Passing the Bar, Taking the Oath and Signing the Roll be sent by registered mail to the member

t by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter

1. In re Edillon concerned.

epublic of the Philippines On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
SUPREME COURT resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
Manila February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
EN BANC
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL
A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1) Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
RESOLUTION arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would

show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
CASTRO, C.J.: Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
the Philippines. integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's of the Court Rule, which reads:
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
which reads: the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued in these words of the Court Rule:
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,'

pg. 1
composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
the Court Rule:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
approval of the Supreme Court. ... Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice
the legal profession. of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained,
unanimous pronouncement that it was the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the
the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
pg. 2
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
public necessity.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a with an interest in his concerns.
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom. The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely
deal with them seriatim.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is
of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of
1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
the Bar ..., national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
pg. 3
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
exercise of the police power of the State. 10 Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its
officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
and purposes of integration. 11 prostituted. ..."

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and
of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court
that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory Court.
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities. Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient
to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
pg. 4
Footnotes Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L, ed.
2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution, promulgated on
January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines. 9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop
vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
2 114 A.L.R. 101.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of
3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of California,
cited in the Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the Integration of 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re Scott,
the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson,
January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar. 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla,
282, 298 P. 623.
4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of
Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State Bar 11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re
Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of
665; Commonwealth ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P.
53; Ayres vs. Hadaway 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for 291; In re Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson,
Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148 Okla,
Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark vs. Austin, 101 S. 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P.
W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 623; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
N. W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291; Baker vs.
Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar of 12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel. Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S.
Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third District Committee of The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The objection would
Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 make every Governmental exaction the material of a 'free speech' issue. Even
Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404. the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE were to thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war
BAR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral
September 17,1971. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers
and the compulsion of the agencies of Government." (Concurring opinion of
6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Harlan, J, joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367
Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d
404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J. with Branders and
Railways Employes' Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293
Ct. 714. U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)

7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration — A Sword and a Shield for Justice" 13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
(Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.
8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar — Aloha!", Journal of the Am.
Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256. 9 Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 2. Petition to resume practice of Law (Dacanay Case)
pg. 5
 him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
Republic of the Philippines the Philippines.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue
of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again
EN BANC met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s
oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, Philippine bar.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with
RESOLUTION certain modifications.

CORONA, J.: The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so

delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and
leave to resume the practice of law. promote the public welfare.3

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,
for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a privilege.4
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition. as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites to practice law.
Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the standing is entitled to practice law.
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
pg. 6
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
the Philippines.6 reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing conditioned on:
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the
bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license IBP;
to practice.10
(b) the payment of professional tax;
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing
― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of
the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
control.14 duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also
renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member
of the Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby
law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16 SO ORDERED.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under Quisumbing, J., on leave.
the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine 3. In re Petition to Practice Law in the Philippines (Muneses Case)
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is FACTS: On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant(OBC) praying that he be granted
no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The petitioner alleged that he
became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21,

pg. 7
 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR
United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, OTHER PURPOSES)
2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
No. 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” by Congress assembled:
taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-
General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines acquisition Act of 2003.”
Section 2. Declaration of Policy – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
and if granted, to resume the practice of law. ISSUE: Whether the said petition
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
must be granted after said requirements to re-acquire the privilege to practice law
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
has been furnished.RULING: Yes. The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship – Any provision of law to the contrary
a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine “I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon
9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The OBC further required myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
aforesaid oath.
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship – The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law. Upon this favorable Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the Philippines.
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities – Those who retain or re-acquire
4. Dual Citizens Can Practice law in the Philippines Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
The Supreme Court has ruled to allow a Filipino lawyer who became a naturalized Philippines and the following conditions:
American citizen to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
ruling has opened the door to Filipino lawyers with dual citizenship to practice law in under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
the country. In a decision, the SC ruled upon the recommendation of the Office of the known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws;
Bar Confidant to give Marcos Del Rosario privilege to perform his profession here. (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
The High Court cited that Art. XII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides in part that holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
“the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
save in cases prescribed by law.” With this, the SC ruled to allow “Del Rosario to renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
resume the practice of law in the Philippines, subject to the conditions that he re-takes administer an oath;
his lawyer’s oath on a date set by the Court…” Del Rosario was also ordered to pay (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
“the appropriate fees, and [submit] the original or certified true copy of the proof of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
payment of the professional tax for 2013” (Pinoy lawyers with dual citizenship may to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
practice in PH by Jeffrey Damicog, Manila Bulletin, November 5, 2014). the country where they took that oath;
RA No. 9225 (AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

pg. 8
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: forgotten.”9
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
Section 6. Separability Clause – If any section or provision of this Act is held unable to provide his roll number.
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective. About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
Section 7. Repealing Clause – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and
following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended
circulation. that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
Approved: August 29, 2003 misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
5. In Re: Medado (B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013) during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
SERENO, C.J.: After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant
petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
general weighted average of 82.7.2 that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do
so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it
province for a vacation.6 was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles
not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was virtua1aw 1ibrary
probably just an attendance record.7 Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot
ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna
was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll
involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] and take the oath as necessary.16
since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from
as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals
who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court,

pg. 9
this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar. hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19 Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the virtua1aw 1ibrary
Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have practice of law.
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the
liability for his years of inaction. lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with
more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He the ethical standards of the legal profession.
justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional
but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”22 Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not
We disagree. yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000.
know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage
neminem excusat. in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated severely by this Court.
under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full- ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law.
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the
Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to circulation to all courts in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or SO ORDERED.

pg. 10
6. Aguirre v. Rana pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
EN BANC George Bunan (Bunan).
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
respondent. Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
DECISION act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
CARPIO, J.:
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
The Case accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services.
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until
examinations. he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
The Facts
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to
2000 Bar Examinations. assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for the pleading.
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
misrepresentation. claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was
allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-
the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of
the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that
the Roll of Attorneys up to now. he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two

pg. 11
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government. On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
vendetta. the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
OBCs Report and Recommendation candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. Philippine Bar.
The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
Philippine Bar. proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
represent him before the MBEC. attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
The Courts Ruling instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel
for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that
counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel

pg. 12
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3] respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special Philippine Bar.
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, SO ORDERED.
and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar 7. In Re Agrosino
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even Republic of the Philippines
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking SUPREME COURT
admission had practiced law without a license.[5] Manila

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. EN BANC
v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar RESOLUTION
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9] FELICIANO, J.:

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Bayan. Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of
was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The
that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel

pg. 13
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn
officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission justice. . . .
to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 xxx xxx xxx 4
Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
of office. 359, 210 NW 710:

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise
Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
(10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar. to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that
the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
as having persuasive effect:
In Re Keenan: 6
In Re Farmer: 3
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
xxx xxx xxx right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted Re Rouss: 7
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . . not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination
into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
xxx xxx xxx
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper.
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of

pg. 14
the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our
justice. legal system as we know it. 12

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning: merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
Ann./Cas. 187): and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an character.
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9 Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment: be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission
Re Stepsay: 10 to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding. consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the
Re Wells: 11 bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in
disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that
the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the law.
acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default

pg. 15
thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from Associate Justice and
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and Chairman, 2003 Bar Examinations
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan. Supreme Court

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur. Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa (x)
Deputy Clerk of Court
Bellosillo, J. is on leave. and Bar Confidant
Office of the Bar Confidant
8. Bar Matter of Ma’am Elijo’s Bar Year Supreme Court

Republic of the Philippines Ms. Carmelita I Quebegco (x)

SUPREME COURT Executive Vice President
Manila 9. In re 1999 Bar Examinations ( Mark Anthony Purisima)
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 986.April 13, 2000]

IN RE 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS

BAR MATTER No. 1222 September 23, 2003
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated
September 23, 2003. Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 13
2000.
"Bar Matter No. 1222.- Re: 2003 Bar Examinations.- Acting on the report and
recommendation by the Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee B.M. No. 986(In re 1999 Bar Examinations.)
concerning the examination conducted on the morning of September 21, 2003 on the
subject of Mercantile Law, the Court Resolved to: In Bar Matter No. 979 we resolved on 19 March 2000 "(a) to approve the report and
recommendation of the 1999 Committee on Bar Examinations under its new
(a) NULLIFY the examination on this subject, in view of the Court's findings which Chairman; and, (b) to order the immediate decoding and release of the names of the
affect the integrity of the examination in Mercantile Law; and candidates who passed the last 1999 Bar Examinations and who have complied with
the prescribed requirements" (underscoring supplied). Among those
(b) HOLD another examination in Mercantile Law on Saturday October 4, 2003, eight conditionally/provisionally admitted to take the examinations who obtained passing
o'clock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue averages but failed to comply with the prescribed requirements were applicants Mark
(De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila.) Anthony A. Purisima, Josenilo M. Reoma, Ma. Salvacion S. Revilla and Victor E.
Tesorero. These examinees were each furnished a copy of the Resolution of the Court
This resolution is without prejudice to any further action the Court may take on the allowing them "to take the 1999 Bar Examinations, subject to the CONDITION that
matter." they shall submit to the Court the required certification of completion of the pre-bar
review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations." Purisima
Very truly yours, received copy of the Resolution on 20 August 1999; Reoma on 27 August 1999;
Revilla on 1 September 1999, and Tesorero on 25 August 1999.
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court Despite due notice, subject petitioners failed to comply with the requirement. In fact,
as of 19 March 2000 when the results of the 1999 Bar Examinations were released, or
Jose C. Vitug (x) almost six (6) months from the last day of the examinations, they had not complied
pg. 16
with the requirement, even up to the present. Neither is there any showing that any of This is without prejudice to whatever further action the Court may take against any of
them was granted a longer period than that prescribed in the Resolutions issued on subject examinees/petitioners for perjury or falsification of public document as the
various dates conditionally/provisionally admitting them to take the examinations. facts may warrant. Purisima, J., no part. Vitug, J., is abroad on official business.
Nor can they justify such failure on the pretext that they have not read the Resolutions
herein mentioned, as they executed a uniform "UNDERTAKING," which they Very truly yours,
individually signed, that they "have read and understood the rules on the conduct of
the bar examinations and that (they) agree to abide by them strictly without any (Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
reservations." 10. Bar Matter No. 810

Aside from the pertinent Resolutions of the Court, par. 4 of the Instructions stated at [BAR MATTER No. 810. January 27, 1998]
the bottom of the standard petition for three- or more- time repeaters which Messrs.
Purisima, Reoma, Revilla and Tesorero adopted and filed specifically provides, "4. If IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS,
conditionally or provisionally admitted to the examinations, the condition/s must be JR.
satisfied within 60 days from the last day of the examination, unless otherwise RESOLUTION
indicated." As previously stated, there is no showing that any of these applicants was FRANCISCO, J.:
granted a longer period than that prescribed in par. 4 of their petitions.
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations.[1] His
As regards petitioner Purisima, he did not only fail to comply with a basic oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Courts resolution dated August 27,
requirement, i.e., submitting a certificate of completion of the Pre-Bar Review course 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations subject to the condition that
under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations, but he also should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyers oath pending
committed a serious act of dishonesty which renders him unfit to become a member of approval of the Court x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his petition that he was enrolled in the Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners participation in the
Pre-Bar Review course of the Philippine Law School when he filed his petition on 19 initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN
July 1999. But, as Dean Tomas P. Maddela Jr. of the Philippine Law School through BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan,
its Acting Registrar Rosalia C. Kapauan certified, Philippine Law School has never a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter,
offered Pre-Bar Review course since 1967. petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was
discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
With respect to petitioners Reoma, Revilla and Tesorero, although they were able to
present certifications that they enrolled in and were attending the Pre-Bar Review In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that he be
course as of the time they filed their petitions, they failed to show that they have allowed to take his lawyers oath at the Courts most convenient time[2] attaching
satisfactorily completed their attendance therein, a basic requirement they failed to thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of
comply with within the prescribed sixty (60)-day period from the last day of the 1999 Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his
Bar Examinations. righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the
Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for non-compliance with the prescribed requirements of (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers;
this Court for their conditional admission to take the 1999 Bar Examinations, and also (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St.
for gross dishonesty on the part of petitioner MARK ANTHONY ABAYA Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral
PURISIMA, all four (4) petitioners, namely, MARK ANTHONY ABAYA Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before
PURISIMA, JOSENILO MARQUEZ REOMA, MA. SALVACION SUCGANG acting on petitioners application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan,
REVILLA and VICTOR ESTELLA TESORERO are declared DISQUALIFIED from father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In
the last Bar Examinations; consequently, as regards them, the examinations taken by compliance with the Courts directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment
them on the basis thereof are considered NULL and VOID. which states as follows:

pg. 17
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent
comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyers oath, and the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been
hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is
willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated Caparros Argosino, petitioners co-accused below, to take the lawyers oath.[4]
March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No.712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries
which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without any infraction of
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps
his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate
and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the
murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes helpless and defenseless condition doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash,
when they were beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog, suggesting the temerarious and uncalculating.[5] Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the
presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing
(People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct
himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to the lesser Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padillas comment
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar
of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas, Jr., will
house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning members of society.[6]
of his sons involvement in the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas,
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal Jr., to take the lawyers oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the
case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has a Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to
high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his petitioners personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he
cannot forget. SO ORDERED.

5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. [3] 11. Mosquera v. Panganiban

At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and SECOND DIVISION
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. [G.R. No. 121180. July 5, 1996]
Camaligan admits that [h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner
since then has become morally fit x x x and submits petitioners plea to be admitted to GERARD A. MOSQUERA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her
the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati,
Metro Manila, HON.FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her capacity as
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, City of Makati, Metro
petitioners admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the Manila, and MARK F. JALANDONI, respondents.
senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latters untimely DECISION
demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And
as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high MENDOZA, J.:
pg. 18
 Accordingly, Second Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista filed a motion to
This is a petition for review on certiorari of orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 147366. Private respondent in turn
1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 64) sustaining an order of the moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Department of Justice but his
Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 65) for the reinstatement of the information for less motion was denied.
serious physical injuries against petitioner Gerard S. Mosquera, which the MeTC had
previously allowed to be withdrawn by the prosecution. The reinstatement of the case In its order dated October 13, 1994,[1] the MeTC, presided over by respondent Judge
was made on motion of the offended party. Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao, granted the motion of the prosecution and
considered the information against petitioner withdrawn. The MeTC stated in its
The prosecution in the MeTC arose out of a physical encounter between petitioner and order:
private respondent Mark E. Jalandoni within the premises of the Ateneo Law School
on June 21, 1993. Petitioner is a graduate of the law school and a member of a Considering the time limit given by the Court to said counsel in the order dated
fraternity in that school. On the other hand, private respondent was then a third-year August 15, 1994 within which to pursue the motion for reconsideration [of DOJ
student enrolled in the law school. There is considerable dispute how the fight took Resolution No. 525, Series of 1994] and without said counsel having informed this
place. Petitioners version was that he had gone to the law school and happened to Court of the outcome of the same,[2] it can safely be concluded that private counsel
meet respondent Jalandoni. Because Jalandoni had a previous altercation with another had lost interest to further prosecute the case. Moreover, Atty. Valdez acting as
member of petitioners fraternity, petitioner tried to talk to Jalandoni, but the latter private counsel in the prosecution of the instant criminal case is under the direct
reacted belligerently and the two had a fight. On the other hand, Jalandoni claimed control and supervision of the Trial Fiscal, who by virtue of the Department of Justice
that petitioner and members of petitioners fraternity simply attacked him upon seeing resolution was impliedly ordered to desist from prosecuting the case for lack of
him, for a remark which they claimed he (Jalandoni) had made, which caused a probable cause. In view thereof, the Court is of the opinion that the motion of the
female student to cry. The female student was a friend of one of the fraternity Trial Fiscal should be accorded weight and significance, as it was premised on the
members. findings that the filing of the information in question has no legal basis.

Be that as it may, as a result of the scuffle, a criminal complaint for frustrated On motion of private respondent, however, the MeTC reconsidered its order. In its
homicide was filed by private respondent against petitioner and five others, namely, order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC said:[3]
Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida, Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr., Walter S. Ong,
and Jayme A. Sy, Jr., before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. After carefully weighing the arguments of the parties in support of their respective
claims, the Court believes that the weight of the evidence and the jurisprudence on the
After the usual preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor matter which is now presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor of complainants
Herminio T. Ubana, Sr. recommended the filing of an information for less serious contention. As held in the cases recently decided by the Hon. Supreme Court, once a
physical injuries against petitioner, Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida and case is filed in Court, the latter acquires complete jurisdiction over the same without
Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr. and the dismissal of the charges against Walter S. Ong and regard to technicalities and personal beliefs.
Jayme Sy, Jr. The recommendation was approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro M. Castro on January 10, 1994. That while there is merit in the accused Gerard A. Mosqueras claim that the institution
of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal who may or may
Accordingly, an information for less serious physical injuries was filed with the not file the complaint or information, when in his opinion the evidence is insufficient
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila on January 17, 1994 against to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the same is true only
petitioner and Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronaldo B. Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon, when the case is not in Court yet because after the case is already forwarded, raffled
Jr. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 147366, was assigned to Branch 65 of the and assigned to a particular branch the Public Prosecutor loses control over the case.
MeTC and tried in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. The arraignment
was set on July 29, 1994, at 8:30 A.M., but petitioner filed a motion before the Office It required the parties to appear before it on January 20, 1995, at 9:00 A.M.
of the Provincial Prosecutor for the reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause against him. As his motion was denied by the Provincial Prosecutor, petitioner Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.[4] In its order, dated
appealed to the Department of Justice which, on July 20, 1994, directed the Provincial April 24, 1995, the MeTC also set the arraignment of petitioner and Meneses, Jr. on
Prosecutor to withdraw the information. May 19, 1995.

pg. 19
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. The case, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 95-718, was assigned In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word party must be
to Branch 65, presided over by respondent Judge Delia H. Panganiban. understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons
who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the
Initially the RTC issued a temporary restraining order but, on June 9, 1995,[5] it party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution
denied petitioners application for preliminary injunction. The RTC upheld the of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the
reinstatement of the information against petitioner and the other accused. With its offense. The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and
denial of injunction the RTC considered the petition for certiorari and prohibition as certiorari from an [interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise
having been rendered moot and academic. Petitioner filed a motion for recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)] and People v.
reconsideration which the RTC denied in its order of July 19, 1995. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that offended parties in criminal cases
have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved to file the special civil
Hence this petition for review on certiorari and for an order: action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the
underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote
a. Reversing the Orders dated 09 June 1995 and 19 July 1995 (cf. Annexes A and B) their object. . . .
issued by respondent Judge Panganiban;
Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno[8] in support of his
b. Setting aside, as null and void, the Orders dated 29 December 1994 and 24 April contention that private respondent has no personality to file the motion in question:
1995 (cf. Annexes R and T) issued by respondent Judge Quiambao;
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private
c. Making the preliminary injunction final; prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day
period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal [from the order of
d. Prohibiting respondent Judge Quiambao from trying and hearing Criminal Case No. dismissal of the information]. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file
147366; and the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case
through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and
e. Declaring the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 147366 as final and executory in only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have
accordance with the Order dated 13 October 1994 issued by respondent Judge interrupted the period for appeal.
Quiambao.
The case of Cabral, however, differs materially from this case. In Cabral, the offended
Petitioners contention is that, because the direction and control of criminal party had lost his right to intervene because prior to the filing of the criminal case, he
prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, the motion for reconsideration of the had instituted a civil action arising from the same act subject of the criminal case. On
order of October 13, 1994, which the private prosecutor filed without the conformity the other hand, in the case at bar, the right of private respondent to intervene in the
by the public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent the order of dismissal from criminal prosecution is well nigh beyond question as he had neither instituted a
becoming final. Consequently, the MeTC gravely abused its discretion in afterward separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so.[9]
reinstating the information.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent has the legal personality to
Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an interest in the maintenance of file the motion for reconsideration in the trial court.
the criminal prosecution. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial
court which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only Beyond the personality of the private respondent to seek a reconsideration of the order
limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the of dismissal of the MeTC, the central issue in this case is whether in ordering the
accused in double jeopardy.[6] We recently had occasion to reiterate this rule in reinstatement of the information, the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[7] where, through the Chief Justice, we held:
The MeTC invoked its authority under Crespo v. Mogul[10] to approve the
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to withdrawal of informations after they have been filed in court, thus:
appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to any party, except
when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy.

pg. 20
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which is now presented for resolution
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of heavily leaned in favor of complainants contention and that after a case has already
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of been forwarded, raffled, and assigned to a particular branch, the Public Prosecutor
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on loses control over the case. The order contains no evaluation of the parties evidence
the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to proceed against
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A petitioner. The statement that the weight of evidence . . . lean[s] heavily in favor of
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who complainants [Jalandonis] contention is nothing but the statement of a conclusion.
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation Nor could the MeTC rest its judgment solely on its authority under the Mogul
or upon instruction of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the doctrine to have the last word on whether an information should be withdrawn. The
investigation. question in this case is not so much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or
not to grant the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the information it does but
Petitioner argues that by its order of October 13, 1994, the MeTC already exercised its whether in the exercise of that discretion or authority it acted justly and fairly. In this
authority under the Mogul doctrine to grant or deny the public prosecutors motion to case, the MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the reinstatement of
withdraw the information and was thereafter precluded from changing its mind in the information against petitioner, just as it did not have good reason for granting the
absence of a motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor. withdrawal of the information.

This argument is untenable. The court could have denied the public prosecutors The matter should therefore be remanded to the MeTC so that it can make an
motion for the withdrawal of the information against petitioner, and there would have independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and on that basis decide
been no question of its power to do so. If it could do that, so could it reconsider what whether to grant or not to grant the withdrawal of the information against petitioner.
it had ordered. Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or
reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or WHEREFORE, the orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, 1995 of the Regional Trial
defect therein.[11] In this case, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the Court are REVERSED and the orders of October 13, 1994 and December 29, 1994 of
private prosecutor who, as already discussed, has the legal personality to do so. the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 are SET ASIDE and the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati is ORDERED within ten (10) days from receipt of
Indeed, the MeTC must have realized that it had surrendered its exclusive prerogative this decision to RESOLVE the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the information
regarding the withdrawal of informations by accepting public prosecutors say-so that in Criminal Case No. 147366, stating in its order clearly the reason or reasons for its
the prosecution had no basis to prosecute petitioner.[12] Its order of October 13, 1994 resolution, after due consideration of the evidence of the parties.
was based mainly on its notion that the motion of the Trial Fiscal should be accorded
weight and significance as it was premised on the findings [of the Department of SO ORDERED.
Justice] that the filing of the information in question has no legal basis.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
This certainly was not the exercise of discretion. As we said in Martinez, whether to 12. Villareal v. People
approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of Republic of the Philippines
discretion required in cases like this [under the Mogul ruling] . . . What was SUPREME COURT
imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not Manila
being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to
accept the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency.[13] SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

Unfortunately, just as in allowing the withdrawal of the information by the public G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
prosecutor, the MeTC did not make an independent evaluation of the evidence,
neither did it do so in granting the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration. In ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
its order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC simply stated that it was reinstating the vs.
case against petitioner because [a]fter carefully weighing the arguments of the parties PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
in support of their respective claims, the Court believes that the weight of the

pg. 21
x-----------------------x validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that
allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
G.R. No. 154954
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
vs. (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while
SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA
B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
DE GUZMAN, Respondents. (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3

x-----------------------x Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-
G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of
G.R. No. 155101 discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona),
Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced
vs. below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
x-----------------------x Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The
appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
vs. Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
RESOLUTION (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
SERENO, CJ: indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
"Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments
raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

pg. 22
 On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti- memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
increase the applicable penalties. and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day
SO ORDERED. officially ended.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon
case:6 (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
(Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes
Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes). heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of
Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
City for the commencement of their initiation. removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and pronounced dead on arrival.
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilans:
Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the
floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans 1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of
initiation. 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

pg. 23
 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
16. Antonio General (General)
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores) 38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo) anew.

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza) criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused
De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) remaining 25 accused, viz:

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima) 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,
Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were
acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable
25. Adel Abas (Abas) doubt.

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola) 2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the
In Criminal Case No. C-38340 crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were
also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

pg. 24
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice
P1,000,000 by way of moral damages. aforethought.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No.
the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted
On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the
court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to
Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial. his death.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
Motion for Partial Reconsideration 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from
with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result,
Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law.
Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already
trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon
She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation
12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April
incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the 2003.13
proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether
the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their
respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications,
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them
terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to
and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that appeal and applied for probation.
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus
interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, ISSUES
it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault
(culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to

pg. 25
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the
of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on
intentional felonies account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of
a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act
probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses
cases against them DISCUSSION thusly:

Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and
passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin
speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal
of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 xxxx
certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision dismissing
the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do
lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual on the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of
its very power to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
evidence.19 manifest. (Emphases supplied)

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate
arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x
sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose
the motion of petitioner Villa with finality. or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall
focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden

pg. 26
act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical
proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels intentional felony.x x x.
one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to
produce the result. On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, xxxx
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these
elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,
existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason
of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
xxxx committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before openly visible.
or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus
interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
imprudence resulting in homicide. negligence.

xxxx As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness,
the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In
since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual,
intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. committing an intentional felony.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we
cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for

pg. 27
intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the nature
of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has
has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing
Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles
246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled
the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of
imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the
court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the
applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase
penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying
for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28

filed by Tecson et al. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final
Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s
The finality of a CA decision will not already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
bar the state from seeking the conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
annulment of the judgment via a initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
Rule 65 petition. State.

In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
result of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where
discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the
heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does
to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court. conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of
former had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have
65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and
that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of
until after the matter is ultimately resolved. the court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is
articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment
once the accused applies for probation, viz:

pg. 28
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That
done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate with law.
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of
has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not
heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121
jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a of the Caloocan City RTC.
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this
Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall
accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly
speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 –
lack of jurisdiction. of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor
Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed
be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch
judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-
appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal 38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners
would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as
the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications
excess of jurisdiction. with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as
The orders of Caloocan City RTC the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on
they were issued without jurisdiction. an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part
and parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with

pg. 29
the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on
appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-
of the court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this
appeal – the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield
the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied
and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the for it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to
any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place. state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making
them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the
the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following community.
conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is
appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59
when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the this Court explained thus:
judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case
was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed
must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion
the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society,
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not
origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s
execution thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46 prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of
the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et
respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the
the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4
upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September
2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of
Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
eventually required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall
the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57 be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.

pg. 30
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied) Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested.
appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case,
the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became al. from probation did not totally
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed extinguish their criminal liability.
to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination
accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis
that all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is
appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court totally extinguished:
enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the
benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
probationable. before final judgment.

While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 2. By service of the sentence.
issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they 4. By absolute pardon.
had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally
found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of 5. By prescription of the crime.
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, 6. By prescription of the penalty.
which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC
should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time. 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of
authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment
and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.

pg. 31
 xxxx
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we
find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
precisely to "suspend the execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas
sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67 not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation."
The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those
"interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or
by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied) xxxx

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains. In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide,
In light of our recent Decision in but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al. imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it
may now reapply for probation. would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand right to apply for probation.
modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who
appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through
Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all:69 no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco,
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the xxxx
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He
will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad
offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have
— even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even
pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the
carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat (Emphases supplied)
the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et
Franciscoand this case. al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by

pg. 32
arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is
prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It
years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties
Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74
Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on
eligible for probation. the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two
penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the
granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. shortening of the prison term.76
have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of
trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the
terms, conditions, and period thereof. discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the
Final clarificatory matters aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on
Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the
minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The
discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public
the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
reads as follows: disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months expressly remitted in the pardon.
of prisión correccional, as maximum.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their
lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence judgment of conviction becomes final.82
Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must
be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they
sentence should now read as follows: shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public
correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of
accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if
al. expressly remitted in a pardon.85

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of
accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the

pg. 33
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n
in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87 correccional, as maximum."

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation SO ORDERED.
is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. 13. Antonio Carpio: The Man of the Bench
We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension 'The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not brilliance,' Justice
from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of Antonio Carpio had told a former associate, and that explains his actuations in the
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the Supreme Court.
order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from MANILA, Philippines - “Let us not…delude ourselves into believing that a new
continuing with her teaching profession. constitution would immediately eradicate the ills that plague our country. Nor can we
expect that tinkering with the constitution will totally purge it of its defects and make
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from this nation great again…. One thing we cannot afford to overlook nor downgrade is
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual the importance of the human element. A basically workable constitution or law can
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto become defective in the hands of enthroned rascals, as we are now experiencing,”
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed wrote Antonio Tirol Carpio.
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
No, this was not written recently but was penned by him when he was a 20-year-old
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even senior economics student of the Ateneo de Manila University in 1969. Published in
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of The Guidon, of which Carpio was then editor in chief, the piece mirrored tumultuous
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. times.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions Before graduating in 1970, Carpio wrote in his last editorial about the seeming
prescribed in the probation order. inevitability of a revolution, given the pervasive and severe inequity prevailing at the
time. Yet he lamented the fragmentation of revolutionary forces and their inability to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of overhaul the system. “A revolution is something that cannot be left to accident. It has
petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby to be a deliberate and organized action.”
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED. A son of the First Quarter Storm, the first months of 1970 that were marked by
massive student protests against Ferdinand Marcos’s rule, Carpio would become
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Supreme Court (SC) justice 31 years later on Oct 22, 2001, and at 52, be the youngest
Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise appointee at that by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the Today, he’s caught in the vortex of public opinion because of his biting language in
aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation his ponencia on people’s initiative. But Carpio—according to those who know him—
proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in is just being consistent. His decision on Charter amendments via what appears to be a
connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel rushed and personal-agenda-driven people’s initiative is not radically different from
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible his early views as a young student leader, they say.
to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of
the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any. The repressive Marcos years which he saw and experienced as a law student at the
University of the Philippines from 1970 to 1975 shaped and left a deep imprint on
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision him. After all, Edgar Jopson and Eman Lacaba, student activists during Carpio’s time,
dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the were among the Ateneo batchmates whom he lost to the “revolution.”
fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows:
"They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months

pg. 34
At UP, radicalism was predominant among students who organized and joined often “Tony would philosophize the needs of society,” says PR consultant Antonio Abaya,
violent demonstrations against the Marcos regime. Although student organizations who recalls that the night before EDSA 1 broke, he, along with Carpio, were supposed
were not recognized then, fraternities became an outlet of rage and violence, and to meet with Jesuit priest Joaquin Bernas who had access to Corazon Aquino, the
Carpio, as head of the Sigma Rho fraternity during his time, got caught in the tides. widow of slain Sen. Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Already in private practice with the
firm he co-founded with partners F. Arthur “Pancho” Villaraza and Avelino
Dad's advice “Nonong” Cruz Jr., Carpio was ready to risk his firm and connect with the mutinous
Sigma Rhoans entangled with rival Alpha Phi Betans who, at the time, were headed Reform the Armed Forces Movement, says Abaya.
by Oscar Orbos, who would later become congressman and then governor of
Pangasinan. The ensuing rumble resulted in casualties on both sides and, following Years later, as the Aquino government remained vulnerable to coup attempts—the
command responsibility, fraternity leaders Orbos and Carpio were suspended from most serious of which was the 1989 Makati siege—Carpio joined the political fray as
law school for a year. Orbos managed to have his suspension reduced to one semester, he got into the circle of Fidel Ramos, whom he did not know personally although they
however, and graduated on time in 1975. were neighbors in the posh Ayala Alabang subdivision. Abaya says it was the late
Teodoro Benigno Jr. who helped connect them directly with Ramos.
Carpio, who was a year ahead of Orbos and was in third year when the rumble
erupted, ended up graduating in 1975 instead of 1974. “This was part of the adventure Regular meetings in Alabang followed in mid-January 1990 for purposes of analyzing
of growing up,” says an Alpha Phi Beta member who recalls events that happened at the prevailing political situation. These eventually gave birth to Ramos’s Alabang
the time. Group which was a merger of his Rotarians’ group and his neighbors’ circle. That
Carpio and what was then the Carpio Villaraza & Cruz (CVC) law firm would play a
It was in UP, too, that Carpio was introduced by former beauty queen and later major role in the Ramos presidency and become ascendant in the process is already
activist Nelia Sancho to his future wife, Vietnamese Ruth Nguyen, with whom he widely known.
would have two children, now both college graduates.
In the 1992 presidential elections which Ramos eventually won, the three partners of
“It was useless to be a lawyer then,” Carpio told people he knew before he was the firm had different political leanings but respected each other’s preferences. While
appointed to the SC, but he nevertheless pursued his law studies “because his father Carpio was for Ramos, Villaraza was batting for Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr.,
wanted him to.” His father Bernardo Carpio, who was former regional director of the and Cruz was for Jovito Salonga.
Bureau of Internal Revenue in Davao, wanted his youngest to be a lawyer like him.
All three combined were a formidable team. While Villaraza was “tactical,” Cruz was
When martial law was declared in 1972, Carpio was in his second year in law school “strategic,” and Carpio, the most serious of the three, was “more deliberate,” says
and like most law students, was reading the SC decision on the case of “Javellana vs Abaya. Carpio put his passion behind whatever he targeted.
Executive Secretary,” of then Alejandro Melchor. In that case, the High Court ruled
that the 1973 Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was ratified He took to sailing, hunting, and sharp shooting, believing that the latter was the best
in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. protection he could possibly have.

What made the decision controversial at the time was the declaration of martial law in What is not widely known is Carpio’s reason for leaving Ramos in 1996, four years
the middle of the convention in 1972 and the absence of real debates on the draft after serving as his chief presidential legal counsel. As legal counsel, he was
Constitution that Marcos wanted the people to ratify through a plebiscite. instrumental in breaking up monopolies in the telecommunications and shipping
industries, the same stranglehold which contributed to societal inequities, and which
“It was a decision issued under the gun of the martial law regime,” Carpio is quoted he already saw as a college student.
by an associate as having previously said. It was precisely the repression of the period
that left an indelible mark on the man who would become SC justice. It would also Against PIRMA
explain some of the important decisions he penned as a member of the High Court. Early talk about constitutional amendments and the possibility of extending the term
of Ramos did not sit well with Carpio because he thought it was not in accordance
The path to FVR with the spirit of the Constitution. And it put him at loggerheads with its proponents.
It marked a key policy difference between him and his boss who did nothing to stop
those lobbying for it.

pg. 35
It was after Carpio’s departure that the People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization To Lani Gomez Somera, one of Carpio’s former students who joined him in the firm
and Action (PIRMA) was given an aggressive push by then Budget Secretary and later in Malacañang, Carpio is a bit standoffish and is not inclined to smile. Her
Salvador Enriquez Jr. and spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, with the backing of boss is even-tempered and the closest he got to losing his cool was when he “took off
then National Security Adviser Jose T. Almonte. The efforts came to naught when his glasses and put them on the table,” she recalls.
brought to the SC, however.
A known techie, the associate justice introduced his former firm to computers as early
Publicist and Ramos media consultant Ed Malay describes Carpio as having enjoyed as the 1980s when these were not yet widely used. Believing that technology is both
the confidence of the former President. “Hindi political, tahimik. He would not even equalizing and liberating, he pushed for an e-library for the judiciary, the “first Web-
exchange banter…. He did not smoke. He would attend meetings and stay for a while; based searchable electronic library in the Philippine government.”
he rarely attended political meetings.”
“He is solution-oriented and likes to think out of the box. He is not predisposed to a
Malay says that despite the association with Ramos, Carpio showed his independence linear way of thinking; he likes branching out,” Somera, who has since left the firm,
from his former boss. One of his first decisions as associate justice involved the adds. In discussions of cases, he would always push with his characteristic, “And?” In
Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp. deal, which the High the aftermath of the SC ruling on people’s initiative, there was an abundance of loose
Court voided in 2003. talk about the firm being behind the Carpio-penned decision and supposed differences
between Carpio and Villaraza over Executive Order 464, which prevented Cabinet
Written by Carpio, the decision upheld the Constitution which prohibits the sale of officials from appearing before a congressional investigation. Despite seeming
public lands to private corporations. The deal was first negotiated under Ramos’s term evidence to the contrary—given the resignation of Cruz as defense secretary and the
and renegotiated under the administration of Joseph Estrada. “Akala ko ba kakampi firm’s other lawyers in government following suit—Villaraza declared that the firm
natin (I thought he was with us),” Ramos is quoted as saying after the SC released its remains supportive of the Arroyo administration.
decision.
If there is anything that the three partners have in common, it is political astuteness.
“The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not brilliance,” Carpio How tactics, strategy, and deliberation will come into play bears close watching. For
had told a former associate, and that explains his actuations in the SC. Carpio however, his place is secure for a good 13 more years—unless politicians in
Congress try to impeach him.
Out of the box 14. University of the Philippines v. Hon. Ligot-Telan

Before he joined government as Ramos’s chief legal counsel, Carpio—perhaps taking G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
after his mother Sol Tirol who was, at one time, superintendent of the Department of
Education—became a professorial lecturer at the UP College of Law from 1983 to UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C.
1992. Notwithstanding his one-year suspension, Carpio graduated cum laude and CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the Board, petitioners,
valedictorian in 1975, and placed sixth in the Bar that same year. vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87,
He went into private practice before forming the firm in 1980 with Villaraza and Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.
Cruz. While the three went their separate ways after law school (the three are Sigma
Rhoans), they promised to keep in touch and get together when anyone felt he had U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioners.
gained sufficient wingspan. It was Carpio who called Villaraza to tell him it was
perhaps time to come together. Bonifacio A. Alentajon for private respondent.

They struggled to build a steady client base as they sought to create a niche for a firm
that they hoped would outlive them. While he was the managing partner of the firm,
Carpio took pains to travel to Diliman to teach credit transactions and negotiable ROMERO, J.:
instruments, two subjects in law. As professor, he was known for his clarity of
thinking and easily recruited to the firm the best and the brightest among his students.

pg. 36
In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the ———————
people, the U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized Student's Signature
scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance
Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian
the public clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist profile of
the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the information which my
educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio- son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this application together with all the
economic ladder. documents attached. I further recognize that in signing this application form, I share
with my son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and
After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by U.P. President completeness of the information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution
establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my
Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the home/residence to verify the information provided in this application and I will give
implementation of the program. my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate
with the fact-finding team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits
In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are and privileges of my son/daughter/dependent.
entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book
subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the —————————————————
opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's Signature 1

Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard the
the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal integrity of the program. One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of
properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their the punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student
financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate falsification or
the end the application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form.
statement, as follows:
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of
Statement of the Student verification of data indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among
those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal,
I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information which I have a student enrolled in the College of Law.
furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that any willful misinformation
and/or withholding of information will automatically disqualify me from receiving On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo
any financial assistance or subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive,
the University. Furthermore, is such misinformation and/or withholding of Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
information on my part is discovered after I have been awarded tuition scholarship or
any form of financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse all financial benefits Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home
plus the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement without visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies
prejudice to the filing of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M.
Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. 2
home/residence to verify the veracity of the information provided in this application
and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal
to cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension of withdrawal of informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the
STFAP benefits and privileges. fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother
but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and

pg. 37
Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June 1992]." As such, the SDT
him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to
"proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make
full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action." 8
his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee
might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. 3 of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct
and Discipline. On November 26, 1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4,
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents
mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR meeting on January 25,
yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying 1993. 9
employment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was
shouldering the expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers. 4 On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the Senate
Committee on Education, thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR,
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that, after
the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, a close review of Nadal s case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr.
1991 with the following: Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he
should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10
That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a student of the
College of Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but
BAYAN) recipient (Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in
applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) benefits which he filed for view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the
schoolyear 1989-1990, and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of Scholarship and United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension,
Student Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance Service) voluntarily effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP,
and willfully withheld and did not declare the following: with legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of
good moral character. 11
(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A., in against the advice of his counsel. 12 The motion was placed on the agenda of the
support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico, February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day before said date, Senator Shahani
wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's case be deferred
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for
B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to accommodate the
meeting on 31 January 1980, and further amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item on its agenda. Again,
December 1988). 5 Nadal's motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in
view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred.
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT 6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No.
91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the
application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the
finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information about the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a
income of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given
studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call,"

pg. 38
Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to
substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that
Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening,
material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, the BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel.
he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as
the matter. the members voted as follows: six members — guilty, three members — not guilty,
and three members abstained. 14 Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadal the
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any
decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has
considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum
dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled
and the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high his financial obligations with the university. 15
school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way
establish that he is 'not guilty as charged' before the SDT," since the formal charges On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that
against him do not include withholding of information regarding scholarship grants "after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely
received from other schools. concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his) financial
obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature take its
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the
session where the following transpired: case. 16

The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the Secretary to However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following decisions of the Board in executive City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary
session, with only the Board members present. restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty
as charged of willful withholding of information in relation to his application for After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:
Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed
for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision rendered on 28
March 1993, exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the Executive dismissing SDT No. 91-026;
Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave
conditional votes, pending verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation
Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement in his STFAP application that he expenses of at least P150,000.00.
was granted scholarship while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that
Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the conditional votes would be Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17
considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman requested the
President to make the verification as soon as possible the next day. In answer to a The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of
query, the Chairman clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo, preliminary injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing,
there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision. the lower court declared that the only issue to be resolved was "whether or not the
respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due process when
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes. it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the
March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr.
The Chairman himself did not vote. 13 Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents' counsel whether they were

pg. 39
amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel replied in the negative, asserting With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well as to other UP
the University's prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this case had
discipline. 18 already been filed, the Court is convinced that there now exists a threat to the
petitioner (respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026) that the decision of the Board of
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order: Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully withholding information material to his
application for Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP)
The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident (application for benefits, will be implemented at any time, especially during the enrollment period,
preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order and opposition and this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him
thereto). For lack of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 in finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job.
both at 2:30 p.m. The injury thus caused would be irreparable.

In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not be rendered moot "Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there is no standard by
and academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva, President of the which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. Where the damage is
University of the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, Oscar susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not irreparable." (Social Security
M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962).
Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili, the officers, agents, representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby temporarily restrained from implementing IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in the
their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 instant proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the
entitled University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes respondents, their officers, agent(s), representatives, and all persons acting in their
of the 1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon Room, behalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending
Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court. petitioner, upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of P3,000.00.

SO ORDERED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 20

Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the
Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an
hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May 29, injunction or temporary restraining order, raising the following issues: whether or not
1993, the lower court issued the following Order: Nadal was denied due process in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
him, and, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from
Meeting on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.
"NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, without
notice to the herein petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall
on his (the Chairman's) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which this time confront a threshold issue raised by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not
resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue of violation of due process having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant
raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for the issuance of petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents"
a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in interest who should
with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from suspending the petitioner for one year. file the same. 21

It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
must be a right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule
March 29 Board meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, in administrative means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
proceedings, a respondent's right to due process exists not only at the early stages but distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
also at the final stage thereof. interest." 22 Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect
inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a

pg. 40
student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by having led or participated in student mass actions against the school, thereby posing a
withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, which collision between constitutionally cherished rights — freedom of expression and
information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for having breached the
financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the students were
effect of subverting a commendable program into which the University officials had not afforded due process for even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to have been
devoted much time and expended precious resources, from the conceptualization to a mere afterthought on part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does not dispute
the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate until the BOR decided to meet
in order that more students may benefit from the public funds allocated to the State on March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda.
University.
In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not
mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as
personality to file the instant petition. 23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary
(Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time
served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with these legal did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular
provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an
University President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider the
mandatory, however, that each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners. decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all
As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained, notwithstanding administrative charges against him." 29
the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the
party would be but a formality. 24 Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993
admitted that there was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of an conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he was "not morally convinced that
academic institution to refuse admission to a student arising from the imposition upon there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because there
him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de was no direct evidence that his mother received income from the United States and
Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 25 wherein certain law students this income was sent to the Philippines to support the studies of the children." 30 Two
were dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter of regents shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four voted guilty,
admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore, beyond three, not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed that, upon the
the province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing. suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU about Nadal's
alleged scholarship as a student in said institution. Consequently, no definitive
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was decision was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of
denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the exoneration handed down as averred by respondent.
March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's counsel: "What was
conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting where all twelve
start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on members of the BOR were present, that all of them participated in the voting held to
March 28, 1993." 26 reconsider the previous day's decision. He stated "I remember Regent Arcellana
questioning the voting again on the ground that there was already a final decision, but
With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration can be decided by the
"unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of board, and a majority of the board ruled that the matter can be reconsidered again
said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non v. Dames II 27 that imposition of upon motion of the chairman." 31
sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," 28 the phrase
obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that he
was not guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining in Non v. Dames II final decision was that which was rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no other decision
and in the instant case. In the former case, the students were refused admission for was made by the Board with respect to the same issue." 32

pg. 41
 This is the reason why a certification of good moral character is one of the documents
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of
process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for
convicted was not the same as the original charge." 33 Obviously, he was referring to disqualifying him.
the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling
the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that
However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in
same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34 It connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the
should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the
Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked
"morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional and rightfully exercised.
insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained
from the AdeMU. As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without
water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power
In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his assure its right to survive and continue operating. In more relevant terms, through its
July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise
that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying its academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend and refuse
employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help admission to a student who has subverted its authority in the implementation of the
of another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal withheld critically important STFAP.
information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in
criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is
in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, encompassed by the right of academic freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind Committee, Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court stated that a school or college
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light of the foregoing objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
circumstances, we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated his save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of the sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students." Elucidating, in
STFAP. Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the Court further
expounded:
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals
who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a
overzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools.

Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
and integrity are requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student

pg. 42
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university- intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students through the STFAP
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying it's operations.
as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby
ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the SO ORDERED.
panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right 15. Caronan V. Caronan
to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, that
is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Emphasis supplied.) "x x x.

On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court A college undergraduate who became a lawyer by stealing the identity of his brother
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work In a per curiam decision in Administrative Case No. 11316 promulgated July 12,
injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and 2016, the court ordered that the name “Patrick A. Caronon with Roll of Attorneys No.
consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers 49069” dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of
his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has The high court also barred Richard A. Caronan or “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” from
completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides being admitted as a member of the Bar.
more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an
erring student of an institution of higher learning. The high court also cancelled and revoked the identification cards issued to Richard
Caronan under the name “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” issued by the Integrated Bar of
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained the Philippines (IBP) as well as the certificates issued to the same by the Mandatory
itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or government agency Likewise, the high court also ordered the Office of the Court Administrator to
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39 circulate in all courts nationwide a photograph of Richard Caronan and a warning of
his false assumption of the name and identity of “Patrick A. Caronan.”
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread
upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of “[R]espondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with
open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal
and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993- cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
1994. It must have been with consternation that the University officials helplessly profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity
watching him complete his academic requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event and dignity,” the court held.
that he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot and
academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed upon him by the Richard is the older brother of the real Patrick Caronan, who, in 2013 filed a
BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for STFAP complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
scholarships from misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting certain
facts or as in instant case, withholding vital information and stating downright The real Patrick Caronan graduated from college with a degree in Business
falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only would this undermine Administration at the University of Makati (UM). He worked his way up until he was
the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated the rules and promoted as branch manager of a convenience store in Muntinlupa.
regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty

pg. 43
His brother Richard studied at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). He
later transferred to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). A year later, he was
discharged from PMA and focused on helping their father in a car rental business.

In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and three children and never went
back to school.

Two years later, he told his brother that he enrolled at a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.

In 2004, their mother informed Patrick that his brother passed the Bar examination.
Their mother also told him that Richard used his name and college records from UM
to enroll at St. Mary’s University College of Law.

Patrick brushed aside what his brother did. He said he did not anticipate any adverse
consequences to him until he was summoned by his office in 2009 informing him that
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) requested his presence for an investigation
against “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” for qualified theft and estafa.

Patrick also learned that his brother was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

Patrick said for fear of his own safety and because he became the subject of talk in his
office, he was forced to resign from his work. He eventually filed a complaint against
his brother.

In his defense, Richard denied all allegations and maintained that his identity can no
longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in an earlier administrative
case declared closed and terminated by this court in AC No. 10074.

But the high court said Patrick “clearly and overwhelmingly” established that he is the
real “Patrick A. Caronan.”

The IBP also noted that since Richard never completed his college degree, he has not
completed the required pre-law degree.

The court held that respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity and school records of
his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him
to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years.

“Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative
in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and
his client, as well as between him and the court,” the court said.

pg. 44