similar deceits” as
stated in Article 315(2)(a). Jurisprudence explains that for this crime to be committed, the false
pretense must be other than those in Article 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, MO
misrepresented that JG’s money would be invested in Philam Fund and that the proceeds will be used
to pay her premium. Since this is what induced JG to part with her money, there was deceit under
Article 315(2)(a) when MO invested her money in PMIAM. Therefore, MO should be convicted for
estafa under Article 315(2)(a) (Osorio v. People, G.R. No. 207711 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) requested the
release of Php 961.5M to the province of Negros Oriental to finance the rehabilitation of
various infrastructures damaged by typhoons and an earthquake. This led to the issuance of
a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO). However, ML, the Undersecretary for operations
of the DPWH, sent a letter to RD, the governor of Negros Occidental, that the SARO had to
be withdrawn because it did not comply with guidelines on large-scale fund releases for
infrastructure projects. In his letter, ML signed in his own name under the words, “By
Authority of the Secretary.”
This led RD to file a complaint for usurpation of authority against ML. RD alleged that ML
falsely posed himself to have been authorized by President Aquino. In his defense, ML argues
that he wrote the letter as the DPWH’s Undersecretary for Operations and that he only acted
upon the secretary’s instructions. Moreover, ML showed proof that the Office of the President
instructed the DWPH secretary to ensure that all SARO’s comply with the guidelines on large-
scale fund releases. Decide.
I will rule in favor of ML. Under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetrator must
knowingly and falsely represent oneself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or
agency of the government. In this case, ML never falsely represented himself to have the authority of
President Aquino. As seen in his letter, ML even expressly acknowledge that he was only acting by the
authority of the Secretary. Moreover, ML did not even write the letter on behalf of the President – he
was writing on behalf of the secretary who was ordered by the president to ensure that all SARO’s
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complied with the proper guidelines. Clearly, RD should not be held liable for usurpation of authority
(Degamo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212416 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
RI was riding a jeepney when four men boarded it. A, one of these men, sat beside him, and
pointed a knife. Subsequently, the four men declared a hold-up. RI, fearing for his life, gave
A his cellphone and his wallet. However, when the perpetrators alighted from the jeep, the
policemen immediately arrested them. The prosecutor charged them with the crime of
brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532. Was the prosecutor correct? Explain.
No, the prosecutor was wrong. Under P.D. No. 532, there is highway robbery or brigandage only if it
can be proved that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing that
crime. Here, there is nothing in the facts which proves this. Therefore, the correct crime to charge
was robbery in band under the Revised Penal Code because RI’s belongings were taken, with intent
to gain, using force. Since four people perpetrated the hold-up, the crime is not simple robbery but
robbery in band (Amparo v. People, G.R. No. 204990 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A, B, and C were members of SR Fraternity. One day, while eating lunch in the campus
cafeteria, they were suddenly attacked by D, E, F, G, H, and I, members of their rival
fraternity, SJ, who used masks to hide their faces; and, started hitting them with baseball bats.
A was able to run away after getting hit a few times but B and C fell to the ground and were
hit repeatedly. The whole commotion lasted for less than a minute. B suffered a few bruises,
but C unfortunately died. Informations for murder and attempted murder were filed against
D, E, F, G, H, and I.
(a) The accused argue that the crime charged for C’s death is improper because there is
no circumstance which qualifies the killing to murder. Decide.
I will rule against the accused because treachery is present. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
essence of treachery is an attack which comes without warning, in a swift and unexpected manner
which affords the victims no chance to resist or escape. In this case, the victims were merely eating
lunch in the campus cafeteria where there was no expectation that they would suddenly be attacked.
A, B, and C were also unarmed while the accused, who outnumbered them, had baseball bats. This
shows that the victims had no chance of defending themselves in a premeditated attack which did not
even last a minute. Clearly, teachery is present and they were properly charged with murder (People v.
Feliciano, G.R. No. 196735 (2014), J. Abad and J. Peralta dissented).
(b) The RTC, finding the presence of conspiracy among them, held that all the accused
are guilty of murder for C’s death, and attempted murder for A and B’s injuries. The
CA modified this ruling, stating that since A was not anymore pursued, intent to kill
is negated and the accused should only be held liable for slight physical injuries as
regards A. Was the CA’s ruling correct? Why or why not?
The CA was incorrect. Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that once conspiracy is proven, all
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation –
the act of one is the act of all. From the facts, intent to kill was already present at the beginning of the
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attack as seen from the accused’s act of repeatedly hitting the victims with the use of the baseball bats.
Therefore, the CA should not have modified the RTC’s ruling (Id.).
PROBLEM:
One evening, AB was watching a television show when his wife, DB went out of the house.
Suddenly, DB was approached by a UG, DB’s paramour. UG kissed DB but the latter said,
“Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya.” Upon hearing this, AB got a hammer and hit DB
on the head. A few hours after, DB died. What crime did AB commit?
AB committed parricide. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is committed when
any person kills his father, mother, child, his ascendants, descendants, or his spouse. Here, the facts
show that DB killed his own wife. Therefore, it is clear that DB committed parricide (People v.
Brusola, G.R. No. 210615 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One night while RP was driving, he noticed that he was being followed by an SUV. When he
alighted from his vehicle, RP was called by EA, one of men inside the SUV. EA said that he
was a volunteer member of the PDEA and that he saw RP buy illegal drugs. According to
him, RP should come with them so that he can be introduced to their team leader, TA. When
RP entered the car, he was strangled and repeatedly punched. Upon arriving at the PDEA
parking lot, EA told RP that he would only be released if his father would pay them Php
150,000. Because of this, RP talked to his father asking that him to give the money being asked
for by EA and his associates. RP’s father complied and RP was released. Subsequently, EA
and his companions were charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. In their
defense, EA argued that they were PDEA agents who cannot be prosecuted under this
provision. Decide.
EA’s argument is unmeritorious. Jurisprudence provides that even public officers can be charged with
kidnapping and serious illegal detention if they detain a person for purpose of extorting money.
Kidnapping for ransom cannot be construed to be within their official functions. By illegally
kidnapping RP, they were deemed to be acting in their private capacity. Therefore, they can be
prosecuted for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under the Revised Penal Code (People v.
Avancena, G.R. No. 200512 (2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The prosecution was also able to prove that they were not even connected with the PDEA.]
PROBLEM:
SC allegedly executed a will before he died. This will was notarized by Atty. BC. The will’s
joint acknowledgement indicated that RC, JB, MB, and Dr. EA were all present as witnesses
and personally appeared before him. However, only RC, JB, and MB signed the document
before he notarized it. Dr. EA, on the other hand, signed it after the will had been notarized.
FC, SC’s son, filed a complaint against Atty. BC for falsification of public document.
According to FC, Atty. BC committed the crime when he did not delete Dr. EA’s name before
he notarized the will. Therefore, he made it appear that Dr. EA participated when in fact he
did not.
(a) What are the elements of falsification of public documents under Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code?
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Falsification of Public Documents under article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) Offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (b) he takes advantage of his
official position; (c) he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person/persons has/have
participated in any act in the proceeding; and, (d) the person/persons did not in fact so participate in
the proceeding (Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696 (2019), unanimous decision).
(b) Should Atty. BC be convicted for falsification of public document? Explain.

No, Atty. BC should be acquitted. In accordance with the elements enumerated above, the last 2
elements are not present in this case. The Supreme Court has clarified that when the disputed
document is a notarial will, the prosecution must prove that the notary public falsified or simulated
the signatures appearing on the attestation clause. This is because the due execution of the will is
proven through the validity of this clause. Here, Atty. BC did not falsify the will because Dr. EA
actually signed the acknowledgment after it was notarized. Since Dr. EA did not sign the
acknowledgment before it was notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and subscribed
to its due execution at the time of notarization. Therefore, it was not Atty. BC who cause the falsity
but Dr. EA himself. Therefore, Atty. BC should be acquitted (Id.).
[N.B. In short, what the Court is saying is that Dr. Asuncion had not yet participated at the time Atty.
Constantino notarized the will. The supposed participation of the witnesses in the will is evidenced by
their SIGNATURES. Therefore, since Dr. Asuncion had not yet signed the document, Atty.
Constantino did not make it appear that he participated when in fact, he did not.
However, Atty. Constantino was held administratively liable for notarizing the acknowledgment
despite Dr. Asuncion’s non-participation in its due execution.]
PROBLEM:
MJ was arrested for allegedly killing his best friend, ED. During the investigation and trial, it
was discovered that his reason for killing ED was due to a misunderstanding over a girl. It
was also discovered that MJ was in possession of ED’s cellphone when he was arrested. The
trial court convicted MJ for the crime of robbery with homicide. Was the trial court correct?
No, the trial court was incorrect. The Supreme Court has explained that to warrant a conviction for
the special crime robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be
adequately proven that the offender had the intent to take personal property before the killing,
regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. Here, all that was proven was that MJ
killed ED – the intent to take was not proven. Moreover, being best friends, there is even a possibility
that ED lent the phone to MJ before the killing happened. This being the case, MJ should have only
been charged and convicted for homicide (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950 (2014), unanimous
decision).
[N.B. Take note that the Court here did not find proof beyond reasonable doubt that MJ actually
took the phone with intent to gain. If it was proven the MJ took ED’s phone but intent to commit
robbery cannot be proven to have preceded the killing, then there should be two separate crimes of
robbery and homicide.]
PROBLEM:
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Allegedly, Ric had sexual intercourse with AAA. AAA was intellectually disabled – she was 21
years old with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months and had an IQ of 38. This finding was
based on the finding of NBI clinical psychologist, BT. There was also a medico-legal report
which showed that A had lacerations in her hymen, produced by the insertion of a blunt
object. In his defense, Ric argues that he was in a romantic relationship with AAA, and that
they had sexual intercourse with the latter’s consent. Assume that AAA’s intellectual disability
was not alleged in the information.
(a) Was there a crime committed?

Ric committed statutory rape under the Revised Penal Code. Under this provision, all that is needed
to be shown was that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman under the circumstances enumerated
therein, one of which, involves a victim under 12 years of age. The Supreme Court has ruled that a
person with a chronological age of under 12 years is incapable of giving rational consent to a sexual
act. Therefore, sexual intercourse with AAA, who had a mental age of 6 years and 2 months is statutory
rape, regardless of whether she gave her consent or not (People v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402 (2014),
(b) Assuming there was a crime, Ric now argues that AAA’s mental incapacity was not
alleged in the information and should not have been considered. Decide.
I will still rule to convict Ric. The Supreme Court has ruled that it is not necessary to allege mental
disability to convict accused of the crime of rape as long as sexual congress and mental incapacity i.e.
incapacity to give consent, are sufficiently proven. The allegation of intellectual disability is only
important in qualifying the crime to statutory rape and increasing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
death. Therefore, Ric was properly convicted for rape (Id.).
[N.B. Like in drug cases, J. Leonen also penned a lot of decisions on rape. Most, if not all, of these
decisions, convicted the accused. These cases all involve similar factual circumstances to the point
wherein you can substantially copy the doctrines of one case and just paste it on the others. Therefore,
I will just enumerate the important doctrines of laid down in these cases.
1. The most crucial element in a rape case is the credibility of the offended party’s testimony.
This is due to the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved.
2. Credibility is almost always associated with the testimonies of child victims because youth and
immaturity are generally indicators of truth and trustworthiness.
3. In line with first two points, minor inconsistencies are not indicative of fabrication
because a woman who has suffered sexual abuse is not expected to remember all the harrowing
details of her experience.
4. Resistance is not an element of rape since judicial notice is taken of the fact that rape
victims react differently.
5. Delay in reporting the crime is not considered as a badge of untruthfulness since many
victims of rape even choose to just bury the experience and suffer instead of revealing their
shame to the world.
6. Especially in cases of rape between close kin e.g. daughter and stepfather, father, uncle, and
the like, moral influence and ascendancy take the place of violence or intimidation.
7. The defenses of alibi and denial are inherently weak and are therefore disfavored unless the
accused can positively prove that it was impossible for him to have been at the place and time
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when the crime happened or when the facts clearly show that he really did not commit the
crime.
8. Under qualified rape when the victim is under 18 and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepfather, guardian, relative by consanguinity of affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, both the age and the relationship must
be alleged and proven.
9. Rape of a person who may be above 18 but has a mental age of below 12 is still statutory
rape because the law looks at the victim’s capacity to give consent. However, the
offender must have known of the victim’s mental disability. This circumstance must be alleged
in the information and proven during trial.]
PROBLEM:
WP and LB were members of ALIMANGO, a duly registered cooperative. One morning, they
were harvesting nipa palm when DP, a barangay official, approached them and asked them
who gave them the authority to harvest there. WP and LB replied that they were ALIMANGO
members who had been allowed to get nipa palm therein. Despite this, DP pushed WP and
LB into a paddle boat for the purpose of bringing them to the proper authorities. When asked
why he arrested WP and LB, DP replied that a Barangay Resolution enacted the day before
ordered barangay officials to surveil the nipa area because of complaints of illegal cutting of
mangroves and nipa leaves.
(a) Did DP commit a crime? Explain.
The crime committed was unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of
unlawful arrest punishes the act of arresting or detaining another to deliver him to proper authorities
when the arrest is not authorized or when there is no reasonable ground to arrest. Here, DP is a
barangay official whose duty does not involve the authority to arrest. Moreover, the arrest made on
WP and LB who were merely harvesting nipa does not fall under the exceptions for warrantless arrests
provided for in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lastly, DP arrested WP and
LB to deliver them to proper authorities. Therefore, DP is guilty of the crime of unlawful arrest
(Duropan v. People, G.R. No. 230825 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
AP owned an abaca plantation. One day, he was surprised to find ML harvesting abaca
therein. This led AP to file a case for theft against ML. In his defense, ML argued that he had
been a tenant of AP and her late husband, and that he was installed as a tenant in the land
which is involved in this case. A DARAB decision held that ML was indeed a bona fide tenant
of the land. Is ML liable? Decide.
ML is not liable. The Supreme Court has ruled that tenants are persons who cultivate the land
belonging to or possessed by another with the latter’s consent, for the purposes of production, sharing
the produce with the landholder or paying to the landholder a price certain. Here, the third element
of theft – taking without the owner’s consent – is absent because ML had a right to take the abaca.
Therefore, he should not be held criminally liable for theft (Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751 (2015),
PROBLEM:
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One morning, the police received a report of an altercation on the ground floor of GenX
Billiard Hall. Upon arriving there, PO2 RN saw 2 groups of women fighting and pulling each
other’s hair out. One of the women involved here was JM. PO2 RN asked JM to go to the
police station to file proper complaints. However, JM shouted “Wala kayong pakialam sa’kin,
‘di ako sasama sa inyo,” then grabbed PO2 RN by the collar, slapped his cheek, and
repeatedly kicked his legs several time albeit with not much power. JM was restrained and
was taken to the police station. She was then charged with direct assault. Was the proper
crime charged? Explain.
No, the proper crime is resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. The
first element of Direct Assault is that the laying of hands or use of physical force against the person
in authority or his agent must be serious. The Supreme Court has explained that the amount of force
employed against agents of persons in authority spells the difference between direct assault and
resistance or disobedience. First, the mere act of grabbing PO2 RN by the collar, slapping his cheek,
and repeatedly kicking his legs with not much power cannot be considered serious. PO2 RN could
not be expected to be seriously hurt with what JM did. Therefore, the correct crime to be charged is
resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (Mallari v. People, G.R. No.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
[IMPORTANT NOTE: Justice Leonen penned a lot of drug cases involving Sections 5
(usually sale) and 11 (illegal possession) of the law. However, MOST of these cases, resulted
to the ACQUITTAL of the accused for the police officers’ failure to comply with the Chain of
Custody provided for in Section 21. Not to mention, these cases all involve similar factual
circumstances to the point wherein you can substantially copy the doctrines of one case and
just paste it on the others. Therefore, memorize the elements of the crimes in the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act but more importantly, KNOW THE RULES ON THE
CHAIN OF CUSTODY BY HEART.
The Chain of Custody is discussed in the Evidence Section of the Remedial Law portion of
this reviewer.
The elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs are as follows:
Illegal sale: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took place; (b) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
Illegal possession: (a) accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a

prohibited or regulated drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; (c) the accused
was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.]
PROBLEM:
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), armed with a search warrant, knocked
on the door of a building and announced that they had a warrant. Upon hearing the PDEA
agents, A and B jumped out the window but were caught. On the other hand, C, D, and E
were left inside the building. During the search, the PDEA agents recovered sachets of shabu
and other drug paraphernalia. Thereafter, A and B were subjected to a drug test where both
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of them tested positive for shabu. Based on the positive drug tests conducted, an information
against A and B was filed for knowingly visiting a drug den. Should they be convicted for the
crime charged? Explain.
No, they should be acquitted. Under Section 7(b) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the
prosecution is required to show that the accused knew that the place he or she wanted to visit was a
drug den, but still visited the place despite this knowledge. In this case, the facts state that the
prosecution seemed two infer such knowledge solely from the positive drug test results. However, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the drug tests only prove that A and B had used drugs before their
arrest. It does not necessarily mean that they knew the place visited to be a drug den nor the fact that
they even used drugs there. Therefore, A and B must be acquitted (Coronel v. People, G.R. No.
[N.B. However, they were convicted under an information for Section 15 of the law – use of
prohibited drugs.]
PROBLEM:
The police set-up an entrapment operation after they received reports that several individuals
were pimping women in the red-light district of Cebu. Officers A and B went there and posed
as tourists looking for women to have sexual intercourse with. While they were walking, S
went up to them and asked if they were looking for women to sleep with. A and B answered
yes and that they wanted someone who was good in sex. S said that she had a 17-year-old girl,
CCC, who fits that description. Upon hearing this, A and B told S to bring CCC to the Q
motel. Upon the arrival of S and CCC, A and B paid S Php 500. When the latter received the
money, S was immediately apprehended by A and B’s fellow police officers. In the police
station, S argued that CCC agreed to be a prostitute and that S was just helping CCC because
the latter needed money.
(a) What crime was committed?
The crime of qualified trafficking in persons was committed. Under the Expanded Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2012, one mode of committing this crime is through the offering of a person to
another for the purpose of prostitution; and, is done by taking advantage of the victim’s vulnerability.
Moreover, one of the qualifying circumstances of the crime is when the person trafficked is a minor.
All elements are present here. First, S offered CCC to A and B for the purpose of prostitution. Second,
S took advantage of CCC’s vulnerability because the latter needed the money. In the law, it is
immaterial if the victim consents to or has knowledge that he or she is being trafficked. Lastly, CCC
was only 17 years old. With all of these circumstances, S clearly committed qualified trafficking in
persons (People v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) Differentiate the objective test and the subjective test in determining the validity of an
entrapment operation.
According to jurisprudence, the difference between these tests is the focus of the inquiry. The
subjective test looks at the accused’s predisposition to commit the offense charged and his state of
mind before his exposure to the government agents. If the accused was found to have been willing to
commit the offense even before exposure to the police, then the entrapment is valid. On the other
hand, the objective test looks at the means of inducement used by government agents – on police
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conduct – and not on the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. The test here is whether or
not the conduct of the police was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person other than a person
willing to commit the offense (Id.).
(c) S argues that the entrapment operation done was invalid. Decide.
I will rule against S – the entrapment operation was valid. Whether one uses the subjective or the
objective test, it is clear that S was predisposed to commit the crime and that A and B’s conduct would
not induce a normally law-abiding person. As the facts state, A and B were merely walking when S
approached them and asked if they wanted to have sex with a woman. Clearly, the intent to commit
the crime originated from S (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CSG, a female contractual employee of NEDA, filed a complaint against JRE, a regional
director of the same government office. According CSG, JRE told her that he has fallen in love
with her. JRE has also embraced and kissed her forehead without consent. Moreover, JRE
has groped her thigh and has sent her messages showing his amorous concern for her and
other messages suggestive of sex. As a result, CSG felt afraid to be alone in a room with JRE
and has even asked some of her officemates to always keep an eye on her whenever she was
in the office.
What crime did JRE commit?
JRE committed the crime of sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877 i.e. Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995. The three elements of the crime are as follows: (a) that the accused has
authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another; (b) that the former element exists in a work-
related, training-related, or education-related environment; and (c) that the one exercising authority,
influence, or moral-ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
Jurisprudence also explains that the crime is malum prohibitum and therefore, intent is immaterial.
As seen from the facts, all elements are present. First, JRE had authority over CSG since the former
was a Regional Director of NEDA while CSG was merely a contractual employee. Second, JRE’s
authority also existed in a work-related environment. As for the third requisite, the Supreme Court
has clarified that the demand, request, or requirement need not be articulated in a categorial statement
since it may be discerned from the acts of the offender. Clearly, all of JRE’s acts – kissing her,
confessing his love for her, etc. – undoubtedly amount to a request for sexual favors. CSG even felt
threatened to the point that she asked for her co-employees’ protection. Therefore, JRE committed
the crime of sexual harassment (Escandor v. People, G.R. No. 211962 (2020), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
OM is a grantee of mining lease contract in Palawan. In 2003, the company entered into a 25-
year Operating Agreement, with PG for the mining project. Both OM and PG separately
applied for small scale mining permits before the Provincial Board. The two applications were
approved by Governor MR, who had the power to do so. The permits were valid from 2003 to
2006; and OM and PG were allowed to extract 50,000 dry metric tons of laterite ore separately.
From 2005 to 2006, PG for itself and on behalf of OM, already extracted 203,000 dry metric
tons of nickel under their permits. In 2006, OM applied for the renewal. Governor MR again
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granted the permit for the extraction of 50,000 dry metric tons of ore. Did Governor MR
commit a crime? Explain.
Yes, he committed the crime under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Under this section, the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and, (c) that his action caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions. All elements are present here. First, MR has the legal duty under the Local
Government Code to approve small scale mining permits. Second, the facts show that MR has
committed gross inexcusable negligence in approving OM’s renewal permit, considering that the latter
already violated the terms of his first permit. They were only allowed 50,000 metric tons, but they
extracted 200,000 – an amount clearly over the limit for both OM and PG combined. Lastly, injury
was caused to the environment for allowing further extraction despite the initial overextraction.
Therefore, Governor MR committed the crime under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Reyes
v. People, G.R. No. 237172 (2019), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One afternoon, LN, a Kenyan national arriving from Dubai, presented her baggage to
Customs Examiner ML at NAIA Terminal 1. When LN opened her luggage, ML saw a small
bag which was suspiciously padded and had tampered stitches. Upon the arrival of airport
agents, the bag was opened, and it contained several packages containing a white crystalline
substance which were confirmed to be shabu. LN said that the luggage was merely given to
her in the recruiter’s office in Kenya. Assuming that the chain of custody was properly
complied with, did LN commit any crime? Explain.
Yes, she committed the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs under the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act (CDDA). Under Section 5 of the said law, the prosecution must prove that: (a)
the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (b) the prohibited drug exists. The Supreme
Court has explained that proof of ownership of the drugs is immaterial as long as the two enumerated
elements are proven. Here, LN was found to have been freely possessing the shabu when she entered
the Philippines. Therefore, the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs under the CDDA
was committed (People v. Noah, G.R. No. 228880 (2019), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
CCC filed a complaint for malicious mischief against VT who allegedly caused damage to his
multicab. AAA, a minor who witnessed the incident, accompanied CCC during the barangay
conciliation. When VT arrived at the barangay hall, CCC persuaded the former to just answer
for his liability but VT vehemently denied damaging the multicab. In the middle of the
argument, AAA suddenly interjected and said that he clearly saw VT causing the damage. VT
told AAA not to pry in their affairs, but AAA continued to accuse VT of damaging the
multicab. Out of anger, VT continuously whipped AAA three times on the neck using a wet
t-shirt, causing the latter to fall down the stairs. Because of his fall, AAA suffered a contusion.
VT was charged with child abuse. In his defense, VT argues that the crime charged is wrong
because child abuse requires intent to abuse. In this situation, he says that his act was justified
because AAA vexed him. Was the correct crime charged? Explain.
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Yes, it was. Jurisprudence explains that an intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child can be inferred from the manner in which the act complained of was
committed. Here, VT used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three times. Common
sense dictates that hitting a sensitive body part such as the neck would cause an extreme amount of
pain. Moreover, the fact that AAA fell down the stairs shows that VT used excessive force. Therefore,
VT should be held liable for other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610
(Torres v. People, G.R. No. 206627 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One night, BBB, a 9-year-old girl, was sleeping. Suddenly, she woke up when her father, JD,
started running his hands over her leg and breasts. BBB also felt JD poking his erect penis
against her buttocks. BBB begged her father to stop so JD moved away and went out of the
house. What crime was committed by JD? Explain.
JD committed the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The
implementing rules and regulations of the law defines lascivious conduct as intentional touching of
several body parts which includes thighs and buttocks, with an intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify the
sexual desire of any person. In this case, JD ran his hands over his own 9-year-old daughter’s thighs
and breasts. Moreover, BBB was a minor who is protected under this law. Therefore, JD committed
the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (People v. Divinagracia, Sr.,
PROBLEM:
AAA was placed by her parents in the custody of their neighbor AL. During AAA’s stay with
AL, she suffered physical abuse such as strangulation, beating, pinching, and the touching of
her sex organ. AL was then charged with child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. In her
defense, AL argued that the physical injuries inflicted on the child were not proven to be so
grave as to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of AAA. Decide.
I will rule against AL. Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse, whether habitual or not,
includes physical abuse and cruelty imposed on the child. Jurisprudence has explained that Section
10(a) punishes four distinct offenses: (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d)
being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. However, the element that the
acts done must be prejudicial to the child’s development is only required in the fourth instance. Since
AL is being punished for child abuse, the prosecution need not prove the prejudicial effects of AL’s
acts. Moreover, the act of strangling, beating, and pinching the child can definitely be characterized as
cruel and abusive. Therefore, AL was properly charged with child abuse under Section 10(a) of the
law (Lucido v. People, G.R. No. 217764 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
PP forcefully inserted his finger into the private organ of his neighbor AAA, a 12-year-old girl.
He was then charged with child abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. PP now
argues that he is only liable for acts of lasciviousness because AAA was not a child exploited
in prostitution nor subjected to other sexual abuse. Decide.
I will rule against PP. Jurisprudence explains that a child under the coercion and influence of an adult
is sufficient is sufficient to classify the child victim as one subjected to other sexual abuse. Therefore,
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by Paul Tan
when PP inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat of coercion, he is
already liable for sexual abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 (Perez v. People, G.R. No. 201414 (2018),
REMEDIAL LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
PROBLEM:
FS Inc. obtained a loan worth Php 40M from PBCOM. This was secured by a real estate
mortgage over several parcels of land. FS subsequently defaulted which led PBCOM to file a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Thereafter, the mortgaged properties
were auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest bidder.
Three days after the auction sale, FS filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
with the RTC, claiming that it never received the loan proceeds, but PBCOM still sought the
foreclosure of the mortgage. In its opposition, PBCOM asserted that the RTC failed to
acquire jurisdiction over FS’ complaint since it was a real action, and the latter did not pay
docket fees based on the fair market value of the properties. In FS’ rebuttal, it alleged that its
complaint was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Decide.
I will rule in favor of FS. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended provides that RTCs have the exclusive
and original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Jurisprudence also
instructs that to resolve whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
or not, one must first determine the nature of the principal action or the remedy sought. Here, the
facts show that FS never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed – it assailed the
validity of the loan because it supposedly never received the proceeds. Moreover, the complaint was
filed only three days after the auction sale which means that the redemption period has not yet lapsed.
In other words, the properties were not yet registered in the name of PBCOM when FS filed its
complaint. Therefore, the subject matter of his complaint was one incapable of pecuniary estimation
(First Sarmiento v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 202836 (2018), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
MS executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, CS over two lots. In 1978, CS
subsequently sold the lots to VP. 12 years later, VP discovered that CS had executed a
quitclaim, stating that he was renouncing his interest as the owner in one of the lots in favor
of RA. Thereafter, the other lot was also sold to RA who developed them as a part of a
subdivision. Subsequently, RA filed an application for the issuance of an original certificate
of title which was granted by RTC branch 1 in 1993. This became final and executory. In 1996,
VP filed a complaint to recover the land and declare the nullity of RA’s title with damages and
this case was raffled to RTC branch 2. RA argues that RTC branch 2 does not have the
jurisdiction to nullify RTC branch 1’s decision because it is only the CA or the SC which has
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that power. Assuming that the lots are worth Php 5M, does RTC branch 2 have jurisdiction
over VP’s complaint? Decide.
Yes, RTC branch 2 has jurisdiction. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the Regional Trial Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of the property
exceeds Php 20,000 or Php 50,000 for civil actions in Metro Manila. Jurisprudence explains that an
action for reconveyance admits the registration of title but claims that it was erroneous because the
plaintiff has a superior right over the property. On the other hand, an action for annulment of title
questions the validity of the title because the procedure taken was invalid. Therefore, it is clear the
actions here are original, real actions under the RTC branch 2’s jurisdiction and not merely an action
for annulment of RTC branch 1’s judgment (Sps. Aboitiz v. Sps. Po, G.R. No. 208450 and 208497
[N.B. Pursuant to R.A. 11576, effective on August 21, 2021, the jurisdiction of all first level courts
over real actions i.e. actions which involve title to, or possession of any real property, or any interest
therein, has now been increased to properties or interests which DO NOT EXCEED PHP 400,000.
Take note also of the following points:

a) That the difference for the values between Metro Manila and other cities/municipalities has
been deleted;
b) That actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry are still within the MTC’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction; and
c) That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The Court also reminds us here that in an action for reconveyance against the defendant, the person
who had sold the land to the defendant, i.e. the transferor, is not an indispensable party.]
PROBLEM:
Mr. AG and FCI company entered into a sale where the former sold shares in Alabang Country
Club and Manila Polo Club under his name to the latter. A few months after the sale, the
shares were sold at a public auction to the Philippine Investment System Organization (PISO)
due to an existing lien the latter had over said shares. Because of this, FCI filed a complaint
for Other Deceits under Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code against AG for allegedly
misrepresenting that the shares were not subject to any liens or encumbrances.
The information was filed with the RTC who acquitted AG for insufficiency of evidence. FCI
filed an MR which was denied, so it subsequently filed an appeal to the CA for the civil aspect
of the case. 2 months after, the Prosecutor’s Office and FCI also filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC, assailing AG acquittal.
If you were the lawyer of AG, what arguments will you present on behalf of your client?
I will present two arguments: (a) that the proceedings in the RTC were void for the court’s lack of
jurisdiction and (b) that FCI committed forum shopping when it files an appeal with the CA and a
petition for certiorari with the SC.
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First, B.P. 129, as amended, states that it is the MTC which has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
with imprisonment of less than 6 years, irrespective of fine. Here, the crime of Other Deceits only has
a penalty of arresto mayor – one which has a period of less than 6 years. Therefore, the information
should have been filed with the MTC. It has also been ruled by the Supreme Court that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not by the allegations of the parties nor by their or with the court’s acquiescence.
Therefore, the issue of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding.
Second, I will also argue that FCI was guilty of forum shopping. Here, the elements of forum shopping
are present in the appeal to the CA and in the petition for certiorari with the SC. First, the parties are
the same – GA against FCI with the People. Second, since the facts do not show that FCI has made
a reservation for filing an action for civil liability ex delicto nor has filed a separate civil action, this civil
aspect of the case is deemed included even on appeal. Therefore, in the CA and in the SC, the issue
of civil liability ex delicto will be litigated and resolved. Lastly, that since the first two elements are
present, any judgment rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other.
Because of these points, I will pray that the Court dismiss FCI’s action (Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals,
Inc, G.R. No. 172505 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The Philippine College of Criminology (PCC) issued a Board Resolution No. 1 stating that
upon Chairman and President ES’ death or whenever he chooses to relinquish his position,
EVP AB shall become the President and Board Chairperson. No one opposed this. However,
upon ES death, several board members convened without AB’s knowledge and elected MC
as the new Chairman of the Board.
As a result, AB filed a petition for Quo Warranto since his removal was invalid due to the
board members not meeting the required quorum when they elected MC as the new
chairman. The RTC denied the petition, but AB filed an appeal which is now pending in the
CA.
Thereafter, AB filed an action for Specific Performance, asking MC and the new Board to
honor the commitment they made in Board Resolution No. 1.
As MC’s lawyer in the second case that AB filed, what defense would you proffer? Explain.
I will argue that the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. According to the
Supreme Court, the test for determining forum shopping is to ask whether the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia
requires that there be an identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and, (c) that a judgment in one would amount to res judicata on the
other. Here, all requisites of litis pendentia are present. First, the parties involved in the two cases are
both AB against MB and the other Board members. Second, both actions are anchored on AB’s
supposed rights from Board Resolution No. 1 where it was agreed upon that he would serve as
President and Chairman upon ES’ death. A judgment in his favor in either case, would make him the
President and Chairman of PCC. Therefore, the second case should be dismissed on the ground of
forum shopping (Philippine College of Criminology et al. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 242486 (2020),
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PROBLEM:
City of Taguig filed a complaint for judicial confirmation and territory before the RTC of
Pasig against the City of Makati. The RTC ruled in favor of Taguig. Makati then filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA and argued that the RTC’s decision was
void since the judge issued it after he had retired. Subsequently, Makati also filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision with the RTC. Taguig filed a motion to dismiss with the
CA, arguing that Makati engaged in forum shopping. On the other hand, Makati argues that
the causes of action and the reliefs sought are different. Decide.
I will rule in favor of Taguig. A Petition for Annulment under Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that its purpose is to have a final and executory judgment set aside so there can
be a renewal of litigation. On the other hand, a motion for reconsideration under Rule 37 asks the
court to set aside the judgement that it rendered. The Supreme Court has explained that the purposes
of these remedies are fundamentally the same and they only differ on their grounds and on the periods
wherein they can be filed. Therefore, the cause of action – the void judgment – and the reliefs sought
are actually the same. With these considerations, Makati clearly engaged in forum shopping (City of
Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No. 208393 (2016), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The Court emphasized that first, the filing of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment was
improper because this remedy can only be availed of after the decision has become final and executory.
Second, the lack of the court’s jurisdiction can be raised in a motion for reconsideration.]
PROBLEM:
What are the cases wherein parties may go directly to court without first complying with the
precondition of undergoing barangay conciliation?
According to Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, the cases are as follows: (a) when the accused is
under detention; (b) when a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings; (c) where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and (d) where action
may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations (Sps. Mañas v. Nicolasora, G.R. No. 208845
[N.B. See Circular No. 14-93, July 15, 1993 for a more exhaustive list.]
PROBLEM:
ABC filed a case against DEF. Subsequently, FGH filed a motion for intervention in the same
case, arguing that it had the same rights as ABC against DEF. However, before the Court
could rule on FGH’s petition, the former already issued a decision on the merits between ABC
and DEF, ruling that ABC’s claim must fail.
(a) As the trial court judge handling this case, what action will you take as regards FGH’s
petition?
I will dismiss it since it has already become moot and academic. The Supreme Court has ruled that a
case becomes moot when a supervening event has terminated the legal issue between the parties, such
that the Court is left with nothing to resolve. In other words, there ceases to be a justiciable
controversy. Since ABC’s petition has been denied with finality, FGH simply has no more case to
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intervene in. Therefore, his motion must be dismissed (Express Telecomm., v. AZ Comm., G.R. No.
(b) What are the exceptions wherein the Court may still rule on moot cases?
According to the Supreme Court, the exceptions are as follows: (a) when there are grave constitutional
violations present; (b) when the case is exceptional in character; (c) when paramount public interest is
involved; (d) when the case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; (e)
when the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (Id.).
PROBLEM:
To secure a loan, MMI Corp. mortgaged its property to CP Corp. Then, a second mortgage
was executed in favor of DBP and PNB. When MMI defaulted, DBP and PNB jointly
foreclosed the property. CP, as first mortgagee, foreclosed the mortgage but DBP redeemed
it after. The property became part of the DBP’s assets. When DBP offered the property for
sale, CR Corp. emerged as the highest bidder. In the deed of absolute sale, DBP made a
promise to deliver the title free from any liens and encumbrances. However, the title
contained annotations from the mortgage of PNB and a lien for unpaid taxes. This led CR to
file a complaint for specific performance with the RTC against DBP. Trial ensued. After CR
Corp had rested its case, DBP moved to file a third-party complaint to implead the Asset
Privatization Trust who had the obligation to pay for the taxes and to have the lien cancelled.
On the other hand, CR argues that admitting the third-party complaint would cause
unreasonable delay and entail unnecessary costs. The RTC agreed with CR and decided not
to admit the third-party complaint. Was the RTC’s decision proper? Explain.
Yes, it was proper. First, DBP, as mortgagee of the property can pay the tax liability and cause the
cancellation of the tax lien since there was no legal impossibility which prevented this. Second, the
Supreme Court has ruled that discretion is with the trial court whether or not to admit a third-party
complaint. The trial court would have wasted time and effort had it admitted the complaint because
CR Corp. had already rested its case when the motion for leave to admit it was filed. Therefore, the
RTC was correct in denying the admission of the third-party complaint (DBP v. Clarges Realty Corp.,
[N.B. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure now provides an additional paragraph in Rule 6, Section
11: “The third (fourth, etc.) - party complaint shall be denied admission, and the court shall require
the defendant to institute a separate action, where: (a) the third (fourth, etc.)- party defendant cannot
be located within thirty (30) calendar days from the grant of such leave; (b) matters extraneous to the
issue in the principal case are raised; or (c) the effect would be to introduce a new and separate
controversy into the action.”
Based on the wording of this paragraph, I would like to believe that the doctrine in this case has not
been rendered useless. As seen from the word “shall”, it is clear that these are the situations wherein
the court has no discretion in determining whether or not to admit the third-party complaint. Under
these circumstances, the court is mandated to deny the complaint. Therefore, if these circumstances
are not present, I would argue that it is still within the court’s discretion to decide whether or not to
admit or deny the third-party complaint.]
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROBLEM:
Does the accused have the right to cross-examine witnesses during preliminary investigation?
Explain.
No, the accused does not have that right at this stage. The Supreme Court has explained that the
accused does not have this right during preliminary investigation because the prosecutor has yet to file
an information which would trigger such right into operation. It is the filing of the complaint or
information in court that initiates a criminal action; and, it is only when a person stands trial may he
demand that right to confront and cross-examine his accusers (Dichaves v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
206310-11 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Company A was authorized by an Ordinance to clamp illegally parked vehicles. On May 7, B
parked his car by the side of the road. When he came back, he was surprised to see that his
car was clamped for being illegally parked. B, needing to rush to his next appointment,
forcibly took off the clamp. On May 23, Company A filed a complaint against B in the
Prosecutor’s office for forcibly removing the clamp – an act penalized by the same ordinance.
On October 2, a criminal information dated July 25 was filed by the Prosecutor with the MTC.
(c) What is the prescription period for violations of ordinances?
The prescriptive period is two months from the commission of the violation or from the discovery
thereof. (Secs. 1 – 2, Act No. 3326)
(d) In the MTC, B argues that the violation has already prescribed. A, on the other hand,
argues that the filing of the complaint with the Prosecutor has tolled the prescriptive
period. Decide. (Assume that all the dates in the problem fall within the same year).
I will rule in favor of B on the ground of prescription. Violations of ordinances are covered not by
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code but by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Sec. 11 of the
latter provides that only the filing of an information in court tolls the prescriptive period when the
crime charged is punished by an ordinance. In other words, only an information filed in court will toll
this period – not a complaint filed with the Prosecutor. Since the crime was committed on May 7, the
information was clearly filed beyond the two-month period. Therefore, the case against B must be
dismissed on the ground that the crime has already prescribed (Id.).
PROBLEM:
The city prosecutor filed 4 informations for oral defamation against DV, pursuant to a
complaint filed by JV. During trial, the private prosecutor was absent despite notice. On the
motion of DV, the MTC considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further
evidence and to make a formal offer of evidence. JV, through his private prosecutor alone,
subsequently filed an MR, explaining that his failure to appear was due to his high blood
pressure. DV filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his
conformity to the private prosecutor’s MR. Should the MTC grant the MR? Decide.
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The MTC should deny the MR. In accordance with Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the public prosecutor’s conformity to the MR is necessary. The Supreme Court has ruled
that the conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity but was mandatory since a
private party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of the case. Here,
JV’s failure to get the conformity of the public prosecutor was fatal. Therefore, the MR should be
denied (Valderrama v. People, G.R. No. 220054 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
TD is the Chair and CEO of SBME while VD is the Treasurer and also a member of the
Board. TD filed a complaint against VD for libel. According to the information, VD sent
electronic messages to other persons, saying that TD is bleeding the company in the guise of
being an environmental advocate. Before she was arraigned, VD moved to quash the
informations arguing that the facts do not constitute an offense since it allegedly fails to allege
publication. Moreover, VD argues that the officer who filed the information had no authority
since the information did not contain an allegation as to where the crime was committed. The
judge handling the case granted VD’s motions and quashed the informations. Was the judge’s
action proper? Decide.
No, it was improper. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order
that an amendment be made. The Supreme Court has ruled that first, when the ground used is that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court must give the prosecution a chance to amend
the information. On the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the same can also be cured by amendment in
this particular case. For an information to be quashed on the prosecutor’s lack of authority to file it,
the lack of authority must be evident on the fact of the information. Here, since the informations do
not allege any particular venue, the authority of the prosecutor, or lack of it, cannot be seen on its
face. Therefore, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to amend it (Dio v. People, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
A, B, C, and D (the petitioners) are members of congress. In December of 2006, three murder
cases were filed against them. The petitioners filed a motion to quash the complaint, arguing
that there was no valid complaint against them, and that the preliminary investigation was
highly irregular. The prosecutor however denied their motion and filed two informations
against them for the crime of murder. When the case was already before the RTC, the
petitioners again raised the irregularity of the preliminary investigation. A few days after, the
judge noted several irregularities and ordered the prosecutor to conduct another preliminary
investigation.
Was the judge’s action proper? Explain.
No, it was improper. Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge
has three options when the complaint or information is filed before him: (a) to dismiss the case if the
evidence clearly fails to establish probable cause; (b) to issue warrant of arrest or commitment order
if the findings show probable cause; and (c) to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if
there is doubt on the existence of probable cause. Therefore, when the judge ruled on the irregularity
of the preliminary investigation and reordered another preliminary investigation, she actually
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encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutor. Clearly, the judge’s action was improper
(Maza v. Turla, G.R. No. 187094 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
One evening, police operatives conducted a stake-out operation in Bacolod. While
conducting the operation, PO2 RV heard noises from one of the houses. RV peeped through
the window and saw SL having a pot session. Because of this, RV entered the room and
arrested SL. He underwent a drug test and he tested positive for shabu. He was then charged
with the crime of use of dangerous drugs. Assisted by his counsel, SL entered his plea of not
guilty. However, during trial, SL argued that his arrest was illegal since RV’s act of peeping
through the window violated his right to privacy. On the other hand, the prosecution argues
that SL has waived his right to question his arrest. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the prosecution. The Supreme Court has ruled that any objection involving the
arrest of the person must be made before he enters his plea. Otherwise, it is deemed waived. Since the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect
in the arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits himself to such jurisdiction. Here, SL
entered his plea without filing a motion to quash to information or questioning his arrest beforehand.
Therefore, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest (Lapi v. People,
[N.B. J. Leonen here reminds us that the waiver of the validity of the arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the admissibility of evidence. However, since the crime here was use of drugs, there is no
need to establish the presence of the drug specimen itself unlike in the crime of illegal possession or
sale.]
PROBLEM:
Mayor EB and the other officers of the City of Makati entered into a contract with AM
Company for the purpose of buying Php 38M worth of hospital beds and cabinets. However,
upon post-audit, the Commission on Audit (COA) discovered that the contract was awarded
to AM without benefit of public bidding. Moreover, it was also seen that the total cost of the
items was only around Php 2M. Because of this, Mayor EB and the City officers were charged
with violating Section 3(e) the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and with malversation.
During trial, Mayor EB argues that he was not served with copies of her co-accused’s motions
for reconsideration during preliminary investigation. Therefore, her right to due process was
violated. Decide.
I will rule against Mayor EB. The Supreme Court has ruled that a preliminary investigation is not part
of trial and is not subject to the same due process requirements during trial. A person’s rights during
preliminary investigation are limited to those found in Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Under this provision, a respondent has the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his co-respondents.
Therefore, Mayor EB’s allegation is unmeritorious (Binay v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 213957-58 (2019),
PROBLEM:
Explain the rules on bail after conviction.
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Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court state that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, the accused
shall be denied bail or shall be cancelled upon a showing, with notice of the accused, of the following
or similar circumstances (a) that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by reiteration; (b) that he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) that
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) that the
circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) that there is undue
risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the presence of just one of the enumerated circumstances is sufficient to deny or cancel bail
(Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 237172 (2019), unanimous decision, citing Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure).
PROBLEM:
OV was one of the members of JOK fraternity who were charged with violating the anti-hazing
law. It was alleged in the information that “OV, a member of JOK fraternity subjected one
WD to hazing or initiation by placing WD, the recruit, in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation such as forcing him to do physical activity or subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury…”
After arraignment, the information was amended to correct WD’s name by adding the suffix
“III” to it i.e. the name, as originally stated, was not WD III.
(a) First, OV argues that the phrase “as a prerequisite for admission into membership in
a fraternity…” was an essential element of hazing which should have been alleged in
the Information. Decide.
I will rule that the argument is unmeritorious. Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
is clear that the information does not need to use the exact language of the statute. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has explained this further by stating that the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him is upheld as long as the crime is reasonably adequate
to apprise him of the offense charged. The words “fraternity”, “hazing or initiation”, “recruit” shows
the true nature and cause of the accusation. As a result, he would be able to prepare his defense and
evidence based on that information. In any case, he should have moved to quash it before arraignment
– which he didn’t. This only means that he had already acquiesced to its validity and sufficiency
(Villarba v. CA, G.R. No. 227777 (2020), unanimous decision).
(b) Differentiate a formal amendment from a substantial amendment.
According to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the similarities and distinctions are as follows: first,
any amendment, whether it be formal or substantial, may be made without leave of court before the
arraignment. However, after arraignment, only formal amendments may be made but only if there is
leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. On the other hand, a substantial
amendment can no longer be made unless it is beneficial to the accused.
Second, unlike a substantial amendment, a second arraignment is not required for a formal
amendment. This is so because a formal amendment does not charge a new offense, alter the
prosecution’s theory, or adversely affect the accused’s substantial rights (Id.).
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(c) Second, OV argues that he should have been arraigned under the amended
information which added “III” to WD’s name. Decide.
The argument is unmeritorious. From the previous discussion, it would be clear that merely adding
“III” to WD’s name is a formal amendment which does not require that OV be rearraigned (Id.).
PROBLEM:
AE was shot to death by CS in Nueva Ecija. CS was caught in flagrante delicto, arrested, and
charged for murder. During his arraignment, CS admitted the killing but pleaded self-
defense. Trial ensued. In the meantime, the wife of AE filed a complaint affidavit which
implicated mayor JC as the one who ordered CS to kill AE. The prosecutor found probable
cause to indict JC in the murder and he filed an amended information before the RTC. The
new information merely added the phrase “conspiring and confederating together,” along
with JC’s name as one of the accused. This led AC and AE to file a motion arguing that the
amendment was improperly made because it was a substantial amendment done after
arraignment.
(a) Was the amendment a formal one or a substantial one? Explain.
The amendment is merely a formal one. The Supreme Court has ruled that a formal amendment is
one which does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. Here, the amended information only
included JC’s name as one of the co-accused and inserted the phrase “conspiring and confederating
together.” These additions do not alter the basic theory of the prosecution that CS willfully and
intentionally shot AE. Therefore, the amendment is merely formal (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No.
(b) Based on your answer in the previous question, was the amendment here proper?
Explain.
No, it was improper. Under Section 14, Rule 110, formal amendments are allowed after the accused
has entered his plea only when they do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test in determining
if there is prejudice to the defendant is whether or not a defense under the original information would
still be available after the amendment is made. Upon his arraignment under the original information,
CS admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Though the allegation of conspiracy is merely a
formal amendment, CS will be prejudiced because self-defense cannot be argued anymore if JC
allegedly ordered AE’s killing. Therefore, this formal amendment after plea is not allowed (Id.).
PROBLEM:
GO was shot dead while he was in an ukay-ukay in Palawan. MR was arrested. He executed
an extrajudicial confession confessing that he shot GO and at the same time, alleged that it
was former Governor MJ who ordered GO’s killing. Sec. of Justice (SOJ) LDL created a special
panel (first panel) of prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the first
panel issued a resolution dismissing the affidavit-complaint against MJ. Subsequently, GO’s
wife filed a motion to re-open preliminary investigation, seeking to admit additional evidence.
SOJ LDL then created a new panel (second panel). MJ then filed a petition for certiorari and
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prohibition before the CA, alleging that SOJ LDL gravely abused her discretion in creating a
second panel to conduct preliminary investigation.
(a) Is SOJ LDL’s decision to create the second panel within the scope of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition? Explain.
Yes, it is. The Supreme Court has explained that in the conduct of preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions which would generally take it out of the ambit
of a writ of certiorari which is directed against the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On
the other hand, a writ of prohibition is also directed against the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. Since the conduct of preliminary investigation is also not an exercise of a
ministerial function, then generally, the writ of prohibition is also unavailing.
However, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of
grave abuse of discretion. Since MJ alleges that the creation of the second panel was done in grave
abuse of discretion, his petition is properly the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (De
Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Is the SOJ authorized to create motu proprio another panel of prosecutors to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case? Explain.
Yes, she is authorized. Pursuant to Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the SOJ may motu proprio
reverse or modify resolutions of the prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. The
Supreme Court has expounded on this by stating that the SOJ exercises control and supervision over
prosecutors. Here, the SOJ had reason to believe that the first panel’s resolution might result to a
miscarriage of justice. The second panel was created not to overturn the findings of the first, but to
ensure that all the pieces evidence were considered in the investigation. Therefore, the SOJ’s creation
of the second panel was proper (Id.).
[N.B. The petition of Reyes was rendered moot and academic since an information was filed and a
warrant of arrest had already been issued against him. Pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul, the filing of the
information in court vests the latter with jurisdiction over the case and all actions thereafter rest within
its sound discretion.
In Napoles v. De Lima, G.R. No. 213529 (2016), unanimous decision, which was also penned by J.
Leonen, he once again reminds us of this doctrine. There, the Court stated that when an information
is filed in court, the question of probable cause for filing the information is mooted since any
disposition of the case – its dismissal, the conviction or acquittal of the accused – rests in the sound
discretion of the Court.]
PROBLEM:
Company A, which sells second-hand cars, filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor against its supervisor B for qualified theft and estafa. B was A’s Used Car
Supervisor who allegedly failed to remit several payments and to account for several cars
under his care. Two informations for qualified theft and estafa respectively were filed with the
RTC. However, presiding Judge C dismissed these cases, finding that the evidence adduced
did not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses charged. Judge C explained that
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the prosecution did not prove crucial elements of the crimes such as A’s ownership over the
cars allegedly unaccounted for and B’s official receipt of these cars.
(a) Differentiate the probable cause determined by a prosecutor and the probable cause
determined by a judge.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained the differences between these two. First, probable cause
determined by a prosecutor is done by the executive during preliminary investigation. Here, the
prosecutor has the sole discretion to determine whether probable cause exists that a crime has been
committed, that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and that the latter should be held for trial.
On the other hand, the judicial determination for probable cause takes place once the information has
been filed in court. Here, the judge personally determines whether or not there is probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest. (Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) A argues that Judge C gravely abused her discretion in dismissing the cases after the
prosecutor has found probable cause to charge B. Decide.
I will rule against A. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that once a complaint is filed in court,
any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court. Moreover, Sec. 6(a) of the Rule
112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly allows the judge to immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. In this case, Judge C validly dismissed
the case because her independent assessment revealed that elements of the crimes charged were not
shown. Therefore, she was correct in ruling that there was no probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest and that the cases should be dismissed (Id.).
PROBLEM:
PR filed a complaint against her husband, AK for a violation of R.A. 9262 i.e. Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children. AK allegedly punched PR’s head, dragged her by her hair, and
pushed her head against the wall. The RTC acquitted AK on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, PR filed a Complaint for Damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Because of this, AK filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. He claimed that
the dismissal of the criminal case barred the filing of the civil case because both cases
allegedly involved identical causes of action. Will you grant AK’s motion to dismiss? Explain.
I will deny his motion to dismiss. Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a
civil action may proceed independently if it is provided for in Article 33 of the New Civil Code. On
the other hand, Article 33 includes physical injuries which is understood in their ordinary sense. Here,
violence under the VAWC law is subsumed under Article 33. Lastly, the Supreme Court has explained
that if the acquittal is based only on reasonable doubt, the plaintiff may still prove the accused’s civil
liability by a preponderance of evidence only. Therefore, PR may still prove AK’s civil liability through
the independent civil action that she filed (Kane v. Roggenkamp, G.R. No. 214326 (2020), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
A, B, and C kidnapped MGC for the purposes of obtaining ransom and brought her to a resort
owned by ME. An information was filed against A, B, and C for kidnapping for ransom.
During trial, A became a state witness and implicated ME and RV, stating that they served
as advisers. Because of this, ME and RV were also charged as co-conspirators in the crime.
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Subsequently, ME filed a petition for bail which was denied by the RTC – a decision which
was affirmed by the CA. The CA’s decision became final. In the meantime, RV was arrested.
Subsequently, RV applied for bail. Thereafter, the RTC granted RV’s bail application and
stated that A’s testimony does not adequately prove that ME and RV served as advisers for
the crime.
Upon learning about RV’s meritorious bail petition, ME once again filed a petition for bail
before the RTC. He argues that as stated as ruled in RV’s bail application, A’s testimony was
insufficient to prove his participation in the crime. However, the RTC denied ME’s petition,
ruling it is barred by res judicata due to the finality of the CA’s decision for his first bail
application. Was the RTC correct? Explain.
No, the RTC was incorrect. First, it is a well-settled rule that the concept of res judicata has no bearing
in criminal proceedings. Moreover, even assuming that the concept applies herein, the finality of the
CA’s decision for his first bail application does not bar the filing of the second. This is because a denial
of an application for bail is only interlocutory in nature. On the other hand, res judicata applies only to
a final judgment on the merits of a case. Therefore, the RTC was incorrect in denying ME’s petition
(People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed a municipality’s direct procurement of
computer equipment and software from AS Corp. Subsequently, several individuals filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman against A, B, and C, members of the Sangguniang Bayan
(the members) for allegedly violating R.A. 3019 and R.A. 9184 when they authorized the direct
procurement of the items. The Ombudsman indicted the members for violating R.A. 3019 and
recommended that they be found guilty of grave misconduct as well. Aggrieved, the members
filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition, stating that it only
had jurisdiction over the issuance of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
Was the CA’s action proper? Explain.
Yes, it was. The Supreme Court has explained the different remedies available to the accused from the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases and in the finding of probable cause in criminal cases.
First, in administrative disciplinary cases, the Ombudsman’s decisions may only be appealed to the
CA under a Rule 43 petition. On the other hand, the remedy available to the accused when the
Ombudsman finds probable cause against him in a criminal case is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 filed before the SC. In this case, the members were indicted for allegedly violating R.A. 3019.
Therefore, they should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the SC (Ornales v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 214312 (2018), unanimous decision).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROBLEM:
SP, an American citizen, married MS, a Filipina, in Quezon City. Barely three months into
their marriage, MS filed a Complaint-Affidavit against SP for maltreatment in relation to R.A.
No. 9262 i.e. Anti-VAWC law. She alleged that her friends were telling her that SP had a
girlfriend who worked in Manila Peninsula Hotel. Allegedly, SP would also shout at MS and
would even give her two small tablets nightly which made her dizzy. This complaint was
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unfortunately dismissed by the assistant city prosecutor during preliminary investigation. The
day after the MS’ complaint was dismissed, CM, MS’s mother, filed with a petition praying
for the temporary protection order (TPO) or permanent protection order (PPO) for MS’
benefit. CM used the same allegations that MS did, along with an allegation that MS was
admitted to the hospital because of SP’s acts of violence. Subsequently, the RTC issued a
TPO. Thereafter, SP filed a motion praying for the dismissal of CM’s petition and the
reconsideration of the TPO.
(a) He argues that CM had no legal personality to file the petition for the benefit of her
daughter, MS. SP cites the portions of the procedural rules issued by the SC governing
proceedings under the Anti-VAWC law stating, “that filing a petition for a protection
order by the offended party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file
similar petitions.” Decide.
I will rule against SP. Section 9 of the Anti-VAWC law expressly provides that a petition for the
protection order may be filed by the parents of the offended party. Clearly, the petition for the issuance
of the protection order is not limited to the alleged victim herself. Moreover, the provision cited by
CM expressly provides only for suspensions of the right of other authorized party. From the facts of
the case, this suspension did not even arise because MS’ complaint was dismissed during preliminary
investigation; and, this is not a prior judicial proceeding which could lead to the issuance of the
protection order. Therefore, there is no doubt that CM had the legal personality to file her petition
(Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) He also argues that CM’s petition should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata
because she only filed a petition for the issuance of a protection order after the criminal
complaint under the Anti-VAWC law was dismissed by the prosecutor. Decide.
I will rule against CM. The Supreme Court has ruled that a ruling in an investigative exercise – such
as fact-finding and preliminary investigations – could not be the basis of res judicata. During preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor does not exercise adjudication – it is merely inquisitorial. Therefore, the
prosecutor could not have ruled on the merits of the protection order. On the other hand, res judicata
requires that there must have been a judgment or order on the merits in the previous case. Here, as
explained, no such judgment or order exists.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled doctrine that res judicata does not apply in criminal law cases, except in
the concept of double jeopardy. However, even if SP argues the dismissal on the ground of double
jeopardy, it will still be unmeritorious. As explained by the Supreme Court, first jeopardy attaches only
after a valid indictment. Here, there was no indictment to speak of (Id.).
[N.B. Another issue in this case was whether the service of summons was validly served on Pavlow.
He raised that the service of summons was invalid because it was done via substituted service to an
employee residing at his house. To justify the mode of service, Court cited the phrase “If, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section…” Note however that the phrase in bold has already been deleted in the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure which now categorically require at least three attempts on two different dates of
personal service as explained in the landmark case of Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974
(2017), unanimous decision).]
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PROBLEM:
RD obtained several loans amounting to Php 6.9M from MB Bank. However, RD defaulted
so MB sent him demand letters, stating that his outstanding debt has ballooned to Php 44M
which consisted of the principal amount, along with interest, penalties, and attorney’s fees.
RD still ignored MB’s request, so the latter filed a collection case with the RTC. The RTC
ruled in favor of MB. On appeal, RD raised for the first time the issue of the trial court’s lack
of jurisdiction over the complaint due to MB’s deliberate attempt to evade the correct
payment of docket fees. According to RD, MB only paid the fees corresponding to the
principal amount of Php 6.9. However, as shown by the Statement of Account attached to the
complaint, the true amount it was claiming was Php 44M. On the other hand, MB argues that
it was impossible to compute the true amount of the interests, penalties, and attorney’s fees
since the date of RD’s actual payment was still uncertain. Therefore, MB argues that if the
judgment awarded goes beyond the principal amount, the additional docket fees shall just be
a lien on the judgment.
(a) Can RD raise the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction for the first time on appeal? Explain.
Yes, RD can. The Supreme Court has ruled that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and the right to raise it is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. A party
is only estopped from raising the issue when it does so in an unjustly belated manner especially when
it participated during trial. Here, the general rule applies. Even if RD did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction in the first instance, he raised it as soon as he appealed his case. Therefore, this can still
be considered as a timely challenge on the RTC’s jurisdiction (Heirs of Dragon v. The Manila Banking
Corp., G.R. No. 205068 (2019), unanimous decision).
[N.B. As repeatedly cited by litigants who try to strike down a party’s belated challenge of a court’s
jurisdiction, the rule of estoppel was laid down in the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. However, the
Court has been consistent in ruling that this is a HIGHLY EXCEPTIONAL CASE which can only
be applied if the factual circumstances present therein are also present in the case where its doctrine
is being invoked. In the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the estopped party – Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co – waited for 15 years before raising the issue of the CFI’s jurisdiction. Before that, Manila Surety
repeatedly invoked the court’s jurisdiction by seeking several affirmative reliefs. It was only when the
CA affirmed the CFI’s decision that Manila Surety decided to challenge the latter’s jurisdiction. Again,
this was only 15 years after it had first participated in the case. To use the Court’s words, the Tijam
doctrine “must be applied with great care, otherwise, the doctrine may be a most effective weapon for
the accomplishment of injustice.”
The Court also reminds us here that Plaintiff must pay docket fees on interests, penalties, and
attorney’s fees which have accrued as of the time of the filing of the complaint.]
(b) Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the case? Explain.
No, the court did not acquire jurisdiction due to MB’s failure to pay the correct docket fees. The
Supreme Court has ruled that paying the filing fees in full at the time of filing is necessary for the court
to acquire jurisdiction. For actions involving recovery of money or damages, the aggregate amount of
claimed should be the basis for assessment of docket fees. Therefore, the basis for assessing the docket
fees to be paid by MB was not only the principal amount but the whole amount of Php 44M. MB’s
argument should be struck down because this exception only applies when the court awards an
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amount greater than that prayed for. Here, MB was already asking for the Php 44M from the time it
sent its demand letters to RD. Since he deliberately used the amount of only Php 6.9 in paying the
docket fees, his case should be dismissed for the court’s lack of jurisdiction (Id.).
PROBLEM:
A filed a case with the RTC against B, a subdivision developer. A alleged that B, in bad faith,
subsequently sold a parcel of land which he previously bought. The RTC ruled in favor of A.
B appealed to the CA but the latter upheld the decision of the RTC. Subsequently, B appealed
to the SC and alleged for the first time, that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over A’s
complaint since he should have filed it with the HLURB. In his defense, A argues that B is
now estopped because he only raised this issue in the SC, 22 years from the time he filed his
complaint. Moreover, A argues that the law conferring jurisdiction over the subject matter to
the HLURB was already in effect when the controversy ensued.
(a) What are the requisites for the Tijam doctrine to be applied?
The Supreme Court has explained that the following must be present for the Tijam doctrine to be
applied: (a) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant; (b) the statutory right was not invoked;
(c) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction; (d) the
claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without
jurisdiction; (e) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject
matter jurisdiction; and (f) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the
forum and the claimant’s implicit waiver (Amoguis v. Sps. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626 (2018),
(b) In whose favor will your rule – A or B? Explain.
I will rule in favor of A. In accordance with the requisites enumerated, the doctrine of Tijam applies
in this case. Here, 22 years have passed from the initial filing of the complaint and B only raised the
issue of jurisdiction before the SC. This shows that B actively sought for relief in the lower courts
despite the knowledge that it was the HLURB which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint. Therefore, the Tijam doctrine applies, and B is now estopped from raising the RTC’s
jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Company A filed a collection suit against Company B, for the collection of the latter’s debt to
the former. While the case was pending, A transferred B’s loan obligations to Company C
through a deed of assignment which included a reference to a certain loan sale and purchase
agreement (LSPA) executed between A and C. Because of this transfer, C substituted A in the
pending litigation. B filed a Motion of Production/Inspection of the LSPA which the judge
denied on the ground that there was no good cause shown and that the LSPA was irrelevant
to the case.
(a) Was the judge’s denial proper?
No, it was improper. The scope of discovery is to be liberally construed to provide the parties and the
court with essential information to enable a fair and amicable settlement or an expeditious trial of the
case. The test to be applied is one of reasonableness and practicability. In essence, B wanted to know
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if C validly acquired the title over the loans. Since C’s claims were dependent on the validity of such
assignment, B had every right to know what was contained in the LSPA (Eagleridge Development
Corp. v. Cameron Granville, G.R. No. 204700 (2013), unanimous decision).
(b) Assume that the motion for production/inspection of the LSPA was filed after pre-
trial. A now argues that such motion should be denied because it should have been
filed before pre-trial. Decide.
A’s argument is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has explained that the rules are silent with regard
to the period within which modes of discovery may be requested. Therefore, they may be availed of
even after pre-trial as long as it is grounded on good cause. Here, the LSPA is relevant since it squarely
tackles the issue of whether or not the assignment of credit was valid. Therefore, in keeping with the
broad and liberal treatment of the rules of discovery, allowing B to inquire into the LSPA will further
its right to due process (Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville, G.R. No. 204700
(c) A also argued that allowing the presentation of the LSPA and its annexes would violate
the parol evidence rule since it is only the deed of assignment being challenged in this
suit. Decide.
A’s argument is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has ruled that the parol evidence rule does not
apply to a party which did not take part in the transaction being challenged. Here, B was not a part of
the assignment between A and C – clearly, the parol evidence rule is inapplicable. Moreover, even if
the rule does apply, the Rules on Evidence explicitly provides that another exception to this rule – if
the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement. Here, since the LSPA referenced, a
conclusion can be made that it was meant to be read with the deed of assignment. Therefore, it can
be presented in court (Id.),
PROBLEM:
SMC’s VP for Finance wrote to BIR Assistant Commissioner LA to request the registration of
and authority to manufacture “San Mig Light” to be taxed at Php 12.15/liter. Subsequently
however, the BIR replied and noted that the product needs to be subjected to a higher excise
tax rate. Because of this, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice against SMC.
Thereafter, two formal letters of demand were also issued against SMC. The latter submitted
letters of protest. To prove its claims, SMC cited certain statements from its publication
“Kaunlaran” and from its annual report to the stockholders. However, the BIR denied its
protests.
SMC then filed a petition in the CTA, arguing that the BIR erred in denying the protests,
citing again the publication and the annual report to the stockholders. The CTA granted
SMC’s petition. This led the BIR to file an MR with Motion for Production of Documents,
praying that SMC be compelled to produce the “Kaunlaran” publication, the annual report to
stockholders, and two commercials seen in the latter’s website.
Should the CTA grant the motion for production of documents? Explain.
No, the CTA should not. The Supreme Court has explained that a motion for production of
documents under Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are used to expedite time-
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consuming trials. Moreover, the allowance of a motion for production rests on the sound discretion
of the court. In this case, the purpose of expediting trials will not be fulfilled if the motion is granted.
First, the documents sought to be produced were already discussed in both the BIR and the CTA
proceedings. Second, if the BIR really believed that these documents are crucial in the case, then it
should have sought their production at an earliest stage. Therefore, BIR’s laxity is inexcusable and
fatal (CIR v. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No. 205045 & 205723 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
The RTC rendered a decision on March 27, 2006 concerning a case between A and B. The
registry return receipt attached to the back of the RTC decision showed that A’s counsel,
received a copy of the decision on April 14, 2006. On June 16, 2006, A filed her MR was denied
by the RTC. When A appealed to the CA, the latter ruled that the RTC’s March 27, 2006
decision had already attained finality since A filed his MR after the 15-day reglementary
period. In his defense, A argues that the decision was not yet final and executory since service
was made to her counsel’s former address as opposed to its current address. A also presented
the Notice of Change of Address dated June 8, 2004 filed with the RTC which was noted by
the latter. Lastly, A alleges that service was actually made on his counsel on June 1, 2006.
Decide.
I will rule against A. First, A is correct when he argues that the service on his old counsel’s address
was invalid because the RTC, almost two years prior to issuing its decision, already noted that A’s
counsel has changed his address. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure state that
if a party appears by counsel, service on the party is made on the counsel unless service upon both of
them is ordered by the court. Here, the RTC bound itself to make service at the new address of A’s
counsel. Therefore, the service on the old address was invalid.
However, A was not able to sufficiently prove that his counsel was actually served on June 1, 2006.
There is nothing in the facts which proves that this date was the date of actual receipt. In failing to
prove his assertion, the proper thing to do is to rule that the RTC’s decision has indeed attained finality
(Gatmaytan v. Dolor, G.R. No. 198120 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
TC, an American citizen residing in California, USA, filed a complaint against KG, a resident
Filipino citizen, involving MLD shares which the former bought from the latter. In their share
purchase agreement, they stipulated that any action with respect to matters contained therein
may be filed in California or in Cebu where MLC was incorporated. TC then moved for court
authorization to take deposition and prayed that his deposition be allowed to be used as his
direct testimony. KG opposed the motion, arguing that since TC elected to file suit in Cebu,
he should testify before the court.
Should TC be allowed to take a deposition and subsequently use it as his direct testimony?
Explain.
Yes, he should be allowed to take it and use it as his direct testimony. The Supreme Court has ruled
that Section 21, Rule 23 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure gives utmost freedom in the taking
of depositions and that it can only be denied when there is good cause shown. Here, KG’s arguments
cannot be considered as good cause shown. The civil suit was filed pursuant to an agreement which
gave TC the option to either file in California or in Cebu. It would have been more time-consuming,
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costly, and disadvantageous to KG if TC chose to file it in California. Furthermore, Section 4(c) of
the same rule allows the taking of a deposition when the witness resides out of the Philippines. In any
case, KG is still allowed to make objections to admissibility during trial. Therefore, TC should be
allowed to take his deposition in the USA and use it as his direct testimony here (Santamaria v. Cleary,
G.R. No. 197122 and 197161 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
HP Corp., which has its principal office in Laguna, manufactures plastic bottles and caps
while NA Corp., which has its principal office in Pasig, manufactures and sells products such
as ketchup. HP supplied bottles and caps to NA for the latter’s ketchup products. During the
course of their transactions, HP would issue sales invoices to NA. These invoices contained
a statement that any case arising from such sales must be filed in Manila and that the parties
waive any other venue. The signature of the one receiving these invoices is placed above the
phrase “received the above goods in good order and condition.” On the other hand, NA sent
purchase orders to HP. These purchase orders contained a stipulation that all disputes arising
from such orders must first be brought to arbitration. The person receiving these purchase
orders signs above the phrase “acknowledged” by supplier.
NA failed to pay HP. This led the latter to file a collection case in the Manila RTC. HP argues
that NA should have first brought the issue to arbitration and, in any case, NA’s case should
be dismissed for being filed in the wrong venue.
(a) Are the stipulations in either the sales invoices or purchase orders binding on the
parties? Explain.
No, they are not binding. The Supreme Court has ruled that these documents cannot be considered
as contracts that would bind the parties as to the venue of dispute resolution. As to the sales invoices,
the phrase “Received the above goods in good order and condition” shows that the purpose of signing
the sales invoice is merely to acknowledge that he has received the products in good condition. On
the other hand, since purchase orders merely indicated how many products NA wanted, the signatory
merely acknowledges NA’s order. Therefore, neither the sales invoices or purchase orders bound the
parties to the stipulations for venue and arbitration (Hygienic Packaging Corp. v. Nutri-Asia, G.R. No.
201302 (2019), unanimous decision.)
(b) Did HP file his case in the proper venue? Explain.
No, HP did not. Since, the neither the purchase orders nor the sales invoices bound the petitioners in
terms of venue, Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies. Here, the plaintiff
may file the case where he resides or where the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court has explained further that the residence of a corporation is where its principal place
office is. Therefore, HP could have filed the case in either Laguna or Pasig. Since he filed in Manila,
his case should be dismissed for being filed in the improper venue (Id.).
PROBLEM:
The Republic entered into a service contract with SPE Corp. for the development of petroleum
resources in Palawan. Some of the materials to be used had to be constructed in the
Philippines. SPE determined that there was a possible site in Subic, Zambales. However,
there were around 80 households that would have to be relocated. Because of this, SPE sought
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the help of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) so that the latter can relocate the
people affected. To facilitate the process, SPE offered monetary compensation to these
people.
Thereafter, several of the affected residents filed a complaint for damages against SPE
arguing that they were evicted without due process and that the monetary compensation
given to them was not enough. In its answer, SPE raised the affirmative defense of failure to
state a cause of action. According to SPE, they could not ask for damages since the land they
occupied belonged to the SBMA and is therefore government property. The plaintiffs on the
other hand, argue that in raising their affirmative defenses, SPE had hypothetically admitted
the factual allegations in their complaint. In the summary hearing held by the court, the
plaintiffs admitted they did not own the land.
Should the complaints be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action?
Explain.
Yes, they should be dismissed. The Supreme Court has ruled that under Section 12, Rule 8(a)(4) of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it contains a
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party relies for his claim. In raising this affirmative
defense, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. This is, however,
limited to the relevant and material facts and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
In this case, even if the ultimate facts are presumed to be true, the complaints still do not state a cause
of action. This is because the plaintiffs themselves have admitted that they do not own the parcel of
land they possessed. The right to demand compensation for deprivation of property belongs to the
owner, not to strangers. Moreover, admitting their lack of claim over the land, they are also builders
in bad faith who have no right to be compensated for the improvements that they have built.
Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
Pilipinas Shell v. Fredeluces, G.R. No. 174333 (2016), unanimous decision).
[N.B. In this case, Pilipinas Shell filed a motion to dismiss. However, in the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the ground of failure to state a cause of action can only be raised as an affirmative defense
in the defendant’s answer. I slightly modified the facts to account for this very important amendment.]
PROBLEM:
MG filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against PIA and the DPWH. He alleged
that in the last few months of former President Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration, DPWH
Secretary VD contacted him to make an advocacy campaign to counteract the public’s
negative perception on the government’s performance. MG accepted the project and
submitted the finished product despite the absence of the appropriated funds for his payment.
This led to other tie-ups with several government agencies such as the PIA. Thereafter, MG
billed the PIA for Php 15M. However, he was never paid.
The OSG, on behalf of these agencies, raised that the complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense. The OSG posits that the contract
between MG and the government is void due to the absence of the appropriated funds for the
project. Decide.
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I will rule in favor of the OSG. The Supreme Court has ruled that in determining the sufficiency of a
cause of action in a motion to dismiss (NOW AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE UNDER THE
REVISED RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE), only the facts alleged in the complaint should be
considered. In this case, even if MG’s allegations are presumed to be true, they are still insufficient to
prove his right to get paid. Under the Administrative Code, no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, and that any contact
entered into contrary to this provision is void. Therefore, since the contract was void by express
provision the Administrative Code, MG has no right to seek payment from PIA and the DPWH
(Guillermo v. PIA, G.R. No. 223751 (2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The Court however stated MG’s recourse: to go after the officers whom he contracted with
and to hold them personally liable.]
PROBLEM:
What are the rules when it comes to a supposedly defective verification and certification
against forum shopping attached to a petition?
The Supreme Court has laid down the rules on resolving the issue of noncompliance with regard to
these requirements. First, a distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
or submission of a defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement or submission of
a defective certification against forum shopping. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction if strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein is generally

not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of substantial compliance or for special and compelling reasons. The certification against
forum shopping must be signed by all plaintiffs and those who did not sign will be dropped as parties.
However, under justifiable circumstances, the signature of only one of them is deemed substantial
compliance when they all share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense.
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. However, if he is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating
his counsel of record to sign on his behalf (Cordillera Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215998
[N.B. First, the rule of substantial compliance before as to the verification is deemed satisfied when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs it and when allegations have been made in good faith. However, I am not sure of how the
amended rules will affect this ruling since it now adds very specific attestations that must be stated to
wit: (a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his or her personal knowledge, or
based on authentic documents; (b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (c) the factual allegations therein have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery.
Moreover, the new Rules also require that the Special Power of Attorney be attached to the pleading.]
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PROBLEM:
What are the 8 procedural standards that a petitioner must satisfy for a Rule 45 petition to be
entertained?
According to the case of Kumar v. People, which explains Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the 8 standards are: (a) the petition does not only exclusively raise questions of law but
also that it distinctly sets forth those legal issues; (b) that it be filed within 15 days from notice of the
adverse ruling that impels it; (c) the docket and other lawful fees are paid; (d) that proper service is
made; (e) that all matters which Section 4, Rule 65 specifies are indicated, stated, or otherwise
contained therein; (f) that it is manifestly meritorious; (g) that it is not prosecuted manifestly for delay;
and (h) that questions raised in it are of such substance as to warrant consideration (Kumar v. People,
PROBLEM:
The Municipality of VNO published an invitation to bid for the construction of a concrete
seawall along its shoreline. Subsequently, it awarded the project to JLH, the second lowest
bidder. DB, the lowest bidder, lodged a protest which the mayor eventually denied. Because
of this, DB simultaneously filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC, assailing the mayor’s
decision and a petition for prohibition with prayer for a TRO with the SC. DB argues that this
is allowed because Sec. 58 of R.A. 9184 states that only the SC has the power to issue
injunctions relating to government infrastructure projects. Therefore, since he wanted to
assail both the mayor’s decision and to ask for an inhibition, his action was proper.
Did DB violate any procedural rules? Explain.
Yes, he violated the rules against the splitting a cause of action, forum shopping, and the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. First, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure state that a party may not institute
more than one suit for a single cause of action. Here, DB seeks essentially the same relief with both
the RTC and the SC – to enjoin JLH from proceeding with the project and have itself declared as the
winning bidder. Second, his actions necessarily violated the rule on forum shopping because he
resorted to two different tribunals for the purpose of obtaining the same relief. Third, he violated the
principle of hierarchy of courts because even if the RTC and SC have original concurrent jurisdictions
over a petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court has ruled that a direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction is only allowed when special and important reasons are clearly shown.
Under, R.A. 8975 the trial court may issue an injunction against the government when the matter is
of extreme urgency. Therefore, there was no need for DB to go straight to the SC to ask for the
injunction. By filing a petition with both the RTC and the SC, DB violated the rules against the splitting
of a cause of action, forum shopping, and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts (Dynamic Builders v.
Presbitero, G.R. No. 174202 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
What are the instances where a court can resolve issues not raised on appeal?
According to the decision of the Supreme Court, these instances are as follows: (a) issues affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters which are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) the consideration of issues necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (d) issues raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
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submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) closely related to an
error assigned; and (f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is
dependent (Oriental Assurance v. Ong, G.R. No. 189524 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
RO filed a complaint for accion reivindicatoria against Sps. M. The latter did not file their
answer, so RO filed a motion to declare them in default, which was granted. Sps. M, filed a
motion to lift the order of default, arguing that they were not properly served with summons
because they had changed their address. On the other hand, RO alleged that the sheriff’s
return on summons showed otherwise.
The return states that the sheriff attempted to personally serve summons on Sps. M at their
residence. However, the latter requested that it be served on another date since the one of
their children is critically ill. Subsequently, another attempt was made where the sheriff
personally explained to Sps. M the contents of the summons and the complaint, along with
their duty to file their answer on time. However, Sps. M refused to accept it which led the
sheriff to just leave summons in front of them.
If you were the judge deciding this case, in whose favor will you rule?
I will rule in favor of RO. Rule 14, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Court governing personal service of
summons state that if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for the summons, it may be served by
leaving the summons within the view and presence of the defendant. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has explained that personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location of the defendant
as long as Rule 14, Sec. 5 is followed. Here, the Sps. M did not even deny what was in the sheriff’s
return – they only argued that summons were served at the wrong address. Therefore, they were
properly served with summons (Sps. Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A filed a case for damages against B. However, the sheriff served the summons on C, B’s
brother, without any explanation as to why the substituted service was done. Because of this,
B filed his answer and raised the affirmative defense the case should be dismissed because
the court had no jurisdiction over his person by virtue of the improper service of summons.
Decide.
B’s argument is unmeritorious. First, B is initially correct in saying that the court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. The Supreme Court has also explained that when substituted service is
resorted to, the sheriff must specifically narrate the serious efforts he undertook in attempting to serve
the summons on the person of the defendant. However, Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure now states that when the summons is improperly served and a lawyer makes a special
appearance on behalf of the defendant to question the validity of service of summons, the counsel
shall be deputized to serve summons on his client. In accordance with this provision, the case shall
not be dismissed but the counsel shall be deputized to serve summons on B (People’s General
Insurance Corp. v. Guansing, G.R. No. 204759 (2018), unanimous decision).
[N.B. In the original decision, Guansing was deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by filing several pleadings.]
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PROBLEM:
RRR company filed a case for nullification of title against A over several parcels of land.
Attempts to personally serve summons were futile and the officer’s return reads as such:
“OFFICER'S RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy
of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-
entitled case on the following, to wit;
1. A — Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig
their [sic] is no person in the said given address.”
RRR subsequently filed a motion to serve summons by publication which was granted.
However, A still did not file his answer. This led RRR to file a motion to declare A in default,
which the RTC granted. After the trial, the RTC ruled in favor of RRR.
(a) What is the type of action involved here – in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem?
Explain.
The action involved here is quasi in rem. The Supreme Court has explained that an action for annulment
of certificate of title is quasi in rem. Actions like this is not against a person on the basis of the
defendant’s personal liability nor over the property itself, but one which subjects the defendant’s
interest over a property to a burden (De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 194751
(b) Was there a valid service of summons?
No, there was none. The Supreme Court has laid down the rule that personal service of summons is
the preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the
circumstances showing efforts to do this. Only upon a showing of an impossibility of personal service
of summons should the court allow its service through other modes. Here, the sheriff’s return does
not satisfy this requirement – it only indicated that there was no one in A’s address, but it did not
show an attempt to locate his whereabouts. Since the sheriff’s return was patently defective, it could
not be the basis to allow service by publication (Id.).
(c) Upon promulgation of RTC’s decision, A filed a petition for a new trial on the ground
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Decide.
I will deny A’s petition. First, the Supreme Court has ruled that filing a motion for a new trial is
tantamount to voluntary appearance which cures the invalidity of the service of summons. Second,
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure declares that where summons is invalidly served and a lawyer
makes a special appearance to question such invalidity, the counsel shall be deputized to serve the
summons. Lastly, lack of jurisdiction is not one of the grounds provided in the Rules of Court for a
new trial (Id; Rule 14, Sec. 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
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(d) Assume that the motion for a new trial is denied. Can A still file a petition for
annulment of judgment on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction? Explain.
No, he may not file it anymore. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an action for
annulment of judgment may be grounded on lack of jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court has
explained that it may not be invoked when the party has availed himself of other appropriate remedies
like new trial, and he still lost. Since A has already availed of the remedy of a new trial, he may not
anymore file a petition for annulment of judgment (Id.).
PROBLEM:
JC filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against RC before the RTC. JC then
amended this complaint with leave of court and tried to include a petition for the annulment
of an extrajudicial settlement. JC also impleaded PWP wherein RC was a primary stockholder.
PWP filed a motion to dismiss on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, which was
granted.
A few months after, JC again filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial settlement and
titles against RC and PWP in the RTC. However, before any responsive pleading was filed by
RC and PWP, JC filed a motion to dismiss his complaint. This was granted by the RTC which
declared that the complaint is being dismissed without prejudice. This led RC and PWP to
file an MR, arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice by virtue of the two-
dismissal rule.
(a) Are RC and PWP correct in arguing that the two-dismissal rule applies to this case?
No, they are incorrect. Sec. 1 of Rule 17, as explained by the Supreme Court, requires that both notices
for dismissal for the same claim was filed by the plaintiff. Here, the first dismissal was at the instance
of the defendants PWP and RC who filed the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Therefore, when JC filed a motion to dismiss in his second complaint, it was only the first dismissal
at the plaintiff’s instance. Clearly, the two-dismissal rule does not apply in this case (Ching v. Cheng,
(b) During the pendency of RC and PWP’s MR of the second case’s dismissal, JC again
filed another complaint for nullity of the extrajudicial agreement. RC and PWP filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. Decide.
I will rule that there is indeed litis pendentia but I will not dismiss the case to further the interest of
substantial justice. First, there is litis pendentia present because RC and PWP’s MR of the second case,
means that it was not yet final, and it may still be overturned by the RTC or even by a higher court on
appeal. Therefore, filing the third case while the second case was pending, on the same claims, and
between the same parties constituted litis pendentia. Despite this, it is clear from the facts that there has
not yet been a resolution on the merits because of numerous procedural entanglements. Therefore, it
would better serve the ends of substantial justice by allowing one of the cases to proceed (Id.).
[N.B. I’m not 100% sure as to whether the ruling on the 2 nd issue still applies because of the 2019
amendments. Rule 8, Sec. 12 of the 2019 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides that if an
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affirmative defense is denied (which includes the waivable and non-waivable grounds for a motion to
dismiss), it shall not be subject of an MR, petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The remedy
is to raise this matter on appeal. HOWEVER, in this case, the motion to dismiss subject to the MR
was filed by the PLAINTIFF, and not by the DEFENDANT. This is definitely not an affirmative
defense and the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss here was done as a matter of right. So, it seems as if this
ruling still stands.]
PROBLEM:
CDC, a GOCC, engaged LMCG Law through a retainership contract to handle its labor cases.
However, this was done in violation of certain COA regulations which require their approval
and the approval of the OGCC before private counsel is hired. COA subsequently issued a
resolution stating that the retainership was illegal and they LMGC cannot be paid. LMGC
received the decision on Oct. 16, 2007. It then filed an MR on Nov. 6, 2007. This was denied
by the COA and the decision was received on November 20, 2008. Subsequently, LMGC filed
a petition for certiorari on December 19, 2008.
(a) Was the petition for certiorari filed on time? Explain.
No, it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Even if the procedure under Rule 64 and Rule 65 are
generally the same, the period to be followed is the 30 days provided for in the Constitution and in
Sec. 3, Rule 64, and not the 60 days provided for in Rule 65. Moreover, the filing of an MR interrupts
the 30-day period but does not give the aggrieved party a fresh period for filing a petition for certiorari.
Here, LMGC received the decision on Oct. 16 and filed its MR on Nov. 6 – after 21 days. This means
that when LMGC received COA’s denial of its MR on Nov. 20, it only had 9 days – until Nov. 29 to
file a petition for certiorari. Since it only filed the petition on Dec. 19, it was clearly filed out of time
(Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. COA, G.R. No. 185544 (2014),
(b) COA argues that the case should be dismissed because LMCG law is not the real-
party-in-interest. According to the former, it is CDC – the one whose request was
denied – who has a right to bring suit. Decide.
I will rule that COA’s argument is unmeritorious. The Revised Rules of Court state that a real party
in interest is one who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Here, the net effect of the decision will determine whether or not
LMGC gets paid for the services that it rendered. In other words, it is ultimately LMCG who stands
to get benefitted or injured by the suit. Therefore, LMCG is the real party in interest (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Sps. A owned a piece of land in Calbayog City. Sometimes in 1995, the National Power Corp.
(NAPOCOR) entered the property to install transmission lines for a power line project. Sps.
A allege that the NAPOCOR promised to pay them the value of the portion of the land used
and all improvements that would be destroyed for the project. However, NAPOCOR only
paid for the improvements and refused to pay for the value of the land. Because of this, Sps.
A filed a complaint for payment of just compensation and damages against NAPOCOR.
During pre-trial, NAPOCOR and its counsel failed to attend so Sps. A were allowed to present
evidence ex parte to Atty. FA, the branch clerk of court who was appointed as commissioner
by the court. Thereafter, Atty. FA recommended the fair market value of the land to be set at
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Php 800 per sqm based on the pertinent documents. This was adopted by the RTC.
NAPOCOR appealed the case and argued that Atty. FA as commissioner did not have the
power to appraise the value of the land. Decide.
I will rule against NAPOCOR. Section 3, Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that the trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before
the trial court, but the court can limit or specify his powers. Here, there is nothing in the facts which
shows that the court had limited Atty. FA’s power as the court-appointed commissioner. This means
that he was allowed to make factual findings and recommendations on the valuation of the property.
More importantly, this is a case of inverse condemnation where NAPOCOR entered the property
without filing a complaint for expropriation. When this happens, the expropriator is considered to
have violated procedural requirements is deemed to have waived the usual procedure under Rule 67.
Therefore, there was nothing erroneous with Atty. FA’s appraisal of the value of the land (NAPOCOR
v. Sps. Asoque, G.R. No. 172507 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
XYZ company filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation with the RTC, which the latter
granted. However, CBC, a creditor of XYZ, elevated the case to the CA, arguing that the
rehabilitation plan impaired the obligation of contracts and that the dacion en pago provision
therein did not come with its consent. BPI, another creditor of XYZ, filed a separate petition
with the CA, arguing as well that the obligation of contracts was impaired. The CA’s 7 th
division granted CBC’s petition. On the other hand, the CA’s 1 st division initially granted
BPI’s petition but eventually dismissed it on reconsideration. Two appeals were separately
filed – first is by XYZ in the first case, and the second was by BPI in the second case. The SC
resolved to accept XYZ’s appeal but denied BPI’s. BPI’s appeal was denied with finality on
reconsideration which also came with the rehabilitation plan’s approval.
(a) Can the Court already dismiss the pending appeal of XYZ on the ground of res
judicata? Why/why not?
The Court may dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court has laid down the
four elements of res judicata: (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; (d)
between the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes
of action. Clearly, the facts show that all elements are present. First, the appeal of BPI was already
dismissed and ruled upon by the Court with finality. Second, the Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction
over the parties because the case has already gone through the RTC and the CA. Third, the judgement
was on the merits because the Court even ruled on the validity of the rehabilitation plan. Lastly, both
CBC and BPI were creditors of XYZ assailing the rehabilitation plan which was approved in favor of
the latter. Therefore, the Court can already dismiss XYZ’s pending appeal on the ground of res judicata
(Pryce Corp. v. CBC. G.R. No. 172302 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) CBC argues that the Court cannot dismiss on the ground of res judicata because it is
a separate entity from BPI? Decide.
I will rule against CBC’s argument. The Supreme Court has held that res judicata does not require the
absolute identity of parties – substantial identity is enough. The latter exists when there is a community
of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not
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impleaded in the first case. Here, CBC and BPI are XYZ’s creditors and they are both assailing the
RTC’s approval of the rehabilitation plan. Since the Court has already approved the rehabilitation plan
in the case of BPI v. XYZ, the decision will bind all creditors, including CBC (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CFI company and CLUFEA, a union representing the employees of CFI entered into a CBA.
Due to the impending expiration of the CBA, CLUFEA made several demands on CFI
negotiate a new one. They were unable to agree and they ended up in a bargaining deadlock.
CLUFEA conducted a strike which was declared illegal by the Labor Arbiter (LA). Therefore,
several officers of CLUFEA were dismissed. However, this case was appealed until the
Supreme Court which, eventually ruled that the strike was legal. CFI filed an MR which was
denied. Subsequently, CFI filed a motion for leave to file a second MR.
(a) What are the requirements that must be satisfied for a second MR to be allowed?
The Supreme Court has ruled that there must be extraordinarily persuasive reasons and that it may
only be filed upon express leave first obtained. The propriety of a second MR rests in the higher
interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous but when it is patently unjust
and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irreparable injury to the parties (Club Filipino v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 168406 (2015), unanimous decision).
(b) Does the grant of a leave to file a second MR prevent the Court’s decision from
becoming final and executory? Explain.
No, the second MR does not prevent the decision from becoming final and executory. As explained
by the Supreme Court, the grant of leave to file the second MR does not toll the 15-day period for a
decision of the court to become final and executory. This only means that the entry of judgment first
issued may be lifted should the second MR be granted (Id.).
(c) During the pendency of this case, CFI implemented a retrenchment program which
also concerned some of the officers dismissed due to the allegedly illegal strike. When
the illegal strike case attained finality, the dismissed employees filed an illegal
dismissal case with the LA, arguing that the retrenchment program was bereft of
factual basis. Can CFI argue that the finality of the first case constitutes res judicata
as to the second? Explain.
No, CFI cannot argue that there is res judicata present. The Supreme Court has enumerated the
requisites for the application of this doctrine: (a) that the first judgment must be final; (b) that it was
rendered by the court having jurisdiction; (c) that the disposition was on the merits; (d) and that there
is an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The facts clearly show that the first three
requisites are present. However, the last requisite is not because the causes of action are different. In
an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action is premised on the union’s conduct of
strike without allegedly complying with statutory requirements. On the other hand, an action for illegal
dismissal is premised on an alleged dismissal without just or authorized cause as provided for in the
Labor Code. Therefore, the first case does not constitute as res judicata on the second (Id.).
PROBLEM:
AC was a pilot of PAL. Due to the latter’s downsizing program, AC applied for leave without
pay which the latter approved. PAL even advised him that he would continue to accrue
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seniority during his leave and that he will be granted retirement benefits if he chooses to opt
for early retirement. Two years later, AC advised PAL of his intent to retire. In response, PAL
advised him that he was deemed to have lost his employment status a month after he filed his
leave. This led AC to file an illegal dismissal case with a claim for retirement benefits against
PAL with the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The LA ruled in favor of AC and awarded him retirement pay, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision but reduced the amount
of exemplary damages. AC filed a motion for partial reconsideration arguing that the
exemplary damages should not have been reduced. Subsequently, NLRC issued resolution,
deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and reducing the amount of AC’s
retirement benefits. This led AC to file another MR seeking the reconsideration of the
reduction of his retirement benefits. The NLRC denied the MR for allegedly being a
prohibited second MR. Was the NLRC’s denial of AC’s second MR correct? Explain.
No, it was incorrect. The Supreme Court has ruled that a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration is one which assails the same judgment. Necessarily, an amended judgment – one
which is considered entirely new and therefore supersedes the original decision – is allowed to be
questioned again with a motion for reconsideration. In this case, the NLRC ruling on AC’s first motion
for reconsideration substantially modified its previous decision by deleting moral and exemplary
damages, along with a reduction of his retirement benefits. This is a new, amended decision which AC
can now question again through a motion for reconsideration (Cristobal v. Philippine Airlines, G.R.
PROBLEM:
JKL company leased a piece of land from ABC company. JKL company subsequently received
a letter from PBC bank, claiming to be the new owner of the property and asked that rental
be payment be made to them. PBC grounded its right as an owner on an alleged dation en
pago made by JKL over the parcel of land. When JKL company informed ABC company about
PBC’s demand, ABC insisted the rental payments be made to it. This led JKL to file an action
for interpleader in the RTC to compel ABC and PBC to litigate among themselves. ABC filed
his answer after 34 calendar days from the service of summons. Because of this, JKL moved
that ABC be declared in default. This motion was granted by the court.
(a) Identify the remedies which can be taken by a party declared in default.
The remedies available in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the following: a motion to set aside
the order of default, a motion for new trial, and a petition for relief from judgment which are all
mutually exclusive. If the defendant acquires knowledge of the declaration of default before the court
renders judgment, Rule 9, Sec. 3(b) provides that he may file a motion to set aside order of default. If
the defendant discovers the default after judgment but prior to the judgment becoming final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Sec. 1(a). Finally, if the defendant discovers
the default after the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from judgment may
be filed under Rule 38, Sec. 1 (Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, G.R. No. 193494 (2014), unanimous
decision).
(b) Before the court rendered judgment but only one year after the issuance of the order
of default, ABC filed a motion to set aside order of default on the ground of excusable
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negligence. First, ABC argued that their former counsel was negligent in filing their
answer and this prejudiced their right to fairly present their case. Second, ABC argued
that it had filed an earlier case against PBC to nullify the deed of dacion en pago in
favor of the latter. Decide.
I will deny ABC’s motion to set aside order of default. As enumerated in Rule 9, Sec. 3(b) of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and as explained by the Supreme Court, the defendant must satisfy
three conditions for his motion to be granted: (a) it must be filed before judgment, (b) he must have
been prevented by filing his answer to due fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and (c)
that he must have a meritorious defense. Here, ABC’s mere allegation of its former counsel’s
negligence did not even endeavor to explain the specifics of why the answer was filed late. This cannot
satisfy the requirement of “excusable negligence” and therefore, ABC’s motion must be denied (Id.)
[N.B. In the case, what was filed beyond the reglementary period was a motion to dismiss on the
ground that JKL’s representative did not have authority to file the complaint. However, because of
the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, this ground cannot be anymore used for the filing of a
motion to dismiss – it is merely an affirmative defense which must be alleged in the answer.]
(c) ABC then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the previous case it filed to nullify
the deed of dacion en pago constitutes litis pendentia which is a ground to dismiss the
interpleader case. Decide.
I will deny ABC’s motion to dismiss – litis pendentia is not present in the case. As stated in Rule 15,
Sec. 12(a)(2), a requisite for a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia is that there must be
another action between the same parties for the same cause of action. In this case however, there is
no identity of parties because JKL is not a party to the case for the nullification of the deed. There is
also no identity of rights asserted because ABC aims to nullify the deed of dacion en pago in the former
case while JKL filed the current case to extinguish its obligation as a lessee. Therefore, ABC’s motion
to dismiss must be denied (Id.).
PROBLEM:
RREC entered into an agreement with Pasay City for the reclamation of the foreshore lands
along Manila Bay. Subsequently, the Republic sued for recovery of possession and damages.
This case reached the Supreme Court which ruled in favor of the Republic. Nevertheless, it
recognized that RREC undertook partial work and must be compensated for the service it
had actually rendered. The SC pegged the reasonable value at Php 10.9M, plus 6% interest
until paid. This decision became final and executory. Pasay City then filed a Motion for
Execution with the RTC. The Sheriff executing the decision however used the value of Php
49.1B. Was the sheriff’s act proper? Explain.
No, it was improper. The Supreme Court has ruled that a judgment, once final, is immutable and
unalterable. Therefore, the Court’s final and executory decision cannot be amended by any other court,
nor by the sheriff. There execution of judgment is a purely ministerial phase of adjudication. This
means that in implementing the writ, the sheriff must strictly conform to the latter of the judge’s order.
Therefore, the Sheriff should not have used a different value other than that prescribed by the Court
(Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp., G.R. No. 208205 and 208212 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
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Thousands of banana plantation workers from 14 countries instituted class suits in the U.S.
against 11 foreign corporations. They claimed to have been exposed to a chemical which has
caused serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems. As a response to this,
1843 Filipino claimants also filed a complaint for damages against the same corporations
before the RTC. Before pre-trial, the companies entered into a worldwide settlement
agreement in the US with all the plantation workers, including the Filipino claimants.
The settlement agreement provided that the amount due should be deposited in an escrow
account which would be administered by a mediator. After the claimants execute individual
releases, the mediator will then give them checks to the claimants’ counsel who has the duty
of distributing it to each of the plantation workers.
As a result of the settlement, the companies moved to dismiss the civil case pending in the
RTC. The RTC dismissed the case and approved the settlement agreement by way of
judgment on compromise. Several claimants then moved for execution of the judgment on
compromise. This was opposed by the companies, arguing that they have already deposited
the settlement amounts into an escrow account and was already under the administration of
the mediator. The RTC granted the claimants’ motion stating that there was no proof that the
settlement amounts had been withdrawn and delivered to each individual claimant.
(a) What are the instances wherein a writ of execution may be stayed or quashed?
Jurisprudence has enumerated these instances to be as follows: (a) when the facts and circumstances
transpire after judgment which makes execution impossible or unjust; (b) when the writ of execution
alters or varies the judgment; (c) payment or satisfaction of the debt; (d) when the writ is defective in
substance, was improvidently issued or issued without authority, or was issued against the wrong party
(Chiquita Brands Inc. v. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Was the RTC correct in granting the claimants’ motion for execution? Explain.
No, the RTC was wrong. According to the Supreme Court, a judicially approved compromise has the
force and effect of a final judgment i.e. it is considered a judgment on the merits which is covered by
the doctrine of immutability of judgments. In this case, it was stated in the agreement that the
companies are required to deposit the settlement amount in escrow – there was nothing therein which
required them to ensure the distribution of the amount to each claimant. Moreover, none of the
exceptions discussed above are present in this case. Therefore, the RTC should not have granted the
motion for execution (Id.).
PROBLEM:
The heirs of PM owned four parcels of land which had a total area of 88.5 hectares. When the
Comprehensive Agrarian Law (CARL) was enacted, the heirs voluntarily offered their
landholdings for agrarian reform, for the price of Php 100k/hectare. However, Landbank
issued a valuation arguing that the proper price should only be Php 30k/hectare. The
Landbank’s valuation was adopted by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAB).
This led the heirs to file a complaint with the RTC which appointed commissioners who
subsequently reported that the valuation of the property is around Php 100k/hectare. This
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report was adopted by the RTC. This led Landbank to file an appeal with the CA. However,
the heirs filed a motion for execution pending appeal arguing that they have been
dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties for 19 years already.
The RTC granted the heirs’ motion. Landbank now argues that the grant of execution
pending appeal was improper. Decide.
I will rule in favor of the heirs. Under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a
judgment appealed may be executed provided there are good reasons for the execution. First, the heirs
have already been deprived of use, income, and fruit for 19 years already. Thus, the denial of execution
pending appeal will infringe on their constitutional right against the taking of private property without
just compensation. Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that the just compensation paid
pursuant to the CARL is not even complete at the time of payment since a significant percentage of
the payment comprises of bonds which will mature only after 10 years. By that time, the monetary
value of the properties would no longer be the same. Thus, denying the execution pending appeal can
also stall the payment of the properties through frivolous motions and appeals. Therefore, the motion
for execution pending appeal was properly granted (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R.
PROBLEM:
One evening, a six-wheeler truck owned by MD Corp. crashed into the car of SH. As a result,
SH suffered serious spinal cord injuries which resulted to his permanent condition of being a
paraplegic. This led Sps. H to file a case for damages based on tort against MD. The RTC
ruled in Sps. H’s favor and held MD liable for actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages, along with attorney’s fees. This case went all the way up to the SC which affirmed
the RTC’s decision. The SC’s decision became final and executory.
Thereafter, Sps. H moved for the execution of the judgment. A Writ of Execution was issued
for Php 2.9M as actual damages, Php 23.4M for life care cost, Php 10M for SH’s loss of earning
capacity, Php 1M for moral damages, Php 2M for exemplary damages, and Php 1M for
attorney’s fees. MD moved to quash the writ, arguing that there were mathematical errors in
the computation of the correct amounts since the actual expenses for SH are much lower than
the amounts awarded by the Court.
(a) What is a nunc pro tunc judgment?
The Supreme Court has ruled that a nunc pro tunc judgment is one used to enter into the record an act
previously done by the court which had been omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. This
kind of judgment does not operate to correct judicial errors nor to supply omitted actions by the court
– it is for the entry into the records of a judicial action which has been actually taken. A party seeking
the issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment must allege and prove that the court took a particular action
and that this action was omitted through inadvertence (Mercury Drug v. Sps. Huang, G.R. No. 197654
(b) MD argues that what it seeks is merely a nunc pro tunc judgment which allows for the
correction of the judgment even after its finality. Decide.
I will rule against MD. As seen from the facts, the amendments sought by MD affect the very
substance of the controversy. By arguing that the Court awarded amounts greater than what was due,
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MD was not seeking the correction of a clerical error – MD was actually appealing the merits of the
case. Therefore, since the SC’s decision has attained finality, it is now immutable regardless of whether
or not the amounts awarded were actually correct (Id.).
PROBLEM:
A, B, and C were siblings and heirs of D who died intestate. A, B, and C inherited a parcel of
land which they divided among themselves. A filed a complaint for partition in the RTC – the
court which had jurisdiction. However, during mediation, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement wherein it was stipulated that the whole property will be sold and that
the proceeds, along with pending rentals, will be divided among them. The RTC approved
this compromise agreement, and it became final and executory. B then filed a motion for
execution of the compromise agreement, demanding his share of the rentals and that C be
taken out of the division because he had already been occupying one of the units. The part of
the property which C had been occupying remains unsold. This caused A to move that the
property be partitioned instead of being sold.
(a) If you were the judge deciding on this matter, will you grant A’s motion for partition?
Explain.
No, I will deny A’s motion for partition. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that a judgment
based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits and will therefore have the effect of
res judicata. Here, the elements of res judicata are present. First, there is already a previous final judgment
on the merits – the compromise agreement brought about by the previous filing of the complaint for
partition. The facts also clearly stated that the RTC was the court with jurisdiction. Lastly, the parties,
subject matter, and cause of action are the same – the same heirs, property, and even action filed are
identical. There is also no evidence that the agreement was void, or that it was obtained through any
vice of consent. Therefore, I will have to deny A’s motion because the compromise agreement
approved by the RTC now has the effect of res judicata on the latter (Gadrinab v. Salamanca, G.R. No.
(b) A argues that assuming there is res judicata, the disagreement among the parties
qualifies as a supervening event which justifies the new action. Decide.
I will rule against A. The Supreme Court has explained that a supervening event which justifies a
disturbance of a final judgment on compromise is one which has brought about a material change
between the parties and which renders the execution of the judgment unjust and inequitable. The
subsequent disagreement did not bring about any material change between the parties as regards their
situation and relations. Moreover, the compromise was even with their consent. Therefore, they would
have no choice but to comply with the compromise agreement that they all agreed to (Id.).
PROBLEM:
BC owned a parcel of land covered by title, which was also being claimed by the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA), claiming to have its own title. BC entered into a contract of
conditional sale with ORC corporation for a total price of Php 19M. They agreed on the
following stipulations: (a) that ORC will give a down payment of Php 5M and the balance to
be paid in installments; (b) that ORC will initiate the action against PTA to cancel the latter’s
title, with the full assistance of BC; (c) that ORC will pay disturbance compensation to the
current tenants of the land; (d) that BC will clear these tenants within 6 months from the
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signing of the deed of conditional sale; and that failure to do so will give ORC the right to
suspend the payment of installments.
4 months after they signed the contract, BC filed a complaint for recission of contract against
ORC in the RTC, arguing that the latter only paid Php 2.5M for the down payment, and that
ORC neither filed a case against the PTA nor paid the tenants disturbance compensation. In
its answer, ORC countered by arguing that BC did not assist them in filing the action against
PTC nor did BC clear the tenants within 6 months. Therefore, ORC argued that it had the
right to suspend payments.
(b) BC filed a motion for summary judgment which ORC opposed. If you were the judge
deciding this case, would you grant BC’s motion? Why/why not?
I will grant BC’s motion. Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court
may dispense with trial and proceed to decide a case if from the pleadings, affidavits, and other
documents on file, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Here, a summary judgment is
proper because although the answer had affirmative defenses, the issues are sham. First, ORC did not
deny that it only paid half of the stipulated down payment. Second, its defense of BC’s failure to assist
them in filing the case is clearly a sham because the contract expressly stipulates that the ORC is the
one who shall initiate it. Moreover, ORC cannot use BC’s failure to clear the tenants as the defense
because BC had a period of 6 months to do it. Here, ORC chose to pay only half of the down payment
and to not file the case against PTA before this period had even expired. Since the issues raised by
ORC’s answer are clearly sham, BC is entitled to have his motion for summary judgment granted
(Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251 (2014), unanimous decision).
(c) ORC also argues that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the action because BC
did not pay docket fees based on the property’s fair market value. Decide.
I will rule against ORC because BC’s action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Supreme Court
has held that even if an action involved a real property, it is the nature of the action as one for recession
of contract which is controlling. Here, since the RTC principally determined whether ORC failed to
pay the price agreed in the contract, the action is clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the
docket fees need not be based on the property’s fair market value (Id.).
PROBLEM:
CJ was married to RS in 1980. On June 15, 2007, RS was able to obtain a declaration of absence
or presumptive death for the purposes of remarriage from the RTC. He alleged that his wife,
CJ, left their residence in Tarlac to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong and ever since
then, she was never heard from again. He said that he tried contacting CJ’s relatives, but they
too did not know where she was. RS married PT on September 17, 2008.
On Nov. 17, 2008, 1 month after she found out about what her husband did, CJ filed a petition
for annulment of judgment with the CA, arguing that she was deprived of her day in court
when RS misrepresented to the court that they were residents of Tarlac City. According to
her, the truth is that they resided in Quezon City. Moreover, it was actually Ricardo who left
in 2008 but she herself never left their place of residence.
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The CA dismissed CJ’s petition, stating that she availed of the wrong remedy – she should
have filed a sworn statement declaring her reappearance. CJ now files an appeal, assailing the
CA’s decision. If you were the SC Justice handling this case, how will you decide?
I will rule in favor of CJ and overturn the CA’s decision. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that an annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC’s judgment has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, and other remedies are no longer available. Here, CJ
properly alleged extrinsic fraud – one of the grounds for an annulment of judgment – by stating that
RS’ misrepresentations prevented her from having her day in court. Moreover, CJ filed the petition 2
years from the RTC’s decision and within a month from her discovery of such decision. Lastly, CJ
properly filed a petition for annulment instead of a sworn statement of reappearance, because she
never disappeared in the first place (Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
JT married CT and they lived in BF Homes, Parañaque. Their residence was registered in the
name of JT, married to CT. A year after, CT filed a petition for the nullity of her marriage with
JT which the RTC granted. In the same decision, the RTC also declared the resident to be
CT’s exclusive property. This decision became final and executory.
When the petition for nullity of marriage was pending, SS filed a complaint for the collection
of sum of money against JT. SS and JT eventually entered into a compromise agreement. After
the finality of the decision on the nullity of JT and CT’s marriage, the latter’s residence was
levied upon and was sold at a public auction. Two years after, CT filed a complaint for
reivindication of title against JT and SS. The RTC ruled against CT. She appealed the case to
CA where she argued that the decision nullifying her marriage with JT was null and void
because there was no valid service of summons on him in that case. CT further alleges that
JT deliberately indicated a non-existent address to ensure that he did not receive the
summons.
If you were one of the CA justices handling the case, how will you rule on CT’s argument?
Explain.
I will rule that it is unmeritorious. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
a petition for annulment of judgment is allowed on the ground of extrinsic fraud. This action should
be filed within four years from discovery of fraud. In this case, this remedy is expressly available to
CT. However, he chose to file a reivindicatory action against SS and JT instead of filing an action to
annul the RTC’s decision on the annulment. Therefore, CT’s argument is unmeritorious, and his
petition should be denied (Tortal v. Taniguchi, G.R. 212683 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
QWE company owned a large parcel of land in Pasig City. Upon the request of DPWH, QWE
segregated the property into separate lots for the road widening of C5. However, only a
portion of one lot was used in the project so QWE filed a petition for authority in the RTC to
sell this portion actually used. The RTC ruled in favor of QWE. The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) however, filed an opposition alleging that the property
can only be conveyed by donation as provided under Sec. 50 of P.D. No. 1529. RTC denied
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the opposition and the subsequent MR. The OSG filed a notice of appeal arguing that the lot
can only conveyed to the government via donation.
(a) The CA dismissed the appeal on two grounds. The CA stated first that an order
denying an MR is not appealable, citing Rule 41, Sec. (1)(a) of the Revised Rules of
Court. Was the CA correct? Why/why not?
The CA was incorrect. What Rule 41, Sec. 1(a) of the Revised Rules of Court prohibits is an appeal
taken from an interlocutory order i.e. one which does not completely dispose of the case because it
leaves to the court something else to be decided upon. However, a motion for reconsideration may
be considered as a final decision subject to an appeal if it already puts a particular matter to an end. In
the case at bar, the RTC’s denial of the Republic’s MR is already a final order which settles QWE’s
authority to sell. Therefore, the denial of the MR is subject to an appeal (Republic v. Ortigas Co., G.R.
(b) The CA also dismissed the appeal on the ground that the wrong remedy was availed
of by the OSG. Was the CA correct? Why/why not?
The CA was correct because the Republic should have filed a verified petition for certiorari to the SC.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that appeals from the RTC to the CA must raise a question of
fact or a question of both fact and law. The Supreme Court has explained that a question of law is one
that raises and issue as to what the law shall be on a given set of facts. On the other hand, a question
of fact is one which requires the court to examine the truth or falsity of the facts and one which invites
a review of evidence. In the present case, the Republic only raises the issue of whether or not the land
should be donated by virtue of P.D. No. 1529 – clearly a question of law. Therefore, the Republic
through the OSG, should have gone straight to the SC under rule 45 (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Does the Court of Appeals have the power to receive evidence in civil cases on appeal?
Yes it does, but only in a very exceptional situation – when the CA grants a new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence (Crispino v. Tansay, G.R. No. 184466 (2016), unanimous decision).
[N.B. Atty. Riguerra points out that the CA has power to receive evidence for civil and criminal cases
originally filed with the CA, and on criminal cases appealed to the CA.]
PROBLEM:
A loaned Php 500,000 from B. To secure his loan, A mortgaged a piece of land in QC. A
defaulted so B filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure in the RTC. In a decision dated Dec.
22, 2009, the RTC ordered A to pay B and that failure to do so will result to his property being
sold in a public auction. A received this decision on January 29, 2010. On February 8, 2020, A
filed an MR. On May 25, 2010 this was denied by the RTC for being pro forma since it failed
to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were not supported by evidence
or contrary to law. A received a copy of this denial on June 24, 2010. On August 11, 2010 A
subsequently filed a notice of appeal which was denied for allegedly being filed out of time.
On September 24, 2010, A filed a petition for relief from judgment, arguing that their 80-year-
old lawyer failed to file the appeal on time. According to A, this constituted excusable
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negligence. The RTC denied the petition on two grounds: (a) for being filed out of time; and
(b) for the absence of excusable negligence.
(a) Was the RTC correct in denying the petition for relief from judgment on the ground
of being filed out of time?
Yes, the RTC was correct. Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly state that
two periods which must be complied with in filing a petition for relief from judgment – it must be
filed 60 days after the petition’s knowledge of the judgment and not more than 6 months after it was
entered. The Supreme Court has also repeatedly held that these periods are jurisdictional and
noncompliant petitions must be dismissed outright. Here, A received a copy of the RTC’s original
decision on January 28. Even if an MR was filed, the RTC considered it pro forma which meant that it
never tolled the 15-day period to appeal i.e. the decision became final on February 3. A then had 6
months to file his petition for relief or, until August 12. Since he only filed it on September 24, the
petition must be dismissed for being filed out of time (Madarang v. Sps. Morales, G.R. No. 199283
(b) Assuming that the petition for relief was filed on time, was the RTC correct in denying
the petition for relief from judgment for the absence of excusable negligence?
Yes, the RTC was correct. The Supreme Court has ruled that for the ground of excusable negligence
to prosper, it must be so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
The argument that their counsel’s old age caused the mistake is a mere stereotype which demeans
senior citizens. Clearly, this does not satisfy the jurisprudential requirement for excusable negligence
(Id.).
(c) Because of the RTC’s denial of his petition, A filed a petition for certiorari alleging
that the RTC’s denial constituted grave abuse of discretion. This was denied by the
CA, stating that A should have first filed an MR. A now comes to the SC, arguing that
there was no more need to file an MR because the petition filed in the CA only raised
questions of law. Decide.
I will rule against A. Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states that there
must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy before a party files a petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an MR is an adequate remedy to allow the court to correct
the errors it allegedly committed. Moreover, contrary to A’s claim, the allegation of their counsel’s
excusable negligence is a question of fact. Therefore, the CA was correct in denying A’s petition (Id.).
PROBLEM:
City of ABC leased a piece of land to Mr. M where the latter constructed a commercial fish
center. This center was demolished by City of ABC, so Mr. M filed a complaint for injunction
with damages with the RTC. The court awarded Php 10M in actual damages based solely on
Mr. M’s testimony. This led City of ABC to file an MR.
(a) Mr. M, in his opposition, argued that since the MR was not set by City of ABC for
hearing, it should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Decide.
I will rule in favor of City of ABC. In Secs. 5 and 6, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
it is clear that the party moving for reconsideration does not have the duty to set the motion for
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hearing anymore. Now, it is up to the court’s discretion whether or not to hold a hearing for a litigious
motion such as a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, Mr. M’s argument for treating City of ABC’s
MR is unmeritorious (Secs. 5 – 6, Rule 15, of the 2020 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
[N.B. The facts of this question were taken from City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411
(2014), unanimous decision. However, in the original decision, the Court, speaking through J. Leonen,
explained that the general rule is that the case should be set for hearing by the movant. This
requirement, as explained, has already been rendered nugatory by the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.]
(b) Assume that the MR was denied on the ground cited by Mr. M. City of ABC now files
a petition for relief from judgment, arguing their legal officer’s negligence as its
meritorious ground. The City was able to show that based on actual receipts and other
documents, Mr. M was only entitled to Php 75,000 for damages. Decide.
I will rule in favor of City of ABC. The Supreme Court has explained that excusable negligence as a
ground for a petition for relief from judgment requires that it be so gross that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against it. The facts of this case show that there is a gross disparity
between the actual damages awarded and those which were actually proven. Therefore, it is clear that
the negligence committed by the legal officer herein already bordered on extrinsic fraud – fraud where
the losing party has actually been prevented from fully presenting his case. Therefore, ruling otherwise
would clearly cause a grave injustice to City of ABC (City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411
PROBLEM:
The PCGG filed a complaint for reversion against Former President Marcos and his family.
The complaint came with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment over a
piece of land located in Cabuyao which was titled to the Marcos children when they were
minors. However, the prayer for preliminary attachment was denied by the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that the Cabuyao property was never concealed, removed, or disposed of by the
Marcoses. Therefore, according to the Sandiganbayan, there was no exigency warranting the
attachment of the property especially because the PCGG had been possessing the property
for more than a decade. Was the Sandiganbayan correct in denying the writ of attachment?
Explain.
No, the Sandiganbayan was wrong. Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
grounds upon which attachment may issue. Section 1(b) provides that the proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached in an action for property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied
or converted to his own by a public officer in the course of his employment as such. On the other
hand, Section 1(c) also allows attachment in an action to recover possession of property unjustly or
fraudulently taken when it has been concealed, removed, or disposed of. Here, the facts of the case
show that it falls within Sections 1(b) and (c). Former president Marcos, taking advantage of his
powers as president accumulated ill-gotten wealth which suffices to bring this case under the ambit of
1(b). Moreover, the fact that the property was titled to the Marcos children when they were minors
shows that there was an intent to conceal the property. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan should have
granted the writ of preliminary attachment (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195295 (2016), J.
Velasco dissented).
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PROBLEM:
CAV Corp. entered into a lease agreement with Meralco for the use of the latter’s 5000
lampposts to display advertising banners. For this, CAV obtained sign permits from the
appropriate city government offices. When Typhoon Milenyo hit, several billboards in Metro
Manila were blown by strong winds and fell. This led former President GMA to direct the
DPWH to specify the legal grounds and procedures for the prohibition and abatement of
billboards which are considered a public nuisance via administrative order. The
administrative order also stated that the DPWH can avail of one of the following remedies: a
prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or a summary
abatement if the local Building Official determines that this is the best remedy under the
circumstances.
Shortly after, DPWH started dismantling billboards and was able to remove hundreds of
CAV’s advertising materials. This led CAV to file an injunction suit against DPWH with a
prayer for preliminary injunction. CAV argued that the DPWH exceeded its authority when it
dismantled its materials, especially because the latter did so without due process. In its
defense, the DPWH argued that: (a) the lampposts are outside the commerce of men; (b) that
CAV violated several MMDA issuances; (c) that this was a valid exercise of police power; and
(d) that CAV’s lease agreement with MERALCO has expired. Does CAV have a clear and
unmistakable right which entitles him to the writ of injunction? Explain.
Yes, CAV does. First, CAV entered into a lease agreement with MERALCO for the use of its
lampposts and it acquired the necessary permits. On the other hand, DPWH’s allegations are better
proven during trial. However, at the point when the court is confronted with a prayer for temporary
relief, all that CAV needed to prove was a right ostensibly in existence. Therefore, CAV had a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected since its lease agreement with Meralco for the use of the latter’s
lampposts is still subsisting (DPWH v. City Advertising Ventures Corp., G.R. No. 182944 (2016),
[N.B. May be asked in Civil Law – the DPWH may abate billboards which can be categorized as
public nuisances, but it must follow the requirements of Art. 704 of the Civil Code: demand to owner
to abate the nuisance, demand rejected, abatement approved by the district health officer and with
assistance of police, and that value of the destruction does not exceed Php 3,000. See also p. 134 of
Ateneo Blue Notes for Civ.]
PROBLEM:
The Municipality of F was originally incorporated in the Municipality of S. However, through
Executive Order No. 72, F was separated and became another entity. This led to a boundary
dispute between the municipalities over 2 barangays – K and L. To resolve this dispute, the
Provincial Board rendered a decision ruling that S had jurisdiction over the barangays. A few
years later, an elementary school built in K was considered under F’s jurisdiction. K’s
barangay officials were also elected and declared to be under F’s authority. Because of this,
Vice Mayor RA of S filed a petition with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, arguing that it had
jurisdiction over K. However, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled in F’s favor. As a result, S
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
(a) What are the requisites for the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction?
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The Supreme Court, explaining Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, has provided the following
requisites for the writ to be issued: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right; (b) there
is a material and substantial invasion of the right; (c) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury; and, (d) and that no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent
the infliction of the injury (Municipality of Famy v. Municipality of Siniloan, G.R. No. 203806 (2020),
(b) If you were the judge handling this case, will you issue the writ of preliminary
injunction? Explain.
Yes, I will issue it. Here, all requisites are complied with. First, the clear and unmistakable right of S
over K and L can be seen from the Provincial Board decision which vested S with the jurisdiction
over these two barangays. The second requisite can be seen from the elementary school being
considered under F’s jurisdiction, along with the barangay officials of K being elected under the F’s
authority. Third, S stands to suffer irreparable injury such as losing a portion of its internal revenue
allotment even during the pendency of the case. Lastly, there is no more ordinary, speedy, and
adequate remedy since S already brought this case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan before filing the
case in court. Therefore, I will issue the writ of preliminary injunction (Id.).
PROBLEM:
The City Council of CDO passed an ordinance which approved an unsolicited proposal for
the redevelopment of Agora Complex into a Modern Terminal and Market (Agora Complex).
Pursuant to this, a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract was drafted. Subsequently, the City
Council also referred the contract to the Committee on Economic Enterprises for the latter’s
consideration.
Two years later, MF, through ES, entered into a BOT contract under the BOT law with the
newly elected mayor CJ for the redevelopment of the Agora Complex. This led the members
of the City Council to file a complaint for Declaration of Nullity with a prayer for the issuance
of a TRO against the City Government of CDO, CJ, and MF. According to the petitioners, the
BOT Contract would require that the Agora Complex be made an exclusive terminal in
violation of the constitutional right of citizens to free enterprise.
In its defense, the defendants argue that R.A. No. 8975 prohibits the issuance of TROs against
national government projects. To refute this argument, the petitioners argue that this was
only a local government project and is outside the ambit of the said law.
(a) Is the Agora Complex BOT Contract a national government project? Explain.
Yes, the Agora Complex BOT Contract is a national government project. Under R.A. No. 8975, the
definition of national government projects includes all projects covered by the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer (BOT) Law. Therefore, the Agora Complex BOT Contract should be properly characterized
as a national government project by express provision of the law (Lao v. LGU of Cagayan de Oro
City, G.R. No. 187869 (2017), unanimous decision).
(b) Should the RTC issue the TRO against the Agora Complex BOT Contract? Explain.
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No, the RTC should not issue the TRO. Under R.A. No. 8975, only the Supreme Court may grant
injunctive relief. The only exception is when the matter is of extreme urgency, involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave and irreparable
injury will arise. Here, the mere allegation that the contract violates the constitutional right of citizens
to free enterprise is not enough to show that the exception applies. Therefore, the RTC should not
issue the TRO (Id.).
(c) The respondents argue that the members of the City Council do not have the standing
to file the case. Decide.
I will rule against the respondents. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a
real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Therefore, in a case questioning the validity of a contract entered into by the city mayor who is
allegedly bereft of authority to do so, the real party in interest is the city itself. Under the Local
Government Code, city councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the
ground that the city mayor had no authority to enter into it. Therefore, the members of the city council
had the authority to file the case (Id.).
PROBLEM:
In 1933, CSP, a government hospital, was built. Along the premises of CSP is road lot no. 3
which it used as a service road. Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur (CamSur) Provincial
Government donated 5 hectares of land to the Department of Health (DOH) which included
the area of road lot no. 3. In 2009, CSP closed a gate along road lot no. 3 for a development
project within the hospital complex. However, several individuals criticized the closure. This
led the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga to pass a resolution authorizing Mayor JB to
dismantle the gate. Instead of dismantling the gate, JB filed a petition with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction against CSP instead. To prove its right, Naga City presented a 1970’s
Revised Assessor’s Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map which both
identified road lot no. 3 as being in the name of the province of CamSur. To oppose the writ,
CSP presented a certificate of title covering the lot, indicating that the DOH as its registered
owner. Decide.
I will rule in favor of CSP. The Supreme Court has ruled that under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicant of a writ of preliminary injunction must show a clear right
founded in or granted by law. In this case, whatever right that Naga City had was trumped by the
DOH’s certificate of title which clearly indicated the latter’s ownership over the property. Therefore,
I will rule in favor of CSP and deny JB’s application for the writ of preliminary injunction (Bicol
Medical Center v. Botor, G.R. No. 214073 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
ECD Corp. purchased a parcel of land covered by a TCT from LNA through a deed of
absolute sale. At the time of sale, there was no lien or encumbrance except for a notice of
adverse claim filed by LNA. Two weeks after the sale, the Register of Deeds annotated a
Notice of Levy on Attachment on the TCT by virtue of the writ of preliminary attachment
issued by the RTC in a case between LNA and VRF Corp. EDC then registered the deed of
sale in its name. A few months after, the RTC ruled in favor of VRF so it issued a writ of
execution against the property.
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In an attempt to protect its interest, ECD filed a Notice of Third-Party Claim informing the
RTC that it had already filed an affidavit of title in accordance with Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, VRF posted a bond to answer for any damages
which ECD may suffer.
In the meantime, ECD filed a complaint for quieting of title with an application for TRO
and/or preliminary injunction. ECD argues that it was the registered owner of the property
who has the right to its full use and possession.
Should the writ of preliminary injunction be granted? Explain.
No, it should be denied. The Supreme Court has explained that an applicant must be able to show a
right in esse i.e. an actual, existing, and substantial right. It cannot be issued to applicants whose rights
are merely contingent. Here, though the sale came before the annotation of the Notice of Levy on
Attachment, the registration in ECD’s name came only after such annotation. It is a well-settled rule
that a sale of property not registered under the Torrens system binds only the parties to the sale and
not innocent third persons. In other words, when the RTC ordered the annotation, the property was
still in LNA’s name. Therefore, in determining whether or not ECD is entitled to injunctive relief, the
court would have to pass upon the issue of who between ECD and VRF has the better right over the
property. This would now amount to a prejudgment of the case which is not allowed (Evy
Construction v. Valiant Roll, G.R. No. 207938 (2017), unanimous decision).
EVIDENCE
PROBLEM:
One evening, RM’s motorcycle broke as he was riding it so he was forced to push it along the
road. As he approached a white van parked nearby, four armed persons emerged from it. One
pointed a gun at RM and declared a holdup. Fearing for his life, RM immediately gave them
his watch, t-shirt, wallet, and the motorcycle.
RM reported the incident to the police and told the police that four men held him up and took
his things. He offered no other description of the perpetrators. Four days after, the police
contacted RM and asked him to proceed to the police station for the purpose of identifying
persons suspected to be responsible for the crime. Upon arriving there, four individuals were
presented to RM – A, B, C, and D (the accused). Upon seeing them, RM told the police that
they were the ones who conducted the holdup. The accused where then charged for
carnapping.
A and B, however, denied their involvement in the incident. They allege that they were just
suddenly picked up by the police while they were walking and then presented to RM. More
importantly, they argued that the out-of-court identification was invalid since it was
conducted through a police show-up, not a line-up since only four suspects were presented
to RM. According to A and B, this reeked of improper suggestion on the part of the police
officers.
(a) What is the totality of circumstances test when it comes to out-of-court identifications?
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According to Supreme Court, the following circumstances have to be considered to determine
whether or not the out-of-court identification is valid: (a) the witnesses’ opportunity to view the
accused at the time of the crime; (b) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (c) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness; (d) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (e) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (f)
suggestiveness of the identification procedure (Concha v. People, G.R. No. 208114 (2018), unanimous
decision).
(b) Was the out-of-court identification valid? Explain.
No, it was invalid. In accordance with the totality of circumstances test, it was clear that RM’s
identification fell short on several factors. First, he failed to provide descriptions of his attackers when
he reported the incident to the police. Without any description, any group of four men is susceptible
of being identified as the perpetrators. Second, RM’s certainty as to his identification cannot be
properly shown as well. Third, RM was admittedly scared and confused which reduced his degree of
attention. His disorientation was apparent when he gave his wallet, t-shirt, and watch without even
waiting for the men to give their demands. Fourth, the out-of-court identification was tainted with
improper suggestion since the police showed RM only four people to be identified. Therefore, when
RM was invited to the police station for the identification of the supposed perpetrators, his mind was
already conditioned that he would come face-to-face with the persons who robbed him. With these
considerations, RM’s mind could have been easily tainted with apparent suggestiveness. Therefore, it
was clear that the out-of-court identification done by RM was invalid (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Company A filed a collection suit against Company B, for the collection of the latter’s debt to
the former. While the case was pending, A transferred B’s loan obligations to Company C
through a Deed of Assignment which included a reference to a certain loan sale and purchase
agreement (LSPA) executed between A and C. Because of this transfer, C substituted A in the
pending litigation. B filed a Motion of Production/Inspection of the LSPA but C argued that
only the Deed of Assignment was produced in court and was marked as a documentary
exhibit.
Should B’s motion be granted? Why/why not?
The motion should be granted. First, it is reasonableness and practicability which must be used to
determine the propriety of discovery. Here, B had every right to know whether its loan was validly
transferred to C. Second, Sec. 17 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that when part of a
writing is given in evidence, the whole may be inquired into if the latter is necessary for the former’s
understanding. This provision clearly applies in the case herein because the LSPA was made a part of
the Deed of Assignment by explicit reference. Therefore, the LSPA will be needed for the full
understanding of the Deed of Assignment (Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville,
PROBLEM:
Pasig City Police received reports of illegal drug activities in a certain baranggay so they
conducted surveillance activities. They decided to conduct a buy-bust operation where H sold
them 0.5 grams of shabu for Php 200. Upon the completion of the sale, the police operatives
arrested H who was charged for illegal sale of shabu. During the trial, the police officers were
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able to show that they properly marked the evidence and that there was a baranggay official
and media representatives present during the buy-bust. In any case, assuming there were
lapses in the chain of command, they were still able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the shabu.
On the other hand, H vehemently argued that the police officers did not follow the chain of
custody prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. H alleged that PO1 A, one of
the officers in the buy-bust, only marked the plastic sachet supposedly obtained from him
without complying with all the other requirements under the law. Moreover, though the
officers say that a brgy official and media representatives were present, these people were not
presented as witnesses. Lastly, H argues that PO1 A was not even able to disclose who held
the sachet of shabu at the crime scene, at the police station, and at the crime laboratory.
(a) What are the four links that must be established in the chain of custody for illegal
drugs seized?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled these links to be: (a) the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug by the apprehending officer; (b) the turnover of the drug by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; (c) turnover by the investigating officers of the drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and, (d) turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. 207992 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) If you were the judge deciding this case, in whose favor will your rule? Explain.
I will rule in favor of H. The Supreme Court has held that failure to identify the person who submitted
the drug for forensic examination is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Here, the prosecution was
unable to concretely prove 3 out of the 4 links – the seizure and marking, turnover to the investigating
officer, and turnover to the forensic chemist – since all that they proved was that the police officers
marked the evidence. Moreover, the police officers did not offer any justifiable ground for dispensing
compliance with the chain of custody. The miniscule amount of shabu involved herein leads to the
higher likelihood of tampering, loss, or mistake which means that the officers involved should have
shown that they properly handled it. Therefore, H should be acquitted (Id.).
[N.B. This ruling was reiterated almost verbatim in People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 205821 (2014) – also a
unanimous decision penned by J. Leonen. The facts were almost identical in both cases – but in People
v. Cruz, not only were there no photographs taken with the people enumerated in Sec. 21 of the DDA
as amended but there was no inventory at all. The Court once again emphasized that mere marking is
insufficient, especially because the miniscule amount of shabu taken increases the doubt on the
integrity of the corpus delicti.]
PROBLEM:
In a buy-bust operation, JQ was caught selling .0157 grams of a shabu to PO3 SL. When he
was arrested, PO3 SL also found another sachet of shabu in his pocket. JQ was then brought
to the police station where the drug specimens were marked and turned over to investigator
SPO4 ET who marked them with his initials. ET also prepared the letter request for laboratory
examination of the sachet’s contents. The specimens were then turned over to MD who
subjected them to a laboratory examination. They tested positive for shabu. JQ was then
charged for illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs under the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act.
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Should ET be convicted for the crimes charged? Explain.
No, ET should be acquitted. Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act lays down the
chain of custody which must be followed by the police officers to ensure that the integrity of the corpus
delicti is maintained. The same provision, however, provides that noncompliance with the requirements
therein under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. In this case, the police officer’s noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirements was fatal to its case. First, there is nothing in the facts which showed that the police
officer made a proper inventory. The apprehending officers also did not take any pictures. Second,
none of the witnesses required by law were present during the seizure and the marking of the
specimens. Third, the police officers offered no explanation whatsoever to justify their noncompliance
with the chain of custody. With these circumstances, ET should be acquitted for the prosecution’s
failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti (People v. Que, G.R. No.
[N.B. Here are important notes when it comes to the chain of custody:
1. Absence of the witnesses required by law. Take note of when the buy-bust happened. Before
the enactment of R.A. No. 10640 on July 15, 2014, the following were required to be present:
(a) a representative from the media; (b) a representative from the Department of Justice; and
(c) any elected public official – all three of them are required. In R.A. No. 10640, the following
persons must be present: (a) an elected public official and (b) a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media – here, only the elected public official is absolutely required
to be present along with either a representative of the NPS or the media.
2. The witnesses must be present not only during the inventory and the taking of photographs
but also during the actual seizure or confiscation of the drugs. The presence of the witnesses
serves as an “insulating presence against the evils of planting, switching, or contamination.”
3. In accordance with R.A. No. 10640, the physical inventory and photographing shall be
conducted: (a) at the place where the search warrant is served i.e. this presupposes that the
arrest was not done in flagrante delicto or (b) at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending team/officer, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.
4. As much as it is important to establish the four links in the chain of custody, (see People v.
Holgado as discussed above), the prosecution must also explain for the intervening periods
between the links. For example, it’s not enough to merely state that PO1 A transferred the
drugs to PO2 B. The police officers must explain how they handled the drug specimens while
these were in their possession.
5. Failure to mark the evidence and to take photographs are fatal to the prosecution’s case.
6. The chain of custody must be strictly complied with and non-compliance with any of its
requirements negates the allegation of presumption of regularity.
7. When there is a failure to follow the chain of custody, the prosecution must be able to show
that the police officers exerted effort in complying with the requirements. Moreover, the lapses
in the chain of custody must be properly explained i.e. the lapses were really forgiveable given
the circumstances present. See People v. Pangan as discussed below.
In another case penned by J. Leonen - People v. Turematsu, G.R. No. 227497 (2019), unanimous
decision – the Court reiterated the rule that if the investigating fiscal filed the case in court despite a
showing that the chain of custody was not observed, the courts may exercise its discretion to either
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refuse to issue a commitment order/warrant of arrest or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable
cause.]
PROBLEM:
When must the objection to the offer of evidence be made?
In accordance with Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, the objection to the offer
of evidence must be made orally after the offer is made. Objection to the testimony of a witness for
lack of a formal offer must be made as soon as the witness begins to testify. Objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness must be made as soon as the grounds
therefor become reasonably apparent (Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626 (2018), unanimous
decision citing Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence).
[N.B. Take note that testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely objected to by the
opposing party may still be considered by the court. Therefore, when the opposing party belatedly
raises the technicality that the witnesses’ testimonies were not formally offered to “ambush” the party
presenting them, the court may not expunge or strike them out. The failure to timely object to the
evidence constitutes as a waiver.]
PROBLEM:
PO1 EC conducted a test-buy operation on EP at the latter’s store. After EC bought shabu
worth Php 1,000, EP instructed him to come back in the afternoon because more drugs would
be delivered via Fastpak. EC immediately went back to police station and reported the
information to his colleagues. They also secured a search warrant from a judge. That same
afternoon, EC went back to EP’s store and waited for the arrival of her package. When the
Fastpak package was delivered, EC made the pre-arranged signal, prompting his fellow
officers to rush to the store and enforce the search warrant. When EC grabbed the package,
EP became hysterical and uncontrollable and attempted to grab the package back. She even
knocked down a glass bottle. Because of her demeanor, EP was forced to enter a police
vehicle.
When they opened the bag, they found three big sachets of a substance which was later on
confirmed to be shabu. A barangay kagawad and two media representatives were present
during the conduct of the search and seizure. Another police officer marked the items and
prepared the inventory which was signed by the witnesses present. EC also took pictures of
the items and the premises.
EP was subsequently charged for illegal possession under Section 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. In her defense, EP argued that the prosecution failed to prove the
corpus delicti of the crime since the police officers did not follow the chain of custody. In
particular, EP pointed out that she was not present when the inventory and photographing
were done. Decide.
I will rule against EP. Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,
provides that non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, shall not render void the seizure
and custody over the items. Under the facts of the case, the police officers were justified in not marking
the items and making the inventory in EP’s presence. When EC grabbed the package, EP became
uncontrollable and even knocked down a glass bottle. Therefore, there was a justifiable reason for
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putting her in the police vehicle before the marking and the preparation of the inventory. Moreover,
the presence of the barangay kagawad and the media representatives effectively prevented the planting
of evidence or a frame-up. With all these considerations, there was substantial compliance with the
chain of custody (People v. Pangan, G.R. No. 206965 (2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. This case shows that the presence of the witnesses required by Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act is very crucial. Here, the Court even upheld the validity of the marking and
inventory of the drugs without the accused’s presence since the required witnesses were present.]
PROBLEM:
RL filed a complaint for grave threats against his brother, EL. The information was
subsequently filed in court. During pre-trial, the prosecution moved that they be allowed to
submit the Judicial Affidavits of RL and their witnesses later that day. The prosecution
explained that it had completed the affidavits but “for whatever reason” was not able to
submit them. The defense counsel opposed but the MTC granted the prosecution’s motion,
giving them until 5 PM of the same day to submit them. Was the MTC’s action proper?
Explain.
No, it was improper. The Section 10 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule explicitly provides that the
prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than 5 days before
pre-trial. Failure to do so within the time period constitutes as a waiver to submit the affidavits. The
same provision however, allows a late submission only once, provided that the delay is for a valid
reason, that it would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and that the defaulting party pays a fine.
In this case, the reason proffered by the prosecution – “for whatever reason” – cannot be considered
as a valid reason to allow the belated submission of the affidavits. Therefore, the MTC’s action was
improper (Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 214163 (2019), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
EA was charged with four counts of statutory rape for having carnal knowledge with AAA, a
14-year-old mental retardate with a mental age of five years and eight months. During trial,
AAA testified in a straightforward manner that in four separate occasions, EA gave her money
to convince the her to have sex with him. A few months after, AAA’s stomach became
noticeably bigger. When AAA was subjected to a medical exam, it was discovered that she
was pregnant. In his defense, EA argued that AAA was not competent to testify as a witness
since the latter only had a mental age of five years and 8 months, and an IQ of 70, at the time
of her testimony.
(a) Is EA’s argument meritorious? Explain.
No, it is not. Section 21, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states that all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make their perception known to others, may be witnesses. Therefore, a
person is not ineligible from testifying in court solely by the reason of his or her intellectual disability.
The Supreme Court has also explained that the credibility of an intellectually disabled person is upheld
provided that she is capable of and is consistent in narrating her experience. In this case, AAA narrated
her harrowing experience in a straightforward manner. Here, EA’s blanket argument of intellectual
disability cannot overthrow the credibility of AAA’s testimony (People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 208013
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(b) During trial before the RTC, the defense applied for a DNA paternity test which was
granted. DC, the forensic biologist and GO, the forensic chemist of the NBI, took
biological samples from EA, AAA, and XXX who was AAA’s daughter, in open court.
During her testimony, DC stated that the DNA profiles obtained revealed a
“99.99999% probability” that EA is XXX’s father. A confirmatory test was done which
affirmed this finding. Now, EA argues in his appeal to the CA that the DNA results
are unreliable. Decide.
I will rule against EA. Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence states that if the value of the probability
of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. In this case, the
DNA profiles showing a 99.9999% probability that EA was the father were sufficient to create this
presumption. Furthermore, it was even EA who moved for DNA testing. Therefore, he is now
estopped from questioning and objecting to the reliability of the testing because the results were not
favorable to him. Therefore, I will rule against EA (Id.).
PROBLEM:
While AM and his family were asleep, they were awakened by the sound of stones hitting their
house. When AM peeped through the window, he discovered his neighbor MB as the one
throwing the stones. MB was also shouting expletives and was saying that he will burn the
house. A few hours after, AM heard the dogs barking outside and saw MB walking towards
their nipa hut which was located 10 meters from their house. MB was pacing back and forth,
and he decided to shake the nipa hut. Moments later, AM was surprised to see that the nipa
hut was already burning. As a result, an information for arson was filed against MB. In his
defense, MB argues that nobody – including AM – actually saw him set the nipa hut on fire.
Decide.
I will rule against MB. Section 4, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, MB’s liability for arson was sufficiently proven
through circumstantial evidence. First, AM saw MB throwing stones while saying that he will burn the
former’s house. Second, AM saw MB walking towards the nipa hut and shaking it right before it
burned. These circumstances when taken together show that MB was undoubtedly liable for burning
AM’s nipa hut (Bacerra v. People, G.R. No. 205544 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
PGIC, an insurance company filed a collection case. It alleged that a Honda Civic Sedan
which it insured was hit by a truck owned by DST. In support of its claim, PGIC relied on an
accident report prepared by a certain PO2 CT. In CT’s report, he indicated that a certain GS
of PNCC/NLEX narrated the incident to him. In its defense, DST alleged that the truck did
not make any trips on the alleged day of the accident since it was undergoing repairs. The
MTC, RTC, and the CA all found DST liable, ruling that the accident report fell under the
exception of entries in official records. DST filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45, arguing that the MTC should not have relied on PGIC’s narration of events since it
was only based on the accident report. Therefore, PGIC was unable to prove DST’s liability
by a preponderance of evidence.
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(a) First, PGIC argues that the determination of whether a matter has been established by
a preponderance of evidence is a question of fact which is outside the ambit of a
petition under Rule 45. Decide.
I will rule that PGIC’s argument is unmeritorious. First, PGIC is correct in saying that the
determination of whether or not a matter has been established by a preponderance of evidence is a
question of fact. However, a jurisprudential exception applies in this case – that the judgment involves
a misapprehension of the facts since the MTC should not have relied on the accident report of PO2
CT for being hearsay. Therefore, the Supreme Court can take up a factual matter in this case (DST
Movers v. General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Was the MTC correct in relying on the accident report even if neither CT nor GS was
presented as a witness? Decide.
No, the MTC was wrong – the report should not have been admitted as evidence for being hearsay.
The Revised Rules on Evidence deems entries made in official records as an exception to the hearsay
rule. However, the accident report does not fall under that exception. Here, there was nothing in the
facts to show that PO2 CT had personal knowledge of the facts which he had indicated in the report.
On the contrary the report itself stated that a certain GS of PNCC/NLEX was the one who narrated
the incident to him. Therefore, the report should have been ruled as inadmissible (Id.).
PROBLEM:
GA married TT, a Japanese citizen. After 19 years of marriage, they filed a notification of
Divorce Agreement with the Mayor of Osaka City, Japan. Subsequently, GA filed a petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. To support
her petition, one of the documents she submitted was an English translation of the Civil Code
of Japan, published by EHS, a private company in Japan. The RTC denied GA’s petition,
stating that she failed to prove the copy of Japan’s law. GA appeals to the CA, arguing that it
is an official publication and is therefore self-authenticating. If you were one of the CA justices
handling the case, how will you decide? Explain.
I will decide against GA. It is a well-settled rule that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence,
a writing or a document may be proven as an official record by (a) an official publication; or (b) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is in a foreign
country which is part of a treaty in which the Philippines is also a party, then the certificate shall be in
the form prescribed by the treaty. If the country is not a party of the treaty, then it shall be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed therein, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The certificate shall
not be required when the treaty has abolished or has exempted the document from this formality.
In accordance with these rules, it is clear that a publication from a private company in Japan does not
satisfy these rules. Therefore, the English translation submitted by GA is not an official document
exempted from the requirement of authentication (Arreza v. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198 (2019),
[N.B. The part of the Rules regarding the treaty was added in the Revised Rules on Evidence.]
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PROBLEM:
A filed a case against B, arguing that the deed of sale allegedly entered into by B and C, A’s
mother, was void. A argues that C was illiterate and did not even know how to write her own
name. Therefore, she only affixed her thumbmark on documents when she is assisted by A.
Here, A argues that if the thumbmark is really genuine, then he should have known about the
sale.
In support of its allegations, A presented several documents which bore the authentic
thumbmarks of C. The thumbmarks of C in the documents were clearly different from the
one in the deed of sale with B. A also presented EG. EG is an NBI fingerprint examiner,
referred by the NBI itself, who conducted an examination to determine the genuineness of
the thumbmark. EG testified that in the supposed deed of sale between B and C, the latter’s
thumbmarks were not genuine.
In his defense, B argued that the deed of sale is notarized and therefore shows that C’s
thumbmark is genuine.
Is B’s argument meritorious? Explain.
No, it is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court has ruled that the notarization of a document only enjoys
the presumption of regularity and a notarized document is accorded evidentiary weight as regards its
due execution. However, this presumption is disputable, and it can be refuted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
In this case, A was able to present clear and convincing evidence that C’s thumbprint was forged.
First, the documents presented by A already showed that the genuine thumbmark of C is different
from the one in the deed of sale with B. Furthermore, EG, the NBI’s fingerprint examiner also attested
that the thumbmark in the deed of sale was forged. Therefore, A was able to overturn the presumption
of regularity brought about by the document’s notarization (Tortona v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 202612
[N.B. Here, the Court also reminds us of doctrines regarding expert witnesses. First, an expert witness
must be shown to possess knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the subject matter of his
testimony. Second, not only must the witness be credible, but the testimony must also be credible in
itself. Third, the courts are not bound by expert testimonies and the former has the discretion whether
or not to consider the expert testimony given.]
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
PROBLEM:
Congress passed a law which required the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to use the
Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). The VVPAT consists of physical paper records
of voter ballots. Through the VVPAT, the voter can verify if the choices on the paper record
match the choices that he or she actually made. On the other hand, COMELEC refuses to
implement the VVPAT function because of fears that this may aid in vote-buying and it may
prolong the voting period. Assuming you have the proper standing, what remedy can you file
against the COMELEC to compel it to implement the VVPAT system?
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I will file a petition for mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Under this provision, the writ of mandamus is proper to compel the performance of a clear legal duty,
or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant by operation of his office, trust, or station.
Here, the law explicitly requires the COMELEC to use the VVPAT in the conduct of elections.
Therefore, the implementation of the VVPAT system is mandatory on the part of COMELEC. As
much as the COMELEC is given ample discretion to administer the elections, its constitutional duty
is still to enforce the law. With these considerations, I will file a petition for mandamus (Bagumbayan-
VNP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 222731 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
DL, wrote to the BIR, saying that former President Marcos’ family had various Swiss dollar
accounts. 20 years later, he wrote to BIR Commissioner, demanding that he be paid his 25%
informer’s reward on the Php 118B supposedly recovered by the Philippine Government
through compromise agreements with the Marcoses. Thereafter, DL filed a petition for
mandamus and damages against the BIR, asking for his informer’s reward. Decide.
I will rule against DL. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a petition
for mandamus is proper to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. In this case, no such
ministerial duty exists. Under the Tax Code, as amended, the grant of an informer’s reward is not a
ministerial matter because the information supplied must not yet be known to the BIR. Moreover, the
information must lead to the actual collection of the proper taxes. These considerations show that the
grant of an informer’s reward requires the consideration of proper evidence and proper application of
the law. Therefore, DL could not compel the BIR via mandamus to pay the reward (Lihaylihay v. Tan,
[N.B. I modified the facts of this case because Lihaylihay filed a case under R.A. No. 2338 – a law no
longer in effect. In any case, the Court used the provisions of the Tax Code to show that the grant of
the informer’s reward is discretionary and not ministerial.]
PROBLEM:
ZD, a domestic corporation, mortgaged a parcel of land to IE Bank as security for its loan.
ZD defaulted and IE exercised its option to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage. ZD
subsequently filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the sale and to declare Sec. 47 of
R.A. 8791 as unconstitutional. ZD argues that the General Banking Law of 2002 violates its
right to equal protection since law provides a shorter period for redemption of 3 months or
earlier to juridical entities compared to the 1 year given to natural persons. The RTC
dismissed the complaint and refused to rule on the issue of constitutionality of the provision.
ZD appealed the decision to the CA. The latter categorized the complaint as one for
declaratory relief and refused to rule on the issue of constitutionality as well. Aggrieved, ZD
filed a Petition for Mandamus before the Supreme Court, asking that the CA be compelled to
decide on the issue of Constitutionality.
Did ZD avail of the proper remedy? Explain.
No, ZD’s remedy was improper. Section 5, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that courts may refuse
to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments where a decision would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy or in any case where the declaration is not necessary and
proper under the circumstances. From this provision, it is clear that courts exercise discretion in
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deciding whether or not to entertain an action for declaratory relief. On the other hand, mandamus
under Section 3, Rule 65 can only be availed of to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. Since
the CA’s duty here is discretionary, it cannot be compelled via mandamus to rule on ZD’s petition
(Zomer Development v. CA, G.R. No. 194461 (2020), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The Court also ruled here that in a petition for declaratory relief questioning the
constitutionality of a law/ordinance, the Republic need not be impleaded. Mere notice to OSG is
sufficient.]
PROBLEM:
AAS Inc. mortgaged a parcel of land to DTR Inc. as security for credit purchases. Under the
mortgage agreement, DTR was given express authority to extrajudicially foreclose the
property should AAS fail to pay. While the mortgage contract subsisted, AAS Inc. sold the
property to MM who acknowledged DTR as the first mortgagee. Subsequently, AAS Inc.
defaulted on its obligation. DTR extrajudicially foreclosed the property and was the highest
bidder at the sale. A month after the certificate of sale was registered, MM filed a complaint
for specific performance and annulment of auction sale before the RTC. A year after the case
was filed, DTR now files a motion in court, arguing that the period of redemption had already
lapsed. To refute DTR’s argument, MM argues that the filing of his petition tolled such
period. Decide.
I will rule in favor of DTR. Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides that any subsequent mortgagor may
redeem at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale. The Supreme Court
has ruled that this period is non-extendible to avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the
ownership of the thing sold. Therefore, MM was mistaken in arguing that the filing of his case tolled
the redemption period. If he really wanted to acquire the property, he should have just redeemed it
from DTR. With these considerations, I will rule in favor of DTR (Mahinay v. Dura Tire, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
GP Inc. loaned Php 300M from MBTC. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over
one of GP’s properties located in San Fernando, Pampanga. Subsequently, GP defaulted and
MBTC filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the lot. Subsequently, GP caused the
publication of the notice of sale in Remate, a newspaper printed and published in Manila, and
is of general circulation all over Luzon. After the foreclosure sale, GP filed a case in court,
arguing that the publication of the Notice of Sale in Remate was invalid because this
newspaper was not printed and published in San Fernando, Pampanga where the property
was located. Decide.
I will rule against GP. The Supreme Court has explained that the purpose behind Section 3 of Act
No. 3135 is to attain publicity wide enough so that all interested parties can be properly informed of
the upcoming sale. Therefore, the crucial factor is not where the newspaper is printed but whether the
newspaper is being circulated in the city where the property is located. Even Section 3 just requires
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Here, the facts state the Remate was of general
circulation all over Luzon and not only in Pampanga. Therefore, the publication in Remate complies
with what the law requires (Gotesco Properties v. Solidbank, G.R. No. 209452 (2017), unanimous
decision).
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PROBLEM:
City of ABC assessed PEZA, a government instrumentality, for real property taxes. This led
PEZA to file a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC, asking that it be declared exempt
from the payment of real property taxes. The RTC ruled in PEZA’s favor. ABC then filed an
MR which was denied, and an appeal to the CA, stating the following arguments: (a) that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over PEZA’s relief; and (b) that PEZA was not a GI but a GOCC.
(a) Did the trial court have jurisdiction over PEZA’s petition? Explain.
No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that a petition for
declaratory relief is only available if there has been no breach of the document or governmental
regulation being assailed. Here, ABC had already issued demand letters and an assessment in violation
of PEZA’s supposed tax-exempt status. In other words, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition had
already been breached and the trial court is therefore stripped of its jurisdiction over it (City of Lapu-
Lapu v. PEZA, G.R. No. 184203 (2014), unanimous decision).
(b) Was ABC’s mode of appeal correct? Explain.
No, ABC’s mode of appeal was incorrect. According to the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an
appeal to the CA from the RTC in the latter’s exercise of its original jurisdiction, must raise a question
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. Here, the petition was filed by PEZA in the RTC, pursuant
to its original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However, the matters that ABC raised
were pure questions of law. Jurisdiction is a question of law because it is law that confers such; and,
the character of PEZA as an institution can clearly be determined from its charter. Therefore, ABC
should have gone straight to the SC with a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 (Id.).
[N.B. The procedural mistakes of the parties rendered this action moot. However, the Court still took
cognizance of the case “in the interest” of justice because PEZA was indeed tax-exempt (see the
discussion under Political Law). I suggest that you read this case in the original since the Court reiterated
the rules for the proper remedies in assessments by local government units. However, I decided not
to make a question for that since that discussion was not material in determining the taxability of
PEZA nor the procedural errors committed by the parties. There was a small but obvious discussion
therein, which stated that since the petition filed was a tax case, then the appeal should have been filed
with the CTA, not the CA.]
PROBLEM:
AC, the president of CI, Inc., was charged with violating the Trust Receipts Law. This was in
relation to a transaction with BDO. After the prosecution rested its case, AC filed a demurrer
to evidence which was granted by the RTC. The court also declared that the case is subject
to compensatory action which is civil in nature. Thus, BDO filed a petition for Certiorari
before the CA, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the petition since it should still be paid the money owed by AC. AC argues that BDO had no
legal personality to file his petition before the CA. Decide.
I will rule in favor of BDO. Generally, the acquittal of an accused can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question
the acquittal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused in concerned. Here, the main argument of
BDO concerns the civil aspect of the case. Therefore, BDO’s petition for certiorari concerns the civil
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aspect which it has the personality to question despite AC’s acquittal (BDO v. Choa, G.R. No. 237552
PROBLEM:
A, B, and C were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for unwarranted
benefits given to a contractor, to the government’s prejudice, involving a certain infrastructure
project. When the prosecution formally offered its evidence, A, B, and C filed their respective
demurrers to evidence, arguing that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since
the crucial document which would allegedly prove their act was not presented in evidence.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied their demurrers, ruling that there was sufficient basis to
support the charge in the Information. In the order of denial, they were ordered to present the
evidence for their defense. This led, A, B, and C, to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied their demurrers.
Was A, B, and C’s recourse to the Supreme Court proper? Explain.
No, it was improper. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a petition for certiorari may only
correct errors of jurisdiction, or such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It does not include correcting the evaluation of evidence and factual findings of a certain
decision. Here, A, B, and C are asking the Supreme Court to evaluate the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence which is beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise will
amount to deciding on the case in advance of trial. Therefore, A, B, and C must continue with the trial
and present their evidence (Espinosa, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191834 (2020), unanimous
decision).
PROBLEM:
President XYZ passed an Executive Order which designated ABC city as the regional center
of Region XII. As a result of this, the Department of Agriculture directed the transfer of the
regional office in Region XII to ABC city from its current location in MNO city. The
employees of the regional office filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order in the RTC to oppose this transfer.
They argued that there will be substantial operational costs incurred and that it will
significantly disrupt the lives of the employees residing in MNO. This was opposed by the
Republic, arguing that this injunction goes against established constitutional principles. The
RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. This caused the Republic to file a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, arguing on the same ground which it
raised before the RTC. This action was dismissed by the CA for the Republic’s failure to file
a motion for reconsideration first with the RTC.
(a) What now is the proper remedy of the Republic?
The proper remedy is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. It must be remembered that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
independent action. Therefore, the dismissal by the CA would attain finality if it is not elevated on
appeal via Rule 45 (Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492 (2013), unanimous).
(a) Was the CA correct in dismissing the Republic’s action for the latter’s failure to file an
MR first with the SC?
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No, the CA was incorrect. The Supreme Court has ruled that filing an MR is generally a condition sine
qua non before a party can file a Petition for Certiorari. However, the Court has also recognized several
exceptions to this rule, including where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court or are the same questions raised and passed therein. From
the facts of this case, it is clear that this exception applies because the issue raised by the Republic in
the RTC is also the same one in the CA (Id.).
PROBLEM:
A and B ran for the position of Representative of the first legislative district of Makati City. A
won with only a margin of 242 votes. This prompted B to file an election protest before the
HRET. B designated 59 clustered precincts for her protest which were all recounted by the
HRET. After the recount, A’s margin increased from 242 to 265 votes. B questioned the
decision in the SC via Rule 65.
Can the SC review the HRET’s decisions on mere errors of fact or law?
No, the SC cannot. The Court’s jurisdiction to review the HRET’s decisions and orders is exercised
only upon a showing that the latter acted with GADLEJ. Where a tribunal has issued orders within its
jurisdiction, such orders, though erroneous, cannot be corrected by certiorari. This same rule applies
to the HRET which is a constitutionally recognized body (Locsin v. HRET, G.R. No. 204123 (2013),
PROBLEM:
ME filed a complaint for Replevin against WA before the RTC for the recovery of her van
worth Php 300,000. ME applied for a replevin bond from MI Inc. for the amount of Php
600,000 which had a period of one year. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the complaint without
prejudice due to ME’s failure to prosecute. Subsequently, the RTC found that ME failed to
return the van to the sheriff from the dismissal of the case. Thus, the RTC ordered MI to pay
WA the full amount of the bond. This order was not challenged by ME.
MI then asked ME for the reimbursement of the bond which the latter failed to pay. This led
MI to file a collection suit against ME with the RTC. Should ME be made liable for the full
amount of the bond? Explain.
Yes, she should be liable for Php 600,000. Section 2, Rules 60 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the party seeking the issuance of the writ of replevin must file a bond in an amount
double the value of the property. The rationale for requiring double the amount of the property is to
answer for it in case it is lost and to answer for damages that may be awarded if the court rules in
favor of the defendant. Therefore, any application of the bond in a replevin case is premised on the
judgment being rendered in favor of the defendant. Here, the case was dismissed due to ME’s failure
to prosecute i.e. there was no judgment on the merits in favor of WA. Moreover, for the defendant to
be granted the full amount of the bond, he must first apply to the court for damages. Here, no
application was made. Therefore, she was supposed to be liable for only value of the van – Php 300k.
However, this case involves a situation not covered by the rules. Here, the case was dismissed for
failure to prosecute and ME was ordered to return the van – an order which she did not comply with.
This led the RTC to order MI to pay the full amount of the bond. Since ME did not challenge this
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order, she cannot now evade her liability to reimburse MI for the Php 600,000 which the latter paid
(Enriquez v. Mercantile Insurance, G.R. No. 210950 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
JKL company leased a piece of land from ABC company. JKL company subsequently received
a letter from PBC bank, the latter claiming to be the new owner of the property and asked that
rental be payment be made to them. When JKL company informed ABC company about
PBC’s demand, ABC insisted that rental payments be made to them.
If you were the counsel of JKL company, what remedy would you file in court to protect your
client’s interests?
I would file a special action for interpleader under Rule 62 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 1 of the said rule provides that this action may be filed when there are conflicting claims made
upon the same subject matter on a party who has no interest therein or an interest in whole or in part
which is not disputed by the claimants. By filing an action for interpleader, ABC company and PBC
bank who are both claiming the same right to receive the rental payments, would be compelled to
litigate among themselves. This would then protect my client by extinguishing his obligation and by
insulating him from double vexation in respect of one liability (Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma,
PROBLEM:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) instituted expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of a 3954 sqm parcel of land owned by PB with the RTC. According to the NPC,
the land was to be used for a substation island grid project. The NPC subsequently filed a
Notice to Take Possession along with a deposit in the LBP in the amount of Php 580,769,
representing the provisional value of the properties. This amount was based on NPC’s own
determination. Subsequently, a writ of possession was granted by the Court.
(a) The PB appealed the case, arguing that the writ of possession should not have been
issued. Decide.
I will rule in favor of PB. Despite the rules prescribed in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it is Republic
Act No. 8974 which governs the expropriation for national government infrastructure projects, which
includes power generation, transmission, and distribution. Here, the substation island grid project falls
under such category. R.A. 8974 requires that immediate payment of the zonal value of the property
be made to the owners based on BIR’s zonal valuation, along with the value of the improvements,
before possession may be allowed. Therefore, the RTC should not have even issued the writ of
possession for two reasons. First, NPC only deposited the money to the LBP when the law requires
actual and immediate payment to the owners. Second, the deposit was only based on its own
determination of the provisional value when the law requires that the value be based on the BIR’s
zonal valuation. Therefore, the NPC should not have been granted possession (NPC v. Posada, G.R.
(b) Assume that before the writ of possession was issued, the court-approved
commissioners reported that the value of the land was Php 827,000. This amount was
approved by the RTC. Can NPC pay only the provisional value as required by law for
it to be allowed possession? Explain.
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No – NPC must pay the full amount. The Supreme Court has explained that generally, only the
provisional amount is required for possession to be granted. However, this amount is not a substitute
for the judicial determination of just compensation. Here, since the RTC had already determined the
actual amount of just compensation, the NPC is required to pay it in full before its possession may be
allowed (Id.).
[N.B. The Court also ruled that if the expropriator is no longer using the properties, it may be allowed
to discontinue with the expropriation proceedings, unless: (1) the trial court’s order had already
become final and executory; (2) the government already took possession of the property; and (3) the
expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner. See p. 223 of Ateneo Blue Notes.]
PROBLEM:
IA leased certain real properties of the national government, the administration of which was
transferred OC Corp. Pursuant to the lease, OC introduced improvements in the leased
premises. However, IA and the Department of Tourism (DOT) halted the projects due to
OC’s non-conformity with P.D. No. 1616. OC filed an injunction case against IA. However,
they subsequently executed a Compromise Agreement where they affirmed the validity of the
lease contracts.
However, OC started defaulting on its rental fees and utility bills despite several demand
letters. IA tolerated the occupation, hoping that OC would pay its arrears. However, OC still
failed to pay them. This led IA to file a complaint for ejectment against OC with the MTC. In
its defense, OC alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint since the contract
between IA and OC was not actually a lease but a concession. The MTC dismissed the
complaint, stating that the issue involved cannot be limited to a simple determination of who
has the better right of possession. Assuming that IA was able to sufficiently allege the grounds
for unlawful detainer, was the MTC’s action proper? Explain.
No, it was not. The Supreme Court has ruled that the respondents’ defense does not determine
whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserted therein. In ejectment cases, only the issue of
physical possession is resolved and once the jurisdictional facts have been alleged, the MTC is vested
with jurisdiction regardless of the defendant’s claims. Therefore, the MTC should not have dismissed
the complaint (Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction, G.R. No. 196795 (2018),
PROBLEM:
In 1992, CA Corp. bought a parcel of land in Cebu. 10 years after acquiring the property, CA
decided to construct a commercial building on it. The City Zoning Board required CA to
construct a parking lot which then required the latter to make a deep excavation first. In the
process, it discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground which had been
placed there by PLDT sometime in 1983. In April 2003, CA applied for an exemption from the
parking requirement which was denied by the Zoning Board. On June 15, 2004, CA wrote a
demand letter to PLDT, asking the latter to remove their property. The latter refused to
comply, so CA filed a complaint for forcible entry before the MTC on October 1, 2004. PLDT
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argued that the case should be dismissed since the prescriptive period to bring the action has
prescribed. Decide.
I will rule in favor of PLDT. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the action must be brought
at any time within 1 year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Since this is a
case of forcible entry, the 1 year is counted from the time of unlawful entry, except for situations
where entry was done through stealth which is counted from the date of discovery since stealth
presupposes that the unlawful entry was initially not known by the bona fide possessor. Here, CA
discovered the lines of PLDT when it applied for an exemption from the parking requirement in April
of 2003. Since it only filed the action for forcible entry on October 1, 2004, the action has clearly
prescribed (PLDT v. Citi Appliance, G.R. No. 214546 (2019), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The Court also mentioned here that the issue of eminent domain cannot be properly resolved
in a complaint for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. A complaint for expropriation is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. See p. 223 of Ateneo Blue
Notes for Political Law].
PROBLEM:
VJ entered into a verbal, month-to-month lease contract over her property with Sps. C. After
a few years, VJ suddenly refused to accept the rental payments. Subsequently, she sent a letter
to Sps. C, demanding them to vacate the property and pay all the unpaid rentals. However,
Sps. C did not comply. The parties then participated in barangay conciliation proceedings
which did not result into a compromise between them. One of the issues discussed therein
was whether or not Sps. C received a proper demand to vacate.
Three years later, VJ again sent a final demand letter demanding that Sps. C to pay the rentals
and to vacate the property. The latter still refused to comply. Subsequently, VJ filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC. In their defense, Sps. C alleged that they never
received the demand letter and therefore, the requisite of a prior demand for unlawful detainer
cases is lacking. Decide.
I will rule against Sps. C. The Supreme Court has ruled that the jurisdictional requirement of prior
demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the
terms of contract. This means that the complaint must be brought on the allegation that the lease has
expired, and that the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed
to pay the rent. In this case, the termination of the lease came when VJ refused to accept the rental
payments – an act implying that VJ has already refused to renew the contract. Moreover, Sps. C cannot
merely allege that they failed to receive the demand letter because this issue was even raised in the
barangay conciliation proceedings. With these considerations, I will rule in favor of VJ (Cruz v. Sps.
Christensen, G.R. No. 205539 (2017), unanimous decision).
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
PROBLEM:
LKB and CKL, both Chinese nationals, got married in Quezon City. They had 3 children –
JN, WB, and CT (“The Children”). In their birth certificates, the nationalities of their parents
were indicated as “Chinese.” A few years after, LKB and CKL were both naturalized as
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Filipino citizens. As the decades passed, The Children all studied, engaged in professions,
and got married in the Philippines. Later on, they all filed a petition for correction of entry
under Rule 108 of their respective Certificates of Live Birth, contending that the nationality of
their parents should be changed from “Chinese” to “Filipino.” May the nationality of their
parents be changed under Rule 108 considering that their parents were still Chinese Nationals
at the time of their birth? Decide.
I will decide in their favor. The Supreme Court has ruled that the New Civil Code allows the recording
in the birth certificate of acts and events which have occurred after birth. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court allows the change of nationality of parents who were foreign nationals but were
naturalized later on. Since the entry sought to be changed was substantial – citizenship – then the
Children were correct in availing of a petition under Rule 108 (Republic v. Chia Lao, G.R. No. 205218
PROBLEM:
Michelle Soriano Gallo (MSG) has always been female, and she has always been known by
this name. Furthermore, her parents, who were married on May 23, 1981, have never changed
their names. Despite these facts, there were several mistakes in her birth certificate: (a) Her
first name therein was “Michael” instead of “Michelle”; (b) her biological sex was “Male”
instead of “Female”; (c) her mother’s name did not include the middle name “Angangan”;
and, (d) her father’s name did not include the middle name “Balingao.”
Seeking to correct these mistakes, MSG filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
before the RTC. MSG presented her diplomas, a voter’s certification, and transcripts
indicating that her name was really “Michelle”. She also submitted herself to a medical
examination, showing that she was born a female.
On the other hand, the OSG appeared and argued that the applicable rule in this case should
be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The OSG alleges that the changes which MSG seeks to
make are not typographical or clerical errors.
(a) What are clerical or typographical errors when it comes to changes in a person’s
records with the civil registrar?
Under Republic Act No. 10172, a clerical or typographical error is one which was committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records (Republic v. Gallo, G.R.
No. 207074 (2018), unanimous decision citing Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 10172).
(b) Under what Rule should MSG’s petition be filed – 103 or 108? Explain.
Neither because her allegations are covered by R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. No. 10172. First, Rule
103 does not apply in this case because that rule governs a change of name which are is not caused by
mere clerical or typographical errors. In this case, the changes sought to be effected by MSG were
only clerical. MSG is merely correcting the spelling of her name – from Michael to Michelle. Rule 108
also does not apply because as ruled by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9048 effectively removed clerical
errors from the ambit of such rule. In other words, Rule 108 is only proper for substantial corrections
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and entries. In this case, the prayer to enter her parents’ middle names and the correction of her sex
may be done by merely referring to existing records in the civil registrar because they are again, mere
clerical errors. Therefore, the matters which MSG seeks to change are expressly governed by R.A.
9048 as amended by R.A. No. 10172 (Id.).
(c) Did MSG file her petition before the proper tribunal? Explain.
No, she did not. Under R.A. No. 10172, petitions concerning matters covered by the law should first
be brought before the civil register in accordance with the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction. Only when the civil registrar rules against the petitioner’s favor may
the latter bring the case to court. Therefore, MSG should have first filed a case before the civil registrar
(Id.).
[N.B. I slightly modified the doctrine for question (b) because Gallo filed her petition before R.A.
10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 i.e. when it was still R.A. 9048 which was in effect. Therefore,
the Court ruled that as for the change of Gallo’s sex, it was Rule 108 which governed.
Remember that before R.A. 10172, a change of a person’s sex, even if the error involved was merely
clerical, was expressly excluded from R.A. 9048. However, as even recognized by the Court here, by
virtue of R.A. 10172, even a person’s change of sex due to a clerical error is now covered by petitions
before the civil registrar.
Lastly, the Court held here that the OSG here was estopped from raising Gallo’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, citing the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.]
PROBLEM:
A and B were legally married, and they bore 4 children – W, X, Y, and Z. After A’s death, a
certain J filed a petition for Partition and Accounting of A’s estate before the RTC alleging
that she is A’s illegitimate child with L. J presented her birth certificate to show that A was
her registered father. She also showed a holographic will purportedly executed by A, saying
that he bequeaths 1/8 of his estate to J. W subsequently filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in J’s birth certificate praying that it be cancelled, along with the prayer that the Local
Civil Registrar be commanded to replace J’s surname with that of her mother. Was W’s
remedy proper? Explain.
No, it was not. As seen from W’s prayers, what he filed is a cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108. What he seeks here is not a mere clerical change, nor is it a matter of
misspelling. In his petition however, J’s filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from
J’s to L’s will also change her status. It has been ruled by the Supreme Court that legitimacy and
filiation can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party and not through
a collateral attack. Therefore, W’s remedy was improper (Miller v. Miller, G.R. No. 200344 (2019),
PROBLEM:
VS learned that her estranged husband, EL, was among the 7 alleged members of the NPA
who were gunned down by the PNP. VS went to the funeral home to verify EL’s death. Upon
arriving there, police officers took her photos without her permission. VS subsequently
discovered that her photo was being circulated at the police station. Thereafter, a certain
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police officer warned her to cooperate with the investigation or they might put her under
surveillance. In the following days, she noticed frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of
her house. She and her daughter, SL, started to feel anxious and unsafe because of the
constant presence of the police. As a result, she filed a petition for a Writ of Amparo against
the police officers allegedly harassing her. The police officers denied that they were doing
acts inimical to VS’s right to life, liberty, and security; and, they argued that her allegations
were grounded on hearsay.
(a) What is a writ of amparo?
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states that the writ is a remedy to any person whose right
to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official. It is an equitable remedy against concerns such as threats of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. (Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257 (2019), J’s. Hernando, Gesmundo,
A.B. Reyes, Carandang, and Zalameda dissented).
(b) Is SL entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo? Explain.

Yes, she is entitled to it. The totality of VS’ evidence showed that she and her child were the subject
of surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected member of the NPA. Undoubtedly, the
police officers’ acts of constantly driving by their house, circulating VS’ photo in the precinct, and
threatening VS show that there is a real threat to their life, liberty, and security. Moreover, the mere
denial of the police officers is not the lawful defense required in a Verified Return. This mere denial
necessarily failed to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in performing their duty as
required by Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Therefore, VS is entitled to the privilege
of the writ (Id.).
PROBLEM:
DOJ Secretary DL directed Bureau of Corrections Director, FB, and NBI Director, VM, to
transfer several high-profile inmates from the New Bilibid Prison to the NBP extension
facility for a few days. The purpose behind this temporary transfer was a result of several
months of intelligence reports, alleging that illegal activities were being perpetrated by these
inmates. Subsequently, MB, the wife of one of the inmates transferred, filed a Petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Amparo and a Writ of Habeas Corpus/Data, while AB, the cousin of
another inmate, also filed for a Writ of Amparo. MB and AB alleged that the transfer of their
relatives was tantamount to detention incommunicado since they were precluded from having
visits and from being able to communicate with their lawyers.
(a) Can a Writ of Habeas Corpus be availed of even in the mere case of a prison transfer?
Explain.
Yes, it can be availed of. Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled
that any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient for the filing of a petition of
habeas corpus. If MB and AB’s allegations of detention incommunicado are proven, then can be
deemed to have the proper standing to file for a petition of habeas corpus. This is because detention
incommunicado, even if done after a valid arrest or detention, is unconstitutional (In the Matter of
the Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus/Data and Amparo in favor of Amin Imam Boratong v. G.R.
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[N.B. The Court found that the allegations of Memie Boratong and Anthony Bombeo were
unmeritorious since evidence shows that they were actually allowed to visit the inmates.]
(b) In support of the prayer for a Writ of Habeas Data, MB alleges that the DOJ should
furnish her with documents to justify his husband’s transfer. Decide.
I will rule against MB. The Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information of the aggrieved party
regarding his person, family, home, and correspondence. However, MB’s allegation bears no relation
to her husband’s right to privacy. There is also no allegation that the government agents are gathering,
collecting, or storing data or information regarding his person, family, home, correspondence.
Therefore, the Writ of Habeas Data cannot be granted (Id.).
(c) Should the Writ of Amparo be granted? Explain.
No, it should not be granted. The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened to be violated by an unlawful act of a public official,
which includes enforced disappearances or threats thereof. In this case, however, the transfer done by
Secretary DL was in accordance with law since she is given the power to transfer inmates from one
penal institution to another even without court authorization. Therefore, there was no illegal act which
violated the inmates’ right to life, liberty or security. Therefore, the writ of Amparo should not be
granted (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Sgt. EO and his superior officer, Major General JP, were charged in two informations for
allegedly kidnapping UP students KE and ST. Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued
against EO and he was detained in the Philippine Army Custodial Center. Contending that
the deprivation of his liberty was illegal, EO filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus with
the CA. To support his petition, EO argued that courts-martial, and not a civil court, had
jurisdiction to try his criminal case since he was a soldier on active duty and the offense
charged was allegedly service-connected. Decide.
EO’s petition should be denied. Republic Act No. 7055 which enumerates the service-connected
offenses of members of the Philippine Army do not include kidnapping under the Revised Penal
Code. Furthermore, common sense dictates that kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier.
Even if a public officer has the legal duty to detain a person, the officer must show the existence of
legal grounds for the detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have
acted in a private capacity. Therefore, the civil courts have jurisdiction over his offense and his petition
for the writ of habeas corpus must be denied (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus pf Ssgt.
Edgardo Osorio, G.R. No. 223272 (2018), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo, directed against the Secretary of Justice
(“SOJ”) and several others, in the RTC. The judge issued summons and ordered the SOJ to
file an answer.
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(a) Was the judge’s action proper?
No, it was improper. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo states that it is a RETURN that serves as the
responsive pleading to a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. Unlike an answer, the Return
has other purposes aside from identifying the issues of the case (Secretary De Lima et al. v. Gatdula,
G.R. no. 204528 (2013), unanimous decision).
(b) What are the respondents required to state in the Return? (IEW-CMLT-O).
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are required to state the actions they had
taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to
the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain
statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and
time of death or disappearance, as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the
death or disappearance; and they are required to (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent
court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that he or she can calibrate the means and
methods required to promote the protection of the petitioner if he or she is proven to be entitled to
relief (Id.).
(c) The judge in this case issued a decision stating: “The Branch Clerk of Court of Court
[sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of Amparo. Likewise, the Branch Clerk
of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ of Amparo in an
expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the
assistance of any military or civilian agency of the government.” Can this be appealed?
No, it cannot be appealed. From the wording of such “decision”, it clearly pertains to the issuance of
the writ under Sec. 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, and not the judgement under Sec. 18. What
the judge issued was actually an interlocutory order granting interim reliefs. Being an interlocutory
order, it cannot be appealed (Id).
[VERY IMPORTANT NOTE: There was a lengthy discussion of the remedies of the Writ of
Kalikasan and the Writ of Continuing Mandamus in the case of Abogado v. DENR, G.R. No. 246209
(2019), unanimous decision. Familiarize yourself with their intricacies. This case, however, was
dismissed because during the oral arguments, the OSG submitted documents showing that the
petitioners did not authorize their counsels to file the case. This eventually led to the counsels
withdrawing. The Court, through J. Leonen, decided to discuss the environmental writs, along with
the repetition that the mere desire to save the environment and mere advocacy are not enough. There
must be concrete evidence to show that they are entitled to the reliefs they are praying for.]
PROBLEM:
Jose filed a petition for adoption of Jed and Regina, his illegitimate children with Lilibeth.
Attached to his petition was his legitimate wife Rosario’s alleged affidavit of consent. Jose
argued that he was not able to have children with Rosario and that they were already separated
de facto. The adoption was approved by the RTC on October 16, 2000.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario found out about what Jose did. She goes to you and alleges that
she had a child with Jose named Joanne who was born in 1970. Moreover, she alleges that the
affidavit of consent Jose filed was forged since she did not even know then that he filed the
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petition. Lastly, she alleged that she was never informed of the proceedings, and neither was
Joanne.
As Rosario’s lawyer, what remedy will you avail of to protect her interests?
I will file a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. First, there are no other remedies available
because the decision has been final for 7 years. Moreover, I cannot file for rescission of adoption since
the Rules on Adoption specifically state that this remedy is only available to the adoptee.
The petition for annulment of judgment can be annulled on the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction and
also on extrinsic fraud. The Rules on Adoption explicitly require that if one spouse seeks to adopt his
illegitimate child, the other spouse has to signify his or her consent thereto. Here, Rosario, who was
only separated de facto from Jose, did not consent. Moreover, the Rules on Adoption also require that
the legitimate children 10 years old or above must also consent. Here, Joanne – the legitimate daughter
who was already around 30 years old – did not give such consent. These requirements are jurisdictional
and non-compliance therewith results to the court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud is also present. The Supreme Court has explained that this type of fraud contemplates
a situation wherein the losing party was prevented from having her day in court. This type of fraud is
present here. First, Jose lied about not having children with Rosario. Second, he also falsified Rosario’s
affidavit of consent. All these machinations prevented Rosario from even being notified about the
adoption proceedings. Clearly, extrinsic fraud is present in this case (Castro v. Gregorio, G.R. No.
PROBLEM:
DMS went to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj pilgrimage. When he returned, he was arrested by the
police since he was allegedly BSM, one of the perpetrators of the infamous Maguindanao
massacre. While under detention, DMS argued that he could not have been involved in the
massacre since, as evidenced by his documents, he was at Saudi Arabia when it happened.
DMS then filed a petition for habeas corpus, questioning the legality of his arrest. To counter
the petition, the prosecution argued that DMS could not avail of this remedy since he was
already charged under a valid information and a warrant of arrest had already been issued;
and, he should have just filed a motion to quash the information.
In whose favor will your rule? Explain.
I will rule in favor of DMS. Rule 102, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court provides that if the person is in
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, then the writ shall not be allowed.
However, since the information and the warrant of arrest were for BSM, and not DMS, it was clear
that he was illegally deprived of his liberty. In other words, he correctly availed of a petition for the
writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, under the facts of this case, none of the grounds for a motion to
quash are even available (In re: Salibo v, Warden, G.R. No. 197597 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
This is an offshoot of a case against HJW, among others, who was charged with the crime of
rape with homicide for allegedly raping and killing CV. When the case was pending before
the trial court, HJW filed a Motion to direct the NBI to submit Specimens for DNA analysis.
According to him, this would establish his innocence since the semen found in CV was not
his. The Supreme Court eventually granted his request on April 20, 2010. Dr. B of the NBI
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then claimed in a manifestation that the semen specimen was no longer in its custody because
it had already submitted the same to the court. This was denied by the court, saying that this
was never submitted. In another certification, Dr. B of the NBI confirmed that the slides were
still with them, based on the medical technologist’s certification. During the trial, HJW also
alleged that the prosecution counsel was coaching one of their key witnesses.
Because of the missing specimen, HJW filed a petition for Indirect Contempt. He prays that
the prosecution counsel be cited for indirect contempt for “impeding, degrading, and
obstructing the administration of justice,” for allegedly coaching a witness during trial. He
also alleged that the NBI officers should be held in contempt for disobeying the April 20, 2010
resolution of the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Supreme Court, issued a ruling in the
original case, stating that the prosecution had failed to prove HJW’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
(a) Explain the 2 concepts embraced by res judicata: (i) bar by prior judgment; and (ii)
conclusiveness of judgment.
Res judicata by bar by prior judgment is found under Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Court. It
prohibits the filing of a second case when it has the same parties, subject, and cause of action, or when
the litigant prays for the same relief as in the first case. On the other hand, res judicata by conclusiveness
of judgment is found in Rule 39, Section 47(c) of the Rules of Court. It precludes the re-litigation of
a fact or issue that has already been ruled upon in the first case between the same parties. If between
the first and second case, the causes of action are different and only the parties and issues are the
same, then res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment is present (Webb v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 194469
(b) The officers of the NBI now argue that the Supreme Court’s ruling on the criminal
case renders the current case dismissible on the ground of res judicata. Decide.
I will rule against the NBI officers. First the Supreme Court has settled that res judicata, a civil law
principle, is not applicable in criminal cases. In any case, even assuming arguendo that the principles of
res judicata apply, the resolution of the criminal case will not preclude the current case. This is because
there is no identity of parties, issues, and causes of action between them. The NBI officers are not the
victims of the rape slay in the first case. Moreover, in the original case, HJW seeks to prove his
innocence while here, he seeks to cite the NBI officers in contempt. Clearly, the argument of the NBI
officers is unmeritorious (Id.).
(c) Differentiate criminal contempt from civil contempt.
As explained by the Supreme Court, criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity
and authority of the court or a judge; and an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends
to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. A contempt proceeding is criminal when the primary
purpose is punishment – there is no element of personal injury involved. On the other hand, civil
contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a court order in a civil action that would benefit the opposing party.
When a contempt proceeding is civil, the purpose is compensatory or remedial. This is because civil
contempt contemplates an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made.
Another difference lies in the burden of proof. In criminal contempt, the contemnor is presumed
innocent, and his guilt needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. His intent must be proven as
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well. In civil contempt, the burden of proof is merely preponderance of evidence; and good faith is
not a defense (Id.).
(d) Rule on HJW’s petition for indirect contempt.
I will rule only partially in favor of HJW. First, the ground HJW alleges against the NBI officers is in
the nature of civil contempt since the submission of the DNA analysis was for his benefit – to prove
his innocence. Based on what HJW has shown, it is clear that the NBI officers acted with gross
negligence in safely keeping the specimen in their custody. They tried to evade liability by stating that
they have submitted it in court, but this was belied by the records of the latter. With these
considerations, the NBI officers should be cited for indirect contempt.
However, the prosecution counsel should not be held in contempt. From HJW’s allegations, the act
of coaching the key witness amounts to improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice. In other words, this is in the nature of criminal contempt. Here, HJW was not able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the counsel’s guilt. He was not able to show that the act was done willfully
and with a deliberate intent to cause injustice. Therefore, the prosecution counsel cannot be held in
contempt (Id.).
ARBITRATION
PROBLEM:
SL, Inc. insured its fleet of vessels with SMU Assoc. was a Bermuda-based Protection and
Indemnity Club managed just outside London, England. This was done through SMU’s local
insurance agent, PIS Corp. The insurance policy states that SL, Inc. agrees to be a member
of SMU and that the former is bound by a written document entitled, “The Club Rules.”
Shortly after the policy was executed, one of SL’s vessels was gutted by fire. As a result, SL
claimed indemnity from SMU. However, the latter denied the claim, arguing that SL’s
negligence caused the fire. Because of this, SL filed a complaint for specific performance with
the RTC against SMU and PIS. In its defense, SMU filed a motion to refer the case to
arbitration, citing Rule 47 of the Club Rules which provides that disputes between SMU and
its members are subject to arbitration in London.
(a) To rebut SMU’s motion, first SL argues that there was no valid arbitration clause
agreed upon since the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Law requires that the
arbitration agreement be in writing and subscribed by the parties. Therefore, SL
alleges that the arbitration clause merely contained in the Club Rules cannot be
binding. Decide.
I will rule against SL. The Supreme Court has held that an arbitration clause incorporated to the
principal contract by way of reference is binding on the parties. The Supreme Court has explained that
in a contract with several instruments, unsigned documents are binding as long as they are clearly
identified, referred to, and made part of the signed documents. Therefore, SL is deemed to have
accepted the Club Rules which was referenced by the insurance policy which it signed. By accepting
the stipulations of the policy, SL cannot subsequently object to being bound under the Club Rules
(Steamship Mutual v. Suplicio Lines, G.R. Nos. 196071 and 208603 (2017), unanimous decision).
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(b) Second, SL argues that arbitration is improper because PIS, one of the respondents in
the case, is not a member of SMU, and is therefore not bound by the Club Rules.
Decide.
I will rule against SL. The Special ADR Rules provide that the court shall not decline to refer some or
all of the parties to arbitration simply because not all of them are bound by the arbitration agreement.
This rule unequivocally shows the law’s policy in favor of arbitration. Moreover, Section 24 of the
ADR law provides that the dispute must be referred to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration
agreement is void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. As discussed above, the arbitration
clause in the Club Rules is valid and binding on the parties. Therefore, the Court must refer the dispute
to arbitration (Id.).
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS & PRACTICAL EXERCISES
LEGAL ETHICS
PROBLEM:
Atty. A, holding the position of Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) for Region II, was suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court.
However, he continued discharging his responsibilities under his public office. B now files
another administrative complaint, asking the Court to impose further sanctions on A for
violating his suspension. B argues that A’s position requires him to be a lawyer in good
standing. Therefore, since A was suspended, he had no right to discharge his functions and
doing so amounted to the practice law. On the other hand, A argues that the position of
Regional Director has other responsibilities which do not require the application of legal
knowledge. According to him, the exercise of his functions during his suspension was only
confined to these. Decide.
I will rule in favor of B. The landmark decision of Cayetano v. Monsod has settled that work requiring
the use of legal knowledge is considered the practice of law. The CHR is mandated by the Constitution
to investigate all forms of human rights violations which requires the application of legal knowledge.
Moreover, a Regional Director has the power to administer oaths, conduct initial investigation, review
draft resolutions of human rights cases – all of which require the use of legal knowledge as well.
Therefore, the exercise of the powers and functions under this position constitutes practice of law.
For doing so despite his suspension, A must be penalized (Lingan v. Calubaquib, A.C. No. 5377
PROBLEM:
AM sought the services of Atty. FC to assist in the naturalization of her son, PM, a British
national. FC agreed to take on the task, so AM paid him Php 80,000 for his acceptance fee.
However, three months passed without FC doing anything substantial. This led AM to
terminate FC’s services and asked for a refund of the acceptance fee. Should AM be
administratively sanctioned? Decide.
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Yes, he should be sanctioned. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. In this case, FC did not do anything in three months which led not only to his
client’s dissatisfaction, but even to the termination of their contract. Therefore, FC should be
sanctioned for his negligence (Murray v. Cervantes, A.C. No. 5408 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Sps. P hired Atty. I to facilitate the transfer of title of property owned by M to them. Sps. gave
I a check for the payment of transfer taxes and another check for the latter’s professional fee.
However, despite repeated follow-ups, I failed to produce the title for 3 years. Sps. P then
asked I to return the amounts given to him, but the latter did not comply. This led Sps. P to
file a complaint, asking that I be disciplined for his actions. In his defense, I argued that there
Sps. P had not paid him for other cases that he handled for them; therefore, he had the right
to retain the funds. Decide.
Atty. I should be disciplined for his actions. First, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property received from the client, and that he shall
deliver such funds and property when due or upon demand. Here, Atty. I continuously reneged on
his duty and his client’s demands for the return of the money they paid fell on deaf ears. Moreover,
his defense of lawyer’s lien is untenable. Jurisprudence provides that even if all requisites for a valid
retaining lien is present, a lawyer cannot appropriate for himself the client’s funds without proper
accounting and notice to the latter. Such accounting and notice were not done here. Therefore, Atty.
I should be disciplined. (Sps. San Pedro v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440 (2014), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
BC, a senior citizen, was in a mandatory conference with MA before the Labor Arbiter in
connection with a money complaint which the former filed against the latter. As they were on
their way out of the Labor Arbiter’s office, Atty. WB, MA’s counsel, arrogantly threw his arm
toward BC and shouted, “Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want.”
This was witnessed by the employees of the NLRC. Feeling humiliated, BC filed an
administrative case against Atty. WB. Decide.
I will rule in favor of BC. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer
shall not, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Moreover, Rule 8.01 of the same code provides that a lawyer must employ respectful and
restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. Here, Atty. WB’s statement to
BC, a senior citizen, was rude and disrespectful. Atty. WB, instead of giving the respect that BC is due,
chose to annoy and humiliate him. Therefore, he must be sanctioned for his action (Canlapan v.
Balayo, A.C. No. 10605 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
HC engaged the services of Atty. JH as legal counsel to represent her in several collection
cases pending in various courts. She paid the latter Php 61,000 for his services. However, Atty.
JH failed to attend any of the hearings and sent another lawyer without HC’s consent. The
lawyer that JH sent also failed to attend the hearings and the cases ended up getting
dismissed. In his defense, Atty. JH said that he unilaterally withdrew from the cases due to
HC’s uncooperative demeanor. HC argued that since she did not know Atty. JH’s withdrawal,
she failed to engage new counsel. Should Atty. JH be sanctioned for his actions? Decide.
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Yes, he should be sanctioned. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an attorney
may retire at any time with the written consent of his client filed in court; or, he may retire without
such consent if the court allows him to do so. Here, JH withdrew unilaterally since HC was supposedly
uncooperative. However, due to his withdrawal without HC’s consent, the latter did not hire a new
counsel, and this led to the dismissal of her cases. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and that his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In accordance with this, Atty. JH must be
sanctioned (Chang v. Atty. Hidalgo, G.R. No. A.C. No. 6934 (2016), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
TF, the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, hired Atty. NA to defend her in
criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman. At that time, Atty.
NA was working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health, a government
entity. Atty. NA asked Php 1.4M from TF, saying that he had friend in the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help dismiss her case for a certain fee. However, two weeks after
Atty. NA’s statement, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of a criminal complaint
against TF.
(a) Assuming that Atty. NA was given an authority to practice by his superior, can he
represent TF in this case? Explain.
No, he cannot. Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees states that engaging in the private practice of one’s
profession must not conflict with the official functions of the government employee. In this case, a
suit against the Ombudsman i.e. a suit against the government, puts gives rise to a conflict of interest.
Atty. NA, a government employee, cannot go against the Ombudsman, a part of the government
which employs him. Therefore, Atty. NA was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this case
(Fajardo v. Atty. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018 (2016), unanimous decision).
(b) Assuming he could represent TF in this case, should Atty. NA still be administratively
liable? Decide.
Yes, he should still be held administratively liable. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct. Moreover,
Canon 13 of the same Code provides that he shall refrain from impropriety which tends to influence
or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Atty. NA’s act of influence peddling is highly
immoral. Based on his statement to TF, he was willing to bribe employees of the Ombudsman to win
the case. Clearly, Atty. NA should be held administratively liable for his actions (Id.).
PROBLEM:
Atty. GM represented ADJ in a case pending before the CA. On July 20, 2010, the CA issued a
notice to Atty. GM, requiring him to file an appellant’s brief. At that time, Atty. GM recently
moved out of his office. He asked Atty. MJ if he can use the latter’s office as his temporary
address. Atty. MJ granted his request. All communications addressed to Atty. GM was to be
handled by RL, the Atty. MJ’s messenger. RL was then tasked to inform DD, Atty. GM’s,
messenger, who was then tasked to give the communications to Atty. GM. In the meantime,
Atty. GM moved to withdraw ADJ’s appeal because an amicable settlement on the disputed
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property has been reached. After the motion to withdraw was filed, Atty. GM stopped
communicating with Atty. MJ and instructed DD to do the same.
In a subsequent resolution, the CA directed Atty. GM to secure ADJ’s written conformity to

the motion to withdraw appeal within 5 days from notice. Atty. GM did not comply.
Thereafter, the CA resolved to deny the motion to withdraw appeal and reiterated the order
to file an appellant’s brief. This was again not complied with. The CA then sent an order,
compelling Atty. GM to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. This
was again not complied with. The CA fined him, but he did not pay. Because of his repeated
failure to comply, he was suspended from legal practice.
Eventually, Atty. GM found out about what happened in the proceedings in the CA. He then
argues in his defense, that he should not be sanctioned because all the CA’s resolutions and
orders never reached him. Decide.
Atty. GM’s defense is unmeritorious. The lawyer’s oath states that a lawyer will obey the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein. Here, he failed to follow the orders of the CA. The facts
show that his troubles were due to his negligence to keep himself informed on the status of the case.
Not only did he stop communicating with Atty. MJ, but he also asked his own messenger to do the
same. Moreover, the motion to withdraw of appeal does not result in its automatic withdrawal because
the court still needs to resolve the motion. As seen in this case, the CA first required the client’s
conformity. Since Atty. GM just assumed that the withdrawal was final, then he must be held liable
for his negligence (In Re: Resolution Dated August 14, 2013 of the CA, A.C. No. 10117 (2016),
PROBLEM:
EA engaged the services of Atty. WL to file a petition for the nullity of her marriage with her
husband. She paid him Php 50,000 for his professional fee. EA repeated followed-up with Atty.
WL on the status of her cause. Atty. WL then sent her a complaint which bore the “received”
stamp of the RTC. The complaint was supposedly docketed as Civil Case No. 1234. When EA
went to the RTC to inquire about her case, she was shocked to discover that the stamp used
by Atty. WL was fake. She also found out that there was no pending case number 1234 within
the court’s docket. Angered by her discovery, EA asked that Atty. WL return to her the fees
she has paid. Should Atty. WL be administratively sanctioned? Explain.
Yes, Atty. WL should be sanctioned. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. Moreover, Rule 18.03 of the same Code states that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. Here, Atty. WL did not file the agreed upon
case for EA’s annulment. To make things worse, instead of just filing an actual case, he attempted to
fool EA by furnishing her a copy of a complaint which bore a fake stamp. Clearly, Atty. WL deserves
to be administratively sanctioned for his acts (Angeles v. Atty. Lina-Ac, A.C. No. 12063 (2019),
PROBLEM:
R engaged Atty. M to act as his counsel in a Quieting of Title case. R lost in the RTC, so he
asked Atty. M to file an appeal for him. R kept on following-up with Atty. M who told him
that there is still no word from the CA. After several months, R asked the CA regarding the
status of his case. To his surprise, he was informed that no appeal was filed and that the RTC
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case had attained finality. R filed a disciplinary case against Atty. M, who alleged that he was
only doing this as pro bono work. Decide.
I will rule in favor of R. Canon 18.03 states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence will render him liable. Moreover, Rule 18.04 also states that a lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case. Here, Atty. M unjustifiably disregarded R’s cause without
even exerting efforts to inform him about the proceedings. This led R to lose all legal remedies to
protect his interest. The fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client is not lost just because
services are being rendered pro bono. A lawyer must exert his utmost diligence to a client from the time
he agrees to accept the latter’s case (Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537 (2015),
PROBLEM:
Atty. S assisted A in making the latter’s affidavit of self-adjudication when A’s father died. A
died a few months after this. Subsequently, B and C, siblings of A, asked Atty. S to help them
impugn A’s affidavit of self-adjudication because he was not the only heir to their father’s
estate. Atty. S agreed to represent B and C. Subsequently, a disciplinary case was filed against
Atty. S, alleging that he violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Decide.
I will discipline Atty S for representing conflicting interests. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after full disclosure of facts. Jurisprudence explains that the essence of conflict
is this: if the lawyer argues for one client and this same argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other. In representing B and C, Atty. S will refute the affidavit of self-adjudication that
he helped A make. Moreover, there was no showing that the parties consented to his representation
despite the conflict of interest. Therefore, Atty. S should be disciplined for his action (Bernardino v.
Santos, A.C. No. 10583-84 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
Atty. DV borrowed Php 500k from TE. To secure her debt, DV issued post-dated checks
covering the amount. Upon maturity of the checks, TE presented them for payment, but they
bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. This led TE to file a disciplinary case
against DV. In her defense, DV said that it was actually TE who had a loan to her friend MJ
and the checks she issued were only for show. Decide.
I will rule in favor of TE because issuing bouncing checks even if only for accommodation is
punishable. Jurisprudence explains that the lawyer’s act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under
B.P. Blg. 22, constitutes as serious misconduct. Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct; and, that he shall not engage in such
conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law. Therefore, even if DV only “lent” her
checks to TE, she must still be punished for issuing worthless checks (Enriquez v. De Vera, A.C. No.
PROBLEM:
WY, JG, and DM are lawyers practicing under the firm YRGM. PP filed an opposition against
the appearance of their lawyers since R, a name included in the firm name, was already
disbarred. YRGM replied that they opted to retain his name simply as an act of charity. PP
subsequently filed a petition to cite YRGM’s lawyers in contempt. Decide.
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I will rule in favor of PP because the name of a disbarred lawyer cannot be used in the firm name.
Using such name violates Canon 9 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility which states that a
lawyer shall not directly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Moreover, jurisprudence has already
declared that the use of the name of a person not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of
court. Therefore, YRGM’s lawyers should be cited in contempt (Kimteng, et al. v. Young, et al. (2015),
PROBLEM:
JL was killed at a motel in Olongapo City by US Marine JSP. Since the issue of jurisdiction
between the Philippines and the US was disputed, JSP was transferred to the headquarters of
the AFP. When JL’s family found out about this, they went to his place of transfer along with
their lawyer, Atty. HR. While they were there, HR allegedly incited his clients to scale the
perimeter fence. He also started shouting expletives against the soldiers present there.
After the incident, the AFP released a press statement, saying that they were considering filing
disbarment proceedings against Atty. HR. Five days later, AFP filed a disbarment complaint
and called a press conference to publicly announce that the case has been filed. Lastly, the
AFP issued another press statement, stating that:
“The AFP has filed a disbarment complaint before the IBP against atty. HR for violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he must bring honor to the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society and he must refrain from doing any act that
might lessen the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. His unlawful conduct is clearly prohibited under the rules of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.”
After seeing the last press statement, Atty. HR filed a case in court, asking that several AFP
members be cited in contempt. He argues that AFP’s acts of publicly threatening to file a
disbarment case and announcing the filing of the case violated the confidentiality rule in
relation to disbarment proceedings. Decide.
I will rule against HR because the AFP did not violate the confidentiality rule. First, since there is no
pending disbarment case against him, there is nothing yet to be kept private and confidential. Second,
a perusal of the AFP’s press statement was a brief, unembellished report that a complaint had been
filed. Jurisprudence explains that the confidentiality rule covers the proceedings themselves and not
the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions. In this case, the AFP’s press statement did not
discuss the disbarment complaint itself, nor did it divulge any acts or character traits on Atty. HR’s
part that would damage his reputation. Clearly, Atty. HR’s complaint for contempt has no leg to stand
on (Roque, Jr. v. AFP, G.R. No. 214986 (2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The Court also discussed that the power of contempt should be balanced with the right to
freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters.
Moreover, the Court also explained that It has given a restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes
contempt where freedom of speech and the press are involved.]
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JUDICIAL ETHICS
PROBLEM:
An administrative case was filed against MTC Judge B because he allegedly solemnized
marriages without the required marriage license. Instead, he notarized affidavits of
cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties on the same day of their marriage.
The complainant alleges that Judge B did this on 9 separate instances.
(a) The complainant alleges that Judge B’s actions violated Circular No. 1-90 which gives
MTC judges the authority to act as notaries public ex officio. Judge B argues that
notarizing the affidavits was connected to his official functions. Decide.
Judge B violated Circular No. 1-90 because notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation are not connected
with his official functions. This issuance allows MTC judges to notarize documents which fall
exclusively within the exercise of their judicial function and only if lawyers or notaries public are
lacking in their territorial jurisdiction. First, affidavits of cohabitation are not within the duties of the
judge as a solemnizing officer. In accordance with Art. 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by Members of the Judiciary, the judge must examine the affidavit of
cohabitation to ensure that the couple has indeed cohabited for 5 years and there is no impediment to
marriage. A judge cannot objectively examine a document which he himself has notarized. Second,
Judge B did not even certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in his territorial jurisdiction.
This also amounts to a violation of the circular. (Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 (2014),
(b) The complainant also alleges that Judge B’s actions violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice because he did not require the parties to present competent pieces
of identity. Judge B argues that since he interviewed the couples, this requirement is
already dispensed with. Decide.
Judge B violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice because he should have asked for the
presentation of competent pieces of identity. Rule IV, Sec. 2 of the said Rules states that a person
cannot perform a notarial act if the person is not personally known to the notary public or is not
identified through competent evidence of identity as defined therein. The fact that the parties
personally appeared before Judge B and were interviewed by the latter does not take away this
requirement. Judge B did not personally state that the parties were known to him; and, merely
interviewing them does not satisfy the requirement of presenting competent pieces of identity to the
notary (Id.).
(c) Assuming that Judge B’s actions were violative of Circular No. 1-90 and 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, should he be punished? Judge B argues that he did these acts in
good faith and that he just followed what the other judges did. Decide.
Yes, he should be punished because his acts are tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. First,
violating Circular No. 1-90 and the Rules on Notarial Practice on nine separate occasions is
inexcusable. Jurisprudence dictates that the defense of good faith cannot prevail if the issues are so
simple, and the applicable legal principles are so evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins
of error. Moreover, the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge must not only ensure that
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his conduct is above reproach, but that he is perceived to be in the view of a reasonable observer. If
the law is so basic, ignorance already constitutes lack of integrity (Id.).
PROBLEM:
In a case for ejectment pending in Judge WL’s court, a motion to withdraw admission was
filed by RR and was submitted for resolution on September 12, 2008. However, despite the
lapse of three years, Judge WL still has not acted on the motion. RR subsequently filed an
administrative complaint against Judge WL for undue delay. In her comment, Judge WL
explained that the Branch Clerk of Court failed to return the record of the case to her for
resolution. She only discovered the unresolved motions when she found out about the
administrative complaint against her. Moreover, Judge WL added that she consistently gave
unsatisfactory ratings to her Clerk of Court and had even raised the issue of her incompetence
before then Court Administrator JP. Lastly, she states that she had to attend to her cancer-
stricken husband and son from 2009 to 2011 but despite this, she was still able to substantially
reduce the pending cases before her court. Should Judge WL be sanctioned for undue delay?
Explain.
Yes, she should be sanctioned. Even though her Clerk of Court was mainly to blame for what
happened, this does not completely exculpate Judge WL from liability. Jurisprudence provides that
judges and their clerks of courts should personally conduct a physical inventory of the pending cases
not only at the time of their assumption to office, but every semester thereafter on June 30 and
December 31. If only Judge WL had done this, then she would have immediately discovered the
pending motions. For failing to do so, she should be held liable (Rapsing v. Walse-Lutero, A.M. No.
MTJ-17-1894 (2017), unanimous decision).
[N.B. The Court considered Judge Walse-Lutero’s circumstances and decided to only admonish her
for what happened.]
PROBLEM:
CF, who was facing financial difficulties, approached Judge MD to ask his help in selling rice
to the latter’s employees and to the employees of other branches. MD agreed and issued a
check to CF as his contribution to the capital. MD and CF also made an agreement where the
former would get a small portion of the profits for his own benefit. Subsequently, CF
presented the check which allegedly bounced. This led CF to file an administrative case
against MD. Assuming that the bounced check was not sufficiently proven, should Judge MD
still be held administratively liable? Explain.
Yes, he should still be held administratively liable. Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states
that a judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the
court’s impartiality. Here, Judge MD’s act of attempting to sell rice to his own employees and to the
employees of other branches is highly improper. He had moral ascendancy and supervision over them,
and he would have profited if the transaction pushed through. Because of this, Judge MD should he
held liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge (Mendoza v. Diasen, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900 (2017),
PROBLEM:
Judge BC of an RTC in Pangasinan rendered a decision against DB in an unlawful detainer
case. This decision became final and executory. Thereafter, the winning party SC, moved for
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by Paul Tan
the issuance of a writ of execution. This was granted by BC. DB opposed the writ and argued
that the judge had no jurisdiction over the case since the land was not in Benguet. Moreover,
DB also argued that there is an ongoing boundary dispute between Pangasinan and Benguet.
However, DB’s opposition was dismissed by BC. This led to DB filing an administrative case
against BC, arguing that the latter should have made inquiries on the exact location of the
land. Therefore, her failure to do so shows her gross ignorance of the law. Should Judge BC
be administratively sanctioned? Explain.
No, she should not be sanctioned. Jurisprudence explains that an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge deemed irregular when where is another judicial remedy
available. Here, the orders of Judge BC were done pursuant to her judicial capacity. Therefore, the
issue of jurisdiction raised by DB are correctible through judicial remedies and not through
administrative complaints. Moreover, there is no gross ignorance of the law present in the case.
Jurisprudence explains that the judge’s actions must not only be erroneous but must be attended by
bad faith, dishonesty, or other similar motive. Here, there is nothing in the facts which show that BC’s
orders were attended by these circumstances. Therefore, Judge DB should not be sanctioned (Biado
v. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A civil case for absolute nullity of deed of sale between A and B was pending before RTC
branch 1, Bogo City, Cebu, presided by Judge AM. During the pendency of the case, A filed
a criminal complaint for VAWC against B. This was raffled to RTC branch 2, Cebu City, Cebu,
presided by Judge BS. With no standing warrant of arrest against him, B was able to post bail
before the court of AM. This led A to file an administrative case against AM for gross
ignorance of the law. A argues that in allowing B to post bail, AM violated a very basic rule of
criminal procedure. Decide.
I will rule in favor of A. Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court shows an order of preference
with respect to where bail may be filed. In the absence or unavailability of the judge where the case is
pending, the accused must first go to a judge in the city where the case is pending. Moreover, a judge
of another city may grant bail only if the accused has been arrested in a city other than where the case
is pending. Violating these very basic rules makes the judge administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law. Here, Judge AM was not a judge in the city where the case was pending, and neither was
B arrested in the city other than where the case was pending because there was no standing of warrant
against him yet. With these circumstances, I will rule in favor of A (Tejano v. Marigomen, A.M. No.
RTJ-17-2492 (2017), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
A judicial audit on January 29, 2009 was conducted in RTC Br. 53 of Lucena, Quezon where
Judge A was presiding. Judge A then retired on March 27, 2009. The Court Administrator
discovered that Judge A had failed to act on hundreds of cases beyond three months from the
date of their submission. An administrative case was filed against him on April 29, 2009. In
his defense, Judge A argued that he had health problems in the last few months of his service
and that he has served 22 years in the judiciary.
(e) Can the Supreme Court take cognizance of the administrative case? Explain.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case filed. Jurisprudence states
that the judge’s compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to institute the administrative
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by Paul Tan
case. This also means that the Court can no longer acquire jurisdiction because he is not a public
official anymore. Since Judge A retired before the administrative case was filed, the remedy is to file
the appropriate civil or criminal case against him (OCA v. Ret. Judge Andaya, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181
(f) Assuming that the administrative case was filed before Judge A retired. Will your
answer change?
Yes, my answer will change. Jurisprudence states that once the Court acquires jurisdiction over an
administrative case by virtue of a complaint filed during the respondent’s incumbency, such
jurisdiction will not be divested by reason of the respondent’s cessation from office. Since the Court
has validly acquired jurisdiction in this situation, then it can now proceed to rule on the merits of the
administrative case (Id.).
(g) If the Court can take cognizance of the case, should Judge A be sanctioned?
Yes, Judge A should be sanctioned. The duty of the judge to decide cases within the required periods
is not only found in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, but it is also enshrined in Sec. 15(1), Art. VIII
of the Constitution which mandates lower courts to resolve matters within three months from the
date of submission. Moreover, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that
all judicial duties must be performed efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. Since A
repeatedly failed to follow these periods, he should be sanctioned (Id.).
PROBLEM:
An administrative case was filed against Judge LOC. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that she be dismissed from service and likewise disbarred. However, during
the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, Judge LOC died. Should the case be
dismissed because of Judge LOC’s death? Explain.
Yes, the case should be dismissed. Jurisprudence explains that a disciplinary case against a court official
may continue even after retirement or resignation. However, death is different because it effectively
forecloses the respondent’s opportunity to be heard. To continue with the proceedings is a violation
of the right to due process. Moreover, since Judge LOC already died, the penalty of dismissal or
suspension can no longer be meted out. With regard to the accessory penalty of forfeiture of
retirement benefits, the Court believes that the penalties in administrative cases are personal to
respondent. Therefore, it would be cruel to take away the retirement benefits from the family who
probably have nothing to do with the erring judge’s infractions. Therefore, the case should be
dismissed (Flores-Concepcion v. Judge Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438 (2020), J.’s Caguioa, Perlas-
Bernabe, Zalameda, Reyes, and C.J. Peralta dissented.).
RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
PROBLEM:
Siblings A and B were surprised to find out that they were being asked to leave a piece of land
they co-owned with their brother C, by virtue of an alleged sale to D. Upon checking the deed
of sale, they saw that their signatures were falsified, and Atty. E notarized the contract. They
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by Paul Tan
filed a disciplinary case against Atty. E, arguing that they could not have presented
themselves to him at the time of notarization since they were in the United States. In his
defense, Atty. E argued that C approached him and assured him that the sale was done with
A and B’s consent. Moreover, C begged that the contract be notarized right away since he
needed money to pay for his mother’s hospital bills.
(a) Was Atty. E’s notarial act proper? Explain.
No, it was not. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice explicitly prohibits notarizing a document if the
person involved as signatory to the contract is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of
notarization. Here, Atty. E did not even dispute that A and B were in the U.S. when he notarized the
deed of sale. If Atty. E exerted vigilance in performing his notarial duties, then he could have easily
prevented the fraud that took place. Therefore, Atty. E’s notarial act without A and B presenting
themselves to him was illegal (Anudon v. Cefra, A.C. No. 5482 (2015), unanimous decision).
PROBLEM:
CP purchased a motorcycle and went to Atty. JS, a notary public, to have the documents
notarized. These documents indicate that they were registered under the latter’s notarial
register. After a few months, CP obtained a copy of the 3 documents from the Land
Transportation Office and called JS to have them certified because they were going to be used
in a civil suit. JS “disowned the documents”, arguing that they were not found in his notarial
register as it was his secretary who certified them. CP then filed a disciplinary case against
JS, arguing that the latter should be punished for the impropriety of his actions. Decide.
I will rule in favor of CP. First, the 2004 Notarial Rules requires that several details of documents
notarized be entered in the notary public’s notarial register and that failure to do so is a ground for
revocation of notarial commission. Here, JS negligently failed to enter the details in his notarial register
which violates this rule. Moreover, the notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary
public and cannot be delegated. Therefore, JS should be held liable for letting his secretary certify the
documents (Pitogo v. Suello, A.C. No. 10695 (2015), unanimous decision).
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Q&A of J.

(a) What are the requisites for judicial review?

(b) Does M’s letter comply with such requisites?

(b) Does Atty. JF have legal standing? Explain.

(c) Did Atty. JF avail of the proper remedy? Explain.

(d) Was his resort to the Supreme Court proper? Explain.

(a) Did petitioners avail of the correct remedies? Explain.

(a) Is there an actual case or controversy? Explain.

(b) Is the case ripe for adjudication? Explain.

(c) Do the parties have legal standing? Explain.

(a) Is ABC’s contention correct? Why/why not?

(a) In whose favor will you decide? Explain.

(a) Was the arrest valid? Explain.

(b) Was there a search incidental to a lawful arrest? Explain.

(c) Was there a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle? Explain.

(a) What is a stop and frisk search?

(b) Was the search done on GT valid? Explain.

(a) Is the case ripe for adjudication? Explain.

(e) Is the law a bill of attainder? Explain.

(b) Was the search valid? Explain.

(b) What remedy did IF avail of? Explain.

(c) Rule on the merits of IF’s petition.

The names of AZ and RZ in the official ballots are indicated as follows:

(a) Should RZ be declared as a nuisance candidate? Explain.

(a) What are the requirements of administrative due process?

(b) Rule on APM’s argument before the CTA.

(a) What is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction?

(a) What attributes must be present for an entity to be properly characterized as a

(b) Is CFI a GOCC? Explain.

(d) Is CFI under COA’s audit jurisdiction? Explain.

(a) What is a government instrumentality?

(b) Is MWSS is a government instrumentality? Explain.

(c) Is the MWSS liable for real property taxes?

(a) Was there a valid cause for her dismissal?

(a) Is AE a regular employee? Explain.

(b) Was AE illegally dismissed? Explain.

(a) Is there an employer-employee relationship? Explain.

(b) Are HP et al. regular employees? Explain.

(b) Rule on the merits of LB’s complaint.

(a) Rule on the argument of A, B, and C.

(a) Was LR constructively dismissed?

Was MP illegally dismissed by LBC? Explain.

Was Sec. CLV’s opinion, correct? Explain.

(a) Rule on PSN’s argument of prescription.

(b) Was GA illegally dismissed? Why/why not?

(a) Can ODR be dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct? Explain.

Did UR commit unfair labor practices? Decide.

Was RR terminated for just cause? Explain.

(a) Was M’s suspension valid?

(a) What are the requirements of a valid redundancy program?

(b) Was MA validly dismissed? Explain.

In whose favor will you decide? Explain.

(a) Was OP’s heart disease work-related? Explain.

(b) Rule on Q Air’s argument.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Will you grant MT’s petition? Explain.

(b) Rule on B’s complaint.

(a) Was the mortgage void? Explain.