Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

L-28446 December 13, 1982

provided for in the Rules, such as written notice to the heirs, devices and legatees of the application to sell and of the time and place for the hearing thereof; and that without compliance therewith, the authority to sell itself and the order approving it would be null and void. They further argue that an action to declare the inexistence of such a void contract is inprescriptible pursuant to Article 1410 of the new Civil Code. Answering these contentions of plaintiffs -appellants. defendantappellee argues that the plaintiffs - appellants are already in estoppel by their inaction and failure to question the sale despite the lapse of more than fifteen (15) years from the time of its execution and by conducting themselves in a manner as to show consent and assent to the consummation of the sale; and that defendant -appellee acquired the land in good faith until judicial appr oval and valuable consideration. Moreover, assuming that the plaintiffs -appellants may have a good cause of action, the same had already prescribed. The appeal taken by the plaintiffs-appellants must fail, both on legal and equitable considerations. 1. It is true that when an application is made by an administrator to sell real property of the estate for the payment of debts, expenses and other obligations of the estate, an application must be filed with the probate court which may grant the same on written notice to the heirs, devices and legatees. (Section 2, Rule 89, Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule 90, of the old Rules of Court which was the rule in force at the time of the transaction herein involved.) It is also the rule that a sale of property of the estate without such notice to the heirs, devices and legatees is void. ( Estate of Gamboa vs. Lorenza , 12 Phil. 191; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church, 45 Phil. 895; and Ortalez vs. Register of Deeds, 55 Phil. 33.) Equally unassailable is the statuto ry pronouncement that an action declaring the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. (Art. 1410, New Civil Code.) Nevertheless, plaintiffs -appellants' cause of action may not derive support from the aforementioned doctrines, There is no clear showing that the authority granted by the probate court to sell the parcel of land in question way back since May 22, 1948 as without written notice to the heirs, devices and legatees. Plaintiffs -appellants offered no proof as to such alleged lack of notic e. 'They rely solely on Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "D" and "D -1 " which were presented not by them but by defendant-appellee during the hearing of the motion to dismiss to support such contention. Exhibit "A" is the motion of Atty. Emilio Lumontad, counsel for the administrator, praying that the administrator be authorized to sell the land in question. Exhibit "B" is the order of Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg granting said authority for the purpose of meeting the obligations of the estate. Exhibit "C" is another motion of Atty. Lumontad praying that the sale in favor of defendant-appellee be approved. Exhibit "D" is the deed of sale and Exhibit "D-1 " is the approval of said sale indicated by Judge Juan L. Bocar on page 2 thereof. Plaintiffs -appellants capitalize the fact that in none of said documents or papers does it appear that they were served or given notice of the same. To Our mind, the circumstance pointed out by plaintiffs -appellants does not suffice to annul the sale in question. The lack of any indication on the documents mentioned that they were served with copies of the same does not necessarily mean that they had no notice thereof. In the absence of a positive showing that the requirements for securing the authority to sell had not been complied with, it is appropriate to apply the presumptions that the law had been obeyed; that official duty has been regularly performed; and that private transactions had been fair and regular. (Sec. 5, pars. m. p and ff. Rule 131, Rules of Court.) When, by the order of the court, a property of the estate is sold under this provision, the purchaser in good faith may rest on the presumption of the legality of the court's order. (Esguerra vs. de Leon, 69 Phil. 493.) 2. The record reveals sufficient indicia that the plaintiffs-appellants were fully aware of the sale of the subject land in favor of defendant -

FRANCISCA H. RAFOLS, FLORACION RAFOLS, AMPARO RAFOLS, CESAR CIMAFRANCA, CRISOSTOMO RAFOLS and RICARDO RAFOLS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARCELO A. BARBA, defendant-appellee. VASQUEZ, J.: Plaintiffs-appellants Rafols are the wife and the four (4) children of Nicolas Rafols, a resident of Cebu City, who died testate on May 2, 1947. His estate was the subject of administration in Sp. Proc. No . 154-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Nicolas Rafols" in which a certain Vital T. Montayre, now deceased was appointed administrator. In a motion dated May 22, 1948, Vidal T. Montayre, thru counsel, sought authority from the probate Court to sell a parcel of land belonging to the estate in order to pay taxes, expenses of administration and other indebtedness of the estate. The said motion was granted by the Court in its order dated May 22, 1948. The land authorized to be sold was a parcel of cogon land with an area of approximately 100 hectares assesed at 7,800.00 under Tax Declaration No. 05805 situated in Barrio Bunga, Toledo City. The sale of the said parcel of land, however, was not effected despite the lapse of more than three (3) years from the time that the Court had authorized the sale allegedly due to the lack of interested buyers. On August 14, 1951, herein defendant-appellee Marcelo A. Barba purchased the land for the stated consideration of P18,000.00. The deed of sale executed in his favor by administrator Vidal T. Montayre was submitted to the Court for approval on August 15, 1951. The said sale was approved by Judge Juan L. Bocar who manifested such approval on the face of the deed of sale. On November 24, 1966, or more than fifteen (15) years after the execution of the deed of sale in favor of defendant -appellee, herein plaintiffs-appellants instituted Civil Case No. 124 -T in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against defendant -appellee Marcelo A. Barba for the declaration of the nullity of the said deed of sale and for the recovery of damages and attorney's fees. They anchor their complaint on the principal contention that the sale was null and void inasmuch as plaintiffs. appellants were not notified of the hearing of the application to sell the said parcel of land, nor of the order dated May 22, 1948 and the approval of the sale which had been stamped on a deed of sale on August 15, 1951. Defendant-appellee filed an answer alleging, among others, the affirmative defenses that he bought the land in good faith, that the plaintiffs-appellants are in estoppel, and that the action had already prescribed. Subsequently, he filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds, to wit, (1) plaintiffs -appellants have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. In an order dated June 29, 1967, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 124-T on the grounds that it is barred by the statute of limitations a nd by estoppel by laches. This order of dismissal is the subject-matter of the instant appeal. Plaintiffs-appellants assail the ruling of the trial court that they cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations by alluding to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bonaga vs. Soler, et al., G.R. No. L15717, promulgated on June 30, 1961; De Jesus, et al vs. de Jesus, et al. , G.R. No. L-16553, promulgated on November 29, 196 1; and Corpuz, et al vs. Beltran et al., G.R. No. L-7487, promulgated on October 27, 1955, which held that the sale of properties pertaining to an estate must be done only upon prior compliance with the requisites

appellee despite which they questioned the validity of the same only after the lapse of fifteen (15) years from its execution. They could not have been ignorant of the fact that the estate of their deceased father was under settlement proceedings with a court -appointed administrator who is required by law to render an accounting of his administration. The record shows that on August 18, 1951 or just three (3) days after t he execution of the deed of sale in favor of defendant-appellee, herein plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo, Crisostomo and Amparo, all surnamed RAFOLS, filed a motion praying that the administrator be ordered to pay each of them the sum of P1,000.00, plus P600.00 for their lawyer. This motion was granted by Judge Bocar on the same date. (Rollo, p. 31.) It also appears that after the death of Vidal T. Montayre who was the one originally appointed administrator of the estate, he was substituted in such capacity by Ricardo Rafols, one of the plaintiffs -appellants herein. On January 8, 1954, the administrator filed a "REPORT ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE ESTATE OF NICOLAS RAFOLS." (Rollo, pp. 33-37.) In the said report, mention is expressly made of the sale of the parcel of land in question in favor of defendant appellee for the sum of P18,000.00 (at page 3 thereof). Plaintiffs appellants do not claim that they had no notice of such report, nor of the final accounting and motion for closing of administration filed by Ricardo Rafols as administrator on September 17, 1962. (Rollo, pp. 38-39.) It was not until November 24, 1966 that the plaintiffs appellants commenced the present action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motivation for having instituted this act ion was placed in issue by the actuation of Ricardo Rafols who, during the pendency of the present appeal in this Court, filed a motion to withdraw appeal on April 27, 1968. In said motion, he stated, among others, the following: d) That the Deed of Sale o f the land in question was executed by the Administrator selling the same to defendant Marcelo Barba for the consideration of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00), and the sale was approved by the Court on August 15, 1951; e) That all of us, heirs of the late Nicolas Rafols, knew all the time that the estate had no money with which to pay the claims of the creditors, to pay the estate and inheritance taxes and other expenses of the administration and the only way to raise money to meet all obligations of t he estate is to sell the land in question situated in Toledo, Cebu, or that other land situated in Dumanjug Cebu; f) That all of us, heirs of the late Nicolas Rafols, knew that the consideration of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00) paid by Marcelo Barba for the land in question was the best price offered for the land was unproductive; g) That out of the proceeds of the sale, the inheritance and estate taxes, creditor's claim, other expenses of the administration and the attorney's fees were paid and the surplus amount left were divided be all of us, heirs of Nicolas Rafols h) That, in conscience, I cannot allow myself to be a party to an injustice for deep down in my heart I and all of us, heirs of the late Nicolas Rafols, are conscious that the transaction was on the level and it helped the estate in meeting its obligations. (Rollo, pp. 42-43.) 3. The infirmity of the subject deed of sale is premised on the alleged nullity of the order of the court authorizing the sale, The validity of said order may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the supposed ground for declaring it void for lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the face thereof. To enable the plaintiffs -appellants to rely on the rule that the action t o declare the inexistence of a

contract does not prescribe, it must first be shown that the subject contract is indeed null and void. As aforesaid, the basis of this supposition, to wit, the nullity of the authority granted by the probate court to sell the property, had not been adequately shown. In the least, plaintiffs-appellants are already guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. While it is true that, technically, the action to annul a void or inexistent contract does not pr escribe, it may nonetheless be barred by laches. As was stated in Nielson & Co. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. , L-21601, December 17 1966 18 SCRA: The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on the same change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time; laches is not. The essential elements of the principle of laches are all present herein, to wit: ... (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit it not held barred. ( Yusingco vs. OngHingLian, 42 SCRA 589.) The defendant-appellee purchased the parcel of land in question giving rise to the complaint of herein plaintiffs -appellants. The latter delayed the assertion of their supposed right to annul the sale for a period of over fifteen (15) years despite knowledge or notice of such sale. They had all the opportunity within that period of time to take action to set aside or annul the sale. Defendant - appellee was never apprised of arty intention on the part of plaintiffs -appellants to annul the sale until this action was filed. Finally, the defendan t-appellee stands to lose the property in question if the suit filed against him by plaintiffs-appellants shall not be deemed barred. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiffs -appellants. SO ORDERED.

RULE 131 BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS SECTION 1. Burden of proof.Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.(1a, 2a) SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions.The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it: (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.(3a) SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d) That a person take ordinary care of his concerns; (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; (f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter ; (g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter; (h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid; (i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced; (j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him; (k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly; (l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it; (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction; (o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed; (r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract; (s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration; (t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated; (u) That a writing is truly dated; (v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail; (w) That after an absence of seven years, it being un known whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft; (2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years; (4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances hereinabove provided an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for a declaration of presumptive death of the

absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact; (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life; (z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership; (aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; (bb) That property acquired by a man and woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. (cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal. (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature; (ff) That the law has been obeyed; (gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published; (hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases; (ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest;

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules: 1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived; 2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived; 3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived; 4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older; 5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived. (kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.(5a) SEC. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy o f such child must prove his
allegation.(6)