Exercise.

1. What are the different schools of thought or theories in Criminal Law and describe each briefly.

a. There are two schools of thought in Criminal Law, and these are (a) means that the basis of criminal
liabilities is human free will, and the purpose of the penalty is retribution which must be proportional to
the gravity of the offense;

b. the POSITIVIST THEORY, which considers man as a social being and his acts are attributable not just to
his will but to other forces of society. As such, punishment is not the solution, as he is not entirely to be
blamed; law and jurisprudence should not be the yardstick in the imposition of sanction, instead the
underlying reasons would be inquired into.

c. There are two schools of thought in Criminal Law, and these are (a) the CLASSICAL THEORY, which
simply means that the basis of criminal liabilities is human free will, and the purpose of the penalty is
retribution which must be proportional to the gravity of the offense; and (b) the POSITIVIST THEORY,
which considers man as a social being and his acts are attributable not just to his will but to other forces
of society. As such, punishment is not the solution, as he is not entirely to be blamed; law and
jurisprudence should not be the yardstick in the imposition of sanction, instead the underlying reasons
would be inquired into.

d. Nonsense

2. 2) To what theory does our Revised Penal Code belong?

a. We follow the classical school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in
tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in our Code.

b. We follow the classical school and positivist school of thought although some provisions of eminently
positivist in tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in
our Code.

c. We follow the positivist school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in
tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in our Code.

d. We follow the neo-classical school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in
tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in our Code.

3. Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and
Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba,
Laguna. 1) Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?

a. No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the bigamous marriage was contracted or
solemnized in Singapore, hence such violation is not one of those where the Revised Penal Code, under
Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially. The general rule on territoriality of criminal law governs
the situation.
b. Yes, because the general rule on territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.

c. No, where the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially.

d. No, it is unlikely guaranteed by law

4. After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a Filipino
seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the Pacific", an
overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is
owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman. When M/V "Princess of the Pacific" reached a Philippine
Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities.
An information for homicide was filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved
to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction. If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion?

A. Yes, the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction
over the crime committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine territory and
on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines It is the registration of the vessel in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner, which makes it a
Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is in the high
seas.

b. No, It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the
citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the
laws of Panama govern while it is in the high seas.

c. Yes, Yes, the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has no
jurisdiction over the crime committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine
territory and on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines

d. Maybe, because the board vessel is not registered or licensed in the Philippines

5. A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed themselves with
knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters from their
destination, the group alighted and after instructing E, the driver, to wait, traveled on foot to the house
of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group's lookout. C and D stood guard outside the house.
Before A could enter the house, D left the scene without the knowledge of the others. A stealthily
entered the house and stabbed F. F ran to the street but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards
another direction. Immediately after A had stabbed F, A also stabbed G who was visiting F. Thereafter, A
exiled from the house and, together with B and C, returned to the waiting taxicab and motored away. G
died. F survived. Who are liable for the death of G and the physical injuries of F?

A. A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D
was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held
 criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former
was completely unaware of said killing.
B. For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A
who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are nonetheless liable for
conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to the realization of a common
criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked F's escape. D, however,
although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left the scene before A could
enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier part of the conspiracy, he
did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts which directly tended toward
the same end
C. In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the infliction of physical injuries
upon F because there is no showing that he had knowledge of the plan to kill F.
D. A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D
was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held
criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former
was completely unaware of said killing. For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held
liable therefore. Even if it was only A who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B
and C are nonetheless liable for conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to
the realization of a common criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked
F's escape. D, however, although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left
the scene before A could enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier
part of the conspiracy, he did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts
which directly tended toward the same end. In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also
held liable for the infliction of physical injuries upon F because there is no showing that he had
knowledge of the plan to kill F.

6. BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew his
gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by AA, who grappled with him for possession of the
gun. FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC were charged with murder. In his defense, AA invoked
the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury, contending that by preventing ST from
shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a greater evil. Will AA's defense prosper?

A. No, AA's defense will not prosper because obviously there was a conspiracy among BB, CC and AA,
such that the principle that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, shall govern. The
act of ST, the victim's son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence, justified as a defense
of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. ST's act to defend his father's life, cannot be
regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful act.

b. No, AA's defense will not prosper because obviously there was a conspiracy among BB, CC and AA,
such that the principle that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, shall govern. The
act of ST, the victim's son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence, justified as a defense
of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. ST's act to defend his father's life, cannot be
regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful act. What AA did was to stop a
lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve their criminal objective of stabbing FT.
c. What AA did was to stop a lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve their criminal
objective of stabbing FT.

d. ST's act to defend his father's life, cannot be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the
law, a lawful act. What AA did was to stop a lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve
their criminal objective of stabbing FT.

7. Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel's house, Juan will hide
behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the latter passes through on his way to work. Arturo will
come from the other end of the alley and simultaneously shoot Joel from behind. On the appointed day,
Arturo was apprehended by the authorities before reaching the alley. When Juan shot Joel as planned,
he was unaware that Arturo was arrested earlier.

A. Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-
principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur criminal
liability.
B. There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a
co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that of an accomplice only
C. Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-
principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur criminal
liability. Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose from his participation in jointly devising the
criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed Joel.
The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt act was done pursuant to that
conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act
of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that
of an accomplice only because he was not able to actually participate in the shooting of Joel,
having been apprehended before reaching the place where the crime was committed.
D. Arturo is not liable because he was not able to participate in the killing of Joel. Conspiracy itself
is not punishable unless expressly provided by law and this is not true in the case of Murder. A
co-conspirator must perform an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy.

8. At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila.
Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby,
Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and
Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino died, Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and
Johnny were charged with homicide. Is there conspiracy in this case?

A. Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as manifested by their concerted actions against
the victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of assaulting the victims. The existence
of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced from the manner the offenders acted in commonly
 attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal design to inflict
harm on their victims.
B. No, The existence of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced from the manner the offenders
acted in commonly attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of
criminal design to inflict harm on their victims.
C. Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as manifested by their concerted actions against
the victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of assaulting the victims
D. I don’t know

9. Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning,
robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living. While the
four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters
was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant from
the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the
four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his family. a) What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and
Fernando commit?

A. Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special complex crime.
B. Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders committed the robbery but the rape
was committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the house" where the robbery was
committed
C. Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex crime of
Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders committed the
robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the house" where the
robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando alone
should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special complex crime.
D. Bruuuh

10. Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the
latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what crime did
the four commit?

a. My answer would in the same in the preceding question

b. No, I would change because the fact that they killed the whole enemy already consummates the
crime of murder
c. The crime would be Robbery with Homicide
d. None
11. A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the money kept in
the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping,
and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the
plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring
passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in
the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already
left the place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any?

A. the act of A in pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and
commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable
for the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

b. A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not incur criminal
liability because he desisted. B's spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of execution are
performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se punishable. The desistance need not
be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance comes from the person
who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are performed. A person
who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to
one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path
of righteousness.

c. The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance
comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are
performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal
liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience
and returns to the path of righteousness.

D. There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter's money. The
planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as component crimes, hence a
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and
B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned and agreed on the sequence of their attack even
before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their
criminal plan. That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not
spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried to stop A
from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in pursuing the
commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would
also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the composite crime of
robbery with homicide.

12. What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy?

a. The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the commission of a
crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent any agreement to that
effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common purpose or
objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their criminal participation in
pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be deemed the act of all.

b. The Doctrine of implied piracy is clearly an implication that the person’s agree without manifestion

c. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing
the crime and thus the act of one shall be deemed the act of all.

d. Maybe

13. A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X, who
happened to be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the room that X occupied. The four culprits
peppered the room with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a hand grenade that totally destroyed X's
room. However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room and nobody was hit or injured
during the Incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any crime?

A. Yes. A, B. C and D are liable for destructive arson because of the destruction of the room of X with the
use of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible crime is to be imposed only if the act
committed would not constitute any other crime under the Revised Penal Code. Although the facts
involved are parallel to the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the
liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in said case, which
constitutes a more serious crime though different from what was intended,

b. Yes, Liability for an impossible crime is to be imposed only if the act committed would not constitute
any other crime under the Revised Penal Code. Although the facts involved are parallel to the case of
Intod vs. Court of Appeals (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was for an
impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in said case, which constitutes a more serious crime
though different from what was intended,

c. Yes, the facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals (215 SCRA 52), where it
was ruled that the liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in
said case, which constitutes a more serious crime though different from what was intended,

d. None

14. Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila from Bicol
and killed ten (10) persons. Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin who are passengers of the bus,
jumped out of the window and while lying unconscious after hitting the pavement of the road, were ran
over and crushed to death by a fast moving Desert Fox bus tailing the Superlines Bus. Can Alexander be
held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin although he was completely unaware that the two
jumped out of the bus?

A. Yes, Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act of
running was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when a person, by a
felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the
latter to escape from or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the
person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death.

b. Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act of running
was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when a person, by a felonious act,
generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or
avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act
is responsible for such injuries or death.

c. Alexander cannot be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act of
running was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when a person, by a felonious
act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from
or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious
act is responsible for such injuries or death.

D, Yes, alexander can be held liable. The rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in the
mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger
and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act is responsible for
such injuries or death.

15. Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but the latter was able to parry it with his hand, causing upon
him a twoinch wound on his right palm. Vicente was not able to hack Anacleto further because three
policemen arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente if he did not drop his bolo. Vicente was accordingly
charged by the police at the prosecutor's office for attempted homicide. Twentyfive days later, while the
preliminary investigation was in progress, Anacleto was rushed to the hospital because of symptoms of
tetanus infection on the two-inch wound inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the following day. Can
Vicente be eventually charged with homicide for the death of Anacleto?

a. Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection
which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient supervening cause.
Vicente's felonious act of causing a two-inch wound on Anacleto's right palm may still be
 regarded as the proximate cause of the latter's death because without such wound, no tetanus
infection could develop from the victim's right palm, and without
b. Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection
which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient supervening cause.
c. Vicente cannot be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection
which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient supervening cause.
d. Vicente is insane