MODULE 5: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

5.1. History and Background

5.1.1. The Philippine Revolution and the Malolos Constitution
5.1.2. Organic Laws under the American Period
a. McKinley’s Instructions (1900)
b. Spooner Amendment (1901)
c. Philippine Bill of 1902
d. Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law (1916)
5.1.3. Japanese Occupation
5.1.4. 1935 Constitution
5.1.5. 1973 Constitution
5.1.6. 1986 (EDSA) Revolution and the Freedom Constitution
5.1.7. 1987 Constitution

5.2. Definition, Nature and Concepts

5.2.1. Parts, Features, Characteristics and Requisites
5.2.2. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
5.2.3. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing
- In case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing.
SELF-EXECUTING
- A self-executing provision is a rule that by itself is directly or indirectly applicable without the need of
statutory implementation
- Example: provisions found in the Bill of Rights, which may be invoked by proper parties independently
of or even against legislative enactment.
NON-SELF-EXECUTING
- One that remains dormant unless it is activated by legislative implementation.
Example: Article II, Section 4, which provides that in the fulfillment of the prime duty of defending the
State, “all citizens may be required under conditions provided by law to render personal military or civil
service. Such a requirement cannot be imposed until and unless the legislature so wills, through the
passage of a law specifying the conditions.

Cases:
1. Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 [SCRA 668 (1989)]
FACTS - Former President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
- But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision
to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
- Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to
issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s
power to bar his return in the country.
- According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it
deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the
constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
ISSUE/S - Whether President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos’
remains.
- Whether President Aquino’s refusal to allow the return of Marcos’ remains
is tantamount to dictatorship
RULING - Marcos’ petition DISMISSED
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 - YES, The President, upon whom the executive power is vested, has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for
her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are
not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
- NO, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused
with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to
Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an express
grant of power.

2. De Leon vs. Esguerra (G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987)

FACTS - Esguerra – OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal

- Alfredo De Leon was the incumbent Barangay Captain of Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, after
having been elected in the May 1982 elections. His term was to end in 1988.
- On February 9, 1987, De Leon received a memorandum signed by OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra designating Florentino MAgno as barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores.
- Esgurra relied on the Provisional Constitution which provides that “all elective officials
under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until designation of their successors if
such appointment is made within one year from February 25, 1986.
- Respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the provision and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the provision of the Provisional
Constitution.
ISSUE - Was the designation of respondents to replace De Leon et al. validly made
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution?
RULING - The memorandum issued by OIC Governor Esguerra is declared to be of no legal force
and effect.
- NO, the designation is not valid.
- Article XVIII, Sec 27 of the 1987 Constitution reads: “This Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.” The 1987 Constitution was
ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must have been superseded already. Having been rendered inoperative,
Esguerra could no longer correctly rely on it when he designated the respondents on
February 8, 1987.
- While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the provision in
the Provisional Constitution which the OIC Governor relied from, must be deemed
to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.
OLD (Provisional Constitution):
- SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.

3. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

FACTS - The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through

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 public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- The respondent Government Service Insurance System decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation.
- In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995, only two bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corp., which offered to buy at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, which bid for P44.00 oer share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter,
petitioner sent a manager’s check for 30 million pesos as bid security to match the bid of
the Malaysian group.
- GSIS refused to accept. Hence, petitioner appealed to the Supreme court.
- PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
Invokes Sec. 10 (2) of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has become a part of the national patrimony.
- RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
Sec. 10 (2) of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislations.
Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests, or
timber, wildfire

ISSUE - Is Art. XII, Sec. 10, paragraph 2 self-executing?

Note: May isang issue rito about whether Manila Hotel falls under the term “national
patrimony”, but I think ang related issue sa topic is re self-executing eme, though it has
been held that Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, hence it has the right to be
preferred over the Malaysian Corporation as stated in the Constitution
RULING - YES, Section 10 (2) of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
- From its very word, the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
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 - When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos are
preferred.

4. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (407 SCRA 10)

*Hindi ko sure kung aling case ba ‘to, parang andaming Republic vs
Sandiganbayan

5. Flores vs. Drilon (G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993)

FACTS - The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employess of the US Facility at Subic, Zambales,
and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association, challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227, otherwise known as the “Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992”.
- Under the said Act, respondent Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
- the said paragraph reads:
“(d) Chairman / Administrator – The President shall appint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of
the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic authority.
Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority.
- Petitioners argue that the aforementioned provision infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
1. Sec. 7, par.1, Art IX-B – “No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure;
2. Sec. 16, Art. VII – “The President shall appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be

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 authorized by law to appoint.
ISSUE - Whether the provision in Sec. 13, Par (d) of RA 7227 violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
RULING - The provision in Sec. 13 of RA 7227, which states “provided, however,
that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority, is declared
unconstitutional.
- As long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office. Where, as in the case of respondent
Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his
ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility
imposed by the Constitution.
- A legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. The
Constitutional prohibition is very clear: “No elective official shall be
appointed or designated to another position in any capacity”.
- For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain
amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the
waves. "
- One of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence, i.e., "its
capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate
needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional
infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities.
- Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political
expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change."

6. Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS - The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- This is a class suit filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa et al., representing their

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 generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents, against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., then Secretary of DENR.
- They prayed that:
1. All existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country be cancelled; and
2. No new TLAs shall be received, processed, renewed, or appraised.
- Petitioners argued they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
- They further claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources.
DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT:
1. Petitioners have no cause of action to file a case;
2. The issues raised is a political question
ISSUE - Whether the petitioners have a cause of action
- Whether the complaint raises a political issue (hindi na ata ‘to related sa topic on
constitution kasi more on the jurisdiction of the branches na siya)
RULING - Being impressed with merit, the petition is GRANTED
1. The petitioners have a cause of action to file a complaint.
- The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution
- even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: “[it]
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”.  The right is
linked to the constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-
executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. 
- As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
- As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form.

7. Imbong vs. Executive Secretary, GR. 204819, April 8, 2014)

FACTS - The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which

6
 offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- RA No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 was enacted by Congress on December 12, 2012 and was known as
the RH Law.
- The RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws
on contraception, women’s health and population control
- Challengers from various sectors of society assailed the constitutionality of the said law
on the ground of its violation of the following:
1. right to life of the unborn;
2. right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products;
3. right to religious freedom;
4. right to free speech;
5. right to privacy of one’s family;
6. natural law
ISSUE - whether the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating rights of citizens which the
constitution
RULING - Petitions are partially granted. The court declares RA No. 10354 as not unconstitutional
except with respect to the some provisions which are declared unconstitutional.
Gumive-up ako rito, andaming issues, napakahaba rin ng explanations. Haha

8. Legaspi vs. CSC (G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987)

FACTS - The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Invoking his fundamental right to information on matters of public concern, petitioner
Valentin Legaspi filed a special civil action against the Civil Service Commission after
the latter denied his request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.

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 - Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligible who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
- Petitioner claimed that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and
Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
ISSUE - Whether the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit on the ground of his right to
information on matters of public concerns
RULING - The Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position
of sanitarian.
- The constitutional right to information on matter of public conerns has been first
recognized in the Bill of rights of the 1973 Constitution, and had been retained in Article
III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
“The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by
law.”
- These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating
the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
- In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New
Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official
records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for
policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
- But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

5.3. Interpretation
Francisco vs. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
FACTS - The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only

8
 two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- On June 2, 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against C.J.
Davide, Jr., among others.
- The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect has not been sent to
the House in plenary.
- The following day and just nearly five months since the filing of the first complaint, a
second impeachment complaint was filed by respondents house representatives.
- Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the
respondents House of Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5),
Art. XI of the Const. which provides:
“No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”
- The House argues:
the one year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment complaint has not
been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body,
which has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.”
- “Initiate” could not possibly mean “to file” because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit:
(1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or
(2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3
of all the members of the House.
- Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on the first impeachment complaint,
the first complaint could not have been “initiated”.
ISSUE - Whether the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3 (5) of Art. XI of the
Constitution
RULING - The second impeachment against the petitioner is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
ISSUE ON INTERPRETATION:
- The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the framers
intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.
- The vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified
complaint.
- Thus, under the one year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings, no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action within one
year from filing of the first verified impeachment complaint.
- To the argument that only the House as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says “The House shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment,” this is a misreading and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with “impeachment
proceeding.”
- The well-settled principles of constitutional construction: 
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular

9
 provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as
to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

5.4. Amendments and Revisions (Article XVII, Sections 1, 2 & 3)

5.4.1. Quantitative vs. Qualitative
5.4.2. Procedure
a. Proposal
i. Congress (Constituent Assembly)
ii. Constitutional Convention
1. Province of Cotabato vs. The Government of the RP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain (G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
2008)
2. Imbong vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970)
3. Gonzales vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967)

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 4. Occena vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981)
5. Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W Va.613)
6. Frantz vs. Autry (91 Pac. 193)

iii. People (Initiative and Referendum)

1. Santiago vs. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106 (1997)]
2. Lambino vs. COMELEC [505 SCRA
160 (2006)] 3. R.A. 6735

b. Ratification
Tolentino vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971)
5.5. Judicial Review
1. Sanidad vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)
2. Lambino vs. COMELEC [505 SCRA 160 (2006)]

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