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PAUL M. SWEEZY was educated at Exeter and

Harvard University, from which he received his
B.A. in 1931 and his Ph.D. in 1937, and did
graduate work at the London School of Econom-
ics. From 1934 to 1942 he taught economics at
Harvard and worked for various New Deal agen-
cies (National Resources Planning Board, the
SEC, and the TNEC) investigating the concentra-
tion of economic power. During World War II he
served with the Office of Strategic Services in .

England, France, and Germany.

In 1949 he founded Monthly Review with the
late Leo Huberman. He has been a visiting pro-
fessor at Cornell, Stanford, the New School for
Social Research, Yale, and Manchester Univer-
sity, and in 1971 delivered the Marshall Lectures
at Cambridge University. He has served on the
Executive Committee of the American Economic
Association. Sweezy is the author of many
books, including The Theory of Capitalist De-
velopment, The Present As History, Modern

Paul •
Capitalism and Othar Essays, and Monopoly
Capital (with Paul Baran). With Leo Huberman,
he has written Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,
Introduction to Socialism, and Socialism in
Cuba. With Harry Magdoff, he has written The
Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism, Revolution and
Counter-Revolution in Chile, and The End of
Prosperity.
 Revolutio
nary
Society
Essays
by
Z wexsuiwang.org
 For Zirel

Copyright C) 1980 by Paul M. Sweezy

All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Sweezy, Paul Marlor, 1910-
Post-revolutionary society.
Includes bibliographical references.
CONTENTS: Lessons of the Soviet experience.—
Lessons of Poland.—Transition to socialism. [etc.]
Russia—Social conditions-1917-
2. Social classes—Russia. 13. Socialism.
4. Socialism in Russia. 5. Socialism in China.
I. Title.
HN526.S9 947.084 80-8085
ISBN 0-85345-550-3
Monthly Review Press
62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011
47 Red Lion Street, London, WC1R 4 PF
Manufactured in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 CONTENTS
Preface 9
Introduction 13
1. Lessons of the Soviet Experience 19
2. Lessons of Poland 32
3. Transition to Socialism 46
4. The Nature of Soviet Society—Part 1 55
5. The Nature of Soviet Society—Part 2 71
6. Theory and Practice in the Mao Period 85
7. Charles Bettelheim on Revolution from Above: The USSR in the 1920s 96
8. Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR? 113
9. A Crisis in Marxian Theory 134
10. Post-Revolutionary Society 139
Notes 153
18 I Post-Revolutionary Society
1920s, the reasons for and meaning of Stalin's so-called "revolu -
tion from above."
Having by this time come to the view that the Soviet Union is a
new kind of class society, I felt the need to go back and critically
discuss Trotsky's theory of the nature of Soviet society and its
updated version as presented by Ernest Mandel, the leading
Trotskyist theorist of our day. This task forms the subject
matter of Chapter 8, which also contains as a sort of appendix an 1
abbreviated version of my rejoinder to Mandel's reply to the
original article. LESSONS
Chapter 9 is a brief presentation, addressed to a large audience
gathered to discuss the nature of Soviet society, of a theme central
OF THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE
to the whole book but not made explicit elsewhere, namely, that The October Revolution marked the birth of the historical era of
the failure of actual post-revolutionary societies to confirm the socialism, and for this achievement we celebrate it today as human-
expectation of classical Marxism that socialism would follow capi- kind will continue to celebrate it for centuries to come. But there is
talism has created a crisis in Marxist theory which is having dire more to celebrate too. Historically speaking, fifty years are a very
consequences for the international revolutionary movement. short time; and it could easily have happened that during its first
half century socialism might have made little headway or might
Finally, Chapter 10, based on a talk given to the Faculty of even have been temporarily crushed in its birthplace by the forces
Economics at Tokyo University in November 1979, attempts a of international counterrevolution. That this did not happen, that
reasonably comprehensive, if very brief, presentation of my ideas instead socialism spread in little more than three decades to vast
at that time about the nature of the new class society which exists new areas of the earth, is due in very large part to the unprece -
in the Soviet Union and, in less clear-cut form, in the other post - dentedly rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union in the late
revolutionary societies that have emerged since World War II. I 1920s and the 1930s. If this massive industrialization had not been
have been somewhat reluctant to commit these ideas to print, successfully carried through in time, the Soviet Union would have
since I am very much aware that they need more criticism and lacked the economic and military strength to withstand the Nazi
"seasoning." But I am also aware that this book would be seri - onslaught of 1941; and the revival of socialism within the USSR
ously incomplete without the last chapter, and I comfort myself and its spread to other lands .might not have occurred for many
with the thought that I am not likely to get the critical discussion years. Nearly two decades of forced industrialization and total war
needed to move forward unless all these matters are subjected cost the people of the USSR more than 20 million lives and untold
to much more open debate than has been the case to date. If this suffering. But these heavy sacrifices were not in vain, nor were
book helps to promote such debate and discussion, I shall con - those who made them the only beneficiaries. By timely preparation
sider it a useful contribution. and heroic struggle, the Soviet Union played the decisive role in
smashing the fascist bid for world power and thereby kept the road
open for the second great advance of socialism in the period after
1945. For these historic achievements no less than for the October
Revolution itself, humankind owes a lasting debt of gratitude to
the Soviet Union and its people.

19
20 / Post-Revolutionary Society Lessons of the Soviet Experience / 21

Spokesmen for the Soviet regime both at home and abroad these private motivations are effective in shaping the quantity,
claim yet another achievement which they believe humankind quality, allocation, and discipline of the labor force.
should celebrate on this fiftieth anniversary. The Soviet Union, But the prevalence of these mechanisms cannot but have a
they say, has not only laid the foundations of socialism through profound influence on the quality of the society and the "human
nationalizing the means of production, building up industry, and nature" of its members. This is part of the ABC of socialist
collectivizing agriculture; it has also gone far toward erecting on thought and need not be elaborated upon here: suffice it to say
these foundations the socialist edifice itself—a society such as that the privatization of economic life leads necessarily to the
Marx and Lenin envisaged, still tainted by its bourgeois origins privatization of social life and the evisceration of political life.
but steadily improving and already well along the road to the Bourgeois values, bourgeois criteria of success, bourgeois modes
ultimate goal of full communism. If this were true, it certainly of behavior are fostered. Politics becomes a specialty, a branch of
should be celebrated, perhaps more enthusiastically than any the division of labor, like any other career. And of course the
of the other achievements of the first half century of Soviet other side of the coin is the perpetuation and deepening of that
existence. For then we should know that, at least in principle, alienation of humans from their fellows and hence from them -
humankind has already solved its most fundamental. problems selves which many socialists have long felt to be the ultimate evil of
and that what is needed now is only time for the Soviet Union to bourgeois society.
work the solutions out to their ultimate consequences, and de -
termination and will on the part of the rest of the world to follow It may be argued that while these tendencies exist—this, we
the Soviet example. believe, can be denied only by blind apologists—they are not
yet dominant and they are being effectively offset by counter-
tendencies. In this connection, it is usual to cite the narrowing of
If only it were true! But, alas, apart from the pronouncements
the gap in incomes and living standards between the collective-
of the ideologists and admirers of the Soviet regime, it is ex -
farm peasantry and the urban proletariat, the leveling-up of
tremely difficult to find supporting evidence; while the accumula -
the lower end of wage and pension scales, the shortening of
tion of evidence pointing to a quite different conclusion is as
the working day, and a general rise in living standards. These
persuasive as it is massive.
developments are supposed to be preparing the way for a trans -
The facts indicate that relative to most other countries in the formation of the social consciousness and morality of the Soviet
world today, the Soviet Union is a stable society with an enor - people. As William Pomeroy explained in an article in the National
mously powerful state apparatus and an economy capable of Guardian (July 8, 1967), after an extensive tour around the
reasonably rapid growth for the foreseeable future. It is also a Soviet Union:
stratified society, with a deep chasm between the ruling stratum
of political bureaucrats and economic managers on the one side The Soviet view is that education in communist behavior can go only
and the mass of working people on the other, and an impressive so far without continually rising living standards. They say they are
spectrum of income and status differentials on both sides of the now "laying the material base for communism," and that the aim is
chasm. The society appears to be effectively depoliticized at all to create the highest living standards in the world and that the "new
levels, hence a fortiori nonrevolutionary. In these circumstances man" will fully flourish only under conditions of abundance.
the concerns and motivations of individuals and families are
naturally focused on private affairs and in particular on indi - What this argument overlooks is that living standards are not
vidual careers and family consumption levels. Moreover, since only a matter of quantity but also of quality. With negligible
the economy is able to provide both an abundance of career exceptions, all Marxists and socialists recognize the necessity of
openings and a steadily expanding supply of consumer goods, high and rising living standards to the realization of socialist goals
22 I Post-Revolutionary Society many purposes the automobile is an inefficient and irrational
means of transportation. Furthermore, restricting the output of
and the transition to communism. But this is the beginning of the automobiles and concentrating instead on other forms of trans -
problem, not the end. It should be obvious by now from the portation requires a different pattern of investment in highways,
experience of the advanced capitalist countries that higher living railroads, subways, airports, and so on.
standards based on the accumulation of goods for private use—
houses, automobiles, appliances, apparel, jewelry, etc.—do not
create a "new man"; on the contrary, they tend to bring out the Now, if the Soviet Union had embarked upon a program of
worst in the "old man," stimulating greed and selfishness in the raising living standards in this second, socialist, sense there would
economically more fortunate and envy and hatred in the less be every reason to take seriously the contention that, certain
fortunate. In these circumstances no amount of "education in appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, they are indeed
communist behavior" can do more than provide a thin disguise "laying the material base for communism." But this is certainly
for the ugly reality. not the case; nor could it be the case as long as Soviet society is
geared to and dependent upon a system of private incentives.*
These matters are all indissolubly tied together. A depoliticized
But is any other kind of rising living standards, more compatible society must rely on private incentives; and for private incentives
with the realization of socialist goals, conceivable? The answer is to work effectively, the structure of production must be shaped to
obviously yes. We may concede that a priority charge on a socialist turn out the goods and services which give the appropriate con -
society's increasing production is to provide leaders and more crete meaning to money incomes and demands. The only way out
skilled and/or responsible workers with what they need to do of this seemingly closed circle would be a repoliticization of Soviet
their jobs properly. But beyond that, certain principles could be society,' which would permit a move away from private incentives
followed: (1) private needs and wants should be satisfied only at a and hence also a different structure of production and a different
level at which they can be satisfied for all; (2) production of such composition and distribution of additions to the social product.
goods and services should be increased only if and when the But repoliticization would also mean much else, including in
increments are large and divisible enough to go around; (3) all particular a radical change in the present leadership and its
other increases in the production of consumer goods should be methods of governing—at least a "cultural revolution," if not
for collective consumption. As applied to an underdeveloped something even more drastic. This means that short of a major
country, these principles mean that there should be no produc - upheaval, which does not seem likely in the foreseeable future,
tion of automobiles, household appliances, or other consumer the present course is set for a long time to come. And since, as we
durable goods for private sale and use. The reason is simply that have already indicated, this course has little to do with "laying the
to turn out enough such products to go around would require material base for communism," we have to ask in what direction it
many years, perhaps even many decades, and if they are dis - is leading.
tributed privately in the meantime the result can only be to
*The debate over incentives is usually couched in terms of "material" vs.
create or aggravate glaring material inequalities. The appropriate "moral." But this is not really accurate, since in both cases material gains are
socialist policy is therefore to produce these types of goods in envisaged: the opposition lies rather in the composition of the gains and the way
forms and quantities best suited to the collective satisfaction of they are distributed. Hence it may be more helpful to speak of "private" vs.
"collective" incentives. At the same time it should be recognized that there is a
needs: car pools, communal cooking and eating establishments, moral element in the collective incentive system: behavior directed toward im -
apartment-house or neighborhood laundries, and so on. Such a proving the lot of everyone (including oneself) is certainly more moral, and
policy, it should be emphasized, would mean not only a different presupposes a higher level of social consciousness, than behavior directed toward
immediate private gain.
utilization of goods but also a very different pattern of production.
In the case of automobiles in particular, a policy of production for
collective needs means a strictly limited production, since for
Lessons of the Soviet Experience / 23
24 I Post-Revolutionary Society zero. No garages are available. None are provided in the new
apartments or office buildings. Most Moscow car owners drain
The answer, we believe, is that it is leading to a hardening of their radiators every night in winter and fill them in the morning
material inequalities in Soviet society. The process by which this with boiling water to get started. There are three gasoline stations
is occurring can be seen most clearly in the area of consumer in Moscow selling high-test gasoline. Today there are perhaps
100,000 private cars in Moscow. What will happen when there
durable goods. For most of Soviet history, the need to concentrate are a million?
on heavy industry and war production, and to devote most of
consumer good production to meeting the elementary require -
Part of the answer of course is that along with the increase
ments of the mass of the population, precluded the possibility of
in production of cars, the Soviet Union will have to embark on
developing industries catering to the latent demand of the higher
a vast expansion in the provision of all the facilities required
income strata for consumer durables. In respect to this aspect of
by an automobilized society: highways, garages, service stations,
the standard of living, which bulks so large in the advanced
parking lots, motels, and all the rest. And in sum, if American
capitalist countries, there was therefore a sort of enforced equality
experience is a reliable indicator, these complements to the auto -
in the Soviet Union. In the last few years, however, this situation
mobile will absorb an even larger part of the Soviet economy's
has been changing. Now at last the production of refrigerators,
labor power and material resources than production of the
washing machines, automobiles, etc. on an increasing scale has
vehicles themselves.
become feasible, and the Soviet government is moving vigorously
to develop this sector of the economy. And while a considerable Two points need to be specially emphasized. First, even assum -
proportion of the output, especially in the case of the automobile ing a continued rapid increase in automobile production, it will be
industry, will have to be devoted to official and public uses for many, many years before more than a small minority of the Soviet
years to come, nevertheless it is clear that the basic policy is to population can hope to join the ranks of car owners. During this
channel a larger and larger share of consumer durable produc - period, the automobile will add a new dimension to the structure
tion into the private market. Some idea of what this portends is of material inequality in Soviet society, which will by no means be
conveyed by Harrison Salisbury in an article entitled "A Balance limited to the simple possession of cars. Those who have their
Sheet of Fifty Years of Soviet Rule" in the New York Times of own private means of mobility tend to develop a distinctive style
October 2, 1967: of life. The automobile increasingly dominates their use of leisure
time (after work, weekends, vacations) and thus indirectly gener -
ates a whole new set of needs, ranging from country houses for
In the fiftieth year of Bolshevik power the Soviet Union stands on
those who can afford them through camping equipment to all
the edge of the automobile age that the United States entered in the
kinds of sporting goods.
1920's. With new production facilities being constructed by Fiat,
Renault, and others, the Soviet Union will be turning out 1,500,000 Second, and this is a point which is generally neglected but
passenger cars a year in the early 1970's, more than five times the which in our view is of crucial importance, the allocation of
present output. But this will not be soon enough to cut off the wave vast quantities of human and material resources to the pro -
of popular grumbling. duction of private consumer durable goods and their comple -
"When I see that any ordinary worker in Italy or France has a mentary facilities means neglecting or holding back the devel -
car," said a writer just back from one of his frequent trips to opment of other sectors of the economy and society. Or to put
Western Europe, "I wonder what we have been doing in the last 50 the matter more bluntly: a society which decides to go in for
years. Of course, there has been progress. But it's not fast enough." private consumer durables in a big way at the same time decides
The Soviet Union's entry into the automobile age is not going to not to make the raising of mass living standards its number
be easy. The Russian writer owns a car, a 10-year-old Pobeda. He
has to keep it on the street all winter in temperatures of 30 below
Lessons of the Soviet Experience I 25
26 I Post-Revolutionary Society Lessons of the Soviet Experience / 27

one priority.* And these are indeed the decisions which the egalite, fraternite"—designed to rally the support of th9se who
Soviet leadership has taken and is in the process of vigorously look forward to a better future but increasingly divorced from
implementing. economic and social reality.
To sum up: The course on which the Soviet Union has em - The reader will note that we have been careful to speak of a
barked implies a long period of increased material inequality ruling "stratum" rather than a ruling "class." The difference is
during which productive resources are, directly and indirectly, that the members of a stratum can stem from diverse social
channeled into satisfying the wants of a privileged minority and origins, while the great majority (though not all) of the members
mass living standards are raised less rapidly and less fully than of a class are born into it. A new class usually begins as a stratum
would otherwise be possible. and only hardens into a class after several generations during
which privileges become increasingly hereditary and barriers are
We shall perhaps be told that even if the period in question is of erected to upward mobility. Historically, property systems have
necessity long, it is in principle transitional and will eventually been the most common institutional arrangement for ensuring
lead, via a process of leveling-up, to a situation in which everyone is the inheritability of privilege and blocking the upward movement
a full participant in a society of consumer-durable-goods abun - of the unprivileged. But other devices such as caste and hereditary
dance—or, in other words (since the automobile is. by far the nobility have also served these purposes.
dominant consumer durable), to a fully automobilized society. It To what extent, if at all, the Soviet system of stratification has
is a strange conception of socialism, this gadget utopia; but, developed into a true class system we do not pretend .to know.
fortunately or unfortunately, it does not seem very likely to be Fifty years—about two generations by usual calculations—is in
realized. For if anything is well established on the basis of long any case too short a time for the crystalization of such a profound
and varied historical experience, it is that a ruling stratum which social change. At the present time, therefore, one can only say
is firmly rooted in power and has accustomed itself to the enjoy - that conditions favoring the development of a class system exist
ment of privileges and emoluments finds ways to preserve and and that in the absence of effective counter-forces, we must
protect its vested interests against mass invasion from below. assume that these conditions will bear their natural fruit. And by
There already exists such a ruling stratum in the Soviet Union, effective counter-forces we do not mean ideological doctrines or
and the course now being followed guarantees that its privileged statements of good intentions but organized political struggle.
position will be enhanced and strengthened for a long time to Unless or until signs of such struggle appear, one can only con -
come. If anyone thinks this stratum is going to renounce its clude that Soviet stratification will in due course be transformed
position unless obliged to do so by force majeure, he or she is either into a new class system.
a dreamer or a believer in miracles. "Laying the material base for
communism" seems to be a slogan of the same kind as those even That all this is a far cry from the Marxian vision of the future
more famous slogans of the eighteenth-century bourgeois revo - (even the relatively near-term post-revolutionary future) as ex -
lutions—"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and "liberty, pressed for example in Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program or
Lenin's State and Revolution, needs no demonstration. This di-
*With this in mind, we can see how absurd it is to describe the debate between vergence between theory and practice will naturally be interpreted
Soviet spokesmen and their critics in the socialist camp as being between those who
want the Soviet people to have the "good things of life" and those who would
by bourgeois critics as (yet another) proof of the failure of Marxism
impose on them an artificial austerity. The truth is that it is between those who and as (further) evidence that "you can't change human nature."
want a small minority to have the lion's share of the good things and those who What is the Marxian answer to these critics? Did it have to happen
think these good things ought to be produced and distributed in forms accessible that way in the Soviet Union? Or might events have taken a
to the broad masses.
different course? These are by no means mere "academic" ques-
28 'I Post-Revolutionary Society Lessons of the Soviet Experience I 29
Lions (i.e., questions the answers to which have no practical signifi- all students of Marxism, especially from the famous preface to the
cance). If what has happened in the Soviet Union had to happen, Critique of Political Economy. What does not seem to have been
the chances that other socialist countries, present and future, will widely recognized is the clear implication that the ratio of de -
be able to escape the same fate would, at the very least, have to terminism to voluntarism in historical explanation necessarily
be rated low. If on the other hand events might have taken a varies greatly from one period to another. Once a social order is
different course in the Soviet Union, then other socialist coun - firmly established and its "law of motion" is in full operation,
tries, learning from Soviet experience, can still hope to prove that power naturally gravitates into the hands of those who under -
Marx and Lenin were right after all and that in entering the era of stand the system's requirements and are willing and able to act as
socialism humankind has at last found the key to a new and its agents and beneficiaries. In these circumstances, there is little
qualitatively better future. that individuals or groups can do to change the course of history:
for the time being a strictly determinist doctrine seems to be fully
What is at issue here is really the age-old question of historical
vindicated. But when the inherent contradictions of the system
determinism. The determinist position holds essentially that the
have had time to mature and the objective conditions for a revolu -
conditions which exist at any given time uniquely determine what
tionary transformation have come into existence, then the situa -
will happen next. This does not necessarily mean. that every
tion changes radically. The system's law of motion breaks down
individual's thoughts and actions are uniquely determined, but
wholly or in part, class struggles grow in intensity, and crises
only that in the given circumstances only one combination of
multiply. Under these circumstances the range of possibilities
thoughts and actions can be effectively put into practice. Indi -
widens, and groups (especially, in our time, disciplined political
viduals can choose but societies cannot. At the other extreme,
parties) and great leaders come into their own as actors on the
what is often called the voluntarist position holds that anything
stage of history. Determinism recedes into the background and
can happen depending on the will and determination of key
voluntarism seems to take over.
individuals or groups.

If we apply this dialectic of determinism and voluntarism to the

Marxism is neither determinist nor voluntarist; or, if you pre -
interpretation of Soviet history, two conclusions stand out very
fer, it is both determinist and voluntarist. "Men make their own
clearly: First, the early years—from 1917 until the late 1920s,
history," wrote Marx in the second paragraph of The Eighteenth
when the country had irrevocably committed itself to forced
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, "but they do not make it just as they
industrialization and collectivization of agriculture—were a "vol -
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them-
untarist" period during which the Bolshevik Party and its leaders,
selves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and
meaning primarily Lenin and Stalin, played a crucial role in
transmitted from the past." In other words, at any given time the
shaping the course of events. There were of course definite limits
range of possibilities is determined by what has gone before
to what could have been done after the Bolsheviks came to power,
(determinism), but within this range genuine choices are possible
but they were wide enough to encompass the course which was
(voluntarism). This very general principle, however, by no means
actually followed under Stalin at one extreme, and at the other
exhausts the Marxian position. Even more important from our
extreme a course (certainly feasible and actually advocated by
present point of view is the idea, which is of the very essence of
Bukharin and others in the Bolshevik leadership) of "socialist
Marxism as a revolutionary doctrine, that in the life of societies
laissez faire" which would have involved surrender to the kulak -
there are long periods of relative stability during which a given
dominated market economy and most likely a relatively rapid
social order unfolds and finally reaches the end of its potentiali -
restoration of capitalism.
ties, and that these are followed by periods of revolutionary
transition to a new social order. This theme is of course famiar to The second conclusion which stands out is that in recent
30 / Post-Revolutionary Society Lessons of the Soviet Experience / 31

years—at least since the Twentieth Party Congress and the begin - This is not the occasion for a review of the arguments over what
ning of de-Stalinization—the Soviet Union has entered a "de - policies might have been adopted and their probable conse -
terminist" period in which the party and its leaders are hardly quences: that would be an ambitious undertaking indeed. Suffice
more than cogs in a great machine which is running, sometimes it to say that our own view is that Stalin was certainly right to make
smoothly and sometimes bumpily, along a more or less clearly preparations to repel external aggression the number one priority,
prescribed course, some of the main aspects of which have been but that a different choice of means could have produced better
analyzed above. results in the short run and much better results in the long run.
More equality and fewer privileges to the bureaucracy, more trust
Now it is clear that the kind of machine which came into being and confidence in the masses, greater inner party democracy—
to dominate the "determinist" period was formed in the "volun - these, we believe, could have been the guiding principles of a
tarist" period by the conscious decisions and acts of the party course which would have ensured the survival of the Soviet Union
leadership, for the most part after Stalin took over. This is not to and pointed it toward, rather than away from, the luminous
imply that Stalin had a blueprint of the kind of society he wanted vision of a communist future.
to create and shaped his policies accordingly, though considera -
tions of this kind may have played some role. Between 1928 and Fifty years of Soviet history have many lessons to teach. And of
the end of World War II, which was certainly the crucial forma - these the greatest and most important, we believe, is that revolu -
tive period of present-day Soviet society, Stalin was probably tionary societies can and must choose and that how they choose
mainly motivated by fear of external attack and a supposed need, will unavoidably have fateful consequences for many years and
in the face of this danger, to crush all actual or potential internal decades to come.
opposition. In other words, the kind of society being created in
the Soviet Union during these years was in a real sense a by - (November 1967)
product of policies designed to accomplish other ends. But, from
our present point of view, this is not the important point. What is
crucial is that these policies were deliberately decided upon and in
no sense a mere reflex of an objective situation. They could have
been different. The goal they were intended to achieve could
have been different, and the combination of means designed to
achieve the goal actually chosen or another goal or set of goals
could also have been different. And the result today could have
been a different society operating with a different internal logic
and following a different course of development.

These are not mere armchair speculations. We know that dif-

ferent courses were possible in the decisive years after Lenin's
death because we know that great struggles and debates racked
the Bolshevik Party in that period. Nothing requires us to believe
that Stalin's victory was inevitable, or that if the left or right
opposition had won out it would necessarily have followed the
same course he followed. The options were real, and the Soviet
Union is what it is today because some were embraced and
others rejected.