BELGICA

vs
OCHOA
G.R. No. 208493, 208566 and G.R. No. 209251,
November 19, 2013
BELGICA, ET.AL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL.

FACTS:

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The so-called pork
barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly
known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “ Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been
done in the following manner: a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken
down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.); b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects; c. P200 million: for the Vice-President;
broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects. The PDAF
articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in
the GAA. The so called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been
around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed
that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet
Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into
about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost”
projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and
several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. II. Whether or not
presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional

because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws
– this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the
law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law,
was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should
be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle
of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that
pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional
insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go). This is also
highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power

in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar
as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power
cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it
by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are: (i) delegated legislative power to local
government units but this shall involve purely local matters; (ii) authority of the President to,
by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times
of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government. In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively
renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part
of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can
either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles
with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in
the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators. II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al
against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation. The
Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12
thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These
are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be
a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
FACTS:
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise
known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and
realignment of unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also
became involved in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called
“Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works
project or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which would fall
under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork
barrel was revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas
Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The
CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing
agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators
and congressmen could identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads,
buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual
legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of
Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from
the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside
from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to
direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of
CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii)
Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision
requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA.
PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release
of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except
personal services and other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from

2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a
provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies.
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative
district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.

MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No.
1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and
is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of
money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate
defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers
and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit
investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had

gone into a dummy NGO.

ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar

the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b)
non-delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e)
political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING

PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding
the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for
their utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof
does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have
constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case
considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character
and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d)

the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.

(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme
Court has the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on
the part of the government.

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to sue

 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the
Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez because the
Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas
of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This
power cannot be exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to

appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.

 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed
on a procedural technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments
has been violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong
to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.

 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the

various operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities and the ― regulation and release of funds
in violation of the separation of powers principle.

 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory

in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.

 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only
recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification of the
legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped
as a funding source.

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated

 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.

 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear
from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because

each of them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.

(c) Checks and balances

 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion.

 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system

fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of
item veto.

 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF
to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as
a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is because the appropriation
law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is

incapable of checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of
the appropriation law.

 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which
they themselves participate.

 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the

1987 Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government, because it renders them susceptible
to taking undue advantage of their own office.

 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow
him to perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing
provision.

 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on

political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this
issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy

 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.

 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents.

 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of

equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration.

 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already
legally mandated to―assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development
efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.

 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially

geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions
should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation
laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”, it is enough that (a) the
provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and
(b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.

 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a

determinable amount: a Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and
receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources.

 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation

programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President.

 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart
a determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the
Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
[PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000.00.

 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects

and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.

(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue
delegation of legislation powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.

 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar

as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers
because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the
same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.