The State Seewooduth Goorbin
The State Seewooduth Goorbin
The State Seewooduth Goorbin
Record no CS 9/11
The State
v/s
SeewooduthGoorbin
The accused stands charged with having, on 13 October 2010, criminally and wilfully
killed one Rajesh Sharma Nathooram in breach of S 215 and S 223(3) of the Criminal
Code.
In order to understand the issue at hand fully, we have to set out the manner in which
the case has developed. The charge being one of manslaughter, the accused was to be
tried before the assizes constituted of a Judge and a Jury. Pre-trial matters were sorted
out during ‘formal’ sessions. Thereafter, the plea was supposed to be taken and the jury
was supposed to be empanelled on the first day of the trial. However, before those were
done, defence counsel moved for a permanent stay of the proceedings on the ground of
abuse of process. The motion was objected to by the prosecution.
The question which arose, at that stage, concerned the manner in which the motion
should be dealt with procedurally speaking. It was proposed that the issue should be
debated in the course of a voir-dire inasmuch as some evidence would have to be
adduced in relation to the motion. The proceedings show that the matter was treated as
a preliminary issue which would have to be decided prior to the plea being taken and
prior to the jury being empanelled. Accordingly, the matter was to be heard and
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determined by the Judge alone, without the Jury. The hearing has started on that basis
and the defence called several witnesses who adduced evidence in support of its
motion. The case for the defence has been closed. The prosecution subsequently
opened its case and has called its witnesses save for one last witness.
State Counsel has now made the following motion: since the issue which is being
presently debated is eminently an issue of fact, the Judge should proceed to empanel
the jury so that the matter can be henceforth dealt with before the jury and decided by
them. State Counsel conceded that the present motion is being made at quite a late
stage, the more so that the prosecution did not formulate any specific objection to the
procedure adopted so far. However, she felt in duty bound to raise the point since the
matter is one of importance and may affect the propriety of the procedures and the
proceedings as a whole.
The argument of the prosecution is based on two limbs: firstly, reference was made to
two statements made by the defence. Indeed, on 25 June 2012, the prosecution moved
that the plea of the accused be recorded, but defence counsel stated that:
“ …. the point made by the defence (right from the word ‘go’) is that my
client is unfit in the sense that he would not be able to understand the trial
and give instructions. That of course includes the plea which has to be given
by the accused after having fully understood the evidence before, which the
prosecution has and having assimilated and understood legal advice given
by him. It is precisely that point which the defence wishes the court to decide
and since the court has not decided whether my client would be in a position
to stand trial or not …”
The second limb is that, in the course of the so-called voir-dire, three doctors have given
evidence for the defence and three doctors have given evidence for the prosecution. As
such, a large amount of facts has come out as reflected in the court record.
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State Counsel referred to the cases of R v Pritchard [1836] 7 C&P 303 and R v Podola
[1960] 1 QB 325 which suggest that where it is alleged that an accused is unfit to plead
or to stand trial, the classic test which is applied implies six limbs:
[1]. Can the accused understand the charges against him?
[2]. Can the accused take an informed decision as to whether he should plead guilty or
not?
[3]. Can the accused exercise his right to challenge jurors?
[4]. Can the accused instruct counsel?
[5]. Can the accused follow the proceedings:and
[6]. Can he give evidence in his own defence?
Referring to the two statements made by defence Counsel and which have been set out
above, State Counsel argued that, in essence, what we are having to deal with is a
motion that the accused is unfit to plead and/or to stand trial. This remains so
notwithstanding the language that has been used by the defence and the manner in
which the motion has been couched. Basing herself on this premise, she has argued
that a motion of this nature, which is essentially a factual matter, is the sole province of
the jury and must therefore be dealt with by them. Of course, the jury would have to be
given directives by the Judge as to how they are to treat the facts and, in particular, the
expert opinion evidence given by doctors and other medical experts. In the absence of
any specific statutory provision and of any established precedent, reference can be
made to section 56 of the Courts Act which allows us to follow what obtains in England
on the issue. She argued that the procedure described above is a common practice in
England and that the Court would be well advised to follow the same procedure in the
present case. Hence, her motion that the jury be empanelled forthwith and that the
motion of the defence be debated before them and that the decision be ultimately left to
them.
In deciding the issue, I believe that it is essential for us to consider the motion made by
the defence and to understand its implications fully. Counsel actually moved
that‘proceedings be stayed permanently on the ground that the state of health of the
accused would not allow him to have a fair trial as guaranteed by S 10 of the
Constitution’.
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Having duly considered the motion of the defence, it is apparent that this is the exercise
that the defence is asking the Court to do. I am therefore of the view that this is a pure
matter of law which has to be decided by the Judge. Such a matter can neither be
debated before the Jury nor be left to them for decision. I therefore set aside the motion
of the prosecution. The matter is to be proceeded with as per the procedure which has
been adopted so far.
P. Fekna
Judge
28 December 2012