SALUBRE - LTD Final Exam

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RICHIE H.

SALUBRE
EAC Institute of Law and Justice

THE EVOLUTION RE: ALIENATION OF LAND BELONGING TO PUBLIC DOMAIN


FOR PRIVATE USE FROM THE CASE OF IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
AND IN THE CASE OF HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC

IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. L-12958; May 30, 1960

In the case of Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, the Supreme Court laid down the following
doctrine with respect to alienation of public land for private use, to wit:

1. ACCRETION: A littoral owner is not entitled to accretion to his land. Article 457
of the Civil Code applies only to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters. It is not applicable when the accretion is caused by the
action of the sea.
2. ARTICLE 4 OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866
provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of
the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government
shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as an increment thereof. It is only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any
land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such
declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part
of the public domain. The reason for this pronouncement is undoubtedly that
the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in
Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on the
part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature,
to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard
service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
3. ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION: land of the public domain is not subject to
ordinary prescription. The occupation or material possession of any land
formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous permission from the
proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner
for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a
mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it
pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit
of those who live nearby.

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RICHIE H. SALUBRE
EAC Institute of Law and Justice

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179987; April 29, 2009

In the case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, the Supreme
Court made an extensive discussion on the history of the relevant laws pertaining to
alienation of public land belonging to public domain for private use. The Court referred to
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) vis-à-vis Property Registration Decree and
the provision of the New Civil Code.

The Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The
President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.

Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization." Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073,
supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated
therein:

“Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.”

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain." Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a
mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,

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RICHIE H. SALUBRE
EAC Institute of Law and Justice
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only
"agricultural lands."

The length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or
earlier."

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same
as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various
laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:

“SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.”

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly
refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That
is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:

“Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

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RICHIE H. SALUBRE
EAC Institute of Law and Justice

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:”

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself
for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino
citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public
Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that
both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

“Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time,
not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply
also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior
to the period fixed by the President.”

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

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RICHIE H. SALUBRE
EAC Institute of Law and Justice

The Supreme Court synthesized the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person


acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may
be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and
with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

********** NOTHING FOLLOWS **********

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