FROM

REDUCTIONISM
TO
CREATIVITY

RDZOGS-CHEN
AND THE
NEW SCIENCES OF MIND

HERBERT V. GUENTHER

FOREWORD BY
JEREMY W. HAYWARD

SHAMBHALA
BOSTON & SHAFTESBURY
1989
34:

Sthiramati's insight that this operator can also operate in an improper

manner, as it often does, should be ample evidence that the rendering of
the Sanskrit term prajiiii by "wisdom" is contrary to textual evidence and
reveals wishful thinking on the part of those who use this rendering.
Moreover, such usage also contradicts the accepted connotations of the
word "wisdom" in the English language. Such a translation, speaking in
the context of the contemporary scene, would make wisdom a character­
istic of such notorious destroyers of man and his environment as the mili­
tary (government-sponsored) and the terrorists (free-lance or agency­
sponsored). Both have an uncanny ability to use whatever critical acumen
they have to select and act on that which is sinister, degrading, and
pernicious.

"MIND" AS A SELF-STRUCTURING PROCESS

Within the framework of representational thinking so prominent in

what is generally referred to as Buddhist philosophy and psychology, we
have noticed that set-theoretical considerations were instrumental in the
attempt to rediscover the unity of the mind that had been lost in the
welter of entitatively conceived operators. We also noticed that there are
sets with a plurality of members and sets with only one member. It is a
matter of choice whether attention is focused on sets with many members
or on a set with only one member. The Yogacara thinkers, who continued
the quest for unity within the framework of representational thought,
focused their attention on a set with only one member and referred to it
by the term cittamiitra. In this technical term citta was understood to re­
fer to a complex experiential (cognitive) field or situation, and miitra to
the exclusion of everything else. In other words, citta was used to convey
the unity of insight and action, knowledge and valuation, thinking and
feeling, and much more. This is in contrast to an earlier conception of it
as a granular entity among others that in one way or another were con­
nected or associated with it.
Another term used by the Yogacara thinkers was vijiiapti. This term
indicates information, not in the sense of a transfer of knowledge from
one system to another, but in the sense of an announcing of how matters
stand with regard to the system's self-organization and self-generation,
through which the system renews itself in a prognostic manner specific to
its niche-say, the human world-which is experienced as the sum total
of all its constituents. These the experiencer describes connotatively on
the communkative level and enacts, or acts upon, denotatively. In strictly
philosophical terms, the followers of this new trend said unequivocally
that the phenomenal world exists only as the apprehended meaning of a
system of concepts externalized by language into what is believed to be a
physical (and not quite so physical) reality. Since self-organization may
 THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM "MIND" : 35

be conceived of as an aspect of an overall organizational dynamics that is

physical and psychic at the same time, the assumption of any kind of du­
alism is superfluous and unwarranted. The Yogacara thinkers who em­
phasized self-organization must be credited with having been the first to
present a unified evolutionary (dynamic) perspective. Consequently they
also understood yoga not in the sense of a particular practice but rather
as an overall tuning-in to this evolutionary dynamics.
Lastly, the use of the term vijiiiina ( vijiiiinamiitra) is ample proof of the
fact that in spite of having glimpsed the dynamic character of all life, they
were unable to break away from the limitations set by representational
thinking.
The process character of the one-member set on which they focused
attention was referred to by the term iilayavijiiiina. In this technical term,
iilaya was understood as a qualifying attribute of vijiiiina, but since it is,
grammatically speaking, a noun indicating a repository, a site, a place
(with the implication of status), the static notion of "container" crept into
this term. It had the dynamic character of a large-scale feedback/feed­
forward operation that actively "stored" initiated potentialities of experi­
ence (Skt. viisanii). Statically, passively, it was these "stored" potentialities.
The decisive and truly innovative point was that the iilayavijiiiina was
seen as involving a triune transformation that ensured its own continuity
in an evolutionary manner. No matter what view and interpretation the
various thinkers of Yogaciira movement subscribed to, they agreed that
the iilayavijiiiina could be subsumed under three headings: vipiika, ma­
nana, and vijiiapti, as indicated by Vasubandhu in his fundamental treat­
ment of this movement, a writing called the Triirzsikii.
The "first concurrent transformation: Vipiika. In its literal meaning this
term corresponds to the static notion of "result," but it can be and is used
as a process term meaning "maturation." It was this latter connotation
that led to the understanding of vipiika as a transformation that is both a
dynamic process and the outcome of the process. In its former aspect, this
transformation corresponds to what in the older mechanistic terminology
of structure-oriented thinking was called "cause," but which in this new
perspective is better understood as the "momentum" imparted to the
evolutionary process emerging from the experientially initiated poten­
tialities of experience (Skt. viisanii), which as microstructures are termed
"seeds" (Skt. btja).
These microstructures are of two kinds, pure potentiality (Skt. ni$yan­
daviisanii) and potentiality-in-the-process-of-becoming-actualized (Skt.
karmaviisanii). As pure potentiality, they are the sediments of operations
that reflect the nature of their origin-whether they occurred within a
valuative (moral) context that could be described as healthy, unhealthy,
or neutral and as having operational consequences or not. But ·they are
36 :

themselves amoral, because as pure potentialities, no valuation applies to

them. As potentialities-in-the-process-of-becoming-actualized, they ma­
ture into healthy or unhealthy operations, which are, generally speak­
ing, such as to have operational consequences. On the purely potential
level, they merely foreshadow the "niche" in which the actual operation
takes place.
The outcome of these two microstructural operations is the actual psy­
chophysical cognitive process, the macrostructure with the two poles of
the intentional experiential act, the act phase reaching toward a mean�
ingful content, and the object phase (Casey 1976). In sum we can say that
the code name vipiika describes the simultaneity of macro- and micro­
evolution in the universe called experience. Macroscopic structures be­
come the environment for microscopic structures and influence their de­
velopment in a decisive manner, while the development of microscopic
structures becomes an equally decisive factor in the evolution of macro­
scopic structures.
The term vipiika, which dates back to a mechanistic assessment of lived
reality as a linear progression, has its shortcomings when it is used in a
new context that is attempting to give a dynamic account. Thus it hap­
pened that, on the one hand, the overt (conscious) experiential operation
and its macroscopic structure were understood to be the result of the ma­
turation of the experientially initiated potentialities of experience that
constitute its microstructure; on the other hand, these very microstruc­
tures and potentialities were understood as the result of the maturation of
the overt operation or macrostructure. One could then choose either per­
spective to satisfy one's linear thinking. It seems, however, that in the dy­
namic interpretation of the term vipiika by the Yogacara thinkers, the
mechanistic notion of causality, which is valid within certain narrow lim­
its, has been replaced by the overall evolutionary notion of homeorhesis
which describes a flow-process. Or, as Vasubandhu picturesquely put it,
"It (the iilayavijfiiina) moves on like a river in spate." 43
Metaphors are imaginative devices to assist the experiencer in his eman­
cipation from the tyranny of the concrete. Their wide use in Buddhist
thought is testimony to the intention of making people think and of mak­
ing difficult problems easier to understand. Sthiramati's commentary on
Vasubandhu's statement is a fine example of how this can work:

"River" is (a metaphorical description of) a flow in which cause and

effect go on without interval (or interruption). "In spate" is said with
reference to the volume of water in which no separation into an ear­
lier and later section can be introduced. Just as a river in spate sweeps
along with it grass, wood, cow dung and other such stuff, so also
the iilayaviiiiiina with its potentialities-in-the-process-of- becoming­
actualized as.. meritorious, unmeritorious, or neutral operations,
 THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM "MIND": 37

sweeps along (the five operators of ) the tactile program (sparsa), the
system-tilting (manaskiira), and the other programs, and moves on
unceasingly as long as samsiira lasts, in the manner of a river.44

Apart from the dynamic character of this transformative process, which

precedes, as it were, all other transformations, though no actual sequence
is involved, another idea emerges clearly: the idea of vipiika as a dynamic
field. It is only recently in the West that the notion of a field has attracted
attention. The notion has come to the fore especially in quantum field
theory and in works by phenomenology-oriented thinkers. In the Bud­
dhist notion of the iilayaviiiiiina, we can also detect the modern idea of
time- and space-binding. The spatial symmetry of the field is maintained
at first; but then it is broken by a kind of time-binding whereby experi­
ences of the past may be become effective in the present. These considera­
tions will help us to understand Vasubandhu's presentation of the trans­
formation termed vipaka:

Here, the viiiiiina which is termed iilaya, is a resultant ( vipiika) and

as such the sum total of microstructures in their phase of
germination (bqa).
Furthermore, it is such that the organization into what is to become
subject, as well as the intended structure in which it will find
itself, is as yet subliminal.
It is always accompanied by the operators (initiating) the tactile
program (spar5a), the system-tilting (manaskiir�), the feeling
tone ( vit), the sign-symbol system (samjiiii), and the project­
execution operator ( cetanii).
Furthermore, feeling here is of a neutral character (that is, it is a
feeling tone, not a judgment of feeling), and this ( vijiiiina) is as
yet not confined to a particular niche and is as yet amoral.
So are the program operators, and as such it moves on like a river
in spate.•5

The second concurrent transformation: Manana. This term is used in­

terchangeably with manyana and manas, which in conformity with the
emphasis on the system's character as vinjiina, is also termed manovi­
jiiiina, in which case manas is used as a quasi adjective (as was a/aya in the
previous instance). Its Inda-European root is men, "thinking," and thus
it is related to Latin mens and its derivatives "mentation" and "mind."
Specifically in the Indian context, it marks the emergence of what may be
described as the sense of being a subject using conceptual systems to
structure what is going to be perceived and determine how to get around
in the "world." This emergence as the total system's transformation is de­
termined exclusively by the inner dynamics of the system; it introduces a
directedness, a vector that clearly indicates in which direction a new
structure may be expected. This is a first step toward distinguishing dif-
J8 :

ferences in a universe the boundaries of which are as yet undefined and

can virtually be drawn anywhere. The universe cannot be distinguished
from how we "think" it and implicitly think about it. This transforma­
tion is, therefore, best understood as the system's instability phase, which
may be likened to a change of state (such as that from water to ice or
steam) where any modeling in terms of representational (mechanistic)
thinking breaks down.
This vectorial flow, indicated by the term manana and linked to the
notion of "subject," immediately brings up the so-called problem of the
self, which in the Western world has persistently moved either in the di­
rection of a dualism of body and mind appearing as distinct and sepa­
rable substances, or in the direction of a reductive monism culminating
either in some sort of reductive materialism or in some kind of panpsych­
ism, which is in no way less reductive. Any such supposed entitative
status of a self-regardless of whether we speak of a self or the Self (the
capital letter added to reinforce an already prevailing obscurantism)­
owes its supposed existence to the representational mode of thinking,
which by no means exhausts the reach and range of what is so inade­
quately referred to as "mind." As an emergent vectorial flow, the so­
called self cannot be equated with the privileged ego or "I" in egological
philosophies, nor can it be equated with a transcendental ego or self in
transcendentalist philosophies (represented in India by all those systems
that advocate an iitman theory). No such entitative and lifeless postulate is
able to account for a living system's most outstanding feature: creativity.
Any reductionism, however evocatively it may be disguised, reflects
vectorial directedness and carries with it a kind of pollution that affects
the whole system. Thus, this vectorial flow termed manana (manas) is
always associated with four "pollutants" (Skt. kle§a), which, as it were,
reinforce its direction and intensity. These pollutants are first the ego­
logical preoccupation with one's concrete existence as the Self (Skt. iit­
madr$ti), which is prompted by a lack of awareness of what actually is the
case. Secondly, this lack of awareness is representative of a person's infat­
uation with a self or the Self (Skt. iitmamoha), and as such is a stepped­
down version of the cognitive nature of the total system. Thirdly, in this
state, the individual has lost his bearings and is quite literally groping in
the dark. Hence he is prone to succumb to the lure of an overevaluated
idea-the delusion of the "I am" (Skt. iitmamiina)-as the last word in
the matter. Together, these three pollutants prompt the individual to be­
come thoroughly immersed in the fourth pollutant, his clinging to, and
craving for, this alleged Self (Skt. iitmasneha).
In purely psychological terms, these pollutants can be said to be emo­
tions, but unfortunately the term "emotion" has been much abused by
contrasting it with reason and rationality, overlooking the fact that emo-
 THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM "MIND" : 39

tions, too, give us knowledge, knowledge that may even be very vital.
As
the Buddhist account shows, thought and emotion are not separabl
e en­
tities, and in the transformation under consideration they merely specify
th�v�ctonal_
flow. Although vector-specific, these pollutants are still oper­
ative man amoral manner. Implied also is the fact that this vectorial
flow
prefigures the existential niche in which the individual will eventually find
himself and act upon its presentation. It is obvious that this transforma­
ti? n contributes significantly to the formation of a personal identity, but
it also entrenches the individual in his niche and prevents him from reach­
ing beyond the limited horizon set by it. The above considerations, which
attempt to clarify the global character of this vijfiiina transformation,
may assist in understanding Vasubandhu's concise statement:

Lodged in it (the iilayavijfiiina) and taking it as its frame

of reference, this vijfiiina called manas is of the nature of
"thinking."
It is always accompanied by four pollutants that are vector-specific
but (otherwise as yet) amoral.
They are known as the preoccupation with one's existence as the
Self (iitmadr$fi), the infatuation with a Self (iitmamoha), the
megalomania of a Self (iitmamiina), and the attachment to a
Self (iitmasneha).
On whichever level or in whichever niche this (manas) finds itself,
its associated pollutants and the other operators will share in
the niche's character.46

The third concurrent transformation: vijiiapti. This term, as has been

pointed out in a previous section, refers to information in the sense of
announcing the self-organization of the system as brought into a specific
·form. Specifically, it covers the six operations that go by the name of per­
ception and are sense-specific. It is through the senses, which have a dual
nature, a physical and a psychic one, that we encounter the world around
us. But this encounter does not merely consist in passively receiving stim­
uli. The senses themselves are most active in determining what and how
we are going to perceive and thus, according to Alexander Gosztonyi
(1972, 68),47 play a decisive role in structuring the "world" in terms of a
reality value, indicating the degree to which a sense transmits material
resistance; a formal evidence value, indicating the degree of insight into
formal relations; and an existential-evidence value, indicating the inten­
sity of the experience of what a sense mediates. The world we encounter
is, therefore, always an informed one in the true sense of the word. In ad­
dition to the five classical senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch),
the Buddhists recognize a sixth sense the domain of which is ideas or
meanings. Long before Kant in the Western world, they and other Indian
thinkers had already realized that no amount of association of sense data
40:

and impressions can give us the idea of, say, an elephant. Rather this idea
is brought to the contingent data of the five senses by the sixth sense,
called manas. As a matter of fact, the Buddhists revolutionized the whole
of Indian thought in that they did not speak of "things" in terms of sub­
stance, whether physical or mental, but of "meanings."
It is with this third transformation of the total system that experiential
ethics as information comes into play. This is not something static or, as
theistic religions claim, something "revealed," but as a dynamic prin­
ciple, it is the manifestation of what is referred to as "mind." Hence this
transformation is said to be involved in moral operations that may be de­
scribed as healthy (positive), unhealthy (negative), or neither; and it en­
gages the total system with its innate operators, which were already given
as wide-ranging in nature (sarvatraga) on the level of the first transforma­
tion. It also does so with those operators which the Vaibha11ikas had
listed as also being of a wide-ranging nature, but which the Yogacara
thinkers had realized as bearing on specific, determinate aspects of the
multifaceted reality that is our human world. The emphasis on the sys­
tem's healthy operation, which continues the overall Buddhist concern
with a human being's role in the contextuality that is his/her "world,"
reveals a basic attitude toward life that takes into account the system's
creative processes as they unfold in what becomes a life fully lived.
Vasubandhu sums up the complexity of this transformation in the fol­
lowing words:

The third (transformation) is the perceptions in a sixfold cognitive

domain. They are healthy, unhealthy, or neither.
This (transformation) is associated with the wide-ranging operators
and with the topic-specific operators, as well as with those that
pertain to a healthy attitude.
It is also (associated with) the set of pollutants and the set of quasi
pollutants, and it has a triple feeling quality.4'