Villanueva, Vince Ivan S.

2021107261
JD-1A – Criminal Procedure

Assignment 5

DOMINGO NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 141524
FACTS: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et.al filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July
22, 1998 since this was the day that they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days
had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999,
the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the
Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod who was charged with violation of RA 3019

RULING: YES. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. EXCEPTION: RA 7975, as well as RA
8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of RA 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense. In the case at bar, the crime charged was committed from the period of
January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The applicable law, therefore, is RA 7975. The expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Sec. 4 of PD 1606 which specifically include
Provincial governors, vice governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, city mayors, vice-
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads.

PANFILO LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 128096 20 JAN 1999

FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, stated that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then
formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,

asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one of the “principal accused” are government
officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A.
8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

ISSUE: Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.

RULING: RTC has the proper jurisdiction over the case. In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an
offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there
was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established. The continuous failure to show in the
amended information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and
not the Sandiganbayan.

Soliven v. Judge Makasiar

167 SCRA 393 (1988) 

FACTS: President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Luis Beltran, a columnist for
the newspaper Philippine Star and Maximo Soliven. They were sued for libel due to an article
written by Beltran wherein he alleged that the president “hid under the bed” during a bloody coup
attempt staged by military rebels in December 1989. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge
Ramon Makasiar. Judge Makasiar then issued a warrant of arrest against Beltran et al. Beltran et al
filed a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court alleging, among others, that (1) the warrants of
arrest against them were irregularly issued due to the fact that Judge Makasiar did not personally
examine the complainant (President Aquino) and her witnesses before issuing the arrest warrants,
and (2) President Aquino cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her presidential
immunity from suit; A president cannot be sued, however, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would
be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not
be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

RULING: NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
People vs. Aminnudin
163 SCRA 402 (1988)

FACTS: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected
his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. Later on, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen and both were
charged for Illegal Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough
investigation. Then trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted. His defense, Aminnudin, disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was
his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.

He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the
stock room of the PC headquarters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

RULING: NO. Aminuddin was arrested illegally.  The mandate of the Constitution is clear that a valid
search or arrest warrant shall be served first before the authorities can check his personal
properties or deprived him of his liberty.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after a
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed,
as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was
clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.
 The accused-appellant, in this case, was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called
for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-
appellant
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

FACTS: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. They were frisked and there found in possession of Mengote a 38. caliber revolver with
six live bullets in the chamber and a fan knife in the possession of his companion Morellos. They
were arrested and the weapons were taken from them. The revolver seized was used as evidence
against Mengote but he contends that the revolver should not be admitted as evidence because the
seizure was the product of an illegal search which is not incident to a lawful arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the accused acts of merely “looking from side to side”
and “holding his abdomen,” do not constitute enough basis to implement a warrantless arrest.
There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or
at least being attempted by the accused in the presence of the arresting officers. In this case, the
Solicitor General argued that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote’s acts “created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in
them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed
it.” The Court shot down this argument stating that no offense could possibly have been suggested
by a person “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and in a place not exactly
forsaken.
People v. Tangliben
184 SCRA 220 (1990)

FACTS: In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of
the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission was aimed not only against persons who may
commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen
noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him.
The person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but
the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside
the bag where marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less.
The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his
name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver
the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, for further investigation. The RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga found Medel Tangliben y
Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search incident led to a lawful arrest.

RULING: NO. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may without a
warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of
marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is
that, this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an
informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The
police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant. To
require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of
firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.

ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 101837
FACTS: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove
off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. Accordingly, on 11 July 1991,
the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder
before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the
Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not
execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

The counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner
argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six
(6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime
had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none
had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING: NO. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in
the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
said rule. Under Sec. 5 par. (a), (b), the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7.

The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they
have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the
fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the
above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is
baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to
determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is
probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought
by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived
of.

On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation
contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when
the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. The facts of
the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they
were afforded the proper preliminary investigation.

VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
FACTS: As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioner
Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere,
as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the
people.

According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches
and seizures without the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident
happened, where a certain Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the members of
the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring
and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against
illegal search and seizures.

RULING: NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue
its mission of establishing an effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the
benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize
the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to
mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in
such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e.,
without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation
of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.

Kho vs Makalintal
G.R. No. 94902-06   April 21, 1999

FACTS: NBI Agent Salvador applied for a search warrant against Benjamin Kho in his residence at BF
Homes, Paranaque. On the same day NBI Agent Arugay also applied to the same court for a warrant
against the Kho for in his house at Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The warrants were applied for after
NBI trams had conducted personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses based on the
confidential information they received that the places were being used as storage centers for
unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles. NBI sought the issuance of the warrants in
anticipation of criminal cases to be filed against Kho.  On the same day, the Judge Makalintal
conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued
the warrant.

On May 16, 1990 the NBI agents, armed with a search warrant, searched the subject
premises and recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition,
explosives, and various radio and telecommunication equipment. The items were confiscated. Upon
verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, the NBI agents found out that no license has ever
been issued to any person/entity for the confiscated items. Petitioners then question the issuance
of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefor.  They
contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises
involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to
vest in the applicant’s personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the
commission of a crime by them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject search warrants were issued without probable cause.

RULING: NO. Petitioners argue that the surveillance and investigation conducted by the NBI within
the premises were not sufficient to vest in the applicant’s personal knowledge showing the
commission of crime but the records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and
investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded in the two
houses. Applicant Salvador and Agent Vargas testified that they personally attended the
surveillance together with their witnesses and saw the firearms being unloaded from motor
vehicles and brought into the houses. It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the
questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their
witnesses.

The Judge also personally examined them under oath and asked them searching
questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed
procedure and legal requirements. The sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses
were duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the
examining judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the examinations
asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry – the existence or absence of a probable cause.