·,

3&.epublit of tbe ~bilippinet

~upreme C!Court
;!llllanila

FIRST DIVISION

QUIRINO M. UIBUNAO, I
G.R. Nos. 214336-37
l Petitioner,
Present:

CAGUIOA, J., Acting Chairperson,

LAZARO-JAVIER,
- v rsus - LOPEZ, M.,
LOPEZ, J., and
DIMAAMPAO,* JJ:

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF T : E PIDLIPPINES,
Respondent. _F_EB_.. 5--=2=022=---t-~
;;__;,cl

x------------

DECISION

LOPEZ, J., J.:

Before the Court is a Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari 1

under Rule 45 oif the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated January
16, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated September 12, 2014 of the
!

Sandiganbayan, first Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case Nos.

27803 and 27805, convicting petitioner Quirino M. Libunao of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrup~ Practices Act.

Designated ad~itional member in lieu of Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo per Raffle dated
November 29, 2021. I
1
Rollo, pp. 3-52,
2 Penned by Ch,µrperson/ Associate Justice Efren N. De La Cruz with Associate Justices Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada and Rafael R. Lagos, concurring; id at 57- 122
3 Id. at 123-127.[
I
i
' '

Decision 2 GR. Nos. 214336-37

The Antecedents

At the heart of the present controversy is the Countrywide

Development Fund (CDF) allocated to accused Constantino H. Navarro, Jr.,
then Surigao Del Norte First District representative. By virtue of Assignment
Order No. 00-002 dated January 17, 2000, the Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted a special review of the utilization of Navarro's CDF for the years
1997 to 1998. The audit team discovered that Pl3,832,569.00 of said CDF
was used to purchase, on different occasions, assorted medicines, shabu
testing kits, nebulizing machines, sporting materials, rice paddy plows
(araro), blackboard erasers, chalks, and notebooks from various suppliers.
But instead of conducting a public bidding, the purchase was done through
direct contracting, in violation of Section 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
3024 resulting in an overpricing of the items purchased amounting to
f'2,863,689.36 or equivalent to 13.6% to 506% of the prevailing market
prices. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Disallowance dated
January 23, 2001. 5

After due proceedings and finding probable cause, the Office of the
Ombudsman criminally charged the following persons before the
Sandiganbayan for their involvement in the said illegal purchases:

(1) Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro);

(2) Quirino M. Libunao (Libunao ), Carlos T. Derecho

(Derecho), and Romeo S. Jardenico (Jardenico), all as
Regional Directors of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, the
implementing agency at the time of the transactions;

(3) Benito R. Catindig (Catindig), as Assistant Secretary for

Support Services, and Regional Operations, DILG-
Quezon City;

(4) Iluminada C. Tuble (Tuble), President of San Marino

Laboratories Corporation (San Marino);

(5) Marlene B. Corpus (Corpus), Owner-Proprietor of Mt.

Bethel Pharmaceutical (Mt. Bethel);

(6) Edwin L. Dizon (Dizon), as owner-proprietor of E.G.

Trading;

4 E.O. No. 302, Providing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for the Procurement of
Goods/Supplies by the National Government, February J9, 1996.
5
Rollo, pp. 70-71; 87.
.'

Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

(7) Gerardo A. Rosario (Rosario), owner-proprietor of

Revelstone Sales International (Revelstone); and

(8) Mario Tokong (Tokong), representative of Revelstone

Sales International. 6

In several Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27796-27805,

the accused public officers were charged for acting in evident bad faith
and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits to the accused
suppliers by entering into contracts without the benefit of public bidding.
The accusatory portions of the Amended/Re-Amended Informations filed
against Libunao and said public officers, read:

Criminal Case No. 27803

That in the month of October 1998, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H.
NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and BENITO R
CATINDIG, both high ranking public officials, being then the
Congressman of the 1st District of Surigao de! Norte, the Regional
Director of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-
Caraga Region, and Assistant Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all high ranking public
officials, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and
taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating
with each other and with accused ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, President
of San Marino Laboratories Corporation, a private enterprise, and
mutually helping one another, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality (or at the very least, through gross inexcusable negligence), did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted
benefits, advantage and preference to San Marino Laboratories
Corporation and cause undue injury to the Government, by entering into
a contract, without conducting the required public bidding, with said San
Marino Laboratories, for the purchase of forty five (45) boxes of
assorted medicine in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS
(1"2,000,000.00), which price was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government considering that similar medicines available in the
market, as canvassed by the Commission on Audit (COA), could have
been purchased at only SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO & 25/100 PESOS (1"762,262.25),
inclusive of l 0% allowance, thereby resulting to an overprice in the total
amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY & 75/100 PESOS
(l"l,237,740.75), to the damage and prejudice of the goverruuent in the
aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

xxxx.

6
Id. at 59-70.
Id. at 64-65.
 Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

Criminal Case No. 27805

That during the period from October 16, 1998 to December 10,
1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
CONSTANTINO H. NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and
BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public officials, being then
the Congressman of the 1'' District of Surigao del Norte, the Regional
Director of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-
Caraga Region, and Assistant Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all high ranking public
officials, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and
taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating
with each other and with accused GERARDO A. ROSARIO and
MARIO TOKONG, proprietor and representative, respectively, of
Revelstone Sales International, a private enterprise, and mutually
helping one another, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at
the very least, through gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage
and preference to Revelstone Sales International and cause undue injury
to the Government, by entering into a contract, without conducting the
required public bidding, with said Revelstone Sales International, for the
purchase of one thousand two hundred ( I ,200) sets of araro tools in the
amount of NINE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P900,000.00), which
price was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government
considering that similar araro tools available in the market, as canvassed
by the Commission on Audit (COA), could have been purchased at only
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P792,000.00), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby resulting to an
overprice of in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P!0S,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

Upon arraignment, Libunao pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

Hence, trial on the merits ensued. To establish its case, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of Rosalina G. Salvador, an auditor of the COA,
Ruby D. Pascual, a pharmacist editor, Manuel M. Parian, Deputy Regional
Chief of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, and Manuel Dy
Sio, a businessman engaged in selling hardware and farm construction
supplies. 9

In Criminal Case No. 27803, the prosecution established that Navarro

requisitioned for the purchase of 45 boxes of assorted medicines in the
amount of 1'2,000,000.00 from San Marino. Libunao approved the
transactions, certified that the expense was necessary, lawful, and incurred
· under his direct supervision; he then signed checks payable to San Marino.
This was supported by documentary exhibits such as Requisition and Issue

Id. at 66.
9
Id. at 70-77.
Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

Vouchers (R.IVs), Purchase Orders (POs), Disbursement Vouchers (DVs),

certificates, and checks. 10

In Criminal Case No. 27805, it was established that Navarro

requisitioned for 1,200 sets of araro tools in the amount of r'900,000.00
from Revelstone. Again, Libunao approved the transactions, certified that
the expense was necessary, lawful, and incurred under his direct supervision,
and he signed the checks payable to Revelstone. These were also supported
by documentary exhibits such as RIV s, POs, DVs, certificates, and checks. 11

In his defense, Libunao testified that he assumed his position as

Regional Director of DILG-Caraga based in Butuan City on October 17,
1998. According to him, he signed the documents in relation to the
transactions relying on his subordinates who assured him that the same were
in order. Since his position as regional director had many functions, he had
to rely on these financial people who prepared the documents he signed. 12

On January 16, 2014, the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution

successfully proved with moral certainty that public officers, Libunao and
Derecho gave unwarranted benefits to Revelstone, San Marino, Mt. Bethel,
and E.G. Trading when they resorted to direct contracting, instead of public
bidding. As for the accused suppliers Rosario, Tuble, Corpus, and Dizon,
however, it was held that the prosecution failed to establish the same
quantum of proof that they were patently propelled by criminal designs
when they allowed their companies to receive undue benefits. Thus, with
respect to Libunao in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805, the
Sandiganbayan disposed as follows:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders

judgment as follows:

xxxx

7. In Criminal Case No. 27803, accused QUIRINO M.

LIBUNAO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, aud pursuant to Section 9 thereof, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
years aud one (1) month as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum,
with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Accused ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, is hereby ACQUITTED for

failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

10 Id. at 96-97.
11 Id. at 99-100.
12
Id. at 78.
 Decision 6 GR. Nos. 214336-37

9. In Criminal Case No. 27805, accused QUIRINO M.

LIBUNAO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and pursuant to Section 9 thereof, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) month as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum,
with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Accused GERARDO A. ROSARIO, is hereby ACQUITTED for

failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

Except for accused Tuble who is hereby ordered to pay the DILG-
CARAGA the amount of Pl,071,721.80, no civil liability may be assessed
against accused Rosario, Corpus and Dizon considering that the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise does not exist.

Let the hold departure order against accused Rosario, Tuble,

Corpus and Dizon by reason of this case be lifted and set aside, and their
bonds released, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedure.

SO ORDERED. 13

Libunao moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's

January 16, 2014 Decision. 14 On September 12, 2014, however, said court
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and undated Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. 15

Unfazed, Libunao filed the present petition on October 9, 2014

essentially reiterating the following arguments:

I.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN VIOLATED PETITIONER'S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM.

A. PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME

DIFFERENT FROM THOSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATIONS, AMENDED INFORMATIONS, AND
RE-AMENDED INFORMATIONS.

B. THE THEORY THAT OFFENSE WHEREIN WHICH

PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED INCLUDES OR IS
NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

13 Id. at 120-121.
14 Jd. at 57- 122.
15
Id. at 123-127.
 Decision 7 GR. Nos. 214336-37

C. ALLOWING THE PETITIONER TO BE CONVICTED OF

A CRIME DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HE IS CHARGED
WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE AS STATED IN
SECTION 13, RlJ"LE 110 OF THE RULES OF COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.

IL

THERE COULD BE NO VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(g) OF R.A. NO.

3019 AS THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF THE ELEMENTS THEREOF.

A PETITIONER DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY CONTRACT

WITH THE PRIVATE SUPPLIERS IN THE PURCHASE
AND DELIVERY OF THE GOODS.

B. THERE IS NO CONSPIRACY.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT SECTION 3(e) OF R.A. NO. 3019

WAS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, THE ELEMENTS
THEREOF WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 16

Libunao argues that the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional

right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him by convicting him under Section 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 when he
was actually charged in the Informations of an offense under Section 3(g)
thereof. He claimed that there was neither identity nor exclusive inclusion
between the two offenses. To insist that one is a mode or manner of
committing the other violates the principle of duplicity of offense in Section
13 17 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Be that as it
may, petitioner posits that even assuming the possibility of the same, he
must still be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of
either Section 3(e) or Section 3(g).

Our Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

Prefatorily, it must be remembered that petitions for review on

certiorari under Rule 45, such as the one filed by petitioner, must raise only
questions of law. Settled is the rule that issues raised on whether the
16
Id at 33-34.
17
Section 13. Duplicity 0+the 0lfense. -- A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
 Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

prosecution's evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable

doubt, or whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded, the
accused are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact. 18 In view of the
absence of the recognized exceptions 19 to this rule, the Court shall refrain
from reviewing the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan as it duly
considered the totality of circumstances that led to the conclusion that
petitioner violated the law.

To begin with, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that his

constitutional rights were violated. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the
charge was designated as Section 3(g) in assailing the validity of the
Informations filed against him. However, well-entrenched in jurisprudence
is the dictum that it is not the technical name given by the prosecutor
appearing in the title of the information, but the facts alleged in the body of
the information that determines the character of the crime. 20 As early in
United States v. Lim San, 21 the Court has explained that:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no

concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x.
That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all
things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real
question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right,
how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from
the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion oflaw made
by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense[,] he
need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence
whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and
important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what
the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of
the court alone to say what the name of the crime is or what it is named.
22
XX X.

Indeed, what is controlling is not the title of the complaint or the

designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts

18 Jaca v. People, 702 Phil. 210,238 (1013).

19 Id, provides that among the exceptions are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmise[s], and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of
the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
20
People v. Dasmarinas, 819 Phil. 357,374 (2017).
21
22
17 Phil. 273 (1910).
Jd. at 278-279, cited in Consigna v. People, 731 Phil. 108, 120-121 (2014). f
 Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

therein recited. 23 As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and

with such particularity and reasonable certainty that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged, then the information is considered
sufficient. 24 If the elements of the crime are duly alleged in the information,
the accused can be rest assured of being informed of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. 25

It. would not take more than a plain and simple reading of the
Re-Amended Informations herein to be properly apprised of the nature of
the offense charged against petitioner. Specifically, he, together with his
co-accused, Navarro and Catindig, all high-ranking public officers, were
accused of acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality or at the very
least, through gross inexcusable negligence, in giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to another, and thereby causing undue injury to the
Government, by entering into a contract for the purchase of various goods at
disadvantageous prices without conducting the required public bidding. One
cannot mistake this to be something other than the elements of a violation of
Section 3(e)26 ofR.A. No. 3019.

Accordingly, petitioner's claim that the Informations violate the rule

on duplicity of offenses in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is
untenable. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only
one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. 27 Petitioner insists that the
Informations accused him of both Sections 3(e) and 3(g). The argument
fails to convince. While it is true that entering into a contract is also an
element of Section 3(g),28 We agree with the Sandiganbayan that the
allegation can be considered simply as the means by which the accused
persons violated Section 3(e).29 As such, his conviction under the latter
could not have been on a defective Information.

But even assuming that the Informations charged more than one
offense, the fact remains that petitioner did not question the validity of the
same before entering his plea. Time and again, the Court has held that an
accused who fails to move for the quashal of a duplicitous Information is
deemed to have waived his right to question the same. 30 This is in
23 People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649 (2005).
24 Supra note 18, at 239.
2s Jd_
26 Reyes v. Ombudsman, 783 Phil. 304, 336 (2016), provides that the elements of violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial,
or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
27 People v. Court ofAppeals, 755 Phil.80,116 (2015).
23 Froi/an v. Sandiganhayan, 385 Phil. 32, 44 (2000), provides that the elements of Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019, are: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or transaction
on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
29
Rollo, p. 125.
30 Peoplev. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806,822 (2016).
 Decision 10 G.R_ Nos. 214336-37

consonance with Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion
to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this
Rule." 31 Indeed, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. 32

Ultimately, petit10ner can no longer deny the validity of the

Informations against him. In no uncertain terms, said Informations
sufficiently charged him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
carefully identifying the essential elements thereof. Section 3(e) ofR.A. No.
3019 states:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices ofpublic officers. - In addition to

acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

In Tio v. People, 33 We laid down the elements of Section 3(e), to wit:

(1) that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such
public officer; (2) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the Sandiganbayan's
31 Section 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
xxxx
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
32 Supra note 27, at 117.
33 G.R. Nos. 230132 & 230252, January 19, 2021.
 Decision 11 GR. Nos. 214336-37

finding that the elements of the cnme charged were sufficiently proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

The first element is self-explanatory. As borne by the records,

petitioner was a public officer acting in his official capacity as Regional
Director of the DILG-Caraga at the time of the commission of the crime.

The second element pertains to the modalities by which the offense

may be committed. Well-settled is the rule that proof of any of the three
modes, namely:. manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence, in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e)
ofR.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict. 34 In a long line of cases, 35 the Court
elucidated that:

There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear, notorious, or

plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
"Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. 36

The third element requires that the act constituting the offense must
consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official,
administrative or judicial functions. 37 The former act need not be proven
with actual certainty but by some reasonable basis by which the court can
measure it. 38 As for the latter act, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official,
administrative or judicial functions. 39 The word "unwarranted" means
lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit

34 People v. Naciongayo, G.R. No. 243897, June 8, 2020.

35 Id.; Tio v. People, supra note 33; Villarosa v. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020;
Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020; Rivera v.
People, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019; Cabrera v. People, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019;
Sabio v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233853-54, July 15, 2019; Abubakar v. People, 834
Phil. 435,472 (2018).
36
Id.
37
Villarosa v. People, supra note 35.
3S Cabrera v. People, supra note 35.
39 Villarosa v. People. supra note 35,
 Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher

evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. 40

The second and third elements discussed above are positively proven
by the records of the case. We, therefore, find no error . in the
Sandiganabayan's ruling that petitioner gave unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference to San Marino and Revelstone through gross
inexcusable negligence in approving the subject transactions despite the
absence of public bidding.

Section 3 of E.O. No. 30241 expressly provides that awarding of

contracts shall be done through public/open competitive bidding to ensure
efficiency and equitable treatment. As an exception to the rule, its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) enumerates the conditions under
which direct contracting instead of public bidding may be resorted to:

a. Procurement of items of proprietary nature which can be obtained

only from the proprietary source, i.e., when patents, trade secrets and
copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing the same item;

b. Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer which does not

have sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable
substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms to the Government;

c. When the procurement of critical plant components from a

specialist manufacturer/supplier/distributor serves as a precondition of a
contractor responsible for the erection of the project for his guarantee of
project performance;

d. For purposes of maintaining standards, such as a purchase

involving a small addition to an already existing fleet of equipment;

e. In emergencies where procurement must be immediately

accomplished regardless of cost. Emergencies shall be defined as those
situations where there is imminent danger to life and/or property as
determined by the Head of Agency concerned or his duly authorized
representative.

Settled is the rule that as a matter of policy, public contracts are

awarded through competitive public bidding. Not only does competitive
bidding give the public the best possible quality of goods and services
garnering contracts most favorable to the government, it also avoids
suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public
transactions. 42 It promotes transparency in government transactions and
accountability of public officers as it minimizes occasions for corruption
and temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of government authorities

40 Id.
41 Providing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for the Procurement of Goods/Supplies by
the National Government, February 19, 1996.
42 Abubakar v. People, supra note 35, at 474-475.
 Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

in awarding contracts. 43 For these reasons, important public policy

considerations demand the strict observance of procedural rules relating to
the bidding process. 44

In the present case, not only were the subject purchases of medicines
and araro tools done through direct contracting; petitioner utterly failed to
present any justification sufficient to forego the conduct of a competitive
public bidding as expressly mandated by E.O. No. 302. Neither was there
any effort to invoke the exceptions under the IRR. In an attempt to exculpate
himself from liability, he merely engaged in a finger-pointing expedition
seeking to pass the blame to both his superiors as well as his subordinates.
Unfortunately for him, however, We cannot give credence to his defenses in
light of the glaring evidence of his gross inexcusable negligence.

As duly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was the

Regional Director of the DILG, no less, who served thereat for 39 years. It
is the mandate of the DILG, as an agency that acts on behalf of the President
to achieve the effective delivery of basic services to the citizenry. 45 Explicit
in its Charter is its duty to faithfully conduct the procurement process in
strict compliance with the provisions of applicable law on procurement 46
Hence, in all procurement of goods and services, the DILG ensures that they
be governed by the principles of: (1) transparency in the process and
implementation of contracts; (2) competitiveness by extending equal
opportunity to enable all eligible parties to participate in public bidding; (3)
streamlined procurement process that will uniformly apply to all government
procurement; (4) system of accountability where both public officials
directly or indirectly involved in the procurement process are held liable for
their actions relative thereto; and (5) public monitoring to guarantee that
contracts are awarded strictly in accordance with law. 47

The Court cannot, in good conscience, accept his reasoning that

Navarro was "a very powerful congressman" and as such, he simply
implemented the directive to approve the transactions with the pre-selected
suppliers. It is well to remember that the power of members of the House of
Representatives on the disbursement of the CDF is limited to the
identification of projects, while the determination of the mode of
procurement is vested in the DILG, which in this case, was under the
leadership of petitioner. As such, he was mandated by law to make an
independent assessment of the subject contracts. However, despite the
blatant absence of the required public bidding, he fully consummated the
illegal transactions in blindly signing the POs, RIVs, certifications, and

43
Cabrera v. People, supra note 35.
44
Id.
45 R.A. No. 6975. An Act Esrnblishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized
Department of the lnterior and Local Govermnent, and for other Purposes; Department of the Interior and
Local Government Act of 1990; Approved on December 13, 1990.
46
DILG Citizen's Charter, 2020 (2'' Edition); last accessed on May 18, 2021.
47 DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2016-96, July 15, 2016.
Decision 14 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

checks payable to the pre-selected companies. Indeed, the Sandiganbayan is

justified in saying that by tolerating the direct purchase from Navarro's
favored suppliers, petitioner reduced his office to a mere puppet. 48 Contrary
to his incessant claims that he merely exercised a ministerial duty, it was
because of his gross inexcusable negligence that allowed San Marino and
Revelstone to derive unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference from the
subject transactions.

As the head of the very agency tasked with ensuring that government
contracts strictly adhere to the laws on procurement, the Court cannot reduce
petitioner's acts to simple errors of judgment. At the time of the commission
of the offense in 1998, E.O. No. 302, had already been in existence since its
passage in 1996. In fact, during said time, the concept of procurement
through public bidding can hardly be considered novel or complex so as to
excuse petitioner's non-compliance therewith. As can be seen in Our
discussion in Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr., 49 the laws on procurement dates
back to the 1900s, thus:

History ofPhilippine Procurement Laws

It is necessary, at this point, to give a brief history of Philippine

laws pertaining to procurement through public bidding. The United States
Philippine Commission introduced the American practice of public
bidding through Act No. 22, enacted on October 15, 1900, by requiring the
Chief Engineer, United States Army for the Division of the Philippine
Islands, acting as purchasing agent under the control of the then Military
Governor, to advertise and call for a competitive bidding for the purchase
of the necessary materials and lands to be used for the construction of
highways and bridges in the Philippine Islands. Act No. 74, enacted on
January 21, 1901 by the Philippine Commission, required the General
Superintendent of Public Instruction to purchase office supplies through
competitive public bidding. Act No. 82, approved on January 31, 1901,
and Act No. 83, approved on February 6, 1901, required the municipal and
provincial governments, respectively, to hold competitive public biddings
in the making of contracts for public works and the purchase of office
supplies.

On June 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission, through Act No.

146, created the Bureau of Supply and with its creation, public bidding
became a popular policy in the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment for the use of the national government, its subdivisions and
instrumentalities. On February 3, 1936, then President Manuel L. Quezon
issued E.O. No. 16 declaring as a matter of general policy that government
contracts for public service or for furnishing supplies, materials and
equipment to the government should be subjected to public bidding. The
requirement of public bidding was likewise imposed for public works of
construction or repair pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of
1917.

48 Rollo, pp.109-110.
49 544 Phil. 645 (2007).
 Decision 15 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

Then President Diosdado Macapagal, in E.O. No. 40 dated June 1,

1963, reiterated the directive that no government contract for public
service or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities, should be
entered into without public bidding except for very extraordinary reasons
to be determined by a committee constituted thereunder. Then President
Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 1594 prescribing guidelines for government
infrastructure projects and Section 4 54 thereof stated that they should
generally be undertaken by contract after competitive public bidding.

Then President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 301 (1987)

prescribing guidelines for government negotiated contracts. Pertinently,
Section 62 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterated the requirement
of competitive public bidding in government projects. In 1990, Congress
passed RA 6957, 55 which authorized the financing, construction,
operation and maintenance of infrastructure by the private sector. RA
7160 was likewise enacted by Congress in 1991 and it contains provisions
governing the procurement of goods and locally-funded civil works by the
local government units.

Then President Fidel Ramos issued E.O. No. 302 (1996), providing
guidelines for the procurement of goods and supplies by the national
government. Then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued E.O. No. 201
(2000), providing additional guidelines in the procurement of goods and
supplies by the national government. Thereafter, he issued E.O. No. 262
(2000) amending E.O. 302 (1996) and E.O. 201 (2000).

On October 8, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

EO 40, the law mainly relied upon by the respondents, entitled
Consolidating Procurement Rules and Procedures for All National
Government Agencies, Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations
and Government Financial Institutions, and Requiring the Use of the
Government Procurement System. It accordingly repealed, amended or
modified all executive issuances, orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent therewith.

On January 10, 2003, President Arroyo signed into law RA 9184.

It took effect on January 26, 2004, or fifteen days after its publication in
two newspapers of general circulation. 50

In fact, petitioner even expressly testified that he was "in charge of the
implementation of the projects identified by a congressman wherein his PDF
will be used" and was "tasked under law to be the particular office to handle
procurement and distribution." 51 But despite knowledge of this, he went on
to state that "his responsibility stops" "after the delivery of the procured
items to the office of the congressman." 52 He :further admitted that he no
longer knows "whether as a matter of fact, these procured items were
delivered to the end-users" because he "cannot just go to the congressman"
and ask "have you distributed the items already?" 53

50 Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr., id. at 679-682.

51
Rollo, p. 462.
52 Id. at 467.
53
Id. at 468.
Decision 16 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

It is clear from the foregoing that petitioner could no longer feign

ignorance to settled law or claim innocence to the acts charged against him.
He persistently blames Navarro as the one who entered into the purchase
agreement without public bidding. He insists that he merely performed his
ministerial duty of signing the DV s, POs, RIV s, certificates, and checks,
nothing more. The argument, however, fails to persuade. Just because his
name does not appear in the contract, does not mean he should be absolved
of any liability. To repeat, petitioner was responsible for the consummation
of the contract. He approved the transaction and signed the checks, which
ultimately led to the release of the funds.

On this matter, Our ruling in Tio v. People54 is instructive. There, Tio,

then Mayor of the Municipality of Luna, and Cadiz, then municipal
accountant, were both convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 for awarding a road concreting project to a private corporation in the
absence of public bidding. While the prosecution was unable to prove that
Cadiz participated in the award of the contract, We did not hesitate to
convict her for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for her
participation in the unlawful release of funds in consummation of the illegal
contract. In certifying the transactions and signing the DVs despite the
presence of irregularities, Cadiz was remiss in her duty as municipal
accountant, which is to ensure that public funds are disbursed only after the
requirements of law are complied with. To the Court, this constitutes gross
inexcusable negligence.

55
In the same vein, the Court ruled in Umipig v. People that when
public officers make certifications that the expense is necessary and lawful,
said officer attests to the transactions' legality and regularity, which signifies
that he or she had checked all the supporting documents before affixing his
or her signature. 56 The existence of obvious infirmities, however, shows that
the public officer negligently failed to exercise the reasonable diligence
required by law thereby resulting in government loss in favor of private
persons.

To be convicted of violation of Section 3(e), therefore, one's name

and signature do not necessarily have to be written on a contract. For as long
as the prosecution sufficiently proves the elements of the crime, public
officers can rightfully be charged and convicted of the same by their acts of
negligently approving the illegal transactions and signing checks· for the
disbursement of funds. The Court cannot tum a blind eye to their
participation that is indispensable to the consummation of the transaction
and for which, they must be held accountable.

54 See Tio v. People, supra note 33.

55 691 Phil. 272 (2012).
56 Id at 306.
 Decision 17 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

In a last-ditch effort to save his plight, petitioner continues his finger-

pointing, but this time, he tries to pass the blame to his subordinates who
allegedly assured him of the validity of the transactions. Invoking the
doctrine laid down in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 57 petitioner claims that as a
head of office, he can rely in good faith on the acts of his subordinates as he
cannot reasonably be expected to examine every single document relative to
government transactions. Unfortunately for petitioner, the circumstances of
this case prevent him from seeking refuge behind the Arias doctrine.

The Arias doctrine is not some magic cloak that can be used as a
shield by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his
subordinates and necessarily escape liability. 58 In fact, the Court has had
numerous occasions59 to reject this defense i11 light of circumstances that
should have prompted the government officials to exercise a higher degree
of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had
prepared.

Such is the case here. As duly observed by the Sandiganbayan, it is

unacceptable that petitioner blindly signed the subject documents despite the
fact that the absence of public bidding was readily ascertainable on their
face, being as they were, mere "one-paged documents." 60 As a high-ranking
DILG official, moreover, the first thing he should have determined was the
mode of procurement employed in the transactions. Instead, he testified in
court that his primary act as regional director, on his very first day, was to
sign the checks for the araro procurement, simply because the accountant
told him that the transactions were in order. 61 According to him, he "just
relied so much on my [his] staff that I [he] do [did] not even know persons
who entered into these transactions." 62 Had petitioner exerted the necessary
precaution, he would have discovered that, as testified by the president of
Revelstone, said company was never even involved in the production of
medicines, araro tools, and drug testing kits. 63 Regrettably, and with no
valid reason, he failed to pay due attention to the glaring illegality of the
subject contracts.

All told, the Court is convinced that based on the totality of facts
herein, petitioner was correctly convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. In blindly proceeding with the unlawful agreements, he
failed to perform his sworn duty as head of the DILG-Caraga office in clear
violation of E.0. No. 302 and its IRR. Had he only exercised enough
prudence and been more circumspect, he could have easily discovered the

57 259 Phil. 794 (1989).

58 Riverav. People, 749 Phil. 124, 151-152 (2014).
59 Abubakar v. People, supra note 35, citing Office of the Ombudsman, et al. v. PS/Supt. Espina, 807
Phil. 529 (2017); Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 576 Phil. 345 (2008); Alfonso v. Office of the
President, 548 Phil. 615 (2007); Escara v. People, 501 Phil. 532 (2005).
60 Rollo, p. 1 l 0.
61
Id. at 442.
62
Id. at 445.
63
Id. at 84-85.
 Decision 18 G:R. Nos. 214336-37

absence of pubic bidding, and upheld the basic principles of transparency

and accountability that his office was created to protect. Instead, he chose to
tolerate the clear irregularities in the transactions which resulted in
unwarranted preference in favor of San Marino and Revelstone. Not only
were other suppliers precluded from submitting potentially more beneficial
bids, the government was also effectively robbed of its right to determine the
best possible prices in its acquisition of supplies.

Indeed, the rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement

are imbued with public interest. 64 As a system of transparency in the
procurement process, said rules were formulated to guarantee that the public
enjoys the most advantageous transactions at the least possible expense. It
cannot be denied, however, that these procurement laws, no matter how
good, become meaningless without accountable public officials to ensure
faithful compliance therewith.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the

Sandiganbayan. Section 9(a) 65 ofR.A. No. 3019 provides that a violation of
Section 3 of the same law shall be punished with, inter alia, "imprisonment
for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15)
years" and "perpetual disqualification from public office." Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is sentenced to
suffer for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805, the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one ( 1) month,
as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, together with the
aforementioned perpetual disqualification from public office. 66

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant pet1t10n is

DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 and the Resolution dated
September 12, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal Case
Nos. 27803 and 27805 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Quirino M. Libunao is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and accordingly, sentenced to suffer
for each count the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as
maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

64
Cabrera v. People, supra note 35.
65 Section 9. Penalties for violations.~ (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of
the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of
conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in
favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the fair
value of such thing.
xxxx
66
People v. Naciongayo, supra note 34.
 Decision 19 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

SO ORDERED.

JHOS~OPEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

J~ 0a<'!!J
~~
V LFREDO

B.DIMAA

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assign~ the · er of the opinion of the
Court's Division. ,/

AL
Decision 20 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

C E RTI FI CA TIO N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation. I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 214336-37 - QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, petitioner, versus

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Promulgated:

FEB 1~·20:12 w
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : :

CONCURRING OPINION V
CAGUIOA, J.:

Petitioner Quirino M. Libunao (Libunao ), a former Regional Director

of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), was convicted
in the Sandiganbayan for two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019 because of procurements in 1998 that did not go through
public bidding.

The ponencia denies Libunao's appeal, ultimately ruling that the

Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Libunao as he was guilty of giving
unwarranted benefits in favor of two suppliers.

I agree.

I offer this Opinion, however, to clarify that Libunao is guilty not

because of the mere failure to conduct public bidding for the procurements
involved, but rather, because the elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are
present in these cases.

It must be emphasized that in criminal cases involving Section 3(e) of

RA 3019 in relation to alleged irregularities in procurement committed by
public officers, "findings of violations of procurement laws, rules and
regulations, on their own, do not automatically lead to the conviction of the
public officer under the said special penal law. It must be established beyond
reasonable doubt that the essential elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are
present." 1

Brie/review of the facts

The controversy arose from the Countrywide Development Fund

(CDF), a form of"pork-barrel" fund, allocated to Constantino H. Navarro, Jr.
(Navarro), then the representative of the First District of Surigao del Norte to
the House ofRepresentatives. For the years 1997 to 1998, Navarro's CDF was
"used to purchase assorted medicines, shabu testing kits, araro (rice paddy

' Martel v. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021, accessed at <https://elibrary.
judiciary.gov. ph/tbebookshelf/showdocs/1 /67194>.
 Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

plows), notebooks, ballpens and blackboard erasers." 2 The DILG-CARA.GA

was one of the implementing agencies for Navarro's CDF, and Libunao was
the Regional Director of DILG Region XI. Libunao participated in two
procurements involving Navarro's CDF:

(l)Procurement of 45 boxes of assorted medicines from San

Marino Laboratories Corporation (San Marino) in the amount
of P2,000,000.00; and

(2)Procurement of 1,200 sets of araro tools from Revelstone

Sales International (Revelstone) m the amount of
P900,000.00.

It is undisputed that the procurements did not go through public

bidding. The said fact was only discovered, however, upon post-audit made
by the Commission on Audit (COA) on the utilization ofNavarro's CDF. The
COA also discovered an alleged overprice

when they compared the suppliers' purchase price with the price of the same
items obtained through personal canvass conducted in Surigao City and in
Manila. The canvass was made with the use of a canvass or quotation forms
with the listed items. The forms were given to suppliers for them to quote
the prices of the items listed. 3

Based on the result ofCOA's audit, Informations were eventually filed

in the Sandiganbayan against Navarro, the Regional Directors of DILG-
CARAGA, and the owners of the companies which were the suppliers for the
projects covered by Navarro's CDF. The accusatory portions of the
Informations where Libunao is one of the accused read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27803

[(Procurement of assorted medicines from San Marino)]

That in the month of October 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H. NAVARRO, JR.,
QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking
public officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st District of Surigao
de! Norte, the Regional Director of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant Secretary for Support
Services & Regional Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all high
ranking public officials, committing the offense in relation to their official
duties and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused ILUMINADA C. TUBLE,
President of San Marino Laboratories Corporation, a private enterprise, and
mutually helping one another, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality
(or at the very least, through gross inexcusable negligence), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to San Marino Laboratories Corporation and
cause undue injury to the Government, by entering into a contract, without

2
Rollo, p. 87.
Id. at 71.
 Concurring Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

conducting the required public bidding, with said San Marino Laboratories,
for the purchase of forty five (45) boxes of assorted medicine in the amount
of TWO MILLION PESOS (PZ,000,000.00), which price was manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that similar
medicines available in the market, as canvassed by the Commission on
Audit (COA), could have been purchased at only SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO & 25/100
PESOS ('1"762,262.25), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby resulting to an
overprice in the total amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY & 75/100
PESOS (l"l,237,740.75), to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27805

[(Procurement of araro tools from Revelstone)]

That during the period from October 16, 1998 to December 10,
1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
CONSTANTINO H. NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and
BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public officials, being then the
Congressman of the 1st District ofSurigao del Norte, the Regional Director
of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-Caraga
Region, and Assistant Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all high ranking public
officials, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and
taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating
.with each other and with accused GERARDO A. ROSARIO and MARIO
TOKONG, proprietor and representative, respectively, ofRevelstone Sales
International, a private enterprise, and mutually helping one another, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, through gross
inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to
Revelstone Sales International and cause undue injury to the Government,
by entering into a contract, without conducting the required public bidding,
with said Revelstone Sales International, for the purchase of one thousand
two hundred (1,200) sets of araro tools in the amount of NINE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS ('1"900,000.00), which price was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that similar araro
tools available in the market, as canvassed by the Commission on Audit
(COA), could have been purchased at only SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY
TWO THOUSAND PESOS ('1"792,000.00), inclusive of 10% allowance,
thereby resulting to an overprice of in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (l"l08,000.00), to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARYTOLAW. 5

Based on the evidence presented during the trial, the Sandiganbayan

made the following factual findings:

I. The funds used to pay the purchases came from accused Navarro's CDF;

4
Id. at 65-65.
5
Id. at 66.
 Concurring Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

2. There was no public bidding conducted;

3. Accused Navarro certified the urgency of the purchases;

4. The subject purchases had available substitutes in the market;

5. The accused-suppliers were pre-selected by the office of accused

Navarro before the actual procurement;

6. All RIV's were signed by accused Navarro;

7. The DILG-CARAGA undertook the procurement process, including the

payments;

8. The DILG-CARAGA delivered the supplies to the office of accused

Navarro;

9. Accused Derecho and Libunao did not deny their signatures on the
documents;

10. Except for accused Rosario of Revelstone, all accused private

individuals admitted to have received the payments. 6

From these factual findings, the Sandiganbayan proceeded to convict

Libunao (and Carlos T. Derecho [Derecho], another Regional Director of
DILG-CARAGA who was also an accused in the other Informations) for
violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for their participation in the
procurements which did not undergo public bidding. Particularly with
Libunao, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty because he approved the
Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIVs) and Purchase Orders (POs) which
were necessary for the procurement, and he certified in the Disbursement
Vouchers (DVs) that the "expenses were necessary and lawful, and incurred
under his direct supervision." 7

The ponencia upholds both ofLibunao's convictions.

As already mentioned, I agree.

In the recent ruling of the Court en bane in Martel v. People, 8 the Court
emphasized that

in order to successfully prosecute the accused under Section 3 (e) of R.A.

3019 based on a violation of procurement laws, the prosecution cannot
solely rely on the fact that a violation of procurement laws has been
committed. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1)
the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,

Id. at 102-103.
Id. at 109.
Supra note I.
 Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

advantage or preference, and (2) the accused acted with evident bad faith,
manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence. 9

The prosecution was able to prove the foregoing in both of the two
cases.

Elements of a violation of Section

3(e), RA 3019

To be found guilty of violating Section 3(e), RA 3019, the following

elements must concur:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official,
administrative or judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference. 10

The existence of the first two elements - that Libunao was a public
officer and the acts in question were done in the discharge of his official
functions - are not disputed. The disagreement lies in the existence of the
third and fourth elements, particularly whether his act of signing the RIVs,
POs, and DV s during the procurement process even as no public bidding was
undertaken was (1) done in either evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or
gross inexcusable negligence, and it (2) resulted in either causing the
government undue injury or giving any private party unwarranted benefits.

Third element: Evident bad faith,

manifest partiality, or gross
inexcusable negligence

There is gross inexcusable negligence in this case. "'Gross inexcusable

negligence' refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." 11
"More than committing a breach of a legal duty, it is necessary that in
committing the said breach, the public officer was inattentive, thoughtless,
and careless." 12

9
Id.
10
Sison v. People, 628 Phil. 573,583 (2010).
11
Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 279,290.
12
Martel v. People, supra note 1.
 Concurring Opinion 6 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

In this case, there is indeed gross inexcusable negligence because, as

the ponencia points out, Libunao had been with the DILG for 39 years, and
he himself admitted that he was aware of the requirement to conduct public
bidding for procurements in the government. Moreover, the following
ratiocinations of the Sandiganbayan deserve merit:

It is unbelievable that he just blindly signed the [RIV s] and [POs]

upon presentation and assurance of his staff that the documents were in
order, such that he did not know that the method of procurement used was
direct contracting and not public bidding. The [RIV s] and the [POsJ were
just one-page documents, and it was readily ascertainable on their face that
the brands of the medicines were indicated as well as the suppliers. In fact,
as a ranking official of the DILG and the deciding authority, the first thing
he should have determined was the mode of procurement employed in the
transactions. He did not have to dig into piles of records to realize that the
purchase did not go through a public bidding.

[While] it has been held that heads of offices have to rely to a

reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations, it is not
unreasonable to expect [Libunao] to exercise the necessary diligence in
making sure at the very least that the proper formalities in the questioned
transaction were observed - that public bidding was conducted. This step
does not entail delving into intricate details of product quality, complete
delivery or fair and accurate pricing. Unlike other minute requirements in
government procurement, compliance or non-compliance with the rules on
public bidding is readily apparent, and the approving authority can easily
call the attention of the subordinates concerned. 13

Fourth element: Undue injury or

unwarranted benefits

There is "giving of unwarranted benefits" in these cases. To be clear,

the law punishes the act of "giving [to] any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his [or her] official
administrative or judicial functions." 14 While it was not Libunao but Navarro
who gave Revelstone or San Marino the preferences it obtained as supplier,
Libunao's gross negligence ultimately enabled the consummation of the
transactions, thereby allowing the aforementioned companies to obtain the
unwarranted benefits they received.

To be clear, I maintain, as I had stressed in the case of Villarosa v.

People, 15 that the element of "unwarranted benefits" must be seen from the
lens of graft and corruption. Thus:

As its name implies, and as what can be gleaned from the

deliberations of Congress, RA 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and
corruption measure. At the heart of the acts punishable under RA
3019 is corruption. As explained by one of the sponsors of the law, Senator

13
Rollo, pp. I I 0-111.
14
RA 3019, Sec. 3(e).
15 G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshel£1showdocs
/1/66280>. Italics and underscoring in the original.
-------------------·--·---

Concurring Opinion 7 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

Arturo M. Tolentino, "[w]hile we are trying to penalize, the main idea of

the bill is graft and corrupt practices. x x x Well, the idea of graft is the one
emphasized." Graft entails the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways.

Hence, in saying that a public officer gave "unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference," it is not enough that the benefits, advantage, or
preference was obtained in transgression of laws, rules and regulations.
Such benefits must have been given by the public officer to the private party
with corrupt intent, a dishonest design, or some unethical interest. This is
in alignment with the spirit of RA 3019, which centers on the concept of
graft.16

I recognize, however, that in cases of gross negligence - meaning, the

crime was committed through culpa, not dolo - the courts cannot expect to
be shown proof of "corrupt intent, a dishonest design, or some unethical
interest." 17 Thus, for cases where the crime was committed through the
modality of gross negligence, it is enough that the actions, or inaction, of the
accused resulted in ultimately causing undue injury or giving unwarranted
benefits. It is well to clarify, however, that the negligence must be so gross -
as the jurisprudential definition puts it, "with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected" 18 - that the
negligence would rise to the level of willfulness to cause undue injury or give
unwarranted benefits.

Having said that, the alternative element of "causing undue injury to

the government" is also present in this case, at least for the procurement of 45
boxes of assorted medicines from San Marino.

In Cabrera v. People, 19 the Court explained that an accused

is said to have caused undue injury to the government or any party when the
latter sustains actual loss or damage, which must exist as a fact and
cannot be based on speculations or conjectures. The loss or damage need
not be proven with actual certainty. However, there must be "some
reasonable basis by which the court can measure it." Aside from this, the
loss or damage must be substantial. It must be "more than necessary,
excessive, improper or iilegal."20

Based on the foregoing standards, the prosecution's evidence failed to

establish the existence of undue injury in the procurement of 1,200 sets of
araro tools from Revelstone but it was able to establish the same in the
procurement of 45 boxes of assorted medicines from San Marino. For this, I
note that the Sandiganbayan observed that "except for the x x x 45 boxes of
medicines from San Marino, the allegation of overprice was not sufficiently
established." 21

16 Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Villarosa v. People, G.R. Nos.
233155-63, June 23, 2020, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/662
80>.
17 Id.
18 Supra note 14.
19 Cabrerav. People, G.R. Nos.191611-14, July 29, 2019, 910 SCRA 578.
20 Id. at 588. Emphasis supplied.
21 Rollo, p. 114.
 Concurring Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

The Sandiganbayan, citing jurisprudence on the matter, explained that

"an allegation of overprice is not provable by plainly comparing apple to apple
or orange to orange. The comparison must be between the same variety of
apples or oranges, bought at or about the same period, within the same
locality." 22 The prosecution's evidence, however, failed to comply with the
jurisprudential parameters to establish overprice. 23 The Sandiganbayan also
noted that even the auditor, who was a prosecution witness, "aired a
reservation as to the conclusiveness of their findings of overprice." 24 Thus, in
the absence of any conclusive proof on overprice, there consists reasonable
doubt on the existence of the element of undue injury.

The foregoing, however, applies only to the procurement of araro tools

from Revelstone. Overprice - and therefore, undue injury on the part of the
government - was duly proven in the procurement of 45 boxes of assorted
medicines from San Marino. The Sandiganbayan noticed that in these
consolidated cases, there were two procurements from San Marino: (1)
procurement of 97 boxes of medicines, where the signatory was Regional
Director Derecho, where each box was priced at 1'20,628.96; and (2)
procurement of 45 boxes of medicines, where Libunao was the signatory,
where each box was priced at P44,445.00. 25 The Sandiganbayan noted that in
both procurements, the boxes contained the same set of medicines. 26 The price
difference in the two procurements was acknowledged and admitted by the
President of San Marino herself, and the Sandiganbayan adjudged her civilly
liable to return the overprice of Pl,071,721.80. 27

Given the foregoing proof on overprice, there is thus no doubt that the
element of undue injury was present in the procurement of the 45 boxes of
medicines from San Marino. Libunao should thus be convicted for violation
of Section 3(e) ofRA 3019 for this procurement because his gross inexcusable
negligence caused undue injury to the government in the amount of
Pl,071,721.80.

Conclusion

In sum, I find that Libunao should be convicted on both counts of

violating Section 3(e), RA 3019. He should be convicted in the charge
involving the procurement of 45 boxes of medicines from San Marino, not
simply because the procurement did not go through public bidding as required
by law, but because it was attended by gross inexcusable negligence that
caused undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to San
Marino. In the same vein, Libunao should be convicted in the charge involving
the procurement of the 1,200 sets of araro tools from Revelstone, not because
the procurement did not go through public bidding, but because it was
22
Id. at 117.
23
Id. at 115.
24
Id. at II 6.
25
Id. at 112.
26 Id.
27
Id. at 121.
Concurring Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 214336-37

attended by gross inexcusable negligence that gave unwarranted benefits to

Revel stone.

Based on these premises, I vote to DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM

the conviction of petitioner Quirino M . Libunao for two (2) counts of violating
Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019.