The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A Case study

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the longest in the world. The dispute is between
two distinct movements: Jewish Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, both parties claiming
the same territory. The roots of the hostility run deep, manifesting beyond national
considerations, ideology and religion, as an Israeli-Arab conflict as well as a Jewish-Islam
clash (Inbari, 2018). In conclusion, the Israeli ‘beacon of democracy’ (Lombardi, 2005) is
darkening.

Jewish persecution in Europe during the early 20th century caused the United Nations
(UN) to create a Jewish national homeland in 1948 by partitioning Palestine to create a
Jewish and Arab state; The State of Israel (Anon, n.d.; Ben-Gurion, 1948). Precipitated by
the Balfour Declaration (1917) and de-colonialisation within the British Empire (1947),
Muslim Arabs were displaced by Jewish returnees as the new country was established on
their homeland (Little, 2018). Unsurprisingly, several wars were provoked within the
territory creating the current border lines; outcomes of two wars that were waged in 1948 and
1967 (Beauchamp, 2018).

Of particular import is the Six Day War of 1967. In May 1967, President Nasser of Egypt
pronounced the closure of the Straits of Tiran, a strategic seaway for Israeli access to the
Suez Canal (Nasser, 1967), and proceeded to assemble forces along the Egypt/Israel border.
In 1957 Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, had declared that any closure to Israeli shipping
along the Straits of Tiran would be a declaration of war (Barak, 2007, p.657; Meir, 1957).
On 5th June 1967, Israel attacked Egyptian airfields, the subsequent conflict decimated
Egyptian forces. Precipitated by the Israeli/Egyptian Suez crisis conflict of 1957, Israel took
control of the West Bank, Sinai Peninsula and Gaza, each having large Palestinian
populations.

Sources of conflict have been numerous with many discussions and disputes between the
Arab World, the United Nations (UN) and America ensuing. The Rabat conference in 1967
swore support for the Palestinians (Vasilʹev, 2012, pp.333-334), along with the 1978 Camp
David Accord; Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat agreeing on Israeli withdrawal from the
Sinai Peninsula in return for negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza.

In 1987, however, due to no solutions from Camp David being implemented and the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) having accomplished nothing for the Palestinians,
the spontaneous First Intifada (uprising) commenced with Palestinian violence aimed at Israel
(Naser-Najjab, 2020, p.62). The uprising re-shaped relations between Palestine and Israel,
changed internal Palestinian politics, and fundamentally revised the international perception
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Ashrawi, 1992, p.12). During the 1987 intifada, however,
Hamas was established as an alternative to the PLO and began its assault on Israel in 1989,
with attacks on civilians and military throughout the 1990s. It important to understand that
frustration at the inertia of Camp David laid the ground for the intifada. Consequently, the
aim of the Madrid peace conference in 1991 was to revive the Israel-Palestine peace process.
Harms and Ferry (2012, p.153) suggest that the symbolism of Madrid was more significant than
its accomplishments, although the bilateral negotiations between Palestine and Israel would lead to
the Oslo Accords. The challenges up to this point are that international interventions, and third-
party support do little but pave the way for further talks while Palestinian frustration grows.
Although Camp David had set workable frameworks, nothing was implemented.

In August 1993 in Washington D.C., PLO chairman Yasser Arafat acknowledged

the State of Israel; likewise, Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin recognised the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people (Struck, 1993), a seemingly successful outcome of
the first Oslo Accord. Israel, however, was unenthusiastic about accepting full statehood for
Palestinians and a potential resolution, the two-state solution, was not discussed. The
significant aspect of the second Oslo Accord was the recognition of the Palestinian Council
(Anon, 1995; Government of Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, 1995) which
provided authority, and a degree of autonomy, for Palestine (Segal, 2020). However, Rabin’s
Knessett speech ratifying the Oslo peace accords, indicated that Palestine would be “less than
a state”, and will “independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority” (Rabin,
1995), Rabin clearly indicated that the two-state solution was not an option; Oslo promised a
positive resolution, but the culmination fell short.

In July 2000, a Camp David summit was arranged by US President Bill Clinton, in an
attempt to build upon the Oslo Accords. The summit concluded with no agreement as the
interim process put in place had not satisfied the hopes of either Israel or Palestine. In late
September, the dissatisfaction of no outcome at Camp David, and the visit of Israeli
opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, caused frustration to erupt into the
Second Intifada, which continued until February 2005 when Sharon and Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to stop all acts of violence (Anon, 2006). This period
began the current stalemate that exists between the two factions.
 Israel’s main concern was that giving up territory would result in more violence, while
Palestinians believed that Oslo simply brought more Israeli settlements and more occupation.
In September 2005, however, Sharon withdrew troops and uprooted Jewish settlements from
Gaza, closing the border and relieving the occupation. With the lack of a peace deal and
Israeli retention of border control, it could be considered that there was no negotiation, simple
unilateral action by Israel, which is in contradiction to peace talks.

With no agreement, there was no obligation that Abbas could enact. This was
particularly problematic with Hamas. It could be considered that Sharon had been more
interested in developing his relationship with President Bush than discussing terms with the
Palestinians and the 2005 withdrawal of troops took place with no commitment from the
Palestinians. It could also be argued that Sharon was expecting a violent continuation of the
conflict after the withdrawal should Hamas gain power in Gaza, and so set up the Palestinian
cause to fail. Hamas indeed won the election and proceeded to attack Israel with rockets.
Clearly, any trust was now eroded in any peace process as the concession of land did not
bring a peaceful outcome.

Currently, the West Bank is under Palestinian authority, but experiences Israeli
occupation with troops imposing restrictions on Palestinian activities (Shakir, 2019).
Continued expansion of Jewish communities in the West Bank curtails Palestinian land
ownership, while Gaza is under the control of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas and
subject to an Israeli blockade, but not occupation.

There are two main suggestions to resolve the conflict in Israel. The first is the ‘two-
state’ solution which creates an independent state for Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank,
the frontiers to be the 1967, pre-Six Day War borders. The remaining territory would belong
to Israel (Britannica, 2020). While this is a rational and practical solution in principle, there is
division between the two sides as to how the administration would work in practice (Egel et
al., 2021). The second proposal is the ‘one-state’ solution, whereby the territory becomes
either Israeli or Palestinian; Israeli Jews and Palestinians would have equal rights with no
national or religious identity. Given the volatility of the relationship it is likely that this
arrangement would create more conflict. Demographic growth must be given consideration.
The population of the region is currently 60% Israeli to 40% Palestinian, but the Palestinian
birth rate is growing at a faster rate (Horovitz, 2020). Clearly this will create challenges
within the population. The one-state solution, however, is gaining ascendancy (Tharoor,
2020).
 The Palestinians have splintered since 2006. Conflict still exists between the two major
parties: Fatah, traditionally the dominant party; and Hamas whose militaristic arm frequently
shows prominence. The differences now apparent between Hamas and Fatah make them
more hostile to each other than to Israel. The stalemate that exists re-enforces the lack of
confidence in a two-state solution. Despite many peace talks and brokered arrangements, the
gap between Palestine and Israel is as vast as ever. It seems neither Israel’s Benjamin
Netanyahu, nor Palestine’s Abbas believe either faction are serious about resolving their
differences, neither are they under pressure from their electorate to make a peace that the
people reject. Netanyahu’s conviction is that Jews should not compromise. Each side is
more uncertain of each other than in 1967.

Solutions to the conflict, would seem to be a two-state solution; two administrations over
the existing territory; a one state solution, a single territory which becomes either Israel or
Palestine, each with equal rights and no national or religious identity; or another possibility, a
bi-national state with each group retaining their national identity. The objections are clear.
The Palestinian position denies the existence of Israel (Youssef, 2020) and so a two-state
position is untenable. A one state solution with Palestinian and Jewish equality, the state
being both Jewish and democratic (the hub of Israel’s aspiration), is not realistic. To reduce
Palestinians to second class citizens who do not hold full rights challenges Israel’s rhetoric
that it is a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. In contrast, acceptance that the State of
Israel will no longer be a Jewish state, denies the history which led to its creation. Hamas is
willing to accept a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries, but is still committed to the
liberation of all Palestine, meaning the end of Israel.

In summary, disappointment and disagreement have dogged peace talks for decades,
from Camp David to Oslo. Whether a two-state, one-state or bi-national solution has been
proffered, failed peace talks and the return of violence confirm the attitude that ‘the other
side’ are continually seeking confrontation (Lintl, 2019). The ‘beacon of democracy’ in the
Middle East is dimming. Indeed, the suggestion of Israel being a ‘beacon of democracy’ as
suggested by Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison (J-Wire Newsdesk, 2019), is shown
by Enterline and Greig (2005, p.1093), to be a dubious conjecture in that democracy is an
aspect of regional prosperity, not chaos.
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