Asia-Pacific

Asia-PacificRegional
Regional Framework for
Framework
NATECH (Natural Hazards Triggering
for NATECH (Natural Hazards
D
Technological Disasters) Risk Management
Triggering Technological Disasters)
N& Risk Management
HAZARD
CATION DEFINITION
CLASSIFICAT
REVIEW
TECHNICAL REPORT

2020
2020

UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

About this Publication
This publication is developed by a group of individuals from the Working Group on
NATECH Risks in the Asia-Pacific with support from researchers, scientists and
practitioners from different countries, under the aegis of the UNDRR Asia-Pacific
Science, Technology and Academia Advisory Group (APSTAAG). A call for sub-mission
of NATECH cases studies was made and 19 examples were submitted. These cases
were subsequent analysed leading to the development of guiding principles and a
framework for NATECH risk management in Asia Pacific.

Coordinators
• Rajib Shaw, Keio University
• Animesh Kumar, UNDRR

Key Contributors
• Aleksandrina Mavrodieva, Keio University (Japan)
• Ana Maria Cruz, DRS, DPRI, Kyoto University (Japan)
• Antonia Loyzaga, Manila Observatory (Philippines)
• Devendra Narain Singh, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay (India)
• Emily Chan, Collaborating Centre for Oxford University and CUHK for Disaster and
Medical Humanitarian Response (CCOUC), Chinese University of Hong Kong
(China)
• Fatma Lestari, Universitas Indonesia (Indonesia)
• Kampanart Silva, Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (Thailand)
• Maria Camila Suarez Paba, Kyoto University (Japan)
• Ranit Chatterjee, Kyoto University (Japan) and Resilience Innovation Knowledge
Academy (India)
• Takako Izumi, Tohoku University (Japan)

Citation
UNDRR-APSTAAG (2020) “Asia-Pacific Regional Framework for NATECH (Natural Haz-
ards Triggering Technological Disasters) Risk Management”, United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction – Asia-Pacific Science, Technology and Academia Advisory
Group

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this document do not

necessarily reflect the views of UNDRR or of the United Nations Secretariat, partners,
and governments, and are based on the inputs received from different contributions
received from the science and technology community.

© 2020 UNITED NATIONS

For additional information, please contact:
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)
9-11 Rue de Varembé, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel: +41 22 917 89 08
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 3.O IGO
(CC BY-NC 3.O IGO).

No part of this publication can be used for commercial purposes without the prior
permission of UNDRR. Please write to [email protected] to obtain permission.
To view a copy of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc/3.0/igo/

When content, such as an image, graphic, data, trademark, or logo, is attributed to a

third party, the user is solely responsible for clearing the rights with the right holders.
 Asia-Pacific Regional Framework
for NATECH (Natural Hazards
Triggering Technological Disasters)
Risk Management

2020

Asia-Pacific Science, Technology and Academia Advisory Group

Working Group on NATECH Risk Management
Foreword

As the world has become more complex, so has risk. In a connected word, with
inter-dependent systems, disasters emanating from distant corners are more likely
to cause cascading disruptions down the line to countries vast and far.

At the same time, within countries, in the quest to power cities, mine resources,
build industries, and feed growing populations, humans have left a strong mark on
the environment around them, often creating new risks along the way. Moreover,
the need to expand cities and infrastructure means humans are increasingly en-
croaching on new areas that have traditionally been uninhabited, usually for good
reason, thus exposing people and economic assets to new hazards.

This global interconnectedness, and the increased interaction between the built
environment and the natural environment, means our development gains are in-
creasingly at risk of natural hazards, notwithstanding the increasing intensity and
frequency of climate-related hazards.

Resource-intensive investments such as power plants, factories and public utility

infrastructure are not only uniquely vulnerable to these hazards, but also hold the
potential to trigger larger disasters if they fail. Such events are known as “natural
hazards triggering technological disasters” or NATECH.

The Global Assessment Report (GAR) 2019 was the first GAR to cover NATECH
due to their relevance to managing systemic risk and minimizing the cascading im-
pact of disasters. The Asia-Pacific Regional Framework for NATECH Risk Manage-
ment takes the discussion even further through a closer examination of specific
cases and a focus on the Asia-Pacific region.

There is no stopping the pace of human development and growth, but for this
growth to be sustainable, it must be risk-informed. This calls for an expanded un-
derstanding of new types of complex risk such as NATECH, which is what this
report hopes to accomplish.

Loretta Hieber Girardet

Chief, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

2
Message from AP-STAAG

The Asia-Pacific region has emerged as a hotspot of natural hazards ranging from
earthquakes, floods to tsunamis and volcanic eruptions among others. The Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction has expanded the scope of disaster risk
reduction by adding a range of other hazards (including man-made hazards and
related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks).

The NATECH (Natural hazards triggering Technological disasters) risks provide

a good basis to demonstrate the expanded scope of the Sendai Framework.
In particular, the NATECH risks faced by the Asia-Pacific region is of significant
importance due to two specific reasons: first, the potential of NATECH events to
compound the impact of a natural hazard and second, very little is known about the
past and potential NATECH events.

NATECH events are mostly low impact events aside from the large-scale 2011 East
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami that triggered the Fukushima nuclear disaster and
brought the global attention to NATECH. However, there is no baseline available to
compare NATECH risk trends in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, tools and initiatives
for reducing technological risks often overlook specific drivers of NATECH events. This
necessitates a study of NATECH risks and relevant risk management principles.

The interest in NATECH risks has grown in recent years across disciplines. In addition,
several international organisations have provided sector specific guidelines for NATECH
risk management. This study is another step towards creating a shared understanding
of the NATECH risk in the Asia-Pacific region by documenting and subsequently
analyzing various NATECH events with known impact in the last three decades.

The study has been steered by the UNDRR Asia-Pacific Science, Technology
and Academia Advisory Group (AP-STAAG) that established a working group of
experts on NATECH risk. The experts have reported and compiled a total of 19
cases studies on NATECH risks in the region. Based on the analysis of the case
studies, ten guiding principles are proposed to aid national governments to take up
NATECH risk management.

The study has also benefited from a series of consultations to draw lessons from
the case studies. A regional action-oriented framework has been proposed as a part
of this report. We hope that this report will add momentum to the activities directed
towards managing NATECH risk in the Asia Pacific region and help in making the
societies sustainable and disaster resilient.

Rajib Shaw Animesh Kumar

Co-Chair, AP-STAAG Co-Chair, AP-STAAG
Professor, Graduate School of Media and Deputy Chief, UNDRR Regional Office
Governance, Keio University for Asia and the Pacific
3
Executive Summary

NATECH (Natural hazards triggering Technological disasters) is an emerging theme

in the field of disaster risk reduction globally. The Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the Global Assessment Report (GAR 2019 ) have
stressed the need for engaging in NATECH risk assessments, policy formulation
and local actions. In 2017, UNDRR developed a guideline on national disaster risk
assessment that included NATECH risks and urged countries to undertake risk
assessment, preparedness planning and build capacity for effective response.

The Asia-Pacific region faces a varied continuum of natural hazards creating

greater complexity and deep uncertainty in the face of changing climate and rapid
industrialization. Considering the number of chemical industries and units handling
hazardous materials has increased, the NATECH risk is growing in the region. This
necessitates advancing the present understanding of the NATECH risk based on
past incidents and potential future events for informed decision-making.

The report, through a series of consultations and drawing lessons from the past
NATECH disasters proposes ten guiding principles for NATECH risk management
in the Asia-Pacific region:

1. Conduct Multi-Hazard, Systematic Risk and Ecological Impact Assessment

A holistic and systematic risk assessment for multiple hazards should form the
basis of all future actions for NATECH risk management.

2. Enable Coordinated Policy and Planning among Local Government and

Industrial Clusters
Effective planning for NATECH risk management should involve active
engagement of institutions at all levels with time-bound roles and responsibilities
for all stakeholders including the private sector.

3. Develop and Implement Safety Codes

Safety codes and regulations for land use, construction, design, materials
and usage for ensuring sustainable and resilient infrastructure tailor-made to
national and local needs incorporating global and regional experiences. Further
mechanisms for implementing and monitoring should be set up by the regulatory
authorities.

4. Enhance Offsite and Onsite Risk Communication

The findings from the risk assessment and development of codes need to be
effectively communicated to all stakeholders for informed decision making for
effective risk management. This should be complemented by enhanced risk

4
 communication between the scientific, community, and the policy makers;
amongst the personnel of industrial and hazardous installations; between such
installations and the nearby exposed communities.

5. Strengthen Internal Capacities

Building capacities by means of skills development for resource mapping,
response and scaling up of required resources (human, equipment and
financial). National and local governments need to work closely to strengthen
the capacities at national, sub-national and local level for providing timely early
warning and specialized response to NATECH incidents.

6. Build and Reinforce Critical Infrastructure

Critical infrastructure needs to be designed to minimize service disruptions in
case of a NATECH disaster. At the same time, existing infrastructure needs to be
retrofitted based on NATECH risk assessments and national codes.

7. Enhance Response Capacities

Capacities to respond effectively need to be strengthened at regional, national
and local levels. Countries need to share, cooperate and establish joint
NATECH response centers for transboundary NATECH response based on risk
assessments.

8. Promote Business Resilience

Industries and corporate houses need to be aware of NATECH risk and factor in
for investment decisions and integration into business continuity plans.

9. Plan for Recovery

Planning for early recovery needs to be aligned to principles of sustainable
development and should be guided by the “Build Back Better” approach to
prevent creation of future risks.

10. Foster Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships

NATECH risk management needs a multidisciplinary approach bringing together
academics, practitioners and policy makers at various levels. The ARISE regional
and country chapters, a disaster risk reduction platform for the private sector,
and other business networks should be leveraged to spearhead and foster
NATECH partnership in Asia Pacific region.

5
List of contributors to case studies

1. Ms. Aleksandrina Mavrodieva, Keio University, Japan.

2. Prof. Akhilesh Surjan, Charles Darwin University, Australia.
3. Prof. Ana Maria Cruz, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University,
Japan.
4. Ms. Antonia Loyzaga, International Advisory Board, Manila Observatory,
Philippines.
5. Mr. Chi Shing Wong, Faculty of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
China.
6. Prof. Devendra Narayan Singh, Department of Civil engineering, IIT Mumbai
India.
7. Prof. Emily Chan, Faculty of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China.
8. Prof. Fatma Lestari, Health & Environmental (OSHE) Unit, Universitas
Indonesia, Indonesia.
9. Prof. Takako Izumi, IRDeS, Tohoku University, Japan.
10. Mr. Jeevan Mandpala, Centre of Excellence in Disaster Mitigation and
Management (CoEDMM), IIT Roorkee, India.
11. Dr. Kampanart Silva, Renewable Energy Research Team, National Metal and
Materials Technology Center (MTEC), Thailand.
12. Prof. Mahua Mukherjee, Centre of Excellence in Disaster Mitigation and
Management (CoEDMM), IIT Roorkee, India.
13. Dr. Maria Camila Suarez Paba, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto
University, Japan.
14. Dr. Shohei Matsuura, Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Center (DPPC),
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia.

6
Table of Contents

Foreword........................................................................................................................ 2
Message from AP-STAAG........................................................................................ 3
Executive Summary................................................................................................... 4
List of contributors to case studies......................................................................6

1. The Context.................................................................................. 8

2. Background................................................................................ 10
2.1 Trends in Definition.................................................................................... 14
2.2 Clarification on the Terminology.......................................................... 15
2.3 Areas of Focus............................................................................................ 15

3. Ten Basic Principles of NATECH Risk Management.................. 17

4. Policy Integration....................................................................... 20

5. Operational and Knowledge Management................................. 26

5.1 Operational Management....................................................................... 26
5.2 Knowledge Management....................................................................... 27

6. NATECH Events in Asia-Pacific.................................................. 29

6.1 Details of Referred Case Studies......................................................... 29
6.2 Case study Analysis.................................................................................. 44
6.3 Gaps............................................................................................................... 46

7. Proposed Framework for NATECH Risk Management............... 50

References...................................................................................... 53

Annexure ........................................................................................ 56
Annex 1: Summary of Existing Definition/ Description of NATECH.....56
Annex 2: List of Key Reference Materials................................................. 59
Annex 3: Case study Template..................................................................... 60

7
1. The Context

N
atural hazards triggering technological disasters (NATECH) are complex
events that were first studied at the end of 1970s and have regained
importance in the recent past, particularly after the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami. The occurrence of NATECH events was estimated to
be approximately 5 percent of the total records reported in industrial accident
database up to about 20 years ago. The NATECH events at present are under
reported. In addition, it is presumed that the increasing frequency of climate change
linked natural hazards will lead to a spike in the number of NATECH cases in future
(Alessio Misuri, 2020).

Traditionally, NATECH has been studied with focus on adverse impacts of disasters
on industrial facilities leading to release of hazardous materials (hazmat). The
size of the global chemical industry exceeded $5 trillion in 2017 and is projected
to double by 2030 (UN Environment, 2019). The production and consumption
of manufactured chemicals continues to spread worldwide, with an increasing
share now located in developing countries and economies in transition, many of
which may have limited regulatory capacity. Considering these, it is certain that the
industrial sector and installations will continue to be a primary focus for NATECH

Addressing cascading and complex

hazards and risks
There is an urgent need to investigate further the direct and indirect linkages and
effects of natural, biological, technological and other human-induced hazards to
identify better and understand cascading and complex hazards and risks in a sys-
tematic way.

The shift towards a broader view and a more context-dependent definition of haz-
ards requires a systematic approach to risk that considers hazard, vulnerability,
exposure and capacity together and better understands their complex interactions.
The hazard list and associated HIPs may assist the activities of the GRAF, inform-
ing efforts to develop an enhanced understanding of the systemic nature of risk,
including the management of systemic risks.

UNDRR and ISC (2020) Hazard Definition and Classification Review

8
Figure 1: Projection of annual production growth in
chemical industry by region

risk management. Nevertheless, over the years, various other infrastructure sectors
like water reservoirs, power stations, barges, etc. have faced NATECH disasters,
thereby highlighting the changed and advanced nature and complexities of these
events. This demands for an inter-disciplinary approach and a comprehensive
framework for efficient management of NATECH risk.

Over the past 25 years, presence and growth of chemical industries has increased
tremendously in countries like Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines
and is expected to continue this growth path further in the coming years (ASEAN,
2014). This information must be examined closely with the fact that the Asia-Pacific
Region has also witnessed the highest number of disasters in the past decade.
Thus, the growing threat of NATECH in the region must be studied from all possible
dimensions of exposure and vulnerabilities in order to lay down a holistic regional
framework for NATECH risk management in the Asia-Pacific.

9
2. Background

T
he academic interest in NATECH has increased over the past two decades.
As per a review of Science Direct , out of 170 publications (2000-2020), 100
were found to be relevant. Figure 2, 4 and 5 map these publications on basis
of year of publications, type of publications and publication titles of relevant ones
respectively.

Figure 2: Mapping Academic Interest in NATECH through

Science Direct Search for keyword NATECH (2000-2020)
as on 07.01.2020

A higher number of publications is found through other search methods like the
Google Search using the keyword NATECH (Figure 3) vis-à-vis that done on Science
Direct using the same keyword.

10
Figure 3: Mapping NATECH
Publications through Google
Scholar Search for key word
NATECH; Total Publication
Count- 2190 (1997-2019)

The difference could indicate more discussions happening on the topic in workshops
and conferences (compared to academic publications) whose proceedings are
included in Google search but are not included in Science Direct search which
included five key types of academic publications (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Relevant Publications during 2000-2020 as per

type of publications based on search on Science Direct for
keyword NATECH on 07.01.2020

11
Figure 5: Relevant Publications during 2000-2020 as per
Publication Title based on search on Science Direct for
keyword NATECH as on 07.01.2020

Among others, NATECH risk management has been highlighted in context of

design and safety standards of ageing factories and contaminated environments
(Rongshi Qin, 2020; Hangnan Yu, 2020). Some studies emphasise the importance
of conducting regular risk assessment with the help of various tools including GIS,
remote sensing and other statistical models.

Sano et al. propose an index for translating risk assessment results for production
process safety to costs, thus aiding in appropriate prioritization and allocation of
management resources to safety investments. The index also accounts for indirect
costs including that of lost opportunity, business interruption, loss of raw materials
and products, lost profits, etc. for expressing damages incurred. A key highlight of
the paper is inclusion of natural hazards as one of the four considerations for risk
identification at industrial level. This marks an important shift in the approach of
compartmentalizing the natural and technological hazards for risk assessment.

The domino effect in the field of risk analysis was first documented in 1947, while
the earliest systematic study began in 1991. Domino effect can be understood

12
as “An accident in which a primary unwanted event propagates within an
equipment (“temporally”), or/and to nearby equipment (“spatially”), sequentially or
simultaneously, triggering one or more secondary unwanted events, in turn possibly
triggering further (higher order) unwanted events, resulting in overall consequences
more severe than those of the primary event” (Lei Hou, 2020). Conventional domino
effects are cascading accidents caused by a primary event like fires, blast waves,
etc. inside the boundaries of the plant and NATECH can be considered as an external
domino effect caused by natural events. NATECH events in an industrial or process
installation are likely to escalate the internal domino effect involving surrounding
equipment, thus further exacerbating the already catastrophic consequences of
the initial scenario (Alessio Misuri, 2020).

Hou et al. highlight four management factors for preventing and mitigating escalation
accidents (Figure 6). While inherently safe designs can mitigate the risk of domino
effect to certain extent but often the pre-designs have limitations of not taking into
account the cost and land use planning. Active protective barriers automatically
or manually trigger the protection action and include fire-fighting systems, etc.
Passive protective devices tend to delay the time of triggering domino effect by
constructing physical barriers between primary scenario and the secondary target.
For e.g. fireproofing. Emergency measures are related to personnel performance
and emergency procedures (Lei Hou, 2020)

Figure 6: Safety Barriers for Preventing and Mitigating

Escalation Accidents Source: (Lei Hou, 2020)

13
Misuri et al. flag that despite the growing interest in the analysis of NATECH
scenarios, systematic approaches for the analysis of the performance of safety
barriers in NATECH scenarios are lacking (Alessio Misuri, 2020).

Nishino et al. (2020) raises a significant aspect of safety of pre-identified shelters in

case of NATECH. For e.g., the study highlights how that tsunami vertical evacuation
buildings would be exposed to high thermal radiation in event of tsunami-triggered
oil spill fire. So, it brings forth a critical aspect that identification of safe evacuation
shelters should be done in due consideration of the potential consequences of
NATECH events, which is not a practice currently.

2.1 Trends in Definition

The first use of the term “natech” is traced back to a journal paper by Showalter and
Myers in 1994, analysing the release of oil, chemicals, and radiological materials due
to natural hazard-induced disasters. This section traces the etymological evolution
of the term from natech to more recent usage of the term NATECH. GAR 2019
notes that natural hazards have the potential to surpass safeguards, triggering
negative impacts that may entail hazardous substance release, fire, explosion or
indirect effects with wider repercussions than those felt in the immediate proximity.
The cascading technological side effects of natural hazards are called NATECH
accidents. NATECH event consequences can range from health impacts and
environmental degradation to major economic losses at local or regional levels due
to damage to assets and business interruption.

As per Joint Research Centre, European Commission, accidents initiated by a

natural hazard or disaster which result in the release of hazardous materials is
commonly referred to as Natech or na-tech accidents. This includes releases from
fixed chemical installations and spills from oil and gas pipelines.

As per OECD, a natech accident is a chemical accident caused by a natural hazard

or a natural hazard-induced disaster. Chemical accidents include accidental oil and
chemical spills, gas releases, and fires or explosions involving hazardous substances
from fixed installations (e.g. petrochemical, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, storage
depot) and from oil and gas pipelines.

ASEAN Risk Monitor and Disaster Management Review describes that technolog-
ical accidents triggered by natural hazards, known as Natech, are typically more
devastating in terms of human casualties, economic loss, and environmental
damage than either a natural or technological disaster on its own. When a natu-
ral hazard occurs in an industrial area where hazardous materials (hazmat) are
used, handled, generated, or stored, there is a high risk of the release of contained
hazmats. Hazmats include certain liquids, gases, and pressurized gases with haz-
ardous properties, such as toxic, flammable, and/or explosive materials. Hazmat

14
releases – depending on their properties, processes, and confinement – can result
in contamination, toxic vapor, fire, or explosion that can impact surrounding com-
munities and industries.

Natural hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, storms, or extreme temperatures

etc., can cause the release of dangerous substances from hazardous installations
resulting in fires, explosions or toxic or radioactive releases. These are called Natech
accidents. They are frequent in the wake of natural-hazard induced disasters
and have often had severe and long-term consequences on the population, the
environment and the economy. Any kind and size of natural hazard can trigger
a Natech accident. It does not necessarily require a major natural hazard event,
like a strong earthquake or a major hurricane, to cause a Natech accident. With
increasing industrialisation and urbanisation coupled with climate change, Natech
risk is expected to increase in the future.

WHO mentions that a Natech event is a technological accident triggered by a natural

hazard. These can include floods, earthquakes, lightning, cyclones and extreme
temperatures. A technological accident can include damage to, and release of
chemicals from, fixed chemical installations, oil and gas pipelines, storage sites,
transportation links, waste sites and mines.

Apart from the above, various journal papers, workshop proceedings and NATECH
related literature were referred to better understand the diverse definition and
description of the term in use. A summary of the same is listed below in annexure 1.

2.2 Clarification on the Terminology

Existing literature use varied terminology for NATECH and there is a need to clarify
and standardize the terminology. Various terminology currently in use include
NATECH, Natech, na-tech, Na-tech, etc. Henceforth, this document will use the
terminology NATECH (NAtural hazards triggering TECHnological disasters) as
mentioned in GAR 2019.

2.3 Areas of Focus

The natural hazards triggering NATECH can be broadly divided into slow onset
hazards like drought and weathering and rapid onset hazards of geological and
hydro-meteorological nature (Figure 7). Thus, the area of focus for NATECH risk
management should include understanding the nature of cascading risk these
natural hazards can pose to different infrastructure and services and thereby
having a potential to become technological disaster.

15
Figure 7: Types of Natural Hazards Triggering NATECH

Majority of the publications and case studies exiting on NATECH are focused on
NATECH risk on fixed installations like industrial setup, warehouses, hospitals, etc.
However, there are possibilities of NATECH risk to assets which are of mobile/
non-fixed nature or even while in transit. Thus, areas of focus include studying and
understanding the nature of NATECH risk to both kinds of infrastructure and the
identifying the challenges therein. Some of these infrastructures is listed in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Types of Infrastructure at NATECH Risk

(Source: WHO, 2018)

16
3. Ten Basic
Principles of NATECH
Risk Management

T
he implementation of the Asia-Pacific Regional Framework for NATECH Risk
Management can be guided by the following principles (Figure 9), with due
considerations of national circumstances, consistency with domestic laws
as well as international obligations and commitments.

Figure 9: Ten Basic Principles of NATECH Risk Management

1. Conduct Multi-Hazard, Systematic Risk and Ecological Impact Assessment

NATECH risk management calls for a holistic risk assessment in all its dimensions
of vulnerability, capacity and exposure of community, assets and environment

17
to multiple hazards. It should include assessing the systemic interdependencies
between natural hazards and technological hazards in a built environment
and evaluating the effectiveness of existing capacities with respect to likely risk
scenarios.

2. Enable Coordinated Policy and Planning among Local Government and

Industrial Clusters

Each State has the primary responsibility to establish and put in place a systems
of risk governance comprising of institutions, mechanisms and policies for
implementation of the present framework at national, sub-national and on-site level.
Effective planning for NATECH risk management should involve active engagement
of institutions of legislation and execution at all levels; thereby clearly voicing out
of time-bound roles and responsibilities across all stakeholders including private
businesses and academia. The sources of funding for implementation of the plan
should be specified in the plan. Linkages to existing disaster risk management
plans sustainable development and climate change adaptation plans should be
made where possible.

3. Develop and Implement Safety Codes

Safety codes and regulations should be developed at national and sub-national

levels catering to various aspects of structural and non-structural safety with an
all-hazards approach. These include norms for land use, construction, design,
materials and usage for ensuring sustainable and resilient infrastructure. Codes,
tailor-made to national and local needs, should incorporate global and regional
experiences.

4. Enhance Offsite and Onsite Risk Communication

Comprehensive risk assessment is a pre-cursor to efficient risk communication.

Risk communication provides a ground for informed decision making for effective
risk management and includes understanding and building the risk perception of
the stakeholders. Effective risk communication should take place between the
scientific & academic community and the policy makers; amongst the personnel of
industrial and hazardous installations; between such installations and the nearby
exposed community.

5. Strengthen Internal Capacities

Capacity development includes skill development, resource mapping and scaling

up of required resources (both human, equipment and financial). In-charge of
each hazardous and industrial installations are responsible for developing on-site
capacity for mitigation, prompt response and rapid recovery commensurable to
the nature and quantum of risks assessed They are also responsible for enhancing
the coping capacity of the off-site community. Each State is responsible for

18
strengthening the internal capacities at national and sub-national level for providing
timely early warning of and specialized response to NATECH.

6. Build and Reinforce Critical Infrastructure

The critical infrastructure at national and sub-national levels needs to be

strengthened and made resilient by respective authorities for ensuring continued
social and economic functioning of the community even during times of disasters.
The resilient lifeline infrastructure of health, fire and emergency response aids in
substantial reduction of life loss & injuries and in prompt containment of damage
and losses to assets.

7. Enhance Response Capacities

The litmus test for response mechanism is the number of lives saved and
quantum of damage & destruction prevented. It relies on NATECH risk-informed
preparedness measures, readiness and response capacities of on-site and off-
site responders including the communities. It is the responsibility of authorities
at national, sub-national and on-site level to put in place a set of specialized
agencies and mutual-aid groups to save lives, contain health and other cascading
impacts, ensure public safety and meet the immediate basic needs of the affected
community.

8. Promote Business Continuity Management

Each industry and business should analyze the NATECH risk and put in place
arrangements including processes, robust supply chains, financial mechanism for
ensuring continued functioning of business, commercial activities and services in
aftermath of NATECH.

9. Plan for Recovery

The sub-national and on-site authorities are responsible for safe disposal and
management of hazmat, if any, released during the NATECH. This is followed by
prompt restoration of services, livelihood and normalcy in the affected community.
The process of recovery should be aligned with principles of sustainable
development and should be guided by the building back better approach so as to
prevent creation of future risks.

10. Foster Multi-Stakeholders Partnerships

NATECH risk management is an inter- and trans-disciplinary field and seeks

coming together of academicians, practitioners and policy makers at multiple
levels. Depending on the nature of technological disaster, NATECH sometimes
calls for trans-boundary cooperation for its management. It is the responsibility of
authorities at relevant levels to nurture such partnerships.

19
4. Policy Integration

C
ases studies were used to understand the existing policies, if any, on NATECH
and related issues. In most of the cases, a specific policy on NATECH is
missing. There are policies existing on safety, preparedness and response
measures concerning industrial, chemical, nuclear and other infrastructure including
dam, power plants, etc. but the possibilities of them getting impacted due to natural
hazards and leading to NATECH have not been fully explored and addressed. Thus,
in most of the cases, these policies fail to link the cause (natural hazard) and effect
(triggered technological disaster) relationship and in some cases, where they do,
proper implementation and its monitoring is a key challenge and gap.

Japan

Legislation exist on specific sector safety requirements, such as Petroleum

Complex Disaster Prevention Law (Policy and legislation related to the safety
measures in the petroleum industry in Japan: https://www.paj.gr.jp/english/
data/paj2011.pdf

With regard to the nuclear disaster, Japan has an Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (1999) which aims to strengthen
nuclear disaster control measures, under which there is a Guideline for
Earthquake Resistant Design of Nuclear Power Plant (2006) dedicated to the
regulations on the nuclear power plant design against earthquake. An Interim
Report of the Special Committee on Safety Goals for Nuclear Installations
(2003) indicates the importance of performing probabilistic risk assessment
which cover all hazards including natural-hazard induced disaster, though
the assessment was not mandated until after the 1FNPP accident. Although
NATECH was not included as a keyword in these documents, the nuclear
community has been aware of the nuclear disaster induced by earthquakes.
However, combination of natural hazards, e.g. an earthquake followed by
a tsunami, was not considered, and the risk assessment was on voluntary
basis.

Overall, a comprehensive policy addressing technological hazards in general and

NATECH in particular is mostly missing at sub-national, national and regional
level. Absence of a targeted policy on NATECH risk management results in

20
operational gaps in understanding and management of the NATECH whereby
the triggering natural hazards and the triggered technological disasters are often
compartmentalized.

Malaysia

Given the low frequency of NATECH events in Malaysia in the past, there is still
no official platform that engages and informs communities about NATECH.
Although authorities such as BOMBA and Department of Occupational Safety
and Health (DOSH) are usually well informed about industrial disaster risks,
communication to communities and other stakeholders such hospitals
and CBOs are very limited. As of now, if a NATECH event would occur in
Malaysia, the authorities will respond to it as two separate events; natural
hazard event (flood / lightning) and industrial incident.

Nonetheless, an Internal Emergency Response Team (ERT) is established

based on relevant regulations. The industry players conduct their annual
emergency drills according to legislation and guidance such as, Control of
Industry Major Accident Hazard (CIMAH) Regulation under Occupational
Safety and Health Act 1994 (OSHA) and ERP (Emergency Response Planning),
CMP (Crisis Management Planning) program of individual companies.

In Pasir Gudang, major industries like oil and gas companies are required to
register in a mutual aid membership called PAGEMA (Pasir Gudang Emergency
Mutual Aid). PAGEMA was established in 1988 and the main objective of the
establishment is to improve coordination during emergencies between
private sector and government stakeholders.

The year 2011 onwards, there has been an increasing focus on evolving nature of
NATECH risk resulting in development of various framework and guidelines on/
including the subject of NATECH (Figure 10). These includes the OECD Guiding
Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response (2011),
Sendai Framework 2nd Addendum for NATECH, OECD (2015), Words into Action
Guideline, UNDRR (2017), WHO Chemical Leak from NATECH Information (2018)
and GAR 2019 Chapter on NATECH, ARMOR, ASEAN and RAPID-N in 2019, among
others. The recently released Sendai Framework-aligned hazard definitions and
classification lists NATECH hazard under technological hazards and “industrial
failure/non-compiance” hazard cluster (UNDRR and ISC, 2020).

The Sendai Framework acknowledges the need to focus on technological hazards

and disasters and has stressed for sectoral approach while building coherence
among various related stakeholders to manage risk.

21
Figure 10: Recent Guidelines and Framework on NATECH
Risk Management

Thailand

The National Disaster Management Policy focuses on disasters resulting

from natural hazards, and more emphasis is placed on mitigation and
response measures rather than protective measures. No policy on NATECH
is confirmed. Only large enterprises had a business continuity plan (BCP).

APRU (Association of Pacific Rim Universities)

APRU, consisting of 50 universities in the Pacific Rim, initiated the Campus
Safety Program under its Multi-Hazards Program. Under the campus safety
program, a workshop to discuss the issue and challenges related to disaster
preparedness on campus is organized every two years since 2016. The 3rd
workshop to be held in 2020 includes the aspect of man-made hazards as
well as natural hazards. It is because the risks of the NATECH is acknowledged
through various natural hazards experience and it is important for universities
to expand their preparedness capacity to man-made hazards considering the
huge impact to the communities if it happens.

22
The Global Assessment Report (GAR) of 2019 included NATECH along with hazards
like environment, radiological, nuclear among others. The very first guidelines on
chemical accidents was prepared by OECD in 2011. The guiding principles revolve
around four pillars of prevention, preparation, response and follow up.

• Preventing the occurrence of incidents involving hazardous materials

• Preparing for accidents, and mitigating adverse effects of accidents through
effective planning
• Responding to accidents that do occur in order to minimize impact
• Follow-up to accidents, reporting and analysis

In 2015, OECD came up with Addendum 2 to address NATECH adding to the

earlier OECD guiding principles for chemical accident prevention, preparedness
prepared in 2003. A new chapter was added to NATECH risk to support better
management and preparedness. The guidelines focus inclusion of NATECH risk in
hazard mapping, adequate training of human resources, regulations and planning,
transboundary cooperation, and bettering of warning systems among others.
The UNDRR Word into Action guidelines (2017) emphasizes on NATECH as an
emerging hazard risk and is inter-reliant on human, natural and technological
systems. Acknowledging the lack of comprehensive NATECH assessment tools,
the guidelines lists out quantitative, semi quantitative and qualitative tools (ARIPAR,
RAPID-N, PANR) available at present for conducting regional and national risk
assessments.

Japan

Since 2005 there has been a requirement for municipalities in Japan to

develop and publicize hazard maps and by 2013, 95 % of municipalities had
produced flood hazard maps and 81 % for landslides. Nonetheless, a number
of houses, built before the 2005 requirement, were erected on areas of higher
risk (WEF, 2018).

Global Assessment Report (2019) was first to include various hazards for the
first time including NATECH linking its impact to social, environment, health and
economy. The GAR 19 proposes ways to map the NATECH risk in relation to not
only critical infrastructure and industrial sites but overall socio-economic and
governance issues.

The World Health Organisation (2018) guidelines principally for health impacts
of NATECH events focus on earthquakes, cyclones and floods. The guideline
is inclusive of immobile and mobile sites which includes hazardous material
transportation through rail, road, air and sea.

23
 Philippines

In recognition of the need to mitigate potential effects of disasters on energy

supply due to damaged facilities, and subsequent impacts such as disruption to
vital public services, associated risks to public health and safety, and economic
and financial losses to communities and businesses, the Department of
Energy issued a department circular on, “Adoption of Energy Resiliency in
the Planning and Programming of the Energy Sector” in January 2018. Citing
laws on power sector reform, deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and
the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, the policy
defines resilient energy infrastructure as, “…the ability to restore and sustain
availability and accessibility of energy in the most timely and efficient manner
in the aftermath of natural and man-made disaster” with particular focus
on developing standards and strengthening infrastructure, and improving
operational and maintenance standards and practices to expeditiously restore
energy supply. It also requires energy sector actors to formulate Resiliency
Compliance Plans (RCP) to constitute the Energy Resiliency Plan, which, in
turn, will form part of the Philippine Energy Plan (Department of Energy, 2018).
The risk posed by the exposure of ecosystems and communities to the
energy infrastructure is not addressed in the policy document.

Malaysia

Control of Industry Major Accident Hazard (CIMAH) Regulation was adopted

in 1996 with aim to enhance control of major accidents at high-risk places (e.g.
office, factories, warehouses). Although this regulation requires establishments
with HAZMAT to provide information to the nearby communities on the
possible risks and consequences of emergency incidents, some companies
are found to be reluctant on giving such information.

Singapore

The Fire Code of Singapore requires oil storage tanks to have lightning
protection systems. The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) has been
officially tasked with mitigating and response to hazmat incidents. Since
2002 fire stations in Singapore have been going through major capability
upgrades in order to be able to respond to emergencies involving releases
of hazardous materials. All responders from regular fire stations receive
training on response measures to hazmat-related incidents. A second tier of
specialized respondents is established – the hazmat Incident Team (HIT)
who are responsible for mitigation and decontamination operations (Hwa et
al., 2016). A Hazmat Emergency Assessment and Response Team (HEART)
is also established to provide specialist advice to respondents on the ground

24
 in time of incidents. The team utilized a unique vehicle – the Hazmat Control
Vehicle (HCV), which is deployed during incidents to identify the type of hazard
and to assess the level of contamination. The vehicle has an integrated
functional laboratory for analysis of hazardous materials and can be deployed
in monitoring operations. The SCDF has also established a social media
monitoring function in its operation centre to monitor social media platforms
in case citizens post information on new incidents (Hwa et al., 2016).

Another aspect missing in the existing legislations, guidelines, etc. is holistic

coverage of all components of disaster management cycle. While some only lays
down preventive and mitigation measures for safety, others only focus on the
response component, thus leaving operational gaps.

New Zealand

After the September 2010 Earthquake, the Government created the

Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act (2010), appointed a
dedicated Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery and established the
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission. However, the Commission
was not considered to be effective. For example, the CCC had not produced
a recovery plan by the time of the February 2011 earthquake (CGC, DPM&C,
2017).

At the time of the February 2011 Earthquake, there were three primary
documents in effect that outlined the roles and responsibilities of key
government agencies that were involved in the response. These are:

a. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002);

b. National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan (2005); and
c. The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan of
2006 (revised 2009) (CGC, DPM&C, 2017; McLean et al., 2012)

Together with improving regulatory enforcement, it is recommended that the

existing and future policies should incorporate measures for management of risks
related to natural hazards that could multiply the effects of conventional industrial
incidents. They should also include aspects of disclosure of information and risk
communication to public describing worst case scenarios, alternative evacuation
routes and relevant emergency contact details.

Further, national and regional legislations and guidelines should include the
evaluation of community-based and traditional knowledge and cultural practices in
the design of prevention, remediation and resilience plans for natural-technological
disasters. This process should include the utilization of locally available natural
materials and appropriate technologies.

25
5. Operational and
Knowledge Management

5.1 Operational Management

Major causes of NATECH include high population density, increased frequency

of severe weather related events, more industries and infrastructure at risk. With
growing industrialization (notably in emerging economies), rising vulnerability
(e.g. due to encroachment and often unplanned urban development), as well as
changing hazard frequency and occurrence (including as a result of a changing
climate), NATECH risk is expected to trend upwards.

Despite presence of some existing policies on safety and management of various

infrastructure including dams, industries and other technological assets, gap in
efficient and effective implementation of these existing policies and the inability of
these policies to fully explore, understand and address NATECH related complexities.
During onset of any natural hazard, these operational gaps are aggravated further,
often resulting in technological disasters.

Figure 11: Potential Contributors to the Primary Scenario

Source: (Lei Hou, 2020)

26
Hou et al. have suggested potential contributors to the primary scenario (Figure 10).
If the listed factors/ failures other than the environment factor (which in our case
is the natural hazard triggering the disaster) are considered, potential operational
issues could be worked out.

5.2 Knowledge Management

The Sendai Framework recognizes that disaster risk reduction requires a multi-
hazard approach and inclusive risk-informed decision-making based on the
open exchange and dissemination of disaggregated data and easily accessible,
up-to-date, comprehensible, science-based, non-sensitive risk information,
complemented by traditional knowledge.

The risk and challenges faced during NATECH events have been evolving over the
years and have become more frequent and unpredictable due to climate-induced
hazards. Comprehending the degree of cascading risk and developing ways to
isolate, measure and manage or prevent them is challenging. To have better risk
perception and to address these cascading nature of challenges faced during
NATECH, the key is creation and sustenance of knowledge at all levels. Lack or gaps
in knowledge limits the ability of government and other stakeholders to act and
effectively communicate the risk to all concerned. Thus, knowledge management
is inevitable to support informed decision-making for effective management of
NATECH risk.

Further, GAR 2019 flags the importance and need to assemble new combinations
of tools that can help the world think and act at a pace, as well as at the scale
commensurate with the complex problems we face. In too many fields, the most
important data and knowledge remain flawed, fragmented or closed, lacking the
context and organization required for them to be accessible and useful for decisions.

The following gaps have been observed in the knowledge management of NATECH:

a. Absence of single registry of the location of industrial facilities in natural hazard

zones
b. Absence of baseline to compare NATECH risk trends
c. Absence of information on natural hazard in industrial accident databases and
that on NATECH events in disaster loss databases
d. Instruments for reducing technological risks often tend to overlook the specific
drivers of NATECH, leaving an important gap in managing this type of risk
e. Inadequate interaction amongst the various stakeholder communities involved
in NATECH risk management including the experts of technological risks, natural
risks, industrial risks, civil safety and protection, etc.
f. Low risk perception of NATECH events triggered by certain hazards like lightning
and low/ high temperatures

27
g. Absence of composite indicators for measuring progress in NATECH risk
management

In the context of NATECH, knowledge management must take into account the in-
teractive nature of the drivers of risk; their interrelationships and interdependencies.
Tools of knowledge management for NATECH include IT-based tools and non-IT
tools. While the former include databases or application for collection and gener-
ation of baseline information, risks maps, assessment tools, etc., the latter include
policies, research studies and platforms like conferences, workshops for knowl-
edge-sharing and dissemination, etc. These tools should be easy to access, easy to
disseminate, easy to use, easy to update and should be relevant to all-hazards and
all stakeholders (Figure 12) to ensure better coverage of stakeholders and hence ef-
fective risk communication. Apart from the creation, application and updation of the
NATECH knowledge, another critical aspect of its management is acknowledging
the gaps in existing knowledge and prioritizing ways to understand them.

Figure 12: Attributes of NATECH Knowledge

Management Tools

While an essential step is to strengthen technical and scientific capacity to capitalize

on and consolidate existing knowledge, focus should also be on concerted
international, regional and local cooperation to stimulate and contribute towards
the same at all the levels. GAR 2019 notes that regional cooperation mechanisms
can provide key support to knowledge-sharing and capacity-building among
countries with similar risk profiles and regional concerns. Nevertheless, contextual
understanding and the use of appropriate traditional, indigenous and local knowledge
and practices must complement the scientific knowledge for NATECH for having a
holistic understanding of under-lying systems and challenges therein.

28
6. NATECH Events in
Asia-Pacific

Figure 13: Distribution of Case Studies

6.1 Details of Referred Case Studies

Various cases of NATECH in the Asia-Pacific region have been studied for the
purpose of identifying the nature of failure, gaps and best practices and for
understanding the lessons learnt and recommendations put forth in aftermath of
each case. These case studies have been analysed in Table 1.

29
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
1. Earthquake, • Minor leaks • No major • All indoor storage
Kobe Japan and fire releases despite facilities, especially
(1995) at many the proximity warehouses
hazmat of industrial are extremely
facilities facilities to the vulnerable to
• Damage epicenter and ground shaking, so
to gasoline severe ground develop a broad-
stations shaking based widely
leading to • Industries better applicable solution
release of prepared due to • Review
LPG existing codes earthquake design
• Damage and practices criteria for plants,
to storage • Improved tanks, pipelines,
containers foundation containment walls,
• Mixing of construction, equipment, etc.
chemicals in flexible pipes, • Include social,
government concrete block systemic and
laboratory firewalls around organisational
leading to gasoline stations vulnerabilities
fire • Lack of in NATECH
preparation & preparedness and
coordination management
amongst civil
protection
agencies

2. Earthquake, • Damage to • Poor early • Develop and

Tsunami, Aceh, oil, gasoline warning for improve early
Indonesia and jet earthquake and warning system
(2004) fuel tanks tsunami for earthquake &
leading to • Lack of adequate tsunami
spill awareness in the • Improve
• Damage community for knowledge
to cement tsunami risks and enhance
plant leading • Poor mitigation awareness of local
to high practices for community
chances of earthquake and • Improve disaster
chemical tsunami response planning
spill • Put in place
• Damage to business
ship, tugboat continuity plan
and barge
leading to
spill

30
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
3. Heavy rainfall, • Disruption • Prompt action • Equip landfills
Selangor, of landfills by authorities in with modern and
Malaysia and water shutting down environment-
(2006) treatment affected water friendly systems
plants supply • Undertake EIA
leading before establishing
to severe waste disposal
pollution sites
of water • Human technical
sources blunder plays a
role in contributing
to the NATECH
• Implement
structural and
non-structural
measures of DRR
• Investigate
landfills exposure
to climatic hazards

4. Lightning, • Fire and • Situation was • Pre-disaster

Johor Port, explosion at easily controlled agreement
Pasir Gudang, petroleum with help of between local
Malaysia (20 tank government authorities and
06) • Spread and private fire- industry players
of fire to fighters helped make
nearby tanks • Local authorities disaster response
and installed didn’t have more efficient
pipelines required during crisis
equipment ready • Rumours based
• Only single route on unconfirmed
for evacuation information could
was available be disseminated
that became quickly through
congested due to social media and
mass evacuation may create panic
• Because • Relevant
NATECH is a authorities may
new emerging develop a proper
risk, information monitoring/
regarding checking system
NATECH risks for industries
have hardly been to manage
shared outside of supplies for
industrial players, better emergency
hence, others response.
stakeholders
are unaware
of the lessons
and knowledge
gained through
these incidents

31
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
5. Earthquake, • Fire broke • Vulnerability of • Importance
Niigata, Japan out at crisis response of BCP and
(2007) nuclear system such supply chain
power plant fire-fighting management
• A very small system at the • Need for
amount of nuclear plant, diversifying
radioactive lack of required suppliers
material equipment, etc. or multiple
flowed into was highlighted purchasing is
the sea • With support highlighted
of employees • Importance of
and business cooperation of
partners in business partners
clean up and was highlighted
restoration, the • The importance of
affected factories proper information
were fully sharing within
restored in just the crisis
two weeks management
• There was
a delay in
providing correct
information to
local residents

6. Earthquake, • Collapse of • Failure of safety • Seismic designs

Chengdu, phosphate measures of buildings and
China (2008) mines • Building codes to codes are of
• Spill of withstand lesser prime importance
hazardous seismic intensity and should be
materials were in place regularly updated
from • Safety barriers to address higher
multiple had largely failed seismicity
chemical in the older • Realistic and
industries buildings continuous risk
• Leakage of • Failure of assessments are
sulphuric non-structural recommended
acid and elements like • Buildings with poor
ammonia pipes and reinforcement,
from storage tanks non-reinforced
plants and brick structures,
fertilizers stiff-frame design,
producing heavy topsides
facilities and thin columns
• Fire and were much more
explosion vulnerable to
in sulphur collapse.
plant

32
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
7 Heavy • Excess water • Lack of • Industrial estate level
rainfalls levels in explicit roles & and SMEs should
and tropical waterways, responsibilities develop BCP
storms dams, of stakeholders • Decentralise
causing reservoirs relating water planning and
floods, • Submergence management decision making
Thailand of the • No policy on • As factories
(2011) industrial NATECH in industrial
estates • Only large estates contain
• Washing enterprises have significant amount
out of toxic BCP of hazardous
materials by materials, measures
the flood like for prevention
the waste or and mitigation of
mud which NATECH risk must
severely be discussed in the
contaminated aforementioned
the water BCPs.
during the • Measures to prevent
flood electrocution
and mitigate
deterioration of
water quality must
be discussed at both
local and national
levels.

8. Earthquake • Station • The accident at • Undertake realistic

and blackout in the the LPG storage and continuous risk
Tsunami, Fukushima tank farm might assessments
Honshu Daiichi Nuclear have been • Adhere to and
Island, Power Plant manageable had monitor safety
Tohoku, (1FNPP) the safety valve systems and
Japan leading to not been locked measures at
(2011) reactor core open. (Human installations with
meltdown in error) major accidents
Unit 1 – 3 and • Laws existed potential
contamination focusing on • Ensure that all
of about 800 petrochemical, personnel are aware
km2 of land oil and gas of applicable laws
around power industries along and regulations
plant with earthquake • Reinforce LPG tank
• Damage structural safety braces to increase
to many measures resistance to tank to
hazardous future earthquakes
installations • Minimize human
leading to errors
• Nuclear power plant
release of
or other facilities
hazmat in
with hazardous
air and flood materials
waters

33
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
8. • Damage to must design
LPG storage preparedness
tank farm and response
leading to strategy to natural
BLEVE hazards, including
combination of
hazards.
• Local disaster
management
center should
establish
cooperation
with related
organizations
and effective
communication
means with
public at daily
basis in order
to ensure its
functionality
during the
disaster
• The 1FNPP
accident
demonstrated
that the
conventional
nuclear safety
regulations which
emphasizes on
the protection of
the power plant
from designed
natural hazards
are not sufficient.
The regulatory
framework
must be able to
holistically cover
various

34
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
. types of natural
hazards including
their combinations,
and also to
design response
measures once
the nuclear
disaster happened.
The accident has
also revealed the
importance of
the local disaster
management
center (so called
off-site center)
which has to
be trained and
maintained to be
able to function
during the disaster

• Fire in Dept. • Failure of • Not many staff and

of Chemistry, non-structural faculty members
Tohoku elements like understood the
University high book response manual
• In Dept. of shelves thoroughly
Engineering, • Seismic
Tohoku reinforcement
University, was extremely
some effective to reduce
chemicals the damage of the
splashed and strong earthquake
a few high • Need for further
pressure gas comprehensive
cylinder fell disaster
preparedness
on campus
considering the fact
that universities
keep various types
of dangerous
chemicals and risks
of discharge of gas,
experiment waste
liquid, high pressure
gas, explosives,
radiation, poisonous
substance, etc.

35
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
9. Earthquake • Damage to • Water and • Pre-established,
leading to wastewater wastewater functional
liquefaction, treatment infrastructure relationships with
flooding plant was not well external agencies
and lateral • Uncontrolled designed/ allowed for more
spreading, release of prepared rapid response
Christchurch, untreated to continue than formal
New Zealand sewage functioning communication
(2011) with minimum channels would
disruption due have provided
to earthquakes. • Better
It was already understanding of
weakened by the distribution and
September 2010 use of alternate
earthquake waste disposal
• Post-earthquake, systems
Christchurch was • Management
divided into four and coordination
zones based on of information to
varying stability the public
of land for further • Evaluation and
land use planning planning for the
• Shut-down and use of temporary
containment toilets in an
procedures emergency would
for sites with be appropriate
dangerous • To prevent
chemicals contamination
had not been of drinking water
considered in supplies from
detail prior to the broken sewage
event pipes, drinking
water pipes
and sewage
pipes should
be installed at
a greater depth
from each other.
Drinking water
pipes could
also be laid
aboveground to
allow for faster
repair of broken
pipes

36
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
10. Typhoon • Damage to • Power • Review safety
Haiyan, power barge barge crew protocols in power
Estancia, Iloilo which broke implemented sector against natural
Province, loose and ran emergency hazards
Panay Island, ashore measures post- • Continuously monitor
The Philippines • Oil spill disaster but failed key contaminant
(2013) leading to to contain heavy levels to understand
contamination fuel oil spill temporal trend of the
of fishing • Challenges to pollution
grounds and contain the • Enhance equipment
coastal waters spilt fuel were and infrastructure
compounded for prevention,
by the need to emergency and
manage, collect hazardous waste
and treat this management
mixed and • Incorporate impacts
contaminated of multiple hazards
debris on interdependent
socio-ecological
and technological
systems in disaster
management
planning at local level
• Enhance
occupational
health and safety
procedures
• Mandate minimum
investment for
private companies
for multi-hazard risk
assessment and
strengthen risk and
resilience research
• Promote inter-agency
coordination and
risk communication
program
• Promote use of
renewable energy in
island sites

37
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
• Increase regional
cooperation on
resilience to natural-
technological hazards
• For mega cities,
consideration of
the complexities of
urban systems in
terms of continuity in
space of functions,
networks, flows, etc.,
and varying exposures
and vulnerabilities
should be strengthened
in emergency
planning regardless
of administrative
boundaries
• Reference must
also be made to
International Good
Practice of policies and
guidelines that require
investment projects
to have an emergency
preparedness and
response plan that is
commensurate with
the risks of the facility
• Ensure that the
potentially affected
communities are
informed of significant
potential hazards
and the emergency
preparedness and
response plan

38
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
11. Floods, • Dam failure • Realizing the full • Development
Uttarakhand and destruction • extent of floods, and enforcement
(2013) of seven all the dam gates of guidelines,
hydroelectricity were opened regulations and
projects at once to codes for floods and
• Damage to avoid structural landslides is critical
power house damage to • Environmental
the Dam. This Impact Assessment
sudden release of (EIA) and Disaster
• water was Impact Assessment
done without a (DIA) should be made
concern for the compulsory for kinds
downstream of projects in eco-
people, leading sensitive regions
to large scale • Blasting for
damage. developmental
• If the Dams activities be avoided
were properly as it may destabilize
managed the the weak rocks
• impact of the in mountainous
flood could have regions. A special
been reduced to central programme
a great extent. be undertaken for
construction of new
roads and renovation
of existing roads in a
scientific manner
• Develop Disaster
Risk Management
plans which should
be regularly reviewed
and updated to
ensure a functional
structure and
accountability for all
actions initiated by
the State Government
to enhance the
resilience of the
region
• The community-
based disaster
management
system at the local
level must be given

39
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
utmost importance
and strengthened
through appropriate
training and aware-
ness programmes
• Tourism related
development should
not be allowed along
the river banks
• An effective pilgrim
control and regu-
latory body should
be constituted for
control and manage-
ment of pilgrims/
tourists
• Need of planned
and sustainable
development

12. Hudhud • It doesn’t • Timely early • Need for integrated

Cyclone, mention any warning by IMD DM plan among all
Andhra NATECH • Pre-positioning stakeholders and
Pradesh, India event which of alternate equip response
(2014) happened or communication teams
was prevented! system, response • Develop multi-hazard
forces and relief resistant housing
material and infrastructure
• Mandatory including power,
evacuation communication
• Establish cyclone
resistant agriculture
• Need of disaster
insurance for infra-
structure and assets
• Develop cyclone
building codes and
cyclone zonation
• Rigorous implemen-
tation of coastal zone
management plan
should be ensured
• Eco-based resilience
mechanism
like mangrove
forest protection,
conservation and
plantations should
be a priority area for
mitigation

40
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
13. Heavy rainfall • Flooding of coal • Area was • Retrofit coal plants
leading to mines leading suffering from • Increase dependence
floods, Quang to release of deforestation on renewable energy
Nihn province toxic waste and occasional • Take measures
and Ha Long water landslides against deforestation
Bay area, • Dam and dyke • Legislation on
Vietnam failure environment
(2015) • Damage to coal protection
port facilities • Monitor and manage
waste water
• Role of local
organisations and
communities

14. Lightning, • Fire at oil • NATECH was • Importance of

Pulau Busing storage tank prevented by specialised response
Island, prompt response and equipment
Singapore by specialised • Social media
(2018) forces and monitoring proved
equipment useful in detecting
• Establishing the disaster and
two levels of analyzing public
respondents opinion, level of
– providing awareness and
trainings preparedness of
for general citizens
respondents
and setting up
a specialized
team - is a
good practice
in securing
immediate
and adequate
response
15. Anak Krakatau • It doesn’t • Limited early • Develop and maintain
Volcanic mention any warning early warning system
Eruption, NATECH system/ lack of • Develop technology
Landslide, event which technology to to detect tsunami due
Tsunami, happened or detect tsunami to volcanic eruption
Banten and was prevented!! due to volcanic • Improve knowledge
Lampung eruption and awareness of
Provinces, • Inadequate local community
Indonesia shelters & poor • Build appropriate
(2018) community number of shelters
preparedness • Improve disaster
• Poor disaster response planning
planning & • Conduct
mitigation comprehensive
system financial impact
analysis of disaster

41
 S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
• Lack of financial • Provide sufficient
impact analysis funding for
on disaster disaster
• Lack of allocated mitigation and
funds for disaster planning
planning

16. Earthquake, • It doesn’t • The tsunami • Explore limitations

Tsunami and mention any early warning of tsunami early
Liquefaction NATECH system created warning system
Phenomenon, event which a false sense of technology
Central happened or security • Self-evacuation is
Sulawesi, was prevented! the key to safety
Indonesia • Ensure
(2018) unimpeded
evacuation routes
from beachfronts
• Use experience
and local
knowledge
• Contextualise
preparedness
education to
characteristics of
local threats

17. Typhoon, • Fire and • Social media was • Train

Heavy rains, explosion at used to allocate communities on
Floods and aluminium victims and different types of
Landslides, factory people in need disasters as well
West Japan and re-connect as on complex
(2018) family members disasters
• The government • Need for
started several improved
loan schemes communication
with special on preparedness
interest rates for and safety
businesses to • Properly
support recovery communicate
of operations the severity of
• Volunteers possible risks
undertook a and mitigation
number of measures to be
activities to taken to those
rebuild and who live in high
restore the risk areas
city after the
explosion

42
S. Failure/Gaps/ Lesson Learnt/
Disaster Impact
No Good Practices Recommendations
18. Typhoon/ • No • Better prepared • Identify
extreme wind documented community transportation
events, Hong impact • Existing and risk
Kong (2019) institutional communication
mechanism for channels that
response will work during
• The Philippines disasters
reported over 100 • Lay down inter-
deaths; while in department SOPs
Hong Kong, there • Fund
were no fatalities preparedness
and mitigation
measures
• Identify
occupational risks
• Mobilise social
capital and
volunteers
• Establish
evaluation
mechanism
• Conceptualise
health-emergency
and disaster risk
management

19. Muri, • Breach of - • Study soil strata

Jharkhand, retaining wall and probability
India (2019) of bauxite of liquefaction
residues at each stage of
storage dumping/ storage
pond leading of BRs
to spillage • Develop guidelines
of bauxite for utilization of
residues (BRs) BRs for various
conventional and
new applications
• Policies related
to storage/
management/
transportation/
utilization should
be brainstormed,
created and
implemented
• Use online
instruments for
studying the
micro-motions
in embankments
and retention
walls

43
6.2 Case study Analysis

A total of 19 cases were collected representing countries in the Asia Pacific region.
Out of 19 cases 14 cases reported a NATECH event while other 5 cases reported a
possibility of a NATECH event. From the reported cases flooding and heavy rainfall
is the most potential natural hazard to trigger a NATECH event. This is followed by
earthquake and Typhoon/cyclone as the second most potential trigger. Along with
these cases of slow onset hazards like weathering has been reported as a trigger
for NATECH event (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Type of Natural Hazards Triggering

Technological Disasters

Analysing the various trigger points for the reported case studies, physical
damage to plant and equipment is the most common cause for triggering a
NATECH event. From the other case studies, apparently it is evident that physical

44
damage is the major causal factor leading to a NATECH event (Figure 15). Need
for safety of storage and warehouse facilities comes out strongly in the case
studies. A possible contributing factor which has not been reported in the case
studies is human error and lack of training and expertise to contain a crisis
situation.

Based on the cases studies, a set of recommendations (Figure 16) were proposed
by the experts which is customized to the regional and national context in Asia
Pacific region. Most of experts recommend preparation on business continuity
plans, occupation safety guidelines and standard operation procedures are the
most crucial for NATECH risk management. This is followed by emphasis on
research, development of risk assessment tools customized to the local context.
The experts also stress on community participation in NATECH decision making
process, strengthen coordination among various stakeholders and focus on
resilience infrastructure. Other recommendations include need for early warning
mechanism, awareness and training as important activities for NATECH risk
management.

Figure 15: Type of Triggered Technological Failure

45
Figure 16: Recommendations for NATECH risk management

6.3 Gaps
Based on the case studies and secondary data including various research papers,
reports, case studies and databases from across the globe on the NATECH
management, the following gaps have been identified through different phases of
disaster management cycle.

1. To holistically understand the inter-linkages of natural and technological

hazards, definition and scope of NATECH may be expanded to include the
cases where technological hazards have triggered disasters. Currently studies
on NATECH are focusing only on one aspect of this linkage that is natural
hazards triggering technological disasters. Some of the cases to highlight the
significance of studying the other aspect of the linkage include the Chasnalla
(Jharkhand, India) mine disaster (1975) killing 375 persons due to flooding in the
mine, the 2009 oil depot’s fire explosion triggering an earthquake of 2.3 Richter
in Jaipur, India.

2. Further, there is a need to better define what a technological disaster

constitutes. Currently most of the research papers deal with release of chemicals

46
 or hazardous material as technological disasters. As per UNDRR, technological
hazards ‘originate from technological or industrial conditions, dangerous
procedures, infrastructure failures or specific human activities. Examples include
industrial pollution, nuclear radiation, toxic wastes, dam failures, transport
accidents, factory explosions, fires and chemical spills. Technological hazards
also may arise directly as a result of the impacts of a natural hazard event.’ By
better defining the technological hazards, one would be better able to gauze all
aspects of NATECH which currently mainly focuses on fixed installations like
chemical industries.

3. Risk perception and tolerance of the society shapes our decisions on protection
against and management of certain risks. It is pertinent to note here that only
after Fukushima Daiichi disaster of 2011 public in general and stakeholders in
particular started noticing possible consequences of nuclear and radiological
disasters as NATECH. Learning from this event, it is necessary to work on
NATECH risk perception and tolerance of different stakeholders even for the
biological hazards which have not yet attracted the required attention from the
stakeholders and operators.

4. Many papers advocate plant/ factory specific assessment and audits as a tool
for NATECH risk prevention and mitigation measures. Though it is a step in
right direction but at ground level, these measures are often not implemented
effectively because of either inadequate risk perception or due to lack of financial,
human and technical resources. The latter issue is often faced by small and
medium enterprises with limited resources. Thus, suitable mechanism for
capacity development should be explored so as to ensure better management
of NATECH risk across different sectors

5. Case of Singapore Lighting Incident of 2018 underscores the importance of

having specialised response for NATECH management. A huge fire took over
on oil storage tank on Pulau Busing island as a result of a lightning. However,
due to existing response mechanism (including Singapore Civil Defence Force
(SCDF), the Hazmat Incident Team (HIT), Hazmat Emergency Assessment and
Response Team (HEART), the Hazmat Control Vehicle(HCV) and Company
Emergency Response Team (CERT)), NATECH was prevented and no domino
effects were reported. Thus, as part of NATECH management, specialized and
well-equipped teams should be put in place for containing and responding to
NATECH events

6. Proper containment and disposal of hazardous materials in aftermath of

NATECH in installations dealing with hazmat is of prime importance to limit the
adverse impacts of the disaster. For this, trained, specialized and well-equipped
teams need to be put in place. Besides, the nearby community, all stakeholders
should be duly made aware about possible cascading events along with actions
to be taken. This can be taken care of if capacity development is made an integral
part of NATECH management.

47
7. Psycho-social support is very crucial in aftermath of any major disaster; the
same is the case for NATECH as the adverse impacts are further aggravated
due to the triggered technological disaster. Further, in case the disaster involves
hazmat release and contamination having long term health and environmental
impacts, the need for psychological first aid and care is all the more needed.
Previous studies suggest that the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) of natural hazard-induced disasters is often lower than the rates of
human-made or technological disasters, and that the prevalence of PTSD
following technological disasters ranged from 15 to 75 percent (Neria et al, 2008).
In the aftermath of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami which
had triggered Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, the affected population including the
plant workers exhibited high levels of post trauma stress disorder. In a study
examining the distress in survivors of the GEJE disaster, they found that 406
deaths in Minamisona City, in Fukushima Prefecture, were officially attributed to
disaster related distress (Hori et al, 2014). Hence, psychological support should
be made an integral part of NATECH risk management.

8. The Sendai Framework emphasizes that risk is everyone’s business. “While

the enabling, guiding and coordinating role of national and federal State
Governments remain essential, it is necessary to empower local authorities
and local communities to reduce disaster risk, including through resources,
incentives and decision-making responsibilities, as appropriate. The same
holds true for NATECH risk management. Thus, management of NATECH risk
of a specific infrastructure/ installation should not be done in isolation from
its surrounding and should consider all possible interactions of the same with
the surrounding community, other installations, critical infrastructure, etc. for
identifying potential cascading events. It is of paramount importance to identify
and map the stakeholders and lay down engagement mechanism and
inclusive action plan for NATECH risk management.

9. Trans-boundary cooperation is crucial in the prevention of all hazards and

disasters as these do not stop at borders. The Sendai Framework recognizes
that it is important that states consider the potential impacts of man-made/
technological hazards on other States – whether neighbouring or riparian – in
particular as the effects of accidental water pollution can be far-reaching. Thus,
such a cooperation is also crucial while planning, developing and institutionalizing
NATECH risk management mechanism.

10. GAR 2019 identifies that natural hazard information is often absent in industrial
accident databases; vice versa, information on NATECH events is often missing
in disaster loss databases.

11. Due to climate change, one can expect non-linear changes in the frequency
and intensity of natural hazards and such effects should be considered while
planning NATECH management. GAR 2019 calls for urgent action to deal with

48
 simultaneous systemic change around land, ecosystems, energy, industrial
and urban systems, and the social and economic transformations that these
infer.

12. In European Union, gaps in NATECH risk reduction were recognised and are
mostly due to budget constraints and a lack of adequate resources which
lead to the prioritisation of tasks deemed more important, a lack of training
and insufficient knowledge of the dynamics of NATECH accidents. This has
resulted in a lack of specific NATECH risk-assessment methodologies and
tools.

13. GAR 2019 flags that existing disaster risk reduction frameworks have not fully
addressed the issue of technological hazards in general, and NATECH hazards
in particular, although they usually highlight it as an example of a cascading
multi-hazard risk. The Tohoku disaster showed that even countries with high
levels of disaster preparedness are at risk of major NATECH accidents.

49
7. Proposed Framework
for NATECH Risk
Management

NATECH risk provides a practical demonstration of the increasingly interconnected

and cascading nature of risk – disaster risk cannot be managed unless risk in its
totality is addressed. The era of hazard-by-hazard risk reduction is over; present
and future approaches to managing risk require an understanding of the systemic
nature of risk (GAR 2019). Hazards interact with each other in increasingly complex
ways; making NATECH risk a multi-hazard risk cutting across different fields and
stakeholder communities that traditionally have not interacted much with each
other. For managing and governing such a cascading nature of NATECH risk, a
paradigm shift is required that takes into account diverse and interdisciplinary
dimensions of the risk and challenges associated therein. It calls for substantial
improvements in our understanding of anthropogenic systems in nature to identify
precursor signals and correlations to better prepare, anticipate and adapt.

The proposed NATECH framework is envisioned at three levels namely regional,

national and local level. At the regional level, developing regional NATECH risk
management policies and development of standards is essential. In addition,

Figure 17: Proposed Framework for NATECH Risk

Management

50
development of response capacities for transboundary response and agreement
among various nations in the Asia Pacific region is important.

At the national level, the regional policies can be customized leading to development
of national NATECH policies and Acts. The available NATECH risk assessment tools
can be contextualized to the national and sub national conditions. The knowledge
generated through research and documentation of past NATECH cases needs to
be transform into local actions. At the local level, the focus should on implementing
risk assessment, creating awareness among various stakeholders and raising
specialized response teams to handle NATECH cases. Various NATECH assessment
tools as mentioned in Annex 2 can be used for the customization at the national
and local level. The existing Natech RateME Framework for Performance Rating
System of Colombia focuses on four key aspects of infrastructure, organization and
management, external environment and risk governance & risk communication.
This can be customized for national and subnational conditions and integrated at
local level for holistic risk assessment and effective NATECH risk management.

Figure 18: Key Aspects of Capacity Development for

NATECH Risk Management

51
As a way forward for NATECH risk management the following points may be
considered;

• Studying the long term social and health effects of a NATECH event.
• Integration of NATECH risk management policies and risk assessment
methodologies with land use policies & real time risk analysis
• Integration of climate change adaptation and slow onset hazards implication for
NATECH risk management and policy making.
• Strengthening of early warning systems, hazard mitigation, for building resilience
in critical infrastructure
• Undertaking domino effects assessment of possible hazards, event tree analysis
for all-inclusive understanding of NATECH events.
• Understanding liability of plant operator in case of NATECH management
• Critical aspects for capacity building for NATECH management

52
References

1. “Addendum Number 2 to the OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident

Prevention, Preparedness and Response (2nd Ed.) to Address Natural Hazards
Triggering Technological Accidents (Natechs).” OECD Environment Directorate,
2015.
2. Alessio Misuri, G. L. (2020). Assessment of safety barrier performance in
Natech scenarios. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Retrieved from
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832019306179
3. “Analysis of Natech (Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disasters)
Disaster Management.” Italy, 2004.
4. “ASEAN Risk Monitor and Disaster Management Review (ARMOR).” AHA
Centre, (2018).
5. “Chemical Releases Caused by Natural Hazard Events and Disasters-
Information for Public Health Authorities.” WHO, 2018.
6. Cruz, Ana Maria. (2005)“Natech Disasters: A Review of Practices, Lessons
Learned and Future Research Needs”; 5th Annual IIASA-DPRI Forum, 2005.
7. Cruz, Ana Maria, Laura J Steinberg, AnaLisa Vetere Arellano, Jean-Pierre
Nordvik, and Francesco Pisano (2004) “State of the Art in Natech Risk
Management.” Italy: Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
8. Cruz, Ana Maria, and Maria Camila Suarez-Paba. “Advances in Natech
Research: An Overview.” Elsevier, 2019
9. Dash, Ashish & Bhattacharjee, Ram Madhab & Paul, Partha. (2016).
Lessons Learnt from Indian Inundation Disasters: An Analysis of Case
Studies. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. 20. 10.1016/j.
ijdrr.2016.10.013.
10. eNatech Database. (n.d.). Retrieved from European Commission Joint
Research Centre: https://enatech.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
11. Fakhru’l-Razi Ahmadun, M. M. (2020). Consequences of the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami in Malaysia. Safety Science. Retrieved from https://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753517317277
12. Gillian R. Foulger, M. P. (2018). Global review of human-induced earthquakes.
Earth-Science Reviews, 178, 438-514. Retrieved from https://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001282521730003X
13. Girdhar, D. M. (2011). Jaipur Fire and Its Environmental Effects. 12th Esri India
User Conference. esri India.
14. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction(2019). United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), Geneva, Switzerland.
15. Hangnan Yu, W.-K. L. (2020). Risk hotspot of chemical accidents based on
spatial analysis in Ulsan, South Korea. Safety Science. Retrieved from https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753519321551

53
16. Hori, Arinobu & Tsumuraya, Kunihiro & Kanamori, Ryo & Maeda, Masaharu
& Yabe, Hirooki & Niwa, Shin-Ichi. (2014). [Report from Minamisoma City:
diversity and complexity of psychological distress in local residents after a
nuclear power plant accident]. Seishin shinkeigaku zasshi = Psychiatria et
neurologia Japonica. 116. 212-8.
17. Implementation Guide for Man-made and Technological Hazards. (n.d.). Words
into Action Guidelines. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
Retrieved from https://www.unisdr.org/files/54012_manmadetechhazards.
pdf
18. Information and Knowledge Management for Disaster Risk Reduction
(IKM4DRR) Framework and Scorecard. (2013). United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction.
19. Krausmann, Elisabeth, V Cozzani, and E Renni.(2011) “Industrial Accidents
Triggered by Natural Hazards: An Emerging Risk Issue,” 2011. https://doi.
org/10.5194/nhess-11-921-2011.
20. Kazuhiko Sano, Y. K. (2020). Risk assessment and risk reduction of an
acrylonitriile production plant. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0950423019304012
21. Lei Hou, X. W. (2020). Pattern identification and risk prediction of domino
effect based on data mining methods for accidents occured in the tank
farm. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Retrieved from https://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832019302340
22. Neria Y, Nandi A, Galea S. Post-traumatic stress disorder following disasters:
a systematic review. Psychol Med. 2008;38(4):467-480. doi:10.1017/
S0033291707001353
23. OECD Chemical Accidents Programme. (2011). OECD. Retrieved from https://
www.oecd.org/env/ehs/chemical-accidents/49967354.pdf
24. Oscar J. RamírezOlivar, S. Z.-S.-P. (2020). The effects of extreme winds
on atmospheric storage tanks. Reliability Engineering & System Safety.
Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S0951832018309141
25. “Proceedings of the 8th Joint International Symposium on Disaster Risk
Management- Education for Disaster Prevention, Reconstruction from Kobe
Earthquake Disaster, and Adaptation Plan under Climate Change.” The Science
Council of Japan, 2014.
26. Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on
indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction. United
Nations General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.preventionweb.net/
files/50683_oiewgreportenglish.pdf
27. Retrieved from The Human-Induced Earthquake Database (HiQuake): http://
inducedearthquakes.org/
28. Rongshi Qin, N. K. (2020). An overview of the impact of Hurricane Harvey on
chemical and process facilities in Texas. International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction, 45. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S2212420919313949

54
29. Showalter, P.S., Myers, M.F., (1994) “Natural disasters in the United States as
release agents of oil, chemicals, or radiological materials between 1980–
1989: analysis and recommendations”, Risk Anal. 14 (2), 169–182. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1539-6924. 1994.tb00042.x.
30. Suarez-Paba, Maria Camila, Ana Maria Cruz, and Felipe Munoz-Giraldo.
(2018)“Stakeholder Input for a Common, Global, Comprehensive Risk
Management Framework for Industrial Parks to Manage Risks from Natural
Hazards.” DPRI Annuals. DPRI.
31. Suarez-Paba, Maria Camila, Mathis Perreur, Felipe Munoz-Giraldo, and Ana
Maria Cruz. (2019)“Systematic Literature Review and Qualitative Meta-
Analysis of Natech Research in the Past Four Decades.” Elsevier.
32. Sunhwa Park, S. X.-H. (2020). Incorporating inherent safety during the
conceptual process design stage: A literature review. Journal of Loss Prevention
in the Process Industries, 63. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S095042301930840X
33. Tomoaki Nishino, Y. T. (2020). Numerical analysis of tsunami-triggered oil
spill fires from petrochemical industrial complexes in Osaka Bay, Japan,
for thermal radiation hazard assessment. International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction, 42. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S2212420919307435
34. Tsujiuchi, T., Yamaguchi, M., Masuda, K., Tsuchida, M., Inomata, T., Kumano, H.,
… Mollica, R. F. (2016). High Prevalence of Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms
in Relation to Social Factors in Affected Population One Year after the
Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. PloS one, 11(3), e0151807. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0151807
35. United Nations Environment Programme. (2019). Global Chemicals Outlook
II-From Legacies to Innovative Solutions: Implementing the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development-Synthesis Report.
36. Zhichao He, W. W. (2019). Synergic effects in the assessment of multi-hazard
coupling disasters: Fires, explosions, and toxicant leaks. Journal of Hazardous
Materials.
37. UNDRR (2017) Words into Action guidelines: National disaster risk assessment
38. UNDRR and ISC (2020) Hazard Definition and Classification Review: Technical
Report
39. WHO (2018) Chemical releases caused by natural hazard events and disasters
– information for public health authorities. Geneva: World Health Organization

55
Annexure
Annex 1: Summary of Existing Definition/ Description
of NATECH

S. No Literature Details Definition/ Description

1 Journal Paper Advances in NATECH Natural hazard triggered
research: An overview technological accidents
involving the release of
hazardous materials are
known as NATECHs

2 NEIDIES The Black-Out of 28 Natural Hazard Triggering

Workshop September 2003 (Italy), Technological Disasters
Proceedings, JRC Marta Di Gennaro

3 Cascading events and Earthquake-triggered

hazardous materials hazardous materials
releases during the releases, hazmat releases,
Kocaeli Earthquake in hazmat problems,
Turkey, Ana Maria Cruz earthquake triggered
cascading event

4 Observation on the No specific definition or

Recent Earthquake description used
Damage in Japan
Tetsushi kurita

5 NATECHs in the United Natural hazard-triggered

States: Experience, technological disasters
Safeguards, and Gaps,
Laura J. Steinberg

6 Information System Overlapping of natural risk

for the Mitigation on industrial areas
and Reduction of the
Consequences of
Accidental Events,
Loretta Floridi

7 NATECH disaster risk • Natural hazard-

management on the triggering factors
territory of Bulgaria, • Triggered technological
Dimitar Donkov disasters
• Domino effects”
triggered by the natural
hazard

56
S. No Literature Details Definition/ Description
8 NATECH disasters risk • Industrial accident
management in France, triggered by a natural
Agnes Vallee event
• Technological disaster
triggered by any type of
natural-hazard induced
disaster

9 NATECH Disaster Risk No specific definition or

Management in Bavaria, description used
Bernd Zaayenga

10 NATECH Risk No specific definition.

Management in Portugal, Hazards triggering
Catarina Venâncio, industrial accidents,
Patrícia Pires, Carlos pipeline collapse, dam
Mendes breaks, fire in chemical
plants or storage, collapse

11 Lessons Learnt from Technical accidents

the Baia Mare Cyanide triggered by natural events
Spill (January 30, 2000,
North-Western Romania)
Septimius Mara

12 Swedish NATECH No specific definition.

Activities Mattias train derailment, leakage
Strömgren

13 Journal Paper Industrial accidents Chemical accidents

triggered by natural triggered by natural events
hazards: an emerging
risk issue
E. Krausmann, V.
Cozzani, E. Salzano, and
E. Renni

14 Study NATECH Disasters: A Technological disasters

Review of Practices, triggered by a natural-
Lessons Learned and hazard induced disaster,
Future Research Needs, like toxic air releases, spill
Ana Maria Cruz of hazardous materials,
fires or explosions, release
from containment vessels,
damage to lifeline systems
that are needed to contain
the releases

57
 S. No Literature Details Definition/ Description
15 Proceeding Joint Natural and Natural hazard–triggered
Technological Disasters: technological hazards or
An Emerging Risk Issue, disasters
Ana Maria Cruz

16 Report State of the Art Natural Hazard Triggering

in NATECH Risk a Technological Disaster
Management, JRC

17 DPRI Annuals Stakeholder Input for Natural hazard triggered

a Common, Global, technological accidents
Comprehensive Industrial installations,
Risk Management concurrent damage to
Framework for Industrial lifeline systems
Parks to Manage Risks
from Natural Hazards

18 Journal Paper Systematic literature Industrial accidents

review and qualitative caused by natural hazards
meta-analysis of and involving hazardous
NATECH research in materials (hazmat) release
the past four decades,
Suarez-Paba Maria
Camilaa, Perreur
Mathisb, Munoz Felipec,
Cruz Ana Mariad

58
Annex 2: List of Key Reference Materials

A. NATECH Guidelines and Legislations

1. OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and

Response (2015, 2nd Ed.) to Address Natural Hazards Triggering Technological
Accidents (Natechs) “Addendum Number 2 to the.” OECD Environment
Directorate, 2015
2. Words into Action guidelines: National disaster risk assessment, UNDRR,
2017.
3. Chemical releases caused by natural hazard events and disasters – information
for public health authorities. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO); 2018.
4. Global Assessment Report 2019 (GAR 19)
5. ASEAN risk monitor and disaster management review (ARMOR), The AHA
center, ASEAN, 2019

B. NATECH Risk Assessment Tools

1. RAPID-N: Rapid NATECH risk assessment and mapping framework

2. Natech-RateME - Comprehensive Natech Performance Rating System
3. ARIPAR-GIS
4. RISKCURVES
5. PANR

59
Annex 3: Case study Template
Annex 3: Case study Template

Name of the disaster

Location: Natural hazard:

Description:

Domino effects:

Consequences

Fatalities/injuries: Structural damage:

Financial Loss: Hazmat Release (amount and type):

Preparedness measures:

Response:

Lessons learned:

Map:

1. General Information:

2. Incident:

3. Impact:

● Impact on human life:

● Economic impact:
● Environmental and linked health and other impacts:

4. Level of preparedness, measures taken:

● Level of preparedness:
● Response measures:

5. Lessons learnt and recommendations:

6. Sources:

47

60