The Challenge of Election-Related Crimes and Offences in Kenya
The Challenge of Election-Related Crimes and Offences in Kenya
The Challenge of Election-Related Crimes and Offences in Kenya
IM
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NATIONAL CRIME RESEARCH CENTRE
RC
IONAL C
H CENTR
Fighting Crime through Research
AT
N E
ghting rch
crime through resea
ISBN 978-9914-9955-7-2
Part of this publication may be copied for use in research and education
purposes provided that the source is acknowledged. This publication may
not be reproduced for other purposes without prior permission from the
National Crime Research Centre
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
COPYRIGHT .......................................................................................................................................i i
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................................ vii
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................... ix
FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................................ x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background of the Study .............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Global perspective ................................................................................................................. 2
1.1.2 African perspective ................................................................................................................ 4
1.1.3 The Kenyan perspective ........................................................................................................ 5
1.2 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................. 8
1.3 Objectives of the Study ................................................................................................................ 9
1.3.1 General objective ................................................................................................................... 9
1.3.2 Specific objectives ................................................................................................................. 9
1.4 Justification of the Study .............................................................................................................. 9
1.5 Assumptions of the Study........................................................................................................... 10
1.6 Scope of the Study ...................................................................................................................... 11
1.7 Theoretical Framework of the Study .......................................................................................... 11
1.7.1 Rational Choice Theory ....................................................................................................... 11
1.7.2 Aggressive Cues Theory...................................................................................................... 12
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY .............................................................. 13
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 13
2.2 Research Design ......................................................................................................................... 13
2.3 Target Population of the Study ................................................................................................... 13
2.4 Sampling of Counties and Respondents ..................................................................................... 13
2.5. Data Collection Methods ........................................................................................................... 16
2.6. Data Collection Tools ................................................................................................................ 16
2.7 Data Collection and Management .............................................................................................. 16
2.8 Methods of Data Analysis .......................................................................................................... 17
2.9 Ethical Considerations ................................................................................................................ 17
CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS .................................................................. 18
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 18
3.2 Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Sample Respondents................................................ 18
3.3 Prevalence and Typology of Election-Related Crimes and Offences ........................................ 20
3.3.1 Knowledge and/or experience on the existence of election-related crimes and offences.... 20
3.3.2 Types and prevalence of election-related crimes and offences ........................................... 22
3.3.3 Whether land use and/or ownership is a factor in election-related crimes and offences ..... 32
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3.3.4 Typology and prevalence of land use and/or ownership conflicts witnessed and/or
encountered during recent political elections ............................................................................... 35
3.3.5: Hotspot areas for election-related crimes and offences in Kenya ...................................... 38
3.4 Perpetrators and Victims of Election-Related Crimes and Offences.......................................... 41
3.4.1 Perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences ........................................................... 41
3.4.2 Victims of election-related crimes and offences ................................................................. 45
3.5 Factors Contributing to and Triggers of Election-Related Crimes and Offences ...................... 48
3.5.1 Underlying factors contributing to election-related crimes and offences ............................ 48
3.5.2 Triggers for election-related crimes and offences ............................................................... 56
3.6 Effects of Election-Related Crimes and Offences ...................................................................... 57
3.7. Intervention Strategies for Addressing Election-related Crimes and Offences ......................... 59
3.7.1 Reporting of election-related crimes and offences .............................................................. 59
3.7.2 Existing mitigating interventions for the election-related crimes and offences .................. 63
3.8 Challenges Faced in the Control of Election-related Crimes and Offences ............................... 68
3.8.1 Respondents’ suggestions towards addressing election-related crimes and offences in
Kenya............................................................................................................................................ 71
CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 79
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 79
4.2 Summary of Key Findings.......................................................................................................... 79
4.2.1 Prevalence and typology of election-related crimes and offences ....................................... 79
4.2.2 Perpetrators and Victims of Election-related crimes and offences ...................................... 80
4.2.3 Underlying factors and triggers contributing to election-related crimes and offences ........ 80
4.2.4 Effects of election-related crimes and offences ................................................................... 81
4.2.5 Existing intervention strategies and the effectiveness of relevant stakeholders in controlling
election-related crimes and offences ............................................................................................ 81
4.2.6 Challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences ............................ 82
4.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 82
4.4 Recommendations ...................................................................................................................... 83
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................... 91
Appendix 1: Interview Schedule ...................................................................................................... 91
Appendix 2: Key Informant Guide ................................................................................................. 103
Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion Guide ................................................................................. 105
Appendix 4: Hotspot Areas for Election-Related Crimes and Offences per County ..................... 107
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LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 3. 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents ............................................... 19
Table 3.2: Types and prevalence of election-related crimes and offences ............................. 24
Table 3.3: Types and prevalence of election-related crimes and offences as per respondent
category…………………………………………………………………….………27
Table 3.4: Election-related crimes and offences committed during electioneering period as
highlighted by Focus Group Discussants…..………………………………...…….30
Table 3.5: Whether land use and/or ownership is a factor in election-related crimes and
offences…………………………………………………………………………..…33
Table 3.6: Responses on whether it is right to destroy political opponents’ property, evict and
use violence against political opponents to settle land disputes ............................... 35
Table 3.7: Land use and/or ownership conflicts witnessed and/ or encountered during recent
political elections ...................................................................................................... 36
Table 3.8: Election-related crimes and offences arising from land use and/or ownership as
highlighted by Focus Group Discussants ................................................................. 37
Table 3.9: Whether the respondents perceived their counties as hotspot areas…….......…....39
Table 3.10: Perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences ........................................... 41
Table 3.11: Perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences as per the specific category
of the respondents ..................................................................................................... 42
Table 3.12: Perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences as highlighted by Focus
Group Discussants .................................................................................................... 44
Table 3.13: Victims of election- related crimes and offences ............................................... .46
Table 3.14: Victims of election-related crimes and offences as per the specific category of the
respondents .............................................................................................................. .47
Table 3.15: Underlying factors contributing to election-related crimes and offences ............ 48
Table 3.16: Underlying factors contributing to election-related crimes and offences as per the
specific category of the respondents ......................................................................... 49
Table 3.17: Factors contributing to election-related crimes and offences as highlighted by
Focus Group Discussants…....…………………………..…………………………51
Table 3.18: Likely effect of COVID-19 on the prevalence of election-related crimes and
offences in the 2022 General Election as highlighted by Focus Group Discussants
……………………………………………………………………………………...55
Table 3.19: Triggers of election-related crimes and offences................................................. 56
Table 3.20: Effects of election-related crimes and offences as highlighted by Focus Group
Discussants ............................................................................................................... 58
Table 3.21: Whether the respondent has ever reported election-related crimes and offences.60
Table 3.22: Reasons for not reporting election-related crimes and offences .......................... 61
Table 3.23: Trusted Agency for reporting elections related to crimes & other offences ........ 62
Table 3.24: Ideal mechanism for reporting election-related crimes and offences .................. 63
Table 3.25: Existing interventions on election-related crimes and offences as highlighted by
Focus Group Discussants ......................................................................................... 64
Table 3.26: Perceptions on the effectiveness of the electoral management stakeholders in the
control of election-related crimes and offences as per the specific category of the
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respondents…………………………………………………………………..……..66
Table 3.27: Challenges in addressing election-related crimes and offences .......................... 68
Table 3.28: Challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences as
highlighted by Focus Group Discussants ................................................................ .69
Table 3.29: Respondents’ suggested measures for addressing election-related crimes and/ or
offences in general as per the specific category of the respondents ......................... 72
Table 3.30: Measures suggested for addressing election-related crimes and/ or offences as
highlighted by Focused Group Discussants ............................................................. 74
Table 3.31: Addressing land use and/or ownership issues that contribute to election-related
crimes and offences as per the specific category of the respondents ....................... 77
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LIST OF FIGURES Page
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OPERATIONAL DIFINITION OF TERMS
Campaign period
Refers to the period specified as such in the notice issued by IEBC in relation to an election.
Election-related crimes
Mean all the crimes punishable under the Penal Code Cap 63 Laws of Kenya which were
committed during the electioneering period of a General Election and/or By-election for
political offices and which were directly related to the particular elections.
Election-related offences
Refer to the offences provided for in the Elections Act of 2011, which is a legal framework
instrument of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in Kenya.
Election period
Refers to the period between the publication of a notice by the IEBC for a presidential,
Election
Refers to a formal and organized choice by vote of a person for a political office. It includes
the general election and by-elections. It entails presidential, parliamentary, county election
and includes by-election.
Post-voting period
Denotes the period immediately after the day of casting the ballot.
Pre-election period
Indicates the period before the publication of a Gazette notice by IEBC declaring the
Voting period
Refer to the period between 6.00am to 5.00pm local Kenyan time on the voting day.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ix
FOREWORD
The Government of Kenya plays a cardinal role in ensuring that all citizens enjoy their political
rights as provided for under Article 38 of the Constitution of Kenya. These include freedom of
making political choices; the right to free, fair and regular elections; and the right to be registered
as a voter and to vote or be voted for. The regrettable incidences of election-related crimes and
offences that have prominently featured in Kenya’s previous elections are a threat to the
realization of these rights and a stain in the very foundation of our society owing to the far-
reaching negative effects of these vices.
In 2016, the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) undertook a survey on Election Crimes
and Offences in Kenya. The study covered 20 counties and proposed a raft of policy
recommendations towards ameliorating the challenge of election-related crimes and offences in
the country. The study also recommended further research in the counties and sub-counties that
were not covered. Using the 2016 study as a base, this new study seeks to examine the current
situation with regards to election-related crimes and offences in Kenya with the aim of proposing
further interventions.
The findings of this study indicate that election-related crimes and offences continue to pose a
major security challenge in Kenya’s electoral processes. For instance, the most prevalent crimes
and offences identified in 2016 including voter bribery, hate speech, incitement to violence and
giving of alcohol to interrupt electoral processes continue to be prominent in the current
dispensation. The main perpetrators of these iniquities are the political class and supporters;
organized criminal gangs; and the youth. Therefore, there is need for strategic multi-agency and
multi-sectoral initiatives and efforts towards addressing the recurring dynamics of election-
related crimes and offences. This study provides a robust empirical foundation upon which these
initiatives can be anchored.
I wish to reiterate and applaud the significant efforts by the Government of Kenya and other
stakeholders in addressing election-related crimes and offences. Indeed, we all have a stake in
countering this menace and ensuring that Kenyan elections are free of crimes and offences.
Finally, I call upon the duty-bearer agencies, institutions and stakeholders in electoral
management to take cognizance of and utilize the findings and recommendations of this study in
their programming and preparedness for the forthcoming General Election in Kenya.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) wishes to acknowledge and appreciate the
important roles of various individuals, institutions and agencies that participated in this study.
Our unqualified gratitude goes to the Government of Kenya for the financial support, without
which the study would not have been accomplished.
Special thanks go to NCRC’s Governing Council under the leadership of the Chairperson - Hon.
Retired Justice P. Kihara Kariuki for their strategic guidance in the execution of this study. In
particular, our profound gratitude goes to the Council’s Research and Development Committee
comprising of Prof. Robinson Ocharo, Mr. Gerard Wandera (former CEO/Director), Mr. Noah
Sanganyi, Mrs. Jacqueline Mbogo-Asinuli, Mr. Dickson Magotsi, Mr. Joseph Mutevesi and Mr.
Gideon Munga Nyale for their insightful professional guidance throughout the study period.
The Centre sincerely thanks REINVENT Programme for financially supporting the piloting of
this research in Nakuru County.
In a special way, I thank and applaud Senior Research Officer, Mr. Isaiah Nyambariga Ndege -
the lead author of this report as well as Research Officer, Mr. John Ngugi Kariuki - assistant
writer, for their tremendous input and finalization of this report. The Centre also appreciates Dr.
Stephen Handa for peer reviewing this report.
Finally, to Chief Research Officer, Mr. Stephen Muteti who guided the implementation of this
study and also reviewed this report and Principal Research Officer, Mr. Dickson Gitonga - the
first reviewer of this manuscript, I am eternally grateful.
It is my sincere hope that the findings and recommendations arising from this study will inform
policies and programming aimed at mitigating election-related crimes and offences in Kenya.
VINCENT O. OPONDO
Ag. DIRECTOR/CEO
NATIONAL CRIME RESEARCH CENTRE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the recent past, elections in Kenya have been marred by incidences of crimes and offences
which undermine both the legitimacy of elections and public confidence in our democracy.
While the magnitude of these vices vary from each election period and geographical location,
the incidents keep on recurring. Furthermore, all counties in Kenya have experienced
election-related crimes and offences.
Predicated on the above context, this study sought to establish the nature of election-related
crimes and offences in Kenya with a view of recommending remedial measures. Specifically,
the following variables were examined: typology and prevalence of election-related crimes
and offences; victims and perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences; factors
contributing to and triggers of election-related crimes and offences; effects of election-related
crimes and offences; existing intervention strategies and the effectiveness of various
stakeholders in dealing with election-related crimes and offences; and challenges faced in the
control of election-related crimes and offences.
A mixed method research design was utilized in this study. Data collection was carried out in
the 47 counties. A total of 2583 members of the public, 332 political party representatives,
434 electoral/election regulatory/enabling agency representatives, and 137
governance/electoral-related civil society organizations’ representatives were interviewed. In
addition, 16 Focus Group Discussions and 141 key informant interviews were held.
Key Findings
Prevalence and typology of election-related crimes and offences
It was established that the key election-related crimes and offences committed during pre-
election period included: hate speech; voter bribery; campaigning outside the prescribed
period; incitement to violence; giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt electoral processes;
provision of food, refreshments, fare reimbursement and rewards to supporters; and stealing
and looting of property.
The main election-related crimes and offences committed during campaign period were:
voter bribery; hate speech; giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt electoral processes;
incitement to violence; stealing and looting of property; creating disturbance and engaging in
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disorderly conduct; treating; affray; threat to violence; defacing of posters; intimidation of
the opponents; character assassination; use of violence; and malicious damage to property.
As revealed in this study, the leading election-related crimes and offences committed during
voting period included: voter bribery; giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt electoral
processes; hate speech; provision of food, refreshments, fare reimbursement and rewards to
supporters (treating); threat to violence; creating disturbance and engaging in disorderly
conduct; and incitement to violence.
In addition, the most prominent election-related crimes and offences committed during the
post-voting period were stealing and looting of property, malicious damage to property, use
of violence, incitement to violence, forceful displacement of the population and hate speech.
On the one hand, the findings of this study indicated that the prominent perpetrators of
election-related crimes and offences were the politicians, aspirants and candidates;
vulnerable youths (unemployed, unskilled, lowly educated, etc.) and political party agents
and supporters; hired goons; organized criminal gangs; ethnic groupings; rogue business
persons/ financiers; and rogue public officials in elections, regulatory and/or enabling
agencies.
On the other hand, women were identified as the main victims of election-related crimes and
offences followed by children and general members of the public including voters. Other
victims as per the study findings were: the elderly, youths, people living with disability, men,
minority ethnic groups, aspirants and candidates, the sick and party agents.
The study revealed that he main underlying factors contributing to election-related crimes
and offences were the vulnerabilities occasioned by unemployment and by poverty. The
other significant factors were: perceived marginalization including political, socio-economic
inequality; negative ethnicity; perceived corruption/unethical conduct of some election
management officials; perceptions of a compromised electoral system; contested electoral
laws; presence and engagement in organized criminal gangs’ activities; and availability of
weapons.
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According to the findings of this study, the main triggers of election-related crimes and
offences identified in the study included: perceptions that the results have been stolen
followed closely by fake news and rejection of election results. Other noticeable triggers
were: provocative and violent actions by political parties and candidates, high stakes of
gaining or losing power, misuse of social media, perception of biasness by electoral officials,
unethical media reporting and premature announcement of results by unauthorized persons.
The main effects of election-related crimes and offences were: loss and destruction of
property; ethnic hatred, disunity and animosity; loss of lives and injuries; forceful
displacement of populations.
The study findings indicated that majority of Kenyans do not report election-related crimes
and offences. The main reasons mooted for not reporting were: lack confidence in the
responsible agencies, fear of reprisals. Other significant reasons cited included: ignorance,
expected promises/benefits/gifts of not reporting, lack of prompt action by the responsible
agencies.
It was further established that the main existing intervention strategies for election-related
crimes and offences were: civic and voter education by relevant agencies; peace building
meetings by relevant stakeholders; and intelligence gathering and mapping of election crime
hotspots.
The National Government Administration Officers (NGAO) and the Civil Society
Organizations /Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) were perceived by 7 out of 10 Kenyans as
relatively effective in addressing election-related crimes and offences. It is only 5 out of 10
Kenyans who perceived the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) as
effective in this regard. Most members of the public felt that the National Intelligence
Service (NIS), the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), Educational Examining
Bodies (including regulatory agencies such as Commission on University Education), Kenya
Revenue Authority, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission, Credit Reference Bureau, and National Cohesion and Integration Commission
were less effective in the control of these vices.
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Challenges faced in the Control of Election-Related Crimes and Offences
The main challenges faced in controlling election-related crimes and offences as identified in
this study included: vulnerability occasioned by poverty; inadequate civic education;
impunity and selfishness of political leaders; alcohol, drug and substance abuse; inadequate
resources to stakeholders in the election management; illiteracy and ignorance among the
electorate. Other noticeable challenges faced in addressing election-related crimes and
offences were: negative ethnicity and nepotism; lack of goodwill by some stakeholders; lack
of integrity in the electoral processes; deficiencies in investigation, prosecution and
sentencing of perpetrators; insecurity in some parts of the country; inadequate cooperation
and partisan interest among concerned agencies/stakeholders; voter apathy in the electoral
process; and inadequacies of election infrastructure and technology.
Vulnerabilities caused by poverty and unemployment were mapped out as the key drivers
of election-related crimes and offences. For instance, due to these susceptibilities, most
people are influenced to commit election-related crimes and offences for monetary/
material gains. Consequently, there is need for the enhancement of short-term
interventions such as Kazi mtaani, cash transfers to the vulnerable, among others,
especially targeted during the most volatile periods (for example during the campaign
period) and hotspot areas; and long-term interventions such as employment guarantee
schemes, governance reforms, among others. County Governments and the Ministry of
Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizens Affairs and Special Programmes should take the
lead on this.
Inadequate resources and cooperation among the stakeholders were identified among key
challenges faced in controlling election-related crimes and offences in Kenya. These
challenges can be addressed by combining synergies through a multi-agency/stakeholder
approach. This will entail sharing of resources, information, technologies, among others,
with an aim of ensuring crime-/offence- free elections.
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3. Enhance early mapping of election-related crimes and offences
This study established that the consequences of election-related crimes and offences are
far reaching – transcending all spheres of the society. Consequently, there is need for
proactive as opposed to reactive interventions. This should entail electoral risk analysis
and early warning through multi-agency intelligence in mapping out electoral-crime hot-
spots and perpetrators. This has to be made a standing agenda in all County Security and
Intelligence Planning and Coordination.
It was indicated in this study that organized criminal gangs are among the key
perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences. The National Intelligence Service
(NIS), National Police Service (NPS) and other security agencies, therefore, need to
heighten surveillance and vigilance on organized criminal gangs by amongst others,
dismantling their organizational and operational structures and disrupting their funding
sources and networks.
The study established that the prevalence of election-related crimes and offences is high
in Kenya. Indeed, some crimes and offences such as voter bribery and hate-speech which
were most prevalent in 2016 were found to be still prevalent in 2021. For the citizenry to
exercise their political rights freely as envisaged under Article 38 of the Constitution of
Kenya, 2020, these vices have to be mitigated; and this requires the attention and action
of all stakeholders.
Voter bribery was identified among the prominent election-related crimes and offences
experienced in Kenya. The main perpetrators of these vices were the political
aspirants/candidates and their agents. To mitigate this, there is need for IEBC to ensure
strict enforcement of the Election Financing Act, 2013.
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The findings of this study revealed that most Kenyans do not report election-related
crimes and offences because they lack confidence on the duty bearer agencies. The
foremost factor accounting for this lack of trust emerged to be corruption. To address
this, there is need for making zero-tolerance to corruption a standing agenda in electoral
planning and management by all the agencies/actors concerned.
Hate speech was identified as one of the most prevalent election-related crime/ offence in
Kenya. The aim of hate speech is to encourage hate or violence against a person or group
of people based on their demographic orientation. Peace messaging will go a long way
towards mitigating this. Peace messaging is a “bottom-up” approach that targets the
incited, rather than the inciters. It should involve the dissemination of anti-hate or ant-
violence messages through social media, traditional media, barazas, among others.
NCIC and NGAO should take a lead on this.
The study identified high stakes of gaining or losing power among the foremost triggers
of election-related crimes and/ or offences. This can be addressed through local peace
agreements where communities agree on how to share local power after elections; for
instance, by nominating different county positions from different groups. Such
arrangements will promote inter-group tolerance, reduce fears of exploitation and make
politicians less likely to use divisive rhetoric. The NGAO and Faith-/Community-Based
Organizations should be empowered to spearhead these arrangements.
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11. Enhance civic and voter education
It was revealed that most people in Kenya do not report election-related crimes and
offences. One of the reasons cited was ignorance. From the foregoing, there is need for
enhanced civic and voter education for the members of the public on their civic duties as
citizens and rights and obligations with regards to election-related crimes and offences
including the importance of free, fair, transparent and crime-/offence-free elections.
The study showed that most Kenyans did not have confidence on the ability of most
electoral management agencies/stakeholders in tackling election-related crimes and
offences. Indeed, this was also given as the prime reason for not reporting these offences/
crimes. Furthermore, perceived corruption/unethical conduct of some election
management officials and perceptions of a compromised electoral system were mooted as
some of the key contributing factors to election-related crimes and crimes. As a
consequence, these agencies should boost public confidence by fostering transparency,
effectiveness, reliability and competence in the execution of their mandates.
xviii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
According to Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund (2020), use of violence, forced abductions and
voter bribery constitute the most prevalent election-related crimes and offences experienced
in many jurisdictions. Destruction of property, terrorism, defacing of opponents’ campaign
posters, multiple voting and rigging have also been reported to be among the most prevalent
election-related crimes and offences (NCRC, 2016; Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017).
Furthermore, Straus and Taylor (2009) observe that harassment and intimidation are the most
frequent forms of crimes and offences experienced during the electioneering period in Africa.
Election-related crimes and offences are attributed to a number of contributing factors which
can be grouped into two broad categories. Firstly, structural factors related to the underlying
power structures prevalent in new and emerging democracies such as informal patronage
systems, poor governance, exclusionary politics, and the socio-economic uncertainties of
losing political power. Secondly, factors related to the electoral process and the electoral
contest itself, such as failed or flawed elections, election fraud and weak or manipulated
institutions and institutional rules governing the electoral process (Adolfo, Kovacs, Nyström
& Utas, 2012).
The consequences of election-related crimes and offences are varied and detrimental. For
instance, they jeopardize the development, stability, transparency and efficiency of electoral
systems (Ukwayi & Okpa, 2017). They have equally been associated with economic
problems including high poverty, hunger and high unemployment rates (IFES, 2012).
According to (NCRC, 2016), election-related crimes and offences lead to the loss and injury
of human life; destruction and/or loss of property; violence, disturbed peace, fear and
tension; animosity/hatred/enmity; poor leadership and governance; interruption of
businesses; and forced migration – including displacement, of populations.
1
Addressing election-related crimes and offences has taken a number of approaches. The main
strategies have revolved around institutional, legal and policy reforms. For instance,
institutionally, special election dispute resolution courts and tribunals are now gaining
prominence; legally, several laws guiding electoral management such as election financing
and election offences laws have been enacted; and the adoption of Information
Communication Technology (ICT) in the electoral management has now become a policy in
many countries (NCRC, 2016; The Electoral Commission, 2013).
Election-related crimes and offences are serious social problems affecting most countries
across the globe. Illustratively, according to Besaw (2021), (54%) of national political
elections held in 2020 globally had some form of violence and other election-related crimes
and offences. In most instances, the aim of these vices was to unduly influence the process
and outcome of the vote.
Goat and Banuta (2007) study in Hungary’s political elections documented incidences of
vote buying, voter intimidation and tampering with postal votes. The same issues were
replicated in German’s 2017 general elections with some 3660 election-related crime
incidences being documented (Deutsche Welle, n.d). In the United Kingdom, bribery, undue
influence, impersonation, treating, false application to vote by post or by proxy and multiple
voting, false registration information and false postal or proxy voting application and proxy
voting offences are common election-related offences (The Electoral Commission, 2013).
In the United States, the main election-related crimes and offences according to the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (n.d) is electoral fraud. This manifests itself in three variants: fraud
by the voters (for example, voting more than once, giving false information when registering
to vote, using someone else’s name to vote and voting when ineligible to vote); fraud by the
elections/ campaign officials (for instance changing a ballot tally, voter bribery, voter
intimidation, voter suppression); and election campaign financing fraud. These
considerations make poor and rural voters more vulnerable. Election-related crimes and
offences are a common feature in Chile. According to the Standing Committee of the Chilean
Episcopate (Agenzia Fides, 2021), violent demonstrations have become a common feature
during the electioneering period in Chile. Other forms of crimes and offences featuring in
Chile as noted by the committee are murder incidences, destruction of property and hate
2
speech. The underlying grievances propelling these vices include economic inequalities,
contested elections and poverty. Regarding societal factors, scholars have linked ethnic
polarization, the exclusion of ethnic groups from power, and parties representing particular
ethnic or religious identities to greater incentives for electoral violence.
Similarly, India has also experienced a significant spate of election-related crimes and
offences. A report by Pollman and Purohit (2019) indicate that the common election-related
crimes and offences are voter fraud, corruption, cybercrimes, abductions/forced
disappearance, sexual offences and mob violence. Rebel groups, political militias, state
forces and unidentified armed groups were established to be the main perpetrators of these
crimes and offences.
Election-related crimes and offences are not experienced equally by all victims. Existing
evidence suggests that certain demographic groups are more prone to victimization against
certain types of electoral crimes and offences. For example, in their study on electoral
violence in Sri Lanka, Höglund and Piyarathne (2009) found that activists from the lower
classes were victims of more serious violence than the local elites. It was the people who
were active in politics but with a fairly weak socio-economic background that bore the main
brunt of arson and physical attacks, regardless of which party they belonged or associate
with. A growing number of studies also look at the gendered nature of election violence and
argue that women’s experiences with electoral violence are very different from those of men.
For example, male-oriented and non-gendered understandings of electoral violence often do
not include sexist campaign rhetoric that is designed to intimidate and silence female
candidates (Bardall, 2011).
Finally, in managing election-related crimes and offences, the practitioners and policymakers
need to understand that due to high levels of mistrust and insecurity around election times,
increased deployment of security personnel is sometimes necessary. Under the conditions
when national capacity for security is low, or when domestic security forces are themselves
involved in violence, international peacekeepers and police can act as external guarantors. In
other cases, domestic security forces like the police, military police and intelligence among
others can play important roles in preventing violence around elections both in the short-term
and the long-term (Höglund & Jarstad, 2010).
3
1.1.2 African perspective
Elections in Africa have always been fraught with different forms of election-related crimes
and offences. Indeed, a study on 50 political elections in Africa for the period 2011-2017
revealed that they all had some forms of crimes and offences (Kovacs & Bjarnesen, 2018).
Wada, Obatta, Ijeoma and Nweke (2020) documents that Nigeria’s 2019 general elections
were marred with incidents of murder, abductions and kidnappings, voter bribery and
intimidation, hate speech and character assassination, destruction of property, use of
violence, ballot/vote fraud and multiple voting. Similarly, Sierra Leone’s 2018 General
Elections recorded incidences of violence and murder (Taylor et al, 2017) with Uganda’s
2021 presidential elections being decorated with instances of violence, murders, human
rights’ abuses, kidnappings and electoral fraud (Kasozi, 2021).
In Africa, election-related crimes and offences are mainly orchestrated by people who have a
vested interest in the election outcome. They include political aspirants and candidates,
militias and organized criminal gangs who are loyal to particular parties/candidates and rank-
and-file party supporters (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018). However, increasingly members of the
state security apparatuses such as the police and military and the vulnerable youths have been
used by those with vested interests to commit and/or perpetuate election-related crimes and
offences with an aim of influencing electoral outcomes in the continent (Birch, Daxecker and
Hoglund, 2020). Straus and Taylor (2009) further established that most election-related
crimes and violence in Africa pre- and during the electioneering period has been perpetrated
by the incumbent governments and their supporters while the opposition and their supporters
are the main perpetrators of crime and violence in the post-election period.
Election-related crimes and offences have had several adverse consequences to the continent
of Africa. For instance, these vices have denied citizens of many countries in the region a
chance of electing leaders of their choice thereby undermining democracy in the continent
(Taylor, Pavehouse & Starus, 2017). Plausibly, this accounts for the poor governance
associated with most countries in the continent (Chukwuemeka, n.d). Furthermore, these
crimes and offences adversely impacts on the continent’s socio-economic development with
majority of citizens in Africa living below the poverty line (Doctor & Bagwel, 2020).
Election-related crimes and offences in Africa are caused by a multiplicity of factors. Birch
et al. (2020) and Fjelde and Höglund (2014) highlight some of the factors to include:
4
perceived historical injustices, the majoritarian electoral rule associated with many countries
in Africa, the politics of the winner-takes-all and the high stakes of winning and losing
elections associated with it. Other drivers of election-related crimes and offences in Africa
include: perceptions that elections have been stolen, mismanagement of electoral process,
political exclusion, economic marginalization, negative ethnicity, incitement and hate speech,
poverty and weak institutions (Benard, 2015; NCRC, 2016; Kewir & Gabriel, n.d).
Like other countries across the globe, Kenya’s past General and By-elections have been
marred by election-related crimes and offences. These crimes and offences vary in magnitude
with the worst being the 2007 general elections. According to Kenya Human Rights
Commission (2008), the election-related crimes and offences reported in 2007 were bribery
including monetary handouts (81.0%), hate speech (28.0%), discrimination (21.0%),
incitement to violence (15.0%) and vote buying (4.0%). A study by NCRC (2016) showed
that a number of election-related crimes and offences were committed during the
electioneering period. The prevalent crimes revealed by this study were bribery (40.6%),
voter/ballot fraud (16.6%), hate speech (15.4%), fighting (11.8%), voter intimidation (9.2%),
and rigging of candidates during nominations (9.0%), defacing of posters (6.9%) and
provision of food, refreshments, fare reimbursement and rewards to supporters (6.0%).
Studies have shown that people and institutions suffer in elections marred by election-related
crimes and offences. According to Kenya Human Rights Commission (2008), women are
among the categories that suffer most when there are election-related crimes and offences.
They are more prone to gender-based violence and discrimination including rape, indecent
assault, and sexual harassment during the electioneering period. According to Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008), over 300 women were raped during post-
election violence in the early months of year 2008. Further, children are left injured,
neglected or orphaned due to deaths of their parents or guardians. Other victims of election-
related crimes and offences include political aspirants and candidates who may fall victims
by being attacked and suffer injury or lose their lives; lose socially and economically after
being rigged out if they had invested resources in the elections; and their families may lose
their social status or even develop conflicts as a result of the loss of the anticipated political
position. Further, according to IFES (2012) both public and private institutions may become
victims of election-related crimes and offences when they fall victims of looting of
5
businesses and end up collapsing while investors are scared. Public entities including security
agencies involved in elections lose credibility if they engage in commission or omission of
election-related crimes and offences. For instance, the police were accused of using excessive
force by unjustified shooting of people and failure to protect lives and property during the
2007/08 General Elections in Kenya.
Individuals and organizations have been accused of perpetuating election-related crimes and
offences. Politicians; political party agents and supporters; the youths; public officials; hired
goons; and members of the organized criminal gangs have been cited as the main perpetrators
of election-related crimes and offences. On the other hand, some public and non-public
agencies have been accused of engaging in election-related crimes and offences. Public
agencies include the NPS and NGAO while non-public agencies include ICT-based firms
(such as mobile telephony companies) which have at times been accused of being unethical
and running or failing to prevent partisan advertisements and announcements and
propagating hate speech and incitement communication (NCRC, 2013; SRIC, 2012; TJRC,
2013).
According to NCRC (2016), the main perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences
were political aspirants and or candidates (45.7%), unemployed youths (28.0%), supporters
of politicians (14.5%), party officials and agents (13.5%) and voters (11.4%). Political
aspirants and or candidates, unemployed youths, supporters of politicians, party officials,
party agents and voters. Political aspirants and candidates engage in bribery to influence
and or buy support from registered voters who may sometimes be financially
unstable. Perceived supporters of political opponents are bribed to vote for the bribing
candidate or bribed so as not to vote for the challenger (International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, 2012; Makabila, 2013).
Literature on the effects of election-related crimes and offences shows that Kenya has
previously experienced a spate of election-related crimes and offences whose effects are felt
to date. According to National Elections Monitoring Unit (1993), the 1992 general elections
were occasioned by clashes where over 1,000 people were killed, 20,000 families displaced
and property worth Kshs 56 Million destroyed. Similarly, in 1997 General Elections, at least
25,000 families were internally displaced, 120 lives lost and properties worth Kshs 60
million destroyed (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1998). Likewise, the 2007 General
Election were marred by similar experiences and are considered the worst in the country’s
history as they were characterized by high levels of election-related crimes and offences. For
instance, over 1,300 Kenyans lost their lives and over 650,000 people were displaced
(Independent Review Commission, 2008; International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2008;
Commission of Inquiry Post-Election Violence, 2008). Further, 3,561 people suffered severe
injuries; 117,216 private properties destroyed; and 491 government properties destroyed
(International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2013). In the 2013 General Elections, 477 lives
were lost and 118,000 people displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Finally, in the 2017
General Elections, at least 37 persons including a six months old baby died due to
confrontations between state security agencies and opposition supporters during 33 days of
protests, while unknown amount of properties was lost (Kenya National Commission on
Human Rights, 2017).
In an effort to mitigate the effects of election-related crimes and offences, the current and
previous Governments have instituted a raft of remedial measures. For instance, the Elections
Act 2011was enacted. The Act clearly stipulates what constitutes election offences. In
addition, there has been enhanced civic education on electoral processes, voter’s rights and
obligations and peace campaigns in the country by the IEBC, the Media, NGOs, and FBOs
among other agencies. Further, a multi-agency team on election planning and management
has been put in place. Other measures include mapping out of election-related crimes and
7
offences hotspots, intelligence gathering and sharing, early warning mechanisms to identify
and mitigate threats to security and peace during electioneering period, use of Biometric
Voter Registration, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation among other measures
(Munuhe, 2012; UNDP Kenya, 2013; Sharma, 2017).
According to Höglund & Jarstad (2010) in an attempt to address election-related crimes and
offences, practitioners and policy makers ought to put into consideration the consequences of
the electoral system and the risk to violence. This means that there is need to analyze the
potential changes to electoral systems, codes of conduct, and other regulations on the
electoral process. Also, there is need to stipulate sanctions against violence makers, for
example by limiting the right for repeat violence-makers to engage in politics - to stem the
culture of impunity. In addition, there is need to design measures and allocate adequate
resources to support the institutional settings and legal frameworks geared towards mitigating
electoral crimes and offences, for instance through the use of peace pledges.
In the recent past, elections in Kenya have been marred by incidences of crimes and offences
which undermine both the legitimacy of elections and public confidence in our democracy.
For instance, the Kenya National Human Rights Commission recorded 32 deaths in the run-
up to the 2017 General Elections - 3 minors, 26 males and 3 females (KNCHR, 2017). The
report further documented 31 cases of property destruction in the major trading centres in
Nairobi City, Kakamega, Vihiga and Kisumu counties.
The above spate of election-related crimes and offences did not manifest itself in the 2017
General Elections alone. It was equally experienced in the previous elections. Illustratively,
according to the Human Rights Watch (2013), during the 2013 General Elections, 477 lives
were lost and 118,000 people displaced. Similarly, Adeagbo and Iyi (2011) note that as a
consequence of the 2007/2008 election violence, about 1000 people lost their lives, over
300,000 people sustained injuries and 600,000 persons internally displaced. While the
magnitude of these vices varies from each election period, the incidents keep on recurring. It
is against this backdrop that this study seeks to ascertain the current status of these crimes
and offences with aim of suggesting remedial policy recommendations.
8
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this study was to establish the nature of election-related crimes and
offences in Kenya.
ii. Identify the victims and perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences.
iii. Examine factors contributing to and triggers of election-related crimes and offences.
vi. Establish the challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences.
This study is justified by a number of reasons. Firstly, the Government of Kenya has a focal
role in ensuring that all citizens enjoy their political rights as provided for under Article 38 of
the Constitution of Kenya 2010. These include: freedom of making political choices; right to
free, fair and regular elections; and right to be registered as a voter and to vote or be voted
for. Election-related crimes and offences negates the enjoyment of these rights by the
citizenry. Consequently, this study is very critical in establishing the status and nature of
election-related crimes and offences in Kenya with a view of recommending remedial
measures.
Secondly, NCRC (2016) established that the consequences of election-related crimes and
offences are detrimental to all facets of the society. For instance, they result into loss of lives,
injuries, destruction of property, poor governance, among others. These effects threaten the
existential fabric of the society – and indeed the State. There is need therefore to have in
9
place evidence-based recommendations that will be effective and efficient in curbing these
crimes and offences.
Thirdly, the Government of Kenya has instituted a wide array of reforms aimed at mitigating
election-related crimes and offences in the country. Key among them include the institutional
reforms in the electoral management agency, multi-agency framework in electoral
management, and establishment of the electoral code of conduct, among others.
Nevertheless, election-related crimes and offences continue unabated. This study seeks to
establish the underlying factors perpetuating these crimes/ offences.
Lastly, the study was done in fulfilment of the objects of the National Crime Research
Centre. The Centre is mandated to carry out research into the causes of crime and its
prevention with a view to assisting agencies in the administration of criminal justice in their
policy planning and formulation. Thus, the findings of this study will be very critical in
informing relevant Government agencies and stakeholders on the various aspects of election-
related crimes and offences in Kenya.
Election-related crimes and offences is a sensitive and emotive subject among various
quarters of the society. It is against this background that this study made the following
assumptions, that:
i. The sample respondents would give objective views about election-related crimes and
offences despite emotive nature pf election-related crimes and offences.
ii. The sample respondents are knowledgeable on the subject of election-related crimes
and offences in Kenya and would freely report accurate information on this topic
without any fear or prejudice.
iii. State agencies and public officials will cooperate with researchers in providing the
required information.
iv. Institutions charged with prevention and control of corruption are effective.
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1.6 Scope of the Study
The thematic scope of this study was the election-related crimes and offences. Specifically,
the following variables were assessed: the prevalence and typology of election-related crimes
and offences; perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences; factors contributing to and
triggers of election-related crimes and offences; assess the effects of election-related crimes
and offences; existing intervention strategies put in place to deal with election-related crimes
and offences; and challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences.
Data collection was conducted in the 47 counties in Kenya.
Rational Choice Theory was proposed by Adam Smith in 1776. The central argument
espoused by this theory is that individuals rely on rational calculations to make rational
choices that result in outcomes aligned with their own best self-interests (Calhoun, 1995). In
other words, people weigh the perceived and likely gains to be made from a particular action
against the likely costs to be incurred and when they perceive that the likely gains outweigh
the likely costs they adopt the behavior. Also, individuals will use the resources at their
disposal to optimize their gains. However, when the value of the gains diminishes below the
value of the costs incurred, the person will stop the action.
Based on the aforementioned assumptions of Rational Choice Theory, it can be argued that
the commission of election-related crimes and offences is a calculated and deliberate
undertaking. For instance, winning an election is likely to give the greatest satisfaction to
rational political aspirants even if that means engaging in election-related crimes and
offences. Equally, owing to the economic downturns occasioned by COVID-19 and the
accompanying containment measures, and the high rates of poverty experienced in the
country, some election-related crimes such as accepting a bribe, being treated or hired to
interrupt political processes, among others, are likely to be satisfying to the affected
segments of the population. The policy implication of this theory is that to reduce these
crimes, interventions ought to focus in diminishing the value of the perceived or likely gains
as a result of engaging in election-related crimes and offences.
11
1.7.2 Aggressive Cues Theory
Aggressive cues theorists are quick to point out that watching violence does not mean always
becoming more aggressive or violent but increase the chances (Berkowitz, 1969). They also
note that the way in which the violence is presented will have an impact on individuals. For
instance, if individuals can relate to the protagonist committing the violence as presented in a
justifiable way, they can be led to aggressive behavior too. For example, if an individual sees
people being bribed by politicians every day, they are more likely to accept voter bribery as a
normal behavior.
In this study, this theory will help in understanding how the socio-political environment
within which people live and operate can be a determining factor as to whether they may
engage in election-related crimes and offences.
12
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with research design, methods and tools of data collection, data collection
and management, methods of data analysis and ethical considerations.
The sampling unit for the members of the public was the household. The sample size for the
members of public (n=2576) was determined using the Slovin’s formula, thus:
n = N/ (1+Ne2)
Where: n = target sample size; N=total population size of households (12,028,743); e: margin
of error (0.0197 at 97% confidence level).
Probability proportional to size sampling was used to distribute the sample in the 47 counties.
13
Table 2.1 Distribution of the Sample Respondents per County
County Members of public Political party representatives Electoral and election Governance/electoral-related
regulatory/enabling agencies’ civil society organizations’
representatives representatives
Target Achieved Rate (%) Target Achieved Rate (%) Target Achieved Rate (%) Target Achieved Rate (%)
Baringo 31 30 96.8 8 7 87.5 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Bomet 41 38 92.7 8 8 100.0 10 13 130.0 3 3 100.0
Bungoma 80 80 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Busia 43 43 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Elgeyo Marakwet 22 22 100.0 8 4 50.0 10 5 50.0 3 3 100.0
Embu 42 42 100.0 8 5 62.5 10 11 110.0 3 2 66.7
Garissa 31 30 96.8 8 5 62.5 10 13 130.0 3 3 100.0
Homa Bay 58 58 100.0 8 7 87.5 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Isiolo 13 13 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Kajiado 69 67 97.1 8 11 137.5 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Kakamega 95 92 96.8 8 6 75.0 10 10 100.0 3 2 66.7
Kericho 45 45 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Kiambu 174 170 97.7 8 5 62.5 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Kilifi 65 40 61.5 8 7 87.5 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Kirinyaga 46 46 100.0 8 5 62.5 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Kisii 67 60 89.6 8 7 87.5 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Kisumu City 66 66 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Kitui 60 60 100.0 8 3 37.5 10 11 110.0 3 1 33.3
Kwale 38 38 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Laikipia 33 33 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 11 110.0 3 3 100.0
Lamu 8 8 100.0 8 9 112.5 10 7 70.0 3 3 100.0
Machakos 88 88 100.0 8 9 112.5 10 7 70.0 3 2 66.7
Makueni 53 53 100.0 8 10 125.0 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Mandera 28 28 100.0 8 5 62.5 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Marsabit 17 17 100.0 8 6 75.0 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Meru 93 93 100.0 8 6 75.0 10 9 90.0 3 2 66.7
Migori 52 51 98.1 8 8 100.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Mombasa 84 84 100.0 8 6 75.0 10 11 110.0 3 2 66.7
14
County Members of public Political party representatives Electoral and election Governance/electoral-related
regulatory/enabling agencies’ civil society organizations’
representatives representatives
Target Achieved Rate (%) Target Achieved Rate (%) Target Achieved Rate (%) Target Achieved Rate (%)
Murang'a 69 52 75.4 8 7 87.5 10 3 30.0 3 3 100.0
Nairobi City 329 327 99.4 8 7 87.5 10 13 130.0 3 4 133.3
Nakuru City 135 135 100.0 8 7 87.5 10 11 110.0 3 3 100.0
Nandi 44 44 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 7 70.0 3 4 133.3
Narok 53 51 96.2 8 9 112.5 10 11 110.0 3 4 133.3
Nyamira 34 34 100.0 8 7 87.5 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Nyandarua 40 40 100.0 8 7 87.5 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Nyeri 54 42 77.8 8 7 87.5 10 5 50.0 3 4 133.3
Samburu 14 14 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Siaya 55 55 100.0 8 8 100.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Taita Taveta 21 21 100.0 8 6 75.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Tana River 15 14 93.3 8 10 125.0 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Tharaka-Nithi 24 21 87.5 8 8 100.0 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Trans Nzoia 51 51 100.0 8 5 62.5 10 8 80.0 3 2 66.7
Turkana 37 37 100.0 8 7 87.5 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
Uasin Gishu 67 66 98.5 8 9 112.5 10 9 90.0 3 3 100.0
Vihiga 32 31 96.9 8 7 87.5 10 8 80.0 3 3 100.0
Wajir 29 29 100.0 8 4 50.0 10 12 120.0 3 3 100.0
West Pokot 25 24 96.0 8 6 75.0 10 10 100.0 3 3 100.0
2669 2583 96.8 376 332 88.3 470 434 92.3 141 137 97.2
15
An arbitrary 376 political parties’ representatives (8 per county); 470 electoral and election
regulatory/enabling agencies’ representatives (10 per county); and 141 governance/electoral-
related civil society organizations’ representatives were targeted for the study.
The study targeted 3 key informants in each county and 16 focus group discussions (FGD) in
16 counties. Purposive sampling was used to select the key informants and counties for focus
group discussions. Only individuals deemed as highly knowledgeable on the subject of
election-related crimes and offences owing to the positions they hold; and the counties with
high incidence of election-related crimes and offences per region based on the previous
reports were selected.
Qualified Research Assistants were identified and trained. They were then allocated study
sites and facilitated with required resources for the exercise (that is, funds, data collection
16
tools and authority letters). Supervision of the Research Assistants and quality control of the
exercise was done by the Centre’s researchers.
All data collected from the field were then organized and analyzed at the NCRC’s offices. A
draft report of the study was compiled by NCRC‟s researchers for review by NCRC‟s
Research and Development Committee of the Governing Council, the full Governing Council
and later for stakeholder validation before the final dissemination to the relevant agencies
and the public.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is organized into the following sections: the first section addresses prevalence
and typology of election-related crimes and offences; the second maps out the victims and
perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences; the third deals with factors contributing
to election-related crimes and offences; the fourth assesses the effects of election-related
crimes and offences; and the fifth examines the existing control measures and their
effectiveness in dealing with election-related crimes and offences while the last section
captures the challenges facing control of election-related crimes and offences in Kenya.
The survey respondents were divided into four categories: political party representatives;
members of public; respondents drawn from election, regulatory and/or enabling agencies;
and respondents drawn from Governance/ electoral-related civil society organizations.
This study interviewed a total of 3481 sample respondents of whom 62.2% were males and
37.8% were females. Out of this, the majority (72.9%) of the sample respondents were aged
between 18 and 51. These findings therefore point to a productive segment of the population
in Kenya and their probable interest in election and governance matters. Majority of the
respondents of this study were married (79.6%). This implies that most of the respondents
were family members who were likely to influence one another in the family setting on the
election-related issues.
Also, a significant majority of the respondents (96.2%) had attained some level of education.
This was an indication that the level of literacy was high and that most of the respondents
were knowledgeable enough to engage on the study’s subject. A noticeable percentage of the
sample respondents (38.8%) were business people and in formal employment (36.4%). This
shows that most of the respondents were engaged in some income generating activity. On the
level of income, (56.7%) of the respondents were of the low-income status. This reflects the
national picture as depicted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)
Economic Survey of 2021 where low-income earners formed the majority followed by the
middle and high income earners respectively.
18
Finally, a significant majority of the respondents had stayed in their localities for more than
10 years (74.4%). This implies that they had knowledge and or experience on issues of
election-related crimes and offences in these localities having lived/witnessed two election
cycles.
The distribution of the sample across the various categories of the socio-demographic
variables is summarized in Table 3.1 below.
The sample respondents were asked whether there existed election-related crimes and
offences committed during pre-elections, campaigns, voting and post-voting period in their
locality. Majority (96.2%) of the respondents said that they had knowledge and or experience
on existence of the election-related crimes and offences in their locality as indicated in Figure
1 below.
3.8%
96.2%
Yes No
The above finding confirms the existence of the election-related crimes and offences in
Kenya; and concurs with NCRC (2016) where 85.9% of the respondents indicated that they
were aware of the occurrence of election-related crimes and offences in their localities during
20
the 2013 General Elections. Therefore, there has been a significant increase (10.1%) on the
public perception on the incidence of election-related crimes and offences in 2021.
The high incidence of election-related crimes and offences in Kenya may plausibly explain
why some members of the public have refrained and are not willing to participate in the
electoral processes as voters. Indeed, among the sample respondents, approximately 1 out of
10 females (9.2%) and 2 out of 10 (15.2%) youths were not registered as voters as captured
in Figure 2.
The prominent reasons for the respondents not registering as voters included lack of national
identification document (41.4%) and lack of interest in elections (38.9%). Some of the
respondents mentioned ignorance (15.3%) while others cited inaccessibility to voters
registration center’s (12.1%) and health related issues (1.9%) as the reasons as summarized
in Figure 3.
21
Figure 3: Reasons for not registering as a voter (based on percentage of cases)
On the one hand, those who cited lack of national identification document as the reason for
non-registration as voters portray either lack of initiative/inadequate knowledge on their part
in applying for the identification document or delays in the issuance of the identification
documents. Therefore, the Department of National Registration Bureau should expedite the
process of issuance of identification documents as well as conduct civic education for those
eligible to apply for the documents. On the other hand, those who indicated lack of interest in
elections pointed out to their lack of confidence in Kenya’s electoral system
The most prevalent election-related crimes and offences identified during the pre-election
period included hate speech (40.1%), voter bribery (39.8%), campaigning outside the
prescribed period (29.5%), incitement to violence (26.4%) and giving of alcohol and drugs to
interrupt electoral processes (25.3%). The main election-related crimes and offences during
the campaign period were voter bribery (62.5%) and hate speech (57.5%). The other key
crimes and offences identified were: giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt electoral
processes (42.2%) and incitement to violence (41.2%). Other election-related crimes and
offences committed were: stealing and looting of property (39.5%); creating disturbance and
22
engaging in disorderly conduct (35.1%); treating (34.8%); affray (32.4%); and threat to
violence (30.4%). The most prominent election-related crimes and offences during voting
identified by the respondents included voter bribery (62.2%) and giving of alcohol and drugs
to interrupt electoral processes (37.5%). Others included hate speech (28.1%); provision of
food, refreshments, fare reimbursement and rewards to supporters (treating) (24.8%); threat
to violence (24.5%); creating disturbance and engaging in disorderly conduct (21.7%); and
incitement to violence (20.9%). The study further established that the most common and
significant election-related crimes and offences committed during the post-voting period
were stealing and looting of property (45.5%), malicious damage to property (24.9 %), use of
violence (21.2 %), incitement to violence (20.5 %), forceful displacement of the population
(20.5%) and hate speech (20.0%). Table 3.2 below summarizes this information.
23
Table 3.2: Types and prevalence of election-related crimes and offences
Responses (Percentage of cases)
Election-related crimes and offences during the pre-election Pre-election Campaign Voting Post Voting
period period Period Period Period
Hate speech 40.1 57.5 28.1 20.0
Voter bribery 39.8 62.5 62.2 11.4
Campaigning outside the prescribed period 29.5 6.4
Incitement to violence 26.4 41.3 20.9 20.5
Giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt electoral processes 25.3 42.2 37.5 18.2
Provision of food, refreshments, fare reimbursement and rewards 24.0 34.8 24.8 4.7
to supporters (Treating )
Stealing and looting of property 20.6 39.5 27.9 45.5
Rigging 24.3 15.3
Creating disturbance and engaging in disorderly conduct 19.2 35.1 21.7 12.8
Threat to violence 18.6 30.4 24.5 19.4
Character assassination 14.5 24.7 10.3 5.4
Affray 14.0 34.8 15.2 17.1
Intimidation of the opponents 13.8 28.0 13.1 11.1
Defacing of posters 29.0
Use of violence 11.5 23.5 14.4 21.2
Malicious damage to property 10.8 22.3 14.8 24.9
Double registration 8.1
Assault 7.8 17.2 11.3
Announcing false results 15.3
Selling and buying of voters’ Identification Document 7.7 13.3 13.5
Forceful displacement of populations 6.5 8.1 6.3 20.5
Using state resources by aspirants for political purposes 5.5 8.3
Giving false information, forgery and impersonation during voter 6.0
registration
Burglary 5.1 8.8 6.4 8.0
Not maintaining secrecy of voting 9.7 5.6
Murder 5.0 10.8 7.5 18.3
Voter intimidation 4.9 10.9 19.3 3.1
Ballot and vote fraud 11.8 6.1
Unlawful possession of weapons 4.2 3.9 5.5
24
Responses (Percentage of cases)
Election-related crimes and offences during the pre-election Pre-election Campaign Voting Post Voting
period period Period Period Period
Violation of IEBC’s code of conduct 7.2 4.7
Hindering other persons from registering 4.0 5.9
Discrimination and/or being denied to vote (voter rights violations) 4.5
Robbery 4.0 7.0 4.1 6.6
Arson 2.9 5.8 3.9 10.4
Unjustified use of weapons 2.2 3.5 2.2 3.9
Using state resources by aspirants and candidates 2.5 2.0
Unauthorized displaying of symbols of political party and/or 3.8
candidates at voting Centre
Rape 1.9 4.5 2.4 4.6
Kidnapping and abduction 1.8 3.2 2.1 2.0
Preventing opponents from using free media 3.6 1.1 0.7
Voting by unregistered persons 1.4
Unjustified use of national security organs for political purposes 1.8 2.9 2.6 3.6
Forced voter transfer 0.8
Impersonation during political party nominations 1.0 3.8 0.5
Snatching or destroying election material 0.7 4.0 1.1
Defilement 0.1 0.1 0.1
25
The above findings show that voter bribery is one of the most prevalent offense in the pre-
election, campaign and voting periods. The results further indicate that the prevalence of this
offence is significantly high during the campaign and voting period. Section 9 of the
Election Offences Act considers voter bribery to have taken place when during an election
period, a person directly or indirectly offers a bribe to influence a voter to vote or refrain
from voting for a particular candidate or political party. Voter bribery also occurs where a
voter is influenced to attend, participate or refrain from attending a political meeting, a
march, a demonstration or other political event. The high prevalence of voter bribery
witnessed during the pre-election, campaign and voting periods may be explained by the fact
that the perpetrators engage in this vice to influence people to vote or not to vote in a certain
manner.
The study also identified hate speech as a prominent crime during the pre-election and
campaign period. Section 12 of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)
Act indicates that hate speech involves the use of threatening, inciting, abusive or insulting
words or behavior, or display of any written material with the intention of stirring up ethnic
hatred. Indeed, as confirmed by NCIC in a Press Briefing dated 8th April 2022, the incidence
of hate speech in Kenya is high.
For the post-voting period, the key crime/ offence identified was stealing and looting of
property. In the recent past, election results have been disputed leading violent
demonstrations by the aggrieved supporters. These demonstrations have been characterized
by the incidences such as destruction, stealing and looting of property.
An analysis based on the sample respondent categories showed that there were no significant
differences on the respondents’ views on the prevalence and typology of election-related
crimes and offences in Kenya. For example, all respondent categories agreed that voter
bribery was the leading offence in the pre-election, campaign and voting period. Equally, all
categories agreed that stealing and looting of property was the most prevalent crime in the
post-voting period. This information is captured in Table 3.3.
26
Table 3.3 Types and prevalence of election-related crimes and offences as per respondent category
Election-related crimes and offences per Members of public Political party Respondents drawn from Respondents drawn from
respondent category (percentage of cases) representative election, regulatory Governance
(percentage of cases) and/or enabling agencies /electoral-related civil
(percentage of cases) society organizations
(percentage of cases)
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voter bribery 42.1 64.0 61.5 33.0 58.6 72.7 40.6 59.1 63.9 40.7 58.0 68.9
Hate speech 41.1 57.2 28.7 21.5 45.6 62.0 30.9 18.4 38.9 58.1 31.3 18.2 39.0 53.4 26.2 20.6
Campaigning outside the prescribed period 30.8 6.6 2.3 26.5 4.8 1.7 28.7 6.3 1.5 34.7 9.0 0.0
Giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt 27.5 44.0 39.7 21.0 25.9 43.0 36.7 17.9 18.3 33.7 31.3 9.7 22.9 35.9 34.4 13.4
electoral processes
Incitement to violence 26.3 40.1 20.3 20.6 32.3 49.8 23.2 24.8 28.5 43.3 24.7 24.5 23.7 38.9 23.0 16.5
Provision of food, refreshments, fare 24.6 35.1 24.9 5.0 25.9 38.9 26.7 5.1 24.5 31.3 26.3 5.2 24.6 33.6 25.4 3.1
reimbursement and rewards to supporters
(Treating)
Creating disturbance and engaging in disorderly 19.5 34.9 21.2 12.9 20.1 34.3 20.6 14.1 22.5 38.1 26.3 14.9 14.4 33.6 32.0 11.3
conduct
Threat to violence 17.6 29.2 16.2 20.1 26.5 36.8 19.3 19.2 22.3 33.0 20.8 23.8 16.9 29.8 9.8 12.4
Stealing and looting of property 16.4 27.3 30.3 48.2 12.2 23.4 23.8 45.7 12.4 22.7 31.3 45.0 8.5 16.8 20.5 40.2
Character assassination 14.9 24.0 10.1 5.4 17.7 31.8 12.5 6.8 13.5 22.7 8.9 6.7 13.6 29.0 16.4 4.1
Affray 14.1 15.4 18.0 11.2 29.9 15.4 14.1 18.3 32.3 16.8 21.2 16.1 28.2 13.1 13.4
Intimidation of the opponents 11.7 25.1 11.7 10.5 26.2 41.4 17.7 18.4 17.7 33.3 15.8 11.5 16.9 34.4 18.9 11.3
Malicious damage to property 10.9 22.7 15.4 26.3 12.2 23.7 14.1 24.8 10.7 19.2 13.7 24.2 11.9 20.6 13.9 26.8
Use of violence 10.7 22.1 13.3 27.1 15.5 28.8 22.7 16.1 27.5 28.9
Selling and buying of voters’ Identification 6.9 12.1 12.7 0.5 11.2 17.8 17.7 1.3 10.7 14.8 15.8 0.7 8.5 19.8 15.6 0.0
Document
Double registration 6.7 10.2 14.9 11.9
Assault 6.6 16.1 10.3 10.9 9.2 27.1 17.7 12.4 13.8 22.4 14.2 15.2 11.0 27.5 11.5 12.4
Forceful displacement of persons 5.5 7.2 6.1 19.5 10.5 12.1 30.8 9.3 9.9 7.4 24.2 9.3 9.9 7.4 18.6
Burglary 5.3 9.0 7.0 9.0 5.8 14.6 6.1 6.4 6.2 16.7 4.7 7.1 1.7 6.9 2.5 4.1
Murder 4.6 10.8 7.6 18.2 6.8 11.8 6.8 17.9 5.9 10.3 8.4 24.2 6.8 12.2 8.2 18.6
27
Election-related crimes and offences per Members of public Political party Respondents drawn from Respondents drawn from
respondent category (percentage of cases) representative election, regulatory Governance
(percentage of cases) and/or enabling agencies /electoral-related civil
(percentage of cases) society organizations
(percentage of cases)
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Using state resources by aspirants for political 4.4 6.3 1.9 6.1 13.7 3.9 11.0 13.1 4.7 9.3 16.8 2.5
purposes
Giving false information, forgery and 4.1 10.2 12.7 11.0
impersonation during voter registration
Robbery 4.0 6.9 4.5 7.4 4.1 6.9 3.5 6.0 5.1 7.9 8.4 5.6 3.4 6.9 1.6 5.2
Voter intimidation 3.8 9.3 23.6 2.6 5.1 14.6 43.7 5.6 11.3 16.7 34.2 5.2 6.8 12.2 42.7 1.0
Unlawful possession of weapons 3.3 4.7 3.2 5.2 7.5 9.3 6.4 6.0 7.6 10.8 7.4 9.3 5.1 5.3 2.5 3.1
Arson 2.4 5.3 3.5 11.2 3.7 6.5 5.5 9.4 5.6 6.7 4.7 11.2 3.4 12.2 6.6 6.2
Rape 1.8 3.8 2.4 4.4 1.4 5.6 1.9 4.3 3.1 6.9 3.2 7.4 2.5 8.4 2.5 5.2
Kidnapping and abduction 1.4 2.5 1.7 1.6 3.1 3.4 3.9 0.9 3.4 6.7 4.5 2.6 2.5 5.3 2.5 2.1
Unjustified use of national security organs for 1.3 2.1 2.0 2.9 3.7 6.9 4.5 4.3 3.4 3.4 4.7 7.8 1.7 6.1 2.5 4.1
political purposes
Unjustified use of weapons 1.3 2.5 1.7 2.9 3.1 4.4 3.2 5.1 6.5 8.1 5.8 8.9 4.2 6.1 1.6 5.2
Snatching or destroying election material 0.4 0.5 2.9 0.6 0.7 1.9 6.4 3.0 0.8 1.2 7.6 2.6 1.7 0.0 9.0 0.0
Defilement 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.0 1.0
28
Election-related crimes and offences per Members of public Political party Respondents drawn from Respondents drawn from
respondent category (percentage of cases) representative election, regulatory Governance
(percentage of cases) and/or enabling agencies /electoral-related civil
(percentage of cases) society organizations
(percentage of cases)
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Post-Voting Period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Pre-election period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Campaign Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Voting Period
Unauthorized display of symbols of political 2.7 6.4 7.1 9.0
parties and/or candidates at the voting center
Violation of IEBC’s code of conduct 5.9 15.1 8.4 10.7
29
In concurrence with the findings on the typology of election-related crimes and offences by
the sample respondents, the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted in 16 counties also
showed that voter bribery; hate speech; assault; and use of violence were the most prevalent
types of election-related crimes reported by the discussants in most counties in Kenya as
shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Election-related crimes and offences committed during electioneering period
as highlighted by Focus Group Discussants
Election- County
related
crimes and
Total tally
Trans Nzoia
Usan Gishu
Nyandarua
Kakamega
offences
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
committed
during the
electioneerin
g period
Voter bribery √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 12
Hate speech √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 10
Assault √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 9
Use of √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 7
violence
Voter √ √ √ √ √ √ 6
intimidation
Incitement to √ √ √ √ √ √ 6
violence
Being a √ √ √ √ √ 5
member of an
organized
criminal gang
and engaging
in organized
criminal
activities
Defacing of √ √ √ √ √ 5
posters
Malicious √ √ √ √ √ 5
damage to
property
Giving of √ √ √ √ √ 5
alcohol &
drugs to
interrupt
electoral
processes
Campaigning √ √ √ √ √ 5
outside the
prescribed
30
Election- County
related
crimes and
Total tally
Trans Nzoia
Usan Gishu
Nyandarua
Kakamega
offences
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
committed
during the
electioneerin
g period
period
Threat to √ √ √ √ √ 5
violence
Rigging √ √ √ √ 4
Creating √ √ √ √ 4
disturbance
and engaging
in disorderly
conducts
Murder √ √ √ 3
Forceful √ √ √ 3
displacement
of populations
Stealing and √ √ √ 3
looting of
property
Double √ √ √ √ 4
registration
Selling & √ √ √ 3
buying of
voter’s ID
Hindering √ √ √ 3
other persons
from
registering
Ballot & vote √ √ 2
fraud
Intimidation √ √ 2
of opponents
Unlawful √ 1
possession of
voter cards
Unlawful √ 1
possession of
weapons
Affray √ 1
Using state √ 1
resources by
aspirants &
candidates
Rape √ 1
Arson √ 1
Stealing of √ 1
properties
Violation of √ 1
31
Election- County
related
crimes and
Total tally
Trans Nzoia
Usan Gishu
Nyandarua
Kakamega
offences
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
committed
during the
electioneerin
g period
IEBC’s code
of conduct
Stealing stock √ 1
including
cattle rustling
Total Tally 5 9 5 9 6 7 12 8 7 8 6 5 5 13 11 4 120
In consonance with the above findings on the typology of election-related crimes and
offences, a political party representative had this to say:
―Sometimes in this locality we experience voter bribery by politicians, candidates and
their agents; treating; affray; corruption in the procurement of electoral materials
and services; forgery; intimidation especially of women; and rigging of the elections.
These crimes occur in varying electioneering period‖ (Key Informant Interview,
Vihiga County).
A senior County Government of Kericho official also confirmed existence of election-related
crimes and offences:
―There are a number of crimes and offences committed during electioneering period
especially along the Border of Kericho and Kisumu Counties. They include but not
limited to rigging, riots, murder, elections violence, arson, and destruction of IEBC
property, bribery, campaigning outside stipulated timelines, and illegal possession of
firearms and abuse of office during recruitment of electoral officials‖ (Key Informant
Interview, Kericho County).
3.3.3 Whether land use and/or ownership is a factor in election-related crimes and
offences
The respondents were asked whether land use and/or ownership is a factor of election-related
crimes and offences. Majority of them (58.5%) disagreed that land use and/or ownership is a
contributing factor to election-related crimes and offences while (36.7%) agreed and
(4.8 %)were neutral. These findings are portrayed in Figure 4.
32
Figure 4: Whether land use and/or ownership is a factor in election-related crimes and
offences
The key counties where land use and/or ownership was mentioned as a factor in election-
related crimes and offences were Mandera (84.4%), Lamu (77.8%), Uashin Gishu (75.9%),
Elgeyo Marakwet (73.5%), Marsabit (71.4%), Garissa (68.6%), Narok (64.0%), Nakuru
(61.0%), Samburu (60.0%), Wajir (56.2%), Trans Nzoia (56.1%), Kwale (55.9%), Tana
River (54.3%), Kilifi (52.6%), Nandi (51.0%), Mombasa (51.0%), Laikipia (50.9%), Bomet
(50.0%) as captured in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Whether land use and/or ownership is a factor in election-related crimes and
offences
The findings in Table 3.5 reveal that land question was a key factor contributing to election-
related crimes and offences in a significant number of counties. As a mitigation measure, this
study calls for the full implementation of the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission’s Report of 2013 on historical land injustices.
Still on the subject of land use and/or ownership in context of election-related crimes and
offences, respondents were tasked to indicate their level of agreement on some statements.
On whether it is right to destroy political opponents’ property to settle land dispute, a
34
significant majority (99.6%) of the respondents disagreed. Similarly, when asked if it is right
to evict political opponent from their land during election period to settle land disputes, a
resounding majority (99.4%) disagreed. Correspondingly, on whether it is right to use
violence to intimidate political opponents to settle land disputes, an overwhelming majority
(99.6%) disagreed. These results are captured in Table 3.6.
From the findings, it is indicative that majority of the respondents disapprove of the
commission of election-related crimes and offences aimed at settling land disputes. This
finding may plausibly explain why hate speech and incitement to violence are the main
drivers of election-related crimes and offences as majority of Kenyans, on their own,
disapprove of these vices but only engage in them after being influenced/incited.
3.3.4 Typology and prevalence of land use and/or ownership conflicts witnessed and/or
encountered during recent political elections
This study further examined the types and prevalence of land use and/or ownership conflicts
witnessed and/ or encountered during recent political elections. Majority of the respondents
(60.0%) said there they had not witnessed or encountered any land use and/or ownership
conflicts during the recent political elections, while (17.2%) indicated forceful displacement
of populations, (9.9%) mentioned trespass. In addition, (8.2%) identified ethnic or racial
contempt. The details are presented in Table 3.7.
35
Table 3.7: Land use and/or ownership conflicts witnessed and/ or encountered during
recent political elections
The above findings resonate well with an early study conducted by NCRC in 2016 where it
was established that forceful displacement of populations and destruction of property were
among the main election-related crimes and offences involving land use and ownership that
were reported (NCRC, 2016). Also, the TJRC (2013) report established that forceful
displacement of populations and destruction of property were among the main crimes and
offences committed in the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya.
The findings in Table 3.7 were further corroborated by the Focus Group Discussions.
Incitement to violence was reported in 6 out of 16 counties while forceful displacement of
populations and use of violence in 5 out of 16 counties respectively. Trans-Nzoia and
Baringo Counties led in the typology of election-related crimes and offences arising from
land use and/or ownership with a tally of 5 each. They were followed closely by Kakamega
and Kisumu Counties with a tally of 4 respectively as presented in Table 3.8.
36
Table 3.8: Election-related crimes and offences arising from land use and/or ownership
as highlighted by Focus Group Discussants
Election-related Counties
crimes and offences
arising from land
Uasin Gishu
Trans Nzoia
Nyandarua
Machakos
Kakamega
Total tally
Mombasa
use and/or
Kirinyiga
Baringo
Kisumu
Nakuru
Garissa
Nairobi
ownership
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
Incitement to ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
violence
Forceful ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5
displacement of
populations
Use of violence ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5
Hate speech ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 4
Disputes over the ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 4
boundaries
Affray ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 4
Land grabbing ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 4
Malicious damage to ✓ ✓ 2
property
Threat to violence ✓ 1
Illegal grazing ✓ 1
Intimidation ✓ 1
Poisoning of farm ✓ 1
produce to kill
livestock for
pastoralists
Murder ✓ 1
―There is a non-indigenous ethnic group that bought land here. Back in 2007 they
decided to leave their land due to political tension emanating from election-related
crimes and offences and resettled in Nyahururu area. When the tension subsided they
decided to sell their land however, they found that the indigenous ethnic group had
already invaded the land claiming its ownership from their grandparents. This has
become a problem that has resulted into animosity and threat of forceful
displacement of the inhabitants‖ (Key Informant Interview, Elgeiyo Marakwet).
37
Another NGAO official also observed that:
―In this locality, most of the land is under communal ownership. The locals from the
Gabra and Borana sub-tribes always claim ownership. During election period this is
often exploited by the politicians who incite their tribesmen to cause violence against
the minority groups as a means of evicting them from their supposed land‖ (Key
Informant Interview, Marsabit County).
In agreement with the above sentiments, a Senior Police officer noted that:
―The Maasais in this locality once they sell land they still assume it belongs to them
and they demand to use the sold land for grazing. As a result they trespass and
destroy farm produce which finally brings violence between them. Further, they
demand to be employed as security guards or herders in the non-local farms failure
to which they become violent and keep on intimidating others‖ (Key Informant
Interview, Kajiado County).
―There are historical land injustices in Nakuru County especially in areas like Ndefo and
Mauche. Those who genuinely bought land in these areas are named ―Madoa doa‖ (non-
natives/local) by the locals and are intimidated by being threatened with evictions out of
―our land‖. There is also incitement to violence by the local political leaders so as to
influence support from the local populace. As a result, they relocate when the General
Elections approach for fear of being victimized‖ (Key Informant Interview, Nakuru County).
38
Table 3.9 Whether the respondents perceived their counties as hotspot areas for election-related
crimes and offences
The findings in Table 3.9 clearly indicates that all counties in Kenya have a potential of
experiencing election-related crimes and/ or offences. However, the prevalence potential of
these crimes/ offences is varied across the counties. This study, therefore, urges the relevant
stakeholders to take cognizance of these dynamics and put in place appropriate interventions
and contingency measures to address likely occurrence of election-related crimes and
offences.
The respondents were further probed on whether their specific localities were considered as
hotspot areas for the election-related crimes and offences in Kenya. As depicted in Figure 5,
the opinion was divided with half of the respondents affirming and the other half saying the
contrary.
Figure 5: Whether the specific’s locality is a hotspot area for election-related crimes
and offences
The above findings show that whilst some counties may be considered as hotspot areas not
all locations in those counties may be hotspot areas. There is thus an imperative for security
40
agencies and other stakeholders to be vigilant in monitoring and responding to probable
underlying factors likely to predispose certain specific areas as hotspots for election-related
crimes and offences. Appendix 4 provides a list of specific hotspot areas in each county.
Most of the respondents pointed to politicians, aspirants and candidates (88.7%), the
vulnerable youths (59.6%), political party agents and party supporters (51.4%), hired goons
(37.5%), organized criminal gangs (23.3%) and ethnic groupings (22.0%) as the main
perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences. These results are indicated in Table 3.10.
The findings based on the respondent categories show that most respondents from members
of the public were of the view that the dominant perpetrators were the politicians/ aspirants/
candidates (88.4%), vulnerable youths (60.7%), political party agents and supporter (51.1%),
hired goons (35.7%) and criminal gangs (24.4%). Most of the political party representatives
identified the politicians/aspirants/candidates as the main perpetrators (87.1%), followed by
vulnerable the youths (58.3%), political party agents and supporters (48.8%), hired goons
41
(43.6%) and criminal gangs (25.1%). Similarly, majority of the respondents drawn from
election, regulatory and/or enabling agencies said that the perpetrators are politicians/
aspirants/ candidates (90.7%), vulnerable youths (57.8%), political party agents and
supporters (56.6%), hired goons (43.1%) and criminal gangs (26.8%). Likewise, the
respondents drawn from governance/electoral-related civil society organizations identified
politicians/ aspirants/ candidates (91.9%), vulnerable youths (50.0%), political party agents
and supporters (48.5%), hired goons (44.1%) and criminal gangs (25.0%) as the perpetrators
of election-related crimes and offences. This information is summarized in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11: Perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences as per the specific
category of the respondents
From the above findings, all respondent categories agree that the main perpetrators of
42
election-related crimes and offences are the politicians (aspirants and candidates), the youth
and the political party agents and supporters. This findings concur with the NCRC (2016)
study on Election-related crimes and offences in Kenya as shown in Figure 6.
The political aspirants and candidates including their agents/supporters engage in election-
related crimes and offences in a bid to influence voting behavior or the outcome of elections
in their favor. The youth on the other end mainly engage in these vices because of their
vulnerabilities – for instance, unemployment, ignorance and poverty. Because of these
vulnerabilities, they are mostly taken advantage of by the political class to perpetrate
election-related crimes and offences.
The findings on perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences from the sample
respondents agreed with those of FGDs. As shown in Table 3.12, the main perpetrators of
election-related crimes and offences were politicians/aspirants/candidates; vulnerable youths
(unemployed, unskilled, lowly educated); political party agents and supporters; hired goons;
organized criminal gangs; and rogue business persons/financiers.
43
Table 3.12: Perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences as highlighted by Focus
Group Discussants
Perpetrators of County
election crimes &
Usain Gishu
Trans Nzoia
Nyandarua
Kakamega
offences as
Total tally
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nakuru
Garissa
Nairobi
highlighted by
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
Focus Group
Discussants
Political aspirants/ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 15
candidates
Vulnerable youths √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 11
(unemployed,
unskilled, lowly
educated)
Political party √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 7
agents and
supporters
Hired goons √ √ √ √ √ 5
Organized criminal √ √ √ √ √ 5
gangs
Rogue business √ √ √ √ 4
persons/financiers
Media and/ or their √ √ √ 3
agents
Rogue public √ √ √ 3
officials in
elections,
regulatory and/or
enabling agencies
Ethnic groupings √ √ √ 3
Elders √ √ √ 3
Men √ √ 2
Rogue church √ 1
leaders
44
drugs to the same youths so that they can cause havoc during campaign and voting
period‖ (Key Informant Interview, Kilifi County).
Figure 7: Whether the respondent has ever been a victim or witnessed the commission
of election-related crimes and offences
The findings in Figure 7 show that averagely 7 out of 10 Kenyans have been victimized or
witnessed election-related crimes and offences being committed. This confirms that these
crimes/ offences are serious security threat in Kenya.
On the victim categories, the findings reveal that women are the main victims of election-
related crimes and offences at (66.1%) and are closely followed by children at (56.6%),
general members of the public including voters at (52.8%), the elderly (36.5%), youth
(35.7%) and people living with disability (29.9%) as indicated in Table 3.13.
45
Table 3.13: Victims of election- related crimes and offences
Based on respondent categories, majority of the members of the public cited women (65.7%),
children (55.2%) and the general members of public (51.2%) respectively Similarly, political
party representatives identified women (64.2%), general members of the public (56.8%) and
children (56.0%) as the main victims. Respondents drawn from the election, regulatory
and/or enabling agencies equally identified women (67.5%), children (64.2%), and the
general members of public (58.0%) while those drawn from governance/electoral-related
civil society organizations mentioned women (73.9%), children (59.0%) and general
members of public (57.4%) as the key victims of election-related crimes and offences as
presented in Table 3.14.
46
Table 3.14: Victims of election-related crimes and offences as per the specific category
of the respondents
These findings show that women and children are the main victims of election-related crimes
and offences in Kenya. The victimization women and children manifest in several ways. For
instance, women are may be subjected to various forms of gender-based violence while
children are left injured, neglected or orphaned.
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya and Waki Commission Reports
mentioned that during the 2007–2008 post-election violence in Kenya, women were sexually
violated in some parts of the country. Empirical evidence also points out that women who
engage in politics face a disproportionately higher risk of violence than men. There is thus,
the need for the government to enhance security and protection of women, children, and all
47
other vulnerable groups during the electioneering period. In addition, there is need for
provision of psychosocial support to the victims of election-related crimes and offences.
When the respondents were asked to highlight the underlying factors contributing to election-
related crimes and offences, a significant majority of the respondents mentioned vulnerability
occasioned by unemployment (70.9%) and by poverty (65.0%). The other notable factors
highlighted were perceived marginalization including political, socio-economic inequality
(39.9%), negative ethnicity (38.2%), corruption/unethical conduct of some election
management officials (34.6%) %) and perceptions of a compromised electoral system
(23.9%) as summarized in Table 3.15.
48
A further analysis was conducted within the specific category of the respondents. Most
members of the public identified vulnerabilities occasioned by unemployment (71.7%) and
by poverty (65.1%) as the underlying factors contributing to election-related crimes and
offences. Similarly, the political party representatives identified vulnerability occasioned by
unemployment (71.8%) by poverty (63.9%). Equally, respondents drawn from election,
regulatory and/or enabling agencies cited vulnerabilities occasioned poverty (64.5%) and by
unemployment (64.1%), and perceived marginalization/social exclusion (57.2%).
Respondents drawn from governance/electoral-related civil society organizations identified
vulnerabilities occasioned by unemployment (73.9%) and poverty (64.9%) respectively as
indicated in Table 3.16.
49
Underlying factors Category of respondents (percentage of cases)
contributing to election- Members Political party Respondents Respondents
related crimes and of public representative drawn from drawn from
offences election, governance/
regulatory electoral-
and/or related civil
enabling society
agencies organization
s
discrimination and
violence
Inadequate electoral 8.0 10.9 9.9 11.9
administrative rules
Un-harmonized 4.8 7.6 6.9 3.7
parameters among the
regulatory agencies
Greed for power 1.3 3.9 4.3 2.2
Land dispute/conflict 1.0 3.6 4.3 3.0
Political incitement 1.8 3.0 2.8 1.5
Illiteracy 1.9 2.4 4.7 3.0
Alcohol, drug and 2.4 2.4 1.2 3.0
substance abuse
Idleness 2.4 1.5 1.2 0.0
Poor leadership 0.4 1.2 0.9 1.5
Peer influence 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.7
Socioeconomic effect of 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Covid-19
Inflation and tough 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.0
economic times
The vulnerabilities arising from poverty and unemployment may predispose individuals into
engaging in some election-related crimes and offences. For instance, a poor voter who does
not have resources to meet basic needs may not resist the temptation of accepting bribes from
politicians and/or being treated with foods, drinks and other rewards in exchange of their
votes Equally, idle and unemployed youth may be used by the political class to perpetrate
some crime categories while others may engage in organized criminal activities – including
election-related crimes and offences.
The above findings were corroborated by the focus group discussions where the main factors
highlighted by the discussants were vulnerability occasioned by unemployment and poverty;
alcohol, drug and substance abuse; political incitement; corruption of individual officials;
illiteracy; perceived political and socioeconomic exclusion; presence and engagement in
50
organized criminal gangs activities; negative ethnicity; and un-harmonized parameters
among the regulatory agencies as shown in Table 3.17.
Trans-Nzoia
Uasin Gishu
crimes and offences
Nyandurua
Marchakos
Kakamega
Total tally
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
as highlighted by
Baringo
Kisumu
Nakuru
Garissa
Nairobi
focus group
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
discussants
Vulnerability √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 12
occasioned by
unemployment
Vulnerability √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 11
occasioned by poverty
Alcohol and drug √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 7
abuse
Political incitement √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 7
Corruption of √ √ √ √ √ √ 6
individual officials
Illiteracy √ √ √ √ √ √ 6
Perceived √ √ √ √ √ √ 6
marginalization-
political,
socioeconomic
exclusion
Presence and √ √ √ √ 4
engagement in
organized criminal
gangs activities
Negative ethnicity √ √ √ √ 4
Un-harmonized √ √ √ √ 4
parameters among the
regulatory agencies
Perceptions of a √ √ √ 3
compromised
electoral system
Gender based √ √ 2
discrimination
Peer influence √ √ 2
Land √ √ 2
disputes/conflicts
Contested electoral √ √ 2
laws
Struggle for limited √ √ 2
51
Factors contributing County
to election-related
Trans-Nzoia
Uasin Gishu
crimes and offences
Nyandurua
Marchakos
Kakamega
Total tally
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
as highlighted by
Baringo
Kisumu
Nakuru
Garissa
Nairobi
focus group
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
discussants
resources
Idleness √ 1
High stakes of gaining √ 1
political power
Inadequate electoral √ 1
administrative rules
Ignorance √ 1
Rejection of election √ 1
results
―A key factor that has contributed to election-related crimes and offences in this
county is the existence of organized criminal gangs. We have got quite a number of
criminal gangs in this area including Mungiki, 2 brothers and Gucunuo ni Ini most of
whom are concentrated in the informal settlements schemes like Majengo, Chania,
Kiang’ombe, Kiandutu and Gachagi‖ (Key Informant Interview, Kiambu County).
As compared to NCRC (2016) study on Election-related crimes and offences in Kenya, some
of the main contributors to election-related crimes and offences in 2021 still remain the same.
These include vulnerabiltites ocassioned by unemployment and poverty, and negative
ethnicity as shown in Figure 8.
52
Incitement 15.7%
The finding that some of the top factors identified by NCRC (2016) are still prevailing in
2021 is a call for the relevant stakeholders to take note and institute cogent policy measures
towards sustainably addressing them.
This study also sought to find out the effect COVID-19 may have on the prevalence of
election-related crimes and offences in the 2022 General Elections. Most of the respondents
indicated that COVID-19 will unlikely (51.0%) contribute to the increase of the incidence of
election-related crimes and offences with (42.7%)of the respondents saying that it will
result into an increase. This information is presented in Figure 9.
53
42.7%
51.0%
6.4%
Figure 9: Likelihood that COVID-19 may lead to the increase of election-related crimes
and offences in the 2022 General Elections
Evidently, there is a significant number of people (4 out of 10) who felt that COVID-19 may
result to an increase in the prevalence of election related crimes and offences. They posit that
the enduring effects of the containment measures rolled out by the Government may create
opportunities for the commission of some crimes. Indeed, the focus group discussants noted
some of the most likely prominent negative contribution of COVID-19 may include: decrease
in voter turn-out which may encourage some crimes such as rigging; increase in voter bribery
due to the economic downturn, and increase in organized criminal gangs also as a result of
the economic hardships as presented in Table 3.18.
54
Table 3.18: Likely effect of COVID-19 on the prevalence of election-related crimes and
offences in the 2022 General Election as highlighted by Focus Group Discussants
Trans-Nzoia
Uasin Gishu
related crimes and offences
Total tally
Nyandarua
Kakamega
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
in the 2022 General Elections
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
as highlighted by Focus
Kilifi
Meru
Kitui
Kisii
Group Discussants
On the likely effect of COVID-19 on the prevalence of election-related crimes and offences
in the 2022 General Election, one judicial officer had the following to say:
―You know Covid-19 has created new poverty levels as a result of slow down and
closure of some businesses Therefore, it is possible that crimes are likely to be high
come 2022 elections. It will be easier to manipulate most people due to increased
vulnerability. Offences like treating, bribery, incitement to violence are likely to go
up‖ (Key Informant Interview, Narok County).
55
The above sentiments were echoed by a political party representative who observed that:
―Covid-19 has led to unemployment and closure of businesses, this will culminate in
the youths engaging in election-related crimes and offence because of the
vulnerability. Cases of election-related crimes and offences are likely to be on
increases because the politicians are likely to exploit their vulnerability and
compromising them to engage in crime because of their selfish political interests‖
(Key Informant Interview, Kisumu County).
Although the country is on a recovery path following the relaxation of the COVID-19
containment measures, still most people are yet to recover from the economic losses
occasioned by the pandemic situation in the first place. In the framework of the General
Strain Theory of Crime (Agnew, 2015), the strain/stress emanating from this economic
downturn is likely to contribute to the commission of more crimes – including election-
related crimes and offences. There is need, therefore, to activate more economic
empowerment programmes to reinvigorate the economy.
These findings seem to agree with those identified in different studies as responsible for most
election-related crimes and offences witnessed in Kenya in the 2007, 2013 and 2017 General
Elections (Sambuli, 2017; NCRC, 2016; Lafargue & Katumanga, 2008). For example,
Lafargue and Katumanga (2008) established that the mobile phone was a key tool in the
rumor propaganda/ fake news (via SMS) in the 2007/2008 election violence. Both the
opposition and the government used it unsparingly weeks before, during and after the
elections. Equally, the rejection of election results and perceptions of electoral fraud by the
opposition and their supporters have featured prominently as the key triggers of some
election-related crimes and offences.
57
Table 3.20: Effects of election-related crimes and offences as highlighted by Focus
Group Discussants
Effects of election-related County
crimes and offences as
highlighted by Focus Group
Usain Gishu
Trans Nzoia
Total tally
Nyandarua
Kakamega
Machakos
Discussants
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
Nzoia
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
Loss and destruction of 11
property
Ethnic hatred, disunity and 9
animosity
Loss of lives and injuries 7
Forceful displacement of 6
population
Increased rate of crime and 5
insecurity
Loss of jobs 5
Post-Traumatic Stress 4
Disorders
Underdevelopment 4
High cost of living 3
Hate speech 3
Domestic separation 3
Misuse of public office and 3
abuse of power
Increased level of poverty 2
Lack of trust in public office 2
Delayed and/or poor services 1
Low voter registration and 1
turn out
On the effects of election-related crimes and offences, a senior political party representative
had this to note:
“My property was destroyed. I had a supermarket that was burnt down due to
political competition. The motive was to ensure that I am brought down economically
completely. It is very painful for such actions just because of politics‖ (Key Informant
Interview, Kitui County).
Furthermore, a senior official from the National Intelligence Service observed the following:
―The election-related crimes and offences have led to loss of lives, destruction of
property, physical injuries, electing of people of questionable integrity and character
into political office, crippled development and scaring of investors‖ (Key Informant
Interview, Kiambu County).
58
The above averments were corroborated by a senior NGAO official who pointed out that:
―Definitely… it affects the economy of the country. This country spends too much on
election management. This is occasioned by over securitization of elections and hotly
contested campaigns. They spend approximately 25 dollars per voter compared to 1
dollar in a country like Rwanda. In addition, this country has never recovered from
the effects of 2007/2008 post-election violence economic crisis. A number of
companies closed down and tourism sector went down on its knees‖ (Key Informant
Interview, Bomet County).
These findings on the consequences of election-related crimes and offences concur with the
findings of NCRC (2016) which found out that loss and injury of human of life, displacement
of people, destruction of property and violence were the most prevalent in the 2013 General
Elections.
The respondents were asked if they have ever reported election-related crimes or
offences. The majority (76.4%) said they had not. Only (23.6%) said had reported as
shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Whether the respondent has ever reported election-related crimes and
offences
Table 3.21: Whether the respondent has ever reported election-related crimes and
offences
The respondents who said they did not report election-related crimes and offences were
further asked to give reasons for not reporting. Most of them said that they lack confidence in
the responsible agencies (56.9%), fear of reprisals (32.1%) and with (29.6%) stating that they
60
had never witnessed any election-related crime/ offense. Other significant reasons cited
included: ignorance (25.7%), expected promises/benefits/gifts of not reporting (12.3%), lack
of prompt action, uncertainty and cost implication (11.5%) and a personal issue or too trivial
to report (10.6%). This information is captured in Table 3.22.
Table 3.22: Reasons for not reporting election-related crimes and offences
The finding that most people do not want to report the election-related crimes and offences
because they lack confidence in the responsible agencies is a serious indictment on these
institutions. The main reasons provided by the respondents accounting for this was the
perceived inaction and high levels of corruption embedded in these agencies. Consequently,
most people felt that even if they reported such crimes and offences, little action or if any,
would be taken. With such revelations, there is need of for duty bearer agencies to strengthen
professional relationship with the members of public as a way of building confidence and
trust.
Besides, respondents were further asked to indicate the agency they trust in reporting election
related-crimes and offences. Majority (55.2%) indicated National Government
Administrative Office followed closely by the National Police Service (55.1%), and religious
leaders / Faith Based Organization (21.7%). The detailed findings on the trusted agency for
reporting election-related crimes and offences are presented in Table 3.23.
61
Table 3.23: Trusted agency for reporting election-related crimes and offences
The findings in Table 3.23 indicate that most of the Kenyans prefer reporting to the NGAO
and the NPS. Indeed, the current multi-sectoral electoral management framework
incorporates NGAO as integral stakeholders in electoral management. Further, the fact that
IEBC was rated lowly in terms of reporting election-related crimes and offences is a point of
concern as they have a primary mandate in managing elections in Kenya.
In addition, the respondents were further required to identify the most ideal mechanism for
reporting election-related crimes and offences in Kenya. The study revealed that the most
preferred mechanism for reporting was verbal reporting at (46.6%). This was followed by
emergency call numbers at (40.5%), police occurrence book at (36.2%), anonymous letter at
(17.2%) and complaint desk and /or box at (13.7%). Table 3.24 captures this outcome.
62
Table 3.24: Ideal mechanism for reporting election-related crimes and offences
The policy implication of the above finding is that there is need to strengthen and make
available the preferred mechanisms of reporting (verbal reporting, occurrence book, and
emergency call numbers) to members of the public. This will enhance the reporting of
election-related crimes and offences and thus an opportunity to address them.
3.7.2 Existing mitigating interventions for the election-related crimes and offences
This study established that the main existing interventions on election-related crimes and
offences in Kenya in the order of prevalence as highlighted by the FGD discussants were:
civic and voter education by relevant agencies (mentioned in all 16 counties); peace building
meetings by relevant stakeholders (mentioned in 12 counties); and intelligence gathering and
mapping of election crime hotspots (mentioned in 9 counties). The findings also reveal that
Trans Nzoia, Nyandarua and Nakuru counties lead in Kenya in terms of the existing
interventions put in place to mitigate election-related crimes and offences. These findings are
captured in Table 3.25.
63
Table 3.25: Existing interventions on election-related crimes and offences as highlighted
by Focus Group Discussants
Existing interventions on County
election-related crimes
Total tally
Nyandarua
Kakamega
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
and offences in this
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Garissa
Nakuru
Trans-
locality
Gishu
Nzoia
Uasin
Kilifi
Meru
Kitui
Kisii
Civic and voter education √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 16
by relevant agencies
Peace building meetings √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 12
by relevant stakeholders
Intelligence gathering and √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 9
mapping of election crime
hotspots
Multi-agency framework √ √ √ √ √ 5
on elections management
Continuous monitoring of √ √ √ 3
social media information
Crackdown on illicit brews √ √ √ 3
and drugs
Psychosocial support √ √ √ 3
especially by FBOs
Equitable distribution of √ 1
resources
Issuance of title deeds to √ 1
address land disputes
Youth empowerment √ 1
programs
Social cohesion programs √ 1
by the NCIC
Total Tally in 16 counties 5 3 2 4 3 2 4 3 3 4 4 5 5 2 2 3 55
The above findings were in concurrence with the sentiments of a NGAO official who noted
that:
―We usually have public barazas to sensitize electorates during elections on peaceful
election and harmonious co-existence between the locals and non-locals and different
opponents. However, this has not had a meaningful impact because election-related
crimes and offences keep on recurring‖ (Key Informant Interview, Elgeiyo Marakwet
County).
64
Corroboratively, a senior NPS officer had this to note in respect to existing interventions:
From the above findings, a number of measures exist to control election crimes and offences.
However, they are either inadequate or need to be enhanced as the problem of election-
related crimes and offences keeps on recurring in each election cycle.
As captured in Table 3.26, the National Government Administration Officers (NGAO) and
the Civil Society Organizations /Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) were rated highly across
all respondent categories with at least seven (7 out of 10) people indicating that they are
effective respectively. They were followed closely by the Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission (IEBC), National Police Service (NPS), National Intelligence
Service (NIS) and Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) with five (5) out of ten
(10) respondents respectively in each category indicating that they are effective.
65
Table 3.26: Perceptions on the effectiveness of the electoral management stakeholders
in the control of election-related crimes and offences as per the specific category
of the respondents
Public Members of Political party Respondents Respondents
perceptions on public representative drawn from drawn from
the effectiveness (percentage of (percentage of election, governance/
of the electoral cases) cases) regulatory electoral-related
management and/or enabling civil society
stakeholders in agencies organizations
the control of (percentage of (percentage of
election-related cases) cases)
crimes and Not effective
Not effective
Not effective
Not effective
I don't know
I don't know
I don't know
I don't know
offences
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
National 75.7 14.5 9.8 72.7 19.6 7.7 78.4 14.4 7.2 73.5 16.7 9.8
Government
Administration
Officers
Civil 76.0 7.3 16.7 71.3 15.0 13.7 73.7 14.3 12.0 82.2 7.8 10.1
Societies/Faith
Based
Organizations
The Judiciary 56.4 18.8 24.8 62.0 22.4 15.7 68.0 20.2 11.8 68.8 22.4 8.8
Independent 65.1 26.0 8.9 58.2 35.4 6.4 69.1 25.2 5.7 60.0 35.6 4.4
Electoral and
Boundaries
Commission
National Police 58.7 37.0 4.3 56.7 41.1 2.1 70.8 26.6 2.6 53.8 42.4 3.8
Service
National 44.5 6.5 49.0 55.1 9.2 35.7 65.7 8.4 25.9 56.2 9.9 33.9
Intelligence
Service
Office of 40.3 12.4 47.3 50.5 19.2 30.4 62.1 18.8 19.1 52.9 14.0 33.1
Director of
Public
Prosecution
Educational 43.4 6.8 49.8 47.2 11.0 41.7 51.7 15.7 32.5 40.3 19.3 40.3
Examining
Bodies
(including
Commission on
University
Education).
Kenya Revenue 35.9 7.2 56.9 41.7 15.7 42.6 50.0 14.9 35.1 40.2 16.4 43.4
Authority
Office of the 33.6 8.3 58.2 40.5 17.4 42.1 47.8 19.5 32.6 41.2 19.3 39.5
Registrar of
Political Parties
66
Public Members of Political party Respondents Respondents
perceptions on public representative drawn from drawn from
the effectiveness (percentage of (percentage of election, governance/
of the electoral cases) cases) regulatory electoral-related
management and/or enabling civil society
stakeholders in agencies organizations
the control of (percentage of (percentage of
election-related cases) cases)
crimes and
Not effective
Not effective
Not effective
Not effective
I don't know
I don't know
I don't know
I don't know
offences
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Ethics and Anti- 35.1 28.1 36.8 38.1 43.2 18.7 43.3 38.8 17.9 36.8 38.4 24.8
Corruption
Commission
Credit Reference 29.4 4.6 66.0 36.0 7.1 56.9 43.0 7.9 49.1 31.7 10.0 58.3
Bureau
National 26.1 14.3 59.6 28.7 30.9 40.4 34.0 31.2 34.8 32.0 29.6 38.4
Cohesion and
Integration
Commission
The above findings bring to fore the critical role played by the Civil Society/ Faith Based
Organizations in mitigating election-related crimes/ offences in Kenya. Therefore, they need
to be embraced as vital stakeholders in the management of elections in the country. In
addition, despite their good rating in mitigating election-related crimes and offences in
Kenya, concerns were voiced by some NGAO that their roles in the management of elections
are not clearly spelled out leading to collision with other stakeholders. For instance, a NGAO
official in Nyamira County had this to say:
Our roles in the management of elections are not well spelled out. This makes
our work difficult. For instance, whenever we are seen at the polling station,
we usually receive a lot resistance from people who think that we are going
there to facilitate the rigging of elections in the favor of government.
This study established a number of challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes
and offences. Table 3.27 shows that the most prevalent challenges include vulnerability
occasioned by poverty (59.1%), inadequate civic education (56.6%), impunity and
selfishness of political leaders (43.7%), persistent alcohol, drug and substance abuse (43.2%),
inadequate resources to stakeholders (40.3%), illiteracy and ignorance among the electorate
(40.1%). Other challenges include: negative ethnicity and nepotism (37.9%), lack of
goodwill to credible elections by some stakeholders (33.6%), lack of integrity in the electoral
processes (33.4%), deficiencies in investigation, prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators
(29.9%), insecurity in some parts of the country (29.2%), inadequate cooperation and
partisan interest among concerned agencies/stakeholders (16.4%), voter apathy in the
electoral process (11.5%), and inadequacies of election infrastructure and technology
(10.3%).
68
Challenges in addressing election-related crimes and offences Responses
Frequency Percentage
of cases
Lack of integrity in the electoral processes 1145 33.4
Deficiencies in investigation, prosecution and sentencing of 1025 29.9
perpetrators
Insecurity in some parts of the country 999 29.2
Inadequate cooperation and partisan interest among concerned 563 16.4
agencies/stakeholders
Voter apathy in the electoral process 395 11.5
Inadequacies of election infrastructure and technology 354 10.3
Media bias 304 8.9
Perception of influence from foreign interests (e.g. funding) 131 3.8
Corruption 85 2.5
Vulnerability occasioned by unemployment 44 1.3
Inadequate witness protection 10 0.3
The results from the Focused Group Discussions show that the most common challenges
faced in the counties were inadequate resources to stakeholders; corruption; and deficiencies
in investigation, prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators. These are summarized in Table
3.28.
Table 3.28: Challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences as
highlighted by Focus Group Discussants
Uasin Gishu
Total tally
Nyandarua
Kakamega
Discussants
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
Trans-Nzoia
Uasin Gishu
Total tally
Nyandarua
Kakamega
Discussants
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
Baringo
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Garissa
Meru
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
Insecurity in some parts of the country √ √ 2
Voter apathy in the electoral process √ √ 2
Vulnerability occasioned by √ √ 2
unemployment
Illiteracy and ignorance among electorate √ √ 2
Inadequate witness protection √ √ 2
Lack of integrity in the electoral processes √ 1
Negative ethnicity and nepotism √ 1
Poor transport and communication network √ 1
Weak enforcement of laws √ 1
In addition, interviews with the key informants identified impunity and selfishness by
political leaders as the other challenges faced in the control of election crimes and offences.
In supporting this finding, a NGAO official pointed out that:
“Remunerations, privileges and powers attached to political class are very high thus
not willing to lose power. They will do all manner of things including rigging,
causing chaos to retain their political positions‖ (Key Informant Interview, Bomet
County).
Further, the above finding on deficiencies in investigation, prosecution and sentencing of
perpetrators were corroborated by a judicial officer who observed that:
―There are delays in processing election matters in courts of law. This delay is
occasioned by a number of factors among them shortage of judicial officers and failure
of the prosecutors and defense lawyers to appear in a court. These delays have negative
consequences on the election management and also in the interest of the aggrieved
party‖ (Key Informant Interview, Trans Nzoia County).
A comparative analysis on the top five challenges in the control of election-related crimes
and offences was done using NCRC (2016) and this study. The outcome of the analysis as
seen in Figure 11, shows that inadequate resources to the stakeholders, impunity and
selfishness of the political class still remain among the foremost challenges.
70
Figure 11: A comparative analysis of the top five challenges (based on percentage of
cases) faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences in Kenya from
NCRC’s 2016 and 2021 studies
The comparative analysis also shows that although the prevalence of poverty, drug and
substance abuse, inadequate civic education among the electorate were relatives less
prevalent challenges in the 2016 NCRC study, they have emerged among the top in the
current study. The upsurge of poverty and alcohol, drug and substance abuse may be in part
attributed to the strain arising from the recent COVID-19 pandemic situation.
Respondents were asked to propose measures towards addressing election-related crimes and
offences. The most prominent solution cited by approximately 7 out of 10 respondents in all
categories was timely civic education to the electorate. Four (4) out of ten (10) respondents in
all categories suggested: strict enforcement of electoral law, observance of electoral laws,
just and fair elections management and the creation of more economic opportunities for the
youth and vulnerable emerged as the second most significant solutions. Table 3.29 displays
these responses.
71
Table 3.29: Respondents’ suggested measures for addressing election-related crimes and/ or offences in general as per the
specific category of the respondents
73
Measures that were appropriate for addressing election-related crimes and offences as
highlighted by Focus Group Discussants by order of prevalence include: conducting timely
civic education; mobilize sufficient financial and human resources for joint action; arrest and
prosecuting perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences; strict enforcement of
electoral law; enhanced electoral security including to women aspirants; and joint security
planning (multi-agency framework). A summary of these findings are presented in Table
3.27.
Table 3.30: Measures suggested for addressing election-related crimes and/ or offences
as highlighted by Focused Group Discussants
Measures suggested for County
addressing election-
Uasin Gishu
Trans Nzoia
Nyandarua
related crimes and/ or
Kakamega
Total tally
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
offences in general as
Baringo
Kisumu
Nakuru
Garissa
Nairobi
Meru
highlighted by Focused
Kilifi
Kitui
Group Discussants Kisii
Conducting timely civic ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 14
education
Strict enforcement of ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
electoral laws
Mobilizing sufficient ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
financial and human
resources for joint action
Enhanced electoral security ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 4
Joint security planning ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ 4
(multi-agency framework)
Just and fair elections ✓ ✓ ✓ 3
management
Deployment of high ✓ ✓ ✓ 3
integrity and efficient-
technological infrastructure
Observance of electoral ✓ ✓ 2
laws
Media sensitization on ✓ ✓ 2
ethical electoral process
and reporting
Early mapping of hot pots ✓ ✓ 2
of electoral crimes and
offences for intervention
Creation of more economic ✓ ✓ 2
opportunities for youths
and the vulnerable
Sensitization of politicians/ ✓ ✓ 2
citizens to accept defeat in
fair, free and transparent
74
Measures suggested for County
addressing election-
Uasin Gishu
Trans Nzoia
Nyandarua
related crimes and/ or
Kakamega
Total tally
Machakos
Kirinyaga
Mombasa
offences in general as
Baringo
Kisumu
Nakuru
Garissa
Nairobi
Meru
highlighted by Focused
Kilifi
Kitui
Kisii
Group Discussants
elections
Undertaking thorough ✓ ✓ 2
vetting of political
candidates
Eradicate illicit drugs & ✓ ✓ 2
illicit brews
Authoring peace pledges ✓ 1
for parties and candidates to
sign
Strengthening intelligence ✓ 1
gathering on security
threats to elections
Involving independent, ✓ 1
high integrity and
professional election
observers
Expanding the witness ✓ 1
protection program
Judiciary to expedite ✓ 1
election-related cases
Increasing the number of ✓ 1
polling stations and voting
time
Regular transfer of police ✓ 1
officers
Fast trucking issuance of ✓ 1
title deeds
Regarding the mitigation of election-related crimes/ offences, the key informants made an
array of suggestions. For instance, a judicial officer observed the following:
―We need to change how we are doing public sensitizations. Let us have publications
and documentaries of the 1992, 1997 and 2007/8 post-election crimes including
violence as set books in our schools so that the students can reflect on the future of
the country. This way, it will stick into the minds of the young generations thus
averting future violence‖ (Key Informant Interview, Bomet County).
75
Equally, a NGAO official averred that:
―The major challenge here is unemployment and idleness. The government must
create more job opportunities for the youths and other vulnerable members of the
society. This way, we will have reduced the likelihood of being influenced by the
politicians‖ (Key Informant Interview, Siaya County).
Another suggestion was made by a political Party Representative who had this to say:
―The Government normally intimidates members of the public in this locality by over-
deploying security officers during electioneering period. The officers often provoke
members of the public by reminding them that they will deal with them ruthlessly thus
forcing them to retaliate. The government should therefore avoid premature and
uninformed deployment of security agencies‖ (Key Informant Interview, Kisumu
County).
With regards to addressing land use and/or ownership issues that contribute to election-
related crimes and offences, the main recommendations by the members of the public on the
issue was having strict enforcement of land related laws and regulations at (17.5%) and to
prioritization of land adjunction, regulation and the issuance of title deeds to rightful owners
by the Government at (17.2%). The political party representatives suggested the need to
prioritize land adjunction, regulation and the issuance of title deeds to rightful owners
(20.2%). Respondents drawn from election, regulatory and/or enabling agencies on their part
mainly recommended strict enforcement of the land related laws/regulations (19.7%). Lastly,
respondents from governance/electoral-related civil society organizations highlighted
prioritizing land adjunction, regulation and the issuance of title deeds to rightful owners
(19.6%) as the key remedy. This information is summarized in Table 3.28.
76
Table 3.31: Addressing land use and/or ownership issues that contribute to election-
related crimes and offences as per the specific category of the respondents
77
Suggestions on addressing land Respondent category (percentage of cases)
use and/or ownership issues
that contribute to election- Members of Political party Respondents Respondents
related crimes and offences public representative drawn from drawn from
election, governance/
regulatory electoral-
and/or related civil
enabling society
agencies organizations
The above findings were corroborated by key informant interviews in the study. One of them,
a senior NPS official observed the following in relation to addressing land use and/or
ownership issues that contribute to election-related crimes and offences:
―Relevant agencies should conduct community sensitizations on land use
and/ownership issues and also ensure proper demarcation of land and timely
issuance of title deeds to land owners‖ (Key Informant Interview, Kisii County).
78
CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Introduction
This study sought to establish the typology and prevalence of; victims and perpetrators;
factors contributing to and triggers of; and effects of election-related crimes and offences. In
addition, the existing intervention strategies towards mitigating these vices and their
effectiveness were elucidated. Finally, the challenges faced in the control of election-related
crimes and offences were established.
The study established that the key election-related crimes and offences committed during
pre-election period include: hate speech (40.1%); voter bribery (39.8%); campaigning
outside the prescribed period (29.5%); incitement to violence (26.4%); giving of alcohol and
drugs to interrupt electoral processes (25.3%); provision of food, refreshments, fare
reimbursement and rewards to supporters (24.0%); and stealing and looting of property
(20.6%).
As identified in the study, the main election-related crimes and offences committed during
campaign period were: voter bribery (62.5%); hate speech (57.5%); giving of alcohol and
drugs to interrupt electoral processes (42.2%); incitement to violence (41.3%); stealing and
looting of property (39.5%); creating disturbance and engaging in disorderly conduct
(35.1%); treating (34.8% ); affray (32.4%); threat to violence (30.4%); defacing of posters
(29.0%); intimidation of the opponents (28.0%); character assassination (24.7%); use of
violence (23.5%); and malicious damage to property (22.3%).
The leading election-related crimes and offences committed during voting period included:
voter bribery (62.2%); giving of alcohol and drugs to interrupt electoral processes (37.5%);
hate speech (28.1%); provision of food, refreshments, fare reimbursement and rewards to
supporters (treating) (24.8%); threat to violence (24.5%); creating disturbance and engaging
in disorderly conduct (21.7%); and incitement to violence (20.9%).
79
In addition, the most prominent election-related crimes and offences committed during post-
voting period were: stealing and looting of property (45.4%), malicious damage to property
(24.9%), use of violence (21.2%), incitement to violence (20.5%), forceful displacement of
the population (20.5%) and hate speech (20.0%).
The findings of this study showed that the prominent perpetrators of election-related crimes
and offences were: the politicians, aspirants and candidates (88.7%); vulnerable
youths (unemployed, unskilled, lowly educated, etc.) (59.6%); political party agents and
supporters (51.4%); hired goons (37.5%); organized criminal gangs (23.3%); ethnic
groupings (22.0%); rogue business persons/ financiers (10.9%); and rogue public officials in
elections, regulatory and/or enabling agencies (10.3%).
Women were mapped out as the main victims of election-related crimes and offences at (66.1
%) followed by children at (56.6%) and general members of the public including voters’
at (52.8%). Other victims as per the study findings were: the elderly (36.5%), youths
(35.7%), people living with disability (29.9%), men (18.3%), minority ethnic groups
(17.9%), aspirants and candidates (14.2%), the sick (12.3%) and party agents (10.7%).
The study established that the main underlying factors contributing to election-related crimes
and offences were vulnerabilities occasioned by unemployment (70.9) and by poverty
(65.0%). The other significant factors were: perceived marginalization including political,
socio-economic inequality (39.9%), negative ethnicity (38.2%), corruption/unethical conduct
of some election management officials (34.6%), perceptions of a compromised electoral
system (23.9%), contested electoral laws (16.1%), presence and engagement in organized
criminal gangs’ activities (15.3%), and availability of weapons (11.4%).
According to the findings of this study, the main triggers of election-related crimes and
offences included: perceptions that the results have been stolen (43.1%) followed closely by
fake news (42.4%) and rejection of election results (41.1%). Other noticeable triggers were:
provocative and violent actions by political parties and candidates (34.7%), high stakes of
gaining or losing power (33.4%), misuse of social media (19.8%), perception of biasness by
electoral officials (17.4%), unethical media reporting (11.8%) and premature announcement
80
of results by unauthorized persons (11.4%).
Based on the findings of this study, the main effects of election-related crimes and offences
were: loss and destruction of property (reported by FGD discussants in 11 out of 16
counties); ethnic hatred, disunity and animosity (reported by FGD discussants in 9 out of 16
counties); loss of lives and injuries (reported by FGD discussants in 7 out of 16 counties);
forceful displacement of populations (reported by FGD discussants in 6 out of 16) counties.
The study findings indicated that majority of Kenyans do not report election-related crimes
and offences (76.4%). The main reasons mooted for not reporting were: lack confidence in
the responsible agencies (56.9%), fear of reprisals (32.1%). Other significant reasons cited
included: ignorance (25.7%), expected promises/benefits/gifts of not reporting (12.3%), lack
of prompt action by the responsible agencies (11.5%).
The main existing intervention strategies for election-related crimes and offences were: civic
and voter education by relevant agencies (reported by FGD discussants all the 16 counties);
peace building meetings by relevant stakeholders (reported by FGD discussants in 12 out of
16 counties); and intelligence gathering and mapping of election crime hotspots (reported by
FGD discussants in 9 out of 16 counties).
The study also revealed that majority of Kenyans (7 out of 10) perceived the National
Government Administration Officers (NGAO) and the Civil Society Organizations /Faith
Based Organizations (FBOs) as effective in addressing election-related crimes and offences.
It is only 5 out of 10 Kenyans who perceived the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC) as effective in this regard. Most members of the public (at least 5 out of
10) felt that the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Office of Director of Public
Prosecutions (ODPP), Educational Examining Bodies (including regulatory agencies such as
Commission on University Education), Kenya Revenue Authority, Office of the Registrar of
Political Parties, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Credit Reference Bureau, and
National Cohesion and Integration Commission were less effective in the control of these
vices.
81
4.2.6 Challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences
The main challenges faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences as identified
in this study include: vulnerability occasioned by poverty (59.1%); inadequate civic
education (56.6%); impunity and selfishness of political leaders (43.7%); alcohol, drug and
substance abuse (43.2%); inadequate resources to stakeholders in the election management
(40.3%); illiteracy and ignorance among the electorate (40.1%). Other noticeable challenges
faced in addressing election-related crimes and offences were: negative ethnicity and
nepotism (37.9%); lack of goodwill by some stakeholders (33.6%); lack of integrity in the
electoral processes (33.4%); deficiencies in investigation, prosecution and sentencing of
perpetrators (29.9%); insecurity in some parts of the country (29.2%); inadequate
cooperation and partisan interest among concerned agencies/stakeholders (16.4%); voter
apathy in the electoral process (11.5%); and inadequacies of election infrastructure and
technology (10.3%).
4.3 Conclusion
ii. Hate speech and voter bribery are the main election-related crimes and offences
committed during the electoral period.
iii. Women and children are the main victims of election-related crimes and offences in
Kenya.
82
4.4 Recommendations
Arising from the findings and conclusions of this study, the following policy and areas for
further study are recommended:
The Government of Kenya and other stakeholders have instituted and implemented
appreciable efforts towards addressing election-related crimes and offences. Nevertheless, as
revealed from the findings of this study, the prevalence of these crimes and offences is still
high. The implication of this is that the measures in place are inadequate and, therefore, need
to be reinforced. Consequently, this study makes the following policy recommendations:
Vulnerabilities caused by poverty and unemployment were mapped out as the key drivers
of election-related crimes and offences. For instance, due to these susceptibilities, most
people are influenced to commit election-related crimes and offences for monetary/
material gains. Consequently, there is need for the enhancement of short-term
interventions such as Kazi mtaani, cash transfers to the vulnerable, among others,
especially targeted during the most volatile periods (for example during the campaign
period) and hotspot areas; and long-term interventions such as employment guarantee
schemes, governance reforms, among others. County Governments and the Ministry of
Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizens Affairs and Special Programmes should take the
lead on this.
Inadequate resources and cooperation among the stakeholders were identified among key
challenges faced in controlling election-related crimes and offences in Kenya. These
challenges can be addressed by combining synergies through a multi-agency/stakeholder
approach. This will entail sharing of resources, information, technologies, among others,
with an aim of ensuring crime-/offence- free elections.
83
3. Enhance early mapping of election-related crimes and offences
This study established that the consequences of election-related crimes and offences are
far reaching – transcending all spheres of the society. Consequently, there is need for
proactive as opposed to reactive interventions. This should entail electoral risk analysis
and early warning through multi-agency intelligence in mapping out electoral-crime hot-
spots and perpetrators. This has to be made a standing agenda in all County Security and
Intelligence Planning and Coordination.
It was indicated in this study that organized criminal gangs are among the key
perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences. The National Intelligence Service
(NIS), National Police Service (NPS) and other security agencies, therefore, need to
heighten surveillance and vigilance on organized criminal gangs by amongst others,
dismantling their organizational and operational structures and disrupting their funding
sources and networks.
The study established that the prevalence of election-related crimes and offences is high
in Kenya. Indeed, some crimes and offences such as voter bribery and hate-speech which
were most prevalent in 2016 were found to be still prevalent in 2021. For the citizenry to
exercise their political rights freely as envisaged under Article 38 of the Constitution of
Kenya, 2020, these vices have to be mitigated; and this requires the attention and action
of all stakeholders.
Voter bribery was identified among the prominent election-related crimes and offences
experienced in Kenya. The main perpetrators of these vices were the political
aspirants/candidates and their agents. To mitigate this, there is need for IEBC to ensure
strict enforcement of the Election Financing Act, 2013.
84
7. Making zero-tolerance to corruption a standing agenda in electoral planning and
management
The findings of this study revealed that most Kenyans do not report election-related
crimes and offences because they lack confidence on the duty bearer agencies. The
foremost factor accounting for this lack of trust emerged to be corruption. To address
this, there is need for making zero-tolerance to corruption a standing agenda in electoral
planning and management by all the agencies/actors concerned.
Hate speech was identified as one of the most prevalent election-related crime/ offence in
Kenya. The aim of hate speech is to encourage hate or violence against a person or group
of people based on their demographic orientation. Peace messaging will go a long way
towards mitigating this. Peace messaging is a “bottom-up” approach that targets the
incited, rather than the inciters. It should involve the dissemination of anti-hate or ant-
violence messages through social media, traditional media, barazas, among others.
NCIC and NGAO should take a lead on this.
The study identified high stakes of gaining or losing power among the foremost triggers
of election-related crimes and/ or offences. This can be addressed through local peace
agreements where communities agree on how to share local power after elections; for
instance, by nominating different county positions from different groups. Such
arrangements will promote inter-group tolerance, reduce fears of exploitation and make
politicians less likely to use divisive rhetoric. The NGAO and Faith-/Community-Based
Organizations should be empowered to spearhead these arrangements.
85
11. Enhance civic and voter education
It was revealed that most people in Kenya do not report election-related crimes and
offences. One of the reasons cited was ignorance. From the foregoing, there is need for
enhanced civic and voter education for the members of the public on their civic duties as
citizens and rights and obligations with regards to election-related crimes and offences
including the importance of free, fair, transparent and crime-/offence-free elections.
The study showed that most Kenyans did not have confidence on the ability of most
electoral management agencies/stakeholders in tackling election-related crimes and
offences. Indeed, this was also given as the prime reason for not reporting these offences/
crimes. Furthermore, perceived corruption/unethical conduct of some election
management officials and perceptions of a compromised electoral system were mooted as
some of the key contributing factors to election-related crimes and crimes. As a
consequence, these agencies should boost public confidence by fostering transparency,
effectiveness, reliability and competence in the execution of their mandates.
86
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Interview Schedule
County: ___________________________________________________________
Sub County: _______________________________________________________
Constituency: ______________________________________________________
Ward: __________________________________________________________
Date of Interview: __________________________________________________
Time of Interview: __________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
My name is………………………………………. from National Crime Research Centre
(NCRC), which is currently conducting “A Study on Election-related Crimes and
Offences in Kenya” aimed at informing relevant policy and programs. Election–related
crimes and offences in past political elections in the country have been a problem of concern
that needs to be addressed by all relevant players. These crimes and offences occur in the
three phases (before, during and post-election) of the election cycle.
This study therefore aims at gathering vital data on the forms, triggers, perpetrators, victims,
agencies and impact relating to election-related crimes and offences to inform viable
mitigation measures. Your participation in the study is highly valued and your honest and
candid information will help in informing policy.
Participation is voluntary and all the information you give will be treated in utmost
confidentiality.
Thank you in advance.
91
Type of Respondent Tick
Political party representative (8 per county=376)
Member of public in households (=2,653)
Respondents drawn from Election, Regulatory and/or enabling agencies (10 per
county=470)
Respondents drawn from Governance/electoral-related Civil society organizations (3
per county=141)
3. Marital Status:
1. Single/Never Married
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Separated
5. Widowed
11. (a) In your opinion and or experience are there activities that should not be happening
before elections have been declared? 1. Yes 2. No
12. (a) Based on your knowledge and/or experience, are there election-related crimes and
offences committed during Pre-election, Campaigns, Voting and Post-voting period in this
locality?
1. Yes 2. No.
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(b.) If Yes in Q 12 (a) above, which election-related crimes and offences are committed in
your locality during Pre-election, Campaigns, Voting and Post-voting period?
95
(c) Please respond with regard to hotspots of election-related crimes and offences in the
forthcoming General Elections in this locality and/or your county?
(d) (i) In your opinion, will COVID-19 have an effect on forthcoming general election in
Kenya contributing to election-related crimes and offences.
1. Yes 2. No
13. What are the underlying factors and triggers of the election-related crimes and offences in
your locality?
14. (a) Have you been a victim or witnessed a crime being committed during election
activities/events in your locality? 1. Yes 2.No
(b) Based on your knowledge and experience who are the perpetrators and victims of
election-related crimes and offences in your locality?
97
Section E: Intervention strategies for addressing election-related crimes and offences
15. (a) Have you ever reported election-related crimes and offences?
1. Yes 2. No
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(c) If you didn’t report in Q 15 (a) above give reasons
(d) Suggest the most ideal mechanism for reporting election-related crimes and offences in
your locality?
99
16. Based on your knowledge and experience, how effective are the following regulatory
and enabling agencies in the management of the electoral processes?
100
17. (a) What challenges are faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences in
this locality?
(b.) In your opinion, what are the measures that would be appropriate for addressing
election-related crimes and offences in your locality?
102
Appendix 2: Key Informant Guide
County: ___________________________________________________________
Sub County: _______________________________________________________
Constituency: ______________________________________________________
Ward: __________________________________________________________
Date of Interview: __________________________________________________
Time of Interview: __________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
My name is………………………………………. from National Crime Research Centre
(NCRC), which is currently conducting “A Study on Election-related Crimes and
Offences in Kenya” aimed at informing relevant policy and programs. Election–related
crimes and offences in past political elections in the country have been a problem of concern
that needs to be addressed by all relevant players. These crimes and offences occur in the
three phases (before, during and post-election) of the election cycle.
This study therefore aims at gathering vital data on the forms, triggers, perpetrators, victims,
agencies and impact relating to election-related crimes and offences to inform viable
mitigation measures. Your participation in the study is highly valued and your honest and
candid information will help in informing policy.
Participation is voluntary and all the information you give will be treated in utmost
confidentiality.
Thank you in advance.
103
Key Informant Guide
1. Which election-related crimes and offences are committed during the election period in
this locality?
2. Who are the perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences committed during the
election period in this locality?
3. What do you think are the factors contributing to election-related crimes and offences in
this locality?
4. What is the likely effect of COVID-19 in the forthcoming general election in Kenya
contributing to election-related crimes and offences?
5. How will election -related crimes and offences arising from land use and/or ownership
likely manifest themselves in this locality?
6. What land use and / or ownership conflicts have you witnessed and/or encountered in this
area during recent political elections?
7. In your opinion, what would you suggest to address land use and/or ownership issues that
contribute to election-related crimes and offences in this locality?
8. What are the effects of election-related crimes and offences in this locality?
9. What are the existing election-related crimes and offences interventions in this locality?
(probe for effectiveness of each intervention)
10. What challenges are faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences?
11. What do you suggest to address election-related crimes and offences?
104
Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion Guide
County: ___________________________________________________________
Sub County: _______________________________________________________
Constituency: ______________________________________________________
Ward: __________________________________________________________
Date of Interview: __________________________________________________
Time of Interview: __________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This study therefore aims at gathering vital data on the forms, triggers, perpetrators, victims,
agencies and impact relating to election-related crimes and offences to inform viable
mitigation measures. Your participation in the study is highly valued and your honest and
candid information will help in informing policy.
Participation is voluntary and all the information you give will be treated in utmost
confidentiality.
Thank you in advance.
105
FGD Guide
1. Which election-related crimes and offences are committed during the election period in
this locality?
2. Who are the perpetrators of election-related crimes and offences committed during the
election period in this locality?
3. What are the factors contributing to election-related crimes and offences in this locality?
4. What is the likely effect of COVID-19 in the forthcoming general election in Kenya
contributing to election-related crimes and offences?
5. How will election -related crimes and offences arising from land use and/or ownership
likely manifest themselves in this locality?
6. What land use and / or ownership conflicts have you witnessed and/or encountered in this
area during recent political elections?
7. In your opinion, what would you suggest to address land use and/or ownership issues that
contribute to election-related crimes and offences in this locality?
8. What are the effects of election-related crimes and offences in this locality?
9. What are the existing interventions on election-related crimes and offences in this
locality?
10. What challenges are faced in the control of election-related crimes and offences and how
can they be addressed?
11. What would you suggest to address election-related crimes and offences?
Thank you very much for your time and insightful contributions.
#End.
106
Appendix 4: Hotspot Areas for Election-Related Crimes and Offences per County
Baringo Eldama Ravine town, Maji Mazuri,Timboroa, Marigat, Makutano, Mochongoi, Ngelecha, Karbanet, Kipsaraman, Kabartonjo, Tiaty, Loruk,
Barwesa, Elchamus, Kiserian, Border of Baringo East and Sout, Muserechi, Poror/Arama, Saos, Makutani Ward Boarder of Tiaty and
Baringo South , Boarder of Baringo South and North -Lake Baringo, Arabal, Kabiyet, Kabimoi
Bomet Chepilat/Sotik Border, Sotik Town/Chemagel, Ndanai- Abosi Border, Bomet Town, Litein, Mulot, Konoin, Chepalungu, Bomet Township,
Emurua, Mogogosiek, Kimulot, Multi National Tea Estate, Silibwet, Kaplong, Tinet, Koiwa Estate, Kipsigis, Kisii, All Centres Along the
Border
Bungoma Cheptais, Kimaiti Stage, Kabero, Kamarang', Kaptoboi, Bukembe Market, Mt. Elgon, Chepyuk, Kanduyi, Bungoma Town, Bumula,
Namwela Ward, Malakisi Area, Parts of Sirisia, Kamana, Mbirikani, Langas, Kipkomen, Mwithiriria, Bitobo, Tulukii, Mijanga, Ndegelwa
Market, Kopsiro, Nakhwana, Tulukui, Mianga, Kabuchai, Chwele, Kimilili
Busia Malaba Area, Kasarani, Matayos Centre, Marachi, Butula Area, Busia Town
Bunyala, Burumba, Bulanda (Busia Town), Mauko, Amoni Location, Busende, Mabale
Elgeyo Iten Town, Sengwer Shopping Centre, Kerio Valley, Yatoi, Kapyegon, Kambi Nyasi, Laini Moja, Ghorofa, Kiptoi, Tirao, Chesubit, Kamoi,
Marakwet Kapsowar, Chesoi, Tot, Aror, Kimnai, Chesogoche, Elgeiyo, Baringo Boundary, Mororia, Chebelio Forest, Kariobangi in Iten, Chepkorio,
Lilies, Katalel
Embu Muthandara, Karaba, Mbeere- Mwea Boundary, Tharaka-Mbeere Boundary, Runyenjes Town, Embu Town, Kianjokoma Market, Ishiara
Town, Majimbo A.I.P.C.A, Kamiu Primary School Polling Station, Mbeere South (Makima/Mwea), Ishiara-Kamwembe Route At
Shiengela, Kiambere, Siakago, Embu South- Mbere Border, South Ngariama Settlement Area, Kanjeru
Garissa Abakaile Ward,Dertu Ward, Fafi constituency Borders, Daadab Constituency Boarder to Dutis Constituency, Ifo, Dagde, Garrissa Primary
Polling Station, Madogo, Iftin, Windsor, Garissa Town, Mbalambala, Between Modogashe and Isiolo ,Lagdera ,Modogashe
Homabay Sindo, Lak Nyiero, Gembe, Makongeni, Junction Kodoyo, Shauri Yako, Sofia, Mbita, Nyandwa, Homabay Town, Kendu Bay, Rodi Kopony,
Magunga, Oyugis, Ndiwa, Olare, Kochia, Suba, Majengo
Isiolo Ngare Mara, Kina, Bulapesa, Wabera Ward, Epiding, Isiolo Town, Isiolo Central, Burat, Kula Mawe, Mwangaza, Lmd, Checheles, Garrisa
Border, Wajir Border, Kambi Ya Juu, Kambi Ya Garba, Mabatini
Kajiado Sineti, Rombo, Kambi Kuku, Loriko, Kajiado South, Lang'ata, Kitengela, Ngong, Isinya, Bisil, Porini Area, Kimana Town, Noonkopir Area ,
Ildamat, Majengo, Matapato, Kekonyokia, Rongai, Saikeri, Kiang'ombe, Kajiado Central, Kimana Market, Kaputei North, Ole Tepes,
Rung'ong'u, Kimana, Kiserian, Kibiko, Namanga Town, Kajiado Town
107
Kakamega Butere, Makhokho shopping centre and Bodaboda stage, Mutete, Kuyonzo Town, Shibuye Market, Shinyalu Market, Munami, Khalaba,
Indangalasia, Ngairo Area, Shibale, Lukoye, Shikulu Centre, Kayonzo Market, Mwamba, Mumias Town, Matungu, Shinyalu, Ikolomani,
Lurambi, Matungu, Muliro Garden, Maraba, Mayoni, Majengo(Corner), Khayega, Ishukha B, Lugari Scheme Area, Soi, Lukuyani, Moi's
Bridge, Kakamega Town, Mumias Central, Ekero , Shianda
Kericho Soin WardKipkok Primary Schoool, County Borders, Londiani, Kipsitet, Kamasian, Border Of Awasi(Kisumu,Nandi And Kericho,
Kericho/Nakuru Highway, Githuma, Nyagacho Market, Sondu, Sigowet, Kericho Town, Soin, Kapsoit, Sondu Borderline ,Maemba,
Chemogoch, Ng'oina Road, Litein-Kericho Road, Chemosot, Simoton, Kapkatet, Ainamoi, Koguta, Kipkelion, Belgut, Bureti, Konoin
Kiambu Kunamatiko/Nyaga, Karia, Githogoro, Banana, Kibichoi, Githurai, Lioki Sub Location, Kimende, Kagwe, Kinale, Witeithie, Kiandutu,
Chania, Gituamba Town, Gatukuya, Kamwangi, Gakoe, Matara, Nachi Along Nachu- Kajiado Boundary, Nachu Shopping Center, Thika
Town, Kiambu, Gatune, Githunguri, Wangige, Gachie, Ikinu, Juja, Kikuyu, Kiganjo, Kabete, Lwaka, Githogoiyoini, Gatunguru Area, Thika
Township, Kijabe Mission, Mugiko, Maingi, Makongeni, Thika Stadium, Gichiengo, Kwa Michael Market, Dagoreti, Gatundu North and
South
Kilifi Jibana, Magarini, Mtwapa, Kipingo, Kilifi South, Mazeras, Mamburui, Chumani, Makombani, Kaloleni Centre, Chonyi, Ganze, Muyeya,
Chela, Maweni, Madukani – Vipingo, Kaya Ribe, Kaya Funge, Kaya Kauma, Charo Wa Maya, Marereni, Adu, Gongoni Ward, Kisumu
Ndogo, Kanagoni, Msabaha, Kilifi Town, Malindi, Dsitsoni
Kirinyaga Kanyoni, Gereshon, Mwea-Ngurubani, Kagio, Kutus, Kagongo, Gichugu, Kandongu, Kimunye, Kiandegwa, Kerugoya Town, Kagumo,
Kimande, Thiba
Kisii Mogonga, Sensi, Stage Miwa, Miruka, Nyangoso Market, Suneka, Bobasi, Kiunganya, Marani, Kisii -Homabay Border, Gesusu, Kisii Town,
Nyaboge, Daraja Mbili, Keera, Ruga, Kiamokama
Kisumu Manyatta, Car Wash, Bandani, Nyalenda, Mamboleo, Mosque Area, Kubere, Kondele, Muhoroni, Chemelil, Kopere, Otonglo, Obunga, Pap-
Onditi, Royal, Migosi, Kona Mbuta, Kaloleni, Nyamasaria, Pala Boundary, Kibuye, Katito, Kisumu Town, Nyamarimba, Ayucha,
Nyamasima, Tabaitha (Kericho), Ahero, Maseno, Awasi, Kingwechi, Bukurimu, Kibos, Kona Mbaya, Kona Legio
Kitui Kaundu, Mavoko, Kyanika, Syomikuku, Boarder of Tana River and Kitui County, Mukuyuni, Kunda-Kindu, Kalundu, Tseikuru Town,
Kaningo, Mtitu, Muutha, Police check- in Mavoko, Kitui Town, Kanyonyo, Kitukune, Kwa Vonza Location, Mwakini
Kwale Sega Polling Station, Diani, Umoja, Kosovo, Nyumba Tobongwe, Ngombeni, Mwakiwena, Jogoo, Masaai Stage, Kena Ya Beach, Kena Ya
Musa, Ukunda Town, Base Titanium, Lungalunga, Gambalo, Msambweni, Mwereni, Tiwi, Pongwe, Kinayo, Mwangulu, Matuga, Kinango
Lakipia Ngare Ng'iro, Jua Kali, Olmoran, Sipili, Huruma, Rumuruti, Doldol, Thigithu Estate, Igwamiti, Oldonyiro, Sossian-in Laikipia North,
Laikipia East, Kinamba, Salama, Segera, Shamanek, Marani, Thome, Baringo and Samburu County border, Mwenje, Laikipia West,
Marmanet, Laikipia North, Kimanjo, Nyahururu, Nanyuki Town
Lamu Mkomani, Faza, Mkowe, Maisha Masha, Hindi, Jericho Lamshi, Jipendeni Area, Viziwani, Boni Forest, Lake Amu, Baharini, Mkunubi,
Pangawe, Mpeketoni, Lamu, Majembeni, Maruno, Kakathe, Tau, Waridi, Boramoyo, Witu Town, Kangemi, Nyongoru Ranch, Panda Nguo
108
Machakos Athi River, Mlolongo, Mavoko, Kangundo, Mitamboni, Kithima, Keaa, Tala Township, Kathembone, Mjini, Mtitoni, Koma, Malaa, Kamulu,
Machakos Town , Psv Stage, Market Places (During Political Rallies, No Specific Point), Katoloni, Miwani, Migoko Stage, New Naivas
Stage, Kathemboni, Kathiani, Mwanga, Kennol Market, Katine, Sokoni, Kariobangi, Muru Mutesa, Kasinga, Kalimoni , Makutano, Mwala,
Masinga, Around KCB Area, Tala Market, Mutituni, Matungulu Market, Joska
Makueni Emali, Kasikeu, Kilome, Kiboko A, Kiboko C, Makindu Town, Mikululo, Mukaa, Kibwezi East & West, Wote Town, Kiambani, Chuli Hills
(Mikululo), Changala, Kitaingo, Malili Village, Mayaani Village, Homesteads Near Town, Kibwezi East & West, Kiboko Settlement
Scheme, Kitise
Mandera Lafey, Warangara, Olla, Mandera Township, Towns Along Boarders, Rhamu Ward, Banisa, Elwak, Wargadud, Karo Area, Takaba
Marsabit Marsabit Town, Moyale Township, Heilu, Butiye, Somare, Saku, Karare, Sagante, Jirime, Songa, Badassa, Gabras Chome, Scheme Gabra,
Manyatta Jilo, Kuiikalo, Manyatta(Lami), Kituruni, Sololo, North Horr, Bibisa, Saku Gadamoji, Logologo, Turbi, Laisamis
Meru Laare, Mitunguu, Nkubu, Maua, Municipality, Naathu, Tigania, Meru Town, Kitheo, Makutano, Igembe North, Majengo,Kwanthambi,
Mjini,Mikinduri,Tharaka, Akithii ,Mukuuni, Mutuati, Gakoromone, Nyambene, North Imenti, Municipality Buuri, Ntharakanithi, Isiolo-
Meru Boundaries, Kiamuri, Inono Market, Kinoru, Lodu, Bwageni, Mbayo, Kithatu, Kadana, Igembe South, Kianjuri, Kigochwa, Muthara
Muriri, Kamarima, Miccuni, Kianjahi, Mitoone
Meru Laare, Mitunguu, Nkubu, Maua, Municipality, Naathu, Tigania, Meru Town, Kitheo, Makutano, Igembe North, Majengo, Kwanthambi,
Mjini, Mikinduri, Tharaka, Akithii, Mukuuni, Mutuati, Gakoromone, Nyambene, North Imenti, Municipality Buuri, Ntharakanithi,
Isiolo,Meru Boundaries, Kiamuri, Inono Market, Kinoru, Lodu, Bwageni, Mbayo, Kithatu, Kadana, Igembe South, Kianjuri, Kigochwa,
Muthara Muriri, Kamarima, Miccuni, Kianjahi, Mitoone
Migori Wihange, Nyabukarange, North Kanyamkago, Chonge Area, Migori Town, Sibuoche, Chunge ,Awendo, Sori, North Kadem, Luanda,
Kehancha, Kuja, Ikerenge Town, Thimlich, Magungu, Nyakweri, Nyandika, Tuk, Jowi, Karungu, Rapogi, Oyani Masai, Modi
Migori Wihange, Nyabukarange, North Kanyamkago, Chonge Area, Migori Town, Sibuoche, Chunge, Awendo, Sori, North Kadem, Luanda,
Kehancha, Kuja, Ikerenge Town, Thimlich, Magungu, Nyakweri, Nyandika, Tuk Jowi, Karungu, Rapogi, Oyani Masai, Modi
Mombasa Bombolulu, Shanzu, Mvita, Kipevu, Nyali, Brothers Mweza C, Majengo Mapya, Mwijabu Area, Chaani Hall, Msikiti Nuru, Mnazini, Likoni,
Mishomoroni, Mikidani, Changamwe, Mwakilunge, Kongowea, Bamburi, Saba, Majengo, Jomvu, Bangladesh, Darul Ulum-Likoni, Puma-
Likoni, Kindunguni Area, Bamburi, Kipovu Town, Mwagosi, Dunga Unuse, Barsheba, Mtopanga, Utange, Kibarani, Kalahari, Mtimbwani,
Bokole, Kiembeni, Taveta, Mwatate
Mombasa Bombolulu, Shanzu, Mvita, Kipevu, Nyali, Brothers Mweza C, Majengo Mapya, Mwijabu Area, Chaani Hall, Msikiti Nuru, Mnazini, Likoni,
Mishomoroni, Mikidani, Changamwe, Mwakilunge, Kongowea, Bamburi, Saba, Majengo, Jomvu, Bangladesh, Darul Ulum-Likoni, Puma-
Likoni, Kindunguni Area, Bamburi, Kipovu Town, Mwagosi, Dunga Unuse, Barsheba, Mtopanga, Utange, Kibarani, Kalahari, Mtimbwani,
Bokole, Kiembeni, Taveta, Mwatate
Muranga Kigumo, Kandara, Muranga Town, Kangema, Kenol, Kiharu, Sabasaba, Maragwa, Majengo, Njiiri, Marigiti, Kayole Slum, Makuyu,
Gateigoro, Gathima, Gathuri, Magomano
109
Muranga Kigumo, Kandara, Muranga Town, Kangema, Kenol, Kiharu, Sabasaba, Maragwa, Majengo, Njiiri, Marigiti, Kayole Slum, Makuyu,
Gateigoro, Gathima, Gathuri, Magomano
Nairobi Kiambu, Gatina Stage, Stage 56, Stage 46, Githurai 45,Githurai 44, Kahawa West, Kibra, Huruma, Kiangichiri Slums, Street, Darfur,
Riverside, Njiru ,Kamukunji, Bahati, Immaculate, Lucky Summer, Baba Dogo, Kariobangi, Mwalimu Plaza, Motherland Villages, Kasabuni,
Mathare, Korogocho Slums, Utalii, Kiambio, Embakasi, Shauri Moyo, Majengo, Kanyango, Bottom Line, Pipeline, Tassia, Soweto, Sodome,
Kitoka, Keroka, Warucu, Kangemi, Dandora, Kawangware, Mau, Mombasa Road, Kahawa Wendani, Kayole, Savvanah, Gitwamba, Kabiria,
Satelite, Waithaka, Ndunyu, Riruta, Mukuru Kwa Njenga, Aviation Area, Kanyama, Jamhuri, Adam, Lang'ata, Gikomba ,Muthurwa, Nairobi
CBD, Othaya, Mukuru Kwa Reuben, Zimmerman, Kimbo, Progressive, Flyover, Darajani, Uthiru, Kianda, Nairobi Market, Dagoreti
,Thiongo Road, Mich, Eastleigh
Nakuru Kihoto, Kamere, Kabati, Kanjo, Kadenye, Mosop, Chemtit, Kamosop ,Chemarmar, Lower Solai, Mwitetheria, Mogotio, Olenguroen, Total,
Mau Summit, Sirkwa, Mariashoni Forest, Kuresoi North and South, Viwandani, Kalole, Molo, Subukia, Londiani, Sorai, Koringot,
Kiambogo, Nyamamithi, Pandanguo, Maleli, Sagaitim, Mauche, Mwisho Wa Lamu, Kamara, Sachangwan, Muchorwe, Burnt Forest,
Weseges, Tabot, Kambi Moto, Kampara Farm, Visoi, Rongai Town, Lenginet, Kandutura, Gacharage, Kamwaura, Mlindiko, Subukia,
Kibunja, Elburgon, Bahati, Njoro, Ndefu, Maimahiu, Mau Summit, Goldfish, Casino In Town, Ndoinet, Keringet, Naivasha, Gilgil, Molo-
Kenyatta Area, Rongai ,Naivasha Township, Kuresoi ,Salgaa, Nakuru Town, Mau Forest, Daadab Township
Nandi Dotcom, Kipngoror, Koria, Sokomoko, Kamasai, Soy Mining, Kapkoros, Chapterwai shopping Center, Kamweka ( Nandi- Kakamega
boundary),Chemese in Nandi South, Tinderet, Kabimiet, Kapsabet, Laborate Center, Salient, Kipkaren, Nandi Hills, Kabiyet, Kapcheboswo,
Suswa, Cheptilil, Kamobo, Sorongai ,Emgwen, Mosop, Chemilil, Kubere, Songhor
Nandi Dotcom, Kipngoror, Koria, Sokomoko, Kamasai, Soy Mining, Kapkoros, Chapterwai shopping Center, Kamweka( Nandi- Kakamega
boundary), Chemese in Nandi South, Tinderet, Kabimiet, Kapsabet, Laborate Center, Salient, Kipkaren, Nandi Hills, Kabiyet, Kapcheboswo,
Suswa, Cheptilil, Kamobo, Sorongai, Emgwen, Mosop, Chemilil, Kubere, Songhor
Narok Njipiship, Lakwenyi, Narok Town, Bimbinet, Olmeli, Emurua Dikirr, Lolgorian, Mashangwa, Chelget, Shartuka Group Ranch, Elkerit,
Kiribwet, Mogul, Essoit, Timaru, Kwitembe, Kegonga, Dilango, Lakwenyi Border, Ngarare Enosaen, Kilgoris Township, Border Between
Maasai and Kipsigis, Boundary of Migori and Narok, Border with Tanzania, Angata Barakoi Border, Along Migori and Tanzania Border,
Kimindet, Sogon, Ololung'a, Border of Trans Mara and Migori, Ngong Area, Lelakweny Area, Border of Kipsigis and Narok (Olol masani)
Narok Njipiship, Lakwenyi, Narok Town, Bimbinet, Olmeli, Emurua Dikirr, Lolgorian, Mashangwa, Chelget, Shartuka Group Ranch, Elkerit,
Kiribwet, Mogul, Essoit, Timaru, Kwitembe, Kegonga, Dilango, Lakwenyi Border, Ngarare Enosaen, Kilgoris Township, Border Between
Maasai and Kipsigis, Boundary of Migori and Narok, Border with Tanzania, Angata Barakoi Border Along Migori And Tanzania Border,
Kimindet, Sogon, Ololung'a, Border of Trans Mara and Migori, Ngong Area, Lelakweny Area, Border of Kipsigis and Narok (Olol masani)
Nyamira Mekenene,Nyakacho, Nyaronde Town, Chepilat, Nyandoche Ibere,Manga,Kijauri,Gachuba, Miriri, Keroka, Nyangoro
Nyamira Mekenene, Nyakacho, Nyaronde Town, Chepilat, Nyandoche Ibere, Manga, Kijauri, Gachuba, Miriri , Keroka, Nyangoro
Nyandarua Kipipiri (Mshariti ) Miharati,Engineer Town, Ndogino, Salama, Pesi, Mitara Gatuna,Moru, Kahutha, Jua Kali, Rurii,
Kariamu,Gichungu,Wanjohi Centre, Kinangop,Ol Kalou,Tumaini, Njabini
110
Nyeri Nyeri Town,Mathira,Narumoru Town,Mweiga Town,Mwireri,Narumoru,Karatina,Majengo,Ihururu,Mweiga Farm
Samburu Baragoi, Wamba, Kisima, Maralal Town, Poro, Suguta Mar,Archers Post, Serolipi, Lesirikan, Pekera, Nachola, Ol Dokojek, Malaso, Ol
Moran, Shabaa, Loroke
Siaya Siaya Town, Yala, Sidindi, Gem, Alego-Usonga, Bondo, Ugenya-Rarieda, Majiwa-Wangai, Kiongango, Sensi, Obet, North Gem, Ukwala
(Kamukunji), Mutumbu, Kodiaga, Yala Bridge, Ndori, Ugunja, Alego, Luhano Center, Nyar Sakwa, Usenge Town, Majiwa, Ajigo,
Barchando
Taita Taveta Voi, Wundanyi, Bosnia Area Near Challa, Sagalla, Challa- Njukini, Ziwani Sisal Estate, Salaita, Jipe
Tana River Hola, Ngao, Chara, Shirikisho, Mlango Wa Simba, Garsen Center, Tana Delta, Wayu, Bura Scheme, Kilelengwani, Tana River Town,
Galole, Kipawa, Garsen Township, Boga, Baugali, Gafu, Milalulo, Galgalcha
Tharaka Nkodi Market Center, Mkothima, Kathwana, Tigania-Gatunga Boundary, Chuka-Tharaka Boundary, Kibugua, Thuita, Kigumo, Chuka
Nithi Town, Itugururu, Chogoria Town, Kamwimbi, Marima Stage, Sarang'ombe Area, Kamanyege, Kamarandi,Entuani, Kwanza, Namanjalala,
Kaptamai, Kapkoi, Simatwet, Kaptieng', Toro, Endebes, Chepchoina, Kiboroa Area, Saboti, Matisi(Rural And Centre), Forkland, Moi's
Bridge, Matunda, Kamakoro, Makhele, Ziwa, Tuwan, Milimani Area, Senger, Kachibora, Suwerwo, Kinyoro, Mitume, Sebei Area, Kitalale,
Salama, Gituamba, Sokomoko, Tigwani, Machinjoni, Kapcherop, Kipkege, Cherang'any, Geta, Cheptoboa, Bondeni, Kaplemur, Chepsiro,
Kapsikiai
Turkana Lodwar Township, Lokichar, Kakuma, Kanamkemer, Nawoitorong, Kabokorit, Murongulo, Turkana Central, Loima, Turkana West, West
Pokot and Turkana Border, Loreng, Lokitopoto, Lokichogio, Kalokol, Turkana East, Lokori/Kocholelin, Napelton, Kainuk, Kapedo, Along
Lake Region, Kalobeyey, Lokori, Nasiger, Lokangai, Lokitang, Letia, Towokayeni Area, Downie, Nakwamekwi, Soweto, Carlifonia, Loima,
Kerio, Turkana South
Uasin Gishu Taili Mbili, Langas, Kimumu, Outspan, Kapsoya, Yamumbi, Burnt Forest, Leseru, Maili Tisa, Mwamba, Ilula, Kamukunji, Ainabkoi,
Eldoret Town, Munyaka, Jua Kali, Kisumu Ndogo, Iten Road, Kasarani, Matembo, Cheparus, Landhies ,Komongo, Mwitiririra, Action,
Kona Mbaya, Kosachei, Kambi Kuku, Naiberi, Huruma Langas, Chemgoror ,Flax, Roki, Cyrus, Cheptiret, Baharini, Kapsaret, Soi,
Matunda,West Indies, Kiplombe, Jerusalem, Road Block, Turbo
Vihiga Kapsengere, Kiboswa, Luanda, Sabatia Town, Majengo Junction, Insianza, Masana, Shangeda, Kigima, Idorori
Wajir Buna, Batulu, Wajir East, Wajir CBD, Wajir Township, Eldas, Tarbaj, Khorofrar, Haran, Kotulo, Baraza Park, Wajir West, Arbaqeiranso,
Burawayo, Boji Garas, Balatul Amin, Osmodelle
West Pokot Makutano, Chepareria Ortum, Kabichbich, Kadugunya, Border of Marakwet and Pokot, Chepchoina, Mwisho Farm, Katikomor, Kanyerus,
Tarkwel, Chesegon, Kapenguria, Lomut, Mnagei, Murkujit, Kiririgit, Kaibes Talai, Chewoyet, Tapach, Kamologen, Sigor, Lelan, Kacheliba
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NATIONAL CRIME RESEARCH CENTRE
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