57 Ateneo LJ
57 Ateneo LJ
57 Ateneo LJ
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Wrongful Conviction and the Case for
Forensic Evidence in the Philippine
Criminal Justice System
Albert Lee G. Angeles*
Acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent - the LORD detests them
both.
Proverbs 17:15'
* '08 J.D., Ateneo de Manila University School of Law. The Author is currently a
Senior Associate at Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Law Offices where he extensively
practices litigation.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the Author and in no way
reflect the views of Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Law Offices.
Another case was added to the statistics in 2010 when the Supreme
Court reversed a judgment of conviction in the highly publicized case of
Lejano v. Peoples and directed the immediate release of the accused who had
been wrongly detained for 14 years.6 Note, however, that even before the
expos& in 2004 and the consolidated cases of Lejano and Webb in 2010, there
had already been a concern and an admonition to be circumspect to protect
the rights of the innocent and to prevent wrongful convictions.7
Presently, there are two pending bills in Congress that seek to address
the problem of wrongful convictions. These are House Bill No. 2938 (An
Act Providing Compensation for Persons Wrongfully Convicted of a Crime
and for Other Purposes),' 7 authored by Representatives Rufus B. Rodriguez
and Maximo B. Rodriguez, Jr., and Senate Bill No. 2687 (An Act Creating a
Commission on Criminal Justice Reform), 8 introduced by Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago.'9
26. Lejano, 638 SCRA at 189 (2010) (J. Carpio-Morales, concurring opinion).
27. Lejano, 638 SCRA at 293 (2010) J. Sereno, separate concurring opinion).
did not conrnit the crime, would it not have at least cast a reasonable
doubt that he conrnitted it?
Moreover, the argument against the relevance of the semen sample - that
the presence of semen was not necessary to prove that rape was committed
- is not in point. What the defense was after[,] when it sought DNA
testing[,] was neither to prove nor to disprove the commission of rape, but
to pinpoint the identity of the assailant. In this case, semen with
spermatozoa was in fact obtained, and it did possess exculpatory potential
that might be beneficial to the accused. In Tifing v. Court of Appeals, [it was]
held that 'courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.' Hence, it is the constitutional duty of the trial judge to afford all
possible means to both the NBI and the counsel for accused, in order that
such evidence may be scrutinized in open court.2 8
The opinions are so far two of the most potent ones that appreciate the
use and implications of forensic evidence in criminal trials. Nevertheless,
their effects as to how they will impact the conduct of judges in resolving
criminal cases before them have yet to be seen. They do, however, provide
authorities that can support demands for the eventual and more aggressive
28. Id. at 308-09 (citing Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 17, 26 (2001)).
29. PETER P. NG & PHILIPP U. Po, FORENSIC SCIENCE 25 (2007). See also Oregon
State Police Forensic Services Division, Physical Evidence Manual intro.,
available at http://www.oregon.gov/osp/FORENSICS/docs/physevidence
rnanual.pdf (last accessed Feb. 28, 2013).
30. See National Institute ofJustice, Forensic Sciences: Type of Evidence, available
at http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/forensics/evidence/welconie.htn (last
accessed Feb. 28, 2013).
31. NG & PO, supra note 3 1, at 26-28. See also Donald E. Shelton, et. al., A Study of
Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the "CSI Effect"
exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 357 (2006).
33. See LEo 0. OLARTE, LEGAL MEDICINE (VOLUME II) 80-84 (2006).
34. See People v. Visperas, Jr., 395 SCRA 128 (2003). In this case, the accused and
the trial court had diverging interpretations of the physical evidence. The
Supreme Court said,
The theories of appellant and the court a quo may not be clear as to
some of the circumstances surrounding the killing. [It is] certain,
however, that the victim had been shot on the head, and that appellant
was positively identified as the culprit who had fired the fatal shot at
close range. These facts remain steadfast and are not by any means
diminished by the differing theories discussed.
Id. at 141.
and testimonial evidence which, when taken separately, would have been
insufficient to sustain a conviction. 37
For well-funded defense cases, the practice may not be much of a problem as
contrary physical evidence to prove the falsity of a witness' testimony, which
may be financially difficult to secure, may nevertheless be obtained. This
does not mean of course that this happens all the time. For instance, in high-
profile cases generating significant media hype and thus receiving wide
public attention, testimonies of witnesses are almost always readily accepted
without due regard to what physical evidence actually suggests. This may be
in large part caused by the consideration accorded by case law to testimonial
evidence.
However, for those whose resources are already drained or those who
do not even have any to begin with, they will have no other choice but to
turn to the courts for succor. If they are not even aware that there is a way
Ideally, it is at this point that judges should come in and perform their
roles as vanguards of justice and remember that, if they can direct the
prosecution to present additional evidence to establish probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest,51 then there is certainly more reason why they
should so direct the same thing if they find that the evidence submitted,
considering established evidentiary rules and developments in forensic
science, may not be sufficient to justify facts, which may have already been
established by other forms of evidence such as testimonies. They must
understand that an accused, at the commencement of trial, immediately finds
himself in a disadvantaged position.5 2 It has been observed that
in a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters
the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited
means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who
are regarded as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially,
and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of
defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not
for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule
that there is to be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of
3
guilt.S
While authorities recognize that this is the reason why proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required to secure conviction of an accused,5 4 it must not
be forgotten that such quantum of proof will only remain a mere legal
construct void of any practical meaning if not enforced. Judges must
operationalize this, and not just in the way that they were accustomed to. As
there is no exact test that such proof already does exist and must depend
upon moral certainty,s5 which not to mention, is a very subjective term, the
manner by which it is established must necessarily have to change, not only
on a case to case basis, but also as time passes by and technology for criminal
investigation and detection develops.
While judges in the past, who did not have access to the technology
available presently and who may have decided criminal cases without any aid
from forensic evidence, may be excused, those tasked to administer justice
now simply have no reason to be nonchalant and not to be vigilant in
securing the best evidence obtainable just so they can be "more" morally
53. Berroya, 283 SCRA at 122 (citing RICARDO J. FRANCISCO, EVIDENCE 576 (3d
ed.)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
certain about their decision to acquit or convict. It is only through this that
proof beyond reasonable doubt will not be diluted and the confidence in the
criminal justice system will be preserved. Thus, it has been observed:
Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the commumity in applications of
the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.s 6
Understanding the urgency and the burden that the judge has on his
shoulders, he must search for the best possible evidence obtainable, and this
56. People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349, 3 59-60 (1992) (citing In the Matter of Samuel
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
is where forensic evidence comes in. The judge must internalize this as
technology has already evolved to the extent that it now allows several
methods 6 o by which evidence may be examined, which are not even known
or accessible years ago. The results that may be obtained are promising as
they facilitate fact-finding with at least a considerable degree of accuracy,
which for the longest time had only remained an aspiration. With this, and
as he is also aware that the prosecution has all the backing of the government
and police investigators to run after offenders, the judge must, at the very
least, frown upon any failure to submit pertinent and sufficient forensic
evidence, either voluntarily or as directed, or form reasonable doubts to the
evidence presented.
6o. See Erie County Central Police Services Forensic Laboratory, Methods Used for
Examination of Evidence, available at http://www2.erie.gov/cps/sites/
www2.erie.gov.cps/files/uploads/pdfs/Methods%/o2oUsed%/o2ofor%/o2oExaminatio
n%200fo2oEvidence.pdf (last accessed Feb. 28, 2013).
61. See Joseph Peterson, et al., The Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the
Criminal Justice Process (A Research Report Submitted to the United States
Department of Justice), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/
grants/23 1977.pdf (last accessed Feb. 28, 2013).
62. Peterson, supra note 25, at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4. Note that while the year that the research was conducted was before
1987, the same findings may still be applicable to the Philippines, where the use
of forensic evidence in court has not evolved that much.
65. Id. at 5.
Judges may differ in the techniques employed, but the safest assumption,
of course, is that there must still be some sort of an exercise where they
consider each piece of evidence, relate one to the other, analyze facts which
may be inferred from them and the soundness of the relationship, until they
are finally convinced that the evidence establishes only one thing and no
other. This is best described in what David A. Schum referred to as
"inference networks."7o According to him,
68. Mendoza v. People, 356 SCRA 525, 537 (2001) (citing People v. Esquila, 254
SCRA 140, 147 (1996)).
69. Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA i, iI (1988).
correct,"72 as others coming from another vantage point may have a different
interpretation, which often results in confusion.73 He also identified what he
considered an "important technology gap"74 arising from the problem of
drawing conclusions from masses of evidence.75 Aptly, he observed, "We are
still far better at gathering, transmitting, storing[,] and retrieving information
than we are at drawing defensible conclusions from this information."7 6
This is true. For example, a witness may testify that he saw the accused
coming out of the room where a woman was stabbed to death. There was
blood on his hands. The police investigators thereafter presented
photographs of the crime scene showing the room in disarray, the woman
sprawled on the floor with the knife still stabbed in her nape, blood marks
and stains on the wall and beddings. Another witness said that he found no
other person within the immediate vicinity, and he saw the accused roaming
around the area for around two hours before the killing was discovered.
Two more testified that he harbored ill will against the victim as the latter
humiliated him in public.
An inference that the accused killed the victim would seem sound, as he
had access to, went inside the room, and was seen having blood on his
hands. However, another inference is also likely. He wanted to confront the
victim and was thinking about it while walking within the area for two
hours. When he finally decided to talk to her, he discovered the crime, went
in to touch and check the body of the victim, and decided to leave.
Forensic evidence has the potential to fill in the gap created by these two
interpretations or missing links between other physical or testimonial
evidence. Had reports on post-mortem lividity, rigor mortis, blood spatter
analysis, dactyloscopy, DNA results, or other forensic examination been
presented, the judge may not even be forced to choose which of the two
versions he must adopt. He can rely on the scientific evidence before him,
which can afford him to reconstruct the crime scene and make conclusions
of his own which are not dependent on experience, which in itself is very
relative. The same may also be said for criminal cases where direct
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1462.
75. Id.
76. Schum, supra note 73, at 1461.
Every one charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.8 2 In our
jurisdiction, the law requires that all reasonable intendment must be made to
support such presumption,8 3 which is even treated as a conclusion of law.8 4
For this reason, courts are required to "put prosecution evidence under
77. This is on the assumption, of course, that the evidence of an act is clear and
cannot be interpreted any other way.
78. See generally Peterson, et al., supra note 63, at 3-7.
79. See PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 13. See also An Act Revising the Penal Code and
Other Penal Laws [REVISED PENAL CODE], Act No. 3815, arts. 248 & 249
(1932).
8o. Mateo, 433 SCRA at 656-57.
81. See Suerte-Felipe, 547 SCRA at 469.
82. See PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 14 (2) & International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 14 (2), openedJor signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
83. See People v. Lagramada, 388 SCRA 173, 193 (2002); People v. Villaflores, 371
SCRA 429, 437 (2001); People v. Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, 94 (1990); & People
v. Castelo, 133 SCRA 667, 684 (1984). Compare People v. Court of Appeals,
626 SCRA 352, 370 (2010) (discussing the "equipoise rule"), with De Guzman
v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 627, 632 (1994) (asserting that the presumption of
innocence, being only a presumption that may yield to contrary evidence of
guilt, should not be stretched beyond its reasonable intendment).
84. People v. Clores, 125 SCRA 67, 75 (1983).
severe testing,"8 5 and "to take 'a more than casual consideration' of every
circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused." 8 6
The prosecution should take an active and direct part in the trial of the
case, since it has the onus probandi of showing the guilt of the accused. Even
if it is, perhaps, the inadequacy of details in the prosecution's evidence
rather than the actual facts themselves that makes it difficult for [the] Court
to arrive at definite conclusions, still [responsibility cannot be pinned] on
appellant. The moral conviction that may serve as basis for a finding of guilt
in a criminal case should be that which is the logical and inevitable result of
the evidence on record, exclusive of any other consideration. Short of this
minimum requirement, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it
is, even more, [the] Court's constitutional duty to acquit them. Only then
88
may there be fealty to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
(3) Considering that not all investigators are aware of the capability of
your Digital Forensic Laboratory to retrieve deleted messages,
documents, pictures, etc.[,] which might be used as possible leads in
the investigation of cases, this Directorate plans to issue a memo-
directive that will nake the conduct of digital forensic exarminations on
the recovered CPs, laptops[,] and other electronic digital storage
devices mandatory [ ].99
From the above discussion, the problem is two-pronged: the use and
presentation of forensic evidence by lawyers, particularly prosecutors, and
their use by judges in their role as triers of facts. Cases are decided even
without them, albeit authorities agree that they are helpful insofar as
reconstructing the crime scene is concerned. The failure to procure and
introduce them in trial does not even have a consequence. Jurisprudence
even points to other means to prove the corpus delicti and relies on some
nebulous concepts of experience and credibility to check their efficacy.
While there is also recognition of its potential in criminal investigation and
detection, its unique place in evidence has not been firmly entrenched.o.
As a result, one can safely conclude that a person can actually be sent to
prison, even for life, if there will only be witnesses who are willing,
intelligent, decent, and bold enough to lie in a court of law and who can
withstand intensive cross-examination and even questioning from a judge.' 0
'
For as long as there is a semblance of reality in the story, then there is
enough reason for a judge to conclude that a fact does exist and is sufficient
to convict. For as long as facts derived from the mass of evidence are capable
of making up a theory that is consistent with ordinary experience, regardless
of any possible deviation in the normal course of human conduct, which
ironically characterizes a criminal act, an accused totally innocent of a crime
charged can actually be robbed of his liberty.