Chong v. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No.

217725, May 31, 2016 In compliance with the Court's Resolution8 dated June 16, 2015, the
respondents submitted its Comment.9 Summing up the arguments of the
FACTS:
respondents, they essentially stated that: (1) the existence of the AC and the
The factual background of this case dates back to the enactment of R.A. No. TEC does not limit or prevent the exercise of the COMELEC s constitutional
8436 on December 22, 1997 authorizing the adoption of an automated mandate to enforce election laws; (2) the AC and the TEC merely ensure that
election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and the COMELEC will put in place an effective AES that will clearly and accurately
onwards. On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending reflect the will of the sovereign people; (3) the power to provide these
R.A. No. 8436. Of particular relevance in R.A. No. 9369 are Sections 8, 9, 10 safeguards is within the authority of the Congress, whose power includes the
and 11 which calls for the creation of the AC and the TEC. power to ensure the faithful execution of its policies; and (4) the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369 enjoys
In Roque, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,6 the Court stated that the AC is to the presumption of constitutionality.
recommend, among other functions, the most appropriate, secure, applicable
and cost-effective technology to be applied to the AES; while the TEC is tasked ISSUE:
to certify, through an established international certification committee, not
The crux of this petition is whether Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436,
later than three months before the elections, by categorically stating that the
as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369, insofar as they provide for the
AES, inclusive of its hardware and software components, is operating properly
creation of the AC and the TEC, are unconstitutional for allegedly being
and accurately based on defined and documented
violative of Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
standards.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RULING:
Nevertheless, almost eight years after the passage of R.A. No. 9369, and
almost six years after the conclusion of the 2010 elections, and just several The petition has no merit.
months before the 2016 elections, Glenn Chong and Ang Kapatiran Party
The petitioners conclude that with the creation of the AC and the TEC,
(petitioners) came to this Court to assail the constitutionality of the creation
pursuant to Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the Congress
of the AC and the TEC. According to the petitioners: (1) the AC and the TEC
undermine the independence of the COMELEC and infringe upon its power.
are so patently incompatible with a functioning COMELEC; (2) a mere AC
should not be allowed to dictate upon the COMELEC in regard with the The Court, however, finds that the petitioners' thesis finds no support in the
technology to be applied in the AES; and (3) the recommendation of the AC evidence presented. A careful examination of the assailed provisions would
for the COMELEC to re-use the Precinct Count Optical Scan machines, reveal that the AC and the TEC's functions are merely advisory and
Consolidation and Canvassing System, peripherals, laptops, equipment, recommendatory in nature. The AC's primordial task is to recommend the
software, etcetera, in the 2016 elections, as well as its past actions, are patent most appropriate technology to the AES, while the TEC's sole function is to
nullities. certify that the AES, including its hardware and software components, is
operating properly, securely and accurately, in accordance with the provisions not later than 18 months prior to the next scheduled electoral exercise, and
of law. deactivated six months after completion of canvassing, while the TEC shall be
immediately convened within 10 days after the effectivity of R.A. No. 9369;
The functions of the AC are recommendatory, as can be gleaned from the
however, the TEC shall make the certification not later than three months
assailed provision itself in Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436 which provides that the
before the date of the electoral exercises.
functions of the AC are merely to recommend, to provide advice and/or
assistance, and to participate as nonvoting members with respect to the Lastly, the petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the
COMELEC s fulfillment of its mandate and authority to use the AES, and which presumption that the assailed provisions are valid and constitutional since
in all instances, is subject to the approval and final decision of the COMELEC. they failed to present substantial evidence to support their claim.
On the other hand, the TEC's exclusive function is to certify, through an
Besides, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9369 has already been upheld by this
established international certification entity to be chosen by the COMELEC
Court in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
from the recommendations of the AC that the AES, including its hardware and
(BANAT) Party-List v. COMELEC.10 In the said case, therein petitioners alleged
software components, is operating properly, securely, and accurately, in
that R.A. No. 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
accordance with the provisions of law.
claiming that the title of R.A. No. 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll
The Court has conspicuously observed that the petitioners expediently automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual
removed in their petition the following paragraph when they quoted Section canvassing of election returns. They further alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38,
9 of R.A. No. 9369 which amended Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436, which and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of
recognizes the authority of the COMELEC to enforce the said R.A. No. 9369. The Court then sustained the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9369
holding that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified
Nothing in the role of the Council or any outside intervention or influence
code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be
shall be construed as an abdication or diminution of the Commission's
further stated. Moreso, the assailed provisions dealing with the amendments
authority and responsibility for the effective development, management and
to specific provisions of R.A. No. 716611 and Batas Pambansa Bilang 88112
implementation of the AES and this Act.
are likewise germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 9369.
Evidently, the AC and the TEC were created to aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its
Settled is the rule that every law is presumed valid.13 Courts are to adopt a
mandate and authority to use an effective AES for free, orderly, honest,
liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of legislation, as
peaceful, credible and informed elections. The actions of the AC and the TEC
Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law.14 To
neither bind nor prohibit the COMELEC from enforcing and administering
strike down a law as unconstitutional, the petitioners have the burden to
election laws.
prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in
Moreso, the AC and the TEC are not permanent in nature. This is evident in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must
Sections 8 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended. The AC shall be convened sustain legislation because to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition
is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also
of the executive which approved it.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

All told, the Court finds no clear violation of the Constitution which would
warrant a pronouncement that Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as
amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369, are unconstitutional and void. The
power to enforce and administer R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No.
9369, is still exclusively lodged in the COMELEC, and the AC and the TEC may
not substitute its own opinion for the judgment of the COMELEC,

In sum, the Congress created the [AC] and the TEC not to encroach upon the
exclusive power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer laws relating to
the conduct of the elections, but to (1) ensure that the COMELEC is guided
and assisted by experts in the field of technology in adopting the most
effective and efficient [AES]; and (2) to ensure clean elections by having
disinterested parties closely monitor the COMELEC in procuring systems that
operate properly, securely, and accurately. As such, it is apparent that,
through the [AC] and the TEC, the Congress merely checks and balances the
power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer R.A. No. 8436, as amended
by R.A. No. 9369. It does not, however, substitute its own wisdom for that of
the COMELEC.16cralawred

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135

FACTS: RULING:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is reversed insofar as it declared
Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional and affirmed the
Mandatory Public Hearings, Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four findings of the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila
oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known Revenue Code have been observed.
as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a
In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
requirements had been observed. Instead, it declared Section 187 of the Local did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance
of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
power of supervision over local governments. By citing the distinction performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
between control and supervision, the lower court’s concluded that the procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to
challenged section gave the Secretary the power of control and not of the city government under the Local Government Code.
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the
The Court finds that Secretary Drilon had performed an act not of control but
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically
of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of
Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
ISSUE: While in supervision, it merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work
unconstitutional.
done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court
which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal
Antonio v. COMELEC 315 SCRA 62 (1999) and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable.
For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
Barangay captains in las pinas allowed. SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition
FACTS: contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper
municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a
The parties here are rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Bgy. certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within ten
Ilaya, Las Pinas, Manila. After Antonio was proclaimed winner, Miranda, Jr. days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court
filed an election protest before the MTC of Las Pinas. The trial court ruled shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing
in favor of the latter and declared Miranda as the duly elected Barangay thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may
Chairman. Nine days from receipt of the decision, Antonio filed a Notice be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
of Appeal before the COMELEC. The Commission, however, dismissed the party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days
same on the ground that Antonio failed to perfect his appeal within the from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final.
prescribed time. In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21,
Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads: ISSUE:

SEC. 21.Appeal From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved Whether the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the
party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after COMELEC in an election protest involving a barangay position is 5 days per
the promulgation of the decision. On the other hand, petitioner contends COMELEC Rules of Procedure or 10 days as provided for in RA 6679 and
that the period of appeal from decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or the Omnibus Election Code.
Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials is governed by Section HELD:
9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads: The protest is within 5 days. Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own
SEC. 9.A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided
may be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any a uniform five(5)day period for taking an appeal consistent with the
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd and
a barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period
of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within thirty
forbarangayelection contests. In view of theFlores vs. COMELECcase,
jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial
court. The Courten banchas heldinRodillas vs. COMELECthat the
procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court in abarangayelection protest case is set forth in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. More recently, inCalucag vs. Commission on
Elections,the Courten banchad occasion to state that: xxx.Therefore, the
COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the
appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days after the promulgation of
the MTC s decision.xxx.Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution provides in part that [r]ules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.The period for filing an appeal is by no means a
meretechnicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as
if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provisions of the law. By virtue of Section 9 (d),
Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that an appeal
may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the
Commission for failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed period,
the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where the
appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.
ROQUE FLORES v. COMELEC, GR NO. 89604, 1990-04-20 Issues:

Facts: whether he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule

and so subject to our review
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having
received the highest number of votes for kagawad... his election was Ruling:
protested by... private respondent who placed second in the election...
respondent because it apparently believed itself to be without... appellate
sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong... barangay in place of the
jurisdiction over the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Abra.
petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total.
Rejecting the petitioner's claim, the court held that Roque Flores was not
Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast for "Flores"
entitled to any of the four contested votes because he was not incumbent as
only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been
punong barangay (or barangay captain, as the office was formerly called) on
considered... invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner
the date of... the election.
and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The judge held that
the original total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, to 462, the petitioner was elected barangay captain directly by the voters, separately
demoting him to second place from the candidates running for mere membership in the sangguniang
barangay.
The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had no power to review In this sense, it may be said that he is a candidate for both... offices. Strictly
the decision of the regional trial court. speaking, however, the only office for which he may run - and for which a
certificate of candidacy may be admitted - is that of kagawad.
the Commission on Elections is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioner's appeal and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes should In fact, his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong
have been credited to him under the equity-of-the-incumbent rule in Section barangay.
211(2) of... the Omnibus Election Code.
The petitioner was no longer the incumbent punong... barangay on election
The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not day and so was not entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent
entertain the petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. rule.
6679 that the decision of the regional trial court in a protest appealed to it
from the municipal trial court in barangay... elections "on questions of fact Principles:
shall be final and non-appealable."... punong barangay is an essentially Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted
executive officer barangay which shall be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven
(7) kagawads to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay. The
candidate who... obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong because he should not have been considered resigned but continued to be
barangay x x x. entitled to the office of punong barangay under Section 8 of Rep. Act No.
6679, providing as follows:
"on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable.
Sec. 8. Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the Commission
considered resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. They
on Elections shall:
shall continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected and
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the qualified.
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were
municipal officials decided... by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
running for the same... position.
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Under Rep. Act No. 6679, the person who wins the highest... number of votes
Commission on Elections under its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
as a kagawad becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the
contests x x x involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
executive of the political unit but this argument goes to the wisdom of the
limited jurisdiction."
law, not its validity, and is... better addressed to the legislature.
Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that "unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the...
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

The petitioner insists on the application to him of Section 211(2) of the Code,
stating pertinently that:

2. x x x If there are two or more candidates with the same full name, first
name or surname and one of them is the incumbent, and on the ballot is
written only such full name, first name or surname, the vote shall be counted
in favor of the... incumbent.