Case Study Bosh
Case Study Bosh
Submitted By:
Kurt Russel T. Tongol
Submitted to:
Prof. Connie M. Aunario
2022
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. FINDINGS
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Major Problem
Minor Problem
III. OBJECTIVES
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
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Specific Problems
1. The chemical used as a rubber emulsifier didn’t have labels and was
mishandled(IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER, & KMU, 2015).
2. No good smoke and fire alarm system were present within the factory(IOHSD,
CTUHR, EILER, & KMU, 2015).
3. No regular fire safety drills are being conducted for the factory employees (IOHSD,
CTUHR, EILER, & KMU, 2015).
4. The factory compound had no emergency fire exits(IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER, &
KMU, 2015).
III. OBJECTIVES
A. Major Objective
Provide an analysis of the Kentex Manufacturing Corporation factory fire in -
cident on how the conditions of the factory could be improved to lessen the likeli-
hood of a fire happening again in the future based on the Philippine OSH Stan-
dards and the theories learned from BET-2.
B. Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of this case study are the following:
1. Provide alternatives and solutions to reduce workplace fire hazards, whether
corporate or industrial.
2. Promote awareness and knowledge about OSH by presenting the researcher’s
analysis of the studied case.
3. Identify the obstacles to OSHS implementation.
4. Provide a reference for students and researchers who might consider studying
OSH someday.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
There was already a big problem within the Kentex Manufacturing Corporation
factory even before the fire started, and that is, bad working conditions for the em-
ployees. The IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER, and KMU(2015) fact-finding team found occu-
pational safety and health standards violations. Workers reported being forced to en-
dure extreme heat inside the plant during work hours due to the firm's lack of suffi-
cient ventilation. They claimed they became dissatisfied with their jobs not due to a
heavy workload but due to the heat inside the factory premises. In the investigation
done by the Bureau of Fire Protection(2018), a spatter caused by welding being
done inside the factory ignited a chemical powder called “Super Seal,” which caused
the fire. In 2014 and 2015, the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) did not issue fire per-
mits to the factory owners, and violations cited in their reports included a failure to
maintain fire extinguishers, no fire drills were conducted, no fire alarm system and
sprinkler system were implemented inside the factory. The specific problems that
have led and have contributed to worsening the fire incident are the following:
The chemical used as a rubber emulsifier didn’t have labels and was not prop -
erly stored. The chemical branded as Super Seal is a highly explosive chemical pow-
der used to emulsify rubber and stabilize it. In the investigation, it was found out from
the factory workers who survived the fire that they were not aware of the chemical’s
nature because it was not stored and appropriately labeled (IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER,
& KMU, 2015). Emmanuel Madiclom, a husband of one of the former employees of
Kentex, said that like most of the employees in the factory, his wife frequently com-
plained about the smell when she started working there and eventually got used to
it(Pante, 2015). Jobert Canino, one of the fire's survivors, said that there were no
storage for the chemicals and no labeling on the compounds (van der Ze, 2015). Ac-
cording to Leonilo Alibangbang, a welder who survived the fire, he was about to eat
lunch when a fire started from the chemical powder. Due to their lack of knowledge
and familiarity with its nature, they used water to extinguish it, but it was already hard
to control, and it only caused the fire to get bigger. When they used a fire extin-
guisher, it was already too late because the fire was already big, and black smoke
was already coming from it (SafetyCulture & BFP, 2018). The improper storage of
the chemical powder Super Seal violates Rule 1943.07 of the OSHS. The rule states
that: “(1) Significant quantities of commodities with fire hazards greater than ordinary
combustible commodities shall be separated from the main bulk by firewalls.” At the
same time, the missing labels on the chemical container violate Rule 1093.04 of the
OSHS. A rule on marking containers states that “All containers with hazardous sub-
stances shall be properly labeled. No employer shall accept any container of haz-
ardous substances for use, handling, or storage unless such containers are labeled.”
Labeling should be a part of every company’s hazard communication(HAZCOM) plan
because it serves as a communication tool for the employees to recognize the prop-
erties of a hazardous chemical.
There were no fire exits on the manufacturing compound. The factory windows
are protected by grills that are impenetrable during an emergency. According to wit-
nesses, the windows on the second floor were cracked up by the employees until
they could get outside. Workers who could flee the facility had to climb the back walls
since the delivery truck gate was locked. By forcing themselves through a gap, four
workers could escape and leap off the building (IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER, & KMU,
2015). This violated the Rule 1943.03 of the OSHS, which states: “(1) At least two
exits shall be provided in every floor and basement of every workplace capable of
clearing the work area in five (5) minutes,” and “(6) On every floor, except the ground
floor, one of the exits shall lead to an inside stairway or a smokeproof tower, while
the other exits shall lead to inside stairways, smoke-proof towers or horizontal exits.”
There was no proper smoke and fire alarm system present within the factory.
The survivors noted that even after the ground floor was entirely consumed by
smoke, assembly-line employees and office staff on the second story continued to
work. According to them, the fire spread so swiftly that they were locked inside with
no way out but through the main door. Additionally, they stated that they did not hear
a fire alarm. They also noted that personnel on the second level of the building were
stuck since they could not pass through the door due to the intense fire emanating
from the building's entrance(IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER, & KMU, 2015). As a part of an
effective safety program, a good smoke and fire alarm system must be implemented
by the company’s safety committee. This is a violation of Rule 1948.01 of the OSHS.
Rule 1948.01 says, “(1) All buildings having two or more stories in height shall be
equipped with fire alarm system and signals of distinctive quality and pitch audible to
all persons inside the building.” The management of the Kentex factory also violated
Section 10.2.6.4 of the Fire Code of the Philippines, which specified how a fire alarm
and suppression system must be integrated into an establishment.
No regular fire safety drills were conducted for the factory employees. The
survivors of the fire incident told during the investigation that employees who have
worked for Kentex for years have never witnessed a management-led fire and safety
exercise (IOHSD, CTUHR, EILER, & KMU, 2015). This is a violation of Rule 1948.03
of the OSHS, which states that “(1) Fire-exit drills shall be conducted at least twice a
year to maintain an orderly evacuation of buildings unless the local fire department
requires a higher frequency of fire drills” and of the Section 10.2.18.2 of the Philip -
pine Fire Code under Drills which says: “The employees or attendants of places or
public assembly shall be trained and drilled in the duties they are to perform in case
of fire, panic, or other related emergencies to be of greatest service in effecting the
orderly exit of occupants.”
V. ALTERNATIVES/POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Removal of the petrol component of the Super Seal.
Following the control hierarchy, rubber emulsifiers cannot be eliminated or sub-
stituted because they are crucial in manufacturing rubber slippers. However, the re-
searcher proposes that its petrol component could be removed. The advantages of
removing the petrol component in the rubber emulsifier are: It could lessen the likeli-
hood of a fire happening in the factory where it is used because the flammable com-
ponent will be eliminated, second, it will not have a foul smell because the petrol
component of the synthetic rubber produces an unpleasant odor when heated, and
third, it could lessen the risk of suffocation and the risk of external and internal bodily
irritation due to the smell and fumes emitted by the synthetic rubber when heated.
While eliminating a component in the hazardous substance has advantages, it also
has disadvantages. These are: it might take time to produce a new chemical be-
cause it would require a considerable amount of research effort; second, it would be
costly for the company to venture into research since it would require data gathering,
testing, and experimentation; and third, it might affect the overall behavior of the
chemical when used in manufacturing, and different temperatures and materials or
other chemicals interact with it.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
It would also be beneficial for Kentex factory and its employees if a safety
committee will be created to handle the issues with regards to occupational safety
and health and implement a safety program aligned with the company’s goals and
with consideration of the health and well-being of the employees, especially those
who work at the factory. Aside from that, the following is also recommended: Training
of the employees on hazardous chemicals handling following Rule 1093.09: Precau-
tionary Measures for Emergencies, Rule 1093.11: Spillage, Rule 1093.12: Instruction
on Health Hazard, and Rule 1093.16: Medical Aid of the Occupational Safety and
Health Standards(2017). Labeling hazardous chemicals must also be a part of the
hazard communication plan implemented by Kentex. The labels must adhere to the
first paragraph of Rule 1093.04 of the Occupational Safety, which states that haz-
ardous material containers must be appropriately labeled and not be accepted by the
employer if they are not correctly marked. It is also recommended that Kentex must
provide personal protective equipment(PPE) to those who work in the factory that
frequently uses or comes in contact with hazardous substances, as is stated in the
Rule 1081.01 clause (1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Standards(2017):
“The employer…shall at his own expense furnish his workers with protective equip-
ment for the eyes, face, hands and feet, protective shields and barriers whenever
necessary because of the hazardous nature of the process or environment, chemical
or radiological or other mechanical irritants or hazards capable of causing injury or
impairment in the function of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or
physical contact.” In terms of preparing the employees in case of emergency, fire
drills must be conducted following Rule 1948.03 of the Occupational Safety and
Health Standards(2017), which states fire exit drills must be conducted twice a year,
it shall include evacuation of the employees, composition of a fire exit drill committee,
and establishing a company fire brigade based on the Philippine Fire Code. Finally,
the Kentex factory's safety committee must develop an evacuation plan to guarantee
that employees are organized and aware of the facility's egress points and meeting
location outside the building in the event of an emergency.
VII. REFERENCES