Decentralisation and Good Governance in Africa: A Critical Review
Decentralisation and Good Governance in Africa: A Critical Review
Decentralisation and Good Governance in Africa: A Critical Review
Review
This review essay outlines and discusses the conceptual and empirical dimensions of decentralisation
in Africa. It examines the link between decentralisation, development and good governance. The essay
contends that even if decentralisation has been embraced by several countries as an institutional reform
capable of transforming intergovernmental relations, fiscal arrangements in local governments,
increasing people‟s popular participation and enhancing accountability, there is evidence that suggests
that the „good governance‟ dividends of decentralisation remain limited. The key conclusion is that
though the new decentralisation efforts aimed at reshaping central-local power relations of the state,
introduction of markets into public service provision, and allowing civil society to play a greater role in
public governance than was the case in the past, significant issues of political capture and manipulation
continue to undermine its gains. This also appears to have reduced the capacity of decentralisation to
engineer the much touted good governance tenets of transparency, accountability, efficiency and
value-for-money to transform the ways the African states operate.
Key words: Good governance, decentralisation, popular participation, accountability and state-society relations.
INTRODUCTION
This study draws from myriad sources of literature. The state failure was attributed to over-centralisation, and its
review has been undertaken following a thematic tendency to alienate the people it governed (Hyden,
synthesis of issues that revolve around decentralisation 1983). To this extent, the key issue addressed by this
and good governance. The goal is to drive home an review is to explore whether or not, the current
argument that the resurgence of decentralisation in decentralization undertakings have significantly
several countries, especially in Africa has become transformed the African state.
indispensable as African leaders reform their states for
development and good governance. This is pertinent from
a hindsight of the fact that during the first decades of Rationale for resurgence of decentralisation
post-independence period, most African states “failed” to
steer development and to govern well (Ake, 2000). Part of Studies of decentralisation tend to over-emphasise
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Makara 23
Decentralisation suggests the hope of cracking open the From an angle of participation, decentralisation opens the
blockage of a central bureaucracy, curing managerial state system to competitive societal forces by allowing
constipation, giving more direct access for the people to political pluralism to replace single party systems, markets
government and the government to the people, to replace state controlled prices and civil society to
stimulating the whole nation to participate in national provide services where the state is weak (Olowu 1993).
24 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.
Mawhood (1993) posits that decentralisation creates a Third World countries, authoritarian regimes that
situation where autonomous bodies will have a dominated the first three decades of the post-colonial
constructive dialogue with the state at various levels. Africa are crumbling under pressure from both internal as
Democratisation should not stop at the centre. For well as external forces. Secondly, in most of the African
decentralisation to be meaningful, it is important for the countries, socio-economic crises have undermined the
state and other elements in society to act in a democratic legitimacy of undemocratic regimes. Thirdly, most of the
manner (Crook and Manor, 1995). African authoritarian regimes seem to have realised that
This arises because there are some decentralising by continuing to hold power at the centre, this has
states which simply transfer powers and responsibilities generated a source of weakness rather than strength
from the hierarchies of the centre to those of the (Olowu, 1993).
sub-national authorities. Such a transfer of responsibilities The authoritarian practices of the post-colonial state in
alone will not constitute a democratic method of managing Africa were inherited from its predecessor - the colonial
society. The mere transfer of responsibilities may not state. While the colonial state sowed seeds of
transform state-society relations which should be the core authoritarianism, the post-colonial state failed its mission
of a decentralisation programme. of significantly reforming the state for the benefit of its
To many people, decentralisation is associated with peoples. Moreover, while a semblance of local autonomy
people‟s rights to feely organise, form associations and that had been created by the colonial state, this was either
where need be, counter some excesses of the state. abolished or undermined by its successor in the guise of
Rondinelli, (1984) and Mawhood (1993) perceive decen- national unity, centralised planning and development
tralisation as a system of autonomous local governments. (Kasfir 1993). Centralisation of power had the effect of
To Wunsch and Olowu (2000), decentralisation means breeding dictatorship, consolidating one-partyism, political
"self-governance" of the local communities - their values, cronyism and intolerance of the views of opposition
aspirations and innovations. To Tostensen et al. (2001) groups.
decentralisation means freedom of civil society and the The post-colonial African leaders have been obsessed
whole realm of associational life to organise their with maintaining their grip to power by creating cliques of
membership to engage in actions that are beneficial to cronies and ensuring unquestionable loyalty. This state of
them or to question the state. affairs created a situation where the state was no longer a
Public accountability is at the heart of decentralisation. res republicae for all, but for some (Ake 2000). These
To Sandbrook (1993), when decentralisation becomes a authoritarian tendencies undermined the legitimacy of the
modus operandi, both formal and informal groups get state, which according to Kasfir (1993, ibid) had now to
actively engaged with the state demanding that public rely on force rather than persuasion. Centralisation
officials be accountable to the citizens. In this way, manifested not only in political behaviour and practices of
Sandbrook (1993) notes that there is a linkage between the leaders, it also affected the administrative systems.
decentralisation and the notion of empowerment, whereby The negative effects of centralisation of power were
previously deprived groups such as women, peasants and compounded by the severe fiscal crises that afflicted most
minorities develop a sense of agency and usefulness by African countries since the 1970s and 1980s. According
making decisions that enable them to expand their to Mutahaba (1993), the poor state of public finances in
autonomy and capabilities. Although civil society most African countries has been attributed to two factors:
organisations generally lack capacity, confidence and initially, fiscal deficits were a result of escalating
autonomy to confront powerful political forces, according expenditures by African post-colonial governments'
to Sandbrook (1993, ibid), it is possible for them to commitments to development as a response to the
overcome these weaknesses in an era of decentralisation. pressures for enhanced public services, where the
First of all, they can mobilise their membership to government was seen as a provider for most of the
confront government. Secondly, civil society can services in society. Another factor has been the
overcome passivity within its membership. This in turn, depressed scale of economic activity (Mutahaba, ibid)
will help them to remain focused, to act independently and resulting in the economic crisis that plagued most African
confront tasks they were previously unable to undertake. states since the 1970s. We could add that a serious lack
In this way, the engagement between the state and civil of accountability and transparency of the African political
society could gradually produce conditions favourable for and bureaucratic elite exacerbated the situation.
a developmental and democratic society. This is supposed The economic crisis in Africa has had three effects on
to be the ultimate goal of decentralisation. the conduct and management of public affairs. As result of
fiscal stress, the political leaders had fewer resources at
From centralisation to decentralisation their disposal to dispense patronage. This had the effect
of weakening their hold onto power at the centre. At the
The world is experiencing a tremendous upsurge towards same time, due to the deepening weaknesses in the
local democratic governance (The World Bank, 2000). resource base at the centre, civil society organisations
This trend is underpinned by several factors: first, in most began to emerge, either to provide for their membership
Makara 25
(in areas where the state previously had a monopolistic From this perspective, it is probably not very useful to
role) or to press the governments for services that should disconnect the authoritarian practices of the post-colonial
be provided by the state (Mutahaba, 1993). state from those of the colonial state. While it is argued
Additionally, the poor economic performance in most that the first few years of independence were relatively
African countries took place at the same time as there prosperous for most African states (Manor, 1999), other
was rapid increase in their populations which necessitated evidence suggests that it was at the same time that the
increased investment in service delivery. Yet, this African leaders overextended the "boundaries" of the
happened when state capacity was too weak to give an state into the space previously occupied by other
adequate response. The weak capacity of the state and organisations in society (Wunch and Olowu, 1993).
the economic decline forced most the Sub-Saharan These tendencies reinforced authoritarian state
African countries to seek for assistance from international predispositions. In several post-colonial African countries,
financiers especially the World Bank and the International the responses to pre-independence local government
Monetary Fund. These financial institutions imposed arrangements varied but the temptation towards
conditionalities which the aid recipient countries had to centralisation and weakening local governments was
comply with. Such conditions included: cutting down prevalent (Halifani,1997). Weakening local governments
public expenditure, reduction in public employment, and other autonomous organisations in society had the
scaling down activities of government and privatisation effect of undermining the legitimacy of the state itself
(Mutahaba, 1993). In effect, these measures engendered (Lalaye and Olowu, 1989). Thus, while the post-colonial
a critical change in the conduct of public administration in regimes attempted to govern in isolation of the prevailing
donor-supported countries. One of these changes has social forces in society their success was limited because
been the restructuring of the state from centralisation to this undermined their very source of legitimacy.
decentralisation. The renewed efforts by the state in Africa to reinstate
The changes brought about by decentralisation have institutions of local governments and to allow civil society
largely entailed allowing sub-national units of government organisations some space may be seen as an attempt by
to acquire some powers and responsibilities outside the the states to search for new avenues of legitimation as
direct control of the centrally-based officials. Despite other well as readiness to face the challenges imposed by
numerous weaknesses of the International Monetary realities of internal and external pressures to act more
Fund (IMF)/World Bank driven neo-liberal reforms, the democratically and responsively to the needs of society.
decentralisation policies are perceived as a critical There is a sweeping wave towards decentralisation and
measure in reducing the “commandist” role of the central reforms of local government with the aim of allowing
bureaucracy, with all its inefficiency, and failure to deliver sub-national units of government to enjoy some degree of
services at the grassroots. Decentralisation has created a autonomy, to act on priorities of their local areas and to
role for local communities to participate in policy agenda elect local representatives. Decentralisation is seen to
of the government. There is a renewed focus on citizens‟ promote social learning, decongest the centre, and
participation in affairs that affect their well-being. empower local communities; to introduce administrative
efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness.
It is argued that since decentralisation brings authority
Primacy of local government reforms loser to the people, it promotes appropriate action on their
needs and aspirations (Crook and Manor, 1998). In their
The upsurge towards revitalising local governments in work, Crook and Manor (ibid) on South Asia and West
most post-colonial states especially in Africa since the Africa found that several groups advocated for
1990s has been necessitated by a number of factors: first, decentralisation for several reasons: economists pursued
the fresh search for legitimacy of the state. Second, the decentralisation as a means of stopping rent-seeking
attempt by African governments to meet the increasing behaviours of the leaders, pluralists hoped it could give
internal and external pressures for democratic interest groups space to organise, autocratic leaders
governance and thirdly, the attempt to revitalise the welcomed decentralisation because it could act as a
mechanisms of service delivery and to meet the substitute for democracy, democratic leaders saw it as a
challenges of new expectations in public management way of making governments more responsive to local
and state-society relations. The legitimacy of the state in needs while community mobilisers perceived it as a
Africa has been contested. Its claim for control over means to achieve things through cooperation with the
societal forces has remained weak. In general, the local communities.
post-colonial state in Africa has tended not to fare any The decentralisation reforms in most African and many
better than its colonial predecessor. other countries have been precipitated by a number of
Hyden (1983) argues that the post-colonial state in other factors (Smoke, 2003). The most important factors
Africa is similar in many respects to the colonial state include: the realization by central governments that they
because both of them chose to govern without a are unable to effectively deliver services, the high and
democratic engagement with the majority of the people. increasing incidence of poverty in both rural and urban
26 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.
areas; the failure of centralised organisations to work the basis of ability to pay.
efficiently or cost-effectively and the failure of their
managers to be adequately responsive to the needs of the The people who are unable to pay are excluded. The
people, and in some cases the collapse of managerial aforementioned classification of goods can help local
systems themselves. These factors have, over the years, governments to determine when to apply market
culminated in the failure of the centralised organisations mechanisms of provision, co-production or quasi-market
to mobilise resources, to motivate their staff and to be principles. The underlying assumption in this classification
innovative. Thus, decentralisation is a response to a is the search for equity and efficiency. The issue is that
myriad of problems associated with centralised since local governments are public organizations, the
organisational failures (Wunch and Olowu, 1993). public expects them to provide services without
marginalisation of the vast numbers of citizens.
At the same time, local governments must be
Inter-governmental relations and service delivery cost-effective in the process of rendering services, thus
those goods which service a larger private end of
The decentralisation reforms have entailed new individuals should be paid for by those who can afford
centre-local relations. There is an increased tendency to while those that serve the public at large should be paid
transfer powers to local governments with some legal for by the state. In reality however, these models of public
mandates. Of the dominant typologies of decentralisation, service provision depend on concrete circumstances of a
that is: deconcentration (limited transfer of power) and particular country.
devolution (extensive transfer of legal, political and fiscal Rondinelli, (1989) also concede that any tendency to
authority), it is the latter that is now common. The new over-rely on the market for provision of public goods may
mandates allow local governments to take some political raise the profit motive above only equity considerations. It
decisions, collect specific revenues and to spend it on may also lead to over-use or over-consumption of certain
local priorities, to exercise discretionary powers over resources (Rondinelli, 1989). This model of public service
locally employed staff and to plan for the development of provision could have successfully worked in more
their areas. The central governments have undertaken to developed countries but is likely to be inappropriate for
offer a range of grants to local governments, to maintain poor countries (Nangoli et al., 2015). Freinkman and
security, to engage in macro-economic planning and to Plekhanov (2009) note that the success of such
monitor and tender advice to local governments. arrangements depends on the effectiveness of institutions.
Most of the decentralisation reforms require local It may also be observed, for example, that in developing
governments to avoid "centralisation" at the immediate countries this model of public service provision has
local government, district or municipality level. Meaningful encountered challenges.
decentralisation involves organised dispersal of power in For example, Cabral (2011) notes that poverty renders
society in political, social as well as economic sense service delivery in local governments by the private sector
(Olum, 2014; Dickovick and Wunch, 2014; Caldeira, 2015; unaffordable to the poor. In addition, the absence of a
Ribot, 2010). This means sharing power and responsibility strong indigenous private sector leaves foreign companies
between several sub-national authority units which have as the most significant players. This marginalises the local
jurisdiction over their areas in terms of providing services business elites. A weak local middle class increases
to their constituents. It also means allowing various actors feelings of marginalisation, even xenophobia, as has been
in society to participate meaningfully in governance, the case in South Africa. Moreover, in some cases, lack of
including service provision. Implementation of strong civic societies may undermine chances of
decentralisation requires exploration of alternative models accountability (Escobar-Lemon and Ross, 2013).
of service delivery (Rondinelli, 1989). The alternative It may further be argued that although the private
modes of financing local services suggested by Rondinelli provision model of public services has become prevalent,
(1989) include: there is a need for local governments to take an active
role by putting in place regulatory frameworks, monitoring
(1) Public goods: These are consumed jointly and and structuring the arrangements in which the private and
simultaneously by many people from which it is difficult to public sectors play a role. Regulatory agencies may
exclude anyone. These goods may be financed from require new types of skills to fully comprehend the
taxes, for example, public roads application of private provision model in local
(2) Open access goods are also jointly consumed by governments.
people. Such goods may include rivers and most natural Arrangements for service provision similar to the ones
resources (3) Toll goods, these may be provided on the described by Rondinelli, (1989) have been experimented
basis of people's ability to pay, thus, exclusion is feasible. in several African countries since the 1990s. The following
Such goods may include electricity, schools, hospitals and mechanisms of service provision have been adopted by
others. local governments in several countries, and include:
(4) Private goods- these are consumed by individuals on contracting out, outright sale of non-core assets, tendering
Makara 27
markets, charges for bus and taxi terminals, engaging forestalling the pressure from local elites and the
private companies to collect revenues such as property international donor community for more democratic
tax and collection of debts. It is also important to note that reforms. Francis and James summarise their observation
local governments' engagement with each particular thus:
group produces different forms of interactions and results.
These may be in form of co-funding, start-off capital (seed In these circumstances, decentralisation has provided a
money) or whole funding, and leaving the community to democratic gloss in the eyes of both international donors
takeover sustainability of the service. These alternative and local actors. Over time however the movement style
options and their outcomes impact differently on, and are of politics began to take on some characteristics of
perceived differently by communities. For example in traditional one-party rule (Francis and James, 2003).
Tanzania, it has been noted that there is a disconnection
between the mode of local service delivery, and the These authors further observe that in the case of Uganda,
so-called people‟s power in decision making (Massoi and decentralisation was undertaken by the government for
Norman, 2009). two principal reasons: one was the "technocratic" and the
other was "patronage". The "technocratic mode"
prioritised national targets especially poverty reduction
Political commitment to decentralisation (Nsibambi, 1998). The "patronage mode" drew on the
language of participatory planning, which in the context of
The political raison d'etre for local government reforms is lack of resources and the “capture by the local elites”, was
that the success of decentralisation depends on the reduced to ritualised performance with little meaningful
political commitments of central and local governments. citizens' involvement (Francis and James, 2003).
However, this depends on the political and other motives In the "technocratic" mode of decentralisation, there is a
of the elites in both central and local governments. This tendency for the bureaucrats to stick to their hierarchical
resonates with Manor's argument that the real reason why methods of work, for instance, the lengthy bureaucratic
national politicians accept decentralisation is because procedures, which are non-participatory and non-
they wish to "use decentralisation to connect their regime consultative. To assume that the bureaucratic technocrats
with social groups, and to sustain or revive their party will become more democratic in decision-making may
organisations (Manor, 1999)". simply overstretch the expectations, even under
For example, Makara (2000) argues that President decentralisation. In developed countries like Britain, it is
Museveni's government in Uganda was motivated to observed that while the primacy of local authorities is to
decentralise power in early 1990s because encourage the participation of citizens in decision making,
decentralisation was seen as an alternative to full political this may just be a classical wish.
democratisation. In such situations, the underlying According to Stuart (1996), local authorities in Britain
political objectives of the decentralisation policy are have not prepared themselves for such a role.
downplayed. There is a tendency to emphasise the Departments of local governments perform limited
technocratic objectives of. The critics of such an approach functions, for example, while local authorities may try to
argue (Slater, 1989) that this has led decentralisation to speak on behalf of their communities, they consider this
be linked to ambiguity, with intent to "conceal more than it role as peripheral to their work. In less developed
reveals". Eaton has summarised the unrevealed motives countries, technocratic competence itself is a problem.
of some politicians in adopting decentralisation thus: Pointing out this problem in Uganda, Brett observes:
...Even where national politicians genuinely supported “Effective policy implementation is equivalent to the
decentralisation for the broad benefits it promises to difficulty of the tasks they perform. Where these are
deliver, they continue to meddle in the activities that have complex and require continuous supervision, neither
been officially devolved (Eaton, 2001). management nor day to day maintenance can be left to
amateurs. Staff must be employed with appropriate skills”
Indeed, there is usually a tendency by central (Brett, 1993).
governments to pull back some powers already
decentralised. In a study of decentralisation in Uganda, Similar concerns about the calibre of Uganda bureaucrats
Francis and James (2003) argue (that little attention has are expressed by Goetz and Jenkins (1998) who observe
been paid to the ways in which the newly established that the local governments in Uganda hardly have the
system of decentralisation has functioned at the local technical capacity in areas of planning, implementation
level. According to Francis and James (2003) and monitoring of government policies. These authors find
the“no-party” system in Uganda (1986 to 2005) gained no link between decentralisation and poverty eradication,
political 'capital' and self-perpetuation through especially for the poorest of the poor, who continue to
decentralisation. In other words, decentralisation helped have no influence on both local and national policy issues.
the survival of the “Movement” regime in Uganda by According to Goetz et al. (1998):
28 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.
Local authorities often have at their disposal even more government elites. These growing political tendencies will
resources – symbolic and material – with which to resist do more harm than good on the nascent policies of
effort to address the needs of the poor, whether these are decentralisation, and its goals in Africa.
initiated locally or by national and international agencies.
For most part, especially remote and largely obscured
from the scrutiny of the media or public advocacy groups, Is decentralisation an effective tool for “good”
local political environments frequently reduce the governance in Africa?
incentives for elites to re-orient the priorities.
A key question for this essay is whether or not
decentralisation engenders political commitment to “good
From this observation, it is important to ascertain the
governance” broadly, or good public management in
extent to which these kinds of claims of remoteness/
Africa. Broadly, Leonard (1987) observing the situation of
aloofness of elites or what others call “elite capture” have
public management in Africa comments:
affected service delivery (Olowu, 2001).
Similarly, evidence that civil society has been active in
Africans are unusual among the World‟s elites in the extent
demanding and pressing local governments to live to the
of their patronage obligation to the poorer people and the
desired expectations is yet to be seen. The situation in
strength of the moral pressures they fulfil. For these
local governments seems to be a semblance of
reasons and for selfish ones that are far more universal,
concentration of power which as Harris (1983) observes
state organizations in Africa are extensively used to pursue
could lead to those with wealth and power to dominate the
informal, personal goals of their managers rather than
process of decision making, culminating in concentration
collective ones that are formally proclaimed.
of power in the hands of a few elites, leaving the poor more
disadvantaged than was the case before decentralisation. Leonard (1987) further asserts that unlike Europe or United
It is equally important that managerial innovation and a States, Africa has different managerial values and the
shift towards less authoritarian methods are desirable in problem in Africa is absence of what he calls “bureaucratic
this era of decentralisation. Indeed, the problem of hygiene”.
management in most of the African countries is two- fold: Lack of “bureaucratic hygiene”–includes failures of
first it is the failure of the managerial systems themselves systems of accounting, auditing, procurement, contract
and secondly it is the failure to innovate. Thus, the promise compliance and personnel management. According to
of decentralisation to improve service delivery is also Leonard (1987), these elements introduced in Africa by
largely dependent on whether or not managerial system Westerners, have been on the decline. Important to note in
are revamped, revitalized and significantly improved, this regard is the fact that in most African countries both in
including attitudes of local government officials. central government and local governments, political
In this context, it is expected that the government policies patronage interferes with the bureaucratic order and
will be designed to put in place frameworks through which functioning.
the needs, desires and aspirations of the people will be Consequently, the ordinary citizen is not properly
met. The basic assumption in such policy framework served. This is compounded, in the case of poor countries
would be that the government knows what people‟s needs, by the lack of adequate resources, skilled and technically
desires and aspirations are. It would solicit views on how competent personnel and collapse of the managerial
they could be met and consequently, would make attempts systems.
towards getting them met. In reality however, in poor
countries of Africa – afflicted by political conflicts, economic
decline and mismanagement, institutional decay and Understanding governance
social disorders (Twaddle and Hansen 1988).
The conditions for proper policy planning, economic In the 1980s, a realisation by international organisations
development and political stability have not been that inefficient and poor management was responsible for
sufficiently salubrious to allow long term planning and poor economic and political performance in the Third
sustenance of certain respectable levels of service World, a governance approach was coined to tackle these
delivery. Moreover, even if managerial capacity was challenges.
growing, in some African countries such as Uganda and “Governance” does not have a specific or fixed meaning.
Ghana which pioneered decentralisation, there are It is used in most places as a generic concept but its
already political moves towards re-centralisation of some common usage underlies the roles of three agents in
aspects of local government (Awortwi, 2010; Ojambo, society: the state, the market and civil society. The World
2012). Bank (1992) defines governance as the manner in which
A more recent study (Lewis, 2014) found that in Uganda power is exercised in the management of a county‟s
(one time, a bacon of decentralisation), the government economic and social resources for development. The
has created several unviable local authorities-which are World Bank‟s emphasis is on “good governance”. This
poorly resourced, weak, unable to negotiate with the governance with adjective “good” is taken to include four
centre; and entirely beholden to the patronage of central key elements: sound public sector management
Makara 29
(efficiency), accountability, exchange and free flow of -state actors. Since governance is a very broad and
information (transparency) and legal framework for elusive concept, it is important that several of its elements
development (justice, human rights and civil liberties). On are delineated.
its part, The World Bank (1989) report, Sub– Saharan As Hirst (2000) puts it, governance should be seen as
Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, observes: the means by which an activity or a set of activities is
controlled so that it produces a set of acceptable
Ultimately better governance requires political renewal. outcomes. Of particular importance is the debate about
This means a concerted attack on corruption from the states and markets. Hirst (2000:24) argues that if the
highest to the lowest level. This can be done by market was left to govern society it would breed “liberal
strengthening accountability, encouraging public debate, anarchism”. Since the state is seen to be overextended,
nurturing free press and empowering the women and the the market and other forces in society are supposed to
poor by fostering grassroots organizations (The World limit that extension. If that is to happen, then it is
Bank, 1989). imperative that the limited state be democratic and
efficient. Governance is also perceived as a response to
Beyond The World Bank‟s perspective, the debate on what the inherent weaknesses in the state and the market.
governance is, remains varied and at times, controversial; Rhodes (2000) has pointed out that the shift from
yet it is a useful one. Almost all commentators and traditional public administration to governance was the
analysts who have utilized the concept of “governance” result of loss of faith by students of public administration in
have adopted it to particular circumstances and realities. the state because bureaucrats were conceived as
What is critically prevalent, especially in the developing self-serving who sought to maximize the agency budgets
countries, is the dominance of neo-liberal institutional and public interest had become a myth (Rhodes, 2000).
policies. These, in one way or the other, claim to promote The “marketisation” too, was fragmented, and had lost
“good governance”. control or coordination.
The policy reforms ranging from macro- economic The shift in the emphasis to public management as a
restructuring, civil service reforms, trade and currency typology of governance is occasioned by the failure of the
liberalisation, privatisation and decentralisation have state to steer development and at times acting as a barrier
elements of “good governance”. Some observers have to development. Public bureaucracies are failing to
specifically noted that the policy of decentralisation is manage efficiently. Public service is seen as “too inflexible
aimed to promote good governance. and rule-bound to respond to the changing needs” of
However, others have some reservation about the society (Minogue et al., 1998).
extent to which decentralisation contributes to good In pursuit of public management, private sector
governance. For example, Cabral (2011) notes… principles have been adopted for management of public
“Weaknesses found with the local governance are a sector organizations. The private sector principles include:
reflection of problems affecting governance more broadly managerial capacity, flexibility and competitive drive
and cannot be attributed to decentralisation”. It is also essential for the efficient and effective provision of
observed that the ascendance of neo-liberal governments activities previously assumed to be the province of the
in several countries in the 1990s onwards saw the rise of public sector. The public sector in most countries is being
economic and political restructuring of the state: reviewed to take care of these fundamental changes for
deregulation of markets, privatisation; reduction of civil instance local governments have to tender for more work
service, introduction of “managerialism” and other to competitive private sector organisations. The imperative
institutional reforms as part of governance (Pierre, 2000). elements of public sector management are identified by
The restructuring of the state (including decentralisation) Minogue et al. (1998) include:
was part of the strategy to re-define the role of the state in
society (Pierre, 2000). (1) Managers should be given, the freedom to manage,
Pierre (2000) posits that there are two meanings of they must be under corresponding obligation of
governance: “old governance” and “new governance” accountability for their performance,
(Pierre, 2000). To Pierre (2003), “governance refers to (2) Efficiency mechanisms must be promoted: managers
sustained coordination and coherence among a wider must be cost-conscious, efficiency review mechanisms be
variety of actors with different purposes and objectives”. put in performance agreements for senior managers,
Such actors may include: political actors and institutions, service targets should be designed and above all,
corporate groups and interests, civil society and informal methods of measuring customer satisfaction/
groups and transnational organizations. In such a dissatisfaction should designed;
situation, some of the roles that were previously performed (3) Decentralized accountability (financial delegation), and
by government may be taken over by other actors. (4) The gap between customer expectations and
According to this logic, that is the reason why the concept satisfaction must be narrowed (Minogue et al 1998: 27).
of governance is broader than government. Thus, Programmes for customer care could include: citizens‟
governance is the synergy between the state and the non charter and quality management initiatives in addition to
30 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.
standards of service delivery, openness, consultation with promote good governance through new public
service users; value for money and choice. management principles, there are many grey areas of
patronage. The tendencies towards favouritism,
Public sector management principles have been corruption, nepotism and political cronyism) that have
introduced in most local governments. However, the undermined the efficacy of “good governance”. Efficiency
success of these mechanisms in the developed industrial and effectiveness, the pinnacles of new public
societies cannot be assumed for poor countries. It is management have suffered at the altar of political
generally acknowledged that the concept of a “customer” expediency. Following that logic, the claim that better
which has been borrowed from private sector management management will increase the citizens‟ willingness to pay
does adequately apply to a public service consumer, who taxes and contribute towards programmes could be
is at the same time a citizen and a taxpayer. In poor greatly reduced. However, a recent study posits that even
countries, where poverty and illiteracy are high, with with decentralisation, the centre tends to control most of
limited information, the assumptions that an ordinary the resources, delays in transfers, pretending to oversee
citizen will make informed choice amongst alternatives service delivery at local level- yet it has no means of
presented in the provision of public service is greatly effectively supervising what happens at the local level
compromised by his or her failure to access all the (Lutoti et al., 2015).
information. Most ordinary citizens in poor countries
believe that after paying taxes, the government should
provide the public services on the basis of the taxes paid. State –society relations and “good governance”
Advocates of the public sector management tend to
assume that the new approach will open up bureaucratic While attempts have been made to reform the public sector
systems to scrutiny and transparency. On the contrary, in by introducing some public management principles in the
Africa public information in government, including local process of implementing decentralisation in Africa, the
governments, remain inaccessible. The behaviour of the main missing link has remained on restructuring and
political and bureaucratic elites also remains oriented to reconfiguring state – society relations in that the process.
the old ways. Hence, the quest for “good governance” While it is claimed that decentralisation is a means of
through new public management remains contentious in “bringing power closer to the people”, this in itself, could be
the African public sector. an empty political rhetoric. Alternatively, it may imply
Some elements of public sector management which are “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani, 1995).
claimed to promote “good governance” have been Decentralisation without real people‟s power is a hoax.
attempted in some African countries. The implementation State–society relations are interplay between state actions
of decentralisation policy in a number of African countries and those of other actors in society. Contextualised in the
was accompanied bynew governance reforms intended to sense of good governance, non-state actors play
enhance accountability at the local level, these include: significant roles in promoting national and local
democracy, advocating for the rights of their membership,
(1) “Value for money” accountability where it is emphasized self–provision and above all in engaging the state to meet
that money‟s worth of service must be seen instead of its obligations.
„paper‟ accountability, By engaging in service delivery, non-state actors
(2) Institutional accountability whereby each organ of the become either independent providers or co-producers with
local government is charged with a particular responsibility state agents, in both cases they lie in the realm of the
has to account for its activities in its work plan and budget. market. By engaging the state actors in a continuous
(3) Representation whereby the elected representatives of dialogue they become watchdogs against abuse of the
the people constitute a “body corporate”, the council of public office and enhance accountability and prompt
each local government level to which the administrative effectiveness of the state actors.
staff have to account. This representative element also In short, they play a representative function which
acts as a “voice” of the people in determining priorities of logically, promotes a democratic engagement. And by
each local government. The representatives also oversee occupying the space where the state has failed to perform
the implementation of programmes of the local government its mandated functions they enhance values of collective
concerned; citizenship and collective action. Thus while the new public
(4) At managerial level, the recommendations of the civil management approach discussed above deals with the
service reform require the local government to practise quality of government as an aspect of good governance,
results –oriented-management; the notion of civil society (non- state actors) promotes
(5) And competitive examinations conducted by the good governance by virtue of promoting participation,
District /Municipal Service Commissions are held for representation, responsiveness and self–determination.
promotions in local governments (Uganda Government The question then is, how do these play at the local level?
2000). This question needs empirical research.
Equally, the new approaches adopted by African states
Despite existence of these new managerial benchmarks to for provision of services under decentralisation require that
Makara 31
organized groups make some input in policies of local that decentralisation appears prodigious and where it has
government including their budgets. Some civil society been implemented successfully with commitment, the
organizations have played key roles in this arrangement. results have been amazing. And where its implementation
In conceptual terms, the term civil society remains has been bungled, the claim of good local governance
confusing due to the competing usages it attracts. remains in question. It is imperative to stress further that
Robinson and White (1998) warn that “any attempt to African states need more, not less decentralisation, for if
compress the idea of civil society into homogeneous and well implemented, it facilitates some measure of good
virtuous stereotype is doomed to failure.” Thus, a broader governance especially at the grassroots level. Moreover,
conceptualization of civil society should include as many Africa is already through with the centralisation experiment
non-state actors as possible. that has largely failed to advance good governance and
It is well known that not all non-state actors are development on the continent. Therefore, despite the
necessarily “virtuous”. However, a diagnosis of their pitfalls of decentralisation, it is worth trying (Muhumuza,
internal behaviours should reveal their strength and 2008).
weaknesses, prejudging them may be dangerous.
Moreover, as White and Robinson argue (1998), while
there is a strong argument to the effect that both state and CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
civil society forms of provision have intrinsic, albeit
different, strength and weaknesses, the question arises as The author has not declared any conflict of interests.
to the extent to which some kind of complementality can
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