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Review of G. E. Moore'S "Four Forms of Skepticism"

This document provides a summary and analysis of G.E. Moore's article "Four Forms of Skepticism". Moore discusses Russell's interpretation of the four forms of skepticism: (1) certainty of knowledge about oneself, (2) certainty of memories, (3) certainty about others' perceptions, and (4) certainty about relations between things. Moore argues that one can know the four forms, while Russell believes they cannot be known. The reviewer agrees more with Moore's arguments, such as his point about how memories of dreams did not truly occur, and his argument that saying "we never know memories for certain" is self-contradictory. The reviewer finds Moore's arguments against Russell's skepticism about memory and

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249 views2 pages

Review of G. E. Moore'S "Four Forms of Skepticism"

This document provides a summary and analysis of G.E. Moore's article "Four Forms of Skepticism". Moore discusses Russell's interpretation of the four forms of skepticism: (1) certainty of knowledge about oneself, (2) certainty of memories, (3) certainty about others' perceptions, and (4) certainty about relations between things. Moore argues that one can know the four forms, while Russell believes they cannot be known. The reviewer agrees more with Moore's arguments, such as his point about how memories of dreams did not truly occur, and his argument that saying "we never know memories for certain" is self-contradictory. The reviewer finds Moore's arguments against Russell's skepticism about memory and

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Ricefield Cheung
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© © All Rights Reserved
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REVIEW OF G. E.

MOORE’S “FOUR FORMS OF SKEPTICISM”


BY YNARO SAN JUAN

PHB – 3 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

In this review of G. E. Moore’s Four Forms of Skepticism, I will begin by giving a short
introduction on the topic followed by my thoughts and criticisms about said topic. Now, in this
article, the author G. E. Moore talks about the four forms of skepticism according to Russell and
then proceeds to give his own two-cents about Russell’s interpretation about the topic. The
four forms of skepticism are that (1) certainty of knowledge about oneself, (2) certainty of
knowledge about one’s memories, (3) certainty about other people’s white percepts, and (4)
certainty of things in relation to one another. Now as one may notice, each of these four forms
are tied together by the common thread of non-certainty, however they are differentiated by
what is to be uncertain about.
One of the main points of contention in the article between Moore and Russell is the
question of whether it is possible that one can “know” these four forms or not, with Russell
being firmly in the “cannot know” camp while Moore believes that one can know and that he
has always known the four forms. To me, while Russell does bring up some good points
throughout the course of the article, Moore makes even better ones for the idea that one can
know the four forms, such as the points he makes about how one cannot be certain of the
future since to make propositions in regards to the future means that any proposition such as
that has already occurred in the past, or the point he makes about how nothing we
“remember” in a dream really occurred in the sense that we’d experienced and “remembered”
it. I believe that Moore was able to significantly counter many of Russell’s main points, leaving
them quite moot. Moore ends his article still thinking that he knows for certain the four forms
of skepticism, and I do think that he did, just as I am certain about certain things about myself
and my surroundings.
One of the arguments Moore makes against Russell which I find quite compelling is his
argument for memory. I’ve always wondered before whether or not what I remember truly
happened, or if it’s just an illusion perpetrated by external or internal forces, rendering me
unsure of my memories every now and then. part of the section in the article on memory,
Moore says that the statement “we never know for certain that we remember” is a self-
contradictory statement. Moore outlines the different kinds of memories in this section, such as
personal memory, or memory that one experiences for oneself first hand. Examples of non-
personal memories would be abstract concepts such as math equations like the example
provided in the article: 7 x 9 = 63; while we have knowledge about this equation, we did not
experience the equation itself first-hand making it a non-personal memory. Another example
would be historical events such as the Battle of Tirad Pass. Now, I know about this event
because I have heard about it, read about it, and watch documentaries on it, however, I do not
remember it due to me not having been there to experience it first-hand.
Somewhere near the end of the article, Russell hints at man being a “psycho-social”
being: a being that is one of mind and body. It is pointed out that if, say, one asserts anything
about me myself, then they are by extension asserting something about my body, and
therefore it follows that I cannot be certain about myself due to the fourth form of skepticism;
my body parts in relation to one another. It is pointed out by Moore that if this is true, then I
cannot know anything about myself unless I know anything about the fourth form. Moore says
that if Russell had raised this argument then he would have put his certainty in doubt. I agree
with Moore on this one, for I feel that I am certain about things about my body and by
extension myself.

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