EVIDENCE Inference Drawn from the Evidence is Logical

Bacerra v. People GR NUMBER: 204544

DATE: July 3, 2017
PONENTE: Leonen, J.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
• MARLON BACERRA y TABONES • PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This resolves the Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision dated August 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated
October 22, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32923, which upheld the conviction of Marlon
Bacerra y Tabones (Bacerra) for the crime of simple arson punished under Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1613.
FACTS
In the Information dated January 12, 2006, Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613, for the crime of simple arson. He pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Alfredo Melegrito (Alfredo), Edgar Melegrito
(Edgar), Toni Rose dela Cruz, and P03 Marcos Bautista, Jr. to testify on the alleged incident.
Their collective testimonies produced the following facts for the prosecution:
• Alfredo and his family were sound asleep in their home on November 15, 2005.
• At about 1:00 a.m., he was roused from sleep by the sound of stones hitting his house.
• Alfredo went to the living room and peered through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed
him to recognize his neighbor and co-worker, Bacerra.
• Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your mother."
• Just as he was about to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll burn you
now." Bacerra then left.
• Alfredo's son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident through a window in his room.
• Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down beside the window.
• At around 4:00 a.m., he heard dogs barking outside. Alfredo looked out the window and saw Bacerra
walking towards their nipa hut, which was located around 10 meters from their house.
• Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it.
• Moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning.
• Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. Edgar contacted the authorities for
assistance but it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents were completely destroyed. The local
authorities conducted an investigation on the incident.
The defense presented Bacerra, Alex Dacanay (Dacanay), and Jocelyn Fernandez (Fernandez) as witnesses.
Their collective testimonies yielded the defense's version of the incident:
• At around 11:00 p.m. of November 14, 2005, Bacerra was at the house of his friend, Ronald
Valencia.
• The two (2) engaged in a drinking session with Dacanay and a certain Reyson until 1:00 a.m. of
November 15, 2005.
 • Bacerra asked Dacanay to take him to his grandmother's house. Dacanay conceded but they found the
gate closed.
• Embarrassed to disturb his grandmother, Bacerra asked Dacanay to bring him to Fernandez's house
instead. However, Dacanay was already sleepy at that time.
• Hence, Bacerra requested his brother-in-law, Francisco Sadora (Sadora), to acconwany him to
Fernandez's house, which was located one (1) kilometer away.
• Bacerra and Sadora arrived at Fernandez's house at around 1:30 a.m.
• Fernandez told Bacerra to sleep in the living room.
• She checked on Bacerra every hour.
• At around 7:00 a.m., police officers who were looking for Bacerra arrived at Fernandez's house.
• Knowing that he did not do anything wrong, Bacerra voluntarily went to the police station with the
authorities.

RTC (Branch 50 in Villasis, Pangasinan): Found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.
Bacerra appealed, arguing that none of the prosecution's witnesses had positively identjfied him as the
person who burned the nipa hut.
CA: Affirmed in toto.
Bacerra filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

• The Court of Appeals erred in upholding his conviction based on circumstantial evidence, which, being
merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• No direct evidence was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire to private complainant's nipa
hut.
• Moreover, there were two (2) incidents that occurred, which should be taken and analyzed separately.
• There were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses.
• Private complainant acted contrary to normal human behavior, placing great doubt on his credibility.
Persons whose properties are being destroyed should immediately confront the perpetrator. Private
complainant and his family, however, merely stayed inside their house throughout the entire incident.
• Petitioner argues in the alternative that the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary
surrender should have been appreciated by the lower tribunals in computing the imposable penalty.
Petitioner was drunk at the time of the alleged incident. In addition, he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities despite the absence of an arrest warrant.

Arguments of the Respondent:

• Direct evidence is not the only means to establish criminal liability.
• An accused may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence as long as the combination of
circumstances leads to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
• The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's decision.
• For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that it is not habitual.
The state of drunkenness of the accused must be of such nature as to affect his or her mental faculties.
• Voluntary surrender cannot likewise be considered as a mitigating circumstance because there is no
showing of spontaneity on the part of the accused.
ISSUE
W/N PETITIONER'S GUILT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BASED ON THE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL

RULING

YES.

The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact
inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the
evidence.

Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the other
hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence.”

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence.
The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must
be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no
requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict.

Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to sustain
a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be established by
circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken
chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative
test not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent,
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."
In this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has established
multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.

1. The evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned private complainant's house
and threatened to bum him. Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner throwing stones at his
house and heard petitioner say, "okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!" (Vulva of your mother,
Old Fred, I'll burn you now.) Petitioner's threats were also heard by private complainant's son and
grandchildren.

2. The evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a few hours later and made
his way to private complainant's nipa hut. Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m., he saw
petitioner pass by their house and walk towards their nipa hut. This was corroborated by private
complainant's son who testified that he saw petitioner standing in front of the nipa hut moments before
it was burned.

3. The evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa
hut before it caught fire. Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner walk to and fro in front of
the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire. Private complainant's son likewise saw
petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut before it was burned.

The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed separately. Instead, they must be
viewed and considered as a whole. Circumstantial evidence is like a "tapestry made up of strands which create
a pattern when interwoven." Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only
forms part of the entire picture. The events that transpired prior to the burning incident cannot be disregarded.
Petitioner's threat to burn occurred when he stoned private complainant's house.

Also, there is no other reasonable version of the events which can be held with reasonable certainty.

Private complainant could have actually seen petitioner bum the nipa hut by stepping outside of his house.
However, behavioral responses of individuals confronted with strange, startling, or frightful experiences vary.
Where there is a perceived threat or danger to survival, some may fight, others might escape. Private
complainant's act of remaining inside his house during the incident is not contrary to human behavior. It cannot
affect his credibility as a witness.

Furthermore, "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function ... of the trial courts." It is a factual
matter that generally cannot be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition. Petitioner failed to prove, much less allege, any
of the exceptions to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review brought
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this Court will not disturb the trial court's findings on the matter.

Bohol Cases | 3E 2018-19