Delegation-of-Power Cases

Topic Delegation of Powers
Case Sema vs. Comelec

Facts On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May
10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative
district combining the said provice with Cotabato as "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City." Sema, questioned the Resolution combining
the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative district.
Issue Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces
Ruling Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID.
Rationale SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of

Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in
Congress.

Case NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association vs. NPC
Facts On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001.
Under that Law, a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was
formed.
An energy restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created

to manage the privatization and the restructuring of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC).
On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB
Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation
Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel.”
Under this Resolution, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally

terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits
provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution 2002-
125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and implement the NPC’s
Separation Program. Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void,
petitioners filed, in their individual and representative capacities, the present
Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB
Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002- 125.
Issue The issue was whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-
125 were properly enacted.
Ruling Resolutions were invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes
for their adoption.
Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running
the affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons
composing the National Power Board of Directors. When applied to public
functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right conferred upon them by law,
consisting of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates
of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others.
Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the board

of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive
departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen that had
made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus,
the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB,
much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions.
Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the fulfillment of their
responsibilities. There was no question that the enactment of the assailed
Resolutions involved the exercise of discretion, not merely a ministerial act that
could be validly performed by a delegate. Respondents’ reliance on American
Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents was misplaced. The Court explicitly
stated in that case that, in exercising their own judgment and discretion,
administrative officers were not prevented from using the help of subordinates as
a matter of practical administrative procedure. Officers could seek such aid, as
long as the legally authorized official was the one who would make the final
decision through the use of personal judgment.
In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB

Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries
of the different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves
who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. This action
violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to
employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the
NPC.
3/9 members were present and qualified to vote.
NPB Directors who promulgated the resolutions assigned

alternates/representatives to sign the resolution. SC ruled hat the powers of
the NPD directors can no longer be further delegated
Case People vs. Vera
Facts Respondent Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case entitled “The
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", in which
herein petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation is the
offended party and acted as the private prosecutor.
Respondent Unjieng filed an application for probation under the

provisions of Act No. 4221 otherwise known as the “Probation Law” in
the Court of First Instance in Manila where Respondent Vera is the Judge
ad interim. The Fiscal City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation of respondent, stating that Act No. 4221 is violative of equal
protection under Sec 1 (1), Article 3 of the Constitution because its
applicability is not uniform among the provinces in the Philippines,
particularly, the Section 11 of the Act gives the power among the
provinces to determine whether to implement the said law in their province
or not.
Petitioner corporation filed a supplementary opposition arguing that the

Act is an undue delegation of legislative power. Herein petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality
of Act No. 4221 and alleging that respondent judge has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction in granting the probation.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that: the act is constitutional,
that the private may not intervene in probation proceedings, that the City
Fiscal and the Solicitor General are estopped form questioning the validity
of the Act, that its validity cannot be questioned for the first time before
the Supreme court, and that the section in question of the act is inseparable
from the entire Act.
Issue 1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly
raised in these proceedings
2. Whether or not the said Act is constitutional

Ruling 1. Yes. Although the general rule is that only those who are parties to a
suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial
decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court
without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will
be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to be given the statute.
In the case at bar, the trial court in granting the probation derived its
jurisdiction in the assailed Act therefore the petitioners have standing in
the raising the issue. With regard to the Solicitor General acting as a
representing the People of the Philippines, if indeed the Act is violative of
the constitution, then the People has substantial interest on the issue.
The well-settled rule is, the State can challenge its own laws. In raising
constitutionality questions, it must be raised at the earliest possible time.
However, this rule has exception, wherein courts has jurisdiction to
determine the time when question of constitutionality of a statute may be
presented. It can be raised even for the first time, if its resolution is
necessary for the decision of a case, which is the situation of the present
case.
2. No. The constitutionality of the act is questioned on three grounds,

namely: a) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the
Executive Pardon and probation are vested on different branches, the
former to the executive and the latter to the judiciary. The two are
distinct acts, pardon removes the penalties, disabilities and restores
civil rights of the accused, on the other hand, probation, is a
suspension of sentence temporarily or indefinitely but the conviction,
liability and civil disabilities remains and become operative after the
suspension of when the judgement is rendered.
Thus, the court ruled that there is no encroachment in the pardoning power
of the President since the two are very different acts. b) That it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power. The challenged section of Act
No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
“This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer
at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals”.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and

shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. The court rules
that the section above constitute an improper and unlawful delegation
of the legislative power to the provincial board because of its
insufficiency. It does not does not lay down any rule or definite standard
by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise
of the discretionary powers delegated to it. It does specify facts or
conditions which therefore gives the provincial board unlimited absolute
power in implementing the Act. c) That it denies the equal protection of
the laws. To implement the Act, the condition specified is the provision of
the provincial boards for the salary of a probation officer. Therefore, if a
province do not comply with it, the Act will not be enforceable in that
province which means not all provinces will be able to enforce it.
These different situations are clearly a manifestation of discrimination and
inequality. Considering that the Act, particularly Section 11 is an undue
delegation of legislative authority that denies equal protection of laws,
the court ruled it unconstitutional.
And since the said section is inseparable with the entire Act that its
elimination will render the law ineffective, the court further ruled Act No.
4221 as unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is granted.

Case Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
Facts A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The
widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines
with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the
POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of
overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum
circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.
Issue Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation
of non-delegation of powers.
Ruling No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section

4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law

cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in

general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling
in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are
known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations

in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative

authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Case Demetria vs. Alba
Facts Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 states that the President
shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Issue Is the provision valid?
Ruling Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the
privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard
as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made.
It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void. Indeed, where
the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its
authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the
former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to
do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the
Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X,
Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the
Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutional
and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. notes, if any:

Case Chiongbian vs. Orbos
Facts Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a
plebiscite in Mindanao. Only four provinces voted for the creation of
ARMM (Lanao Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi Tawi) The other provinces
who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative
regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. So,
President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who
did not vote for ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the
issuance of EO 429. They claim that President Cory had no authority to
restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces
should remain as they are.
Issue Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power
to the President by allowing Cory to merge the existing regions by mere
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.
Ruling LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT. While the power to merge regions is
not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally
lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL
SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no
abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the
President the POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.
Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Case Ampatuan vs. Puno
Facts On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then
Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named
places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision
of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term
“transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the
supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s

autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong,
and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s
proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as
these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s
operations and to seize the regional government’s powers. They also
claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked
that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President
issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy,
but to restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the
proclamation pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-
Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on
her wisdom. The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killing.
Issue Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers
when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City
Ruling The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency
powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only
a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did
not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out
of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same.

Case David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency .
This case covers the seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the
former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic
institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and
protected by the constitution.
Issue Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

Ruling The assailed PP1017 (due to political opposition of the NPA) is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither
martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows
that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect
to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the
military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
SC declared that while the President alone can declare a state

of national emergency, he may not invoke this provision to
authorize him during the emergency to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers

of the State under Section 17 Article XII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by the Congress

Case Southern Cross Cement Corporation v Cement Manufactures Association
of the Philippines
Facts Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act
(SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress
soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. [3] The SMA provides the structure and
mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures,
including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and
producers from increased imports which inflict or could
inflict serious injury on them.
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern

Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of cement manufacturing, production, importation and
exportation. Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo
Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation,
purportedly the largest cement manufacturers in Japan.
[5]
Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers

Corporation[6] (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic
cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,[7] per
Record. While Philcemcor heralds itself to be an association of
domestic cement manufacturers, it appears that considerable equity
holdings, if not controlling interests in at least twelve (12) of its
member-corporations, were acquired by the three largest cement
manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of
France, Cemex S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and Holcim Ltd. of
Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere Glaris, Ltd., then
Holderfin B.V.).
the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff

Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying
Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the
ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff
Commissions negative findings.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary

by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the
DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. The Court
of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision[13] penned by Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,[14] partially granted
Philcemcors petition.
On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition,

arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over
Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for
review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the
factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-
existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general
safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not
yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary
when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled
that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no
longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors
application for definitive safeguard measures.
The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing

premises, petitioner’s prayer to set aside the findings of the Tariff
Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002 is
DENIED. On the other hand, the assailed April 5, 2002 Decision of
the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry is hereby
SET ASIDE. Consequently, the case is REMANDED to the public
respondent Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry for a
final decision in accordance with RA 8800 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. Hence, the appeal.
Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision,

ruling this time that that in light of the appellate courts Decision
there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding
Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard
measures.[41] He made a determination that, contrary to the
findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had
suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.[42]
Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the
importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive
safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years
on imported gray Portland Cement. Hence, the appeal.
Issue Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard

measures is valid.
Ruling NO, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the
DTI should follow the regulations prescribed by SMA. The
Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs.
The congress in enacting SMA has delegated the power to impose

general safeguard measures to the executive branch but subjected
to limitations, such as the final determination by the Tariff
Commission.

Case Garcia vs. Executive Secretary
Facts The President issued an EO 438 which imposed, across the board,
including crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The
Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a
report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The
President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special
duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of
imported oil products
Issue Whether or not the President may issue an Executive Order that can
increase tariff rates
Ruling WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
Yes, the delegation is constitutional. The Court said that although the
enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the
province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by
Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates
and other duties or imposts…” Thus, there is explicit constitutional
permission for Congress to authorize the President "subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose. This referred
to the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to
issue said EOs.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478, which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter on imported crude oil, and
P1.00 per liter on imported oil products, as a valid exercise of delegated
legislative authority under the Tariff and Customs Code.

Case Rodriguez vs. Gella
Facts Notwithstanding the ruling in Araneta v. Dinglasan, Pres.
Quirino continued to exercise his emergency powers
under CA 671, promulgating EOs 545 and 546
appropriating public funds for public works and the
relief of victims of calamities. Petitioners seek to
invalidate said EOs.
Issue Are the foregoing EOs invalid?

Ruling Yes. More or less the same considerations that influenced
the pronouncements in Araneta v. Dinglasan are and should
be controlling in the case now. [Reiterating], to be
constitutional, CA 671 must be construed to be for a limited
period fixed or implied therein. Express repeal of the same
is unnecessary; otherwise it would be unconstitutional since
it may never be repealed by Congress, or if Congress
attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This in
fact happened when the President vetoed House Bill 727,
repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. This is a clear
repugnance of the Art. VI, Sec 26 (now 23) which expressed
such power to be limited in period, necessarily fixed in the
law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary will of either
the Congress or the President. The President cannot set
aside funds for special purposes, since the Congress
has been approving appropriation acts. If the President
had ceased to have powers with respect to general
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special
appropriations; otherwise he may do indirectly what he
cannot do directly.
Emergency itself cannot and should not create

power. The president may be authorized to exercise
powers “necessary and proper” only for the
purpose of carrying out a national policy declared
by the Congress, Any act of the President that is not
in keeping with the national policy is beyond the
scope of his delegated authority

Case Araneta vs. Dinglasan
Facts In view of the state of world war in 1941, CA 671
(Emergency Powers Act) was enacted by the National
Assembly (NA) which authorized the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency. CA 671 did not expressly fix the term of its
effectiveness, although Sec 3 thereof provides “the
President x x x shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress x x x report thereto all the rules
and regulations promulgated by him under the powers
herein granted.” Then Pres. Quezon later wrote in his
autobiography describing the circumstances obtaining when
he called the NA for a special session and recommended
the enactment of CA 671: “[I issued the call for a special
session of the NA] when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942.” True
enough, Congress met in regular session only on May 25,
1946. Subsequently, by authority vested by CA 671, then
Pres. Roxas issued EO 62 which provided for the
regulation of the rentals of residential lots and
buildings. By the same authority, his successor, Pres.
Quirino issued EOs 192, 225 and 226 providing for the
appropriation of public funds in the operation of the
national govt and the conduct of the 1949 elections, and
the control of exports. Petitioners, being prosecuted
under the foregoing EOs, question the validity of the
same averring that CA 671, by virtue of which said EOs
were issued, has ceased to have any force and effect.
Issue Has CA 671 ceased to have force and effect?

Ruling Yes. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session, thus EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. Art VI, Sec 26 (now Sec
23) of the Constitution, provides that any law passed by
virtue thereof should be “for a limited period.” These words
are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
duration. An emergency xxx “must be temporary or it
cannot be said to be an emergency.”
More anomalous is that fact that there would be two

legislative bodies operating to legislate concurrently
and xxx mutually nullifying each other’s actions.
Furthermore, it is clear from the language of Sec 3 of CA

671 that the legislature intended to limit the duration of the
Act when it provided that there was to be only one meeting
of Congress at which the President was to give an account
of his trusteeship. Moreover, giving much weight on the
statements of Pres. Quezon in his autobiography
(considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out
of the law), it was held that CA 671 was enacted with the
specific view of the inability of the NA to meet. Hence, the
sole raison d’être for the enactment of CA 671 was the
inability for the Congress to function; such emergency
period should thus end with the convening of that body.
Emergency powers of the President
Restrictive in duration, emergency, in order to justify

the delegation of emergency powers must be temporary
or it cannot be said to be an emergency. The
Constitution provided that the delegation of emergency
powers to the president could be withdrawn by
resolution.

Case Kilusang ayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia Jr.
Facts In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to
LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to allow provincial bus to
change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or
below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line
with the liberalization of regulation in the transport sector
which the government intends to implement and to make
progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that

the Public Service Act requires publication and notice
to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990,
Provincial Bus Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed
an application for across the board fare rate increase, which
was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia
issued a memo to LTFRB suggesting a swift action on
adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order
& to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB
Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public hearing announced
a 20% fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move

and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c was denied. Hence
the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO,
w/c was readily granted by the Supreme Court.
Issue Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses

to set a fare range above existing authorized fare range is
unconstitutional and invalid.
Ruling The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is
unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas delegate non
delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is
applicable because a delegated power constitutes not only
a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru
instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power
is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give
provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will
result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave the
riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can
increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when
they deem it necessary.
The authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the existing authorized fare was held to be illegal for being an
undue delegation of power.

Case Philippine Interisland Shipping Association vs Court Appeals
Facts It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an
increase in pilotage rates was given by the then President Marcos
through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088 “PROVIDING FOR
UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES
RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased
substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the
PPA.” During that time the President was exercising legislative power and
was authorized.
However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued
hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby PPA has the
power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86,
which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the
fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract..
Actually Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines is
jus an intervenor in the factual milieu that lead us to this issue. For
Purposes of Admin Law we should not care about it.
Issue Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA has
the power to modify the same.
Ruling EO 1088 is a law.
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.
is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise
of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the
rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088,
the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA
actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees,
and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of
the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in
the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of
delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law,
as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.
It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a
statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA.
What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is
not its form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix
the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always
been regarded as legislative in character.
It was held that the fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When the
same is delegated to the President, he may exercise it directly, e.g., issuance
of the questioned Executive Order 1088, without thereby withdrawing an
earlier delegation made to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). But when the
President directly exercises the delegated authority, the PPA may not revise
the rates fixed by the former.

Case Tablarin vs. Gutierrez
Facts The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for
the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or
did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of
the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987
and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Issue Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education
to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Ruling No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946,
known as the “Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern
(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute
created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain
minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution

which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of
Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52
series 1985. One of the provision is Article 14, Section 1 which states
“The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.”
Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the

petitioners, to the mind of the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police
Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote important
interest and needs -- in other words, the public order -- of the general
community. An important component of that public order is health and
physical safety and well-being of the population, the securing of which no
one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a

condition for admission to medical schools do not constitute
unconstitutional imposition.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Case Cruz vs. Youngberg
Facts This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against
the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, requiring him to... issue a permit for the landing of ten large
cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof.
"Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole
purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into
the Philippine Islands from foreign countries
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on
two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional
and void, the petitioner... would not be entitled to the relief demanded
because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would
prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; a... and (2) that Act
No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid
Issue The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at
present prohibits the importation of cattle ... from foreign countries into the
Philippine Islands.
Ruling we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown
in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155
to protect the cattle industry of the country and to... prevent the introduction
of cattle diseases through the importation of foreign cattle. It is now
generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public
welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects
within the ... scope of the police power
For an administrative regulation to be valid, its promulgation must be

authorized by the legislature, it must be within the scope of authority
given by the legislature, it must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, and it must be reasonable.
Topic Police Power
Case US vs. Salaveria
Facts The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, enacted, on February 28, 1917,
an ordinance which, among other things, prohibited the playing
of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays, and penalized the
violation thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine of not less than P10
nor more than P200, and by jugadores [gamblers] by a fine of not less
than P5 nor more than P200.
The justice of the peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into effect,
was Prudencio Salaveria, now the defendant and appellant.
Notwithstanding his official station, on the evening of March 8, 1917, not
a Sunday or legal holiday, seven persons including the justice of the peace
and his wife were surprised by the police while indulging in a game
of panguingue in the house of the justice of the peace. The chief of police
took possession of the cards, the counters (sigayes), a tray, an P2.07 in
money, used in the game.
These are facts fully proven by the evince and by the admissions of the
accused. Convicted in the justice of the peace court of Orion, and again in
the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Salaveria appeals to this court,
making five assignments of error. The three assignments, of a technical
nature, are without merit, and a fourth, relating to the evidence, is not
sustained by the proof. The remaining assignment of error, questioning the
validity of the ordinance under which the accused was convicted, requires
serious consideration and final resolution. This ordinance in part reads:
Issue Authority for the State or a municipality to take action to control gambling
in this larger sense can be found in an analysis of what is calle the police
power.
Ruling The police power is based on the maxim "salus populi est suprema lex"
— the welfare of the people is the first law. The United States Supreme
Court has said that it extends "to the protection of the lives, health and
property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and
the public morals." Not only does the State effectuate its purposes through
the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. Like the
State, the police power of a municipal corporation extends to all
matters affecting the peace, order, health, morals, convenience,
comfort, and safety of its citizens — the security of social order — the
best and highest interests of the municipality.
Within the general police powers of a municipal corporation is the

suppression of gambling. Ordinances aimed in a reasonable way at the
accomplishment of this purpose are undoubtedly valid. section 2184 of the
Administrative Code of 1916 (sec. 2238, Adm. Code of 1917) reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers an duties conferred upon it by law
an such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.
Topic Police Power
Case Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College
Facts Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of
56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-
Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation
house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The
property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30)
years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and
other improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On

September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted
Ordinance No. 192, entitled “Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in
the Municipality of Marikina.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina
property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six
(6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park
The respondents asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their

property would be tantamount to an appropriation of property without due
process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their
property through eminent domain.
The RTC rendered a Decision,15 dated October 2, 2002, granting the petition and
ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to
permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the
respondents’ property.
In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision. The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in
Ordinance No. 192 did not justify the exercise of police power, as it did not only
seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the respondents’ property
without due process of law
Issue Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police
power by the City Government of Marikina.
Ruling No, because the enforcement of Sect.3.1 and 5 would result in an undue
interference with the respondents’ right to property and privacy.
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent
exercise of its police power. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” The State,
through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is
embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
known as the General Welfare Clause.
Hence, Sect.3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are not valid exercise of police
power.
Topic Taxation
Case Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City Mayor
Facts On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No.
4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due
process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer
unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission or less than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax
issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Ruling Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. There is no violation or constitutional due process
for being reasonable and the ordinance it enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. As such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process.
It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted.
Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount,
object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative
body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
Topic Police Power

Case City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio
Facts Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) engaged in operating
hotels / motels / sostels / lodging business filed for Declaratory Relief
against City of Manila for enacting Ordinance No 7783 for violating their
constitutional rights being confiscatory and invading their property rights.
The said Ordinance prohibits the establishment of certain business
and for those existing business forced to relocate outside Ermita-
Malate or to convert their business to allowable business in the area.
Judge Laguio decided in favour of MTDC declaring the Ordinance ultra
vires. Hence the appeal from City of Manila.
Issue Whether or not Ordinance constitute a proper exercise of police power as
the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to
the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected?
Ruling Petition denied and decision of lower court affirmed. A valid ordinance
must not prohibit but may regulate trade and must not be
unreasonable and for the public good. The problem is not the
establishment, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community, but the human activity that may occur within its premises.
The second option instructing owners to relocate qualifies s taking w/o
just compensation. The solution will not end the problem but only
relocates it. The conversion into allowed business is essentially
destroying property w/o due process and just compensation.
Topic Police Power

Case Ferrer vs. City Mayor Bautista
Facts Respondent Quezon City Council enacted two ordinances: Ordinance No.
SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City and
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, an ordinance imposing an annual
garbage fee on all domestic households and providing penalty for non-
compliance.
Proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be

deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under
the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections.
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January
and shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax,
but not later than the first quarter installment.
Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371- sq.m.

residential property in QC which is covered by TCT No. 216288, and that,
on 7 Jan 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage
fee in the sum of Php100.00.
This petition was filed with prayer for issuance of TRO seeking to declare
unconstitutional and illegal both ordinances.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of both ordinances.

Issue WON the subject ordinances are valid tax.
Ruling HT is valid tax while the ordinance imposing an annual garbage fee is
invalid.
An ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid. For an ordinance to be

valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU
to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to
the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial
or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable. As jurisprudence
indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance
was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was
passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy).
LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the
policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was never intended
by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio
and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single
sovereign state. “[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and
corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government, but as
governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a
municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty;
absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the
entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district
which it possesses before the charter was granted.”
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of

legislative power from the national legislature; they are mere agents vested
with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. “Congress
enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various
LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to
delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by
each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of
making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to
the constitutional and statutory limitations.”
LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power
might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute.
“Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor
a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although
Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic
rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-
sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general
and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend
the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional
objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are
being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still
see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be overburdened or saddled with
multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit
will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the
national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation
will be fair, uniform, and just.”
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and
authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local government
unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for productive,
developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of
their governmental or proprietary powers and functions.
Topic Test of Delegation Power

Case Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD
Facts Petitioner Southern Luzon Drug Corporation filed a petition for prohibition
against the DSWD, NCWDP (now National Council on Disability Affairs or
NCDA), DOF and the BIR, which sought to prohibit the implementation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the
“Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442,
which amends the “Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,” particularly the granting
of a 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons
with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction.
RA 9257 amended some provisions of RA 7432. The new law retained the 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines but removed the annual income ceiling
thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the law. Further,
R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to senior
citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed based on
the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the “Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons” was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs.
Thereafter, on April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No.
7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in
Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of PWDs,
including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to
R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs
as tax deductions from the gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered.
Issue Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens and PWDs is a valid
exercise of police power
Ruling Yes. It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos.
9257 and 9442. In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State." Even then, the State's claim of
police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding
purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public
health and safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the
State exercises, even to the point of interfering with personal liberties or property
rights in order to advance common good.
To warrant such interference, two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the: attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Moreover, the 20% Discount does not violate equal protection. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must
be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Topic Test of valid Delegation Power

Case Gerochi vs. Department of Energy
Facts On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power
Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company
assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an
undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides
for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end
users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the
EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as
payment for government debts, missionary electrification,
equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy
and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to
account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding
three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the ERC on
a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by
the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.
Issue Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on
the part of the ERC
Ruling No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax
but an exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the
state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the
regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not
for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as
tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC,

but by the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA
9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely
coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized
administrative agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate
legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass
both the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test.
The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety
finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any
constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in
form.
the Court held that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to
Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it
contains sufficient standards. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to
ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security
and affordability of the supply of electric power”, and “watershed rehabilitation
and management” are sufficient standards, as they provide the limitations on
the Energy Regulatory Commission’s power to formulate the Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
Topic Test of Valid Delegation of Power
Case Jaworski vs. Pagcor
Facts PAGCOR is a GOCC existing under PD 1869, issued on 11 July 1983 by then
President Ferdinand Marcos. The PAGCOR was granted the authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places,
sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball,football, lotteries, etc. for a period of 25
years, renewable for another 25 years.
On 31March 1998, PAGCOR¶ granted SAGE the authority to operate and

maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR¶s casino locations, and Internet
Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors. Pursuant to the
authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting
gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and
redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets. Senator
Robert S. Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in
favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized
SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the
internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly
contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment the internet was
yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space.
Further,he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers,

necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant
to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in
PAGCOR’s franchise.
Issue Whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity,
SAGE, with the authority to operate Internet gambling.
Ruling A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations.
It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure,
but should be reserved for public control and administration; either by the
government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations
as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is
Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may
be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted,
the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to
be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise
are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. Herein, PAGCOR
has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its
franchise to SAGE. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into
operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter
to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of
the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized
to do so.
Topic Test for Valid Delegation of Power

Case Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA
Conference of Maritime
Facts
Manning Agencies, Inc.,

is an incorporated
association of licensed
Filipino
manning agencies, and its co-
petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies who hire
and recruit Filipino seamen
for
and in behalf of the
irrespective foreign ship-
owner-principals, seek to
annul Resolution No. 01,
series of 1994, of
the Governing Board of the
POEA and POEA
Memorandum Circular No.
05.
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an
incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and
its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who hire and recruit
Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-
principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Issue WON the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional
because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
Ruling Yes. There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed
resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal protection
and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its contention
of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against
foreign ship owners and principals employing Filipino
seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing
overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on
reasonable classification. And for the classification to be
reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class. 14 There can be no dispute about the
dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino
overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work
environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Case Lozano vs. Martinez
Facts Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law).
They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the
acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts,
except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected
thus appealed.
Issue Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-
imprisonment due to debt
Ruling The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an

amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of
a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the
check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the
bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have
become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If
such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes
would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore
tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation
of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest.

Case U.S vs Ang Tang
Facts The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing
the Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor xxx”.
Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive

Order No. 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater
than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found guilty
of violation thereof. He contested the validity of said law
averring that it constituted invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Issue Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General?
Ruling No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision.
When it leaves the legislative branch of the government,
nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the
legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says
that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the
question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the
Gov-Gen.
The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever…

conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or
define what is “an extraordinary rise.”
The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the

consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue and
promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or
define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure,
or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures
shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take
effect.
That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner

specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to
the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-Gener to
say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is
not “an extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a
“temporary rule” or an “emergency measure” for the carrying
out the purposes of the Act.
¹ The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a

law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend. (US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1)

Case Ynot vs. IAC
Facts  Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits
the interprovincial movement of carabaos.
 Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a
writ of replevin.
 After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of authority
and 2) EO’s presumed validity. (Later affirmed by IAC)
Issue Whether EO 626-A is constitutional.
Ruling EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)
 To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that “no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another.” The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
 We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than
in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
 The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the
police only.
 In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after
trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by
the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
 In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action
calling for the petitioner’s peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited
by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of
justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution.
 Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal
in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and
conviction of the accused.
 The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution.
Summary EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:
1. The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.
3. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers.
4. Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

Case Pelaez vs. Auditor General
Facts The President, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating 33 municipalities. Soon after, VP Pelaez,
instituted the present special civil action challenging the
constitutionality of said EOs on the ground, among others, that
Sec 68 of the RAC relied upon constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President. The challenged Sec 68
provides: “the President x x x may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised
therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces,
separate any political division x x x into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another
x x x”
Issue Does Sec 68 of the RAC constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power?
Ruling Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. Sec 68 of the RAC, insofar as it grants to the
President the power to create municipalities does not meet the
well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy xxx, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. * It
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that the law: (a) be complete in itself x x x and (b) x x x
fix a standard to which the delegate must conform x x x.
* The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be

applied concurrently, not alternatively. [In delegating legislative
power to another branch of the govt by law,] it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law : (a) be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
—and (b) x x x fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General,
15 SCRA 569)

Case Lorenzo vs. Director of Health
Facts Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He was confined in San Lazaro
Hospital in Manila in conformity with the provisions
of Section 1058 of the Administrative Code, authorizing the
segregation of lepers. Lorenzo filed petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging
that his confinement in said hospital was in violation of his
constitutional rights. He alleged that human beings are not incurable
with leprosy and that the disease may not be communicated by
contact. The trial court sustained the law and denied the petition for
habeas corpus. Lorenzo appealed.
Issue Whether the Administrative Code provision on the confinement of
lepers is violative of one's constitutional right.
Ruling
1. No. Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by
the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police
power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It
was place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as
a grave health problem. The methods provided for the control of
leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be
taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be
an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be
shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation
of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease of
supported by high scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the
segregation of lepers have been provided the world over. Similarly, the
local legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has
authorized measures to control the dread scourge. To that forum must
the petitioner go to reopen the question.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.

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Topic Delegation of Powers

Case Sema vs. Comelec

The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of

Topic Delegation of Powers

An energy restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created

Under this Resolution, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally

Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the board

In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB

3/9 members were present and qualified to vote.

NPB Directors who promulgated the resolutions assigned

Respondent Unjieng filed an application for probation under the

Petitioner corporation filed a supplementary opposition arguing that the

2. Whether or not the said Act is constitutional

2. No. The constitutionality of the act is questioned on three grounds,

Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and

Topic Delegation of Powers

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in

2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative

Topic Delegation of Powers

Topic Delegation of Powers

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Issue Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

SC declared that while the President alone can declare a state

President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers

the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff

Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary

On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition,

The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision,

Issue Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard

The congress in enacting SMA has delegated the power to impose

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Issue Are the foregoing EOs invalid?

Emergency itself cannot and should not create

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Issue Has CA 671 ceased to have force and effect?

More anomalous is that fact that there would be two

Furthermore, it is clear from the language of Sec 3 of CA

Restrictive in duration, emergency, in order to justify

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that

Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move

Issue Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution

Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the

Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Topic Delegation to the Executive Department

For an administrative regulation to be valid, its promulgation must be