104 Dayot V Dayot - LAMBAYON
104 Dayot V Dayot - LAMBAYON
104 Dayot V Dayot - LAMBAYON
Dayot The Court of Appeals said that since the marriage was
solemnized without the requisite marriage license, it is
Promulgated a month after De Castro.
therefore void ab initio.
Case: Issue:
Consolidated petition challenging the Court of Appeals decision Simply, whether the marriage between JOSE and FELISA is void ab
declaring the marriage between JOSE and FELISA void ab initio. initio for being solemnized without a marriage license.
Lower Courts Rulings: Marriages of exceptional character, as the name suggests, are
RTC ruled in favor of FELISA, stating that the marriage was exceptions to the rule on the dispensability of the formal
VALID. requisite of a marriage license. As a general rule, they should be
RTC said that JOSE should have been more prudent in strictly but reasonably construed.
examining the documents he was made to sign. The fact that it The marriage between JOSE and FELISA is considered
took him at least 3 months to ascertain the contents of the exceptional in character because they availed of the exception
documents was implausible. under Art. 76. In lieu of a marriage license, JOSE and FELISA
executed an affidavit of marital cohabitation.
JOSE wrote FELISA as his wife in his SALN
JOSE’s sister testified that she signed her name voluntarily as For Art. 76 of the Civil Code to apply, the following conditions
a witness to the marriage. This kills/destroys JOSE’s claim must be present:
that his consent was secured through fraud. That the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority; and
The Court of Appeals originally affirmed RTC’s decision but Being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least 5 years.
later reversed it in favor of JOSE declaring the marriage was
VOID ab initio. The Court said there is no other recourse but to read the law as it
is plainly written:
JOSE’s central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license The exception only applies to those who have lived together
under Art. 76 of the Civil Code was not attendant to the case as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
at bar. each other.
Specifically, Art. 76 provides for the “legal condition that the No other reading of the law can be had because the language
man and woman must have been living together as husband of Art. 76 is precise.
and wife for at least 5 years before the marriage.” The requisite 5-year cohabitation period is an indispensability
JOSE basically says that the affidavit of cohabitation was carved in the language of the law. It is embodied in the law
falsified. not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
The Court of Appeals cited Ninal v. Badayog, stating that: mandatory character.
IN THIS CASE, it is indubitable that JOSE and FELISA have
1. The 5-year period of cohabitation should be the years
immediately before that day of the marriage and it not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity… that it is unbroken. In fact, JOSE and FELISA started living together only in June
1986 barely 5 months before the celebration of the marriage.
The falsity of the affidavit executed is without question.
THEREFORE, for the failure of the parties to comply with the
required period of cohabitation under Art. 76, the marriage was
effectively celebrated without a marriage license and thus VOID
AB INITIO.
The following are the points raised in the petition and the ruling
of the Court:
According the Republic, the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit will not affect the validity of the marriage, since all the
essential and formal requisites were complied with.
The Court said that this is WRONG. There is no disputing
that the marriage was celebrated license (in fact, they
executed an affidavit IN LIEU OF the marriage license).
However, both JOSE and FELISA failed to comply with the
EXPLICIT requirement under Article 76.
According to FELISA and the Republic, the Court must hold the
presumption of marriage.
The Court said that this is NOT APPLICABLE. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption
still needs to be applied.
The marriage between JOSE and FELISA was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance.