Mended Complaint For Damages

1
Angela Swan, #213793

2
THE LAW OFFICES OF ANGELA SWAN,
3 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
21151 South Western Avenue, Suite 177
4
Torrance, CA 90501
5 Office Telephone: (310)755-2515
Facsimile: (310)878-0349
6
Email: [email protected]
7
Attorney for Plaintiffs MELODY J. RODGERS; JUDY G. RODGERS; LUCILLE D.
8
GAY; MELONY RODGERS; HARMONY RODGERS; SYMPHONY BROWN; and
9 PRESTON BROWN
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION-LOS ANGELES
12 )
MELODY J. RODGERS; JUDY G. )
13 ) CASE NO.: 2:22-cv-02418-FMO-PLA
RODGERS; LUCILLE D. GAY; ) Courtroom: 6D
14 MELONY RODGERS; HARMONY )
Dist. Judge: Hon. Fernando M. Olguin
RODGERS; SYMPHONY BROWN; and )
15 ) Complaint Filed: January 25, 2022
PRESTON BROWN, individuals, )
16 )
) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
17 Plaintiffs, ) DAMAGES, and DECLARATORY
) AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
18 vs. )
) 1. VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983
19 ) 2. VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1985
) 3. VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1986
20 STATE OF CALIFORNIA; LOS ) 4. MONELL RELATED CLAIMS –
ANGELES COUNTY; CHILDREN’S )
21 ) (LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCESSIVE
LAW CENTER; KERNELL BROWN; and ) FORCE/FALSE IMPRISONMENT/
22 DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, ) SOCIAL WORKER MISCONDUCT/
)
23 ) PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT)
Defendants. ) 5. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION/
24 ) ABUSE OF PROCESS
)
25 ) 6. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
) EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
26 ) 7. DEFAMATION – SLANDER –
)
27 ) FALSE LIGHT
) 8. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
28
______________________________________________________________________________
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1
1 ) 9. BREACH OF IMPLIED
) COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH & FAIR
2 )
) DEALING
3 ) 10. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
) 11. FRAUD UPON THE COURT
4 )
) 12. ULTRA VIRES ACTS
5 ) 13. DECLARATORY RELIEF
) 14. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
6 )
) ORDER, PRELIMINARY AND
7 ) PERMANENT INJUNCTION
) 15. VIOLATION OF RICO ACT under
8 ) 18 USC § 1962 [d]
)
9 )
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
10 )
)
11 )
)
12 )
13
14
15
16
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
18
1343(3) and (4).
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2. The United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
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where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
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interest and costs… pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a).
22
3. Many of the acts and conduct complained herein, occurred in substantial part in
23
this District, including the dissemination and recording of Documents, which contained
24
material misstatements and omissions, complained of herein. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)(2).
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2 II. CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE CALIFORNIA TORT NOTICES &

3 CLAIM FORM REQUIREMENTS
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5 4. I, MELODY RODGERS, hereby declare that claim for damage notices weren’t
6 mailed to the “Clerk of the Board of Supervisors” for the County of Los Angeles.
7
5. However, EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES is NOT A PRERQUISITE to
8
bringing an action under 42 USC § 1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents (1982) 457 US
9
496, 73 L Ed 2d 172, 102 S Ct 2557. See Heath v. Cleary (9th Cir 1983) 708 2d 1376,
10
1378 (concluding that contrary pre-Patsy decisions I Ninth Circuit are no longer
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authoritative). Here, plaintiffs have properly pled a cause of action under the Federal
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Civil Rights Act, in addition to other causes of action
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III. THE PARTIES
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6. MELODY RODGERS (“Plaintiff”), a natural person, is a private individual within
15
the meaning of California law and is a citizen of the United States, and at all times
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relevant hereto a resident of North Carolina. Plaintiff is the mother of minor children,
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Melony Rodgers (hereinafter known as M.R.), Harmony Rodgers (hereinafter known as
18
H.R.), Symphony Brown (hereinafter known as S.B.), and Preston Brown (hereinafter
19
known as P.B.).
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7. JUDY RODGERS (“herein after known as J.R.”), a natural person, is a private
21
individual within the meaning of California law and is a citizen of the United States, and
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at all times relevant hereto a resident of Alaska. Plaintiff is the grandmother of minor
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children, Melony Rodgers (hereinafter known as M.R.), Harmony Rodgers (hereinafter
24
known as H.R.), Symphony Brown (hereinafter known as S.B.), and Preston Brown
25
(hereinafter known as P.B.).
26
8. Plaintiffs and minor children, Melony Rodgers (hereinafter known as M.R.),
27
Harmony Rodgers (hereinafter known as H.R.), Symphony Brown (hereinafter known as
28
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S.B.), and Preston Brown (hereinafter known as P.B.), natural persons, are private
2 individuals within the meaning of California law and is a citizen of the United States, and
3 at all times relevant hereto a resident of California and children of Plaintiff MELODY
4 RODGERS.
5 9. STATE OF CALIFORNIA (“Defendant”) ”), a government agency, doing
6 business in the County of Los Angeles, within the laws of the State of California.
7 10. LOS ANGELES COUNTY (“Defendant”) a government agency, doing business
8 in the County of Los Angeles, within the laws of the State of California.
9 11. CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER (“Defendant”) doing business in the County of
10 Los Angeles, provides legal representation for children and youth under the jurisdiction
11 of the dependency court.
12 12. KERNELL BROWN (“Defendant”), natural person, is private individuals within
13 the meaning of California law and is a citizen of the United States, and at all times
14 relevant hereto a resident of California and father of Melony Rodgers (hereinafter known
15 as M.R.), Harmony Rodgers (hereinafter known as H.R.), Symphony Brown (hereinafter
16 known as S.B.), and Preston Brown (hereinafter known as P.B.).
17 13. Defendants and each of them have denied and prevented plaintiffs from the right
18 to privacy, the right to familial association, the right to speak to each other freely, and the
19 due process right to bring up her child without government interference.
20 A. DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS
21 14. bobby D. Cagle (“Cagle”) was the Director of the Los Angeles County
22 Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). At all times herein mentioned
23 Defendant “Cagle” was a government employee for the County of LOS ANGELES, that
24 had a duty to protect Plaintiffs and to ensure that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were
25 not violated.
26 15. Cagle was the LOS ANGELES foster system official responsible for the proper
27 operation of the foster care system and ensuring that the system operated in accordance
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with federal and state law, for which the federal government provides annual funding to
2 operate the system.
3 16. Cagle maliciously signed numerous false reports regarding Plaintiff M.R. and her
4 family and presenting them to the juvenile court to maliciously prosecute mother and
5 obtain an adverse action against her between the dates of March 2021 to present.
6 17. Cagle also negligently hired numerous social workers who were unlicensed,
7 unqualified and inexperienced for their jobs. DEFENDANT then failed to supervise and
8 oversee the unlicensed workers who were working under other unlicensed workers
9 which is a breach of DEFENDANTS duty of care to Plaintiffs.
10 18. During Cagle’s tenure as the head of DCFS he failed to respond to PLAINTIFFS’
11 numerous complaints and communication regarding social worker misconduct, and the
12 denial of minor children’s kinship care arrangement, which is a willful disregard for
13 correct policy and procedure.
14 19. Cagle harmed PLAINTIFFS by separating them without due process and using
15 perjury and false light misrepresentation of mom’s true character. On all occasions he
16 excluded exculpatory evidence surrounding incidents described in the social workers
17 report that were presented to the court.
18 B. GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM
19 20. Newsom is the Governor of the State of California, the head of the executive
20 branch of the California government and the person responsible for the proper operation
21 of the foster care system, including the portions of the system operated by the California
22 Department of Children and Families Services [DCFS]). By law Governor is responsible
23 for the proper administration of DCFS, assuring DCFS operates in conformity with State
24 and federal law and in compliance with the agreement with the federal government under,
25 inter alia, the Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Family First Prevention Services
26 Act of 2018.
27 21. Newsom as executive officer of California, the Governor is responsible not only
28 for the hiring and continued employment of Brandon T. Nicolson, Director of Los
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Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services but also to make sure that
2 he and the DCFS personnel are not abusing their positions.
3 22. Newsom is also responsible under State law for oversight of DCFS compliance
4 with the mandatory provisions of the California law relating to dependency cases, foster
5 care, and termination of parental rights and is responsible for ensuring DCFS protects the
6 federally protected civil rights of foster children and their biological families by ensuring
7 that once children are removed from their biological parents, they are placed with
8 biological family members if they cannot be safely returned to their Birth Parents.
9 23. Newsom is also responsible for making sure that the Foster System Operators do
10 not provide perjured testimony to the dependency courts, do not withhold pertinent
11 information, or mislead the court about applicable law, and to make sure those operating
12 the California foster system follow the law, rather than ignoring it to unlawfully separate
13 foster children from their relatives, so they can be placed with nonrelative system
14 connected personnel.
15 24. Since Newsom assumed office in January 2019, he has overseen the operations of
16 the California foster care system and tolerated actions taken by the other foster system-
17 connected Defendants in a manner contrary to law.
18 25. MICHEL H. EISNER; MARY THERESA MEZA; CARVIN HALL; SONIA
19 VALIENTE and at all times herein mentioned, were government employees who were
20 employed by the County of Los Angeles, acting under color of law, who had a special
21 relationship with Plaintiffs and owed a duty, to comply with State laws, Federal Laws and
22 the U.S. Constitution, but breached their duties owed to Plaintiffs by taking Plaintiff’s
23 children and placing them into a foster home, without cause.
24 26. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Los Angeles Department of Children and Family
25 Services; Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles were government
26 agencies and/or entities acting under color of law, who had a special relationship with
27 plaintiff and owed a duty, to comply with State laws, Federal Laws and the U.S.
28
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Constitution, but breached their duties owed to Plaintiff by taking Plaintiff’s child and
2 placing the child with foster parents or persons other than the biological parents.
3 27. JERRY BROWN at such time was Governor for the state of California, who
4 lives in the Los Angeles County, and at all times herein mentioned resided in the County
5 of Los Angeles:
6 28. XAVIER BECERRA – Los Angeles Attorney General, employed for the Los
7 Angeles District Attorney’s Office;
8 29. ROB BONTO – Los Angeles Attorney General, employed for the Los Angeles
9 District Attorney’s Office
10 30. MARY C. WICKHAM Los Angeles Attorney General, employed for the Los
11 Angeles District Attorney’s Office
12 31. RODRIGO A. CASTRO-SILVA – Los Angeles County Counsel
13 32. GEORGE GASCON – Los Angeles District Attorney
14 conspired and colluded with Kernell Brown to assault, batter, harass, and stalk
15 Plaintiff mom. Gascon failed to prosecute K.B. for his attack
16 33. Defendant KERNELL BROWN (“K.B.) – Father of Plaintiff’s Children
17 34. MICHEL H. EISNER – Deputy County Counsel for DCFS
18 35. DAE YEON KIM – Deputy County Counsel for DCFS
19 36. VERONICA J RANDAZZO # 292261- Deputy County Counsel for DCFS
20 37. JOSEPH S. LEE #295176 – Deputy County Counsel for DCFS
21 LEE acted as Suppressed information about the lengthy criminal record of
22 Defendant Kernell Brown which includes 7 felonies,
23 38. LINDA SUN #207108– Judge of Superior Court of Los Angeles County
24 39. STEPHEN C. MARPET - Commissioner of Superior Court of Los Angeles
25 County
26 40. MARY THERESA MEZA
27 41. CARVIN HALL – Social Worker
28 42. SONIA VALIENTE – Social Worker

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43. GENET ABERA - Social Worker
2 44. HEIDI MARTINEZ - Supervising Social Worker
3 45. MIA DRAKE – Dependency Investigator Social Worker
4 46. TEELA ALLEN – Social Worker
5 47. LASEAN DAVIS – Children’s Social Worker
6 Authorized and Initiated medical procedures upon PLAINTIFF mom’s children
7 without consent. Around August 4, 2021 DAVIS
8 48. GREG CHASE – Supervising Social Worker
9 49. KENT BENNET - Supervising Social Worker
10 50. NICOLE WADE – Social Worker
11 51. RAE’SHONDA LEVINGSTON – Social Worker
12 52. REGINA MINOR – Children’s Social Worker
13 53. MARCAL MAYE-HENDERSON GH22S2217 – Dependency Investigator &
14 Supervising Children’s Social Worker
15 54. ALLANA DARTER – Dependency Investigator o
16 55. DARRYLLISHA BURCH-PARKER – Supervising Children’s Social Worker
17 56. NGIM LOCK - Social Worker
18 57. YVETTE RAMIREZ - Social Worker
19 58. MICHEL MOORE – Chief of Los Angeles Police Department
20 59. PAUL SANDATE #36567 Los Angeles Police Department
21 Failed to act as a reasonable police officer when he refused to take statements
22 from neighbors and witnesses to determine the facts of the incidents between
23 PLAINTIFF MOM and BROWN.
24 60. He also refused to acknowledge and enforce a restraining order PLAINTIFF
25 MOM had obtained from LOS ANGELES SUPERIOUR COURT.
26 Committed perjury on the stand.
27 61. Asked PLAINTIFF MOM embarrassing personal questions about her sexual
28 identity and preferences while she was handcuffed and falsely imprisoned.
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Lied to PLAINTIFF MOM and detained children without a Social Worker present
2 while telling her there was one present and that she was
3 62. Police Officer of Los Angeles Police Department
4 63. OFFICER CORTEZ #38622–Police Officer Los Angeles Police Department
5 64. JOSEPH S. CASTIEL # - Mother’s Private Criminal Defense Attorney
6 65. JOE (last name unknown) – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
7 66. FRANK OSTROV – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
8 67. MELINEH HATAMIAN – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
9 68. NITI GUPTA – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
10 69. KREE DONALYN FILER – Mother Court’s Appointed Attorney
11 70. LESLIE S. HEIMOV - Executive Director of Children's Law Center of
12 California
13 71. ANGELA TORRES – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of Children's
14 Law Center of California
15 72. JAMIE N. KIM – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of Children's Law
16 Center of California
17 73. MARGARET LEE – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of Children's
19 74. ALYSON BASHOR – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of Children's
21 75. Michael Moore is the Chief of Police (COP) of the Los Angeles Police
22 Department (LAPD). As a general manager of the Police Department, the COP is
23 responsible for the planning, efficient administration and operation of the Police
24 Department under the authority of the Board of Police Commissioners.
25 76. Michael Moore, the COP directs, plans, and coordinates the enforcement of the
26 penal divisions of the City Charter, the ordinances of the City, and the laws of the
27 state and nation for the purpose of protecting persons and property and for the
28 preservation of the peace of the community. The COP is responsible for testifying
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before the City Council, the state and national legislative bodies on law
2 enforcement matters of importance to the City of Los Angeles, as well as
3 proposing new or amending existing legislation which could have an impact on
4 law enforcement.
5 77. Leslie S. Heimov
6 78. Heimov is the Executive Director of the Children's Law Center of California.
7 Children's Law Center of California represents children who have been abused,
8 neglected, or abandoned that come under the protection of the Los Angeles,
9 Sacramento, or Placer County Juvenile Dependency Court systems.
10 79. Leslie S. Heimov; CLC is a public interest law firm that provides legal
11 representation for children impacted by abuse and neglect. CLC attorneys,
12 investigators, peer advocates and support staff advocate for their clients utilizing a
13 multidisciplinary model of representation. Every staff member at CLC contributes
14 to infusing every proceeding and decision that’s made with the premise that kids
15 should be with their parents whenever possible.
16 80. GAVIN NEWSOM – Governor of California
17 81. XAVIER BECERRA – California Attorney General
18 82. ROB BONTO – California Attorney General
19 83. MARY C WICKHAM – Los Angeles County Counsel (2016-2020)
20 84. RODRIGO A. CASTRO-SILVA – Los Angeles County Counsel
21 85. GEORGE GASCON – Los Angeles District Attorney
22 86. Defendant KERNELL BROWN – Father of Plaintiff’s Children
23 87. MICHEL H. EISNER – Deputy County Counsel of Los Angeles County
24 Department of Children and Family Services
25 88. DAE YEON KIM – Deputy County Counsel of Los Angeles County
27 89. VERONICA J RANDAZZO # 292261- Deputy County Counsel of

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90. JOSEPH S. LEE #295176 – Deputy County Counsel for Los Angeles County
2 91. LINDA SUN #207108– Judge of Superior Court of Los Angeles County
3 92. STEPHEN C. MARPET - Commissioner of Superior Court of Los Angeles
4 County
5 93. BOBBY D. CAGLE - Director of Los Angeles County Department of
6 Children and Family Services
7 94. MARY THERESA MEZA - Emergency Investigator of Los Angeles County
9 95. CARVIN HALL – Social Worker of Los Angeles County Department of
11 96. SONIA VALIENTE – Dependency Investigator of Los Angeles County
13 97. GENET ABERA - Social Worker of Los Angeles County Department of
14 Children and Family
15 98. HEIDI MARTINEZ - Supervising Social Worker of Los Angeles County
17 99. MIA DRAKE – Dependency Investigator Social Worker of Los Angeles
18 County Department of Children and Family Services
19 100. TEELA ALLEN – Social Worker of Los Angeles County Department
20 of Children and Family Services
21 101. LASEAN DAVIS – Children’s Social Worker of Los Angeles County
23 102. GREG CHASE – Supervising Social Worker of Los Angeles County
25 103. KENT BENNET - Supervising Social Worker of Los Angeles County
27 104. NICOLE WADE – Social Worker of Los Angeles County Department
28 of Children and Family Services

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105. RAE’SHONDA LEVINGSTON – Social Worker of Los Angeles
2 County Department of Children and Family Services
3 106. REGINA MINOR – Children’s Social Worker of Los Angeles County
5 107. MARCAL MAYE-HENDERSON GH22S2217 – Dependency
6 Investigator & Supervising Children’s Social Worker of Los Angeles County
8 108. ALLANA DARTER – Dependency Investigator of Los Angeles County
10 109. DARRYLLISHA BURCH-PARKER - Supervising Children’s Social
11 Worker of Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
12 110. NGIM LOCK - Social Worker of Los Angeles County Department of
14 111. YVETTE RAMIREZ - Social Worker of Los Angeles County
16 112. MICHEL MOORE – Chief of Los Angeles Police Department
17 113. PAUL SANDATE #36567 – Police Officer of Los Angeles Police
18 Department
19 114. OFFICER CORTEZ #38622 – Police Officer Los Angeles Police
20 Department
21 115. JOSEPH S. CASTIEL # - Mother’s Private Criminal Defense Attorney
22 116. JOE (last name unknown) – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
23 117. FRANK OSTROV – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
24 118. MELINEH HATAMIAN – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
25 119. NITI GUPTA – Mother’s Court Appointed Attorney
26 120. KREE DONALYN FILER – Mother Court’s Appointed Attorney
27 121. LESLIE S. HEIMOV, Executive Director of Children's Law Center of
28 California
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122. ANGELA TORRES – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of
2 Children's Law Center of California
3 123. JAMIE N. KIM – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of Children's
4 Law Center of California 1
5 124. MARGARET LEE – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of
7 125. ALYSON BASHOR – Children’s Court Appointed Attorney of
9
10 126. Plaintiff is currently ignorant of the true names and capacities, whether
11 individual, corporate, associates or otherwise, of the Defendants sued herein by fictitious
12 names, and therefore sues them as Does 1 through 10, inclusive, pursuant to California
13 Code of Civil Procedure, section 474. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their
14 true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff are informed and believe, and on
15 the basis allege, that each of such fictitiously named Defendant is responsible in some
16 manner for the wrongdoing alleged herein and/or liable to Plaintiff.
17 127. Plaintiff is informed and believe, and on the basis allege, that during the
18 times mentioned herein, Defendants collectively, and each of them are the agents,
19 employees, partners, joint venturers, representatives, coconspirators, and assigns of their
20 co-defendants and were, as such, acting within the scope, course, and authority of such
21 agency, employment, partnership, joint venture, representation, conspiracy, and/or
22 assignment, unless the context states otherwise.
23
24 IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

25 128. Plaintiff, Melody J. Rodgers (hereinafter Melody), has four children:
26 Melony Rodgers (born January 2013), Harmony Rodgers (born July 2015), Symphony
27 Brown (born February 2017), and Preston Brown (born February 2018).
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129. Plaintiff is a college graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
2 Hill and is currently a 2nd-year law student at the Northwestern California University
3 School of Law. Plaintiff is also an award-winning, well-respected former public-school
4 teacher. She taught inner-city youth in Baltimore MD and Washington DC for 5 years
5 through non-profit programs Teach for America, Education Based Latino Outreach, and
6 Financial Literacy Foundation.
7 130. Plaintiff taught all elementary school subjects including the 1st Grade &
8 5th Grade as well as High School Finance, which is a category of the Home Economics
9 curriculum. All her students passed the end-of-year testing regardless of disability or
10 aptitude.
11 131. Plaintiff is also a God-fearing mother of four whose aim has always been to
12 bring her children to be respectful, hardworking, contributing members of society with
13 good morals and ethics based on the Holy Bible.
14 132. Plaintiff's Civil Rights and Due Process rights have been violated by
15 California Foster System Operators since 2016.
16
17 a) Melony and Harmony Rodgers

18 133. After the birth of her old daughter, Melody and the children were homeless
19 until December 2015, when they moved into an apartment.
20 134. In fact, on February 2016, Melody told her therapist, ER worker Monica
21 Rosenblum, that she has been doing poorly in school and had wanted to drop her class.
22 She told her therapist she needs a doctor’s note stating that she could not handle the
23 stress, in order to withdraw from classes at university. Rosenblum falsely reported to
24 DCFS that Plaintiff had expressed or implied that she planned on harming her kids
25 despite Melody, during that time, denying all those statements. Moreover, Rosenblum
26 falsely stated she was a medical doctor.
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135. On February 23, 2016, DCFS conducted an assessment at Melody’s
2 apartment and the Department referred Melody to Kedren Community Health
3 Center.
4 136. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, DCFS Social Worker, Michel H. Eisner, filed a
5 false Juvenile Dependency Petition against Plaintiff and her children. DCFS's
6 basis for their petition for Juvenile Dependency against the restrained children has
7 based on an allegation that the parents were not good parents. Plaintiff was denied
8 due process and was denied the right to present evidence on their behalf.
9 137. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Commission Stephen Marpet made false
10 statements to the public regarding Plaintiffs’ criminal history, as means of
11 preventing Plaintiff from obtaining gainful employment. Additionally, Defendants
12 prevented Plaintiff from adequate visits with her children and never allowed
13 "reunification services" as normally provided under Welfare & Institutions Code §
14 300 et. seq..
15 138. During the month of December 2016, Melody had online services with a
16 therapist.
17 139. On March 22, 2016, the juvenile court found that Melony and Harmony
18 were children described by section 300, subdivision (b)(l) without a valid cause.
19 The sustained section 300 petition documented that Plaintiff suffered from mental
20 and emotional problems that rendered her incapable of providing regular care for
21 Melony and Harmony.
22 140. Plaintiff was getting psychological counseling as was declared fit by her
23 psychologist and the same was communicated to _______ Abera, Social Worker
24 of the DCFS. It was written in the letter of Plaintiff's psychologist to the Children
25 Social Worker Department of Child and Family Services that, "It appears that
26 Melody has now corrected most of the areas of difficulty and is a fully committed
27 mother. She spent considerable time this Christmas season making a nice holiday
28
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for her children but also for her neighbors in her new apartment, helping others
2 who were alone."
3 141. Plaintiff has evidence, in the report of Sharon Valentino, which states that
4 she began seeing Melody in December 2016 until about the end of January.
5 Valentino states that Melody saw her for issues relating to her children & her
6 parenting of the children & concluded that all problems that she previously had are
7 now resolved & that she is now able to be a good mother & could have them full
8 time to properly raise her children. However, DCFS did not communicate the
9 latest medical update to the court and hence made the court make a major error in
10 its judgment.
11 142. On March 27, 2016, after Melony indicated to their mother the caregiver
12 had spanked her, Melody refused to return the children to their shelter caregiver
13 after a visit took the children to a police station. The police and an in-house social
14 worker found no evidence of abuse and released the children to the caregiver.
15 143. On April 06, 2016, the juvenile court placed Melony and Harmony with
16 their maternal grandmother, Judy Rodgers.
17 144. From April through September 2016, Melody resumed therapy at Keedren
18 where the assigned psychiatrist after evaluation did not recommend medication
19 and participated in at least seven sessions ranging in duration from 30 to 90
20 minutes.
21 145. On August 2017, a Keedren therapist reported that Melody had “been
22 working on treatment goals which include utilizing positive coping skills to
23 manage daily stressors and positive parenting psycho-education.” He reported that
24 Melody had been compliant over the past four months with her mental health
25 treatment and that she denied ideations of self-harm and harm to others. The
26 therapist also reported that she presents engaged in sessions and motivated to
27 complete the court-ordered plan.
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146. On September 20, 2017, the DCFS recommended terminating family
2 reunification services. Despite the Department acknowledging that Melody
3 appeared to be in literal compliance with her court-ordered programs, including
4 individual therapy and parenting classes, and relayed Plaintiff’s expression of love
5 and affection for her daughters, sustained that it believed “mother's continued
6 unpredictable behavior would be detrimental to M.R.'s and H.R.'s health and
7 safety, particularly at their young ages.”
8 147. During the weekend of October 7 and 8, 2017, Melody and her maternal
9 grandmother had an argument that led to a physical altercation. Mother had taken
10 maternal grandmother's car to the carwash and, while there, threw away some
11 items that had been in the car. Maternal grandmother became outraged when she
12 found out. The argument became physical and maternal grandmother reported to
13 DCFS that she had filed a police report. Melody immediately told to DCFS social
14 workers that, when maternal grandmother found out that she had thrown out her
15 things, she pushed and scratched her and was acting like "a crazy maniac". This
16 event would play a significant role in the court's ultimate decision.
17 148. On November 15, 2017, the Department filed an ex-parte application
18 pursuant to section 385 to modify Plaintiff’s visitations from unmonitored to
19 monitored.
20 149. By January 2017 Melody has completed at least 12 sessions of parental
21 education classes.
22 150. On February 13, 2018, the juvenile court terminated Plaintiff’s family
23 reunification services stating that Melody failed to take responsibility for her
24 actions and also failed to recognize how her behavior was alarming and could
25 potentially be harmful to her children.
26 151. In May 2019, the Juvenile Court ordered legal guardianship for Melony and
27 Harmony with their maternal grandmother.
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b) Symphony and Preston Brown
2 152. Defendant Kernell Sterling Brown Jr. (hereinafter Kernell) is the father of
3 Symphony and Preston.
4 153. Melody met Defendant Kernell in 2016. At that time, Melody was
5 emotionally traumatized and devasted because her first two children Melony and
6 Harmony had recently been taken by DCFS.
7 154. Defendant Kernell was nice to Melody on most occasions but, as neighbors
8 can testify, when he drank alcohol became a completely different person. He
9 would become angry, used to get into arguments with the neighbors, and
10 physically abuse Melody for any reason. On one of these occasions, Defendant
11 Kernell demanded Melody's keys to her white Ford Explorer. When Melody
12 refused to give him the keys, he hit her in the head and made her give him the
13 keys. After he took the keys, he drove Plaintiff's SUV into the neighbor's car in
14 the same parking lot by flooring the gas pedal and colliding with a neighbor’s
15 car. After the collision with a parked vehicle, Defendant Kernell fell asleep in the
16 driver's seat and a male neighbor had to come and pull him from the car and put
17 the vehicle brakes on. The neighbor complained to Defendant Kernell that he had
18 ruined her car and he promised to pay her $100 a month for the car which was
19 worth about $600. Defendant Kernell begged Melody for the money to pay her
20 and when Melody refused to give it to him, he smacked her, stole the debit card,
21 and went to get some money.
22 155. According to Cal. Pen. Code § 13701 (b), “Every law enforcement agency
23 in this state shall develop, adopt, and implement written policies and standards for
24 officers' responses to domestic violence calls by January 1, 1986. These policies
25 shall reflect that domestic violence is alleged criminal conduct. Further, they shall
26 reflect existing policy that a request for assistance in a situation involving
27 domestic violence is the same as any other request for assistance where violence
28 has occurred.”
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1
156. Here, each time Defendant Kernell hit Melody she called the police and
2 reported the incidents, but LAPD Officers refused to arrest Defendant Kernell
3 because Melody didn't have any physical marks or bruises. As to the records, there
4 were seven domestic violence calls for this address, but Defendant Kernell was
5 never arrested.
6 157. Melody, at that time victim of domestic violence without law protection,
7 began making plans to leave Defendant Kernell and started saving money and
8 looking for another apartment. Melody takes two jobs, she drove for Uber on
9 weekends and worked as a substitute teacher for private schools on the
10 weekday. Defendant Kernell noticed Melody was making plans to leave and
11 started accusing her of adultery.
12 158. On September 19, 2018, Melody came home from the gym. Defendant
13 Kernell was drunk out of his mind and started accusing her of cheating. Melody
14 kindly ignored the accusations and went into the kitchen to make dinner for the
15 family. Defendant Kernell started shouting obscenities and Melody called him “a
16 drunk.” Kernell went into the bedroom and got his baseball bat and started hitting
17 Melody with it on the bottom half of the body. Each time the baseball bat hit his
18 body, Melody apologizes for calling him a drunk. Kernell then dragged Melody
19 by his braids, stripped her of his house robe, and threw her outside completely
20 naked. The upstairs neighbor heard Melody screaming and threw her a house robe
21 to wear so she would not be naked outside. Alecia Ward, another neighbor, called
22 the police and a third neighbor allowed Melody to wait in her house until the
23 police arrived. This time, Kernell was finally arrested and taken to jail.
24 159. While Kernell was in jail he sent his family members to harass Melody. On
25 October 20, 2018, Melody had to call the police to get Kernell’s adult daughter to
26 leave the home after Kernell give her the keys to enter the house.
27
28
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19
1
160. On October 26, 2018, Melody was granted a restraining order against
2 Kernell and his adult daugther as well as sole physical custody of minor children
3 Symphony and Preston.
4 161. On December 23, 2018, Kernell came back to Melody's home despite a
5 restraining order. He came back with his adult daughters and tried to get into the
6 home using force. Kernell drilled the locks off the door and came in with his
7 daughters. When Melody tried to shut the door and keep them out, a physical
8 altercation began to occur, and Melody was forced to use physical force to expel
9 the aggressors and protect herself. Kernell and his daughter called the police and
10 LAPD Officer Sandate arrested Melody for PC-245(A)(1).
11 162. According to Cal. Pen. Code § 13701 (b), LAPD Officers “shall encourage
12 the arrest of domestic violence offenders if there is probable cause that an offense
13 has been committed. These policies also shall require the arrest of an offender,
14 absent exigent circumstances, if there is probable cause that a protective order
15 issued under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2040) of Part 1 of Division 6,
16 Division 10 (commencing with Section 6200), or Chapter 6 (commencing with
17 Section 7700) of Part 3 of Division 12, of the Family Code, or Section 136.2 of
18 this code, or by a court of any other state, a commonwealth, territory, or insular
19 possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, a military tribunal, or a
20 tribe has been violated. These policies shall discourage, when appropriate, but not
21 prohibit, dual arrests. Peace officers shall make reasonable efforts to identify the
22 dominant aggressor in any incident. The dominant aggressor is the person
23 determined to be the most significant, rather than the first, aggressor. In
24 identifying the dominant aggressor, an officer shall consider the intent of the
25 law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse, the threats
26 creating fear of physical injury, the history of domestic violence between the
27 persons involved, and whether either person acted in self-defense.”
28
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20
1
163. Immunity does not apply when excessive use of force by a police officer or
2 negligent performance of a police officer's duties. (Robinson v. Solano County (9th
3 Cir. 2002) 278 F.3d 1007, 1016.)
4 164. A victim who has acted reasonably to defend oneself or another from harm
5 is not subject to arrest. This provision is intended to prevent police officers from
6 arresting the victim along with the abuser, and recognizes the fact that victims
7 have the right and may try to defend themselves without being subject to arrest. If
8 an officer investigates and has probable cause to believe that a domestic abuse
9 assault occurred but the victim was not injured, the officer may arrest the abuser,
10 although is not required to do so. Moreover, the officer must find out if there are
11 any no-contact or protective orders in effect against the abuser, and enforce such
12 orders. Here, Officer Sandate did not arrest Kernell even though he know that
13 Kernell was the dominant aggressor, that he was out on bail and had violated a
14 restraining order; he refused to hear Melody and the testimony of neighbors that
15 would immediately clarify the facts that she was acted in self-defense and indeed
16 arrested the victim, Melody.
17 165. On December 23, 2018, DCFS received a referral alleging Symphony and
18 Preston were victims of emotional abuse due to a reported altercation between
19 mother and father where mother attempted to attack father with a butcher knife
20 and she was arrested.
21 166. On January 2019, the DCFS social worker reported completing an
22 unannounced visit at Plaintiff’s home and found that the mother and the two
23 children Preston and Symphony were not in the home. In fact, Melody to protect
24 herself and the children from Kernell had already moved to North Carolina, her
25 home state.
26 167. On February 14, 2019, DCFS filed an initial section 300 petition on behalf
27 of the children. The petition alleged the children “were at substantial risk of
28 suffering serious physical harm based on the violent physical and verbal
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21
1
altercation between mother and father (counts a-1 and b-1), and mother's mental
2 and emotional problems (count b-2).”
3 168. On February 15, 2019, at the detention hearing, neither parent appeared in
4 the juvenile court. The juvenile court detained the children from both parents and
5 issued protective custody warrants for the children and a no-bail arrest warrant for
6 Melody.
7 169. Notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing, with a copy of the
8 petition attached, must be served as soon as possible after the petition is filed and
9 no less than 24 hours in advance of the hearing if the child is detained. (§§ 290.1,
10 290.2.) If the whereabouts of the parents are unknown, the agency must exercise
11 due diligence (i.e., conduct a good faith inquiry that is thorough and systematic) to
12 locate and notice the parent. Failure to give notice to a parent of dependency
13 proceedings violates due process and is “fatal” to the court’s jurisdiction. (In re
14 Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236.) Insufficient notice would mean that the
15 jurisdictional and subsequent findings are subject to reversal on appeal. (In re
16 Arlyne A. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598–600.) The court cannot assume
17 jurisdiction over a minor when his whereabouts were unknown. (In re Baby Boy
18 M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588, 601-602.)
19 170. Here, Plaintiff, that resides in North Carolina, was not present because has
20 no notice of the detention hearing. DCFS, as reported, knows that Melody and her
21 children were whereabouts unknown but did not make any efforts to locate them
22 and to give appropriate notice to Plaintiff of dependency proceedings.
23 171. On March 05, 2019, the father Kernell Brown Jr. informed DCFS that “he
24 is a Truck driver and he is currently in Oklahoma (where he’ll be for the next two
25 months); afterward, he will be in Texas. Father denied knowing the mother and
26 children’s exact whereabouts but reported that they were “somewhere in North
27 Carolina. Father was informed about the protective custody warrants on the
28 children and warrant of arrest on the mother…. Father reported that the children
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22
1
are safe and well cared by mother as she often FaceTime’s him so that he is able to
2 see/speak with the children. Father stated that he is not pressing criminal charges
3 against mother but mentioned that he is no longer in a relationship with mother
4 due to their discord.”
5 172. On March 07, 2019, Melody's grandmother, Judy Rodgers, reported “They
6 (children) are with her (Melody) in North Carolina.”
7 173. On July 17, 2019, DCFS received an immediate response referral alleging
8 Kernell sexually abused his granddaughter, R.B.
9 174. On 31 July 2019 Melody was in Los Angeles, to address criminal charges
10 pending against her as a result of the same incident that DCFS is referring to in
11 their reports and allegations. At the trial, Melody was exonerated of all charges by
12 an impartial jury who decided that Melody was acting in self-defense in his own
13 home. At the trial, LAPD Officer Paul Sandate also committed perjury during the
14 testimony on the stand.
15 175. After the trial, declared not guilty of any crime, Melody returned to pick up
16 his children from Kernell's sister's house who was helping her as a babysitter, and
17 found out that Kernell had taken his children. Melody went immediately to
18 Kernel's house to retrieve his children and was forcibly restrained inside the
19 bathroom by Kernell.
20 176. On the same day, Commission Stephen Marpet sent law enforcement,
21 officer Sandate, and DCFS social workers to Kernell’s home who refused to let
22 them in without a warrant.
23 177. On the same evening, Commissioner Marpet granted DCFS requests for an
24 expedited removal order and requests to dispense with notice of the removal order
25 to detain the children from mother and father. DCFS does not present substantial
26 evidence that Melody was failing at fulfilling any of her responsibilities or had any
27 criminal record related to mental illness.
28
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23
1
178. Commissioner Marpet and Officer Sandate were aware of the outcome of
2 the criminal case against Melody and knew that she did not pose any threat to his
3 children based on actions taken in self-defense. They were aware or should have
4 been aware that Melody has full custody of the children and that they cannot
5 remove custody from Kernell who had already lost it. Therefore, the order was
6 unsupported by probable cause and, therefore, violated Plaintiff's federal
7 constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
8 179. DCFS social workers and law enforcement Officer Sandate, as video
9 recorded by Plaintiff, found Melody locked in the bathroom with her children.
10 They know or should know that Melody had already been a victim of domestic
11 violence by Kernell and that Kernell had already segregated Melody other times
12 against his will but, instead of protecting Melody and her children and keeping
13 them safe from the aggressor, DCFS Social Workers detained the children and
14 Officer Sandate arrested Melody pursuant to the no-bail arrest warrant and
15 violated again his duty to protect Melody.
16 180. DCFS social workers falsely declared on their report that the parents
17 actively concealed the children. In fact, as previously reported, they know that
18 Melody had been resident in North Carolina for nearly 7 months and she had sole
19 physical custody of the children who were also residents of Charlotte, North
20 Carolina. They were aware that Melody had relocated to North Carolina
21 immediately after the attack and was only visiting California temporarily to fight a
22 criminal case. Melody relocating away from Kernell with children and supporting
23 them independently demonstrated a change in circumstance that the department
24 refused to acknowledge. Unless social services had a reason to believe that the
25 child was in danger, it did not have a compelling reason to separate the child from
26 his mother. On information and belief, LAPD Officer Sandate and DCFS Social
27 worker acted with malice and with the intent to cause injury to Plaintiff or acted
28
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24
1
with a willful and conscious disregard to the rights of Plaintiff in a despicable, vile
2 and contemptible manner.
3 181. Making false statements in a dependency petition with the intent that the
4 court rely on it, causing the parents to temporarily lose custody, seriously infringes
5 on a parent’s constitutional rights. See Beltran, 2008 WL 193319, at *1 (no
6 absolute immunity where a social worker “fabricated evidence during an
7 investigation or made false statements in a dependency petition affidavit.”).
8 182. According to California Code, Government Code - GOV § 820.21:
9 (a) “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the civil immunity of juvenile
10 court social workers, child protection workers, and other public employees
11 authorized to initiate or conduct investigations or proceedings pursuant to
12 Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 200) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the
13 Welfare and Institutions Code shall not extend to any of the following, if
14 committed with malice:
15 (1) Perjury.
16 (2) Fabrication of evidence.
17 (3) Failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence.
18 (4) Obtaining testimony by duress, as defined in Section 1569 of the Civil
19 Code , fraud, as defined in either Section 1572 or Section 1573 of the Civil
20 Code , or undue influence, as defined in Section 1575 of the Civil Code .
21 (b) As used in this section, “malice” means conduct that is intended by the person
22 described in subdivision (a) to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
23 conduct that is carried on by the person described in subdivision (a) with a
24 willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”
25 183. On August 2, 2019, 48 hours after the kids, Plaintiff was supposed to be an
26 initial/detention hearing, in order to meet federal legal time limits; however, after
27 heading to Edelman Children's Court on the bus from the detention center, Melody
28
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25
1
was told to return back to jail for the weekend as the matter had been continued
2 without reason. (Cal. Juv. Rule 5.670).
3 184. Here, Commissioner Stephen Marpet after issuing a warrant to arrest
4 Melody on a non-arrestable offense, held Plaintiff in prison longer than the 48
5 hours of detention hearing window thus depriving her of her substantive and
6 procedural due process rights not to be held without just cause and although her
7 case was set for hearing he continued it without justification. Defendants’ actions
8 in detaining and mistreating Plaintiff were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
9 discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, in violation of the
10 constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, and without observance of
11 procedure required by law.
12 185. On August 5, 2019, Commissioner Stephen Marpet exacted cruel and
13 unusual punishment upon Plaintiff when he refused to allow her to return to the
14 location that contained her clothing and personal property. Defendant released
15 Plaintiff from juvenile court jail cells where she had to wear a black paper suit as
16 clothing. As a result of this suit, Melody faced public shame and humiliation and
17 was regarded as a criminal although she never committed any crime.
18 186. On August 5, 2019, Frank Ostrov court-appointed attorney for Plaintiff
19 sign a document from the county, providing Plaintiff's children’s personal
20 information; including their date of birth and social security number, while she
21 was behind bars in a children’s court jail cell and under duress. Moreover, Ostrov
22 gave to his client false information and bad legal advice when he stated that “it is
23 not possible to appeal the case until the end of the trial.” This essentially denied
24 Plaintiff of effective legal counsel to preserve her right to a fair hearing.
25 187. On August 23, 2019, DCFS filed the operative first amended section 300
26 petition on behalf of the children. The amended petition contained the original
27 counts and additional allegations that the children were at substantial risk of
28 suffering serious physical harm and sexual abuse based upon the father's sexual
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26
1
abuse of his granddaughter and his adult children when they were children (counts
2 b-3, d-1, and j-1). DCFS perseveres with the same allegation against Plaintiff by
3 omitting with malice exculpatory evidence on their records.
4 188. On December 3, 2019, the juvenile court held a trial-setting conference and
5 appointed new counsel to represent the mother. Counsel for Plaintiff requested that
6 the dependency investigator (DI) and the social worker be placed on call for the
7 adjudication hearing. The court ordered the DI on call.
8 189. On December 17, 2020, the Juvenile Court of Los Angeles along with its
9 court officers conspired together to prevent the court from receiving evidence in
10 the mother's favor. According to W & 1 C S 317, providing for the appointment of
11 counsel in dependency cases, a parent could waive counsel at any point and had
12 the right to represent him or herself. Here, Judge Sun denied Plaintiff’s request to
13 proceed pro se and refused to bear her case until Melody agreed for an appointed
14 attorney, Mel Hatamian, to represent her. Judge Sun suppressed Plaintiff's right to
15 present evidence and have a fair and unbiased hearing when not allowed witnesses
16 presented to the Court by Melody to testify. Moreover, Judge Sun continues the
17 case beyond the statutory limits to convenience the parties to the detriment of
18 Plaintiff's children who are languishing in foster care and removed from the home
19 and their relatives' love.
20 190. At this hearing, the Children's Law Center appointed attorney, Alyson
21 Bashor, breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff's children by going along with a
22 scam that harmed them and was in direct opposition to their expressed and
23 verbalized wishes of the children. They lied and said that the children could not
24 talk and therefore could not make a meaningful statement to the court when indeed
25 they have expressed their wishes to the attorney on several occasions. Plaintiff has
26 evidence by way of phone recording of children saying that they want to be
27 returned home and also the foster mom, Nakeya Clark, wanted to testify to that.
28
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27
1
191. On the same day, the children's appointed attorney deliberately lied to the
2 court to mislead the court by stating for the record that the children and foster
3 mom were not present to testify when indeed they were present in court and
4 wanted to testify. When Melody called the foster mom during court, she told
5 Melody that she was still waiting to testify but Alyson Bashor told them to leave
6 and come back later when she called. However, she never called them to come
7 back. Plaintiff managed to get Ms. Clark’s declaration admitted to court although
8 her device was muted.
9 192. Minor's Counsel carries a lot of weight with the courts. According to 2020
10 California Rules of Court Rule 5.242, Counsel is charged with the representation
11 of the child's best interest. Their role is to consider what is in the child's best
12 interests. They are a neutral voice for the child, without compromising the child's
13 rights or emotional well-being. According to 2020 California Rules of Court Rule
14 5.242, Counsel is charged with the representation of the child's best interest. The
15 role of the child's counsel is to gather evidence that bears on the best interest of the
16 child and present that admissible evidence to the court in any manner appropriate
17 for the counsel of a party. If the child so desires, the child's counsel must present
18 the child's wishes to the court.
19 193. On February 15, 2020, DCFS Social Worker Investigator, Teela Allen,
20 provided a report with knowingly false statements and intentional omissions of
21 exculpatory evidence in order to obtain a court judgment against Plaintiff. She
22 specifically made misrepresentations to conceal the fact that the aggressor and
23 domestic violence perpetrator was Kernell, not Melody and omitted a large portion
24 of Kernell’s lengthy criminal record to conceal his previous crimes of moral
25 turpitude.
26 194. Specifically, the Department asserted that in December 2018, mother
27 struck father’s back and chased him while holding a butcher knife and was
28 arrested for assault with a deadly weapon. The Department also asserted that on
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28
1
prior occasions mother refused to take her psychotropic medication and suffers
2 from paranoia, suicidal ideation, depression, anxiety, isolation, and erratic
3 behavior. On this basis, the Department alleged the children were in danger of
4 suffering physical harm based on domestic violence between mother and their
5 father (counts a-1 and b-1), and mother’s mental and emotional problems (count b-
6 2).
7 195. Here, Defendants maliciously and fraudulently omitted exculpatory
8 evidence. Defendant knows or should know that Plaintiff was declared not guilty
9 by a jury because she acted in self-defense and, therefore, cannot be considered a
10 danger to his children. Defendant maliciously omitted to inform the Court that
11 Plaintiff had already obtained a restriction order against father at the time of this
12 event and that Plaintiff has been relocated to North Carolina, far away from the
13 aggressor, to protect her and the children. Moreover, regarding Plaintiff’s mental
14 and emotional problems, the report of the Social Worker Investigator continues to
15 refer to contested hearsay allegations of 2016 even if they know or should know
16 that Melody had followed the plan ordered and had been observed by several
17 psychiatrists who have always stated that Melody has no mental and emotional
18 problems and does not need drug therapy. DCFS has never presented substantial
19 evidence of Plaintiff’s mental and emotional problems.
20 196. Bobby Cagle, head of DCFS, demonstrated bad faith business practices
21 under the UCC when he signed the aforementioned report that did not contain any
22 actual child abuse or neglect allegations to sustain a petition under the Welfare and
23 Institutions Code of California.
24 197. On February 20, 2020, after several contend continuance and without good
25 cause of justification, the juvenile court proceeded with the combined jurisdiction
26 and disposition hearing. The Court has continued the cases several times in
27 defiance of California Welfare Institutions Code Section 352 for the protection of
28 children in order to give DCFS time to find any speck of gossip and slander they
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29
1
can obtain from child abusers, perpetrators or domestic violence, and other
2 unreliable sources. Even though jurisdiction hearings cannot be held past 6 months
3 from when the children were detained on July 31, 2019. Commissioner Marpet
4 held a hearing for a continuance on his own motion for a hearing well into January
5 2021 more than 18 months past their detention.
6 198. At the hearing, the social worker report and police report were used as
7 evidence to substantiate their claim and no witnesses were called. Plaintiff’s court-
8 appointed attorney, Mel Hatamian, tried to convince Melody not to express her
9 true wishes to cross-examine the accusing social workers. Mel Hatamian acted in
10 her own best interest and not in Plaintiff's best interest when she gave her bad
11 advice. However, Melody insisted that she intended to cross-examine the DI on
12 the report that was submitted and determine where the DI obtained the evidence to
13 support the allegations. The court denied Plaintiff’s request and said that it saw no
14 basis to have the DI present to be cross-examined.
15 199. The court declared the children dependents and removed them from both
16 parents’ custody. The court ordered no family reunification services for Plaintiff.
17 However, according to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(l0) Cal. Rules of Court, rule
18 1456(c), the court must find that the welfare of the child requires that she be
19 removed from parental custody because of substantial danger, or risk of danger, to
20 her physical health if she is returned home and that there are no reasonable means
21 to protect her without removing her. Moreover, Here, DCFS does not present
22 evidence that Melody was filing at fulfilling any of her responsibilities or had any
23 actual allegations related to mental illness.
24 200. The California Welfare Institutions code mandates the department to make
25 reasonable efforts to return the child home when the danger or threat no longer
26 exists. Here, there is no evidence presented by the department that they attempted
27 to return the children and there is no evidence presented by the Department
28
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1
supporting the allegations against Plaintiff. This is not referring to reunification
2 services.
3 201. At the same hearing, DCFS submitted perjured testimony when they stated
4 Plaintiff had been convicted of lesser charges. They did not present evidence to
5 substantiate this claim and deliberately misled the court in order to maliciously
6 prosecute Melody. Dependency proceedings are not to be prosecutorial in nature.
7 DCFS intentionally and willfully withheld exculpatory evidence that would have
8 proven that Plaintiff was not mentally ill. They disregarded statements from all
9 parties that spoke favorably of Melody and attested to her intelligence and mental
10 health in order to distort character and true identity of Plaintiff.
11 202. Commissioner Marpet assisted the department in making their argument by
12 suggesting they re-word phrases in such a way as to make it appear as if Plaintiff
13 was physically violent. In this instance, the Commissioner expressed an
14 appearance of partiality. Fraud or impartiality in a court makes the order and
15 judgment void because the court is not impartial.
16 203. At each hearing and trial, setting Melody requested that her children be
17 placed with their grandmother and siblings because it would be in the best interest
18 of the children to be with family, who had expressed a willingness to care for the
19 children. This request was expressly denied until "after the dispositional hearing",
20 still not commenced to this day.
21 204. Here, Judge Sun should have dismissed the case because the court must
22 have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case. (In re Nelson B. (2013)
23 215 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1128.).
24 205. Under section 300, subdivision (b), the court can assume jurisdiction if it
25 finds there is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious physical harm as a
26 result of the parent’s failure or inability to provide regular care. A finding the
27 parent abuses substances is prima facie evidence the parent is unable “to provide
28
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1
regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm.” (In re Drake M.
2 (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 754, 767; Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (b).)
3 206. However, a parent’s use of controlled substances, without something more,
4 is not itself sufficient. (In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003; In re
5 Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 453.) The Department must show the
6 parent’s substance abuse poses a “specific, non-speculative and substantial” risk
7 the child will suffer serious physical harm. (In re Drake M., supra, 211
8 Cal.App.4th at p. 767; In re Destiny S., supra, at p. 1003; In re David M. (2005)
9 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830.)
10 207. Domestic violence only supports the exercise of jurisdiction under section
11 300, subdivision (b) if there is substantial evidence the domestic violence is
12 ongoing or likely to continue and either directly harmed or placed the child at risk
13 of suffering physical harm. (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717.)
14 208. Removal at disposition may not be warranted due to the heightened
15 standard of proof1 or changes in circumstances during the passage of time2.
16 Substantial risk of future harm requires that this risk exists at the time of the
17 jurisdictional hearing. In re R.M. (2009) 175 CA4th 986, 989, 96 CR3d 655; In re
18 Destiny S. (2012) 210 CA4th 999, 1004, 248 CR3d 800 (conduct occurred 9 years
19 before current petition was filed).
20
21 1 Even though jurisdictional finding may be based on substantial evidence, dispositional findings have a different
focus and heightened burden of proof – clear and convincing evidence (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); Conservatorship of O.B.
22 (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996, 1011.) This heightened standard is premised on the notion that even after parents
have been found to have abused or neglected their children “keeping children with their parents while proceedings
23 are pending, whenever safely possible, serves not only to protect parents’ rights but also children’s and society’s
best interest. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1066-1067.)
24 2 Even though children may be dependents of the juvenile court, they shall not be removed from their parents
unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety,
25
protection, or physical or emotional well-being and there are no “reasonable means” by which the child can be
protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) When considering if the child will be in substantial danger if
26
permitted to remain in the parent’s custody, the court must consider not only the parent’s past conduct, but also
27
current circumstances and the parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention. (In
re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451-452.)
28
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1
209. Although jurisdiction may be established under Welf & I C § 300 (a),
2 (b)(1), or (d), by a showing that the child has suffered prior physical harm under
3 Welf & I C § 300(b)(1), jurisdiction may not be continued unless the risk of harm
4 continues. An allegation in a petition or evidence simply that there was a prior
5 allegation of unfitness is not substantial evidence without evidence the allegation
6 was substantiated. (In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 547.)
7 210. In In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal. App. 5th 510, the Second Appellate District
8 found that there was insufficient evidence to justify removing a minor under
9 section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Jurisdiction over the minor was based on a single
10 incident of domestic violence between the parents, where Father slapped Mother.
11 By disposition, Father no longer lived or communicated with Mother and did not
12 display violent behavior outside of the relationship with Mother. The Second
13 Appellate District found that the sole source of potential danger to the minor while
14 in Father's care, which was supported in the record, was his history of domestic
15 violence with Mother, but the record did not contain substantial evidence that
16 the domestic violence between Mother and Father was likely to continue.
17 There had been no contact between Father and Mother since the minor’s
18 detention and neither Mother nor Father expressed an intention to reconcile
19 their relationship and there was no demonstrated unwillingness to stay away
20 from each other.
21 211. In addition, children may be found described by Welf & I C § 300(b)(1)
22 although they have suffered no direct harm when there is a pattern of domestic
23 violence that has not been corrected. In such situations of “secondary abuse,”
24 evidence that the child was present and witnessed domestic violence with the
25 expected result that the child suffered emotional abuse is sufficient to sustain a
26 petition. In re Healther A. (1996) 52 CA4th 183, 194, 60 CR2d 554 (mother had
27 permitted unsupervised visit with perpetrator of domestic violence). However, if
28 the evidence does not establish that the child was present and witnessed the
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violence, the fact of domestic violence in the home may not be sufficient to sustain
2 the petition. See, e.g., In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 CA4th 393, 398, 58 CR2d 494.
3 212. To determine whether domestic violence is ongoing and likely to continue,
4 courts look at a number of factors, including the proximity of the event to the
5 filing of the petition, whether the child was present or exposed to the violence, the
6 number and severity of the incidents, and the parents’ subsequent actions. (See e.g.
7 In re Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.)
8 213. Here, there is no substantial evidence that children assisted and that they
9 were posed in danger by Plaintiff. Plaintiff presented evidence of active restraining
10 orders for both Kernell and his adult daughter from the Los Angeles Superior
11 Court. Plaintiff also presented evidence from the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal
12 Justice Court that proved she was acting in self-defense in the episode reported by
13 DCFS. Melody took every legal remedy in the state of California to protect herself
14 and his children from the violent father and in January 2017 moved to North
15 Carolina far away from him. Moreover, Kernell is restrained in jail, and Melody
16 has a new and happy life in North Carolina, therefore there are no possibilities that
17 domestic violence is likely to continue.
18 214. Dependency may not be based on Welf & I C § 300(b)(1) when any mental
19 disorder or substance abuse cannot be tied to any harm or risk of harm to the
20 children who are well cared for and loved, and when the parents’ problems do not
21 impact their ability to care for the children. In re David M. (2005) 134 CA4th 822,
22 829-839, 36 CR3d 411; see also In re A.L. (2017) 18 CA5th 1044, 1049-1051, 227
23 CR3d 3 (mental illness alone not enough even with one incident of violence).
24 215. Mental illness alone is not enough for jurisdiction unless DCFS can show
25 it caused harm to the child. In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318
26 [“The Department has the burden of showing specifically how the minors have
27 been or will be harmed and harm may not be presumed from the mere fact of
28 mental illness of a parent.”]

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216. “‘Harm to the child cannot be presumed from the mere fact of mental
2 illness of the parent and it is fallacious to assume the children will somehow be
3 “infected” by the parent. The proper basis for a ruling is expert testimony giving
4 specific examples of the manner in which the mother's behavior has and will
5 adversely affect the child or jeopardize the child's safety. . . . It cannot be
6 presumed that a mother who is proven to be “schizophrenic” will necessarily be
7 detrimental to the mental or physical well-being of her offspring. . . . The social
8 worker must demonstrate with specificity how the minor has been or will be
9 harmed by the parents' mental illness.’” (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d
10 530, 540; In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1228-1229, overruled
11 on other grounds, In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 857, 866, fn. 5, internal
12 citations omitted, italics in original; In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941,
13 953; In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.)
14 217. DCFS offered no evidence to substantiate the claim that Melody had
15 mental and emotional problems or had failed to take psychotropic medications.
16 There was no medical record or diagnoses presented by a qualified physician to
17 support those claims. Lacking a medical diagnosis, the evidence presented by the
18 department to demonstrate "recognized medical factors" to support their claim was
19 listed as an assortment of assertions from a variety of ailment-none of which were
20 substantiated by actual incidents of the behavior being described. Plaintiff today is
21 happily married and has a happy life in North Carolina.
22 218. On February 27, 2020, Melody filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition
23 challenging the February 20, 2020, orders.
24 219. On June 05, 2020, Niti Gupta, assistant of Mel Hatamian, filed a letter to
25 the Appeals Court stating she could find no reason to file Plaintiff’s appeal.
26 220. On June 5, 2020, Plaintiff’s Counsel, Mel Hatamian, advised the court that
27 he was unable to file a writ petition on Plaintiff’s behalf.
28
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221. On July 23, 2020, Melody filed an in pro per petition for extraordinary writ
2 relief pursuant to 8.452 in the Court of Appeal seeking to challenge the juvenile
3 court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders at February 20, 2020, adjudication
4 hearing. In part of her brief mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to
5 sustain the domestic violence and mental health allegations pursuant to W&IC
6 section 300, subdivision (a) and (b). Mother pointed out that the social worker did
7 not testify and the statements in the reports were hearsay.
8 222. On July 30, 2020, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second
9 Appellate District Division Three issued an order to show cause stating our intent
10 to decide the matter on the merits.
11 223. On October 21, 2020, the Court of Appeal granted the petition for
12 extraordinary relief and concluded that the juvenile court violated Plaintiff’s right
13 to due process by denying her the opportunity to cross-examine the dependency
14 investigator and social worker. The Court guaranteed order that “A peremptory
15 writ of mandate shall issue directing the juvenile court to reverse its jurisdictional
16 findings sustaining counts b-1 and b-2, and dispositional orders as to mother only,
17 entered on February 20, 2020. In addition, the court shall vacate any subsequent
18 order terminating parental rights. On remand, the court shall conduct a new
19 jurisdiction and disposition hearing as to mother consistent with the views
20 expressed in this opinion.” Melody R. v. Super. Ct. CA2/3.
21 224. On March 11, 2021, DCFS' Director, Bobby D. Cagle, and DCFS Social
22 Workers, Marcal Maye-Henderson and Aliana Darted submitted a report with the
23 same fabricated evidence against Plaintiff, stating that “Pursuant to WIC
24 §361.5(b)(10), the Department recommends NO Reunification Services for
25 Mother Melody Rodgers as the Court Terminated Family Reunification Services
26 for children's half-siblings and no subsequent effort to treat problems that led to
27 the removal of those children.” The report presented the same original false
28 allegations against Plaintiff.

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225. On December 12, 2021, DCFS' Director, Bobby D. Cagle, and DCFS
2 Social Workers, Regina Minor and Darryllisha Burch-Parker continued, with
3 malicious and fraudulent intent, their practice of fabricating evidence and omitting
4 exculpatory evidence in their reports. In addition to the previous false and
5 inaccurate allegations against Melody, the department reports that Caregiver, “Ms.
6 C. stated that when mother calls the child, Symphony’s behaviors noticeably
7 changes and the calls cause “more harm, then good.” However, Ms. Clark is ready
8 to testify that she never made such a statement.
9 226. On June 9, 2022, “the Court finds there is no full .26 Report and no In and
10 Out for father. The .26 Hearing is continued to 08/17/2022 for receipt of a full .26
11 report and for an In and Out for father to be transported to court.”
12 227. On June 2022, Plaintiff presented an appeal on the order to continuance.
13 228. 2022, Dae Yae Sun assistant county counsel Joseph S. Lee prevented
14 Melody from obtaining court records for review of case status.
15 229. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth herein, is a substantial factor in causing
16 Plaintiffs harm, which constitutes gross negligence such that Defendants are liable
17 and Plaintiffs are entitled to Punitive damages, and Attorney’s cost and expenses
18 for which Plaintiffs seeks judgment of this Court.
19 230. Plaintiffs intend to show that the factors the jury may consider in
20 determining the amount of punitive damages, which should be awarded include:
21 a. The nature of the wrong committed by Defendants;
22 b. The character of Defendants’ conduct;
23 c. The degree of culpability of Defendants;
24 d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned; and
25 e. The extent to which Defendants’ conduct offends a public sense of justice and
26 propriety.
27
28
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V. BACKGROUND STATEMENT
2 A. Customs, Policy and Practices Adopted by California’s Foster System to
3 Snatch Children from their Birth Parents in violation of civil rights
4 231. This suit addresses the unlawful practices pursued by the Governor and
5 those subordinates of his, who operate the foster care system, letting the operators
6 of the system essentially have their choice of the minor children placed into the
7 state’s foster custody, interfering with the children’s relationships with their
8 families, contrary to law and seeks injunctive relief against the foster system
9 personnel that conspired using the foster care system to take children from
10 biological parents.
11 232. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief condemning the unlawful child-
12 snatching practices the Defendants have been practicing.
13 233. Defendants developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned
14 de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to
15 the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights which caused the violation of such rights.
16 Specifically, Plaintiff contends that these policies, practices, or customs were
17 willfully implemented with the specific intent to deprive Plaintiff's rights under the
18 Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, by, but not limited to:
19 a) The policy of removing a child from the care, custody, and control of her
20 parent without good cause;
21 b) The policy of using trickery, duress, fabrication and/or false testimony
22 and/or evidence, and in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, in
23 preparing and presenting reports and court documents to the court, causing
24 an interference with Plaintiff's rights, including those as to familial
25 relations;
26 c) By acting with deliberate indifference in implementing a policy of
27 inadequate training, and/or by failing to train its officers, agents, employees
28 and state actors, in providing the constitutional protections guaranteed to

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individuals, including those under the Fourteenth Amendment, when
2 performing actions related to child abuse and dependency type proceedings;
3 d) The policy of setting forth allegations in Juvenile Dependency Petitions
4 against parents claiming they suffer from psychological disorders and/or are
5 influencing the minor child to make false reports of sexual abuse, regardless
6 of whether or not reasonable and articulable evidence exists at the time to
7 support the claims set out in the petition or reports under penalty of perjury;
8 e) The policy, practice, or custom of making knowingly false allegations of
9 misconduct in juvenile dependency petitions and/or reports as a means of
10 intimidating parents, by coercion, into accepting the wrongful
11 recommendations and orders based on falsified evidence, whether justified
12 by extant evidence or not, thereby enabling the county to keep the family in
13 the juvenile dependency system and record the case as a positive outcome
14 for purposes of statistical analysis related to funding by the State and
15 Federal governments;
16 f) The custom, policy, and or practice of fraudulently accusing parents of
17 making false allegations where no evidentiary basis exists.
18 (This list is not exhaustive due to the pending nature of discovery and the
19 privileged and protected records of investigative and juvenile dependency type
20 proceedings. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this pleading as more
21 information becomes available.)
22 234. Defendants, including through their respective entities, breached their
23 duties and obligations to Plaintiff including but not limited to, failing to establish,
24 implement and follow well known and clearly established, “bright line”
25 Constitutional policies, procedures, customs and practices.
26 235. By failing to properly select, supervise, train, control, and review its agents
27 and employees as to their compliance with Constitutional safeguards; and by
28
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permitting the Police officers and social workers, to engage in the unlawful and
2 unconstitutional conduct as herein alleged.
3 236. Biological parents have a clearly established due process right under the
4 Fourteenth Amendment to be free from the deliberate use of perjured testimony
5 and fabricated evidence during juvenile dependency proceedings. See, e.g.,
6 Hardwick v. County of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2017); see also
7 Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “the
8 ‘constitutional right to be free from the knowing presentation of false or perjured
9 evidence’ is clearly established” (quoting Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045,
10 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2000))).
11 237. Defendants knew, or should have known, that by breaching the above-
12 mentioned duties and obligations it was foreseeable that they would, and did,
13 cause Plaintiff to be injured and damaged by their wrongful policies, or deliberate
14 lack thereof or deliberate indifference to the need for such policies and/or training,
15 and other acts as alleged herein, and that such breaches occurred in contravention
16 of public policy and their legal duties and obligations to Plaintiff; and that such
17 policies would subject them to injunctive relief which Plaintiff asserts herein.
18
19 B. California’s Foster System Increasingly Serves as a Child Snatching/”

20 Internal Diversion” System Taking Children from Families and Relatives and
21 Letting Foster System Connected Staff Take Them
22 238. This suit also addresses the failure of the Defendants to follow the laws
23 relating to the minor children in California foster care and their biological relatives
24 entitled to participate with those children, as provided by California and federal
25 laws prioritizing the placement and permanency rights of biological and other
26 family members.
27 239. To operate the system for internal diversion of children, Defendants
28 executing their responsibilities [including DCFS, and DCF’s contracted lead

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1
agencies] use a number of artifices and devices, and other outright unlawful
2 actions, including, but not limited to:
3 a. Not providing the dependency court, or Birth Parents and their attorneys,
4 with pertinent exculpatory information;
5 b. Taking advantage of many dependency judges’ lack of knowledge of the
6 foster system and the resulting inappropriate reliance on the Foster System
7 Operators;
8 c. Playing “hide the ball” with information needed by family members,
9 blocking family members from access to hearings and information about
10 how the system works, and what the case plans for permanency for the
11 child are;
12 d. Fabricating “evidence” against relatives and obstructing access to key
13 information relating to parents and children needed by the dependency
14 court for a fair and impartial hearing;
15 e. Failing to conduct the requisite diligent searches for biological relatives of
16 the child when a child is sheltered and then again throughout the case, and
17 again, as required after a TPR judgement;
18 f. Choosing a nonrelative system-connected person for placement of a child
19 instead of complying with the law and placing the child with relatives;
20 g. Having the lead agency [and, at times, a subcontracted case management
21 agency] work with DCFS to divert children to favored non-relatives, rather
22 than conducting the required diligent searches for relatives;
23 h. Willfully disregarding safety statutes and time limitations in the Rules of
24 Juvenile Procedure in order to intentionally inflict further emotional stress
25 on families ;
26 i. Tampering with witnesses and preventing them from testifying in court
27
28
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j. Intentionally writing misleading statements in order create a false record
2 that will allow agencies to collect federal and state funds by taking children
3 who do not fit the WIC definition of abused or neglected
4 k. Ignoring frequently [if not as often as possible] the due process rights of
5 Birth Parents and other Relatives to be present with advance notice of
6 judicial review proceedings and blocking Relatives from being heard in
7 dependency court proceedings by their misuse of the “Participant/Party”
8 Rule of Juvenile Procedure and related California's statutory definitions.
9 l. Compromising the ethical obligations of the attorneys for Birth Parents by
10 paying the attorney for system-connected services inconsistent with the
11 attorney’s obligations to his or her clients;
12 m. Fabricating false reports of abuse attributed to a relative to justify failing to
13 approve a relative for placement while attempting to place a child with a
14 non-relative.
15 240. When relatives who realized how their related youngsters had been
16 essentially kidnapped, snatched, or internally diverted, complained to Defendant
17 Governor directly or through the Inspector General for one or more of the
18 Departments, the Governor and his minions, including the supposedly independent
19 Inspector General, took no independent action other than to redirect the complaints
20 to DCFS to handle, with no accountability or redress for the relatives of the
21 snatched, diverted children.
22
23 CAUSES OF ACTION
24 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF 42 USC § 1983 against ALL
25 DEFENDANTS
26 241. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as
27 though fully set forth herein.
28
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242. To state a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff is required to allege that (1) the
2 conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state
3 law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.
4 243. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, several Social Workers and Police Officers who
5 were sent by defendants entered Plaintiff’s home without a warrant with LAPD
6 when the kids were in no eminent danger.
7 244. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, defendants made comments about race and
8 socioeconomic status-that "black women are supposed to be strong "Defendants
9 stated "That plaintiffs should have gone to school and got married before having
10 kids".
11 245. Carvin Hall denied children financial support. Plaintiff’s oldest daughter
12 was physically abused in foster care and Carvin Hall attempted to suppress this
13 information Sonia Valiente misrepresented who she was and covered up child
14 abuse that was inflicted by the County, Social Workers and by Foster parents as
15 well Mary Theresa Meza and Sonia Valientes.
16 246. Social Workers falsified their Detention report and Jurisdictional Reports
17 and made unreasonable searched in plaintiff’s home, without a warrant, and
18 without justified cause. Sonia also embellished her reports, left out pertinent
19 information regarding the children’s father in order to favor him, and lied to
20 plaintiff about how to get my children back by recommending a specific mental
21 health facility to go to. She did not attempt to reunify plaintiff with the children as
22 she had promised.
23 247. She conspired with the child's father and encouraged him to lie about
24 plaintiff, by telling him he could get custody and be relieved of child support
25 obligation. Defendants further covered up evidence that the children was abused
26 while in foster care.
27 248. ON OR 02/29/16, the Superior Court of California for the County of Los
28 Angeles, Juvenile Court ORDERED that the DCFS be AUTHORIZED TO

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DETAIN PLAINTIFF’S CHILDREN without a valid cause. JERRY BROWN is
2 the Governor of California and owes a duty to Plaintiff to ascertain that the state
3 does not MAKE NOR ENFORCE ANY LAW THAT ABRIDGES THE RIGHTS
4 OF THE CITIZENS.
5 249. However, Defendants did endorse, contribute, and enforce the statutes
6 within Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 300-378, which involve “one-sided” and
7 unconstitutional Juvenile Dependency Laws that allow Social Workers to take a
8 parents children without a warrant, that allow warrants to be issued without
9 probable cause, that allow the quartering of Soldiers or Social Workers in the
10 homes of families, and allow the violation of the Due Process Right of a Parent to
11 Bring up a child without governmental interference.
12 250. Commencing Feb. 29, 2016, Defendants made false statements to the
13 public in regards to plaintiff’s criminal history, as means in preventing plaintiff
14 from obtaining gainful employment. Additionally, Defendants prevented Plaintiff
15 from adequate visits with her children (PC § 278.5) and never allowed
16 “reunification services” as normally provided under Welfare & Institutions Code §
17 300 et. seq. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Michel H. Eisner, the other defendants
18 filed a False Juvenile Dependency Petition against Plaintiff and her children. 18.
19 The restrained, CHILDREN and PLAINTIFF were denied due process and were
20 denied the right to present evidence on their behalf.
21 251. The Los Angeles County DCFS’s basis for their petition for Juvenile
22 Dependency against the restrained, CHILDREN, was based on an allegation that
23 the parents were not good parents.
24 252. re.: Lonisha T - withheld minute orders when I request them from her and
25 said she didn't have them - hired social worker investigator but the investigator
26 was never available, out sick, then out on vacation, did not return emails; I have a
27 voicemail proving that she purposely did not call me back until the morning of my
28 court case which was too late to ask me for what evidence I wanted to present -
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1
said she got the date mixed up - was unavailable via phone and denied case
2 information requests sent via email
3 253. re.: Carvin Hall - told me that a therapist letter would be sufficient but then
4 denied it as evidence when I have it to him - refused to give me minute orders
5 after agreeing to email them to me. Ignored about 4 email requests for them - lied
6 about turning in paperwork so my kids would have funding while in foster care.
7 Kids were without resources for four months - Claimed to be powerless in the case
8 and often said he was just doing what he was told when in actuality he had the
9 power to approve overnight visits for me with my children and to even encourage
10 the case to be dismissed based on his frequent interactions with me - was trying to
11 put my kids up for adoption behind my back and therefore was not putting forth
12 effort to reunify me with my family -essentially withholding evidence of my good
13 character which would have worked in my favor re.: Superior Court of California -
14 Commissioner Stephen Marpet - he is not impartial and favors DCFS - day one in
15 his courtroom he yelled at me and told me to take medication without even hearing
16 my side of the story - does not allow me to speak in court - does not listen to
17 evidence or even seek evidence from my side and tries to silence me by not
18 allowing me to represent myself. He keeps assigning me public defenders who
19 refuse to present my evidence
20 254. Defendants participated with all other defendants and acted in concert, and
21 denied plaintiff due process in the court, and Denied plaintiff right to bring up his
22 child without governmental interference. All of the defendants caused the results
23 of the constitutional rights violations and each participated in the acts while acting
24 under color of law. Plaintiffs hereby allege that EACH DEFENDANT
25 “CAUSED” and “PARTICIPATED IN” the acts or omissions regarding the facts
26 herein alleged either by “direct conduct, neglect or conspiracy”. (See Monell v.
27 Department of Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 US 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018;
28 Pmerantz v County of Los Angeles (9th Cir 1982) 674 F2d 1288, 1291.
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1
255. TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL LIABILITY, it is enough to show that an
2 official, acting under color of state law, caused deprivation of federal right. (See
3 Kentucky v. Graham (1985) 473 US 159, 165, 87 L Ed 2d 114, 121, 105 S Ct
4 3099. Local governments, municipal corporations, and their agents acting under
5 color of “state” law (which may encompass implementation or enforcement of a
6 municipal, local law, regulation, POLICY, or custom, ARE “PERSONS” subject
7 to liability under 42 USC § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. (1978)
8 436 US 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018. California COUNTIES have been
9 treated as municipalities for § 1983 purposes. See Moor v. County of Alameda
10 (1973) 411 US 693, 36 L Ed 2d 596, 93 S Ct 1785. Also, see Hernandez v. County
11 of San Bernardino (2004) 117 CA4th 1055, 12 CR3d 452 (erroneous wage
12 garnishment against plaintiff by county’s family support division may render
13 county liable under § 1983 if family support division is determined to be the
14 policymaker for the county. Additionally, a PUBLIC ENTITY may be held liable
15 for a constitutional violation caused by a POLICY, CUSTOM, OR PRACTICE of
16 the public entity. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. 436 US at 690, 56 L Ed
17 2d at 635. Plaintiffs hereby allege that each defendant participated, caused,
18 conspired and acted under “color of law” to deprive plaintiffs of their
19 constitutional rights based on the policies, customs and practices of the entities
20 sued as public entities, in addition to “malice” and intentional fraud” based on
21 hatred towards the race, creed and religion of plaintiffs.
22 256. The illegality of the restraint, custody or confinement, violation of
23 constitutional rights and conspiracy against plaintiff’s rights consists in the
24 following STATEMENT OF FACTS:
25 257. A Juvenile detention hearing for the restrained, CHILDREN was held
26 recently at the CHILDREN’S Court in the County of Los Angeles.
27 258. To sustain an action under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the
28 conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law;
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1
and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Rinker v.
2 Napa County, 831 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
3 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)). Plaintiff would review de
4 novo the district court's dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
5 Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 745 (9th Cir.1986). A complaint
6 should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that
7 the plaintiff can prove no set of acts in support of his claim which would entitle
8 him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2
9 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory
10 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.
11 Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.1984). On
12 a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true.
13 Shah, 797 F.2d at 745. Plaintiffs claim that defendants breached a duty to protect
14 the children and her parental rights imposed by the due process and equal
15 protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and further claims a violation by
16 defendants of his right to have a thorough investigation by the defendant County
17 of Los Angeles employees. At all times mentioned defendants had a “special
18 relationship” with plaintiff in that they owed plaintiff a duty and each of them
19 breached their duty owed to plaintiff by preventing, dissuading, and conspiring
20 against the constitutional rights of plaintiff and her daughter. Summarily
21 defendants conspired “in concert” to deprive the plaintiff parents of their
22 constitutional right to bringing up her children and her parental rights.
23 259. The heart of Plaintiff, plaintiffs’ civil rights claim is that the Defendant,
24 directors, supervisors and employees for the County of Los Angeles DCFS
25 conspired against plaintiffs to “WRONGFULLY SEPARATE THE FAMILY
26 WITHOUT THAT STANDARD CAUSE OR PROCESS OF LAW, which is an
27 abuse of process. There is, in general, no constitutional duty of state officials to
28 protect members of the public at large from crime and child neglect. See Martinez
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1
v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558-59, 62 L.Ed.2d 481
2 (1980); Ketchum, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.1987); Bowers v. DeVito, 686
3 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.1982). However, such a duty may arise by virtue of a
4 "special relationship" between state officials and a particular member of the public.
5 Ketchum, 811 F.2d at 1247; Escamilla v. Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th
6 Cir.1986). Several courts have held that, to determine whether a "special
7 relationship" exists, a court may look to a number of factors, including (1) whether
8 the state created or assumed a custodial relationship toward the plaintiff; (2)
9 whether the state affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger; (3)
10 whether the state was aware of a specific risk of harm to the plaintiff; or (4)
11 whether the state affirmatively committed itself to the protection of the plaintiff.
12 See Ketchum, 811 F.2d at 1247; Escamilla, 796 F.2d at 269-70; Jensen v. Conrad,
13 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir.1984).
14 260. In this particular circumstance, Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to
15 equal privileges and protection of the laws in that Defendants failed to provide a
16 Fair Trial for Plaintiff, prevented Plaintiff from presenting evidence in the trial.
17 Thereafter, defendants placed Plaintiff’s child in a home with convicted criminals,
18 knowing that they were likely to endanger Plaintiff’s child.
19 261. Additionally, Defendants prevented Plaintiff from having adequate visits
20 with her child (PC § 278.5) and never allowed “reunification services” as normally
21 provided under Welfare & Institutions Code § 300 et. seq..
22 262. In the recent case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County of Department of
23 Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), however,
24 the Supreme Court limited the circumstances giving rise to "a special
25 relationship." Joshua DeShaney fell into a life-threatening coma after he was
26 severely beaten by his father. Prior to this beating, the social services agency
27 recorded multiple incidents indicating that someone in the DeShaney household
28 was physically abusing Joshua and temporarily placed Joshua in the custody of the
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juvenile court. In the course of explaining its holding that Joshua DeShaney and
2 his mother failed to make out an actionable Sec. 1983 claim, the Court explained
3 that its previous decisions recognizing "affirmative [constitutional] duties of care
4 and protection.... stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a person
5 into its custody and hold him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon
6 it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
7 wellbeing.... The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge
8 of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but
9 from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."
10 Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06. We conclude that the state's knowledge of DeShaney's
11 plight and its expressions of intent to help him were no greater than its knowledge
12 of Balistreri's plight and its expressions of intent to help her. See id. at 1010-11
13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Wisconsin law invites--indeed, directs--citizens and
14 other governmental entities to depend on local departments of social services such
15 as respondent to protect children from abuse.... Through its child-protection
16 program, the State actively intervened in Joshua's life and, by virtue of this
17 intervention, acquired ever more certain knowledge that Joshua was in grave
18 danger.").
19
20 SECOND CAUSE VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) against ALL DEFENDANTS

23 264. Section 1985, in pertinent part, prohibits conspiracies either to deter, by
24 force, threat, or intimidation, any party or witness from attending or testifying
25 freely, fully, and truthfully in a federal court or to injure any party or witness in his
26 person or property because he attended or testified in federal court.
27
28
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1
265. Finally, by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) two or more persons are said to
2 have conspired to deprive a third person’s rights or privileges if such persons
3 conspire to:
4 266. go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
5 purpose of depriving, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
6 laws, or the equal privileges and immunities provided under the laws;
7 267. prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled
8 to vote as an elector in the election of President or Vice-President, or members of
9 Congress;
10 268. injure any citizen in person or property on account of support or advocacy
11 rendered to voters in the election of President or Vice-President, or members of
12 Congress.
13 269. If as a result of the conspiracy, one or more persons are injured in person or
14 property, or is deprived of any of their rights or privileges, the party so injured or
15 deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, against the conspirators.
16 However, it is necessary that a plaintiff suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 should show
17 the existence of a conspiracy. The existence of a conspiracy may also be inferred
18 from the surrounding circumstances.
19 270. State limitation periods apply to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
20 1985. The plaintiff must plead facts with specificity and particularity. Nominal,
21 compensatory, and punitive damages are available to successful § 1985 plaintiffs.
22 271. The above-listed defendants have a policy, custom and pattern of practice,
23 and act under color of law in their capacities as employees for local, county and
24 state public entities, and on a daily basis falsify reports, to engage in acts of abuse
25 of process, to defraud the general public by filing false reports in the juvenile
26 courts for the County to justify excessive expenditures of taxpayers’ money and to
27 fail to notify the courts as to the truth of matters and circumstances as their
28 informed. Defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right to

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1
bring up her child without governmental interference and her right to bring her
2 child in general. Defendants and each of them, knowingly and willfully conspired,
3 “acted in concert” and agreed among themselves to damage the plaintiff be
4 depriving him of the privileges and rights within the Constitution of the United
5 States of America because belongs to a protected class and because of HER
6 religious beliefs and creed. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, defendants made comments
7 about race and socioeconomic status-that "black women are supposed to be strong
8 "Defendants stated "That plaintiff should have gone to school and got married
9 before having kids".
15 273. Social Workers falsified their Detention report and Jurisdictional Reports
16 and made unreasonable searched in plaintiff’s home, without a warrant, and
17 without justified cause. Sonia also embellished her reports, left out pertinent
18 information regarding the children’s father in order to favor him, and lied to
19 plaintiff about how to get my children back by recommending a specific mental
20 health facility to go to. She did not attempt to reunify plaintiff with the children as
21 she had promised.
25 while in foster care.
26 275. ON OR 02/29/16, the Superior Court of California for the County of Los
27 Angeles, Juvenile Court ORDERED that the DCFS be AUTHORIZED TO
28 DETAIN PLAINTIFF’S CHILDREN without a valid cause. The Governor of

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1
California and owes a duty to Plaintiff to ascertain that the state does not MAKE
2 NOR ENFORCE ANY LAW THAT ABRIDGES THE RIGHTS OF THE
3 CITIZENS. However, The Governor did endorse, contribute, and enforce the
4 statutes within Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 300-378, which involve “one-
5 sided” and unconstitutional Juvenile Dependency Laws that allow Social Workers
6 to take a parents children without a warrant, that allow warrants to be issued
7 without probable cause, that allow the quartering of Soldiers or Social Workers in
8 the homes of families, and allow the violation of the Due Process Right of a Parent
9 to Bring up a child without governmental interference.
10 276. re.: Lonisha T - withheld minute orders when I request them from her and
11 said she didn't have them - hired social worker investigator but the investigator
12 was never available, out sick, then out on vacation, did not return emails; I have a
13 voicemail proving that she purposely did not call me back until the morning of my
14 court case which was too late to ask me for what evidence I wanted to present -
15 said she got the date mixed up - was unavailable via phone and denied case
16 information requests sent via email re.: Carvin Hall - told me that a therapist letter
17 would be sufficient but then denied it as evidence when I have it to him - refused
18 to give me minute orders after agreeing to email them to me. Ignored about 4
19 email requests for them - lied about turning in paperwork so my kids would have
20 funding while in foster care. Kids were without resources for four months -
21 Claimed to be powerless in the case and often said he was just doing what he was
22 told when in actuality he had the power to approve overnight visits for me with my
23 children and to even encourage the case to be dismissed based on his frequent
24 interactions with me - was trying to put my kids up for adoption behind my back
25 and therefore was not putting forth effort to reunify me with my family -
26 essentially withholding evidence of my good character which would have worked
27 in my favor re.: Superior Court of California - Commissioner Stephen Marpet - he
28 is not impartial and favors DCFS - day one in his courtroom he yelled at me and
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1
told me to take medication without even hearing my side of the story - does not
2 allow me to speak in court - does not listen to evidence or even seek evidence
3 from my side and tries to silence me by not allowing me to represent myself. He
4 keeps assigning me public defenders who refuse to present my evidence.
5 277. Commencing Feb. 29, 2016, Defendants made false statements to the
6 public in regards to plaintiff’s criminal history, as means in preventing plaintiff
7 from obtaining gainful employment.
8 278. Additionally, Defendants prevented Plaintiff from adequate visits with her
9 children (PC § 278.5) and never allowed “reunification services” as normally
10 provided under Welfare & Institutions Code § 300 et. seq. On or about Feb. 29,
11 2016, Defendant Michel H. Eisner, the other defendants filed a False Juvenile
12 Dependency Petition against Plaintiff and her children.
13 279. The restrained, CHILDREN and PLAINTIFF were denied due process and
14 were denied the right to present evidence on their behalf.
15 280. The Los Angeles County DCFS’s basis for their petition for Juvenile
22 under color of law.
23 282. Plaintiffs hereby allege that EACH DEFENDANT “CAUSED” and
24 “PARTICIPATED IN” the acts or omissions regarding the facts herein alleged
25 either by “direct conduct, neglect or conspiracy”. (See Monell v. Department of
26 Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 US 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018; Pmerantz v County
27 of Los Angeles (9th Cir 1982) 674 F2d 1288, 1291. TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL
28 LIABILITY, it is enough to show that an official, acting under color of state law,
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1
caused deprivation of federal right. (See Kentucky v. Graham (1985) 473 US 159,
2 165, 87 L Ed 2d 114, 121, 105 S Ct 3099. Local governments, municipal
3 corporations, and their agents acting under color of “state” law (which may
4 encompass implementation or enforcement of a municipal, local law, regulation,
5 POLICY, or custom, ARE “PERSONS” subject to liability under 42 USC § 1983.
6 See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 US 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98
7 S Ct 2018. California COUNTIES have been treated as municipalities for § 1983
8 purposes. See Moor v. County of Alameda (1973) 411 US 693, 36 L Ed 2d 596,
9 93 S Ct 1785. Also, see Hernandez v. County of San Bernardino (2004) 117
10 CA4th 1055, 12 CR3d 452 (erroneous wage garnishment against plaintiff by
11 county’s family support division may render county liable under § 1983 if family
12 support division is determined to be the policymaker for the county.
13 283. Defendants, and each of them, maintain, and at all times relevant to this
14 Complaint maintained, customs and practices which were the driving force behind
15 their conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.
16 section 1985. Such customs and practices include unlawful removal of minor
17 children; and the procuring of false testimony, fabrication of evidence, and refusal
18 to disclose exculpatory evidence in preparing and presenting reports and
19 documents to the court in relation to dependency proceedings, all in violation of
20 the right to familial association under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
21 Amendment.
22 284. Defendants and each of them, have, and at all times relevant to this
23 complaint had, knowledge of the customs and practices that led to the conspiracy
24 to interfere with Plaintiff's civil rights. [All named defendants] knew that the other
25 individual defendants were conspiring to commit the wrongs noted above, and
26 were going to commit them.
27 285. Defendants, and each of them, had the power to prevent the commission of
28 these wrongs, through the notification of the proper superiors and authorities,
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1
and/or through the implementation of policies, procedures, and training programs
2 that would educate and enlighten employees as to the civil rights of the citizens of
3 the United States and the State of California.
4 286. Despite their knowledge, Defendants, and each of them, refused or
5 neglected to prevent the remaining Defendants from committing these wrongs in
6 violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1985.
7 287. Defendants, and each of them, engaged in said conspiracies for the purpose
8 of depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws of the State of California and
9 of the United States and depriving them of their rights under the Constitutions of
10 the United States and the State of California.
11 288. Defendants, and each of them, acting under color of state law, conspired to
12 deprive and did deprive, Plaintiff of her rights under the laws of the United States.
13 Specifically, Defendants conspired to, and did act, agree and/or conspire to
14 unlawfully examine, investigate, threaten, and make false reports resulting in the
15 removal of the minor child from the custody of Plaintiff. In addition, Defendants,
16 and each of them, conspired to use trickery, duress, fabrication and/or false
17 testimony or evidence and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in preparing
18 and presenting reports and court documents to the court.
19 289. Defendants, and each of them, took several acts in furtherance of the
20 conspiracy, including but not limited to, acting, agreeing and/or conspiring to
21 unlawfully examine, investigate, threaten, and make false reports resulting in the
22 removal of the minor child from the custody of Plaintiff; and by procuring false
23 testimony, fabricating evidence, and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in
24 preparing and presenting reports and court documents to the court in relation to
25 [minor child's] dependency proceedings.
26 290. Children’s Attorney of Los Angeles has conspired with the Attorney for
27 the County and the Department of Children and Family Services to suppress
28 evidence that the children have suffered no harm and want to come home and have
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1
continually expressed their desire to return home to mother. Despite lacking any
2 evidence of harm, children are still being detained.
3 291. Defendants acted with malice and with the intent to cause injury to
4 Plaintiff or acted with a willful and conscious disregard to the rights of Plaintiff in
5 a despicable, vile, and contemptible manner.
6 292. Plaintiff's injuries were the direct and proximate result of the actions of
7 [Defendants] could have, through reasonable diligence, prevented.
8 293. As the direct and proximate result of the Defendants' actions, Plaintiff has
9 suffered and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional injury, all to
10 an extent and in an amount subject to proof at trial. Plaintiff has also incurred and
11 will continue to incur, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, including those
12 authorized by 42 U.S.C. section 1988, to an extent and in an amount subject to
13 proof at trial.
14 294. As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the
15 purpose of punishing Defendants and to deter them and others in the future.
16
17 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1986 against ALL

18 DEFENDANTS
21 296. Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to
22 be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed,
23 and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
24 neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to
25 the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such
26 wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented;
27 and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of
28 persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in

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1
the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and
2 neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor,
3 and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the
4 widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the
5 benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of
6 this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the
7 cause of action has accrued.
8
9 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MONELL RELATED CLAIMS (LAW

10 ENFORCEMENT EXCESSIVE FORCE/FALSE IMPRISONMENT/SOCIAL
11 WORKER MISCONDUCT/PROSECUTORY MISCONDUCT) against ALL
12 DEFENDANTS
15 298. Monell claims are aimed at the government entity as the employer,
16 supervisor and policymaker. To successfully sue under the Monell doctrine and
17 hold the city (or other government entity) liable for an officer's actions, the
18 plaintiff must first show the officer violated a clearly established constitutional
19 right.
20 299. The Monell decision allows plaintiffs a method to sue municipalities for
21 unconstitutional policies and practices that led to an incident that harmed an
22 individual or group. • Employees may be sued individually for misconduct.
23 300. The agency failed to investigate and used the same old “recycled copy and
24 pasted “allegations which were unsubstantiated in an old case. They carried over
25 old lies from a previous case to a recent case with Symhony B and Preston B. At
26 every hearing the prosecution fails to present any evidence or present evidence
27 that children are in danger. They just show up for court late, and wink at the judge,
28 while they grant them anything that they can dream up.
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1
301. The court relies on old rehearsed hearsay evidence and lies from individuals
2 whose sole purpose is to keep mother stuck in a cycle of domestic violence.
3 302. In both cases it has been proven that mother was attacked and defended her
4 but the department took the Side of the perpetuators of the violence because of
5 their malice toward mother for standing up for herself and not allowing the abuse
6 to continue. It is apparent that many of the officials of the court are covert abusers
7 and whenever they see a mother suffering from domestic violence they punish the
8 mother for speaking out against it by taking her children. They are trying to
9 silence abuse victims with their Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation.
10
11 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION/ABUSE OF

12 PROCESS against ALL DEFENDANTS
15 304. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, defendants made comments about race and
16 socioeconomic status- that "black women are supposed to be strong "Defendants
17 stated that “plaintiffs should have gone to school and got married before having
18 kids".
24 306. The Social Workers from DCFS and the County of Los Angeles falsified
25 their Detention report and Jurisdictional Reports and made unreasonable searched
26 in plaintiff’s home, without a warrant, and without justified cause. Sonia also
27 embellished her reports, left out pertinent information regarding the children’s
28 father in order to favor him, and lied to plaintiff about how to get my children
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1
back by recommending a specific mental health facility to go to. She did not
2 attempt to reunify plaintiff with the children as she had promised.
6 while in foster care. 20. On or about 02/29/16, the Superior Court of California for
7 the County of Los Angeles, Juvenile Court ORDERED that the DCFS be
8 AUTHORIZED TO DETAIN PLAINTIFF’S CHILDREN without a valid cause.
9 The Governor of California and owes a duty to Plaintiff to ascertain that the state
10 does not MAKE NOR ENFORCE ANY LAW THAT ABRIDGES THE RIGHTS
11 OF THE CITIZENS. However, the Governor did endorse, contribute, and enforce
12 the statutes within Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 300-378, which involve “one-
13 sided” and unconstitutional Juvenile Dependency Laws that allow Social Workers
14 to take a parents children without a warrant, that allow warrants to be issued
15 without probable cause, that allow the quartering of Soldiers or Social Workers in
16 the homes of families, and allow the violation of the Due Process Right of a Parent
17 to Bring up a child without governmental interference.
18 308. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Defendants made false statements to the public
19 in regards to plaintiff’s criminal history, as means in preventing plaintiff from
20 obtaining gainful employment. Additionally, Defendants prevented Plaintiff from
21 adequate visits with her children (PC § 278.5) and never allowed “reunification
22 services” as normally provided under Welfare & Institutions Code § 300 et. seq.
23 On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Michel H. Eisner, the other defendants filed a False
24 Juvenile Dependency Petition against Plaintiff and her children.
25 309. The restrained, CHILDREN and PLAINTIFF were denied due process and
26 were denied the right to present evidence on their behalf.
27
28
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1
310. The Los Angeles County DCFS’s basis for their petition for Juvenile
8 under color of law.
9 312. Plaintiffs hereby allege that EACH DEFENDANT “CAUSED” and
10 “PARTICIPATED IN” the acts or omissions regarding the facts herein alleged
11 either by “direct conduct, neglect or conspiracy”. (See Monell v. Department of
12 Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 US 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018; Pmerantz v County
13 of Los Angeles (9th Cir 1982) 674 F2d 1288, 1291. TO ESTABLISH
14 PERSONAL LIABILITY, it is enough to show that an official, acting under color
15 of state law, caused deprivation of federal right. (See Kentucky v. Graham (1985)
16 473 US 159, 165, 87 L Ed 2d 114, 121, 105 S Ct 3099. Local governments,
17 municipal corporations, and their agents acting under color of “state” law (which
18 may encompass implementation or enforcement of a municipal, local law,
19 regulation, POLICY, or custom, ARE “PERSONS” subject to liability under 42
20 USC § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 US 658, 56 L
21 Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018. California COUNTIES have been treated as
22 municipalities for § 1983 purposes. See Moor v. County of Alameda (1973) 411
23 US 693, 36 L Ed 2d 596, 93 S Ct 1785. Also, see Hernandez v. County of San
24 Bernardino (2004) 117 CA4th 1055, 12 CR3d 452 (erroneous wage garnishment
25 against plaintiff by county’s family support division may render county liable
26 under § 1983 if family support division is determined to be the policymaker for the
27 county.
28
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1
313. The aforesaid acts that defendants committed, as alleged in the foregoing
2 paragraphs were done to justify the inheritance of tax dollars, without any true
3 basis, by fraud. In addition to the above-stated facts, employees employed by the
4 County of Los Angeles, illegally ran criminal background checks on all plaintiffs
5 and disseminated the findings in the criminal history reports to individuals
6 “outside of the juvenile courts”. [See California Penal Code § 13303] Any person
7 authorized by law to receive a record or information obtained from a record who
8 knowingly furnishes the record or information to a person who is not authorized
9 by law to receive the record or information is guilty of a misdemeanor. Penal Code
10 § 13304. Any person, except those specifically referred to in Section1070 of the
11 Evidence Code, who, knowing he is not authorized by law to receive a record or
12 information obtained from a record, knowingly buys, receives, or possesses the
13 record or information is guilty of a misdemeanor. (A criminal record report is
14 defined in Penal Code § 13300.)] These defendants have a custom, policy and
15 normal practice of obtaining criminal records to all family members who are a
16 party or family member of a minor involved in a juvenile dependency case and
17 thereafter disseminate the record and its contents to “third parties” who are not
18 entitled to receive such information. In fact, any record of criminal conviction to a
19 potential caregiver to a child who is a party to a juvenile dependency case, should
20 not even be subjected to having “irrelevant” convictions reported to any person,
21 including the court, that would not bar that person from being a good candidate as
22 a caregiver for the child. Worst of all, Defendants and each of them Abused
23 Process, because they falsified information to the Superior Court by stating that
24 Plaintiff was a Criminal. Defendants made false statements to the public in regards
25 to plaintiff’s criminal history, as means in preventing plaintiff from obtaining
26 gainful employment. Additionally, Defendants prevented Plaintiff from adequate
27 visits with her child (PC § 278.5) and never allowed “reunification services” as
28 normally provided under Welfare & Institutions Code § 300 et. seq. On or about
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1
Feb. 29, 2016, Michel H. Eisner, the other defendants filed a False Juvenile
2 Dependency Petition against Plaintiff and her children.
3 314. This use of the process was not authorized in the regular course and was not
4 the intended purpose for juvenile dependency statutes when enacted into
5 legislature.
6 315. The ulterior purpose and motivation of defendants in so misusing the
7 process in the above-described manner was to obtain the following collateral
8 advantage over the defendants so they can help the local public entities build value
9 in their proposals to the state and federal government in their requests for
10 additional funds at the end of next year’s, budget assessment.
11 316. As a proximate result of the actions of all defendants, all plaintiffs in this
12 action have been damaged generally by loss of time, money, costs incurred, loss of
13 liberty and damage to their emotional health.
14 317. At all times mentioned herein, all defendants acted willfully with the
15 wrongful intention of injuring cross-complainants and from an improper or evil
16 motive amounting to malice in that defendants willfully and intentionally
17 conspired to defraud and injure plaintiffs.
18
19 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF

20 EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Against ALL DEFENDANTS
23 319. On or about the above-mentioned dates, defendants, and each of them, did
24 each of their acts to intentionally inflict emotional distress upon plaintiff which
25 resulted in “OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT”. Wherefore, Plaintiff did or does seek
26 medical attention to sooth the anguish and mental suffering caused by defendants.
27 320. As a proximate result of defendants’ actions, plaintiff has suffered severe
28 anguish, stress, anxiety and general damages in an amount according to proof.

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1
321. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants regarding
2 the all causes of action in his complaint for damages in an amount according to
3 proof.
4
5 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER (Defamation) Against

6 ALL DEFENDANTS
9 323. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Michel Eisner stated that plaintiff was a bad
10 parent to many people. On or about Feb. 29, 2016 Monica Rosenblum falsely
11 stated to DCFS that plaintiff had expressed or implied that she wanted to kill
12 herself.
13 324. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Philip Browning stated that plaintiff was a bad
14 parent to many people.
15 325. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Mary T. Meza stated that plaintiff was a bad
17 326. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, DCFS stated that plaintiff was a bad parent to
18 many people.
19 327. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, County of Los Angeles stated that plaintiff was
20 a bad parent to many people.
21 328. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Superior Court of California for the County of
22 Los Angeles stated that plaintiff was a bad parent to many people.
23 329. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Carvin Hall stated that plaintiff was a bad
25 330. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Theresa T. Meza stated that plaintiff was a bad
27 331. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Sonia Valiente stated that plaintiff was a bad

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332. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, PHILIP L. BROWNING; COUNTY OF LOS
2 ANGELES; Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services; Superior
3 Court of California for the County of Los Angeles; MARY THERESA MEZA;
4 CARVIN HALL; SONIA VALIENTE knowingly and willfully made false
5 statements orally and in writing to the Superior Court of California for the County
6 and to friends of plaintiff with intent to defame, humiliate and damage the
7 reputation of plaintiffs. These statements included, but are not limited to“The
8 parents of the minor children in the underlying juvenile dependency case
9 committed acts constituting neglect and abuse”. Defendants further falsely stated
10 that “PLAINTIFF is not a good PARENT and is a danger to CHILDREN”. None
11 of these statements were true and defendants knew them to be false when they
12 made them. Whereas plaintiff suffered damages by these false statements by
13 defendants, by the damage to her health, damage to her emotional state, loss of
14 reputation, loss of her job, loss of income. Additionally, plaintiff suffered
15 pecuniary losses including, but not limited to the companionship, comfort,
16 affection, society, solace and moral support of her friends, family and son, based
17 on the false allegations that the defendants intentionally disseminated to the
18 general public.
19 333. The false statements made by defendants were not protected rights of
20 speech because they were false facts concerning Juvenile Dependency Issues.
21 334. Juvenile Dependency Issues concerning a child are not a public issue, and
22 are confidential by law. Therefore defendants are precluded from any defense
23 under a Anti-Slapp Motion.
24
25 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY against ALL

26 DEFENDANTS

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1
336. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Law and Legal Definition. A fiduciary duty is an
2 obligation to act in the best interest of another party. ... A person acting in a
3 fiduciary capacity is held to a high standard of honesty and full disclosure in
4 regard to the client and must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the
5 client ...
6 337. A fiduciary duty is the highest standard of care. The person who has a
7 fiduciary duty is called the fiduciary, and the person to whom he owes the duty, is
8 typically referred to as the principal or the beneficiary.
9 338. To state a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must
10 allege (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty relationship, (2) misconduct by the
11 defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant's misconduct.
12 4 Elements of a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim; The defendant was acting as a
13 fiduciary of the plaintiff; The defendant breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff;
14 The plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach; and the defendant's breach
15 of fiduciary duty caused the plaintiff's damages.
16 339. “A fiduciary relationship is ‘ “ ‘any relation existing between parties to
17 atransaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmostgood
18 faith for the benefit of the other party. Such a relation ordinarily ariseswhere a
19 confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and insuch a
20 relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he voluntarilyaccepts or
21 assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his actsrelating to
22 the interest of the other party without the latter’s knowledge orconsent. . . .’ ” ’ ”
23 (Wolf v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [130Cal.Rptr.2d 860],
24 internal citations omitted.)• “Whether a fiduciary duty exists is generally a
25 question of law. Whether thedefendant breached that duty towards the plaintiff is a
26 question of fact.” (Marzecv. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2015) 236
27 Cal.App.4th 889, 915 [187Cal.Rptr.3d 452], internal citation omitted.)
28
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340. Three Potential Consequences of Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Compensatory
2 Damages. If an alleged breach of fiduciary duties leads to litigation then one of the
3 most common outcomes is for the victim to receive compensatory damages. ...
4 Punitive Damages. ... Professional Consequences.
5 341. DEFENDANTS’ acts were intentional, malicious and oppressive, thereby
6 entitling Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages.
7 342. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conduct of
8 DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS have suffered economical, psychological,
9 emotional, and physical damages.
10 343. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conduct of
11 DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS are obligated to retain legal counsel and to expend
12 or incur liability for costs of suit, attorney’s fees, and related expenses in an
13 amount not yet fully ascertained, but which will be submitted at time of trial for
14 recovery by PLAINTIFFS.
15
16 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF

17 GOOD FAITH & FAIR DEALING against ALL DEFENDANTS
20 345. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs
21 as though fully set forth herein.
22 346. In order to sufficiently plead a bad-faith cause of action generally,
23 PLAINTIFFS must plead that: ELEMENT 1: Valid Contract;
24 An action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
25 requires an underlying agreement of some sort (contract, letter of intent,
26 preliminary agreement to use best efforts to agree, etc.). (Racine v. Laramie, Ltd.
27 v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026.) ; ELEMENT
28 2: Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; The covenant imposes on each party to
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1
the contract the duty to refrain from doing anything which would render
2 performance of the contract impossible by any act of his own, and also the duty to
3 do everything that the contract presupposes that each party will do to accomplish
4 its purpose. (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
5 49.); ELEMENT 3: Breach of Implied Covenant; A party to a contract breaches
6 the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by interfering with or failing to
7 cooperate with the plaintiff in the performance of the contract. (L. Johnson, Inc. v.
8 America West Airlines, Inc. (2003) Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 11455 (citing
9 Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 299).);
10 and ELEMENT 4: Causation and Damage; The breaching party is liable for all
11 damages proximately resulting from the conduct. (PPG Industries, Inc. v.
12 Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310.).
13 347. REMEDIES: Compensatory Damages:
14 Damages for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are limited
15 to damages which might reasonably be foreseen by the parties and exclude
16 punitive damages, pain and suffering and/or medical damages. (Quigley v. Pet
17 (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 877.)
18
19 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE against ALL

20 DEFENDANTS
23 349. To prove legal malpractice you must establish the following four elements:
24 (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) harm. These are the basic elements for
25 most torts in California, as demonstrated herein.
26 350. Mel Hatamian breached a fiduciary owed to mother Melody Rodgers which
27 obliged her to advocate for mother’s interest. Mel Hatamian actively worked
28
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1
against mother because she is part of the conspiracy to deprive mother a 1 nd
2 children and their right to be together.
3 351. Mel Hatamian’s role was to throw the case by not providing effective legal
4 counsel by way of legal research, legal writings, presentation of evidence, and
5 objecting to untrue hearsay evidence.
6 352. Mel Hatamian refused to assist providing arguments for appeal for mother,
7 refuses to object to hearsay evidence, and refuses to obtain court documents for
8 the mother to review. This dereliction and deviation from the standard of care and
9 a failure to exercise reasonable care in fulfilling her duties has resulted in
10 tremendous loss to mother by way of not having custody of her children, and the
11 financial consequences of fighting a court case in other state Pro Per.
12
13 ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD UPON THE COURT Against

14 ALL DEFENDANTS
17 354. Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It
18 is also clear and well-settled California law that any attempt to commit "fraud
19 upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding.
20 355. The court work together to deliberately and intentional without exculpatory
21 evidence from ever making it to the court record. There is evidence that I have
22 been evaluated by several mental health professionals, including going to therapy
23 and their professional of choice. These doctors and nurses provided reports that I
24 was completely sane and fit to care for my children, but the prosecution and Judge
25 are working overtime to keep these documents from making the court record.
26 356. CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER OF LOS ANGELES deliberately lied to the
27 court in order to mislead the court by stating for the record on December 17, 2021
28 that the children and foster mom were not present to testify in court, when indeed
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1
1 they were present in court and wanted to testify. The children’s appointed
2 attorney had in fact told them to leave and come back later when she called. She
3 never called them to come back. When mother called the foster mom during court,
4 Nakeya Clark told her that she was still waiting to testify but was told to come
5 back later. Mother managed to get Ms. Clark admitted to court although her device
6 was muted.
7 357. The department of children and family services wrote Dehumanizing,
8 embarrassing reports about mother which they knew were untrue and phrased it in
9 a way to case mother in a false light. As a result mother has suffered and is
10 continuing to suffer emotional harm. One of the most hurtful things they continue
11 to say is that I am depressed, anxious, delusional among other things. The legal
12 abuse that mother has been put through has caused her to experience emotional
13 harm yet they are making it seem like she has a mental disease that is incurable
14 and putting forth ideas that she may harm children as a result. Mother is happy and
15 will continue to be happy when her children are returned and justice is served. In
16 Fernandez v. Bailey, Finally, concealment is a factor that may be taken into
17 account because concealment tactics, including frequent relocations, the use of
18 aliases, and abstaining from school or community activities to avoid detection,
19 may preclude a child from forming stable attachments. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1236
20 (Alito, J., concurring). Thus, although analysis of the concealment factor examines
21 the removing parent's behavior, the focus remains on the child's connections to
22 their new environment.
23 358. In Heartland Academy Community Church v. Waddle, Furthermore,
24 Plaintiffs allege in this case that Mr. Waddle procured the orders through
25 misrepresentations and material omissions, actions which are not protected by
26 absolute immunity. "[I]t [is] clearly established law that government officials '
27 procurement `through distortion, misrepresentation and omission,'. . . of a court
28 order to seize a child is a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Malik, (internal

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1
citation omitted). See also Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1012 (noting "to the extent the
2 defendants [a social worker and other government officers] knew the allegations
3 of child neglect were false, or withheld material information, and nonetheless
4 caused, or conspired to cause, [the juvenile's ] removal from his home, they
5 violated the Fourth Amendment."). "The fact that the order was allegedly obtained
6 by omissions, rather than affirmative misstatements, is irrelevant, so long as the
7 `omissions are so probative they would vitiate probable cause.'"Malik191 F.3d at
8 1316, (quoting DeLoach v. Bevers31, Thus, because Mr. Waddle did not merely
9 execute the Juvenile Court's orders to seize the children from Heartland, but
10 instead actually petitioned the court for such orders, as well as misstating material
11 facts to the Juvenile Court Judge and omitting known material facts from his
12 papers presented to the Juvenile Judge, the Court finds that his actions are not
13 protected by the absolute immunity doctrine. As such, the Court will now address
14 the issue of whether he violated the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights in
15 procuring the orders for removal.
16 359. Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the
17 court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763
18 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud
19 which is directed to the judicial machinery itself It is where the court or a member
20 is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not
21 performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court
22 have been directly corrupted."
23
24
25
26
27
28
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1
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ULTRA VIRES ACTS against ALL
2 DEFENDANTS
5 361. An "ultra vires" act is one performed without legal authority; something
6 done which is beyond the scope of a corporation's authority. Board Actions.
7 Associations that act outside their authority may have their actions reversed by the
8 courts.
9 362. Ultra vires acts are any acts that lie beyond the authority of a corporation to
10 perform. Ultra vires acts fall outside the powers that are specifically listed in a
11 corporate charter or law. This can also refer to any action that is specifically
12 prohibited by the corporate charter.
13
14 THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF Against

15 ALL DEFENDANTS
18 364. “[D]eclaratory relief is designed in a large part as a practical means of
19 resolving controversies, so that parties can conform their conduct to the law and
20 prevent future litigation.” Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634,
21 648.
22 365. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiffs and
23 Defendants concerning respective rights and duties under the provisions of
24 Dependency Court.
25 366. Plaintiff respectfully asks the court to adjudicate or make an opinion on this
26 Federal question of law: “Are the current juvenile dependency laws under
27 California state statutes unconstitutional?” [ See Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530
28 US 57, 147 L. Ed 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054]

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1
367. An actual LEGAL CONTROVERSY and DISPUTE exists between
2 plaintiffs against the defendant, State of California as to the unconstitutionality of
3 the Juvenile Dependency Laws in California which reflect a VIOLATION OF a
4 PARENT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS which entitle a parent to bring up his or
5 her child without governmental interference.
6 368. California statutes, Welfare and Institutions Codes §§ 300 et. seq. entitle a
7 county, a county employee and social worker to “illegally search and seize”,
8 interrogate a child without being in the presence of his or her parent, and without
9 having the “right to have counsel present”, and without having the right to retain
10 counsel of choice, and subsequently allows a child to be detained as if
11 “incarcerated” for a crime duly committed without committing a crime, “without
12 having the right to bail”, and to be indefinitely “detained or incarcerated” in a
13 foster home or foster care facility “up until the age of 21”, and entitles the County
14 and Social Services to use the sole basis of “hearsay evidence” of a child, without
15 the parents having the right to confront and cross-examine the child, as a legal
16 grounds to TAKE A PARENT’S CHILD FROM THE PARENT’S CUSTODY
17 AND as a legal basis to terminate a parent’s parental rights. These Juvenile
18 Dependency laws are controversial because they violate the “parent’s right of
19 DUE PROCESS” in their right to bring up their children without governmental
20 interference.
21 369. Additionally, another controversy arises, as to the County employees’ and
22 Social Workers’ motives and corrupt customs, policies and unethical practices, as
23 their intent is to JUSTIFY the entity for which employs them in the
24 INHERITANCE and AWARDS of government funds and allocation of federal tax
25 dollars to fund their corrupt system and secure their jobs.
26 370. The abolishment or modification of these juvenile dependency laws and a
27 declaratory finding in this dispute and controversy could resolve the current state
28
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1
budget deficit and re-allocate funds for areas that would better serve the best
2 interests of children in this state.
3
4 FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

5 ORDER, PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Against ALL
6 DEFENDANTS
9 372. Beginning on or about Feb. 29, 2016, JERRY BROWN; PHILIP L.
10 BROWNING; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Los Angeles Department of
11 Children and Family Services; Superior Court of California for the County of Los
12 Angeles; MARY THERESA MEZA; CARVIN HALL; SONIA VALIENTE took
13 plaintiff’s children from her possession and control without cause in violation of
14 Plaintiff’s due process right to bring up her children without governmental
15 interference.
16
17 A. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT

18 AGAINST IRREPARABLE HARM
19 373. The requested preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
20 harm during the pendency of the litigation. Without this relief, the court will be
21 unable to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.
22
23 374. The Court Has the Discretion to Grant Preliminary Injunctive Relief.
24 Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is properly within the Court’s
25 discretion. The preliminary relief requested is of the same character as the final relief
26 sought in the complaint.
27
28 375. The Court Has Discretion to Issue the Preliminary Injunction

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1
The court has the discretion to issue the preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The injunctive relief requested does not exceed the
3 court’s jurisdiction or conflict with any federal law.
4
5 376. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a federal court has the
6 authority to issue a preliminary injunction in a case where it has jurisdiction. The
7 court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant as well as subject matter
8 jurisdiction to issue the injunction. Enterprise Intern. v. Corporacion Estatal, 762
9 F.2d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Cawley, 10-CV-712, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June
10 21, 2010).
11
12 377. The Court Has Discretion to Issue the Preliminary Injunction

13 The court has the authority to issue the preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
14 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state substantive law. The requested injunctive
15 relief does not exceed the court’s jurisdiction, and it is a proper remedy for Plaintiffs’
16 state law claims.
17 378. For cases that are in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, a court
18 will consider state law in determining the substantive legal issues associated with
19 the parties’ dispute and will apply federal procedural law to determine whether the
20 preliminary injunction should issue. Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co.,
21 830 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1987); System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games
22 Development Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d Cir. 1977).
23 379. The procedure for obtaining an injunction is governed by federal law. Thus,
24 if an issue pertaining to the preliminary injunction is procedural, federal law
25 controls and overrides any contrary state law. Southern Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin,
26 924 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
27 Civil Procedure controlled whether a preliminary injunction could issue and
28 rejecting the argument that state law should govern this issue in a diversity case);
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74
1
Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224, 1244 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
2 (holding that federal procedure, not state law, governed whether a preliminary
3 injunction should issue).
4
5 380. Consolidation would Deprive Plaintiffs of a Jury Trial on the Merits

6 The evidentiary record establishes sufficient grounds for granting PLAINTIFFS
7 ‘requested preliminary injunction, and Plaintiffs can present any additional evidence
8 requested by the Court at the hearing. However, consolidating the hearing on the
9 preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits would be improper, as Plaintiffs have
10 not waived its right to a jury trial.
11
12 381. A request for a preliminary injunction that could negate the court’s
13 authority to render a final judgment in the action may be handled by the court as a
14 request for permanent injunctive relief. In such a case, the court has the discretion
15 to consolidate a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the
16 merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
17
18 382. The preliminary injunction should be granted

19 Traditional equitable considerations weigh in favor of granting the preliminary
20 injunction. The evidentiary record demonstrates that: Plaintiffs are likely to succeed
21 on the merits of the claim, Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
22 absence of preliminary injunctive relief, the balance of the equities tips in the moving
23 party’s favor, and an injunction is in the public interest.
24
25 383. In determining whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction,

26 courts will generally consider the following equitable factors: (a) whether the
27 moving party is likely to succeed on the merits, (b) whether the moving party is
28 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (c) whether
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75
1
the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor, and (d) whether an
2 injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 14
3 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
4
5 384. PLAINTIFFS will experience irreparable harm in the absence of the

6 preliminary injunction
7 The evidence demonstrates that PLAINTIFFS cannot wait for relief from a final
8 judgment on the merits. The irreparable injury that PLAINTIFFS would suffer in the
9 interim would render any final judgment a nullity, and money damages would not be
10 able to compensate Plaintiffs for that harm.
11
12 385. An irreparable injury is an injury for which the court could not compensate
13 the moving if the moving prevailed in the final judgment. Injuries that are
14 generally not considered to be “irreparable” include lost income and other
15 economic losses that 1 are calculable and compensable by monetary damages. Di
16 Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017).
17
18 386. An Adequate Remedy at Law is Unavailable for Plaintiffs’ Harms

19 There is no adequate remedy at law for Plaintiffs’ harms. Any award of damages
20 would not fully compensate Plaintiffs for the harm caused by DEFENDANTS’
21 conduct.
22
23 387. An adequate remedy at law may be deemed unavailable if legal redress may
24 be obtained only by commencement of multiple actions, such as when the
25 defendant repeatedly commits the allegedly harmful acts. Ecolab Inc. v. Paolo,
26 753 F. Supp. 1100, 1110 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
27 388. Each day that the Defendants delay their compliance with controlling laws,
28 the children and their Families are further damaged. There is no plain, adequate, or
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76
1
complete remedy at law, as the ordeals the Plaintiff Families have encountered, as
2 courthouse doors and case remain locked and case information showing the
3 wrongful deeds of the Foster System remain hidden by the DEFENDANTS’
4 Foster System Operators.
5
6 389. The Parties’ Relative Hardships Weigh in Favor of the Preliminary

7 Injunction
8 The evidence demonstrates that the hardship to PLAINTIFFS from denying the
9 injunction would outweigh the hardship experienced by DEFENDANTS if the
10 injunction were granted. The preliminary injunction is therefore warranted by the
11 parties’ relative hardships.
12
13 390. In deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court will assess the
14 relative
15 hardships faced by the parties. This assessment involves balancing the injury faced by
16 the moving party against the injury that would be sustained by the opposing party if
17 the injunction were granted. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24
18 (2008).
19
20 391. The Injunction Should Be Granted, as PLAINTIFFS are Likely to

21 Succeed on the Merits
22 The evidence demonstrates that PLAINTFFS are likely to succeed on the merits of
23 the underlying claims. At this stage, PLAINTIIFS do not need to demonstrate
24 absolute certainty of success on its claims, but the evidence demonstrates that
25 PLAINTIFFS have a strong likelihood of success.
26
27 392. This factor weighs in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. In
28 determining whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction, a court must

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1
assess the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately succeed on the merits.
2 Munaf v.Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 3 (2008) (holding that it is abuse of discretion to
3 grant preliminary injunction without considering merits of underlying claim).
4
5 393. While the moving party must set forth evidence to support a likelihood of
6 success on the merits, this factor is not dispositive in determining whether to grant
7 injunctive relief. The moving party does not need to demonstrate an absolute
8 certainty of success in order to prevail. Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d
9 Cir. 1985).
10
11 394. Because the Statute Violates the First Amendment, the Injunction Must
12 be Granted.
13 PLAINTIFFS have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its
14 First Amendment claims. Having made this showing, it is DEFENDANTS burden to
15 demonstrate why an injunction should not issue. Because DEFENDANTS. cannot
16 justify the statute’s infringement of First Amendment rights, the Preliminary
17 injunction must be granted.
18
19 395. In a First Amendment case, a showing of a substantial likelihood of success

20 on the merits often also establishes irreparable harm. Thus, a showing of
21 substantial likelihood of success on the merits can be the determining factor that
22 warrants the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Sindicato Puertorriqueño De
23 Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,
24 509 F.3d 480, 485 (8th Cir. 2007).
25
26 396. When the plaintiff alleges that a statute violates 1 the First Amendment and
27 seeks preliminary injunctive relief on that ground, the burden shifts to the
28 government to show why an injunction should not issue. Specifically, the

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1
government must demonstrate that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits
2 of the First Amendment claim because the statute is constitutional. Ashcroft v.
3 American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (government has
4 burden of proving constitutionality of content-based restrictions on speech).
5
7 397. The Injunction is Narrowly Tailored to Remedy Specific Harms

8
9 The requested preliminary injunction is narrowly tailored to enjoin only

10 DEFENDANTS and to remedy only the specific harms established by PLAINTIFFS.
11 It is therefore proper in scope and should be granted.
12
13 398. A court will grant a preliminary injunction when necessary to protect civil
14 rights. Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, 228 F.2d 853, 857 (6th Cir.
15 1956) (injunction will issue to protect and preserve basic civil rights); Cent.
16 Presbyterian Ch. v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 901 (E.D. Mo. 1969)
17 (preliminary injunction granted to enjoin violation of civil rights laws guaranteeing
18 plaintiffs’ right to use their property for religious services).
19
20 399. Irreparable injury may be presumed in cases involving certain deprivations

21 of civil rights, including deprivation of First Amendment rights. Elrod v. Burns,
22 427 U.S. 47, 373 (1976).
23
24 400. A court will find that the civil rights plaintiff has established a likelihood
25 of success on the merits when the defendant’s proposed actions will clearly violate
26 constitutionally protected rights. Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir.
27 1989) (preliminary injunction was granted when plaintiffs established First
28
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1
Amendment violations); American Federation of Government Employees, Afl-1
2 Cio, Council 33 v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 548 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (compulsory
3 drug testing enjoined as violation of Fourth Amendment "unless and until"
4 plaintiff can show that such testing supersedes constitutional rights of employees).
5
6 401. Plaintiff Families further request the Court to provide temporary injunctive
7 relief and a permanent injunction requiring the Defendants to operate the foster
8 care system in accordance with the state and federal laws in effect and to stop
9 ignoring the procedural and substantive due process rights of Florida’s Children
10 and their Birth Parents and other relatives.
11
12 402. The injunction must stop, immediately, the current detention and placement
13 of minor children. The injunction should compel Foster System Operators to
14 refrain from using perjured testimony in dependency proceedings and to notify the
15 local state attorney of any perjured testimony that is offered.
16
17 403. Foster System Operators should be required to immediately and promptly

18 provide dependency judges and Birth Parents with potentially exculpatory
19 evidence not offered at trial.
20
21 404. Foster System Operators should be prohibited from fabricating false reports
22 in order to try to disqualify relatives as caregivers, and the Foster System
23 Operators should be required to immediately provide any relative disqualified
24 from serving as a relative caregiver the information needed to correct the errors in
25 the system-fabricated reports.
26
27 405. The injunction should require Foster System Operators to promptly correct
28 false statements in home studies, and to remove those whom they listed on the
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1
abuse registry to remove the falsely labeled persons from the registry, and delete,
2 and not use again, the false statements, including those relating to Melody
3 Rodgers.
4
5 406. The injunction should require all attorneys social workers on behalf of the
6 California foster care system to submit an affidavit of personal knowledge
7 certifying the facts in each case with out-of-state relatives of children in state
8 foster care, to timely demonstrate California’s compliance, at the time of shelter
9 and the first hearing after a TPR judgment, with respect of the notice and hearing
10 requirements of California's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act.
11
12 FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY TO PARTICIPATE

13 IN RACKETEERING; VIOLATION OF RICO ACT under 18 USC § 1962 [d]
14 Against ALL DEFENDANTS
17 408. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate
18 RICO. This means that plaintiff allege that the defendants conspired to
19 conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
20 racketeering activity and conspired to violated Plaintiff’s Civil Rights. See 42 USC §
21 1985[3].
22 409. As a result of the acts of defendants, plaintiff suffered damages in an
23 amount of $500,000.
24 410. The circumstances of the violation consisted of the defendants filing of a
25 false Juvenile Dependency Petition, in contrary to legislature’s intent for enacting
26 the laws under Welfare and Institutions Codes § 300, et. seq., with the motive of
27 milking the federal government for Financial Support, based on the false premises
28 that the County and State needed funds to “protect” plaintiff’s minor children.
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1
411. Defendants have a pattern, custom and practice of filing false Juvenile
2 Dependency Petitions, or twisting the meaning of “failure to protect” or
3 “likelihood of emotional or physical harm” as the basis of defrauding the Federal
4 Government and Tax payers of millions of dollars.
5 412. This custom and policy of Defendants is a violation of the RICO Act.
6 WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendant[s, and each of them,]
7 as follows:
8 413. For actual damages in the amount of $500,000.00;
9 414. Plaintiff demands that defendants stop their (threatened) conduct
10 defendants refusal, and resulting necessity for prompt judicial action to protect
11 plaintiff. On or about Feb. 29, 2016, Plaintiff demanded that JERRY BROWN;
12 PHILIP L. BROWNING; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Los Angeles
13 Department of Children and Family Services; Superior Court of California for the
14 County of Los Angeles; MARY THERESA MEZA; CARVIN HALL; SONIA
15 VALIENTE stop their conduct. Defendants, and each of them, have refused and
16 still refuse to refrain from their threatened conduct.
17 415. Defendants’ [threatened] wrongful conduct, unless and until enjoined and
18 restrained by order of this court, will cause great and irreparable injury to plaintiff.
19 416. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the injuries of “threatened
20 forced eviction”.
21 417. As a proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, plaintiff’s health
22 has been damaged in the sum of “at least” $50,000. Plaintiff will be further
23 damaged in like manner so long as defendants’ conduct continues. The full
24 amount of this damage is not now known to plaintiff, and plaintiff will amend this
25 complaint to state this amount when it becomes known or on proof of the
26 damages.
27
28
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1
2 PRAYER
3 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against all Defendants, as to all causes of
4 action, as follows:
5 1. A preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants and its
6 directors, officers, agents, employees and representatives and in and all persons
7 acting in concert with them from engaging in each of the unlawful practices set
8 forth herein;
9 2. A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of in this Complaint
10 are unlawful and violate 42 U.S.C. 1988;
11 3. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the Violations of Civil Rights by
12 Defendants in the amount of $500,000. Plaintiffs pray for a judgment in the
13 amount of $500,000.00 against each defendant for this cause of action;
14 4. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of the Conspiracy Against Plaintiff’s
15 Rights by Defendants in the amount of $500,000. Plaintiff prays for a judgment in
16 the amount of $500,000.00 against each defendant for this cause of action;
17 5. General damages in the amount of $500,000.00 for all other damages
18 deemed appropriate by the courts and as allowed by statute;
19 6. Plaintiff demands a jury trial as to the issues so triable;
20 7. Special damages according to proof;
21 8. As against only the individual defendants and not any municipality,
22 punitive damages as allowed by law;
23 9. Attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and any other appropriate
24 statute;
25 10. Injunctive relief, both preliminary and permanent, as allowed by law,
26 (including preliminary injunctive relief to be based upon a separate application);
27 11. Costs of suit incurred herein; and
28 12. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
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1
2 Plaintiff hereby DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL.

3
4 DATED: July 25, 2022 THE LAW OFFICES OF ANGELA

5 SWAN, APC
7
By:
8
Angela Swan,
9 Attorney for Plaintiff
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1

Angela Swan, #213793

2 II. CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE CALIFORNIA TORT NOTICES &

27 41. CARVIN HALL – Social Worker

28 42. SONIA VALIENTE – Social Worker

27 89. VERONICA J RANDAZZO # 292261- Deputy County Counsel of

28 Department of Children and Family Services

27 104. NICOLE WADE – Social Worker of Los Angeles County Department

28 of Children and Family Services

27 121. LESLIE S. HEIMOV, Executive Director of Children's Law Center of

24 IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

17 a) Melony and Harmony Rodgers

27 complete the court-ordered plan.

27 Harmony with their maternal grandmother.

27 persons involved, and whether either person acted in self-defense.”

27 criminal record related to mental illness.

27 to return the children and there is no evidence presented by the Department

27 permitted unsupervised visit with perpetrator of domestic violence). However, if

28 mental illness of a parent.”]

27 he was unable to file a writ petition on Plaintiff’s behalf.

28 allegations against Plaintiff.

27 inadequate training, and/or by failing to train its officers, agents, employees

28 and state actors, in providing the constitutional protections guaranteed to

27 and employees as to their compliance with Constitutional safeguards; and by

19 B. California’s Foster System Increasingly Serves as a Child Snatching/”

27 239. To operate the system for internal diversion of children, Defendants

28 executing their responsibilities [including DCFS, and DCF’s contracted lead

27 though fully set forth herein.

28 Angeles, Juvenile Court ORDERED that the DCFS be AUTHORIZED TO

27 Department of Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 US 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018;

27 abuse of process. There is, in general, no constitutional duty of state officials to

27 recorded multiple incidents indicating that someone in the DeShaney household

20 SECOND CAUSE VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) against ALL DEFENDANTS

28 informed. Defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right to

27 Angeles, Juvenile Court ORDERED that the DCFS be AUTHORIZED TO

28 DETAIN PLAINTIFF’S CHILDREN without a valid cause. The Governor of

27 in my favor re.: Superior Court of California - Commissioner Stephen Marpet - he

17 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1986 against ALL

28 persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in

9 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MONELL RELATED CLAIMS (LAW

11 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION/ABUSE OF

19 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF

27 320. As a proximate result of defendants’ actions, plaintiff has suffered severe

28 anguish, stress, anxiety and general damages in an amount according to proof.

5 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER (Defamation) Against

28 parent to many people.

25 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY against ALL

27 335. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as

28 though fully set forth herein.

27 Cal.App.4th 889, 915 [187Cal.Rptr.3d 452], internal citation omitted.)

16 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF

27 v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026.) ; ELEMENT

19 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE against ALL

13 ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD UPON THE COURT Against

27 procurement `through distortion, misrepresentation and omission,'. . . of a court

28 order to seize a child is a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Malik, (internal

14 THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF Against

27 California state statutes unconstitutional?” [ See Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530