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4 Rebels and Separatists
in Ethiopia
Regional Resistance to a
Marxist Regime

Paul Henze

DTIC
ELETEpa

A
'Is~ OfnQp, nt h been Gpproved
4 foT pubji r Lae and sale; its

.66 5 27 010
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No.
MDA903-85-C-0030.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Henze, Paul B., 1924-
Rebels and separatists in Ethiopia.
"Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy."
"R-3347-USDP."
"December 1985."
Bibliography: p.
1. Ethiopia-Politics and government-1974-
2. Ethiopia-History-Autonomy and independence
movements. 3. National liberation movements-Ethiopia.
I. United States. Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. II. Rand Corporation. III. Title.
DT387.95.H46 1985 963'.07 86-425
ISBN 0-8330-0696-7

The Rand Publication Series: The Report is the principal

publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major
research findings and final research results. The Rand Note
reports other outputs of sponsored research for general
distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not
necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of
Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation

 I4. OTRLE N OPFICS11e
NE NADRSIS. TPREPORT & EROTSvag

Uneres nSearaofsDefen Ethiopia:______Interim_

fegoa
Poli nc toaMrxs2egm. PUERON PAG.E OTNME

7. AUTORN) AGN8MN ORS(Idhiib C~fh U.)I. SCURITOCLA. mumsc.

tp*)

S. PRFORINGORGA41ZAIONNAMEAND
DO411681S1. OCLASIPIET. POJECTGASK

1700SC Mai SLee

Sa. t Monica,~g CTA 904061..Pni

fpore orc Publi Release Ditibto Unliite

Ii. DISTRIBUTION STATEMIIENT (of. del mR.e Ia * S b

No Restrictions

I*- SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

K.IEVWORDS (Ceiesj, rvere side of""em and Idleniff br Nook .5.w~)

Ethiopia
Resistance
Insurgencv
Foreign Policy
20. ABSTRACT (Cerwnw a rowere add It ne*@6*6if and Idewity by Week euinalbe)

See reverse side

1472
DDIPrcMp EDITION Or I NOV 68 lS OSSOLETC

SERCURITY CLAWSIICATION Of? THIS PAGE (When Data Seed)

SIECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAG Data BaW
F(WIha

L'his report examines the historical

Lackqround, origins, present state, and
prospects or a number of separatist and
antireqime rebellions in Ethiopia, and
1izcusses the implications for Ethiopia's
larxist government and for U.S. policy.
£he author sees no advantage for the Unitel
states in supporting any )f the regional
rebellions or separatist movements that are
workinq agaiinst Ethiopia's Marxist regime
as long as they aim at the break-up of the
country. :ie advocates pursuit of policies
that will lead to a change of course by
hthiopia's ieaders and/or a change of
leadership. ,ie author suggests tnat the
main elements of U.S. policy should be the
following: j1) to press tor basi: change
in. overail eccxtomic policy, especially with
respect to atiriculture; (2) to inake clear
tLat the United States will support an
£thiopian government that adopts a new
course, wiich the United States cin do by
LesuAing development aid on a significant
scaie, encouraging American private
I rivestinErt, and CuI.idleLiuj th e
reestablishirent o t rilitary aid; (3) to
Ltraiqhtforwaudly uphold certain political
principles, including recognizing arid
SuppoLting the maintenance of Ethiopia's
territorial integrity, encouraging measures
that will 4ive disaffected regions of the
country a say in their local affairs, and
standing readly to facilitate the nediation
of quarrels with neighboring countries,
including Somalia and Sudan.

16IAURIT CLASIFICATION OF THIS PA Or('Ia Data Knieaep)

 R-3347-USDP

Rebels and Separatists

in Ehiopia
Regional Resistance to a
Marxist Regime

Paul Henze

December 1985

Prepared for the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy

Rand1700 MAIN STRET

P0 BOX 2138
SNIAMONIC A, C A 4% 2138

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

I ' •q
 PREFACE

This report examines the historical background, origins, present

state, and prospects of a number of separatist and antiregime rebellions
in Ethiopia, and discusses the implications for Ethiopia's Marxist
government and for U.S. policy. Apart from traditional research
methods, the author, who is a Rand consultant, has gained insights
from more than twenty years' involvement in Horn of Africa affairs in
U.S. government service and (since 1981) in private life. The study
reflects numerous conversations with representatives of the various
resistance movements, in the United States and abroad, during the
past year and a half.
The report was prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Pol-
icy under Contract MDA903-85-C-0030 as part of the Rand project
"Anti-Marxist Resistance Movements in the Third World."

Accesst=4 For

'" i .V Codes
,,.u~~i
: dl r ...
mUn1d/or

3J'. %

QUALITY.,
 SUMMARY

The Derg, the procommunist military junta in Ethiopia, has been

beset from its first year in power (1974) by rebellions and self-
proclaimed separatist movements. Its dogmatic efforts to force
communist-style institutions and policies on a country that has little
sympathy for them have provoked resistance. Over and over again, the
Derg has reacted with military force even to the suspicion of resistance.
The best measure of the Derg's failure to solve its problems is the
fact that with armed forces now eight times the size of Emperor Haile
Selassie's, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, who heads the Derg, controls little
more than half his country. Vast supplies of Soviet weaponry have not
ensured elementary security. The diversion of resources to military
operations has brought the economy to a standstill. Between five and
ten million Ethiopians-up to a quarter of the population-are
threatened with starvation and kept alive by Western relief operations.
Regional dissidence and rebellion are not new phenomena in
Ethiopia. The imperial regime also had to cope with dissent and occa-
sional rebellion, but it was much more successful than the Derg has
been in dealing with them. During most of Ethiopia's long history,
local leaders and the central authority have competed. Ethnic and
religious factors have usually played a secondary role to regional power
considerations.
In modern times, the center of political gravity in Ethiopia shifted
from the north to the central province of Shoa. The advent of a Marx-
ist revolutionary regime has not altered fundamental historical pat-
terns. The Derg has failed to exploit religion to bolster national unity;
nevertheless religious feeling has grown stronger since the revolution
among both Christians and Muslims. It works in favor of national
unity, but not in favor of the Derg. Marxism has failed to put down
firm roots in Ethiopia. The famine, which became a subject of world-
wide concern and publicity in 1984, discredits it as a prescription for
achieving economic progress.
Derg failures have generated more disaffection than Ethiopia has
experienced since the mid-nineteenth century. Conversely, however,
the revolutionary experience has also demonstrated the strength of
Ethiopian nationalism. It can now be seen to rest on more than
imperial traditions or alleged Amhara domination.
The Somali invasion of 1977 provoked a g,muine nationalist reac-
tion. With more political creativity and less Marxism, the Derg could
Vi

have capitalized on this upsurge of national feeling to develop a basis

for genuinely popular government. Instead, its efforts to lock
Ethiopian society into a Marxist mold and its stubborn refusal to nego-
tiate and compromise with regional dissidents have left it with no
source of strength but raw power and Soviet arms.
Eritrea is not an ethnic problem. It is an issue of dissidence and
frustration in a border region that gained certain advantages over the
rest of the country as a result of 50 years of colonial experience. In
Haile Selassie's final years, rebellion in Eritrea grew to serious propor-
tions only because of external communist and radical Arab support.
But Eritreans were always too factionalized to cooperate for long.
Ironically, the most radical Eritrean faction, the Marxist Eritrean
Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), has emerged strongest on the
ground in Eritrea. It finds nothing in common with the Marxist Derg
and continues to demand independence, though the situation in Eritrea
has long been stalemated militarily and shows little prospect of basic
change. Neither the Derg nor the rebels can win. Recent develop-
ments may indicate a change in attitude-or tactics-by the EPLF. It
is too early to tell.
Similarly, Marxists have since 1975 dominated the pervasive rebel-
lion in the neighboring province of Tigre. The Tigre Popular Libera-
tion Front (TPLF), however, favors separatism only as a last resort. It
prefers autonomy and a share of power in the central government. In
this we see deep historical currents at work.
The West should not evaluate rebel or separatist movements in
Ethiopia without taking history into account. A Western effort to sup-
port Eritrean independence would be as frustrating an experience as
intervention in Lebanon. There is no good case for it. There may be a
case for modestly supporting the Tigreans to the extent that they aim
at change in the center, rather than separation; however, their relation-
ship to the Eritrean movements is unclear and their Marxism disquiet-
ing. They cannot be equated with the Afghan freedom fighters.
The Oromo Liberation Front has little on-the-ground strength in
Ethiopia. With it and with other such movements, we must differen-
tiate between the propaganda claims of exiles and actual evidence of
following and impact inside the country,
Comparison with Iran offers an enlightening measure of Ethiopian
viability. As in Iran, fanatic, sometimes murderous, and often inept
revolutionary leaders have not destroyed Ethiopian national conscious-
ness. The concept of an Ethiopian state, which has existed in some
form for perhaps 3000 years, remains strong.
We in the West would be foolish to let the Soviets pose as cham-
pions of Ethiopian unity while we dabble with separatist movements
 Vii

for unclear tactical advantages or short-term emotional satisfaction.

Even at high levels in the Ethiopian government, officials are suspi-
cious that the Soviets are cynically scheming with separatist and dis-
sident movements to try to keep pressure on the Derg and exacerbate
tensions with Ethiopia's neighbors. If Ethiopia were to break with the
USSR, the Soviets could then revert to their prerevolutionary policy of
supporting rebels and dissidents again.
While all Ethiopians credit the Soviets with a boundless capacity for
cynicism and selfishness, the preotige of the United States and its
European allies remains high. The West is challenged to find ways of
exercising influence and leverage for change- change of policies and
orientation by the Derg itself, if possible, or change of leadership if
Mengistu is too deeply committed to the Soviets to shift direction.
The United States has credibility as a mediator of quarrels between
Ethiopia and its neighbors. Settlement with Sudan-with which
Ethiopia has no basic differences-could lay the groundwork in the
Horn of Africa for a complete realignment toward the West. The
West, and the United States in particular, is already intervening in the
Ethiopian situation with massive famine relief. What logic is there in
merely keeping people alive if we do not also put our weight behind
serious efforts to help them improve their lot in life?
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I should like to thank Francis Fukuyama of Rand and Thomas L.

Kane, who reviewed this study in draft form, for their observations.
suggestions, occasional corrections, and additions. I have incorporated
most of them into the text. I am grateful also to many other colleagues
and friends, including many Ethiopians, who have been helpful in vari-
ous ways as my research for this project proceeded.

A.
 CONTENTS

PREFACE .................................... . iii

SUMMARY .. ..................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .. ........................... ix
MAPS . ......................................... xiii
ACRONYMS ...................................... xv
Section
I. INTRODUCTION ..............................I
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................... 3
Evolution of the Ethiopian State . ................ 3
Regionalism versus Ethnicity .................... 7
Religion and Ethnicity . ...................... 13
The Dominance of Shoa ....................... 14
The Ethiopian Nation-State ................... 16
III. REBELLIONS BEFORE THE DERG TAKEOVER ..... 18
The Wevane Rebellion, Autumn 1943 .............. 18
Bale and the Ogaden in the 1960s ................ 26
Eritrea in the 1960s and 1970s .................. 34
Politics and Society on the Eve of the
Revolution . ............................. 36
IV. ETHIOPIA UNDER THE DERG.................. 40
The Derg Takeover, 1974 ..................... 40
The Derg and Eritrea . ........................ 41
The Som ali W ar ........................... 52
V. IRAN AND ETHIOPIA-PARALLEL PATHS . . . . . . ..
58
Monarchies Toppled by Revolution ............... 58
Opportunistic Intervention by Neighbors ........... 59
U.S. Reluctance to Become Involved .............. 60
Lessons for the Future ....................... 62
VI. REBELLION AND DISSIDENCE ELEVEN YEARS
AFTER THE REVOLUTION ................. 64
Somali-Oriented Movements ................... 64
Other Southern Insurgencies .................... 65

xi
xli

The W ollega Oromo ......................... 66

Rebellion in Eritrea ......................... 67
Rebellion in Tigre ............................. 72
Other Northern Movements ...................... 74
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF REBELLION AND SEPARATISM . 76
U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopian Separatists .......... 76
Comparison of Ethiopian and Afghan Rebels and
Rebellions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Comparison of Ethiopian and Angolan Rebels and
Rebellions . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Worthy Goals for Ethiopian Dissidents ............. 83
VIII. U.S. POLICY CHALLENGE ..................... 85
Resumption of Development Aid? ................ 85
Regional Approach to Horn of Africa .............. 88
Appendix: THE DERG AND THE NATIONALITIES
PROBLEM ........................... 91
REFEREN CES ................................... 95
 MAPS

1. Provinces of Ethiopia............................. 10
2. Eritrea and Tigre................................ 19

xiii
 ACRONYMS

EDU Ethiopian Democratic Union

ELF-PLF Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces
ELF-RC Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Command
ENLF Ethiopian National Liberation Front
EPDA Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Alliance
EPDM Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement
EPLF Eritrean Popular Liberation Front
EPRA Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Army
EPRM Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Movement
EPRP Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party
FM Foreign Mission
Meisone All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement
NDF National Democratic Front
OAU Organization of African Unity
PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PLF Popular Liberation Front
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Committee
PMGSE Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia
SALF Somali Abo Liberation Front
TPLF Tigre Popular Liberation Front
WPE Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front

xv
 I. INTRODUCTION

The Derg, the procommunist military regime in Ethiopia, has been

beset since 1974, when it came to power, by a bewildering array of
regional and ethnic rebellions and separatist movements. How impor-
tant are they? What are their prospects? Do their appeals for outside
support deserve to be taken seriously?
The failure of Marxism-Leninism in Ethiopia, which has been
dramatically exposed by the 1984-1985 famine affecting several million
people, prompted Western policymakers to pose these and other basic
questions about Ethiopia's survivability as a nation. Are the rebels and
separatists essentially a response to the military junta, or do they
represent deeper contradictions? If so, how irreconcilable are they?
Ethiopia has a long history. To find answers to these current ques-
tions, we have to look back into it and judge the present situation in
light of it.
Ethiopia is an atypical African country. It owes its boundaries not
to colonial powers but to its own inner dynamism and its rulers' ability
to manipulate colonial rivals. Diverse peoples and a complex geogra-
phy created conditions in which different styles of life and economic
patterns exist in close proximity. Ethiopia has evolved similarly to
Middle Eastern and Asian countries, or European nations at an earlier
stage of their history, rather than like the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.
Ethiopia's experience of colonialism was brief. Only Eritrea, its
northernmost province, was a European colony. The colonial period
there lasted only slightly ove. half a century. The Italian invasion and
conquest of the rest of Ethiopia in 1935-1936 resulted in its incorpora-
tion into Mussolini's East African empire. This empire fell apart five
years later as British Commonwealth forces invaded from several direc-
tions and partisans struck from the inside. The experience of Italian
colonialism for the country as a whole was essentially one of military
occupation and popular resistance. It heightened both regional and
1
national self-awareness.
Analogies with other countries in Africa are less enlightening in
studying Ethiopia than are comparisons with similar old states with
long histories, sharp regional contrasts, and multiethnic and/or multi-
religious populations. The most useful comparison for the recent

'An Oxford University Press book recently published in the United States provides an
excellent account of this period: See Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassic's War, Random
House, New York, 1985.

i1

mJ
 2

period may be with Iran. Section V of this study compares the recent
revolutionary experience of these two countries and suggests lessons for
U.S. policy from the experience of both.
After reviewing several aspects of Ethiopian history, the report sur-
veys Ethiopian ethnicity, nationalism, regionalism, and dissidence at
the time of the revolution. It then examines the causes of the rebel-
lions and regional dissident movements that confronted the revolu-
tionary regime and analyzes the dynamics of the most important
regional dissident and separatist movements as they have evolved over
the past ten years.
Finally, after comparing Ethiopia with Iran and with Afghanistan
and Angola, the other two countries investigated by the project of which
this study forms a part, the report discusses the factors that seem most
important for gauging the future evolution of regional resistance move-
ments in Ethiopia and proposes criteria for the United States and its
allies to apply in formulating policy toward these movements.

II
 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

EVOLUTION OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE

Does Ethiopia display the attributes of a nation-state? Or is it sim-
ply a unique indigenous African colonial empire that managed to sur-
vive into modern times? Has the revolution exposed fatal weaknesses
in the Ethiopian state structure? Is Ethiopian nationalism merely the
invention of the ruling classes-whether imperial aristocracy or mili-
tary junta? Or does it have roots in the consciousness of the people?
This report will deal with these questions and others that derive from
them, for only in the perspective of historical evolution, current atti-
tudes, and actual behavior in respect to questions of ethnicity and
nationalism can one judge the numerous insurgent and dissident move-
ments of revolutionary Ethiopia.

One of the Oldest Kingdoms

Ethiopia is unique in Africa. As a political entity, it is one of the
oldest states in the world-to be compared with Egypt, China, and
Iran. The Persian prophet Mani wrote in the third century A.D.:
There are four great kingdoms on earth: the first is the Kingdom of
Babylon and Persia; the second is the Kingdom of Rome; the third is
the Kingdom of the Axumites; the fourth is the Kingdom of the
Chinese.'
The origins of the Axumite empire, the first Ethiopian state, remain
to be clarified by archaeology. The Derg abolished the Solomonic
dynasty, 2 but the legend of the Queen of Sheba visiting King Solomon
in Jerusalem and returning pregnant with Menelik I, first emperor of
Ethiopia, is still depicted in paintings sold in the streets of Addis

'Yuri M. Kobishchanov, Aksum, Nauka, Moscow, 1966, p. 36; Axum, a translation of

this comprehensive work, was published by Pennsylvania State University Press, State
College, Pa., 1979.
Not with the deposition of Haile Selassie in September 1974, but in March 1975,
when Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, who had been proclaimed king of Ethiopia in Sep-
tember 1974 but was sick in London, was declared deposed because "of failure to return
to the country." The deposition of the sick king was a technicality, of course, for
"Ethiopian socialism" had already been adopted in December 1974, leaving no room for
the monarchy. Cautiousness about offending deeply ingrained monarchist sentiments
among the Ethiopian peasantry, rather than concern with legal form, prompted the Derg
to go through the charade of preserving the dynasty in September 1974. Monarchist sen-
timent proved weak as an active political force.

:3
4

Ababa. Ethiopians, contrary to most other Africans, are a naturally

history-conscious people. Like all ancient empires, Ethiopia went
through periods of glory and near eclipse and some parts of its history
are obscure. The idea of the Ethiopian state as remaining in continu-
ous existence from ancient times nevertheless survived into the modern
era. It survived the revolution too.
Unlike Lenin and his Bolsheviks who claimed they were founding an
entirely new political structure-the USSR-that represented a sharp
break with the Russian empire, Mengistu Haile-Mariam and his Derg
have always insisted on historical continuity. Their original motto,
Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First), implies a unified country. Mengistu,
whose origins are in Konso in the far southwest, one of the last areas
Menelik II incorporated into the modern state at the end of the
nineteenth century, likes to talk about Ethiopian history, knows its
general outlines well, and frequently makes historical references in his
3
speeches.
All other sub-Saharan African states owe not only their boundaries
but their very existence to colonial powers. The Arab states of North
Africa and the Middle East also took modern form as a result of
foreign incursions. Many 4 of them still lack all the characteristics of
fully evolved nation-states.
Ethiopia achieved recognition of its boundaries during the last
decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth as a
result of the country's own political dynamism. The British simply
walked away, making no effort to exert influence over the country after
the Napier expedition of 1868, which put an end to the reign of the
energetic but intemperate Emperor Tewodros.' But Tewodros himself
31 experienced this personally in official conversations with Mengistu in February
1978. One of his most extensive public declarations is a speech delivered in Massawa
during the launching of the "Red Star Multifaceted Revolutionary Campaign" on
January 26, 1982. Mentioning "the famous Emperor Caleb" and Emperor Ezana "who
ruled over territory beyond our present Western territorial limits up to Meroe, a fa-.
duly evidenced on stone inscriptions," he went on to reflect "how the once glorious
Axumite civilization faded away" and concluded that it was because of the decline of
trade. His analysis seems to reflect familiarity with the work of the modern Ethiopian
historian, Sergew Hable-Selassie, whose Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270,
Haile Selassie I University Press, Addis Ababa, 1972, is the most complete treatment of
ancient Ethiopian history yet to appear.
4As defined, for example, by Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States, Westview,
Boulder, Colo., 1977.
5
Tewodros has been a favorite of Ethiopian intellectuals since the end of World War
II. The careers of Tewodros and Mengistu show many interesting parallels: They are
both from peripheral areas of Ethiopia and from the lower strata of society. They both
seized power by force. They both relied on foreign advisers and both reacted violently to
opposition. Tewodros did not refrain from attacking the Ethiopian church at a time
when Ethiopians were far more pious than they are now. Eventually Tewodros so
 5

expressed the Ethiopian national spirit that had survived the long
decline and political confusion that set in after the depredations of
Ahmed Gragn and the great Oromo (Galla) migrations.
Menelik II, who had been Tewodros's prisoner on Magdala, escaped
before the battle began and returned to claim the throne of the king-
dom of Shoa. Under Menelik, Shoa rapidly became the center of the
modern Ethiopian state. He was still only king of Shoa when he
reconquered the Rift valley lake region and the highlands of Arussi,
Bale, and Sidamo, areas where imperial authority had lapsed in the six-
teenth century. In 1887, he took the ancient walled city 6 of Harar,
which for centuries had menaced the Christian highlands.

The Creation of Eritrea

When Emperor Yohannes IV7 was killed fighting dervishes on the
Sudan border in 1889, Menelik was the logical and uncontested succes-
sor to the Ethiopian throne. Yohannes, a Tigrean, had tried to defend
northern Ethiopia against the Egyptians and Sudanese, as well as
against the Italians, who had for two decades been trying to gain a
foothold on the Red Sea coast. The Italians had taken over Massawa
from the Egyptians in 1885, but when they tried to move up into the
highlands, Ras Alula, ruler of Hamasien,s practically annihilated their
forces at Dogali in 1887. In the wake of Yohannes's death, the Italians
saw their chance and during 1890 took control of the whole region
down to the Mareb River. Thus 9
was Eritrea born, "an artificial crea-
tion of European imperialism."
The Italians, erratically backed by the British, saw their Colonia Eri-
trea (Red Sea Colony) as a base from which to gain control of all
Ethiopia. They signed a treaty with Menelik at Wichale Ucciali) in

thoroughly alienated his people that only his household troops offered resistance to. the
British Napier expedition. Tewodros enjoys great popularity in revolutionar, Ethiopia.
A special performance of a play based on his life by Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin was staged
for the VIIIth International Ethiopian Studies Conference in Addis Abaha in November
1984.
6Menelik II's accomplishments as king of Shoa are the subject of a detailed study by
R. H. Kofi Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire. 181 81889, Heinemann,
London, 1975.
'Subject of a biography by one of his descendants, Zewde Gebre-Sellassie. Yohannes
IV of Ethiopia, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.
'Subject of another recent historical study by Haggai Erlich, Ethiupta and Eritrea
During the Scramble for Africa. A Political Biography of Ras Alula, 1875-1897, Michigan
State University, East Lansing, Mich., 1982. Hamasien is the Eritrean subprovince sur-
rounding Asmara.
qHaggai Erlich, The Struggle Over Eritrea, 1.962-1978, Hoover Institution, Stanford,
Calif., 1983. This description applies, of course, to most modern African states.
 6

1889. The Italian and Amharic texts had discrepancies, however, and
the Italians interpreted the treaty as giving them a protectorate over
all of Ethiopia. Menelik was not willing to accept Italian protection, as
he made clear when hostilities broke out in 1895.
Menelik had enlisted the support of the French and the Russians
and had built up a formidable army with European weapons and the
help of foreign technicians of several nationalities. When a superior
Ethiopian force routed General Baratieri's army at Adowa on March 2,
1896, Menelik sent messages to the Russian tsar and the French
president "so that our friends can rejoice with us." The Italian govern-
ment fell, and the European powers were shocked that "an African
10
chief and his warriors" had defeated "a civilized European nation."

Italian Colonization
In the subsequent peace treaty, Italy abandoned all pretense of a
protectorate over Ethiopia in return for Menelik's recognition of the
Italian occupation of Eritrea. Ever since, some Ethiopian nationalists
have accused Menelik of forgetting the importance of this historic
north Ethiopian territory and giving higher priority to rounding out his
conquests on the southeast, south, and southwestern marches of the
empire. Like all the if's of history, the question of whether he could
have entirely ejected the Italians from Eritrea in the wake of Italy's
humiliating defeat is interesting to debate in theoretical terms, but it is
the practical results of his decisions that must concern the serious his-
torian.
By accepting Italian colonization of Eritrea, Menelik established a
buffer along Ethiopia's northern boundary and brought to an end
nearly a thousand years of intermittent warfare with Muslim invaders
pressing in from the north. The respect Menelik won from European
powers at Adowa gained for Ethiopia treatment as an equal when terri-
torial claims of the French, Italians, and British were adjusted
throughout the Somali-inhabited regions, northern Kenya, and the
southern Sudan during the early years of the twentieth century.
Thus, the two serious regional problems that have bedeviled
Ethiopia since the 1960s-Eritrea and the Ogaden-had their origins in
the final phase of the European scramble for Africa less than 100 years
ago. Haile Selassie's statesmanship was able to contain these situa-
tions despite Soviet efforts to exacerbate them by supporting insur-

"'Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, Heinemann, London,

1976, p. 404. This book is the most complete and authoritative study available of
Ethiopian politics and external relations in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

I ... IIII
gency in Eritrea and by overarming independent Somalia
11
and, thereby,
encouraging Somali ambitions to gain the Ogaden.
The revolutionary regime has been much less skillful than Haile
Selassie in dealing with Eritrea and the Ogaden. Despite its early turn
toward the Soviet Union, the Derg has been unable to manipulate the
relationship to gain advantages in respect to these crucial territorial
issues. Instead, they have been exploited by the Soviets to strengthen
their grip on Ethiopia. But this is getting ahead of the story. Let us
turn now more specifically to considerations of ethnicity and national-
ism.

REGIONALISM VERSUS ETHNICITY

In short, considerations of regional and national power, rather than
of ethnicity, shaped the history of Ethiopia. The development resem-
bled that through which most of the major nation-states of Europe
passed as power became consolidated in the hands of rulers of a geo-
graphically favored region.
The history of Ethiopia cannot be written in terms of Amharas
against Tigres and Galla versus Amhara, or of Gurages, Agaws, or
Afars playing off one of the larger ethnic groups against others. Ethnic
factors are present, but they are a minor theme even with a group that
has recentlv become as self-conscious as the Somalis.
To present the development of modern Ethiopia as the evolution of
Amhara dominance over the rest of the country is to project current,
oversimplified notions of nationalism onto the past. To speak, as the
1983-1984 edition of the Statesman's Yearbook does, of "the conversion
of the Amharas to Christianity in the 4th century" is absurd. The
Amhara do not begin to become discernible as a people until several
centuries later.

The Development of Languages

The processes by which the population of the Axumite empire
evolved into separate peoples speaking Semitic languages that are
clearly related but distinct can at the present state of our knowledge
only be the subject of scholarly conjecture. Ge'ez, the Semitic language
of Axumite times, is related to ancient South Arabian, and both were

"See my "Getting a Grip on the Horn" in Walter Laqueur _d.).The Pattern of

Soviet Conduct in the Third World, Praeger. New York. 19K.3. pp. 150- lPi.
written in the same alphabet.' 2 From this alphabet a syllabic system
evolved, whereby vowels are indicated by attachments to, or changes in
the form of, consonants. This syllabary, with almost no change,
remains in use for all Ethiopian Semitic languages today.
The differentiation of Ge'ez (which seems to have ceased being spo-
ken around 1000 A.D., though it remains in use in the church) into
Amharic, Tigrinya, Tigre, Harari, Gurage, and other minor Semitic
languages appears to have been similar to what occurred as the
Romance languages developed from Latin. Spoken Ge'ez may have
had many dialects. Preexisting languages left their imprint as indige-
nous peoples were absorbed by the dominant group. Where are the
descendants of Gauls today? Among the French. Where are the
descendants of the Agaw, who seem to have been the predominant
pre-Semitic population of the northern Ethiopian highlands? 13
They
must have been absorbed by the Amhara and the Tigreans.
"The emergence of Amharic and its early history are shrouded in
almost impenetrable darkness," one of the foremost British scholars
specializing in Ethiopia wrote two decades ago. 14 More recently, glotto-
chronologists have attempted to reconstruct the evolution of Amharic
and other Ethiopian languages. These linguistic specialists estimate
the degree of divergence between related languages by comparing basic
words and projecting them backward in time to determine when the
languages diverged5 from a common source. Definitive results cannot
be expected soon.'
The earliest Amharic texts date from the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. The restored Solomonic dynasty after 1270 appears to have
used Amharic as its official language. The language spread southward
as Gojjam and Shoa were Christianized and absorbed into Ethiopian
civilization. The great medieval warrior emperor Amda Tseyon, who
reigned from 1314 to 1344, brought southern regions as distant as Bale
under imperial rule. Thus, Amharic can be said to have been the state
language in Ethiopia for more than 600 years. Tigrinya, in some
respects closer to Ge'ez in vocabulary and structure,1 6 was used only in
12The name is derived from lisane giiz (the tongue of the free). See M. L. Bender et
al. (eds.), Language in Ethiopia. Oxford University Press, London, 1976, p. 99.
13Though isolated pockets of Agaw survive, such as the Bilen of Eritrea and the
Qemant of Begemder. as well as the Falashas.
4
Edward Ullendorff, An Amharic Chrestomath., Oxford University Press, London,
1965, p. 1.
15See Bender, op. cit., pp. 23-33, 63-98.
'5 Amharic has been known as lisane negus (the language of the king) since medieval
times. The fact that instruction in Biblical studies, long the sole fc.rm of higher learning
in Christian Ethiopia, was always given in Amharic clearly exemplifies the dominant
position of Amharic. Even Tigrinya speakers pronounce Ge'ez according to the rules of
Amharic, though the Tigrinya pronunciation would apparently be n.,)re correct.
 9

the north, where it remains today the principal language of Tigre and
Eritrea.
Emperor Tewodros, admired both by modern intellectuals and the
present revolutionary regime, consciously and forcefully advocated
Ethiopian national revival. Though he originated in a border region
that was not absorbed into the mainstream of Ethiopian life until the
eighteenth century, he was an enthusiast of Amharic.
For more than a century,
[Amharic has beeil] clearly dominant in that it is spoken as a mother
tongue by a substantial segment of the population, it is the most
commonly learned second language throughout the country and it is
the official language of the government and the medium of instruc-
tion in primary education .... Amharic is more highly developed
than other Ethiopian languages, in that it has a well-established writ-
ing system and fairly well standardized norms of spoken and written
usage, although its modernization of vocabulary is only barely
begun.'-

Tigrinya is the only other Ethiopian language that is "moderately

well standardized and in regular written use."" It developed indepen-
dently during the Italian occupation of Eritrea and the subsequent
period of British trusteeship and federation. Still, it does not enjoy
quantitative second place among Ethiopian languages. This position
falls to Oromo (Gallinya), a Cushitic language that entered highland
Ethiopia with its speakers in the sixteenth century.

Significance of the Oromo

The Oromo are probably the most numerous of all Ethiopian ethnic
groups today. Unusually prolific, they moved northward in the wake of
the depredations of Ahmed Gragn and within a few decades reached
the traditional heartlands, Tigre and Begemder."9 (See Fig. I-
Provinces of Ethiopia.) Today, Oromo reside in every Ethiopian prov-
ince except Eritrea. They form the dominant population element in
Bale, Arussi, and Wollega and perhaps even in Shoa and Wollo.
Unlike the Somali, a related Cushitic people whose expansion began
not long before, the Oromo were extremely adaptable. They readily
abandoned nomadic cattle raising and settled into agriculture.
Bender, op. cit., pp. 11, 16. This description applies to the situation in the final
years preceding the revolution of 1974. Since the revolution, effort has been accelerated
to develop new vocabulary and standardize political and economic phrasEology to accom-
modate "socialism."
"Ibid., p. 16.
'Begemder was renamed Gondar after the rev)lution.
10

F'VHSda
E T OPIA - .- internationli boundary
---- Provinial boundary
100 200 in, * National Capital
9 Provincial caottar

. 7f C IO 200 300~f --- Railroad

Karf - oad
e-

?~ ~ Nacl
Er itrea North Yemen
r Keren massawi QOr
, , People's
Kasa;a,, Agorda' - San a fl Democratic
Asmara Decame . Reubi
TeseneBa'nntu v tYee

Hunner dowad
Sennar T Ior ~ s
.Mak-elleIt~ *

8 eg emnd-er ~arn * Aden

Gonda'. ce'
Rose re' ' 1 DIrbou i Reu n'Wn
* w ~
"Djibouti
S Bahl 03r D se .

Marcos n
, /

/S/r) 1~e
~~'j S:61 BateO 00,
er;aM nc'Aba
w oI
Garnuat

Motu, Asea - H- a r a, e

oa Ethiopi
 Unexposed to either Christianity or Islam when they began to move
into the Ethiopian highlands, they converted willingly.
As a rule, the deeper they penetrated into the highlands and the
more rapidly thev assimilated, the more the Oromo became involved in
Ethiopian political life. They abandoned many characteristics of their
egalitarian societ and adopted those of the socially differentiated
Amhara. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Oromo
aristocracy participated actively in the political life and rugional war-
fare of Shoa, Wollo, Gojjam, Begemder, and Tigre.
Except along the edge of the Great Escarpment, where they contin-
ued to lead a more pastoral life, the Oromo entered into Ethiopian poli-
tics not as an ethnic entity, but as regional contenders for power.
Around Harar, where they are called Kottu, the Oromo became the
dominant element among the settled agricultural population long
before Menelik II incorporated the region into the Ethiopian empire in
the 1880s. In the south. Oromo subgroups, such as the Arussi and the
Borana. retained much of their original culture and social structure
20
into modern times.
Though persons of Oromo origin may account for as much as 40 per-
cent of Ethiopia's population today, the Oromo exhibit more variability
than any of Ethiopia's other ethnic groups. In religion, they include
groups that still follow animist practices, many people in various stages
of adoption of Islam, Orthodox Christians, and converts to evangelical
Christianity introduced by European missionaries. The largest of
these, the Mekane Yesus church, essentially Lutheran21
in doctrine, is
strongly entrenched among the Oromo of Wollega.
The great majority of Oromo are now settled agriculturalists. Many
who have obtained education pursue professions and government ser-
vice. In modern times, military service, both as enlisted men and as
officers, has appealed to many Oromo young men. While the Oromo
language is a second lingua franca throughout central and southern
Ethiopia, it is seldom written. Western missionaries were the first to
write it. As Oromo assimilated to the dominant culture and became
literate, they learned to write Amharic. This remains true today.
All these processes have been most advanced in the central province
of Shoa, where the Oromo began to assimilate almost as soon as they
settled in the seventeenth century. In Shoa, pure Amhara can ,e
found today only in isolated northern regions, such as Manz and
Tegulet. All other Shoan Amhara have a sizable Oromo strain in their

-"Eike Haberland, Galla Sued-Aethiopiens, Kohihammer, Stuttgart, 196:,.

Gustav Aren. Fi angelical Pioneers in Ethiopia, EFS Forlaget, Stockholm. 1978, is a
definitive study of the origins of this church.
12

ancestry. Some Shoan Oromo have abandoned their )riginal ethnic

identity and regard themselves as Amhara. As the Shoan kingdom
expanded from the late eighteenth century onward, it gained dynamism
from Amhara-Oromo fusion.
Modern Ethiopia rests on a combination of the two largest ethnic
groups--the Amhara and the Oromno-in Shoa. Menelik II, who
extended Shoa's power over the entire country and whose accomplish-
ments include not only the victory at Adowa but most of the actions
that set Ethiopia on a firm path toward modernization, had many
Oromo associates. Haile Selassie's wife, Empress Menen, was the
granddaughter of Negus (King) Mikael of Wollo, a pure Oromo.
The predominant tendency among the Oromo of Ethiopia has been
to integrate into, not to differentiate themselves from, the Ethiopian
mainstream. Throughout the long history of the Ethiopian culture,
group ethnicity has mattered less than religion, historical tradition, and
a sense of participation in a common cultural continuum. 22 Ethiopia
was, and is. far from being consolidated as a nation-state in the sense
that the concept could be applied to France or England. It has more in
common with Italy or Germany, whose late evolution into unified
states reflected deep-seated regionalism.
Regional differentiation, rather than ethnicity, has been the princi-
pal obstacle to the exercise of strong central authority in Ethiopia:
The many centuries of settled agricultural life in the Ethiopian high-
lands, the long history of the Ethiopian monarchy and the Christian
church in the arev. had weakened tribal structures in favor of a more
regionally organized society.
The terrain was perhaps an even more basic factor. Considering the
isolation of the different Ethiopian regions from one another, separated
by high mountains and deep gorges, it is remarkable that the country
displayed such a marked sense of cohesion as early as it did.
Regional rulers were always selective in their subordination to
imperial authority and eager to preserve large areas of autonomy for
themselves. Ethnic considerations seldom took precedence over a local
prince's or king's preoccupation with dominating his own area and bar-
gaining with rivals and emperors to gain political and economic advan-
tage. Ethnicity was too abstract a concept to carry much weight.
Tribalism, as it evolved in most other parts of Africa. was important

-n)[ald Le\ine. a social anthrpologist and one of the most profound students of the
Horn of Africa. has demonstrated the ascendanc of acculturation over ethnicity in
(;reatr Ethupta. t-niv'ersitv of Chicago Press, 1t974.
- Rubensot. op. -it.. pp. :0-32
 13

only around the fringes of the Ethiopian highlands. The Amhara and
the Kikuyu of Kenya are not anal()ugos in their political evolution.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

Even religion did not always make for commonality of interest. In
medieval times, emperors Amda Tseyon and Zara-Yakob exploited the
realization of being a Christian island in a Muslim sea to unif' and
expand Ethiopia's territory. This factor was present with Menelik II
too-but less in the sense of' dealing with a Muslim threat than with24
restoring areas that had been lost to the empire and to Christianity.
Menelik sought primarily to forestall European colonial pressure, to
prevent regional rivals from gaining European backing, and to outflank
other contenders for the imperial throne. Islam as such was no longer
a threat in the east. The problem along the Red Sea littoral and in the
region of Berbera, Zeyla, and Harar was Egyptian ambitions, which
could open the way, as they did in Eritrea, to European penetration.
During the Gondarine period and the Era of the Princes. however.
as imperial power atrophied. regional rulers had forged alliances
against each other with little regard for who was Christian and who
Muslim.2 5 Religion and ethnic distinctions in Ethiopia do not always
match neatly.
While the Oromo, latecomers to the Ethiopian family of peoples,
display the greatest religious divergence, few Ethiopian ethnic entities
can be described as belonging entirely to one religion or another. The
majority of Amhara and Tigreans are Orthodox Christians, but there
are Muslims among both and in recent times smaller groups of con-
verts to evangelical sects, as well as to Catholicism. The Gurage, the
most southwesterly Semitic group, include Muslims and Christians in
almost equal proportions, as well as animists.
The religious picture among the peoples of the far southwest is com-
plex. They have been most influenced by modern missionary activity.
Eritrea has sizable groups of Catholics and Protestants as well as
Orthodox Christians and Muslims. The Afar are almost all Muslim
but retain many pre-Islamic practices. Somalis in Ethiopia come
closest to exhibiting religious uniformity, but they, too, like Muslim
Oromo in the south, retain strong orientation to local saints and

-'Most of them had reverted to paganism. for Christianity had not put down deep
roots (nor did waning imperial power have the means of sustaining it) in the ,out h
Nevertheless, Christian influence had penetrated deep into the southern Rift valley in
the late Middle Ages. See Eike Haherland.. lt.. (hrsti'ntum in Suc'd.Athtpwri. ,m
Vergessene Misswonsepochi,. Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden. 19746.
- Mordechai Abir, Ethiopt etiErai )f ti,' I'rit f',. Longinancs. l non . I 9?i.

JI
 14

mystics, who usually represent a continuation of pre-Islamic prac-

26
tices.
Christian-Muslim rivalry in Ethiopia has always been tempered by
another historical current stemming from the time of Mohammed. In
615 A.D., the fifth year of his mission, the first group of his followers
fled from persecution in Mecca and took refuge in Ethiopia. He had
told them:
If you go to Abyssinia you will find a king under whom none is per-
secuted. It is a land of righteousness where God will give you relief
from what you are suffering."

Mohammed's enemies, the Qureish, sent a delegation to Axum to

persuade the emperor to give up the refugees; the emperor refused. In
628 A.D., the sixth year after the hegira, Mohammed, by then in full
authority, sent an emissary to Ethiopia to ensure friendly relations.
The Muslims never declared a jihad against the Axumite empire.
Far back in time as these events go, they live in Ethiopian memory
and have often been cited as a basis for peaceful coexistence between
Christians and Muslims. Haile Selassie built mosques as well as
churches and granted titles to many regionally prominent Muslims.
The imperial government appointed a small number of Muslim
Ethiopians to high government positions. The Derg has continued the
practice, though it appears to have appointed fewer Muslims than
Haile Selassie did.

THE DOMINANCE OF SHOA

Ethnicity had almost nothing to do with the emergence of Shoa as
the core of the revitalized Ethiopian state at the end of the nineteenth
century. Shoa played as important a role in modern Ethiopian evolu-
tion as Prussia did in the development of modern Germany. There are
interesting parallels. Shoa was for much of its early history a frontier
region, as Prussia was. Its people were a mixture of several ethnic
strains, as Prussians were.
The challenge of dealing with frontier problems stimulated in Shoa
the emergence of strong leadership and the development of efficient
administration and military forces. Among a mixed population, con-
cern with ethnic exclusiveness brought no advantage to those compet-
ing for leadership. Attitudes prevailing in Shoa created a favorable

-,J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, Frank (ass, London, 1965. provides a
wealth of information on this subject.
2
As cited in Sergew Hable-Selassie, op. cit., p. 181.

.1'
 15

climate for the intensified and successful effort Haile Selassie made to
overcome regionalism and build the governmental framework of a
modern state."5
To characterize Haile Selassie's Ethiopia as Amhara dominance, as
many Western journalists and exile separatists have done, is to apply
facile preconceptions rather than to analyze how the system worked.
In the pre-Shoan era, the core of senior officials in the Ethiopian
government came from Tigre or from the central Amhara provinces:
Begemder, GojJam, and Wollo. During the reign of Menelik II, the
representation of these areas in the central government fell sharply.
The northern Amhara regions were severely disadvantaged during
Haile Selassie's reign not only by lack of representation at upper levels
of government, but as development accelerated after World War II, by
lack of a proportionate share of investment and developmental priority.
Table 1 gives the number of high-ranking officials (ministers, ministers
of state, and vice ministers) in the central government from various
regions over a 24-year Deriod.
Table 1
NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS (MINISTERS AND VICE
MINISTERS) IN THE ETHIOPIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT,
BY PROVINCE. 1942-1966

1942 1948 1953 1957 1959 1962 1964 1966 Total'

Shoa 7 10 16 23 30 27 31 43 85
Gojjam 2 1 2 2 0 0 1 3 6
Begernder 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 5
Tigre 1 1 0 3 3 4 3 2 7
Eritrea 2 0 4 2 1 4 9 9 19
Wollega 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 5 6
Sidarno 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
llubador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Harar 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Somalia 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
Unknown 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2

Total 13 15 24 33 40 42 52 68 137
SOURCE: Adapted from Christopher Clapham, Haile Selassies
,,ternment, Praeger, New York, 1969, p. 77.
Ser'ed during 24-year period.

2
'"The Rise of the Kingdom of Showa and the New Christian Empire" in Mordechai
Abir, op. cit., pp. 144-182; Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik 1I, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1975.

• ' m I I IY
16

Shoan dominance of the central government intensified during Haile

Selassie's long reign, with Eritreans coming to play a strong secondary
role. If data were available on Eritrean participation in other ranks of
the civil service and in key technical and professional positions
(telecommunications, air transport, teaching, law, and commerce), they
would show a higher proportion than Shoans in some fields; the north-
ern Amhara provinces would account for only a minor fraction of such
personnel.
Shoa's position can be exaggerated. I stress it here only to dispose
of the facile characterization that, in its extreme form, depicts Ethiopia
as a conspiracy of the Amhara against all its other inhabitants. The
predominance of Shoa has an exact parallel in the preeminence of
Paris and the surrounding region in France, of London and the home
counties in England, and of Athens in modern Greece. Patterns vary.
Rome and Latium dominated Italy for hundreds of years during the
Roman republic and empire but have not gained the same position in
modern Italy. Prussia, of course, no longer exists.
Ethiopia has survived long periods when power was diffused among
regions. Until early modern times, the imperial court moved seasonally
from one part of the country to another. But when Menelik II chose
Addis Ababa as his capital in 1886, it quickly became the hub around
which Ethiopian politics rotated, and the surrounding region, the old
kingdom of Shoa, took on a central role in Ethiopian life which it has
n ever lost. Addis Ababa and Shoa do dominate Ethiopia. They are the
melting pot of the country's ethnic strains. The revolution has
changed nothing in this respect.

THE ETHIOPIAN NATION-STATE

The following were the main developments of Haile Selassie's 58-
year period of dominance in Ethiopia:

* The consolidation of central power by the elimination of auton-

omous regional rulers and their armies and the creation of a
national army
* The establishment of a modern governmental structure
* The spread of mass education and development of higher educa-
tional institutions-
9
2 For a long time, the northern Amhara resisted Menelik's and Haile Selassie's educa-
tional reforms. The first modern schools, limited to Addis Ababa and Harar. had student
bodies drawn largely from the poorer classes. The graduates of these schools, however,
provided the new ministries established by Haile Selassie with the bulk. of their trained
personnel. The people of Goijam and Gondar contemptuously referred to these adminis-
trators as "these Gallas,"
 17

" The inauguration of policies, programs, and organizations

encouraging economic development
* The emergence of Ethiopia as an active factor in regional. Afri
can, and world politics
" The reinforcement of a sense of nationalism that transcended
the Solomonic tradition.
The consolidation of the central government's power brought Haile
Selassie into conflict with long-established regional power centers.
Before the Italian invasion, he had to deal with rebellious princes in
Tigre and Gojjam and assert central authority over potential tradi-
tional dissidents in other parts of the north.
During their occupation, the Italians attempted to capitalize on the
resentment against centralization by restoring such leaders as Ras
Hailu in Gojjam, but they had no significant success. The Patriots
(guerrillas who opposed the Italians). motivated by both regional and
national loyalties, cooperated with British Commonwealth forces who
advanced into the country to destroy Italian power following
Mussolini's entry into World War II (June 1940). By the end of June
1941, the Italians had surrendered not only in Ethiopia itself', but in
Eritrea and Somalia.
Following the Italian defeat, Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa
in triumph on May 5, 1941, exactly five years after he had fled. He
found the British supportive in principle but difficult on many specific
issues. They did not concede full sovereignty to Ethiopia until 1944.
Rebellion broke out in Tigre in 1942 and 1943. Eritrea went through a
long process of trusteeship, first enjoying unprecedented prosperity and
then suffering economic depression before it was finally federated with
Ethiopia in 1952.
The Eritrean problem was never regarded as an ethnic issue--the
half-century Italian colonial period had not created an Eritrean
30
nationality-it was an issue of colonial disposal and regional politics.
Only in respect to the Ogaden did ethnic considerations come into
play, but they did not take precedence. The British did not withdraw
from there completely until 1954. Some British officials favored sever-
ing Somali-inhabited regions from Ethiopia and creating a Greater
31
Somalia.
"'The complexities of this situation, in which the Soviets also attempted to assert
their hand, are chronicled in a work fundamental for anyone who wants to understand
the Eritrean issue today: G. H. K. Trevaskis, Eritrea. A (olon in Transition,
1941-1952, Oxford University Press, London, 1960.
0
: Richard Greenfield, A Modern Histor. of Ethiopia. Praeger, New York, 1965,
pp. 286-290; t. M. Lewis. The Modern Histor-x of Somaliland. Praeger. New York, 1965.
pp. 116-165; John M. Drysdale, The Somali )ispute, Praeger, New York. 1964. See also
The Earl of Lytton, The Stolen Desert, Macdonald. L[ondon, 1966.
 III. REBELLIONS BEFORE THE
DERG TAKEOVER

THE WEYANE REBELLION, AUTUMN 1943

Decline and Disaffection in Tigre

Though rich in the remains of Axumite civilization and (along with
the Eritrean highlands and the coastal plain south of Massawa) the
region where the first Ethiopian state arose, the heavily populated
province of Tigre (see Fig. 2) suffered both economic and political
decline, along with ecological degradation, from the medieval period
onward. In fact, in terms of both social and political conditions, life in
Tigre remained more medieval than anywhere else in Ethiopia into the
twentieth century. 1 The Tigrinva language, though generally regarded
as closest to ancient Ge'ez, was used for neither historical monuments
nor written literature and thus fell far behind Amharic in development.
The oldest text that has come to light dates from the nineteenth cen-
tury.-
Tigre experienced a brief political renaissance during the reign of
the Tigrean emperor Yohannes IV (1872 1889), but basic political pat-
terns remained unchanged. Politics revolved around leading families
whose power had heen established centuries earlier. "In essence it dif-
fered only marginally from what had been the general order in Ethiol 'a
during the 'Era of the Princes.' :' The only new element from the
1890s onward was the Italian presence in Eritrea.
The Italian. regarded Tigre as the avenue through which the" would
eventually advance to take possession of all of Ethiopia. As a result,
until the fascist invasion,
practically all the leading figures of the province, at one stage or
another, openly or secretly co-operated with Asmara [i.e., the Italian
colonial administration] against the authority of Addis Ababa.
Collaboration ...did not stem from a separatist instinct or a modern
sense of Tigrean nationalism. Rather. it was always a means of
obtaining promotlion at home within the traditional Ethiopian power

'This thesis is developed convincingly by Haggai Erlich in "Tigre in Modern

Ethiopian Histiry,' Proceedings of the Scienth Internatinal C'nference of Ethiopian
Studie . East Lansing. Mich.. 1984. pp 327-: :30.
Ananuel Sahle, "Tigrinya: Recent History and Development," Iroceedings of the
Setenth International (onference of Ethiopian Studs. pp. 79- 90.
Erlich. op. cit.. p. :127.

18
 19

10

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'32
SoCh_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
20

game. Taking money and arms from the Italians usually aimed at
maintaining support and creating a nuisance in the eyes of Addis
Ababa. In a way, it was a sophisticated variation of [banditry]--
obtaining power by not serving superiors properly but through becom-
ing a greater annoyance. Indeed the ultimate goal of the Tigrean
chiefs co-operating with foreigners was to eliminate local rivals in
order to be recogipized as Tigre's negus by Ethiopia's emperors. The
Shoans . . . unable to force an Ethiopian centralist government on
Tigre, chose to promote local jealousies and rivalries.'
When the Italians invaded in 1935-1936, several Tigrean leaders, as
well as the entire Raya and Azebu Galla (Oromo) population of the
southeastern part of the province, supported them. After the defeat of
the imperial forces, Tigre was incorporated into Eritrea. The province
did not develop much during the Italian occupation. Politics continued
to operate in the traditional mode. Some leaders shifted allegiance and
supported the Patriots.
After defeating the Italians in 1941, the British occupied Tigre as
well as Eritrea. Some British military officers favored retaining the
connection with Eritrea, but the restoration of Ethiopian sovereignty
made that impossible.

Haile Selassie's Tax on Tigreans

Haile Selassie sought not only to reassert the authority of his
government in Tigre, but to extend it and thus complete the process he
had begun before the Italian invasion. 5 He moved quickly to appoint a
new provincial administration and establish troops in the province
under central government command. Traditional forms of tribute were
abolished and a new tax system was introduced.
Though publicized as a guarantee of tenure, imperial taxation met
resistance from the greater part of the peasantry. Few peasants had
paid taxes during the Italian occupation, when much of the province
had been out of the control of any effective administration. During
those years, bands of Patriots, locally recruited Italian auxiliaries,
troops loyal to local leaders, and bandits had all roamed the region and
compelled the population to support them when they had it in their
power.
Tigrean peasants, thus reluctant to accept any authority, could have
been won readily to the emperor's new system only by an efficient and
rational bureaucracy. The officials and military commanders ap-
4
Ibid., p. 328.
5
Mardory Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, Faber & Faber, London, 1969,
pp. 343-352, 356-358.
 21

pointed from Addis Ababa were more often than not inefficient and
rapacious. A local poem of the time expressed the prevailing attitude:

Woe, woe, woe-death unto the officials of today

Who abuse their authority for a kilo of grain
And destroy documents for the gift of a goat.
The emperor is not aware of these scandals, 6
But surely he has sent us hyenas to all places.

Government Clashes With Dissidents

Serious trouble first developed among the Raya and Azebu and the
Wejerat, peoples with a long history of resistance to authority and
complicated relations with the Tigrean nobility. 7 Some Tigrean nobles,
wanting to retain as much regional autonomy as possible, opposed
Haile Selassie's consolidation of authority in their province. The Brit-
ish military was eager to see security reestablished in Tigre and some-
times encouraged local leaders to assert themselves. The British were
unmindful, however, of the complexity of the political relationships
among which the Tigreans were operating, both on the provincial level
and with respect to Addis Ababa.
In a serious clash in January 1942 at Kobbo, three British officers
and several Ethiopian soldiers were killed trying to force the Raya and
Azebu to pay taxes. The area was subjected to aerial bombardment to
little effect. The rebellious tribesmen were defeated only after a four-
month campaign lasting from April to July 1942 and requiring 30,000
troops, including 5000 from Wollo and Shoa, who were traditionally
regarded as enemies by the Tigreans.
Large tracts of country were devastated and severe fines in both
livestock and money were imposed on the defeated Raya and Azebu.
Severe as this campaign was, it had no serious deterrent effect on the
rest of Tigre. Security conditions throughout most of the province
worsened during the remainder of the year and tax arrears accumu-
lated.

"Cited by Gebru Tareke, "Rural Protest in Ethiopia, 1941-1970: A Study of Three

Rebellions," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York,
1977, p. 147. Much of my discussion of the Weyane rebellion is, in effect, a summary of
this extremely useful work, which is based both on British and Ethiopian documentary
sources and interviews carried out in Tigre in the 1970s. The Weyane revolt has
attracted very little attention from Western historians, even those interested in revolt
and rebellion. Richard Greenfield, e.g., in his Ethiopia. A New Political History, Praeger,
New York, 1965, gives it half a page ip. 285).
See Gebru Tareke, op. cit., pp. 148-158.
22

The central government resporded by bringing in more non-

Tigreans, primarily Shoans, and encouraging further use of force. The
next major clash came with the Vejerat, who are Christian, unlike the
Raya and Azebu, who are predominantly Muslim. The \Vejerat period-
ically raided the lowland MuAim Afar for cattle, adding to the general
instability in the region. Moreover, they refused to pay taxes.
A large force led by a Tigrean subprovincial official acting in the
name of the central government attacked the Wejerat in May 1943 and
was defeated. The commander was taken prisoner and, in accord with
Wejerat tradition, dressed like a woman and kept in detention until
July. The defeat badly undermined the Addis Ababa government's
authority and the standing of Tigrean leaders cooperating with it.

Emergence of Rebel Leader

Open resistance broke out all over eastern Tigre under the slogan,
"There is no government; let's organize and govern ourselves. 5 " Local
assemblies, called gerreb, were established. The gerrb sent representa-
tives to a central congress, called the shengo,. which elected leadership
and established a military command system.
The leadership of the eastern Tigrean rebellion quickly crystallized
around Haile Mariam Redda, a young man of' peasant origin who had
become an outlaw (shifta) after the Italian occupation. The Italians
coopted him and in 1938 put him in charge of his native parish. Dandi-
era, in Fnderta. Removed from that position after the Italian defeat in
1941, he appealed in Addis Ababa but was rebuffed. Returning to his
native region, he again became an outlaw, a Robin Hood type who won
support among the peasants by protecting them from bandits and cor-
rupt officials.
Haile Mariam's political program was essentially a conservative one:
He accused the Shoan Amhara aristocracy of having impoverished
Tigre and destroying its institutions by ranging the Tigrean nobility
against each other. He attacked them lbr having ... accused the
Tigreans as unpatriotic and less nationalistic than the Amharas while
they sold the latter's lands to foreign powers-presumabl. a reference
to Eritrea. He dismissed the emperor as a coward who had betrayed
the country and thus was unfit to rule. He ...accused him of being
an agent of the Catholic church.... He vowed to liberate Tigre from
Shoan Amhara hegemony if the central government failed to respond
to the call of the rebels and .. .reform itself.'

'Ibid.. p. 175.
'Ibid., pp. 185-16.
 2:3

Many of Haile Mariam's commanders were Tigrean nobles. The

rebels were well armed, for the Italians had distributed large quantities
of weapons to presumably friendly Tigrean peasants during their occu-
pation. Haile Mariam established his headquarters at Wokro, an old
settlement north of Agula on the main north-south highway. Located
at the geographic center of the province, this town boasts a famous
ancient rock-carved church.
The rebellion enjoyed the support of the Orthodox clergy. All
elected officials were required to take an oath administered by a priest.
Haile Mariam condemned Catholics, Protestants, and officials who
smoked and wore long pants as alien intruders and an outrage to tradi-
tion.

Rebel Attack on Government Forces

Haile Mariam, an effective military leader, had a natural gift for
delegating authority and inspiring cooperation. He used the rainy sea-
son of 1943 to organize his forces. After celebrating the Ethiopian
New Year on September 12, they went on the offensive. Their first
victory was a hard-fought attack on the besieged government garrison
at Quiha, a key junction on the main highway south of Wokro.
The rebel forces, estimated at 20,000, moved westward from Quiha
to Enda Yesus, a fort overlooking the provincial capital, Makelle.
They captured the fort and then took Makelle. 10 The representatives of
the central government fled. Haile Mariam issued a proclamation to
the inhabitants of Makelle which stated, inter alia:
Our governor is Jesus Christ ...
And our flag that of Ethiopia.
Our religion is that of Yohannes IV. 1
People of Tigre, follow the motto of Weyana."
By September 20 the successful Wevane rebel army was ready to
turn south to face an Ethiopian force attempting to advance into Tigre.
Haile Selassie had ordered his minister of war, the Patriot guerrilla
leader Ras Abebe Aregai, to take charge of the campaign against Haile
Mariam's rebels. The Ras rushed northward and arrived at Korem,
south of Maichew, on September 17. His way was blocked by rebels,

I"Ihave described this region, with historical references, in Chapter 3, "The Old
Heartland, Tigre and Eritrea," Ethiopian Journeys, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1977,
pp. 63-104.
''Cited in Gebru Tareke, op. cit., pp. 189-190. The name Weyane comes from a tra-
ditional Tigrean game. It connoted resistance and a sense of unity. Ibid., p. 217.

JI
24

including large elements of Raya and Azebu, who here were on their
home ground.
During the next three weeks, the Weyane forces fought hard against
Ras Abebe's Ethiopian troops, who were bolstered by a small con-
tingent of British officers and specialists. The fighting centered on the
great natural fortress of Amba Alaji. It had been the scene of two
bloody encounters during the previous eight years: during the Italian
invasion when both aerial bombardment and poison gas were used
against the poorly armed Ethiopian imperial forces and again when the
British and Ethiopian Patriots defeated the Italians in 1941.

End of the Rebellion

The Weyane forces outnumbered those of the government, but their
advantage in numbers was offset by artillery and British air power. As
the struggle dragged on inconclusively, disagreements surfaced between
Haile Mariam and some of the other Tigrean leaders. Haile Mariam
nevertheless maintained discipline, and on October 6-7. he precipitated
the final decisive battle by launching a three-pronged attack on govern-
ment positions with perhaps 10,000 men.
Interviewed in 1974, Haile Mariam contended that his forces could
have won by exhausting their opponents had it not been fbr the artil-
lery and the air attacks.12 A British officer observed at the time:
The bombing was accurate and inflicted considerable casualties
which had their effect in undermining the rebel determination. Quite
apart from the actual casualties inflicted, however, after one or two
attacks the appearance of the aircraft alone was sufficient to cause
concentrations of tribesmen to disperse. Ground troops were thus
enabled to move forward and occupy key places without opposition.'
Although the rebels scattered and battle formations began to disin-
tegrate on October 7, uncertainty still affected the Ethiopian govern-
ment forces and Ras Abebe did not personally move tl of Korem until
October 9. He then moved systematically north&.ird and entered
Quiha and Makelle on October 14, capturing the erstwhile rebel head-
quarters at Wokro on October 17.
The emperor subsequently appointed Ras Ahebe governor of Tigre
and charged him with the pacification of the province. The pacifica-
tion was brutal. The Raya and Azebu suffered the mo)st severe punish-
ment, having all their lands and animals confiscated. Ten Wevane
leaders who were caught were sent to Shoa and imprisoned at Debre
12[bid., p. 196.
"British after-action report cited in ibid.
 25

Berhan. Haile Mariam Redda himself did not surrender until 1946.
He was exiled to Ilubabor and then G(amu Gofa for 420 years. In 1975,
the Derg appointed him head of the militia in Figre.'
Tigre still remembers the Weyane rebellion.' Its memory plays a
role in the rebelliousness that has characterized Tigre since 1975. Let
us conclude this brief summary of the Wevane rebellion hy reviewing
how ethnicity and nationalism were reflected in it.

Rebellion as a Reflection of Tigrean Regionalism

Tigrean regional pride and particularism primarily motivated the
rebellion; separatism as such played no part. The Tigrean rebels con-
sidered themselves as good Ethiopians as the Shoans, whose domina-
tion they resented. Traditional conservative religious orthodoxy
predominated. Muslim rebels participated with Christians.
Oppression, corruption, maladministration, and non-Tigrean leader-
ship engendered Tigrean resentment. This resentment seems at times,
however, to have turned into opposition to all outside authority. Many
Tigreans preferred the traditional tribute system to a more modern,
unified tax system. Some would rather have lived with the autonomy
and near-anarchy to which they had been accustomed for nearly a
decade than adjust to a stable and orderly administ ration.
Tigrean society seemed to lack class tensions of the kind that Marx-
ists like to dramatize. The people did not question the existing social
structure, perhaps because traditional Tigrean patterns of land owner-
ship and generational 6 interrelationships provided adjustment u) and
down the social scale.1
Loyalties were to local communities, traditional leaders, and leading
families. Such loyalties gave the rebellion great strength as it gathered
force but made the movement brittle when the rebels met sustained
resistance and frustration. Thus spectacular victories were followed by
quick and devastating defeat.
The rebellion's leader, Haile Mariam Redda, shares with a long line
of rural insurgent heroes stretching far back into history in many parts
of the world certain conservative populist qualities, but he was not an
ideologue or ethnic nationalist. Interviewed in 1974,

;'Ibid., p. 221.
'As the extensive personal interviews conducted by Gebru Tareke in the mid- 1970s
for his study of the revolt demonstrate. See also Horn of Africa, Vol. VI, No. 4. 198:3/84,
a special issue devoted to Tigre.
See Dan F. Bauer, Household and Soct in Ethiopia. African Studies Center,
Michigan State Universitv. Fast L.ansing, 1977; also the same author's "Land, Leadership
and Legitimacy Among the Inderta Tigray of Ethipia." unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, 1973.

-ii
 26

[Haile Mariam Redda] admitted that he only spoke for the plight of
the poor and the peasant and that he never entertained severing
Tigre from the rest of Ethiopia or restoring its dynasty. Moreover.
he nma not have considered becoming n'gus [king), but the people
expressed it in one of their songs as: "You, the youthful Haile
.Mariam / Today you are a shifta / But next year king."

The Wevane rebellion was local. It drew on no outside inspiration,

either material or ideological. Allegations of British encouragement
and meddling-whatever the attitudes and ambitions of individual
British officers and officials may occasionally have been-cannot be
taken seriously. After all, it wis in large part because of prompt and
effective British support to Haile Selassie's forces that the rebellion
was so quickly put down.

BALE AND THE OGADEN IN THE 1960s

Soviet Involvement in the Horn

Two problems of regional dissidence that flared into insurgency in
the 196os-the Ogaden and Eritrea would have been of little conse-
quence without foreign support. The relative ease with which the
imperial regime was able to contain them can be appreciated only in
retrospect and in contrast to the disastrous performance of the revolu-
tionary government in trying to deal with these same problems. Haile
Selassie's reputation as a Pan-African and world statesman served
Ethiopia well in confronting these situations. It also served as a deter-
rent to Soviet ambitions. The Soviets backed both the Somalis and
the Eritreans but took precautions to hide their involvement behind a
facade of respectability.
The Soviets have shown deeper interest in Ethiopia than in any
other part of Africa.1 8 The USSR quickly established a diplomatic pres-
ence in the country after 1941, even at a time when Stalin was locked
in a life-and-death struggle with Hitler. During the 1950s, the Soviets
marked time in Ethiopia. During the 1960s, a Soviet program for de-
stabilizing Ethiopia and gaining a foothold in the Horn of Africa grad-
9
ually took shape.'

Gehru Tareke. op. cit.. p. 186.

"Edward T. Wilson., Russia and Black Africa Before World War Ii. Holmes & Meier,
New York. 1974; Paul B. Henze. Russians and the Horn. European-American Institute
for Security Research. Marina del Rey, Calif.. 1983: Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W.
Wolfe, Societ Polio and Practice Toi'ard Third World Conflicts. Lexington Books, D. C.
Heath and Company. Lexington, Mass., 1983.
"I have discussed this program in detail in "Gletting a Grip on the Horn" in Walter
Laqueur led. . The Pattern of Noi et (',nduct in the' Third World. Praeger, New York,
198.1. pp. 150 186,

-' • l• d !A
 IIi

27

The USSR invested heavily in arming Somalia after it gained

independence (1960) and tacitly encouraged Somali-backed insurgency
in southeast Ethiopia. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviets, competing
with the Chinese, were through surrogates supporting insurgency in
Eritrea and, employing low-cost clandestine techniques, were working
to radicalize Ethiopian student movements both within the country
and in Europe and North America.
The extent to which the Soviets helped bring Nimeiry to power in
Sudan (spring 1969) and Siad Barre in Somalia (fall 1969) is still being
debated."0 Whether out of commitment or opportunism, they quickly
stepped up arms shipments and catered to both these leaders' proclivi-
ties to seek military solutions to gnawing problems: the southern
rebellion in Sudan and Somalia's irredentist claims against Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Djibouti. Support for the Eritrean insurgency increased
dramatically, with Sudan as the main channel. Cuba played a second-
ary role as source of training and propaganda support.
Haile Selassie was still capable of creative diplomacy, however.
Informed in advance of the U.S. opening to communist China, he took
a prestigious delegation to Peking in October 1971 and agreed to recog-
nition in return for abandonment of Chinese support for the Eritreans.
Nimeiry, meanwhile, had narrowly escaped being ousted by Sudanese
communists who mounted a coup against him in summer 1971. He
quickly modified his pro-Moscow stance and proceeded to make peace
with the southern rebels with the active assistance of Haile Selassie
who, in turn, persuaded the Sudanese to restrict support for the Eri-
21
trean insurgents.
During most of the 1960s, Haile Selassie found the Ogaden a more
threatening problem than Eritrea. The two situations did not have sig-
nificant feedback effect on each other during Haile Selassie's time, as
occurred after the Derg came to power. It may be useful to look back
briefly at the way in which the Bale-Ogaden problem developed to
understand what happened in this area in the 1970s.

The Creation of Bale, 1960

The modern province of Bale was established in 1960, when the area
was separated from the province of Harar. Hararge remained
Ethiopia's largest province in area. Bale is its second largest, but its
most thinly populated. No census had ever been taken, but some

'Gabriel Warburg, Islam , Nationalism and ('urn mu ni.m n a Traditional S ciet The
Case of Sudan, Frank Cass. London, 1978, pp. 120-140: Gary 1). Payvon, "Somali Coup ot
1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity," Horn ,/ Africa. Vol. IV, No. 2. 1951.
-"Warburg, op. cit., p 1:8, pp. 1611ff. Henze. Russians amd the Horn, p. 19.
28

official estimates put the population in the 1960s below 200,000. No

estimates were larger than one million -- for an area the size of Eng-
22
land.
Three-quarters of Bale's inhabitants are estimated to be Oromo.
They live in the largely forested northern highlands, where Ethiopia's
second highest mountain, Batu, rises to 14,360 feet. The vast central
and southern regions of Bale are savannas that slope gradually to the
border of Somalia. This area has for at least three or four centuries
provided grazing grounds for Somali nomads. Bale may have been the
original home of the Oromo, but for several generations, perhaps
longer, Somali have been advancing westward through Bale into
Sidamo, the neighboring province to the west, where they have
occasionally clashed violently with the Borana Oromo.

Dissidence in the Ogaden

Ogaden is a geographical expression, not an administrative region.
The term applies to the entire lowland area of Harar and Bale prov-
inces. It is semidesert, though traversed by several rivers that begin in
the eastern highlands and seasonally carry a large volume of water into
Somalia. The most important of these isthe Webe Shebelle, which has
its sources in the high mountains of northern Bale and southern
Arussi.
The rivers of the Ogaden have considerable potential for irrigation.
but historically there was almost no cultivation in the valleys. The
Ethiopian government and foreign aid donors initiated modest agricul-
tural development projects in the 1960s. In Somalia, the lower Webe
Shebelle valley was opened to agriculture during the Italian colonial
period.
The Somali Youth League, founded in 1943 after the British
defeated the Italians, first articulated territorial claims to the Ogaden.
It somewhat influenced Ethiopian Somalis during the British occupa-
tion, which continued until 1948 in the main portion of the Ogaden
and until 1954 in the Haud, the region directly south of then British
Somaliland. Britain had "hesitated long enough to offend the Emperor
but without being able to justify her own continued retention, ' 23 but
finally returned to Ethiopian control the entire area that had been

22
For a summary of estimates, see my Ethiopian Journeys, pp. 213, 234.
'Perham, op. cit., p. xxxiv.
 29

recognized as Ethiopian under the colonial 4houndary arrangements

negotiated during the early twentieth centuryv. 2
Ethiopian control of the Ogaden was, however, extremely tenuous.
The region had few roads and few settlements that could be dignified
with the designation town. Names on the map were often no more
than weekly market sites, otherwise uninhabited. Its sparse population
and lack of readily exploitable resources gave it low priority for
economic development. While the Somali were primarily nomadic
camel and goat herders, the Oromo were cattle herders and cultivators.
The latter often lived in large villages "walled" by thick hedges of
candelabra euphorbia and surrounded hy tilled fields and open pasture-
land.
As the Addis Ababa government resumed control of the area, fric-
tion developed between the Oromo peasantry and Amhara officials who
sought to impose taxes and exact services. The arrival of Amhara
settlers caused further strain as local grazing and land rights were
often arbitrarily abrogated. Northern Bale had (and still has) vast
expanses of fertile, uncultivated land to which the central government
claimed title by right of conquest at the end of the nineteenth century.
Retired soldiers were prominent among the settlers attrdcted to the
province by grants of government land.
An amalgam of circumstances-the gradual extension of central
government authority, the influx of Amhara officials and settlers,
mostly Christian, and the creation of a small but in the local context
apparently privileged Orthodox church establishment-resulted in the
gradual accumulation of local resentments. The indigenous population
was almost entirely, though often somewhat nominally, Muslim, 26 and
"we-they" attitudes were deeply entrenched. Corruption and abuses by
settlers more often than not went unpunished. Bale did not attract the
best administrators in the overextended imperial civil service. The

' S. Pierre Petrides, The Boundar-. Questwtn between Ethiopia and Somalia, People's
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983.
,"Overpopulation and overuse of agricultural land in Ethiopia's northern highland
provinces is a major factor contributing to the severe famines of the 1970s and mid-
1980s. The famines were anticipated by both Ethiopians and foreign aid specialists in
the 1950s and 1960s. Their predictions led to plans for massive resettlement of north-
erners in thinly populated southern Arussi and northern Bale. After initial reversal of
this policy, the post-1974 revolutionary government has reverted to the same practice,
but instead of encouraging individual settlement has set up state farms and built new set -
tlements for the peasant laborers who work on them.
"Muslim influence in the area extends back perhaps a thousand years, but many
pre-Muslim practices have survived and been amalgamated into Islam. Ethiopia's most
popular Muslim pilgrimage site. the tomb ot Sheikh Hussein, i located on the Wehe
Shebelle in northern Bale.

!J
 :30

central government gave Bale low priority and the Ogaden as a whole
even lower.
Nevertheless. had it not been tor the establishment of an indepen-
dent Somalia in 1960, insurgency would have been unlikely. Though a
sense of grievance among the Arussi Oromo gradually increased, their
interest lay in the avoidance of exploitation by Christian Amharas and
the management of their own affairs, not in separatism.
As the central government built up a provincial bureaucratic struc-
ture and local administration in Bale, conflict with the local population
grew. The problem is age-old and has its parallels in man' developing
societies. Circumstances in Bale did not differ greatly from those else-
where in southern Ethiopia.'2 The reason similar situations did not
produce rebellion and insurgency in other southern Ethiopian tprov-
inces was that it was not in the interest of any neighboring country to
organize, finance, and arm them.

Somali Intervention
A group calling itself the United Liberation of Western Somalia was
set up in Mogadishu (Mogadiscio) simultaneously with establishment
of the Somali Republic. The group included all of Hararge, Arussi,
Bale, and southern Sidamo in its definition of Western Somalia. It is
not clear whether the organization was replaced or simply evolved into
the Ogaden Liberation Front that announced its existence in 1963.
The new Somali government gave asylum to disaffected Somali,
Oromo. and other Ethiopians. As word of this got back, it encouraged
dissidents to look to Mogadishu for support, as did Mogadishu's
intense radio propaganda. Mogadishu agents became active in the
Ogaden and Bale. Arms were smuggled in.
Revolt broke out first in an ethnic Somali area, Elkere, in 1963.
Rebel groups were organized in each subprovince, often under the
leadership of local notables. A general offensive began in 1964, with
attacks on police stations in Oromo regions.
The Addis Ababa government moved to stem peasant discontent by
announcing liberalized arrangements for reclaiming confiscated lands
and settling tax arrears, but bureaucratic processes were complicated
and delays created new grievances between the peasantry and the
authorities. It was a situation ripe for exploitation.

- "The relative cohesiveness of the ruling group of northern origin in the southern

provinces-and the mutuality of interests between officials, landowners, and clergy

within this group - reinforces the power of the provincial hierarchy. The social distance
between this group and the local peasantry renders the power of the officials more awe-
some, and its limits less discernible, than is the case in the northern provinces where
officialdom is an integral part of the society it governs.- John Varkakis, Ethiopia.
Anatom\ of a Traditonal P!,,lit, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1974, p. 299,

II
IIi

The Somalis had meanwhile trained a cadre of insurgent leader.,

foremost among them an Oromo named Wako Gutu, who was given the
rank of general. Subprovincial leaders were designated colonels. By
early 1965, the whole region was in a state of high tension as a result
of rebel attacks on police stations, militia posts, and local government
offices and harassment of highway traffic.
During 1965, several settlements and road junctions fell to the insur-
gents. Government forces were thrown off balance. In March 1966,
the governor of the subprovince of Genale and a sizable entourage were
surprised by a rebel band, and the governor was killed.
As the year drew to a close the rebels clearly had the upper hand; the
greater part of the province had undoubtedl' come under their influ-
ence or control. Government effectiveness was largely confined to
the towns in the highlands, but even these [were unsafe]
and ...Goba [the provincial capital]. was attacked twice by rebel
forces."

Addis Ababa declared martial law in Bale, as well as in the neigh-

boring Borana region of Sidamo in December 1966. Ethiopia openly
accused Somalia of supporting the rebellion; it had ample intelligence
evidence. To downplay the potential for conflict between Somalis and
Oromos, the Somali government encouraged the insurgents to
emphasize Islam as a common denominator and picture their struggle
as a jihad against Christian Amhara domination.
Hundreds of insurgent cadre were trained in Somalia in courses last-
ing from three weeks to several months and sent back into Ethiopian
territory. Rebel movement in and out of Somalia could not be
prevented because control of so long and distant a border was beyond
the capabilities of the Ethiopian military. By this time, Somalia had
acquired mortars, land mines, bazookas, and light artillery, as well as a
wide range of hand weapons- largely from the Soviet Union. These
were provided liberally to insurgent units.

Ethiopian Mobilization to End Rebellion

Ethiopia had little trained manpower available for deployment to the
south because demands in Eritrea were growing. The government
therefore mobilized territorial units and recruited local militia from
among Christian settlers. A Christian Oromo general, Jagama Kello,
was put in charge of the effort to defeat the Bale insurgents. In the
face of more coherent Ethiopian military operations, the guerrillas
became more professional, too, avoiding pitched battles and attacks on
well-defended positions.

'(ehru Tareke. op. cit.. p. 312.

32

The rebels concentrated on daring hit-and-run raids. In a surprise

attack in Borana in 1967, they inflicted heavy damage on Ethiopian
forces. During the following year, as government efforts increased, the
rebels continued to display both strength and daring. They probably
achieved their maximum effectiveness, with perhaps 12,000 to 15,000
fighters, in early 1969:
Rebel performance was so astounding that some of the government
high officials even entertained the notion of external influence other
than Somalia .... The minister of defense explicitly stated: "The
manner the bandits operate in Bale, their aim, cruelty and meticulous
performance indeed exemplify the communist spirit and action which
the rebels seem to have embraced as a religion.""

Several developments helped the government turn the situation

around. Most important was a lessening of support from Somalia,
because Prime Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Egal's government had
decided to concentrate on internal development and reduce tension
with both Kenya and Ethiopia. The effect of this policy was not
immediately apparent, for the insurgents had been so generously sup-
plied that they could maintain their momentum even with a slowing of
Mogadishu's logistic support.
During the latter part of 1968, the Ethiopian air force began bomb-
ing rebel strongholds and livestock concentrations. At the same time.
a newly appointed governor-general of the province adopted a program
of dividing the rebels from the population by attacking corruption and
moving energetically to deal with peasant grievances. Both carrot and
stick had effect, however, for aerial bombardments struck terror into
peasants who had supported the rebels and encouraged disengagement
from them. A British army engineer unit flew in to build a bridge
across the Genale River, greatly facilitating the mobility of the
Ethiopian forces.
When rebels began to surrender at the end of 1969, the movement
quickly lost its momentum. Somali Chief of Staff General Mohammed
Siad Barre's military coup in Mogadishu in October 1969 had further
weakened Mogadishu's support for the insurgency in Ethiopia. Retreat
from the conflict was accelerated by the new Somali government,
which chose to concentrate on internal priorities. Ironic as this may be
in view of Siad Barre's adventurism a few years later, it demonstrates
how quickly the flow of the tide of history can change in the Horn of
Africa from one direction to the opposite.

2
"Kebede Gebre to Diressie Dubale, February 28, 1969, as cited in ibid., p. :126.
 33

By February 1970, insurgent "General" Wako (,utu, retaining barely

200 armed men under his command, was ready to negotiate. The
Ethiopians surrounded him in Arana, an isolated area south of Mt.
Batu, and his surrender was agreed upon. He and his fighters were
pardoned on condition that they return to peaceful life. Haile Selassie
subsequently granted Wako a title and a commission in the Ethiopian
army.

Pacification and Conciliation

The government's conciliatory policy in Bale was underscored by the
appointment of General Jagama Kello as governor and of several other
Oromos and Somalis to other positions. The pacification of the prov-
ince and of most of the Ogaden was completed by 19 7 1.:"'
Although a few guerrillas may have remained at large in isolated
areas during the next year or two, they did not challenge the govern-
ment.a The government, in turn, resumed small-scale land grants for
settlement of retired Ethiopian soldiers and made modest efforts at
economic development. Somali adventurism in the Ogaden had been
costly to all concerned, but had achieved no permanent results.
Ethiopian students in Europe asserted that the struggle in Bale was
continued by an organization growing out of the United Liberation of
Western Somalia which in August 1971 supposedly transformed itself
into the Ethiopian National Liberation Front (ENIF). In 1973. an
exile spokesman claiming to represent the ENLF insi,,ted that Orotlto
and Somali were still united in a struggle against the imperial regime,
and the student journal 7"egelachin periodically reported oi it.
We have no evidence that the ENLF ever had any reality in
Ethiopia itself>'" It may simply be another example of the seminotional
resistance movements that Soviet operatives who were supporting dis-
sident Ethiopian students and Marxist intellectuals were directly or
indirectly encouraging them to promote.

"Compromise and conciliation as a conclusion io tnfi ci are more ( harat'eristic if

this part of Africa than fighting to the finish and humiliaton ,f those who concede
defeat. Ethiopian history provides manY other examples. There i, asi some parallel
between the termination of the insunrgency in Bale i 1970 and the manner in which
Nimeirv settled the southern Sudanese rebellion two years later
"I trekked on horseback into the regiin around Mt. Hatu in earl\ sumnuer 1972 over
a route that had been used by the insurgents less than three \ears earlier Memories it
rebel activities were alive among local Ormno. lit conditliins were entirek lteaceful. see
Ethiopian Journevs, pp. 221 -224.
-Patrick Gilkes. The ling Lion, St. Martin, I'ress, Ne Y,,rk, lT, p 21 220
has a good summari- of the Bale Ogaden insurge ni hut exaggerates the liipi)riance ot
the ENLF; Gebru Tareke has a more realistit dii usi' , ii )f it, f I ) ; 149A. iiW
 34

ERITREA IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

An Unsuccessful Federation
To relate the history of the Eritrean problem with organizational
and tactical detail would require a book. It has inspired the production
of a large body of literature, most of it polemic, infused with passion
for or against the Eritrean separatist cause and lacking in both histori-
cal perspective and hard data.: One good book on the Eritrean prob-
lem which has appeared in recent years. Haggai Erlich's Struggle Ouer
Eritrea, 1962-1978,'3 enables the nonspecialist to ignore all the rest.
Those who would learn more of the historical background can consult
another excellent study by the same author, as well as several other
35
good books.
Had disposal of the former Italian colony reached the international
agenda in the 1960s, Eritrea probably would have been set up as an
independent country, as so many insignificant and less developed colo-
nial remnants in Africa were at that time. After what seemed an inter-
minable process of trying to determine the wishes of the majority of
the people. UN commissioners and the concerned great powers settled
on federating Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. This was not an illogical
move. for the Eritrean highlands and coast are clearly part of historical
Ethiopia.
Eritrea did not exist as a concept until the Italians set up their
colony. It is a geographic and ethnographic miniature of Ethiopia:
highlands, deserts, lowlands, fertile regions, and barren mountains (see
Fig. 2. above). The insurgents recognize nine nationalities and even
more languages within the province. Its religious makeup is equally
complex, with Christians. Muslims. and animists dominating some
regions but also intermixing in others. Orthodox, Catholics, and Prot-
estants are all represented among the Christians. Religious and ethnic
lines do not always coincide. On almost any count, in a comparison of

Examples in the scholarly mode include Hereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Inter-
iention in the Horn of Africa, Monthly Review Press. New York. 1980; and Richard
.Sherman. Aritra Tht, I "nfintshdRetolutin, Praeger. New York, 1980, both of which I
reviewed in "History and the Horn," Problems ,f Communism. lanuary-February 1983.
'Hoo ver lstitut in, Stanford, Calif.. 198:3.
Haggai Erlich. Ethiopia and Eritrea I)hring the Scramble for Africa. Michigan State
Universit*., East Lansing. 1982; Stephen H. L.ongrigg, A Short Histor\ of Eritrea, Claren-
don Press. Oxf ord, 1945; A. .1. Barker. Eritrea 19.11. Faber & Faber, London, 1966; and
(; H K. Tre..askis. Ertrca. A (olo\ in Transition, 19-11 1952, Oxford tUniversity
Press. Lo,ndon. 196o.

Y/
 :15

the two in many respects

36
similar areas, Eritrea comes out more com-
plex than Lebanon.
The wonder then is not that federation did not work, but that the
pretense was maintained as long as it was. Politically and economi-
cally, Eritrea was more developed than the rest of Ethiopia. A good
case can be made that the imperial government never wanted federa-
tion to succeed.3 7 When it was formally terminated in 1962 with
Eritrea's incorporation as Ethiopia's 14th province, a liberation move-
ment had already existed for four ,ears.

Exile Liberation Movement

The Eritrean liberation movement consisted of an insignificant
group of exiles, predominantly Muslim traditionalists, who had sym-
pathy but no strength in their home territory. They were, despite
efforts to represent themselves as a united front, always rent by ten-
sions and rivalries reflecting those in Eritrean society itself.3 8 Life in
Eritrea was little affected by exile activities or insurgency until radical
Arabs and various Soviet proxies began to support Eritrean dissidents.
In the late 1960s, insurgents operating from across the Sudan border
began raids and assassinations in Eritrea and hijacked Ethiopian Air-
lines planes. They were among the first to engage in systematic air
piracy and may have been encouraged to do so by Cubans, who, along
with the communist Chinese and Syrians, were then training Eritreans
in guerrilla techniques. The economic stagnation that set in after the
closing of the Suez Canal created a sizable pool of educated unem-
ployed from which insurgent leadeis could recruit. Nevertheless, the
majority of Eritreans during this period remained oriented toward
Ethiopia, where they had the advantage of superior education and
skills in a larger. expanding economy.
Despite intense exile rivalry, insurgents expanded their operations
on the ground. By 1970, they were fighting pitched battles against
Ethiopian forces. Israeli advisers helped the Ethiopians organize police
commando units, but the Ethiopian army took over and began a pro-
cess of continual alienation of the civilian population by brutal search

"'Lebanon's troubled modern history and the tribulations of all the outside powers
who have become involved in the country in the past two decades-Israel and the United
States above all-should stand as a warning to those who advocate Western intervention
to support the separatists in Eritrea.
' Haggai Erlich, "The Eritrean Autonomy 1952-1962: Its Failure and Its Contribu-
tion to Further Escalation," in Y. Dinstein (ed.i, Models of Autonom%, Transaction Press,
New York, 1981.
'Shumet Shishagne. "Notes on the Background to the Eritrean Problem," Proceed-
ings of the Second Annual Seminar of the )epartrment of Histor), Vol. 1, Addis Ababa
University. 1984, pp. 180-206.
36

and destroy tactics. In this respect, an ethnic factor did come into play
in Eritrea: Officers and enlisted men were primarily from the center
and south of the country.
Still, no more than half of the imperial regime's military forces of
45,000 were ever deployed in Eritrea. American military installations
were never attacked and a relative stalemate, with all the province's
cities and main roads in government control, set in after Chinese sup-
port was terminated and Sudanese supply lines contracted at the end
of 1971.
Qaddafy embraced the Eritrean rebel cause warmly after he came to
power in 1969; Syria also continued to support the insurgency, funnel-
ing in supplies from Soviet-related sources. But the Soviets stayed in
the background. They may even have shifted their expectations in the
early 1970s to much longer-range goals, preferring that the Eritrean
insurgency, should it eventually succeed, result in the establishment of
a Marxist state rather than an Eritrea where Muslim influence would
be strong.
Eritrean political movements were always fragmenting and regroup-
ing. The Muslim-dominated Popular Liberation Front (PLF) had been
established in June 1970. Prospects for a quick outcome of the Eri-
trean struggle were receding when the Marxist Eritrean Popular
Liberation Front was formally proclaimed in February 1972. The
Soviets must have welcomed it, but avoided open endorsement of it.
They had plenty of surrogates to work through.
Before we follow Eritrean developments further into the 1970s, we
have to look at the larger Ethiopian context in which they occurred.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF

THE REVOLUTION

A Sense of Impending Change, 1972

A sense of impending change pervaded Ethiopia in summer of 1972,
when Haile Selassie passed his 80th birthday. Aspirations for ac-
celerated progress spread to ever widening sectors of the population.
These aspirations, which were not sharply focused, revolved around
expectations that a more open political system would be sanctioned by
an imperial successor who would reign as a genuine constitutional
monarch. 39 The educated and politically alert segment of the
'Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, not a forceful personality, was widely expected to
succeed his father as a matter of course, as the constitution provided He encouraged the
widespread expectation that he would liberalize the political system.
population looked forward to political parties, ministerial responsibility
to parliament, a less restricted press, and broadened scope for interest
groups of all kinds.
Modernization in Ethiopia had always taken the general direction of
European and American models, though Ethiopian traditions were also
valued and respected. Traditional behavior patterns persisted even
among those who considered themselves fully modern. 4 ° There was
great dissatisfaction, nevertheless, with overcentralization of authority
in the imperial court. No one, not even the students and few intellec-
tuals who professed Marxism, consciously advocated a more authori-
tarian system.
As the revolutionary process gained momentum in early 1974, a
majority of articulate Ethiopians, had they been polled, would probably
have agreed that they wanted a more open society, broadened educa-
tional opportunity, faster economic progress, and more room for local
and regional initiative. These views were contradictory in that the
population continued to look to a strong central government as initia-
tor of new activitie,., as the source of local status and privilege, and as
arbiter of demands fo resources and attention among competing
groups.
Most societies display such contradict ions. What is most significant
about Ethiopia as its revolution began is that there was no coherent
pressure for total replacement of the existing political and economic
system.

Varied Populations and Life Styles

Styles of life differed dramatically. The population ranged from
nomads and primitive forest dwellers barely out of the stone age to set-
tled highland groups with traditions extending back to biblical times to
modern city life with most features of everyday existence in Europe or
America. Most Ethiopians still lived in iural areas, the majority in
long-established communities that had evolved complex rules of
behavior, some surprisingly flexible and democratic, some much more
authoritarian. 41 Tribalism as known in much of the rest of Africa was
relatively benign in Ethiopia. Regional links often outweighed tribal or
ethnic loyalties in importance.
"'These were not perceived as contradictory by most Ethiopians. who seem to have
regarded their country as susceptible to modernization in the Japanese style, with its cul-
tural uniqueness preserved.
"Detailed studies of different Ethiopian peoples include Donald Levine, Wax and
Gold, University of Chicago Press, 1965 (Amhara); William A. Shack, The Gurage,
Oxford University Press, London, 1966; D. Hallpike. The Kortso of Ethiopia, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1972; Asmarom Legesse, Gada, Free Press. New York, 197:1 Oromo).
38

Christian-Muslim interactions remained localized and relatively

untroubled. There was no cleavage comparable to that between the
Muslim North and Christian South in Sudan. Ethiopian nationalism
was by no means absent among Ethiopian Muslims. The Ethiopian
Orthodox Church had a strong residual influence on many features of
life. Modernizers criticized its lack of social consciousness and mis-
sionary zeal. Islam was advancing more rapidly than Christianity
among animists.
While energetic young men deplored the fact that the Orthodox
Church was sunk in tradition and failed to exploit its immense land
holdings, few questioned the notion that Ethiopia was essentially a
Christian country with traditions going back to the fourth century and
fusing with an earlier -Judaic heritage. Ties to Israel, though pragmati-
cally justified on diplomatic, military, and economic grounds, rested on
a deeper emotional base.
Throughout Haile Selassie's long reign, Shoans continued to exercise
political leadership, and the role of the central province as the source
of both governmental leadership and economic dynamism steadily
increased, The Oromo, though in aggregate the largest single national-
ity group in Ethiopia, were so widely dispersed geographically, varied in
religious affiliation, style of life, and degree of modernization that there
was little comprehensive sense of nationalism among them. Those of
Bale and Arussi played little role in the national political system, while
the Oromo of Wollega were, in effect, junior partners with the Shoans
in the leadership of the country.
Peoples living in the eastern and southeast lowlands-the Afar and
the Somali-were among those least affected by modernization, educa-
tion, and extension of governmental authority. Economic development,
except in the Awash lowlands and to a much lesser extent in the lower
Webe Shebelle valley, had barely touched these regions. Authority was
still exercised mostly through cooptation of traditional leaders by the
central government. The Sultan of Aussa, the principal Afar leader,
enjoyed high status with the emperor.
Along the western border and throughout the south and southwest,
small tribal groups occupied special ecological niches, specialized in
certain crafts and trades, and intermingled with others in accordance
with unwritten rules and customs that had evolved over millenia. The
coffee-growing province of Kaffa enjoyed a high degree of prosperity.
Some of the traditional leaders from the preconquest period retained
administrative authority here. Education and modernization offered
young people from the entire southwest a relatively open path to
assimilation into broader Ethiopian society.
 3]9

Rapid urbanization, a phenomenon affecting primarily Addis Ababa,

Asmara, l)iredawa, most provincial capitals, and several southern
towns (Nazareth. Shashemane), had not produced serious social ten-
sins. It had, however, encouraged intermingling of nationalities and
religious groups. Intermarriage across tribal, national, and even reli-
42
gious lines was increasingly common in such settings.

'-Eritrea was in sone respects a special case-though much of what has been said
above applies to it too. It will be discussed separately below.
 IV. ETHIOPIA UNDER THE DERG

THE DERG TAKEOVER, 1974

Thus, the society over which the Provisional Military Administrative
Committee (PMAC), which rapidly became known as the Derg, estab-
lished dominance in summer 1974 was not one in which ethnic or reli-
gious tensions had become volatile. Nor did festering social strains
confront the government with quandaries that demanded immediate
solutions. Besides, a framework existed for dealing with problems that
surfaced during the months when the imperial regime fell into confu-
sion.
Institutions through which influential groups could express them-
selves functioned tolerably well: labor unions, teachers' associations,
student groups. and business and profession! ,organizations. The
countryside did not experience any mass upwelling of peasant discon-
tent. Until mass arrests and killings began, the unease and uncertainty
that characterized Ethiopian society as the authority of the imperial
regime withered did not automatically lead to violence. The revolution
remained good-natured until late 1974 and expectation,: of a peaceful2
transition to a more dynamic and open political system remained high.
The Derg made no attempt to adapt and exploit the existing consti-
tutional framework. It dismissed parliament, but called no new
national congress or consultative assembly to listen to the advice of the
"broad masses" in whose name it claimed to be acting. At the provin-
cial and local level, as imperial officials were removed or fled, lines of
authority that could have been preserved were severed. The Derg soon
found itself at odds with labor leaders and teachers' representatives.
The revolutionary process unleashed competing and disparate forces
seeking greater influence or advantages for their groups. The Derg
showed no skill in channeling their energies or encouraging competi-
tion among them. The sweeping reforms decreed during 1975 to imple-
ment "Ethiopian socialism" had the effect of stirring up society from
above at a time when it might otherwise have settled down.
The effect of the Derg reforms was heightened hw a series of events
during fall 1974 relating to Eritrea. The manner in which the Derg
tried to deal with the Eritrean problem -the single most important
"The word, whi ch means committee. was not n use in prereo4 ouionary Ethiopia It
was coined from a Ge'ez root.
.The most complete account of the first
three 'ears ol the revoloiinar\ period is
David and Marina Ottaway. Ethipia Empr' in R,. lution. Africana New York. I 97.

40
 4 1

political challenge it faced on taking power determined the subse-

quent course of events in Ethiopia. A different approach to Eritrea
could have meant a different history for Ethiopia from 1974 onward.

THE DERG AND ERITREA

Active insurgency in Eritrea was ten years old in summer 1974.
Almost every feature of the situation offered better prospects of solu-
tion at that time than had been true at any period in the previous
decade. Eritrea was bound to test the political skill of any new
Ethiopian government. The declining imperial regime's failure to take
advantage of the relatively favorable situation it had been instrumental
in bringing about from fall 1971 onward contributed to its downfall.
The Derg, despite favorable prospects. failed even more decisively than
did the imperial regime.
During 1972 and 1973, Ethiopian military forces extended their con-
trol over all major towns and roads in Eritrea. Military brutality
against the civilian population was common. But the economy
improved and the provincial administration was able to organize an
impressive province-wide exposition. "'Expo 1972," that ran for several
weeks in Asmara that spring.
Politically the situation remained stalemated on the government
side. Although Chinese support had ceased and Sudanese supply lines
contracted. Qaddafy warmly supported the insurgent cause and Syria
continued to funnel in supplies from Soviet-connected sources. Cuba
continued to train Eritrean fighters and engage in propaganda action
on their behalf. But the Soviets appear to have hedged their bets on
Eritrea, shifting emphasis to the long-range political struggle rather
than encouraging maximum guerrilla exertions during a period when
the "objective situation" on the ground.i was not particularly favorable.
The Marxist Eritrean Popular 1 iberation Front EIlIF) was for-
mallv proclaimed in February '1972 "unified" competitor to the
"revolutionary command" of the older Fritrean Liberation Front
(ELF-RC. ' Though the Soviets av oided an )en link with it. it seems
to have repre:;ented the hard coire of their Eritrean st rategv during this
period. Like all Eritrean nimvements. h w,%ever, it lacked cohesive
leadership and was susceptible to t rag m-ntaimn. tr it w\a, actually a
coalition of disparate elements:

Haggai Erlich explain', the -nipexi i ,t Ttht-e F rltrvan iato''1 ,is aell as, anyone
ha, been able to d(, lriefl\ in hi s'O / , - F,:!, "K2 - -,r
",. t,4,2 n-tintitin.
Stanford. Calif. I9s:3.

J _ __
42

Endless internal rivalries arose from the plluralist nature of Eritrea.

with each faction having its own interest. In essenee, the EI.F-R('
seemed to be a western Eritrean organizatiun combining young, local
fighters with the older members of the Supreme Council. The EPLF
was a marriage of convenience aming 'hristian highlanders. coastal
Muslims and another faction of exiles. The situation was made even
more complex hy the network of perimnal rio.alries and religious, eth-
nic and other differences.'

Politicking among Eritrean exile leaders and the propaganda that

they broadcast from various Arab capitals magnified .he impression of
the size of the insurgency. The best estimates of separatist fighters of
all factions place their number at no more than 2)0} ill the early
1970s.
In effect, the situation boiled down to a stubburn but unimaginative
Ethiopian government trying to subdue fractious coalitions of insur-
gents motivated by little more than political adventurism and sustained
by foreign money and supplies. Neither side did well. Neither side had
leaders with the breadth of vision to attempt to escape from a vicious
cycle of petty maneuvers.

Opportunity for Settlement, 197.1

With the opening of the Suez ('anel following the 197:1 Yom Kippur
war, an upsurge in economic activitv in Eritrea could have been
expected. An Ethiopian government capahle of both decisive military
action to reduce the insurgents to hit-and-run operations and a creative
political approach, with sustained negotiations and concessions to local
desires for self-administration, could have hrought the Eritrean insur-
gency much closer to real settlement. This was the opportunity open
to the Derg at the end of summer 1974.
When Haile Selassie was deposed. an acting head of state was
required. A distinguished Ethiopian general of Eritrean origin, Aman
Andom, was chosen. On Derg recommendation. Haile Selassie had
appointed him chief' of staff in early .ulv. Before the end of the
month, he had become Minister of Defense. He seemed like a logical
choice as a front man for the [)erg. He had made a name for himself
as a Patriot, but also as a champion uif the common soldier, in fighting
against Somali-backed insurgents in the ()gaden i. the mid-9f" s

'Ibid., p. 31.
'He had also commanded Ethioian c, itingenot in Korea and theu tungo. Arnan's
credentials as a liberal nationalist were ideal fur settling the Eritrean probulein. These
credentials also caused the EPI.F leaders to fear him.
 43

During spring and summer 1974, expectations of a negotiatcd settle-

ment had grown in Eritrea, for the population was eager for peace and
stability. Unfortunately, rivalry between the EPLF and the ELF-RC
had grown in exile and spread into Eritrea, where Christian Tigreans,
newly recruited to the Marxist EPLF, began an assassination campaign
against persons regarded as collaborators with the now almost defunct
imperial government. Several prominent Muslims were killed. Such
6
violence worked against compromise.
As minister of defense, Aman had devoted much of his time to his
home province and traveled extensively there. He returned to the capi-
tal on September 9 to present a 19-point plan to solve the insurgency
calling for

general reform of the administrative system, removal of all obstacles

which had impeded social progress . . . amnesty of political prisoners
in Eritrea, return of exiles and their resettlement, promotion of
foreign investments ... lifting the state of emergency, punishing offi-
cials guilty of misconduct in Eritrea.... land] safeguarding
Ethiopian unity.

Aman hoped to persuade Christians in the EPLF to cooperate with

the government against the predominantly Muslim ELF. He had a
broad concept of Eritrean reconciliation and managed to have Chris-
tian Eritreans appointed as both governor-general of the province and
chief of police. But the Derg was not behind him-Maj. Mengistu
Haile-Mariam opposed conciliation and Eritrean leaders in exile
rejected Aman's proposals. The two, in effect, collaborated to block
progress toward settlement. Meanwhile the Derg appointed Gen.
Teferi Banti. an Oromno hard-liner on Eritrea, as commander of mili-
tary forces in the province. Mengistu encouraged Teferi to pursue the
rebels vigorously.

'The fact that it was primarily the work of groups calling themselves Marxists may be
evidence of Soviet desires, being transmitted through surrogates, to heighten tension it
hopes of accelerating the revolutionary process in Ethiopia. It might reflect the same
activism characteristic of Soviet programs to support anti-Western subversion and ter-
rorism that was by 1974 apparent in many areas in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.
The extreme fractiousness of the Eritrean movements nevertheless argues against the
notion that the Soviets were able to manipulate them through what would in all likeli
hood have had to have been surrogates.
Cited in Erlich, op. cit., p. 49.
44

The Derg's Lost Opportunity

By mid-October 1974 a serious rift had developed between Aman
and hard-liners in the Derg. The situation in Eritrea had become
politically supercharged. On October 1:3, 1974, 20,000 to 30,000 citizens
gathered at a rally on the edge of Asmara to suppori peaceful settle-
ment. Ethiopian military units began flexing their muscles. Osman
Salih Sabbe, leader of the ELF-RC, called from Beirut for intensified
offensive action by the insurgents and warned that the Eritreans would
encourage ethnic groups in Ethiopia to rebel and create anarchy. Thus
positions hardened among both major factions of exile leadership as
Aman's moderate approach generated concerted opposition in the Derg.
While Gen. Teferi Banti prepared for a new military campaign in
Eritrea, Mengistu mobilized Derg members against Aman. By mid-
November the clash between Mengistu and Aman was in the open.
Addis Ababa radio on November IS quoted Mengistu as having referred
in a recent speech to "the few guerrillas who had been maintaining a
state of insecurity in [Eritrea] for the last 1:3years, with the collabora-
tion of foreign countries.i Aman had concentrated on the Eritrean
problem to the exclusion of organizing support in Addis Ababa and
Harar. Mengistu outmaneuvered him.
On November 23. 1974, Mengistu sent troops to Aman's house to
arrest him: a firefight ensued and Aman was killed. That night, 59
former imperial regime officials who had surrendered during the previ-
ous summer and who had been held for investigation and possible trial
were also summarily shot. General Teferi Banti was subsequently
named chairman of the Derg and acting head of state.
The hard-liners had won on Eritrea, and the Derg's uncompromising
policy both strengthened the Eritrean insurgent movements and pro-
pelled the entire Eritrean population into a more negative position
toward the Addis Ababa government than had ever developed during
the imperial period. Reacting to Ethiopian military preparations for an
offensive, several hundred insurgents infiltrated Asmara on December
22 to demonstrate with violence their determination to liberate the
province. In early January, the Derg's police commissioner in Eritrea,
an Eritrean, defected to the insurgents and persuaded the two major
groups to conclude an agreement for military cooperation.
The bloodshed that had begun in Addis Ababa and in Eritrea soon
engulfed the entire country. Mengistu proclaimed Ethiopian socialism
on December 20. 1974. The nationalization of al! banks and insurance
companies was announced on ,January 1, 1975. On February :3,79
industrial and commercial companies were nationalized and the state
Ibid., p. 53.
 45

took a controlling interest in 29 others. On March 4, all rural land was

nationalized and students were dispatched to the countryside to imple-
ment the new system.
In less than four months, the Derg had shattered mosl of the lines
of authority that hid Ethiopia together under the imperial regime.
Internally rent with rivalry, it lacked the means of implementing its
reforms systematically. The Ethiopian revolution seemed almost over-
night to have developed into a Maoist frenzy to change everything.
Not surprisingly, the insurgents in Eritrea concluded that their hour
had come. Ethiopian military efforts against them seemed almost
automatically to work to their advantage. Conservative Arab states,
alarmed at what was happening in Ethiopia, were eager to give more
support to the Eritreans. Sudanese President Nimeiry had sympa-
thized with Aman's efforts to reconcile Eritrea; shocked by Aman's
violent death, Nimeiry permitted increased aid to insurgents through
Sudanese territory.

Anti-Derg Insurgency, 1975-1976

Anti-Derg resistance movements grew rapidly in 1975. The
Ethiopian Democratic U'nion (EDUl advocated replacement of the
Derg with a liberal democratic government. It gained adherents in
Gondar and Tigre but had few overt followers inl the capital. The EDU
was led by Ras Mengesha Seyum, long-time governor of Tigre under
Haile Selassie and great-grandson of' the last Tigrean emperor,
Yohannes IV. and by two generals of the imperial army, Iyasu Menge-
sha, a Christian Eritrean, and Nega Tegegne, a native of Gondar.
With Sudanese tolerance after Nineiry turned sharply against Men-
gistu in 1976 tconvinced that Mengistu and Qaddafyv had been behind a
near-successful coup against him), the EDU built up sizable military
forces in Sudan.
The Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF), a Marxist offshoot of
the EPLF founded in 1975, was led by young activists who rejected the
leadership of Ras Mengesha. The two movements together mobilized
so much opposition to the Derg in Tigre that it was never able to gain
effective control of the rural areas of the province.
The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) came into the
open in Addis Ababa on August 31, 1975, claiming that it had been
founded in April 1972. The EPIRP was Marxist but antimilitarist. It
urged the Derg to step aside to make way for civilian leadership. It
mobilized radical activists, including large numbers of students, into
the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Army (EPRA). which was active
46

in both Tigre and G ondar." Apparent lv receiving some FI',F support,

the EPRA cooperated with the Eritreans. The EPIIP supported Eri-
trean self-determination in principle though it aimed to be essentiallv
an all-Ethiopian national party." Rebellions led mostly by traditional
leaders opposed to land reform broke out in several northern Amhara
areas. The Raya and Azebu Oronmo also became restive as did the
Afars (Danakil). An Afar Liberation Front cooperating with Muslim
Eritreans was formed under the leadership of the traditional Afar sul-
tan and his family, who were underwritten by Saudi Arabia.
It' Aman's policies had been followed and the Derg had been able to
launch a genuine peace process in Eritrea, all of these other insurgen-
cies would probably have developed much less rapidly, if indeed they
had taken serious form at all. They were generated and fed not only
by the Eritrean situation, however, bt br an interlocking set of atti-
tudes: resistance to overly rapid reforms. opposition to military leader-
ship in principle. and desire for greater autonomy.
Effective central governnent administration lapsed in much of the
northern part of the c untr\. The insurgent movements filled the
vacuum. Ethiopia ap)eared to be coning apart at all its seatns. Prone
to turn to military solutions for all problems, the Derg faced the diffi-
culty of coping mot (ol with steadily growing insurgency in Eritrea but
with resistance movements throughout the entire region to the south of
it.

Growing Er-trean Strength, 1976

Military operations in 1975 left more of Eritrea in insurgent hands
than ever before. Still dependent on L'.S. military aid and additional
purchases from Ethiopia's own resources (the Derg had inherited a
well-managed treasury with surpluses), the Derg could make only small
increases in regular military nanpower. To overcome this problem, it
developed a plan for recruiting a huge peasant militia from the center

"The EPRP was rumored to have had Chinese support. but there is no evidence and
little reason to believe that the Chinese were mixing into political ferment in Ethiopia at
this time. It is much more likely that the EPRP grew out of a Soviet-backed student
movement, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Movettent EPRMI active since the
6
late 19 0s both in Ethiopia and abroad, and that it initially represented a Soviet effort to
play safe by having a civilian Marxist political group as a counterweight to the Derg,
where the triumph of pro-Soviet, genuinely Marxist elements was still highly prob-
lematic.
''The EPRP and the EPRA sound similar to the earlier ENL.F Isee above. Sec. Ill, p.
33. which allegedly existed in Bale and Hararge after the defeat of the insurgency there
in the early 1970s.
 4-7

and south of the count rv and sending it to Eritrea in summer 1976.

The scheme became more amhitious as it unfolded.
The 1)erg decided that the peasant militia would push out or annihi-
late the recalcitrant Eritreans and that militiamen would be offered the
opportunity to resettle the region themselves. The genocidal character
of the great peasant march alarmed many Ethiopian officials who had
served the Derg loyally, and word leaked out to Western governments.
Secretary of State Kissinger, who had just approved delivery to
Ethiopia of a squadron of F-5Es originally promised to Haile Selassie
in 1973, transmitted what amounted to an ultimatum to the Derg-call
off the genocidal march or face Western sanctions.
The U.S. threat was not an idle one, for socialist Ethiopia still
depended entirely on the West for military and economic aid. Plans
for the march were scaled down and the F-5Es delivered," but it was
probably at this time that Mengistu decided that he would have to step
up efforts to persuade the Soviets to provide military assistance in
quantities substantially larger than the Cnited States was ever likely to
2
agree to.'
Meanwhile political conditions in Ethiopia had deteriorated. The
capital and the south were also caught up in political ferment as
several parties vied for influence and the I)erg itself was drawn into
the struggles. )erg experimentation in setting up a political movement
led to conflict and contusion.
The Eritreans gained strength steadily during 1976. though rivalry
among the insurgent factions- parallel with developments in Ethiopia
as a whole-grew and new splinter groups appeared.' :' The EPLF was

'They enabled Ethiopian pilots to destroy the Soviet-furnished Somali air force in
summer 1977 and thus blunt the initial thrust of the Somali offensive.
-See my Russ-ians and the Horn. pp, 32 13.
IThe Eritrean factional struggle took place along three principal axes: 1a) among
exiles and fighters in Eritrea; (biamong fighters in various regions of Eritrea along eth-
nic and religious lines: and c among exile leaders abroad. The complexities are such
that it is extremely difficult even to try to summarize the situation, because there were
also uncertainties at any given time regarding the true strength of subfactions and indi-
vidual leaders' hold over their followers. The following summary from Erlich's Struggle
is as accurate a description of' key trends and developments as can be found. 1972-1974:
The ELF-RC refuses to recognize the EPLF. Continuous war between the two claims
over a thousand dead. Late 1974: Following the Ethiopian revolution, both organiza-
tions grow. The majority of the new recruits are Christian Tigreans. War between the
two organizations ends, and there is even some military cooperation between them.
EarlN 1975: Influence of young cadres in both organizations grows, leading to splits with
exiles. Trend to the left and at the expense of Arabism. Ma 1975: Fighters establish
new ELF-RC. .September 1975: ELF-RC maintains "Unity Before Victory." Forms
union with FM, later to discover that it no longer represents leadership abroad known as
the Foreign Mission (FM). March 1976: Formal rupture of relations between EPLF and
FM. Wild accusations on both sides. Jul. 1976: ELF-RC recognizes FM as a third Eri-
trean nationalist organization. Januari 1977: EPLF congress. Formal adoption of
48

nevertheless gaining the upper hand, advocating "revolution before

unity," emphasizing the principle of uncompromising struggle against
"Ethiopian imperialism."
A similar development was taking place inside the Derg-but with
quite different implications. Leftist rivals of Meigistu pushed through
a plan for what was called the National Democratic Revolution,
adopted by the Derg in April 1976. It envisioned a one-party people's
republic with regional self-administration for ethnic groups.
While implementation of the Derg program as a whole was to be
postponed until conditions were more propitio. -. the Eritrean problem
was so urgent that the Derg announced a nine point program for Eri-
trea on May 16, 1976. It included "regional autonomy" for all
nationalities in Eritrea-seven national districts were envisioned. The
scheme could be interpreted as a plan to eliminate the Eritrean prob-
lem by eliminating Eritrea itself'.
The Derg's position was contradictorv. According to Erlich, while
the Derg was waving the olive branch with one hand, the wing headed
by Mengistu and Atnafu was preparing the peasan march-the mili-
tary option. 4 In any event, Marxist idealism in the Derg had little
chance of meshing with Marxist idealism in the EILF.

EPLF National Democratic Program, 1977

The EPLF's answer to the Derg's nine-point program was intensi-
fied military operations in Eritrea, increasing disinclination to
compromise with other insurgent leaders and groups, and a "national
democratic program," adopted by the first congress of the EPLF on
January 31, 1977. Although this program gives generous lip service to
humanitarian and democratic principles. it does not offer much
assurance that the rule of law would prevail in an independent Eritrea

"revolution before unity" policy. Partial cooperation with EILF R(' expressed in estab-
lishment of joint front. FM rejected totally. April 1977: FM,having mobilized fighters,
renamed Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF). Janar
1977-early 1978: EPLF and ELF-RC succeed in gaining control of Eritrean towns.
EPLF proves more efficient and stronger. 4Junc 1977: ELF-R(" and EPLF establish a
coordinating body, the National Democratic Front (NDFi to include non-Eritrean anti-
Derg organizations, but not the ELF-PLF. Meanwhile, Saudi money and Sudanese aid
channeled to the ELF-PLF. dul 1977: The conquest of Keren by the EPLF shows that
the NDF was a fiction from the start. The ELF-R(" recognizes the EIF-PIF as entitled
to membership in the NDF. Close military cooperation between them. JulK-August
1977: Internal clashes in ELF-RC over policy on EPLF and EI.F-PIF deserters. For-
mation of new factions in the FLF-RC, internal instability in the EPLF. The ELF-RC
accuses the EPILF of betraying Fritreanism and collaborating with Ethiopians and
Soviets.
"Ibid., p. 101.
dominated by the EPL.F. 1 Many pro\isimi, ftI lhi progran) aplper 1,,
cancel each other out, e.g.: 5
1. Establish a People's Democratic State
Assure all Eritrean citizens equality beo're the law witbitt
distinction as to nationality, tribe. religion, sex, cultural
level, occupation, posit ion. wealth. fait h.
- Severely punish Eritrean lackeys of Ethiopian c(,linialisin
who have committed crimes against the nation and lhe pye,, -
pie.
Other portions of the ElPLF program combine broad goals wit.h
harsh Stalinist-style rhetoric, threats against opposition. and narrow
dogmatism on economic and racial issues:
2. Build an Independent. Sell-eliant and Planned National
Economy
- Confiscate all land in the hands if the Ethiopian regime,
the imperialists, zionists and Fritrean lackeys and put it in
the service of the Eritrean masses.
- Make big nationalized farms and extensi\e farms requiring
modern techniques [into] state farms and use their produce
for the benefit of the masses.
- Promote an association that will organize. politicize and
arm the peasants with a clear revolutionary outlook so they'
can fully. participate in the anticolonial and anti-feudal
struggle, defend the gains of the revolution, free themselves
from oppresson and ec ,in'mic exl)!mitation, and manage
their own affairs.
- Nationalize all industries in the hands of the imperialists.
zionists. Ethiopian colonialists and their Eritrean lackeys as
well as resident aliens opposed to Erit rean independence.
:3. Develop Culture. Education, Technology and Public Health
- Obliterate the decadent culture and disgraceful social habits
that Ethiopian colonialism, world imperialism and zionism
have spread in order to suhjugate and exploit the Eritrean
people and destroy their identity.
4. Safeguard Social Rights
Abolish the system of labor laws and sham trade unions set
up by Ethiopian colonialism and its iml)erialist masters to
exploit and oppress Eritrean workers.
5. Ensure the Quality and Consolidate the . nity of Nationalities

The provisions are cited verbatim from the text reproduced in Basil I)avidson.
I ionel ('Vifc, and Berekt iIable S, lassie (ed..), to'h u the War im Eritrea, Spokcsman.
Nottingham, 1990. pp 14:3 150.
 1'Ilrcef'ullv oppose t hose xho, in the puirsuiit of their own
interests, create cliques on tlwe basis ofI nllionaljt 'y tribe.
region, etc.. and obstruct the unit,, of the revolttion andI thle
people.
Other articles of' thle programn called for the following:
Severely, punish thle die-hard,. criminal and( at rociouls bench-
men11 and lackeYs of Ft biopian colonmialism.
Mlercilessly'v Iinish aliens who. as lackey's and f~ollowers (it'
Et hiopiant colonialism. impilerialisnm and~ zionism., spy onl or
become hst acles to thle Erit reani people-
Support all jist and revolutionar v movem ents, as our st rug-
gle is an mnt egral part of the international revolutionary
mtovetnent in g-eneral and thle strugg..le of' the African. Asian
and Lat in American peoples against colonialism, imperial-
ism,. zionismi and racial discriminat ion in piarticular.
In compariso n with the Eli .s lanoguaige. the I erg's nine-point pro-
gramt (If the previou May sounds stat esmianl ike. The nine-point proI-
gram. however, obscured the savage intensit. oif' the most ruthbless ele-
ments in the D)er,- and their (let erminat ion tu subjugate
Esrit rea b)y
force. The EPL F's use of uncompromising. threatening languag1e
reflected I t h thle Marxist rigidit v of its leadership and its lack of'
assurance (If' complete suppo rt 1)y the insurgent rank and file. As
events during the tollo(wing yecar w(ould1( demo nst rate. the severit v (If the
language (If thle EI'IY nat inal democratic prrigll was directed hnlt
only against Ethiopian (IolIonialists and imperialist hut aga ist Er;
rean insurgent rivals.

Final Derg Failure to Pacify Eritrea

The deteriorating cent ral government posit ion in Erit rea was a
majoir fact or in thle next int ernal D erg conf'r mtat nln. Leftists inl thle
Derg appear to have been urg-ing cooperation with the EPRI) to gainl its
suppoIrt inl working lint a poIlit ical comproImise inl Erit rea. Mengist u
st ruck hack ()In F'ebruar% :1. 1977. Victims included G en. Teferi B-anti
w-.ho bad mod~eratedl his hard-line st ance (of tw,%o years before and now\
apparent ly favored negolt iat ions withl the E111 F As a result (If this
bloodbat h. Mengistii emerged into the open ats tDerg chairman, a posi-
tion he has held ever since. (iven what we no-w know oIf developments
among the Erit rean insurgents. we have good1( reaiso n to doubt11)that thle
EPR P and Derg tuembers sympathbet ic toI it would have found much to
negotiate ab~out wvit h E111F leaders.
 In this endlessly grim drama, other opportunities for alliances were
also thrown ito the wind, The Red Sea Aral) states had become
alarmed by developnents in Ethiopia in 197 -. Sudan, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia drew Syria and North Yemen into talks in early 1977
aimed at luring Smth Yemen from the So\iet camp and strengthening
the non-Marxist Muslins in Eritrea. All Ethiopians were worried
about this prospect. hut it proved to be a hollow threat, for the young
Marxists of the EPLF were unwilling to accept conservative Arab sup-
port and were less willing than ever to cooperate with moderates, such
as ELF-R( leader Osman Salih Sabbe:
The Red Sea Arabs ---wanted to see [Sabbel lead a unified Eritrean
movement, with a concomitant decline in the power of the Marxists
and radical leftists. The general trend in the Eritrean
movement ... was . . . in exactly the opposite direction .... In early
1977 the Saudis suspended their financial support, renewal condi-
tional on the unification of the two mmements .... The increasingly
leftist EPLF cited Marxist justification for putting revolution before
unity, and its position prevailed. In early 1977, even as the Eritreans
were defeating the Ethiopian army in the field. they were losing the
war. Their old allies and supporters. Libya and PDRY [People's
Deniocratic Republic of Yemenj (and even the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization]) were now supporting the Derg. and the
So\iet Union and ('uba were about to build a new Ethiopian army.'

B, .June and .July 1977, Eritrean insurgent operations had resulted

in the capture of' the strategically important towns of Keren and
Decamere. Militarv success increased factional competition both
within and between the various Eritrean organizations. Two hundred
members of the ELF-RC were reported killed in factional fighting in
-July and the EPIF arrested hundreds of its members for acting
counter to the p)rovisions of the official program.
The fact that the Eritreans were able during the remainder of 1977
to expand the area tinder their control while internecine competition
increased in all groupings steadily is ascribable primarily to the weak-
ness of the Ethiopian army. By the end of the year the Derg retained
a hold on no more than 5 percent of' the province. The port of Mas-
sawa was tinder siege and the capital. Asmara, was thought likely to be
assaulted momentarily. But the comnpeting and mutually hostile insur-
gent organizations could not agree on a plan for consolidating victory:
On the threshold of victory ... the young leaders had lost their
chance to implement their goals. They- had pushed aside older
leaders in exile, hut their radicalism had prevented them frotm bene-
fiting fro n what was fundamentally a pro-Eritrean process in the

Erlich.,Struggh, pp. S3 S;4.

52

region ... . The neighboring Red Sea Arab states [now] conceived an
independent, radical Eritrea as a great threat to 1heir interests. Thus
the stronger the EPLF became, the more isolate, ,t became.'

A belated and abortive effort to achieve Eritrean unity took place

again in Khartoum in March 1978. It was too late. The opportunity
to capitalize on the Derg's fight against Somalia had been lost. Later
that year, with greatly increased forces armed with Soviet weaponry,
the Derg was able to exploit insurgent disunity and demoralization and
regain control of all major Eritrean cities and communication routes.
The failure of the Derg's efforts to subjugate Eritrea was the pri-
mary cause of the Ethiopian crisis of 1977. Other factors contributed
as well, such as the speed of internal socialist-style reforms, which pro-
voked strong reactions, and the ideologically oriented political infight-
ing that intensified during 1976 and 1977. Internal Derg dissension
exacerbated all problems. But these problems by themselves would not
necessarily have tempted Somalia's pro-Soviet strong man, Mohammed
Siad Barre, to attack directly if most of Ethiopia's armed forces had
not become hopelessly bogged down in Eritrea.
The Derg's approach to the nationalities question, which has
relevance to both the Ogaden and Eritrea, is discussed in the Appendix.

THE SOMALI WAR

Increased Soviet Arms for Somalia

By 1974 Siad's relations with the Soviets had matured to the point
of signing a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. Somalia's
armed forces, based on a population no more than a tenth that of
Ethiopia, were in manpower alone half as large. In aircraft, tanks, and
several other types of equipment, Somalia had achieved quantitative
equality with Ethiopia.
Ethiopia had never represented a military threat to Somalia. With
the defeat of the Bale-Ogaden insurgency in the late 1960s, Haile
Selassie had achieved a modus vivendi with Somalia's moderate pre-
mier, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal. Siad Barre's seizure of power in
October 1969 made Ethiopians uncomfortable, but the imperial regime
went to some lengths to avoid strain in relations and the next year sent
one of its ablest diplomats to serve as ambassador in Mogadishu. This
man, Ayalew Mandefro, was called back by the Derg to become minis-
ter of defense in 1975.

'-Ibid.. p. 95.
 53

Significantly, in reaction to the Ethiopian revoution, the Soviel

sharply increased arms aid to Siad Barre's regime. )uring the four
years from 1974 to 1977. Somalia received S3(h) million in military aid,
almost all of it from the USSR or Soviet-friendly countries. As I con-
cluded in an earlier detailed study of arms flow into the Horn: "The
Soviet Union showed noc)reluctance to provide arms in excessive quan-
tities to the one country in s the region which faced no demonstrable
external or internal threat."
Whether the Soviets, who steadily increased their military and secu-
rity advisers in Somalia during the mid-1970)s,19 advised the Somalis to
consider operations against Ethiopia is not known: subsequent events
made it clear that they did not discourage them. As Somali prepara-
tions continued, it is impossible that the Soviets could have remained
unaware of them, for Soviet advisory presence in the Somali military
and security services was too pervasive.

Activities of Somali Liberation Fronts

The Western Somali Liberation Front (\VSLF) had continued a
shadowy existence since the late 1960s.211 In 1976. the Somali Al)
Liberation Front (SALF) announced its formation. It was purportedly
an indigenous Ethiopian group representing Oromo desires for separa-
tion from Ethiopia and incorloration into a greater Somalia. Agents of
these two fronts, which had only a tenuous existence on Ethiopian ter-
ritory, appeared in the Ogaden and Bale in 1975 and 1976. Their
activities soon aroused the concern of Dig o. ficL. ). ti ..
southern Ethiopia, though free of major insurgencies, had also been
engulfed in political ferment as the various political movements, some
with the encouragement of Derg members, tried to build a following in
the provinces.

'Paul B. Henze. "Arming the Horn 1960 1980--Military Expenditures, Arms

Imports and Military Aid in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan, With Statistics on
Economic Growth and Governmental Expenditures." published in draft as International
Security Studies Working Paper No. 43, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.. 1982, and in final form in Proceed-
ings of the Secenth lntermtinal C'onfercnce ol Ethiopian Stud.ie, East Lansing, Mich.,
1984. pp. 637-656.
S'In absolute terms the Soviets had far more personnel in Somalia. approximately
4000 at their height, than they have ever had in Ethiopia; on a per capita basis the
disparity is vastly greater.
'According to some reports it was newly "founded" in 197.5. See I. M. Lewis, "The
Western Somali Liheration Front and the tegacy of Sheikh Hussein of Bale." in -Joseph
Tubiana (ed.), Modern Ethiopia from the Accession of Menelik It to the Present, Balkema,
Rotterdam. 1980, pp. 409-415.
54

The twot soinali-sptinsiired front,, tegan to ifiltrate arias, and set ill)
cadres in thle ent ire sowt bea-tern region during" thle initter of
197 6- 197T Supplies were stockpiled in Somalia to support a major
offensive. Elaborate propaganda siiJ)Jait plan., were also developed to
give both f'roints the appearance (If beiig genunte Eti opian-based
gras-roots iivoxeient 5.
As piiiiCal fe rme nt intc reasedl in Eith iopJia and respect to r t he
De rg- mire imiport alit l pe r haps co)n fidenc ce t hat it couli d act ual ly
maintain its hold onl poiwer --decreased in mjul lvo.ig regions, the Oronw
population in the highland areas becamie read%- to hedge b~et s on the
fttire by cooperating- with the Somiali-ucpji ined infiltrators when that
was the easie,i Course toi fol)low%. Et hiopian Somalis in the Ogadlen and
in the Harar-DIi redawa area t houigh the latter were not ent husiast i-
cally pro-siad - began to ident ifv with what app)eared to iie the wave of
the f'uture--a possibly%successful efbirt at expansion hy the Mogadishu
regime.
Strong proo- M(1gad'shci feelings amiong Oroi were rare, but
garievances o f manl ,%kindcis hald by, this timeW ZRiccu mul1at ec against thle
Derv. 2 1 Large hld iwners and regional leaders fav-ored byv the imperial
administ rat ion had been alienated b)y the loss of' their lpropert. Some
Of' these saw collabiorat ion with Soiiialia as a way of' gaining redress or
at least rev.enge. Thihogh the \ligaidishti regimie was in both t heorv
and practice at least as socialist as- file 1)erg. the two fronts stressed
nationalism and exploit atio n (if grievances wit hoot encumbering them -
selv-es with detailed econioniic and siicial riicrwii- tfor the f'iitio~..

Somali Invasion of Ethiopia, 1977

Siad Barre's original plan ma 'y have been to build tip insurgency
gradually through11 these two) fronts. As the situoat ion in Ft hiopia degen-
erated and the IDerg becamec ev-en mnore deeply, einsnaredl in Eritrea. and
as worldwide concern abotit killings and o ppression in Ft hiopia
mounted, Siad sensed an opport cmiti to advance quick ly and decisivel.y
ag-ainst Ethiopia.
By the time the Soviets brought Fidel Castro into the situation in
March 1977. they must hav-e had a very good idea of Siad's platns.
Castro's efforts to bring all the contending elements inl the Horn and
South Arabian region together into a federation in which the P~eople's
- in it. prograni circulating itt 1985. the Orminii Liberatiiri Frit laiit,)ii hake 6or-
mulated it, posit ions in "Fin Elre, Oroiimia ji .e. Aci Alaba), Oct i her 1974 aml amnended
in -Jutne 19713.-
--Even it they had nut enco u raged h at iir djSCUSsrd hi, plan s A ithI him a po-siiliv.
that rueither side has ever ciintirtnecl .r denedi.
Democratic Republic of Yemen PII){Y I)jibouti. Eritrea, and the
Ogaden would have separate status along wil liEthiopia and Somalia,
appealed to no one. ('astro returned home with the Great Star of
Somalia, which Siad had awarded him, and the complaint that all the
leaders in tle Horn put nationalism above socialism.
In June. Somali guerrillas cut the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad,
)1ih actuallv and synbolically one ()f Ethiopia's lifelines. In 'Jul\,
full-scale Somali invasion began with regular Somali troops thinly dis-
guised as \\sI,F tighters in tle \ anguard. Lightly held Ethiopian posi-
tions in the Ogaden tell in quick succession.
On the third anniversary of the revolution, September 12, 1977,
,Jijiga, key to the route up onto the plateau to Harar, fell. With it the
Ethiopian, lost a new American-supplied radar station that had only
recently gone into operation. The American-supplied F-5Es had
already inflicted heavy damage on the Somali air force, as well as on
ground units, however, and the Somali offensive was held short of
Harar.
In the south, the Somalis advanced to the edge of the plateau, out of
Somali-populated territories into Orormo regions of Bale. Here the
SALF was expected to rally the Oromo to support Mogadishu's offen-
sive. It lacked credihility. The Oromo may have wavered briefly in
some areas, hut hasicallv they rallied to Ethiopia.
Mengistu, who time and again in the previous three years had
prover, himself more fast-footed than his opponents and more adroit in
knowing when to hend ideologically, was using patriotic slogans and
reminders tront history to rally the l)opulation to defend Mother
Ethiopia. Revolitionary rhetoric was dampened. Pressure for compli-
ance with reforms was eased.
Sik '. Barre had overextended himself. He had also overestimated his
ability to dupe potential Western hackers. American intelligence was
too good to permit credence to he given to Siad's claim that no regular
Somali forces were fighting in Ethiopia. The United States adopted a
policy of no military assistance to either side in the conflict.
Even though Jijiga fell, opening the way for Somali forces to
advance on Harar and Diredawa, which they besieged at the end of the
year, it was already clear in September that neither Mengistu nor
Ethiopia had heen dealt a death blow. " Several divisions of new militia
recruits were swelling the Ethiopian forces, while Somalia's manpower

This was quite evident to me when I visited Ethiopia as a National Security ('ouncil
tNS() staff member during mid-Septemher. and t s,) reported to Zbigniew Brzezinski
and 'resident Carter. Because the area is devoid of readiy exploitable resources, the
tern rtarv loss of the )gaden did not represent a loss of strength for Ethiopia or a gain
tor Somalia
56

was stretched as far as it could reach. Ethiopian nationalism was

residually stronger than Siad and many others assumed. Siad's assault
may well have saved Mengistu and the Derg itself, for while reducing
revolutionary pressure on the population at large, Mengistu struck out
boldly against political opponents, purging Marxist intellectuals such
as Haile Fida and mounting the Red Terror against the EPRP.

Soviet Military Intervention to Save Ethiopia

This is not the place to repeat what is already well known about
solidification of the Soviet embrace of the Provisional Military Govern-
ment of Socialist Ethiopia (PMGSE. 24 The Soviets had committed
themselves to a military relationship with Ethiopia, as far as we can
tell, in December 1976, in the wake of' the U.S. presidential election
that year. The commitment required severance of Ethiopia's military
relationship with the United States, for which Mengistu found an
opportunity next spring.
Whatever master plan the Soviets may have had at the time could
hardly have envisioned the unraveling of' the entire Horn situation that
occurred during summer and fall 1977. Trying to retain a position in
Somalia to the last. they accepted Siad's expulsion 25 after they began
their massive airlift and sealift of arms and Cuban troops in
November.
Soviet and Cuban generals took almost complete charge of opera-
tions. By the end of January 1978, the Somalis were everywhere on
the run, Cubans and Ethiopians relieved the siege of Harar and
Diredawa on February 12 and declared the eastern highlands wholly
liberated on March 5. On March 9, Siad Barre announced the with-
drawal of all Somali regular forces from Ethiopian territory 26 but
pledged moral support to the fight that the two liberation fronts-the
WSLF and the SALF-claimed they would continue. All the main
roads and population centers of the Ogaden were quickly reoccupied by
Ethiopian forces with close Cuban support.
A large part of the Ethiopian Somali population fled to Somalia with
the retreating Somali army. Siad's pledge to the guerrilla fronts, how-
ever, represented a firm intention to continue the struggle in the way it
had originally been planned. WSLF guerrilla operations continued for
the next two years, at times reaching a high level of intensity. They
24
See my Russians and the Horn, pp. 34-46; and "Getting a Grip on the Horn,"
pp. 172-173.
-':'But
not severance of diplomatic relations, which continue to this day.
-"Up to then. he had steadfastly maintained that there were no regular Somali forces
fighting in Ethiopia.
 57

were hampered by lack of popular base for the guerrillas to depend

upon, and disguised Somali regulars were again infiltrated, but not in
large numbers. Continued SALF operations proved more illusory and
were confined primarily to hit-and-run episodes. The majority of the
Oromo population remained loyal to Ethiopia.
A more farsighted and creative leader than Mengistu might have
capitalized on the victory over Somali aggression that Soviet and
Cuban aid had made possible so quickly by permanently moderating
policies that had invited the assault in the first place. This did not
happen. The Soviets, eager to lock Ethiopia into socialism and turn it
into a Soviet-style "people's democracy." pressed Mengistu to set up a
Marxist-Leninist vanguard party.
Mengistu had his own reasons for going slow but demonstrated his
Marxist-Leninist zeal by aping Soviet practice in many other respects.
He proceeded with the reconstruction of the economy and society along
Soviet lines. Avoiding direct participation in ground operations in Eri-
trea, Cubans and Soviets provided valuable training and staff guidance
for the greatly expanded Ethiopian ground forces.
During the height of the Somali invasion. E)V forces had crossed
from Sudan and captured a sizable sector of' Gondar province in the
northwest, including Humera, center of a rich agricultural region.
They proved unable to defend their gains against Ethiopian counterat-
tack. EPRP groups took refuge in several inaccessible regions in Gon-
dar, Wollo, and Tigre in the winter of 1977-1978. When Ethiopian
forces regained control of most of Eritrea, other northern resistance
groups also reduced the scope of their operations.
By the end of 1978, regional rebellions and dissident movements had
fallen back to the level of the early postrevolutionary period. Gradu-
ally, however, it became apparent that Derg policies offered little hope
of escape from the rigidities of Soviet-style socialism and pressures for
agricultural arrangements that would facilitate governmental control
over all production with little profit to farmers. Economic stagnation
affected the north much more quickly than it did the south. Under
such conditions, even moderately adverse weather conditions led to
harvest failures, and local famines were developing by 1979. In such
ground, fertile for little else, dissidence and rebellion, never dead, burst
forth anew.
 V. IRAN AND ETHIOPIA-PARALLEL PATHS?

MONARCHIES TOPPLED BY REVOLUTION

Two old empires with roots deep in the past fell unexpectedly within
less than half' a decade of each other. Both had been oriented toward
the West and had had a special relationship with the United States.
Both had been headed by monarchs who had sought to modernize but
had come to be regarded by their younger generations as anachronisms
and the regimes they headed as oppressive.
Expectations of a more liberal political system, widespread among
intellectual opponents of the imperial regimes. were quickly dashed
when successor regimes in both countries proved far less adept than
the leaders they replaced had been at controlling disparate forces com-
peting for power and influence. Both turned quickly to oppression-
which, in turn, provoked rebellion. In terms of governmental theory
and structure, each tried to institutionalize a far more authoritarian
system than the one it replaced. Serious questions have arisen in
respect both to Ethiopia and Iran: Can the old empires be held
together at all? Are the countries themselves perhaps anachronisms?
Ethiopia and Iran have many basic similarities. Both are relatively
isolated in their regions. Both have a sense of being unique and supe-
rior to most of the surrounding peoples, especially Arabs in the case of
Iran and Black Africans in the case of Ethiopia. Both went through
long periods of decline during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
but in the end a consciousness of history and special religious tradi-
tions proved strong enough to enable them to rejuvenate. In both,
however, nationalism is a complex phenomenon and the dominant
nationality is actually a minority in the population as a whole.'
In both Ethiopia and Iran, the seemingly formidable imperial
governmental structure shattered rapidly under challenge. The succes-
sors in Ethiopia were a military junta. Religious leaders were passive.
In Iran. the military proved passive while clerics rapidly took control of
the revolution and excluded all other participants and rivals. The
result was, however, much the same. for in both countries insecure new
leaders rushed to impose on the entire population P highly dogmatic
'People of Turkic derivation may actually outnumber Persians in Iran. but their sub-
group orientation is stronger than their sense of common Turkic identity. Each Turkic
group displays somewhat different patterns of integration into Iranian society and politi-
cal life, with the Azeris having the closest and deepest relationship. There are many
parallels with the Oromo of Ethiopia.

58
political, social, and economic philosph.v. In pressing changes, these
regimes soon found themselves compelled t) resort to o)p)ression far
more direct and onerous for most off the population than wrongs
allegedly suffered under the imperial predecessors.
Coercion and oppression in hoth countries provoked violence in the
capital and rebellion in the periphery. The Fthiopian revolutionary
regime rushed impatiently to settle the chronically intractable Eritrean
rebellion by force and in doing so exacerbated its predicament drasli-
cally. The Iranian revolutionary clerics were equally inept in dealing
with resistance among Kurds, Azeris. Arabs, Baluches, and various
tribal groups.
In both countries, military power was undermined hy the rupture of
traditional support relationships with the United States and purging of
Western-oriented senior officers. In both cases, too, the revolutionary
regimes lost sight of dangers beyond their borders. Traditional ene-
mies, watching closely, could not resist exploiting what they saw as
golden opportunities.

OPPORTUNISTIC INTERVENTION BY NEIGHBORS

To irredentist Siad Barre of Somalia, the temptation to deliver a
death blow to a seemingly disintegrating Ethiopia and secure coveted
territories inhabited mostly by Somalis proved irresistible. Saddam
Hussein of Iraq found it equally impossible to pass up the opportunity
to bring down a detestable Iranian clerical regime, liberate the Arabs of
Khuzistan, and reassert Iraq's rights in the Gulf. Both the Somalis
and Iraqis had been armed well beyond their own defense requirements
by the Soviets.
Both miscalculated. The old empires proved surprisingly resilient.
Under assault from traditional enemies, revolutionary leaders rallied
their people to the defense of the national territory. Although large
numbers of Somalis of the Ogaden shifted allegiance to Mogadishu and
many fled into Somalia on defeat, the Arabs of' Khuizis!an did not
defect en masse to Iraq. Nor did the Iraqi Shiites turn into a fifth
colmn operating against Baghdad. In both Ethiopia and Iran, revolu-
tionary regimes, whatever their shortcomings, skillfully exploited the
residual patriotism of the people. Revolutionarv rhetoric was selec-
tively dampened, the implementation of "'reforms" was slowed, and
some concessions were made to regional grievances.
Ethiopia required foreign help to defeat the Somalis, who were
clearly the aggressors. Alt hough the Somalis at tracted sympat hy from
anti-Soviet Western powers, the fact of' their aggression fespecially in
60

view of their violation of the almost universally accepted African prin-

ciple of recognition of colonial-era borders) made it impos:.ible for any
Western power to provide the military support needed to retain
Ethiopian territory. They overextended themselves and failed to bring
down the Mengistu regime. In effect, although the Mengistu regime
was faltering badly, Ethiopian popular reaction against the Somali
aggression strengthened it. Short of UI.S. intervention-quite out of
the question for any American administration-the Somalis were
doomed to eventual defeat, even without a massive Soviet-Cuban sup-
port operation to bolster the Ethiopians.
The Iraqis even more clearly instigated the aggression against Iran,2
and they, too, aimed at toppling the revolutionary leader, in this case,
Khomeini. The attack, however, gave Khomeini the opportunity to
transform himself from a supranational Muslim fanatic into a national
leader. Iran, however, was unable to gain help from a single major
foreign source. It was more successful than Ethiopia was in 1977-1978,
however, in quickly restoring the morale and fighting capacity of its
armed forces.
Iraq has not yet been defeated as decisively as Somalia was as a
consequence of Soviet-Cuban intervention in support of Mengistu. But
Saddam Hussein clearly cannot win-barring the collapse of both the
revolutionary leadership and the rejuvenated Iranian armed forces,
both unlikely but the latter much more so than the former. In effect,
he must bargain for peace to avoid territorial losses and reparations
and, in the final analysis, simply to preserve his hold on power in Iraq.
Like Siad Barre in Somalia, however, he has the temporary advantage
of having got his country into such an uncomfortable predicament that
rivals fbr power are not eager to take on his problems.

U.S. RELUCTANCE TO BECOME INVOLVED

In both situations, the United States with considerable difficulty has

gradually improved relations with regimes that were virulently anti-
American when they enjoyed strong Soviet support. The Carter
administration was eager in principle to embrace Siad Barre so as to
gain the use of Somali military facilities; in practice, however, it found
the risks too high. Siad organized major guerrilla operations inside
Ethiopia during 1978 and 1979, relying on a modest level of military
assistance from conservative Arab sources, primarily Egypt.

2
Thev did not even pretend. as the Somalis did, that they were merely supporting
grass-roots "liberation fronts."
 Clearly, the provision of U.S. military aid that Siad could have used
offensively would have emboldened him to resume the assault on
Ethiopia--with the iikely result that Ethiopia, strengthened with large
quantities of Soviet arms, would have retaliated. No U.S. administra-
tion could gamble on becoming entangled in such an imbroglio. The
military arrangements that it finally worked out with Somalia in 1980.
therefore, had to he both limited and hedged. The Reagan administra-
tion found no rationale for altering the basic approach of the Carter
administration to Somalia.
The U.S. task of improving relations with Iraq has been even more
complicated. The Iraqis were less eager than the Somalis to have
unconditional U.S. backing, and diplomatic relations had been broken
in 1967. Their disengagement from the Soviet embrace was much less
complete than that of the Somalis.4 Emotional pressures for a strong
U.S. tilt toward Iraq have developed over and over again, but sober
examination of the implications of an all-out anti-Iranian policy has
invariably led to the realization that it would not serve basic American
interests.' As a result, U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations were restored at
the end of 1984, after prolonged and delicate negotiations neither party
could (or did) interpret as decisively taking sides in the Iran-Iraq war.
The Israeli dimension of both the Ethiopian and Iranian situations
is also revealing. Both countries, under their imperial regimes, had
close ties to Israel, as well as to each other. Traditional mutual hostil-
itv toward the Arabs formed a common bond. Though the two rev-
olutionary regimes are officially hostile to Israel, both have accepted
limited Israeli military assistance. The relationship of the Ethiopian
revolutionary regime wth Israel has been the more extensive. It
demonstrates how deep basic geopolitical and historical orientations of
this kind are and how they reassert themselves despite ideological
intensity and revolutionary rhetoric.

U.S-Somali diplomatic relations were strained after Siad Barre took power in 196
but never broken.
'Somalia has never broken diplomatic relation, with Moscow. which retains a
diplomatic presence in Mogadishu.
'Many arguments militate against such a stance, including the fact that it would open
the way for the Soviets to present themselves as protectors of Iran's interests, deprive
the United States of the opportunity to exercise subtle leverage on Iranian developments
in the post-Khomeini era. and freeze U.S.-Iranian relations into the same kind of
deadlock into which the United States fell with communist China after 1949. 1 have dis-
cussed these issues at greater length in a recent Foreign Area Research study, Central
Asia in the 198Os. Strategic Dnamics in the Decade Ahead. FAR, Inc.. Kansasville, Wis.,
July 1984, pp 55 86.
 62

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

What lessons do we draw 'romn comparison of the Ethiopian and
Iranian revolutionary experiences? First and foremost, we should not
underestimate the viability of old established states. Because their cul-
tural roots are deep, their politics complex, and their historical experi-
ence extensive, they can undergo severe stress and temporary disin-
tegration and still rally'. Ethnic and regional particularism in such
states is not necessarily a source of weakness in times of troubles.
Peoples who have lived together in mltiethnic, regionally complex po-
litical systems develop habits of compromise and adjustment that may
be obscured by revolutionary commotion.
When overwhelming pressures force revolutionaries to moderate
their zeal, or when revolutionary momentum wanes, earlier patterns
reassert themselves and diversity becomes a source of strength. The
process does not necessarily proceed smoothly, and it is too early in
both Ethiopia and Iran to forecast how it will unfold over the next few
years. Certainly, the reconstruction of these societies and the reestab-
lishment of these two old states as responsible constructive members of
the international political system will require a reduction in revolu-
tionary arrogance and ideological zealotry. These changes will, in turn,
improve chances for compromises in relations with both internal and
external rivals and enemies.
For powers that want to encourage constructive political evolution in
Ethiopia and Iran another conclusion is clear: The encouragement of
regional dissidence and ethnic separatism as an end in itself will not
achieve the objective. The more such movements can exploit short-
term outside support, the less inclined they are likely to be to exert
realistic pressures inside their own political system for change. Their
activities can. in fact, impede change and temporarily strengthen the
position of the regimes they oppose.
To say this is not to dismiss the often legitimate desires of' ethnic
minorities and the inhabitants of cohesive regions for some degree of
autonomy from central governments inclined to ignore ethnic and
regional interests. The desires of' such groups for a greater say in the
management of the resources of their regions and for cultural self'-
assertion deserve respect. Less dogmatic and less authoritarian central
governments are likely to recognize these aspirations-or at least to
recognize the practical advantages of working out compromises that, in
the end, benefit everyone. A democratic, pluralist system provides the
basis for adjustment of such )roblems without undermining the
existence of the state itself.

J I
 6:3

A highly efficient totalitarian state, one may argue. can equally

effectively suppress ethnic and regional dissent: Consider the example
of the USSR. Such a high degree of repressive capability clearly
exceeds the capacity of the 1)erg in Ethiopia at any point in the fore-
eeable future; the same would seem to apply (though in a quite dif-
ferent fashion) to Khomeini in Iran.
The distinction between advocating political separatism and giving
greater attention to regional and ethnic diversity is reasonably clear-
cut from a policy viewpoint and hould confront the United States with
no great difficulty. It is. in effect, the basic policy that derives
naturally from American advocacy of democratic principles of govern-
ment, private enterprise and the free market economy, and pluralism
as a basis for social organization.
 VI. REBELLION AND DISSIDENCE ELEVEN
YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

As of 1985, despite the ferment that famine has generated in

Ethiopia and the embarrassment that worldwide publicity about condi-
tions in the country has caused the regime, the dissident and separatist
movements and Mengistu's pro-Soviet regime appear to be at a stand-
off. The regime has little chance of a decisive victory over any of the
dissident movements; at the same time, the likelihood that any of these
movements could gain a decisive victory over the regime is also
minimal. Massive Western famine relief has probably, for the short
term at least, strengthened the regime. The details vary substantially
from one group and area to another.

SOMALI-ORIENTED MOVEMENTS
The Somali-oriented movements are weak and have little active fol-
lowing in Ethiopia. Somali dissidents-i.e., opponents of Siad Barre
who are supported in various degrees by Ethiopia-may have become a
greater potential threat to Mogadishu than the remnants of the
Western Somali Liberation Front and the Somali Abo Liberation Front
are to Addis Ababa. Even if friendly sources were to greatly increase
their support, including significant arms, to Somalia, that country
probably could not mount another 1977-type offensive against
Ethiopia, nor could it probably even find the manpower to sustain the
kind of guerrilla warfare that it continued through 1978-1979.
Any new Somali-backed action against Ethiopia would cause most
Ethiopians to rally around whatever regime might be in power in Addis
Ababa to oppose Somali territorial ambitions. Additionally, any
Ethiopian regime would continue to have the advantage of almost
unanimous international backing for the principle of territorial
integrity. Somalia obtained no serious support for altering its borders
by force in 1977-1978; it has no prospects now. The Organization of
African Unity (OAU) will remain opposed to all boundary changes
except by mutual agreement.
The Cubans who remain in Ethiopia reinforce the PMGSE's mili-
tary dispositions in the Diredawa-Harar-Jijiga area, but they are too

64
few in number' to constitute a major addition to Ethiopia.1 military
manpower guarding this strategic sector. There is little evidence of
pro-Siad sympathy or direct Mogadishu influence in this region. The
Somalis of the region are predominantly Issas on both sides of the
border, as well as in Djibouti. They have traditionally seen their
interests as quite distinct from those of southern Somalis.
By recognizing its inability to interfere with the massive smuggling
across all the borders in this area (which makes northern Hararge,
northern Somalia, and the Republic of Djibouti an informal "free (rade
area"), the PMGSE buys the toleration of the local population.2 Nor
has it pressed collective agriculture here. The growing of the narcotic
leaf, chat (also called qat), and its legal export by air to Djiboti add to
the relative prosperity of the rural population. All the indigenous peo-
ples of the region are Muslim. Sufi orders are strong among them.
The regime
3
has permitted local Sui sheikhs to retain status and influ-
ence.

OTHER SOUTHERN INSURGENCIES

Other southern insurgencies do not seriously threaten the regime.
The Sidamo Liberation Front seems to be largely illusory. The claims
of the Oromo Liberation Front of widespread organization and effec-
tiveness inside Ethiopia cannot be substantiated by firm evidence.
Oromia as a territorial entity has no meaning inside Ethiopia. It is an
exile construct. This is not to say that there is no evidence of' dissatis-
faction with the regime among Oromo. but to underscore the fact that
such dissatisfaction is both territorially and politically diffuse and
unlikely to coalesce into a coherent ethnic resistance movement.
Inside Ethiopia (in contrast to claitns of exiles) Mengistu's regime is
still perceived as friendly to the Oromo. The [)erg and the Workers'
Party of Ethiopia (WPE) 4 have more members of Oromno than north-
ern Amhara origin. The oversimplified allegation, repeated with

'According to current best estimates, they number no more than 5000. most of whom
are not combat-ready but are assigned to training and logi. tics tasks.
'Somalis are a minority throughout this region, where the dominant settled group is
Kottu Oromo. The city of Harar has its own distinctive Semitic language and popula-
tion, generally called Adari, whose traditions extend back to the Middle Ages. Though
surrounded by Somali forces during winter 1977 197. Harar held firm and its popula-
tion did not accept Siad Barre's claim that they constituted part of the Somali irredenta.
During the preceding period, the EPRP had been influentiol among younger Hararis.
many of whom fled abroad during the Red Terror.
'These observations are based on a visit to) Diredawa and Harar in l)ecember 1984.
4
Officially proclaimed on September 12, 1984.
 increasing trequencv bY some Ft hiopian exile organizations, that the
PM%( ;',F is Amihara-di minat ed, Just as Hilae Selassie's regimle allegedly%
w~as, cannot he sustained 1. nlv i f p~ersonntel in key positions; and
is seldom) heard inside Ethiopia.
Soiuthern and siothwesterin Ft hiopia. the last area to he brought
under or restored to, dlepending onl which historical interpretat ion is
emphasized) Ethiopian coot rol atl the entd of the nineteenth century.v
has been less (listurlie1) %iactive resistance since the rev out ion of 1974
than any other section ittf the (-()tnnt rv\.Nevertheless. Mengistui cannot
reklynequliVOCall', on thte support ofI thIe people of t he area.
tGrie\ ances arc mouintittg in fte sout h and outlhwest Though the
reg-ion has, not bteen seriioslv, affected 11 tamnne and tho ugh agricul-
tural prodUct iuVit inlmntty part., of' it remains reli ~ely high. there is
grow\ing, dlissat isfact ion w ithI regime laind and pirocuretment policies.
Resistance it' thein take, the torm i' ptissive re-istaince to -socialism,"
i.e., awiidattce (it guivernment economic contruol,,. resort ti) seinilegal hor
illegal channels fir selling agricolt oral prodoce, especiall (coftee. the
count rv, noon fo(reign cx-haittge came r.
Thel( reg,_ime mnaintains fcwNer t roips in the( sooth and southwest than
in all\ ither part of the coututrv. There is tto security threat from
across the Keita attd Sudan borders. Ag,riiwing concentration in the
(iantbela region of refugees friim siiut hertn Sudan does not constitute a
securit vplroblletm: the reginte is offering thenm support and facilitating
the tliw\ iif aid to siouthertn Sudanese insurgents, to counteract the sup-
port that Sudan pteritits to flow to the Fritreans. TFigreans. and other
dissidents o peratittg in nort hemn Ft hiipia. The interests of the south-
ern Sudanf~v refugees coitncide with thiise of' Ethiopia. The Sudanese
gi ierotnen lacks thle ttilit arY strength to intervene decisively in this
regiion.

THE WOLLEGA OROM()

The Wi Ilega ( r ino. especially t hise helonging to the iinuential
Nlekane Yesus church. ciittiitie to reptresenit a source of' serious dis-

These judgmet "ere made liet ire the iveri thri io f the Nime irY governmnent in
Khartini, tint they%remain valid fo r i he subseqiuent pe rod. Neither Ethiopia air Siida n
has the capabihitv oif inflicting decisive militar y (taniage uin the iiitier -nor, in the final
atialsis. the incentive. There is no, contested territory'% atiing the ettire I 400i-tile
Ft hi pan Sudanese inter. Poit icat tensioin bet weeti Fthi tiia and the Sudan ha,
a l" av'
% been A tuinctw ito each cin t rys internatiiinal ties and. t ragicalltv.\ t hough these
have changed in both cases, the tensions have remained 1'ecause of' region-t insurgetncies
neither the central giivernntent in Khartoumn niir that in Addis Abiaba has heen able tii
seitllu the sithern Sudan and Fritrea. In terms ofi the pure utatmnal uitri~, (if bit h
ci int ries, Ft hii anil Sudan shiiiid be able tii ciinitiie t heir ditieretices ii, ttiiiial
ailsantage It i a the interest if' the tnited States but t the t SSR that ths(ci
 67

sidence. The resettlement of large numbers of Tigrean timine victims

in this region could generate further potential for rebelliousness: the
resettled Tigreans and the local Oromo might find mutual advantage in
uniting to undermine Derg efforts aimed at exploiting the resettlement
process to establish agricultural collectives.
The shortage of information on the workings of the resettlement
program does not permit a judgment as to the likelihood of the local
Oromo and resettled Tigreans coming together to oppose Derg policies.
Antagonism between the two groups would seem at least as likely as
cooperation. There are reports of the escape of sizable numbers of
resettled Tigreans across the border into Sudan, where they join their
countrymen in refugee camps further north. Some may have returned
to their original regions via this route.

REBELLION IN ERITREA
Eritrea still constitutes the most serious political and insurgency
problem for any Ethiopian regime. The brutal ten-year revolutionary
junta effort to subjugate Eritrea by arms has no chance of succeeding
on its own terms. Eritrea is not, however (and probably never has
been) a zero-sum game. The stalemating of PMGSE offensives does
not translate automatically into insurgent gains. The Eritrean insur-
gency has less chance of succeeding in establishing the province as an
independent entity than ever.

Eritrean Dependence on Outside Support

Eritrean independence has always been conditional on two prerequi-
sites: 1) sustained control of the province, including the capital,
Asmara, by a united insurgent movement and (2) broad international
support and recognition. The first precondition was closer to achieve-
ment in earl' 1978 than it has been before or since, but Eritrean fac-
tions intensified fighting among themselves to the point where they
could take no coordinated action to capitalize on the favorable cir-
cumstances they had created.
Though the Marxist EPLF has improved its position vis-a-vis its
rivals since 1978, it still does not command enough positive support to
he able to disregard rival insurgent movements or other ideological and
religious currents among the population. Its Marxism is increasingly a
handicap in efforts to secure international recognition and support.
This ideology seriously limits the support that the EPLF can obtain
from Arabs. among whom Marxist sympathies are everywhere on the

J
68

wane except perhaps in the PD)Y. The l'l)RY is one of Mengistu 's
closest allies. It has almost n(o resoiurces of its own o suppoit activi-
ties abroad. It can only channel assistance supplied by the USSt- or
other radical Arah states.
Iraq and Syria may still be furnishing the EP!,F with modest sup-
port. This may even be sanctioned *v the Soviets as a form of casualty
insurance. Large-scale Soviet-approved help for Eritrean or Tigrean
insurgency would be likely again only if an anti-Soviet regime were to
gain power in Addis Ahaha.
An independent Eritrea could never secure broad recognition in
Africa. International recognition could c' 'me from only a few Aral)
states. At present, however. no major Red Sea Arah state looks with
anything but apprehension ol the possibilitY of an independent Marx-
ist Eritrea.
Tile more Arah states concentrate on1 internal threats to their own
stahility and on their domestic economic prohlems. the less enthusiasm
they have for an independent Eritrea of any political colhrition-
Marxist or conservative-flor they all fear the destabilizing effect of
such a state on the region. This is equally true of Saudi Arahia,
Sudan, and Egypt, as well as of more distant states, such as Jordan
and the Gulf sheikhdoms. Modest support for the Eritreans is still a
convenient way for some of these states to demonstrate opposition to
Mengistu's regime and gain anticormnunist credentials, but the pros-
pects for increas ed slport during the next two or three years are
small.
The ElPLF and the other Fritrean groups will do well, in fact. to
maintain their present level of outside support. Increasingl\ , the abil-
itv of the Eritrean insurgents to fight and to maintain control over the
territory they administer depends on obtaining arms and supplies from
Menistu's armed forces.
Ethiopian troops in Eritrea have generallv not fought well. Deser-
tions have been coninin, and iirale has been liow. They have lost
substantial amounts of major equipment to the insurgents during mili-
tarv operations. MNoreiver, when there is little fighting, soldier, and
officers are tempted to engage in various kinds of illicit economic
activity, including the sale of weapons and ammunition. This has
given the insurgents a convenient internal source of resuppl.
During early 1985, the EIPLF managed to capture and hold
Tesseney. a ke.% western Eritrean center on the main route into Sudan.
In early July. it succeeded in gaining Barentu, directly to the east and
much deeper inside the countrv. It proved unable to hold Barenti
against Ethiopian counterattack. Periodic gains and losses of this sort
are likely to,continue indefinitely. This part of Eritrea is populated
largely 1)v Kuttatia. a t ribtal group I thit hi rem'ineditt si riiil Ipro-
Addis Ahaha. The Kuniatti tciltitt'd ile( lerg ittlenisive ili Fvil rea inl
19781 .
Protspects tor mount ing antiher Frit rca-wide offensive aimied at
dealing at decisive ilow\ tol the reibels are' les;s lay rable than at ail'v time
during the past six vears. Menglistlicoulid not ie conhfdtl that his
t'ort-es wittld Mtiintain illt'netL1ant lng t'iotig to itifliCt serious dam-
age oni the insurgents. More seriokik. het could not levI sure that
hard-pressed units would remain lo)yal to) itl\l( ;E

Possibilities for Settlement

A sy\ndrome similar to t hat whicit set inl dulring, Haile Selassie's final
Year is mtore cortceitalt' now t hantiat ant t itte since the revoi~tiiin:
the devielopment ot sentintent lit the armned foirces favoring at negotiated
settlenient inl Frit rea. Fior thitis tol pn teed,. however. reqi tes at readi-
ness on the Erit reani side tol consider concessions.
We hate little reason to believe tm ha t sizable segment of' the
Ethiopian military forces tight ing in IEtrra utcttnll\'N sNiprit/iizecs with
Erit rean St'jp(tranitit objectives. Fevtrvt hing %k know about prevailing
Ethiiipiant otticer attitudes leads to the tont-lusioti thtit t hiey are
stronzu iiitaiiiiiiliit itttiih tmirti tat ijinil ist hatt Malrxist. N either
Marxism nor separat isim. therefore, catt ,erve as cuittmoti groutnd
hetweetn the Etrit rean tttstirgr'nts and Ethliopiatn officersi who tiny le t ir-
ing if tile unwinnaitle w\ar inl Eritrea. (httl a ret Urr to sottle kind if
lt'deral arraniigeiteti appears it 'dflr such iiope.
- nt il very' recently, iiiwever. moist it.rit rean insurgetnt spokesmen
abroad indiaed ai hardeting of' sejtariit st attides. lis tt'ndt'nc\
wvas etncouraged h\v cotlservat iNC Arali suililrters wiho helieve. inl doing,
so. that they are lu'ing-ing greaiteci pressure (il M\etigist tis regi me. Tlhe
Eritreatns appt'ared tie'.eriitless to lie caughit ill what. tol dale, Ilais ibeen
a niever-etiditlg cycle ofI illusiotn. fu)r tilt Artil tivwi1s-' iiis art' all siort -
tertm atnd tact k-al. Behind tht'mi lit's neit her a solid (lusirt' 1iir iti
indlependent Frjit -a nor Ohw cajtiitiiitv% 1( getleitate ite rvrc-eid
diplitmatic sup)rt twtce -ary to tiaitttiti it.A
A nlajiritv it ti-c Ert :eati pipulnt ii isi \\it hiti ilwsi dlisottteuted
trotit Nicilgistus regitti. 'Ihel rt'gitttt'i~ haieeti titalile t,, tti(rie, tmoist

E ritreaii Ieaifi-r, (cIln

L~ ino- m d de 'itiildit I i II rin In itrr Irn i In t OirIir,,
1 6, It Ina\ ag-oai heli1 tpriiai 1 1,(11( 1.,' V - 111-it'd Saui ti11dinc-
Afterw\ard FATl i-itters %erea l,~i 1ts -,igage-d Ili t h1(iltil(i-to' -i\(ir t%ht rile
Gtouo St-did Stiti). ') nm]0 -Marxmi Msiim Xi Iir im ''1 ill \ stir'-, km ild hut, init t
lsied , rgtiann dliian. h imtiiiall, I- Ill ill iiiititnd-i Vt red
70

of its reforms and socialist innovations in Eritrea, though some of the

EPLF's Marxist prescriptions parallel those of the PMGSE.
What is claimed by the EPLFi as total control of the Eritrean coun-
tryside appears often to constitute the absence of effective coercive
PMGSE authority. Services that the government provides, the popula-
tion wants, and the insurgents benefit from are not only tolerated but
welcomed and used: highway maintenance; postal, telephone, and tele-
graph services; and trade.
A sharp line between areas of insurgent influence and those where
the government exercises some authority is difficult to draw. The two
interpenetrate and vary between day and night. If the government
attempts to exercise authority only partially, it is not challenged. It
has demonstrated an ability to maintain its hold on key urban centers,
including Asmara. Massawa, and several subprovincial capitals.
Ethnic and religious rivalries and tensions persist in Eritrea. Com-
pared with the deterioration that has occurred in Lebanon in recent
years, however, with separate communities living in isolation and under
siege, Eritrean day-to-day life appears much more fluid and Eritrean
society much less polarized. In addition, Eritreans still live and work
in all other parts of' Ethiopia, especially in Addis Ababa. A good deal
of private travel takes place in and out of the province.

Decreasing EPLF Intransigence?

A possible break in the intransigence of the EPLF appeared last
spring. The May 1985 issue of Adulis, organ of the Central Bureau of
Foreign Relations of the EPLF in France, featured on its cover the
statement "For the EPLF the struggles for Eritrean independence and
democracy in Ethiopia are inseparable." A six-page article dealing with
relations with "democratic movements in Ethiopia" included the fol-
lowing statements:
The demand for the secession of Ethiopian nationalities has neither
an historical nor an economic basis; nor is the extent of the prevail-
ing national antagonism so acutely sharp as to justify it.... In the
specific case of the question of nationalities in Ethiopia, historical,
economic and other factors show that unity based on equality is the
only correct solution .... Respect 'y each nationality for the right of
the others, inasmuch as it demands respect for its own rights, would
help forge the unity of the oppressed and hasten the day of libera-
tion.

Such positions could be interpreted as inplying readiness on the

part of the EPLF to adjust its own intransigent position in respect to
independence and to compromise on a formula that would amount to a
 71

return to federation. The concluding paragraph of this declaration

reinforces this impression:
The Eritrean Popular Liberation Front has come forward to give its
forthright views on the basic questions and tasks of the Ethiopian
revolution because it is convinced that the destiny of the Eritrean
and Ethiopian peoples is closely linked. The Front believes that for
the advance of the Eritrean revolution, cooperation with the struggle
of the Ethiopian peoples comes second only to the capability of the
Eritrean people and that, for the Ethiopian revolution, the most
important external factor is the Eritrean people's struggle. It works
carefully, patiently, and seriously to broaden and deepen its relations
with democratic Ethiopian organizations and reinforce the solidarity
of the two peoples. The EPLF puts the importance of the formation
of a solid alliance between the two revolutions above any of its
diplomatic activities. At the same time, it expects from Ethiopia's
democratic movements a similar stand and an equal sense of respon-
sibility.

Or is the EPLF merely rejecting separatism for all groups in

Ethiopia but itself? Its statements can be read both ways. Allowing
for the fact that the apparent unity of the EPLF actually camouflages
many diverse strains-reflecting the various nationalities, religions, and
geographical realities of Eritrea-it is perhaps impossible for the specif-
ics of the EPLF position to be worked out except in the context of seri-
ous negotiations with other Ethiopian groups.
At the same time the above statement was being publicized, the
EPLF announced an amnesty forgiving all Eritreans "who have gone
over to the enemy side for the wrongs they have committed.... This
is an additional sign of flexibility.
A sizable group of anti-Derg, pro-Western Ethiopian exiles who do
not support any of the separatist movements is hopeful that the EPLF
declaration represents a serious break in what has for so long been a
frozen situation. Only the passage of time can provide a test. The
response to the amnesty is unknown.
Eritreans living in Eritrea, still the majority of the region's popula-
tion, and perhaps even those living in Sudan would probably not
present an obstacle to a settlement by political negotiation that would
leave Eritrea part of an Ethiopian state. Eritreans %ho have not fled
must compromise every day to live and sustain themselves. They
would welcome a reduction in the intensity of conflict. They would
respond positively to opportunities to help themselves economically.
Famine relief operations in Eritrea of foreign aid groups who are not
strongly partisan but determined to reach the maximum number of
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS, USSR Report. Political and Sociolog-
ical Affairs, ,JPRS-SSA-85-038, May 10, 1985.
'72

people in need of food and medical assistance can hell) to create an

atmosphere where political compromise, at least in a temporary basis.
becomes an end in itself.

REBELLION IN TIGRE
For the following reasons, the rebellion in Tigre represents a more
immediate problem for Mengistu's regime than that in Eritrea.
although the two are closely related:
1. The Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF) appears mnore
united and less intransigent than the Eritrean movement and
can more credibly claim to speak for a majority of the popula-
tion of Tigre, which is ethnically homogeneous and predom-
inantly Christian with only a small Muslim minority.
2. All important communications lines into Eritrea pass through
Tigre. If roads through Tigre are interdicted, the Ethiopian
military must resort to air supplies to support its positions in
Eritrea.
:3. Tigre has been most severely affected by famine and the l)opu-
lation movements resulting from it. and it has been the focal
point of international relief efforts.

The TPLF disavows separatism except as last resort. It calls for a

united front among opponents of the PMGSE both inside and outside
the country and advocates a democratic form of state organization with
s
regional and/or ethnic autonomy
In reality, the on-the-ground situation in Tigre appears to have a
great many similarities with that in Eritrea. Government and insur-
gents interpenetrate. The PMGSE has been able to maintain control
of main highways and of the provincial capital. Makelle, as well as
most other major towns. Governmental authority is weak to nonex-
istent in most of the countryside.
The most important and puzzling question about the TPI,F's rela-
tionship to the Tigrean population is the tnot difficult to answer:
How does the movement's relatively doctrinaire Marxism square with
the fact that Tigreans have been known to he among Ethiopia's most
tradition-loyal peoples, strong in their adherence to religion, whether

'Its somewhat equivocal official position in respect to Eritrea is necessitated in part

bh the fact that the TPIF essentialy grey, out ,I the EPtF and st:ll depends on it for
material help. Some TPLF pronounicements spea k (ilt Ethiopia. others reter to Eri-
trea as if it were a separate countrv.
Chris.t ian it 'v or Islam'." Iigrean,. are known t hroughout Et hiopia as
sharp) businessmen and( traders.
The 'young men who lead thle TI' , claim to have effected a social
re~ olut ion in Tigre and reoriented thle p)OpuLlatain to new lprincilpies of
cooperation and egalitarianism. Ift This is act ually thlt case. t he". would
seem to have changed some of' the most basic principles of' Tigrean life.
Yet. we have little reason to regardI their claims as much more than
rhetoric. If' family and group relationships have not changed basicalv.
the TI'LF may have put a Marxist veneer over preexisting habits,
The TIM F evokes thle Wevane rebellion of' 194:1 as a symbol for
Tigrean solidarit 'v, but seems to misrepresent it as a so cial revolution,
W\hat the memory of' We 'vane means to Tigreans -except oppositiolt to
Shoa -is difficult to determine. Is the TiLF's Marxism simpiv a
means of' challenging the PMGSE's claimns to be a Marxist govern-
ment" Is it a device for facilitat ing political alliances with other
g r( oup who also ,hfini to hie Marxist. suc h as the EI'I F. the EPH P.
and perhaps thle Ft hiopian Peoples' IDenmocrat ic Movement (ElM) ?
D~o TI0 IY leaders hope some day to regain ,-oviet support?
Tigreans have for centuoies migarated to other p~arts of Ethiopia.
During recent dlecades. they have penet rated to many out lying regions
of' the couint rv as >tinall businessmen, officials, and even as farmers. lIn
contrast to current Derg-directed migration. Tigrean migration has
been voluiitarv and individual - or ftamilv -based. The Tigrean natuoral
entrepreneurial sp~irit could serve as, an excellent example for a revolu-
tionarv regimle that could moderate its dogmiatic and unsuccessful
Marxist reg-iment at ion oft thle eco nomy but not if' thle Tigreans are
locked into another versio oo (it arxistn themselves.
It seems, unlikely\ that its Marxismn is thle prime reason for the
TPLF's relat ite SUCCe.S in gaining thle support of' a sizable proportion
of the Tigrean populace. Past i'igrean hist ory would lead to the coil-
clusion that the nilment um derives instead from Tigreans' strong sense
of' history and t heir percept ion of' themselves as coequals with thle
Amhara (and on thle scene well before thbent in leading the Ft hiopianl
emipire.
If' historical att ituodes p)ers-ist as st ro nglv\ as so me analvst s argue, key
features of the THYF can he explained onl this basis. Unlike the Eni-
treans, who have tnot tried to exteiid their movemient ottside their pro-
vince,1 '" tilie TPLF moved iiito the Ambhara-muajorntv proovi nces to tile

'D an F. Bauer, -Lootal-L evel Politic-s and Social C hange in igre: A Transactijonal
Analysis of Adaptive Change." in W. Arens (ed.). A I crittor (0/ Chng
!ini~ EaL(stern Africa,
Mouton. The Hague, t976.
* The people of the Eritrean highlan !. are er hiicallk and linguisticall\ inofit ingish-
able frorn those of Tigre. itritreans, howveer. soeeni to hav inoah less incliniat ion than
Tigreans to think in broad political terms, 6hr their area isa tvpocuil inrolleri region "ith
74

south in the same way Tigreans from the Middle Ages to modern times
have sought to expand their influence over neighboring regions.
The rejection of separatism with emphasis on the need to reconsti-
tute Ethiopia and establish a just government recognizing regional
rights and ethnic distinctions is a natural outgrowth of the Tigrean
view of Ethiopian history. In other words, the Tigreans, at least as
much as the Amhara, are an imperial people who, despite their loyalty
to tradition, think of themselves as having a right-and perhaps even a
duty-to play a role in the larger political entity of which they are a
part.
Tigreans also exhibit Ethiopian particularism. They do not readily
ally themselves with external forces. Unlike some Eritreans, they do
not try to claim they are Arabs and they do not directly seek the sup-
port of Arab governments. Would the Marxism outlast "victory" by
the TPLF, whatever that might add up to? The question cannot yet
be answered.

OTHER NORTHERN MOVEMENTS

No single movement predominates in the northern Amhara areas.
Several appear to both compete and cooperate in a countryside that is
only sporadically subject to the control of the central government. The
EDU has never recovered from its defeat in 1978 and has made no
effort to recapture urban centers. Nevertheless, its leaders maintain a
headquarters in Khartoum and have extensive contacts over the border
with sympathizers in Gondar province. The EPRP, which has a dif-
fuse leadership in Europe, claims pockets of supporters in Gondar,
Wollo, and Tigre, who are still periodically denounced by the regime.
A relatively new group, the Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Move-
ment, appears to be an extension of the TPLF into Amhara areas to
the south. Whether it actually has independent leadership is unclear.
Credit for military actions, such as those directed against Lalibela
(which is situated in a core Amhara area), has been claimed by the
TPLF as well as the EPDM.
The All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement. Mcisone, is a remnant of a
Marxist party that originally enjoyed Derg support. It claims followers
but not militarily active insurgents inside the country.

an ethnically and religiously fragmented populatioi. Local leaders are driven to protect
narrow interests. See Richard Caulk, "Bad Men of the Borders: Shum and Shifta in
Northern Ethiopia in the 19th Century," InternatunalJournal of African Historical Stud-
ies, Vol. 17, No. 2. 1984. pp. 201-227.
 The Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Alliance (EPDA). an )utgrowth
of the EDU. claims sympathizers throughout northern Ethiopia as well
as in the center and among the Oromo of' Wollega. It does not, how-
ever, claim to be directing guerrilla operations on the ground. It
engages in extensive propaganda operations from London: these paral-
lel similar activities conducted by EPRP. TPLF and various Eritrean
groups from several European and Middle Eastern centers, as well as
in the United States. All of these groups claim to, and some undoubl -
edly do, infiltrate propaganda material into Ethiopia.
Western famine relief operations in northern Ethiopia have
encouraged all of these groups to greater activity. The EPI)A has
taken the lead in appeals for cooperation among all anti-Derg fbrces.
Charismatic leadership and a simple, straightforward political program
are still lacking. Proclamations by these groups tend to be filled with
negative rhetoric but lack positive concepts around which resistance
can coalesce for sustained action against the Derg.
Experience in similar situations elsewhere offers little reason to
expect that Ethiopian resistance can be rallied to greater cohesion by
exile politicians who art always prone to fall victim to their own rival-
ries and disagreements. Leaders and action programs around which
dissidents and rebels can rally are more likely to arise from the inside,
perhaps from among officials and military offices who have been sup-
porting the government but increasingly sympathize with its
opponents. Such internal resistance leaders are more likely to be
encouraged by concrete expectations of support for new policies by
foreign governments sympathetic to Ethiopia than by the urgings of
exile politicians who despite good intentions are operating for the most
part in a political vacuum.
The Afar Liberation Front continues to engage in propaganda and
low-intensity operations in southern Eritrea and eastern parts of
Wollo, Shoa, and northern Hararge. It enjoys Saudi support and has
the sympathy of' many Djibouti Afars. Its relationship to the EPLF is
an uneasy one, since Marxism has no appeal to Afars. Afars have not
attempted to challenge the Derg's control of the important transport
route from Assab to the highlands. Given this capability, they would
be important tactical allies of any group challenging the Derg for con-
trol of the central government.

It issued a new political program directed primarily against the Soiet role in
Ethiopia early in 1985. Text in FBIS. U'SSR Report. ollitual and ,"Affair,,
JPRS-SSA-85-040. May I:1, 1985.
 VII1. FI 11,IAAI 0NNS 0OF R EB EL1,1IO0N
A ND S EPA ItAISM

U.S. POLIC'Y TOWARD) ETHIOPIAN SEP~ARATISTS

Criticisms of P~ast U.S. Poliev

W\riters on internat ional st rateg frequent lv Alserve that thle 1. S.
governme'nt, b.\ failing to take effective act ion in 1977 1978. needlessly
"lost Ethmopia.- From) This judgmient emerges thle complaint that bY
neglecting, toI suppoirt resistance imo;~enent s in Ethiopia now we are
missing an opportunity to recoup our lo)sses.1
Inherent in thle v.ery tact- of these crit icisms are the implications that
(1) some tOrlus of political act ion against autocratic and Unsuccessful
regimes are Justified and(l21 develolpnwnt aidi should he conditioned on
certain standards of political and economic pe rfo rmllance. This is
encouraging. 'Such posit ions were un fashionable a decade ago. Prevail -
ing dogma then reject ed antI conideminiedl pl~it ial and economic inter-
ventionism. above all 1) the \Ves t .A sizabule bo)dy of academic opinion
still does. SuchI attitudes p~redonminatedl at the( time of' the Ft hiopian
revuolut ion in19.
It' there wvas external i ntervent io n in Et hioIpian polititcs du ring and
imimedliatelv after the rev )lut~ion. it was not hw Americans; or their
European allies. No economic p~ressuires we(re broughlt to bear oin the
military junta in thle face of drast it Shifts; inl economic policy and
vicious' anti -W\estern rhetoric. American development aid cmntinued
until the end of' thle 197M. and Eu ripeaii and internaltional aid has
never ceased.
Western famine relief' has grown to enormous proport ions sinie ta~ll
1984 and appears likely' to continue indeti nit ely,. RBut, as thle LIAOdIn
Econoimist has asked, rdooe simiply "thr wit-I fom t at the Ethiopian
problem hell) much to solve it'? Should we not be doing something
mo~re fundamental to hell) the people on r food( aid is keeping alive?
To date, evidence of' political intervent ion hY the West -even mlild
potlitical pressure oi Mengistu's reglime is meager. Arab money sup-
plied intermittently' tt some insurgent and separatist movements
hardly' amounts to a W\estern prog-ram tO Undermine -Fthiopian social -
ism." It is undermining- it self.

0ttasivnallv%the (riTICSMl is tiroattenef t,,inclitfe .Amerad Etiropan allies. TheN

are adtfitiinalv MIndenned 1(,r mnoiesl\ tilsiering the fr-St II militarY reginih\b
proifitig geniermls emic fev-eltijment assistac %kithni strings waahef

Jb
 Are the act ivisis crit icisis () it ( '.S. mathin volalid.' Should we
hie suppoirting all iir most ait tile rehel and searat ist inoveni-tits resist -
ing thle IDerg? If'Afg-han rehels tlserve hielp even if we do flat expect
themi ta win against thle Sav\iets should we not alsa hielj thle rebiels inl

The first qlUestian Canl he anlSwered in thle affirniative uil'v if' we take
the prahiemi back to thle heginining at thle Ft hiapian reva.lut ian Amieri-
canls (and Europeans too, P~erhaps) mnight havec triedl to influence its
course in thle early stagfes An evidence af easteen rientat ian and
internal appression mi iunte1. pressure, tiight have iteen increased, ipl
ta anld inll~uding reducing ar terminal ing militarv and ecanaiic aid.
Thle impljact (AtsuJch act ions can nat% anily he titiged hvpat het ically. hut
they might hame kept Ft hiapia f'ramn hecainling a saviet client state.
This issue is no\%time pritnarily- fi(r histarians. nat palicvmakurs. ta
del at e.

Limited U.S. Options

The choices thle 1'.. gi 'ven ient faced inl I IT 19~78 were tiredet er-
inted b\ the situat ion that had evalved LApta that time. Nat hing that
had already heeni done r inoit dane couadd he reversed1. The (Cart er
Idinlist rat an s plchaice. inll~uded nicking the( Samnali invasian.
significant ly suppoirt ing the Erit rean ins'urgenicy% and suppoarting thle
at her insurgencies tin Ft hiapia.
These pal)it v chaices wevre all. in effect. interlinked. far all three
tagether ar any (ale alane imiplied ahandodanent ,' StiIppart for the
integrityv af the Ft hiapian state a reversal at tpreviau t.S. pa(licy ()In
this fLundatnlen"tal i~stje extending hack ta thle time at thle Italian inv"a-
sian in 19:I5
I'Gi. Nine if thlese poalicies cauld have been efflect ivel
imileiented eavertl \ . They%,wild lime ca)mmit ted the 1.'nlited States
toi meeting apeti-ended requiremntsi fir mnilitary suppart, incltiing
large-scale piravisian iii air and( naval hacking- hAr miilitary%aperat ian anl
the ,,raund assisted by allied or t. 5. ti ices.I
The poulit ical camlplicatianls surrammnding- suchi suippoirt ltahicies haggle
thle mnind. The I nited states %%aild hia\u ecenditertaking caminwt-
nient.s in behalf of self'-praclaimed NMar~ist (ir lwicalikt gaenn sair
iniveynents that thle Siiviets had Sappir(teil iM111 I aShaim time earlier.
( 'rit-.
t oi t I S. "I M it 'Itl"dij r tig i e Ii[frii, i . ,'it197AT t iT , nt-i-(i t~, wIi-C\ \%h it
al Iied t irc, Aillt dti im ,e liin lreugh t i it' FhI, j)Iii iId it '\ uni
n It t *, N g riatiil I'trc,'

an ," Turks" Ki-rean,.i Een ,imr-'rv exainnatit'ii t, 'th iuu''- that ,wildtc hi'
 78

Siad's Somalia was (and remains) a highly authoritarian one-party

regime. The Eritreans were then (and still are) rent by internal politi-
cal rivalries, with the least democratic elements in the ascendancv.
Had any 1'.S. administration been impetuous enough to dive into
the Ethiopian maelstrom in 1977 1978, who can serionusly envision
congressional backing for such adventurismn. A modest, more promis-
ing and politically much less complex covert action program in Angola
was cut off by tile Clark amendment in 11)75.
Perhaps the United States tailed to weigh other policy choices in
1977-1978. All of the following actions were advocated, or implied, b "
critics.
1. Assist the Derg to defend itself against Somali invasion with a
renewed military aid )rogram.
2. -Join the Soviets in establishing a multinational federation in
the Horn of Africa. one in which allpolitical rivalries would
have been subsumed and eliminated.
3. Issue the Soviets an til inmat um threatening retaliation if thev
did not refrain from intervention and deployment of Cubans
in Ethiopia.
4. Organize a UN cease-fire and multinational policing operation.

Pitfalls of Proposed Courses of Action

It would be unproductive to examine the implications of any of the
above-listed courses of action in detail. To serious students of history
and strategy, they all tall of' their own impracticalitv and illogic.
Some Ethiopians continue to argvte that the United States-their
countrv's historic friend- betraved them by refusing to renew military
aid in summer 1977. They overlook the fact that Mengistu, not the
United States, had arrogantly cut off the U.S. military assistance pro-
gram only a few months before. Mengistu (tered no apologies or
promise of change (f orientation in return for resumption of aid and, in
fact, never actually asked for it. Byv this time, the Derg's murderous
and oppressive policies had become so untpalatable to U.S. public opin-
ion and Congress that it is doubtful that any administration could have
secured backing for renewed assistance on a significant scale.
To he taken seriously, critics of U.S. inaction in the Horn in
1977-1978 must demonstrate (1)what actions could realistically have
been taken hy the United States and supported by U.S. allies; (2) that
such actions would have been sustainable if announced as policy; and
 3) that t hey, would have produced p,),itkiu consequences lodav. No
critic has been able to ofler such proof'. This is of more than theoreti-
cal interest, since it hears directly On the question of what could be
done now or in the future.

COMPARISON OF ETHIOPIAN AND AFGHAN

REBELS AND REBELLIONS
Let us turn now to the other two interrelated questions posed above:
Should we be supporting rebel and separatist movements in Ethiopia?
If we supply arms to Afghan rebels, why not to Eritreans, Tigreans, or
Oromos? A comparison of the rebel movements in Afghanistan and
Ethiopia and consideration of the challenges they face helps put these
issues in perspective. I stress only highlights of the two situations in
the discussion that follows.

Situation in Afghanistan
All Afghan rebels are fighting against (I Soviet invasion and occu-
pation of their country and (2) a puppet government in Kabul that
would collapse the moment Sovie t bayonets were withdrawn. All
Afghans are united in loyalty to Islam and to the concept of an
independent Afghan state: all are opposed to Marxism in all forms.
There are, of course, substantial ethnic and regional differences
among Afghan rebels and variations in the intensity of Islamic orienta-
tion. There are also important differences in preferences for a future
regime. Antipathy toward Marxism and Russians is so strong that it
tends to overshadow all other differences. Rivalries among Afghan
rebel movements revolve around leaders and personalities more than
they do around issues.
All perceive maintaining the territorial integrity of the country as
desirable. Practicallv everyone living in Afghanistan has felt the
impact of the struggle against Soviet invasion. Almost a third of the
population has fled abroad and unknown thousands have been dis-
placed internally.
Even if' we take the consequences of the Ethiopian famine into
account, it seems probable that the economy and social fabric of
Afghanistan have been more severely affected by the struggle taking
place there than has been the case in Ethiopia. Regrettably, the poten-
tial for a favorable outcome of the struggle appears to be less than in
Ethiopia.
Situation in Ethiopia
The Soviet t'nion did niot invade Et hiopia. Fvenit ifsli- (legret, ()
Soviet clandestine support originally enabled ihe milit ar regime mn
Ethiopia to seize power and nmintain (mtr l) most Ft hittpians dot riot
perceive it as a puppet government. odiouts a., the ' may h fnd it.
Mengist us situation differs great l\ fromi that (t Babrak IKarmal In
Afghanistan. The Ethiopian's abilit :v tot maintain himself in ptwer
does niot vyet, at least ) depend on St viet ((r ( uban ) a rti..
Dissidents and separat ist s in Ft hit pia are niot tight ing Sotviet t r
Cuban invaders; they are rebelling- against an indig-ent us regime.
Many of' the dissident movements are mildly to strttnglv\ sep~arati1st.
Most of' themn do not cooperate or cottrdinat e their activities. At least
three major motvements p~rofess tot be better Marxists than the Addis
Ababa regime itself.' Religion is fo(r the most part neither aI unif~ing
nor a divisive factotr. The D~erg- is generallY lperceived as antireligious.
hut it has treated hot h Christ ian it v and Islam with deference and has
thus, with a few minor exceptittns, avttided inol ilizing- st rtong ant ireli -
giOus. feelings against it.
All Et hiopian ant iregime motvement s claim to woant a less auathttri -
tarian, more demotcrat ic, and less cent ralized potlit ical sv'st em. WVhat
they understand byv demotcrat ic is often hard ttt (determine. The Marx-
ist movements appear to mean Marxist -sty'le -denttcracY.- Onl
econtomic quLestittns (which are i nt rinsical lx' the tnt st import ant for the
future of the count rv). nttne ttf these mttvements appears ttt have dttne
much ctherent thinking-.
The (list inctittn bet ween thle I erg,,s ecttntt; -w polIicies. and those the
Marxist -dttminated mttvements wttuld ftollttw if t hex were in ctont rtl is
far frt m (-lear. The Yenan-st 'vle gratss-rtttts cttmmunisma that thre
EPLF and TPI.F chaim tt havie established in their areas has a rttman-
tic appeal ttt Western itturnalists and leftt i~t intellectuals. WVhet her it
offters any serittus basi> tttr the pr tdluctiie recttnst ruct ion ttf' these
sttcietites is It uht fulI
Althttugh a sizable prttpotrtittn ttf the Fthittpittn pttpulatittn (primiarily
in the center. it.b and sttut hwesti d., not actixely ttppttse the
regime. Niengist u cttild nttt coutnt ttn thlese pettple ttt make persttnal
sac-rifice,. to stqpttirt himi A change fttr the better is much easier, ttt
envisittn in Fthittpia than in Afghanistan, tir thle Sttyiets do niot have
the ph -ysical capaltilitv\ fttr iltterventittn either iti (11 prevent thle
presenit regie. ttr an ttut grotwih tf it. t rotm hiftting it. ttrient at ittt tt
P'resentt knowledtge does tInt ternit a tittgitiit 1111
t'1 p)("I-i''1t,
The Et'tF. the TPLF. and the- FI~t1. t(tt f Hie ttt)\ i, Irnitnr bwn
aptivltrs Ma rxist a1 "e-lk t is .AIt it-.
12) mntain the present regina illtec dtteititil
;t~lia c1irl 1t
overthrow, it.

Differences Betw-een Ethiopian and Afghan Situations

1' nless the preceding, comiparisolito ill(th IwWa Ituoat IoS has imittiei
some essential tactor that is not appiarenit to tie, tOe aniwer I() the
question It' w,, sujtpilv' arms to Afghatt rebel, why\ nat to) Frit reans.
*filrean>. or ()romos ? -SeelmS to emerg111e rat her logicallv ill the nega-
tive. thoughl not without Some qiualificat ions.
The hasic Justificationl for supp~orting Afghan treedom tighters
despite poor Short -term prospects tar Success is that their struggle
weakens and t'rustrates the Smtiets. raise, the cost s at their inlvasion.,
and exposes them as enumlies III humani rights and tiat jonal Self-
determinat:ion. If there is ant\ hope( of restoring ott indoepenident
Afghanistan. it is m agniftied liv lie (letecrm inted resistant e t f a large
proportion ot' its population. Thus kke encourage it inl the iuterst atI
Afghans. %.swell as in li r own Strategic- interest.
Resistance itt Afghanistani discredits the putppet regime in hahiti antd
improves whatever lungi-term Chatit-es there May he of al nleg itiat ed Set -

tlement that coutld lead ti Sovi wit htrawal aitu perhaps netit taliz'a-
tion of the count r . Support for the freedom fighters inl Afhlanistani
does not ito date, at least ) conftrotnt u, wkith am nypailaitabile choies aS
toi ftture piolit ical. Social,. or eciounmic s 'vstetm No r (lilt-s it ct ttproiitie
inl atM way lir commi111tmlenlt tii thle territirial integrity at the Atgltau
state. A brioad ciOalitil ionif free, and Thllird-World ciulcO neS a> wiell a>S
Chinial symIpathizes wvith antd itt vuirimls was sppirts At hati rt-sis-
ance against the Ru-sians,
Support tir separatist nivi-tileu al Ft hioiiit in coat rast, %ouid
etiil adoii a tilic\ t hat o-ni iitS
:i the hreakup (It alitgtcuie
Stalte wIith wkhich ouar ri-lot ii t has 11it1t1 rectirtk htch Wikrttl. It
would pitt its atl iuds. le'alkl atill diil ittat icallv. % with mttiost if Africa.
the rest ot the Thirni rld. ;itoriltu
;dt all (It oil ill it-. It wi tithi leave
thle Svi t to iaj~ lut>mltituim at Ft iitia'S territorial itiegritv\. It
w.ould dern ral i/e Ft hitianl Itatimlti T it fi-Ir the i verwhehling1'
 suport i ot t he presentt regime rangles from~ lttkewarnto ni tif(onomm~ittal
and w\ho) arc almtost all residuiall ' pro-W\esternt ,in( lpro-Amterj(an.
rHncnIt , %validin Afghianistan, that liv sukpport jag rebtels we
The iiIla
ncrtcae the cost, to thle 'Soviets of' niitainiitg control over the couri-
tr,\ i alt hest qutest iontihlv iipplicaltle to Ft hiopia. It may ali t lhevalid
at ll. The Sivets experience little negative effect f'rom the activities
of t he' eparwtist atnd dissident movemenits. TheY are widelyv suspected,
in t'act, of(it intaining- their oiwn lines of' contact with all the Mlarxist
movettents. Suc h suspicions extend high into the D~er,
l'he act i t ics (f the separatists and dissidents push the IDerg into
closer delpendenice on the Soviets. 'lThe itntmediate co~sts all f'all on the
lDerg and the Ft hiopian piipulat iotn. The fhict that the WVest is making
op1the ciir rv\s food deficit which ThIe Soviets have niever tried to hell)
alle~ late, also relieves, the Soviets of most of' tihe economic costs of' the4
Ethiopian relationship.
F Xe in modest. piecemte al armts suippo rt fo r separatist aridl dissident
m vernent s wiold make thieta more co mpet it ive anid less -otnprornising
wvithI eaich ilher. It could also encourage them to adhere to tunrealistic
ptolit ical and ecoinotnic ptrescriptions. On this score, one finds muLchI
no re disparit\ am ing m ventets resisting the IDe rg intEt hiopia than
among A'tltans resistingl the Soviet invasion of their country. A poilicy
of tactical supjport for separat isti d regional dissidence in Ethiopia, if
successful in the short terma in st renglt hening individual movements,
would make it more ditficult fir t heat to compromise atnd negotiate
withI any conili ator,\ regime itt Add~is Ahlmt.
It thlus Itecottes illrent that tew\ posit ive results cotild lie exlpected
frot a ltrogain To -iiltlort urnti-lerg- rehel gritups, in Ethiopia. For the
most part, t hc crit eria that inst ifv suptpotrt for Afghan freedom fighters
dltatitatpll\

COMPARISON OF ETHIOPIAN AND) ANGOLAN

REBELS A\ND REBELLIONS
IliiiV does Th Eit hioiani~~ situat ion comttpaire wkith the Angolan? The
queist ion cain t1w zint\werctl rat her siiull. Savimti is not a sepiaratist.
Hie is ttot a 'Marxist. Heo has' a strong regionail and et haic hase hut his
mtovemietnt has~ alway's aimed at sharing- power throughout thre whole
('itint rv. HeIaiims tii replace the( Marxist government itt Iaianda with a
givernmeat that w\ill represent all Aitgolatts and ini\e toward the
estahlishnient of an iipctn society and a realistic ecitioitic s'vstemt.
Howk effective Savintli ight~ lie itt tchievintg his goals we cannot
tell. but it is nttiteortlhv that it her relle tnoveens in Anigida .rc also
 qA I S N 2/2
4-U
AD-AI68 657
umCLASSIFIIED 5/ L
NW 2III0
W

- - 111111

1-25

!/
 83

oriented toward participation in the political and economic develop-

ment of the country as a whole. The contrast with the Ethiopian
situation needs no further underscoring.

WORTHY GOALS FOR ETHIOPIAN DISSIDENTS

If groups resisting the Derg's leadership and its economic and social
policies would unite in their tactics and agree on the outlines of a pro-
gram for the political and economic reconstruction of Ethiopia in
accordance with recognized democratic and humanitarian principles,
they would constitute more effective opposition. They would have the
majority of the population of the country behind them. They could
capitalize on the opprobrium the procommunist military regime has
brought on itself by economic mismanagement, political oppression,
and obsequious parroting of Soviet slogans and dogma. The famine,
which caught the attention of the entire world, dramatized the
incongruousness of the regime's activities, particularly the expensive
circus organized in Addis Ababa to celebrate the founding of its
Soviet-style party in September 1984.
Ethiopian exiles, united around a coherent set of objectives for their
country, could bring their influence to bear in world capitals and inter-
national organizations, as Afghans have done, for sustained pressures
on the military regime for change. As matters stand, the quarrelsome-
ness of the exiles and the pursuit of separatist and particularist pro-
grains work to the advantage of the Derg.
Marxist and Soviet formulas for development have been exposed in
Ethiopia as disastrous. They not only do not work-they create, as
"
one important commentary recently termed it,"A System of Ruins. 6
World Bank studies have demonstrated over and over again that
Ethiopia ranks among the African countries with the greatest potential
for constructive, multifaceted economic development. By pulling apart,
Ethiopia's peoples diminish the chances of all of them-Eritreans no
less than Tigreans and Oromos-to realize their potential.
Several exile political movements have responded to the famine
crisis by issuing appeals for the unity of all "democratic forces" in the
country. Of these, onl) the TPLF and the Eritreans appear to control
substantial territory in Ethiopia. A TPUF sympathizer recently stated:
ITihere may be a collective will in Tigre for national existence, but
the material capacity to maintain that existence will be infinitely
greater in a unified but democratic Ethiopia. The creation of an
'John (;rav. Times Literar%Supplement, London, I)ecernter 0. 1993.
84

independent Tigre may be feasible but from the perspective of the

Tigrean peasants, in particular, and the Ethiopian masses, in general.
it is not a desirable alternative. The TPILF must recognize the indi-
visibility of the struggle of the Ethiopian peoples. Only through the
formation of a united multinational front consisting of all patriotic
and democratic forces are the nationalities likely to rid themselves of
military dictatorship and its foreign mentors.
In August 1984, the TPLF released a somewhat more tentative for-
mal statement at a press conference in Washington. The statement
omits Eritrea from consideration, but the basic thrust is constructive.
The recent emphasis by the EPLF on an approach similar to that of
the TPLF is likewise hopeful. 9
Rebellion, regional or at the center, with the ultimate aim of restor-
ing and reinforcing national unity makes sense, It underscores the fact
that the Derg has ruptured the national unity of the country and
driven its peoples apart in the name of doctrinaire Soviet-style social-
ism and rigid centralism. Resistance motivated by the philosophy
toward which the TPLF and EPLF appear to be moving is worthy of
consideration for selective support by I'.S. and other Western poli-
cymakers, but only as part of a coherent program for bringing about
constructive change in the country as a whole.

Gebru Tareke. "Resistance in Tigre (Ethiopia), from Weyane to TPLF." in Horn of

Africa. Vol. VI, No. 4. 1984, p. 27.
'Proposal for the Formation of a ,nited Resistance Force. Horn of Africa. Vol. VI.
No. 4. 1984. pp. 61-63,
"See "Decreasing EPLF Intransigence?" Sec. VI. above.
 VIII. U.S. POLICY CHALLENGE

The response of the free world to famine in Ethiopia has been

remarkable. Figures of aid committed and delivered rise constantly;
1985 commitments exceeded $1 billion. The L.S. Congress has shown
no inclination to question administration requests for funds for famine
relief anywhere in Africa; on the contrary, it has been doubling and
tripling amounts sought. Privately gathered funds for famine relief'
from the United States and Europe for Ethiopia alone have been
equally impressive. For the foreseeable future, private commitments
will continue high.
Admirable as this response is, it is not without negative implications
in several respects. The longer a large part of' the population of north-
ern Ethiopia is concentrated permanently in camps inside or outside
Ethiopia's borders, the more the country will have to depend on
foreign-supported relief operations and the more difficult will be the
task of restoring the affected areas to normal life and productivity.
Ethiopia must avoid the creation of permanent Palestinian-type camp
conditions. We have the sad example of the refugee situation in
Somalia, which has been overshadowed by Ethiopian developments but
which belongs to the same set of disasters that Soviet interventionism
in this part of the world has created.
The political effect of' massive relief operations on the rebel and dis-
sident movements is still hard to judge, owing to the lack of concrete
information. To some degree, it has encouraged stronger resistance in
the short term. The Derg, defensive, frustrated, and fearful, has-shown
no inclination to make concessions. The strain that has developed
between the Derg and donor governments and organizations largely
reflects heightened insecurity on the part ofFt hipian officials.

RESUMPTION OF DEVELOPMENT AID?

The Derg. in all likelihood, will never allow relief operators free
access to rebel-cont rolled areas and will continue to press for aid for its
resettlement programs. In ('.S. terms., this means the resumption of
development aid. Congress has already been called on to restore such
aid, which was terminated in 1979 because of legislative requirements
imposed by congressional actions in earlier Years. These restrictions are
still in force.
86

Given the Derg's persistence in pursuing unproductive agricultural

policies, even if' U.S. development aid had not been terminated at the
end of the 1970s, the modest program then in operation would likely
have encountered serious difficulty. American officials would have
found support for state and collective farms illogical and unproductive.
Some European countries have had less difficulty on this score.
With the passage of time and the accumulation of data, the world
now knows that Ethiopia's socialist agricultural policies are failing. If'
these policies do not change, the food crisis can only worsen. The
United States and its friends already face a situation in which they are,
in effect, helping the Derg to survive without the Derg's accepting the
full implications of its mistaken policies and without its feeling the full
pressure for change.
The present approach to aid does not serve the best interests of the
people of Ethiopia or of the free world. Congressional generosity and
strong humanitarian motivation do not preclude strong congressional
criticism of the U.S. administration for the failure to develop more
comprehensive plans for encouraging change in Ethiopia.
Fortunately, the U.S. administration has not shackled itself' with any
commitment to maintain the present Ethiopian political order, or to
refrain from contact with dissidents and rebels in Ethiopia. The
United States ha, insisted on access to faimine areas by U.S. officials,
congressmen, journalists, and relief workers. It has also placed no limi-
tations on the IU.S. right to communicate with the Ethiopian people,
who increasingly depend on the VOA. BBC. and Amharic service of
Deutsche Welle for information.
The United States and its allies have nothing to tear from change in
Ethiopia. This countr" needi not decide in advance whether a Derg
with new policies would he better than a complete change of regime.
but it does need to make certain fundamentals clear. Doing so will
accelerate political processes that are already in motion in Ethiopia.
The main elements of .S. policy should he the following:
" To press for basic change in overall economic policy, especiallY
with respect to agricult tre.
* To make clear that the United States will support an Ethiopian
government that adopts a new course: the tnited States can do
this by
- resuming development aid on a significant scale
encouraging American private investment
- considering the reestablishment of militarv aid.
" To straightforwardly uphold certain political principles, including
- recognizing and supporting the maintenance of Fthiopia's
territorial integrity
 87

- encouraging meas,,res that will give disaffected regions of the

country a say in their local affairs
standing ready to facilitate the mediation of quarrels with
neighboring countries, including Somalia and Sudan.
Such an approach does not preclude dialogue with dissident and
rebel movements in Ethiopia. Military assistance for rebels, dissidents,
and separatists simply for the sake of "increasing pressures" on the
Derg brings no clear-cut gain, however. It is likely not to have the
effect intended. It is also a fundamentally immoral approach, and
therefore over an extended time untenable.
The argument that the United States could pursue a policy covertly
does not make it any more desirable, even in a tactical sense. Recent
experience has demonstrated that no U.S. program of any scope can be
kept covert, even when it is politically desirable and morally justifiable.
The United States could never carry through on either a covert or an
overt commitment to enable Ethiopian separatists to achieve their goal
of breaking up the country and giving independence to segments of it.
Catering to separatist delusions serves no purpose. Tactical support
of Marxist dissident movements on the argument that they are anti-
Soviet also serves no purpose. They are anti-Soviet because the
Soviets back the Derg rather than themselves. They are more anti-
Derg than anti-Soviet. Many of them, in principle and to some degree
in practice, espouse political authoritarianism just as distasteful as that
of the Derg and advocate policies of nationalization and state direction
of the economy of the same kind that have brought the Derg to the
verge of bankruptcy. The Marxist movements all take strong anti-U.S.
and anti-Western positions.
American policymakers find it difficult to escape the straightjacket
of dealing with problems only in the framework of individual countries.
The uniformly disastrous political history of the Horn of Africa coun-
tries over the past decade demonstrates that no pr( blem in this part of
the world can be regarded as purely domestic. Each country in the
region affects the others.
The Somali-Ethiopian situation may be in a condition of stalemate
that could continue for decades. Why should one accept that as a
foreordained condition of life? If either country is worth assisting indi-
vidually, logic dictates that there must be a case for trying to help
both, in a context in which their capacity to interfere with and damage
each other is reduced.
88

REGIONAL APPROACH TO HORN OF AFRICA

Ethio-Somali problems are not for the present, however, the highest
priority in the Horn; Ethio-Sudanese problems are. The present sorry
internal condition of both of these countries and the tensions that have
built up between them are a compelling argument for a regional
approach to this part of' the world by U.S. policymakers-and by the
entire free world.
Neither Ethiopia nor Sudan has a fundamental grievance against the
other. Not even a minor territorial dispute has arisen along the exten-
sive border between the two countries. The internal weaknesses of
each have been exploited by outside forces to heighten tension and gen-
erate confrontations that work to the detriment of' both countries. At
a minimum, U.S. policy should seek a return to the kind of solution of
southern Sudanese-Eritrean rebellion problems that Nimeiry and Haile
Selassie, demonstrating real statesmanship, worked out in 1971-1972.
A much larger framework exists in which an openly declared, honest
U.S. policy toward Ethiopia and the other countries of the Horn might
expect eventually to succeed and to gain broader free world support.
The United States need have no hesitancy in pointing out that more
than 20 years of' active Soviet involvement in the Horn of' Africa have
brought nothing but hardship and disaster for the peoples of the
region, exacerbated all its political problems, and blighted its economic
development.
The area bristles with arms, but the people who live in these coun-
tries enjoy less elementary physical and personal security than they did
25 years ago. Perhaps half a million people in these countries have
died as a result of violence during the past two decades: another half" a
million have starved. At least two million have been uprooted and live
as refugees.
The Soviet Union lacks both the means and the will to remedy or
reverse this situation. It is the prime cause of it. It provided Nimeiry
the bombs to attack Sudanese sutherners in 1969-1970: it provided
the Somali guerrillas the arms and ammunition with which they dis-
rupted life in southeastern Ethiopia in the 1900s. Soviet proxies and
surrogates stoked the Eritrean rebellion in the late 1960s and early
1970s and continued to encourage violence in Eritrea--both among the
Eritrean rebels and through the Derg -during the 197t0s. The Soviets
provided the Somalis all the arms and major militar equipment with
which they were enabled to invade Ethiopia in 1977.
No U.S.-supplied arms enabled any Horn country to (onmit aggres-
sion against a neighbor. l)uring the 25 years of close relationship, 1.S.
economic aid to Ethiopia always exceeded military support. Since the
 59

commoti t ot' the mid-i97T)s. the I nited States has supplied the major
portion of the relief assistance that has sustained the hordes of
refugees Soviet policies have created: hundreds of thousands in
Somalia and now millions in Ethiopia and Sudan.
In contrast to the blood that ))lots the Soviet record in the Horn,
neither the American people nor the I'.S. government has fundamental
reason to apologize as a result of' our involvement in the area during
the past four decades. We have nothing to lose now by enunciating a
basic policy for the area that reflects the best in )oth our experience
and our traditions.
The Horn does not need more arms. Taking sides in the chronic
quarrels of the region can only do all its peoples more harm. Military
costs already represent an intolerable budgetary burden for every coun-
try of the region.t There is no moral juslification for helping any of the
weak, insecure, and undemocratic governments in the region devise
more efficient ways of oppressing their people in the name of Marxism,
Islamic fundamentalism, or any other excuse for tvranny.
The United States has every justification for pressuring, persuading,
cajoling, and--occasionally, when circumstances permit--forcing these
governments to stop regimenting and exploiting their farmers and pro-
vide them the minimal prerequisites to produce and sell. Free agricul-
ture. with genuine state support of' private initiative, can generate
export sur)luses in the Horn. The United States should badger all
these governments into more produclive investment of the develop-
ment aid Western donor nations and international lending agencies are
still providing them. The United States should propose regional 2
development institutions and proigrams and promise support for them.
The United States should encourage as many of its developed-world
allies as possible to join in these eftTorts. Of course, the efforts will pro-
duce no immediate results, and this coitrv niaav he derided for propos-
ing them. But what does the U nited States have to lose by paint ing a
vision that corresponds to American ideals and is at the same time
realistically anchored in the formidable technical and scientific prog-
ress the free world has already- achieved?
The peoples of the Horn know that Marxism-Leninism. "'scientific
socialism." and all kindred dogmas are hollov. Some of their intellec-
tuals still pretend otherwise but the real attraction of Marxism to
them is power, not progress. The productivity of' free \orld agriculture
'Except Djhouti, where the French. with -o)oomen. do the joh.
-There are good ideas long on the hiok.s: irrigMiin and iowe r in the Wehe Shehelle
valley the same for the Blue Nile valley and tor other ri ersthat l t IrmiEthiopia into
Sudan. some modest regional projects. ictlding liveto(k devl 'ptnelnt and locust con-
trol. stand even now, a, examples ,' cooperatin.
90

now keeps several million people in the Horn trom dying of starvation.
Their only hope of becoming self-sufficient again lies not with Marx-
ism. but with the West.
Bookstores in Addis Ababa are filled with Marxist-Leninist classics
that gather dust--and with books on computer programming, manage-
ment, and technology that are sometimes worn out from browsing long
before they are sold. The Marxism that titillated their older brothers
half a generation ago has no serious appeal to students on the campus
of Addis Ababa University today.
When they have the chance. this new generation of' Ethiopians will
loosen themselves from the still incomplete and now faltering grip of
the Derg and begin moving forward. They can lead the whole Horn to
a better and more peaceful life. Any policy the United States can
devise to improve prospects for this happening
:
sooner rat her than later
is worthwhile. Any other is illusory.

I have de-eloped these recoinniendations at greater length in an article,

"1)Diemnas
in the Horn." Thc National Interest. \ nter 1s,.
 Appendix

THE DERG AND THE NATIONALITIES

PROBLEM

Before the revolution, Ethiopian Marxist intellectuals and students

occasionally dabbled with ideas of restructuring the country along
nationality lines, after the pattern of the USSR or China. Somespecu-
lated about breaking up the allegedly outdated empire and giving
independence to separate peoples. This toying with the nationality
issue did not occur on a very high level of sophistication. It does not
seem to Ihave been consistently encouraged by the Soviets or their sur-
rogates.
The Eritrean issue, in which the Soviets played an active, behind-
the-scenes role in supporting insurgency through East European and
radical Arab proxies and in which the Cubans o)penly propagandized
the Eritrean cause and trained guerrillas, was not, strictly speaking, a
nationalities issue. There is no Eritrean nationality or Eritrean
language.
Eritrea is a patchwork of at least eight major nationalities, several
languages (including indigenous languages, English. Italian, and Ara-
bic) and three religions, some with subgroupings. Language and reli-
gious divisions overlap. Eritrean insurgents were sharply divided,
partly on ethnic and religious lines, and these cleavages remain impor-
tant today. Vague idealism about the "solution of the national ques-
tion" permeated leftist debate after the revolution, but it did not
become a major issue.
The imperial regime made minor concessions to nationalities on
language use. It enforced the use of Amharic for administrative pur-
poses and education throughout the country. English was the primary
foreign language. This policy produced serious resentment only in Eri-
trea, where the principal northern language, Tigrinva. had been used
during the Italian period and continued in use after World War I.
The Derg permitted and for a time encouraged the use of major
regional languages for publishing and hroadcasting. Wien the national
literacy campaign was launched, people were permitted to qualify in
several regional languages, as well as in Amharic. This practice
'This section is excerpted from the author's ( > l in Ethupia. Is It Sw'e'd
isnmul
inge The Rand Corporation, P. 70.54, ,/anuarv 1985.

91

01 . . . . , , , 'm i l l I I l ]
continues. TIhe l)erg has never di.criminited itgain.t Amrharic. how-
ever, nor inl aniv vayv rest ricted its offiial uise. Moreover, it has not
downgraded Engllish.
As the Derg, strove to impose Smiiet patterns onl most aspects of
Ethiopian lile. the quest ion of' the possihle reorganization of the Coun-
try along- et ho itines hecatne pertinent. Mengist u came closest to
adipt ing a soviet -t v pe naltionailitijes poi icy' on April 20. 197(6, when he
;innloutited the "national deniocrat ic revolution." According to his
priotlamat ion.
utide r t he prexa i inrg to ndit ions in Ethiopia. the p)roble m of' nationali -
tes call only he solved when the nationalities are guaranteed regional
autinom -. Accordinglyv ahnainlt' ilhv the right to decide
on matters p~revailing within its environs, he they administrative,
political, econoici, social or language. as well as elect its own leaders"
anid adininistratoors. The right of* nationalities lor local autonomy
will ht~ impitleme nted inl a democratic wa..

A proclamation issued onl Ma ' 16, 19763. dealing primiaril.N with Eni-
rea. expanded the concept. It declared that at studys programn wotuld he
launcthedi for each of the regionirs of the country to determine

tile history and interaction of the nionali e. inhabuitinog t hem, their

geographic tuiiitin, ecorirnic structure anid suitahrilit ' for deIelip-
nmerit aind admliini.,tratiori .... ThFie government wAill at an ap~propriate
iine present to the people the format of the regioins that c-art exist ill
thle fture. The entire Ethiopian people will thenl denriicraticallv dis-
cu s the issue at various levels arid decide upon it themselves.

Ani Insti te for the 1;!udv n t' Nationalities startedl to funtion inl
Marc.h 1 t;.In piract ical polit ital Terins, howkever, the nat ionalit ies
issuev hais never advainced hev'ond thle posit ions taketn in I1976. The
Nive -Plotint Pol1icy (in Eritrea etiuntlte(l that 'sear has long beetn mi in-
buitld. t hi ugh never rev.ersed.
Restruituirintg thle counrt rv (in nat ionality tles, would require a
degree (it tit nil thle IDerg has never conie close to establishing. It
W iild imM lie tiiad dil'fitult pract ical p~robllemis. suc h ats how to hall-
*lle arva %Ohere several nationalities live intermingled. The Derg hais
hald (iititvmaintaining control o)ver many of' the 14 lonrg-established
promorie, (to\ iificiallY
(it termned udinisirotltn' regi ons).
N;; Ft hi'piati ethnric iss;ue bet ter detnonst rates the dangers (of' apply-
inug the 5; ivt model than the Ogaden. Were self-determination to he
applied. tit 5;;ia6n (if Et hiopia, who o)riginally, intermixed less with
ither nat i; iadlitie t han altmost ainy ot her Ethiopian people, would have

j';twi Ib ;ildi. April 21, 9Th.fi

- 9a6
a b~asis fir assoclat oni %]ii sIoli;t, it- 'goiXerinmewit,ir ogadishti.
we c-an le sure. wkhoever mighlt lie at it iail. kwould lose no tinme tak-
ing advantage (it siah a situoti.
Any,, lip service to. or prol-fllril iiiitii of. Sll i-.Stvie natioinali-
ties arrangvements in rest rict ed area, %%.here experi mant ation might he
safe carries %kith it far-reaching impiliatio ns IIr Frit rea and hie Oga-
den and the fort her danger of' appearinmg to coinciliate lother separatist
movements. Thus thle mo~st innocent -seeminIg experimnentat ion with
nationalities has explosive potential. No wonder there has been none.
This lack of attention to thle natio ali "kvissue doIes not appear to
concern the Soviets. Soviet writing oin hie stibject of nationalities in
Et hiopia is remarkable for its sparseness and lack of content. The
complexityv of' the problem is ack niiwledged in ai study pub~lished ini
1982. hut the fact the pruiblem exists at all is alleg-ed toi le the fault of'
the imperial regimte and its supporters.
It in1.1oIt e adin iii ed thaiit (I r i g reel it dlecade, ini hi jot)a sepaaist
att it dio have*(gro%%Wn strionge r. pr IX ked i rimiia rik h\ lhe react iin
,111r
iiS-iiflhliatioi ist picii %I (o i-e ;lrevioil teilllll-miiinarchical regimle.
Et hi' pills i-ni 'r\ ill 111
he ilrse it t revui to the path of
onliI
buroad di-lnlcriml. trarliil(riiatillii andi its chiiiie lot oclilil~ orienta-
in firlivoktd hiitte-r re-i.sianl, lh\ iiertial and1( external relaction.
Feutdal ii iottrre% lot iii niergi-il %ith %iXlriouis eparat it itileents,
%%icare ermrgdad wotdh %aiie imperialists adl
M!aoists. t hi- aciii -s lit %%hiel ire elearlv direced~ tolwardl the
disiiwiiieriliet Il i- I hluit liir\ FthIiopIf 101

The hiest qtiat ion that (iX let XX iters havei heeti able to find tol
demiinst rate that Nlctngisi a remiaiin, dti-Ited to iniitat igl the Sliet
approach is so limp as to le iieimitiglcss:

S Ieaking ti the Kriiiliti in Octldler 19,soi. Xfetgistii Haiile-Miariaii

sire-seul "We Etiianlm illi learn itgrvi eatl fril thle first social1-

i-splaki
ilt ii liii~ ng iii V0 intgiiligi- Mw liXc in harmlloX, (,ii lhe
liasis lt prim i fle, iifetfuillit\ itoh
n iiilrlli
) \X

'Ibl e gioivi-r n mitivnt in Add is AI Ia II hat

iI)t IhIt ii
ged I he wItk-k
v i a in~l inl-
isters thfe Somali piopulatioIn if the
( )gaiiei even thbough the wilitary
Sitnatiiin there has. for the mollst palrt sitaliliieul and siitnala. thanks tio
the restraiit impoisedl lv 1ts teniilous \Wetern relatiiinships, most5 likely\
wkill fhit Undertake antlther otifeilsoti- agiisi Ethbioial. aind evenl thugh

a
'1111 ~litiIX
4 pIhtiII

it ,iingP~a~a.
)- ),iher2
94

the Ogaden refugees are gradually returning to Ethiopia. Agricultural

development schemes again envision resettling sizable numbers of
peasants fromn central Ethiopia in the Ogaden.
As far as nationality issues are concerned, the revolutionary
government's approach to resettlement does not differ in any essentials
from that followed by its predecessor. Resettlement plans reflect
Soviet practice only to the extent that they are strongly biased toward
the formation of state farms and collectives and entail forcible move-
ment of people. This represents a commitment to Soviet-style agricul-
ture, with priority on state control over productivity: it has nothing to
do with nationalities issues as such.
Facile Soviet claims to the contrary, the record to date would seem
to indicate that the Derg's efforts to impose a Soviet-style political,
economic, and social system on Ethiopia have resulted in exacerbation
of nationalilies strains and regional tensions. To make this observa-
tion is not meant to imply, however, that the overall concept of
Ethiopian nationhood has been weakened by the revolutionary experi-
ence.
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