SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH

DESIGNATED SECURITY DUTES

COURSE HANDOUT

(IMO Model Course 3.26/STCW A-VI/1)

 Course Outline

№ Topic Hours
Theoretical Theoretical
1 Introduction
1.1 Course overview
1.2 Competence to be achieved 1.0
1.3 Current security threats and patterns
1.4 Ship and port operations and conditions

2 Maritime Security Policy

2.1 Familiarity with relevant international conventions,
codes, and
2.2 Familiarity with relevant government legislation and 0.75
2.3 Definitions
2.4 Handling sensitive security-related information and

3 Security Responsibilities
3.1 Contracting governments
3.2 Recognized Security Organizations
3.3 The company
3.4 The ship
3.5 The port facility 1.25
3.6 Ship Security Officer
3.7 Company Security Officer
3.8 Port Facility Security Officer
3.9 Seafarers with designated security duties
3.10 Port facility personnel with specific security duties
3.11 Other personnel

4 Ship Security Assessment

4.1 Assessment tools 1.0
4.2 On-scene security surveys

5 Security Equipment
5.1 Security equipment and systems
5.2 Operational limitations of security equipment and systems 1.0
5.3 Testing, calibration and maintenance of security

6 Threat identification, Recognition and Response

6.1 Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous 1.5
6.2 Methods of physical searches and non-intrusive
6.3 Execution and coordinating searches
6.4 Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of the 1.5
persons posing potential
6.5 Techniques used to circumvent security measures
6.6 Crowd management and control techniques
7 Ship Security Actions 1.0
7.1 Actions required by different security levels
7.2 Maintaining security of the ship/port interface 1.0
7.3 Familiarity with Declaration of Security
7.4 Report security incidents
7.5 Execution of security procedures 1.0
1.0
1.0
 8 Emergency Preparedness, Drills and Exercises
8.1 Execution of contingency plans 1.0
8.2 Security drills and exercises 1.0

9 Security Administration
9.1 Documentation and records 0.5
Training Hours 9
Total Training Hours 9
Assessment Hours 0.5

Day 1stperiod 2ndperiod 3rdperiod 4thperiod

(2 hours) (2 hours) (2,5 hours) (2,5 hours)

Day 1 1.1 Course overview 3.3 The company 5.1 Security equipment 1.1 Actions required by
1.2 Competence to be and systems different security levels
achieved 3.4 The ship 5.2 Operational 1.2 Maintaining security
1.3 Current security 3.5 The port facility limitations of security of the ship/port interface
threats and patterns 3.6 Ship Security Officer equipment and systems 1.3 Familiarity with
1.4 Ship and port 5.3 Testing, calibration Declaration of Security
operations and 3.7 Company Security and maintenance of 1.4 Report security
conditions Officer security equipment and incidents
2.1 Familiarity with systems 1.5 Execution of
relevant international 3.8 Port Facility 6.1 Recognition and security procedures
conventions, codes, and Security Officer
Course Timetable detection of weapons, 8.1 Execution of
recommendations dangerous substances contingency plans
2.2 Familiarity with 3.9 Seafarers with and devices 8.2 Security drills and
relevant government designated security 6.2 Methods of physical Exercises
legislation and duties searches and non- 9.1 Documentation and
regulations 3.10 Port facility intrusive inspections records
2.3 Definitions 6.3 Execution and
personnel with specific Assessment
2.4 Handling sensitive coordinating searches
security-related security duties 6.4 Recognition, on a
information and non- discriminatory
communications 3.11 Other personnel basis, of the persons
3.1 Contracting 5.1 posing potential
governments 4.1 Assessment tools security risks
6.5 Techniques used to
3.2 Recognized Security 4.2 On-scene security
5.1 circumvent security
Organizations surveys measures
6.6 Crowd management
and control techniques
Detailed teaching syllabus
1. Aim
This model course is intended to provide the knowledge required for seafarers with
designated security duties in connection with a Ship Security Plan (SSP) to perform their duties in
accordance with the requirements of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 as amended, the ISPS Code, and
section A-VI/6 of the STCW Code, as amended.

2. Objectives
Those who successfully complete the course should be able to demonstrate sufficient knowledge to
undertake the duties assigned under the SSP. This knowledge shall include, but is not limited to:
1. Knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
2. Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
3. Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis of characteristics and behavioral patterns of
persons who are likely to threaten security;
4. Techniques used to circumvent security measures;
5. Crowd management and control techniques;
6. Security related communications;
7. Knowledge of emergency procedures and contingency plans;
8. Operation of security equipment and systems;
9. Testing, calibration and at-sea maintenance of security equipment and systems;
10. Inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and
11. Methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo,
and ship stores.

3. Entry Standards
It is assumed that those attending this course will be serving seafarers or other shipboard personnel
and are likely to have designated security duties in connection with the Ship Security Plan.

4. Required Attendance 100% attendance is required for successful completion of the course.
 1 .Introduction
1.1 This course deals with
Maritime Security Policy
Security Responsibilities
Vessel Security Assessment
Security Equipment
Threat Identification, Recognition and Response
Vessel Security Actions
Emergency Preparedness, Drills and Exercises and
Security Administration.

1.2 At the end of this course the seafarer will have an understanding of and be able to deal with
the topics indicated above.

1.3 Presently the maritime transportation industry faces threats from piracy and armed attacks,
terrorism, contraband smuggling, stowaways and refugees, cargo theft and collateral damage.

Piracy and Armed Attacks consist of any illegal acts of violence or detention committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship on the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ships. Today, the deteriorating security
situation in the seas off war- torn Somalia and the Gulf of Aden are at the heart of the problem,.

Another threat to the maritime transportation industry is from terrorism which refers to those
violent acts that are intended to create fear( terror), and are perpetrated for religious, political or,
ideological reasons and which Deliberately target or disregard the safety of civilians and seafarers.
Terrorism is practiced by a broad array of political organizations for furthering their own
objectives. The use of similar tactics by criminal organizations for protection rackets or to enforce
a code
of silence is usually not labeled terrorism though these same actions may be labeled terrorism
when done by a politically motivated group.

Contraband Smuggling –which is the clandestine transportation of illegal goods or persons, across
international borders, in violation of applicable laws and regulations is another scourge that
plagues the maritime transportation industry. There are various motivations to smuggle. These
include participation in any illegal trade, such as the drug trade, in illegal immigration ,or illegal
emigration, tax evasion etc.
Stowaways and Refugees – A stowaway is someone who hides on a train, bus, plane, or ship in
the hope of travelling for free. There are a number of reasons to stowaway on board a craft,
ranging from illegal immigration to a dare. As a general rule, stowaways can be extremely
dangerous, both to themselves and to the craft they stowaway on mainly if they are armed;
besides, they can also carry serious legal and financial repercussions if they are caught- especially
for the craft on which they arrive.
Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin or habitual residence because they
have suffered persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,political opinion, or because
they are a member of a persecuted ‘social group’.Such person may be referred to as asylum
seekers.
Cargo theft- Frauds that occur most commonly in marine world are thefts on ships and other
ocean going vessels. Stealing of cargo, especially during times of high fuel cost is common. Such
thefts can be appropriated by the owner or the client either way, as frauds and thefts continue to
get more technical and treacherous the good thing is that the vigilance for these has also been
increasing immensely.

Cargo theft- can be mediated by the owners, crew and sometimes by persons outsides the ambit
of both. There have even been cases where the entire ship with its crew and cargo has been
diverted to a third country for monetary gain and thereafter disappeared completely.

Collateral damage- is damage to people or property that is unintended or incidental to the

intended outcome. The phrase is prevalently used as a euphemism for civilian casualties of a
military action which can take place if, for example, military action is taken to rescue person or
craft held hostage by pirates or terrorists. Collateral damage is damage aside from that which was
intended. Since the dawn of precision guided munitions, military “targeters” and operations
personnel are often considered to have gone to great lengths to minimize collateral
damage.

1.4 Vessels, port operations and conditions in connection with the intermodal nature of transport
and the interfaces between vessels and other modes. Seaports and maritime transportation
infrastructure face myriad threats from the vessels, people, and cargo that move through them.
Shipping is perhaps the most international of all the world’s industries. Every year more than 20Q
million sea cargo containers move among the world’s major seaports.

01: Introduction to STSDSD

Unfortunately, shipping is also extremely vulnerable to crime and terrorism. A terrorist attack on a
port or other strategic maritime asset could prove potentially catastrophic to the entire economy
of a nation, For companies and authorities involved in international maritime commerce, urgent
improvements in port and ship security are now vital.

The September 11th attacks in USA were horrific in terms of the loss of human life and financial
damage inflicted, yet they were not the worst-case scenario that many security experts, believe
could befall us in future, either in terms of the numbers of casualties or specifically in the use of
new weapons of Mass Destruction.

With the formation of extensive global terrorist infrastructures and the increased reach of
fundamentalist terrorist groups, the spectra of Suicide Terrorism now threatens Europe and North
America and India.

Modern suicide bombing was introduced by the Shlite terrorist organization Hizballah in 1983 in
Lebanon, and it was in Lebanon that this modus operandi was refined throughout the 1980’s.
There have now been well over 300 suicide attacks carried out in 14 countries by 17 terrorist
organizations. All this makes it mandatory for a Maritime Security Policy to be put in place, for
seafarers with designated security duties to be aware of the hazards involved and the need for
heightened security.
 2. Maritime Security Policy
2.1 International conventions, codes and recommendations Piracy attacks constitute one of the
principal security risks to commercial shipping in certain regions of the world. Despite international
awareness and concerted efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, piracy attacks
against commercial vessels resulting in the disruption of trade have increased exponentially.
Modern pirates are not romantic figures. These ruthless mercenaries utilize small, maneuverable,
swift vessels with the ability to overtake commercial ships travelling established trade routes on
the high seas. The modern pirates are armed with machine guns and rocks propelled grenades.
They imperil commercial traffic and hamper maritime commerce along various trade routes in –the
world, seeking the payment of ransom and holding crews hostage. Modern piracy has become a
large business enterprises that threatens the stability of maritime trade.
The IMO, which is an agency of the United Nations with 168 member states, is located in the
United Kingdom. On November 17, 1983, the IMO adopted Resolution A. 545(13)- “ Measures to
Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”. Further amended by “ The Safety of
Ships And The Security of Their Passengers And Crews”

Piracy is a crime of “ universal jurisdiction”. Accordingly, any country which apprehends a pirate
has not only the right, but a duty to prosecute the perpetrator. This grant of universal jurisdiction
to sovereign nations to prosecute individuals committing acts of piracy is incorporated into several
international conventions such as The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and The High Seas A Convention among others.

2.2.2 The Post -9/11 Response of the Maritime Community to 4 Piracy One of the first responses
was The Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence.

The threat of marine piracy and its detrimental impact upon maritime trade become the collective
focus of the Comite Maritime International (“CMI”), the Baltic and International Maritime Counsel
(“BIMCO”), the International Chamber of Shipping (“ICS”), Interpol, the International Group of P
&I Clubs (“IGP&I”), the ICCC International Maritime Bureau(“IMB”), the International Maritime
Organization (“IMO”) and the United Nations (Office of Legal Affairs/Division for Ocean Affairs and
the Law of the Sea.)

The IMO January 22,2002 Resolution On November 20, 2001, two months after 9/11 , an
assembly of T the 22nd Session of the IMO adopted 22/Resolution 924 entitled Review of Measures
and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism which Threaten the Security of Passengers
and Crew and the Safety of Ships. The assembly urgently emphasized the importance and priority
of security measures A to protect ships, passengers and crew on the high seas from A terrorism
and pirate attacks, and to suppress terrorist acts directed at ports and court personnel. On
January 22, 2002, the resolution was passed and published.
Convention for the Suppression of illegal Acts Against the Safety at Maritime Navigation.

United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime : The Palermo Convention the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime ( Palermo Convention) was
promulgated “to promote cooperation to prevent and combat organized crime more effectively.”
To date, there are 147 signatories. The United States signed the convention on Dec 13, 2000, and
ratified it on 3 Nov 2005. 39. The Palermo Convention focuses on the profiteering of piracy
attacks.
Over the past few years, well organized criminal cartels have begun sponsoring and funding the
burgeoning business of piracy attacks.
Piracy has evolved into the equivalent of racketeering or a Mafia-like industry. It is reputed that
pirates creating have in the Gulf of Aden are now receiving intelligence on 1 shipping routes,
cargo, crews, and vessel schematics from accomplices in London via satellite telephone. This
advance planning now aided by sophisticated communications technology transforms piracy
attacks into the equivalent of military operations. Moreover, technology gives the pirates an
enormous advantage and adds an additional transnational element to their attacks.

2.1.3 SOLAS Chapter XI and the contents of the ISPS Code SOLAS Chapter XI deals with special
measures to enhance maritime safety. New regulations have come into force; The existing SOLAS
Chapter XI ( Special measures to enhance maritime safety) has been re- numbered as Chapter XI-
1. Regulation XI-1/3 is modified to require Ships’ identification numbers to be permanently
marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure. Passenger ships should carry
the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Ships should also be marked with their ID
numbers internally.

And a new regulation XI-1/5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR)
which is intended to provide an on-board record of the

history of the ship. A brand new Chapter XI-2 . Special measures to enhance maritime security is
after the renumbered Chapter XI-1 .This chapter applies to passenger ships and cargo ships of
569 gross tonnage and upwards, including high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units and port
facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.

Regulation XI-2/2 of the new chapter enshrines the International Ship and Port Facilities Security
Code (ISPS Code). Part A of this Code is mandatory and part B contains guidance as to how best
to comply with the mandatory requirements.

Regulation XI-2/8 confirms the role of the Master in exercising his professional judgment over
decisions necessary to maintain the security of the ship. It says he shall not be constrained by the
Company, the charterer or any other person in this respect.

Regulation XI-2/6 requires all ships to be provided with a ship security alert system, according to a
strict timetable that will see most vessels fitted by 2004 and the remainder by 2006. When
activated the ship security alert system shall initiate and transmit a ship to shore security alert to a
competent authority designated by the Administration, identifying the ship, its location and
indicating that the security of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised. The system will
not raise any alarm on-board the ship. The ship security alert system shall be capable of being
activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one other location.

Regulation XI-2/10 covers requirements for port facilities, providing among other things for
Contracting Governments to ensure that port facility security assessments are carried out and that
port facility security plans are developed, implemented and reviewed in accordance with the ISPS
Code. The ISPS Code is implemented through chapter XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime
security in the International Convention for the minimum requirements for security of
ships and ports. Part A provides mandatory requirements. Pat B provides guidance of
implementation.

The ISPS Code applies to ships on International Voyages ( including passenger ships, cargo ships
of 500 GT and upwards, and mobile offshore drilling units) and the port facilities serving such
ships.
The main objectives of the ISPS Code are:
 To detect security threats and implement security measures
 To establish roles and responsibilities concerning maritime security for governments, local
administrations, ship and port industries at the national and international level.
 To collate and promulgate security-related information.
 To provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans and procedures
to react to changing security levels

2.2 Familiarity with the Indian Government legislation and regulations Bill No 108 of 2004
introduced in the Indian Parliament amends the relevant section of the Merchant Shipping Act
1958 such that the insertion of the word security mean maritime security and includes any
measure to protect ports or ships or any person or thing relating directly or indirectly to maritime
organization.

2.2.1 the Central Government or such other authority as may be designated by it shall promulgate
such rules which conform to the relevant scheme formulated by the international Maritime
Organization.

2.3.1 Accordingly as per the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, and in order to comply with SOLAS
Chapter YI and the ISPS Code it is mandatory for every vessel to develop implement and maintain
a Vessel Security Plan.

A Vessel Security Plan is one which addresses, the requirements laid down in paragraph 9.4 of the
Code.

Company Security Officer – A Company Security officer (GSO) has the responsibility of ensuring
that a Ship Security Plan (SSP) is prepared and submitted for approval.

Vessel Security officer or Ship Security Officer- Duties and Responsibilities- without effective ship
Security, a vessel is vulnerable to attack. This threat can be minimized by having a knowledgeable
Ship Security requires planning, coordination and new responsibilities. The Ship Security officer
is an essential element to ISPS code Compliance.

Port facility means a location within a port at which commercial maritime activities occur ships
covered by these measures.

Facility Security Officer (FSO) is a person designated as responsible for the development,
implementation, revision and maintenance of the facility security plan and for liaison with the
Company and Vessel Security Officers.

Recognized Security Organization- Under the provisions of ISPS Code, Indian Register of Shipping
(IRS) has been nominated as the Recognized Security Organization (RSO) for the purpose of Port
Facility Security Assessment and preparation of port Facility Security Plan as permitted under
section 15,16 Part A of the ISPS Code.

Security Incident is an act threatening the security of a vessel or terminal. Security Level A
security level under the ISPS code describes the current scenario related to the security threat to
the country and its coastal region including the ships visiting that country.
As soon as the security level has been decided as per the ISPS code, it is displayed prominently on
board vessel at the entrance of the ship. The Three different Security Levels LEVEL 1- Normal
Level
- In normal level, both ships and port operations are carried out in general way.
- Minimum security measures are always maintained on board and in port.
- Ship and port operation are carried out as per ship and port facility security plan.
- Port facility ensures to keep the ' no access' areas under surveillance at all times.

- Ship and port authority mutually supervise loading and unloading operation of cargo and stores,
ensuring access control and other minimum security criteria.
- Minimum access in the ship is maintained at all times

LEVEL 2- Heightened Risk.

- In Level 2, the threat to the security is higher than the normal level.
- All the routine and cargo operations are carried out with an increase in security measures in both
ships and ports.
- Look- outs in no access zone and waterside area is to be increased by port and ship authorities.
- Access control is maintained all the time with escorting the visitors and use of security
equipment like metal detector etc.
- Communication between port authority and ship administration is always maintained in case of
increase in security level.
- Preparing a full or partial search operation of ship.
- A declaration of security is undertaken between port state and ship administration.

LEVEL 3- Imminent danger

Level 3 is imposed when the probability of security threat to ship or port authorities are highest or
imminent and specific protective measures are to be maintained.
- In Level 3, all ship and port operations are stopped and frequent security rounds and duties are
carried out by both ship staff and port authorities. Boat petrol are done by port state on the water
side.
- Main propulsion plant is always kept ready for moving the ship out of port if require.
- No personal is allowed to access the ship without the authorization of port state official.
- Only one access point is maintained on board at all time.

- Preparing a full search operation of ship or under water hull search operation with port facility.
- Preparation for evacuation of ship by its staff.
A declaration of security is undertaken between port state and ships administration

2.4. Handling sensitive security related information and communications 1 defines security-
sensitive information and the importance of keeping it confidential Sensitive Security information
or SSI is sensitive but unclassified information obtained or developed in the conduct of security
activities, the public disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy,
reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information, or be detrimental to the security of
transportation. It is not a form of classification. SSI is not classified national security information in
the sense of Top Secret, Secret or Confidential. Information designated as SSI cannot be shared
with the general public, and it is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)
 3. Security Responsibilities

Security Responsibilities The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an
amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea ( SOLAS) Convention (1974/ 1988) on minimum security
arrangements for ships, ports and government agencies.

3.1 Contracting Governments

Under SOLAS chapter X 1-2 and part A of the Code, Contracting Governments can establish
designated authorities within the government to undertake their security responsibilities under the
Code. Governments or designated authorities may also delegate the Undertaking of certain
responsibilities to Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs) outside government.

3.3 The Company- obligations and responsibilities 1 The Company, owners and operators have the
primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of their ships. Although companies are
to comply with the relevant requirements of the ISPS Code, they need not be certified as such.
The Company must appoint a Company Security Officer (CSO) for the company and a Ship
Security Officer (SSO) for each of its ships.

The Company shall ensure that the Ship Security Plan contains a clear statement emphasizing the
master's authority.

3.4 The Vessel or ship means a passenger ship including high- speed passenger craft regardless of
size; cargo ship including high- speed cargo craft of at least 500 gross tons; and mobile offshore
drilling units engaged in international voyages. Every vessel must have a Ship Security Plan which
indicates the minimum operational and physical security measures the ship shall take at all times.

3.6 Ship or Vessel Security Officer (SSO)

SSO means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated by the Company
as responsible for the security of the ship, including implementation and maintenance of the ship
security plan, and for liaison with the company security officer and port facility security officers.
The duties and responsibilities of the SSO shall include- Maintaining and supervising the
implementation of the SSP on- board ( including any amendments to the plan)
- Proposing modifications to the SSP
- Co- ordinating the implementation of the SSP with the SCO and the relevant PFSO.
- Carrying out regular security inspections of the ship to ensure appropriate security measures are
maintained.
- Co- coordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship's stores with other crew
and the relevant PFSO
- Promoting security awareness and vigilance among the crew members
- Reporting all security incidents.
- Ensuring adequate crew training is carried out
- Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained
- Reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non- conformities and implementing any corrective
actions on- board.
3.7 Company Security officer (CSO)
1 The CSO is a person designated by the Company for ensuring that ship security assessment is
carried out, that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter
implemented and maintained, and for liaison with port facility security officers and the ship
security officer.

1. The duties and responsibilities of the CSO include:

- Ensuring sufficient attention and resources are allocated to security and advising the level of
threats likely to be encountered by the ship.
- Ensuring that the Ship Security Assessment are carried out by person with appropriate skills to
evaluate the security of a ship.
- Modify the SSP to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirement of the individual ship.
- Ensuring adequate security training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship.
- Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities.

3.8 Port Facility Security Officer, (PFSO) is responsible for the development implementation,
revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison with the ship security
officers and company security officers.

3.9 Vessel personnel wit h specific security duties

1. Vessel personnel with specific security duties shall be assigned security duties in support of the
Facility Security Plan and should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned
duties, including as appropriate,
- knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- recognition of characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to threaten
security;
- techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- crowd management and control techniques;
- security related communications;
- Knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans.
3.10 Facility Personnel with Specific Duties
1 Facility Personnel other than the FSO may be assigned specific security duties supporting the
Facility Security Plan and should have
- working knowledge of maritime security terms and definitions
- knowledge of international maritime security policy and responsibilities of Governments/
Designated Authorities,
- RSOs, port facilities security officer and designated persons
- Knowledge of maritime security levels and their impact on security measures and procedures in
the port facility and aboard ships
- Knowledge of security reporting procedures
- Knowledge of procedures for drills and exercises
- Knowledge of procedures for conducting inspections and surveys and for the control and
monitoring of security activities specified in a port facility security plan
- Knowledge of security- related contingency plans and the procedures for responding to security
incidents, including provisions for maintaining critical operations of port facility and ship/ port
interface
- Knowledge of procedures for handling security- related information and security- related
communications
- Knowledge of security documentation including the Declaration of Security
3.11 Other personnel 1 Besides the VSO and PFSO, other vessel and facility personnel may have a
role in the enhancement of maritime security and should have knowledge and receive training, in
some or all of the following, as appropriate.
 4. Ship Security Assessment
4. A Ship or Vessel Security Assessment (VSA) is an analysis that examines and evaluates the
vessel and its operations taking into account possible threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and
existing protective measures, procedures and operations. This Assessment (VSA) shall be carried
out for each Indian- registered ship Covered by the ISPS Code and is an essential and integral
part of the process of developing and updating the Ship Security Plan.

4.2 On- scene Security Surveys 1 Preparations required prior to an On- scene Survey.
Since on-scene (i.e. on board) security survey covers the security aspects of the vessel being
surveyed, it is vital that the items to be surveyed are kept in readiness.
The On-Scene Security Survey is an integral part of any SSA that examines and evaluates existing
shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations.

4.3 Security aspects of vessel layout In order obtain and record the information required for
conducting a security assessment, it is necessary to refer to the general layout or general
arrangement plan of the ship from which one can know

- The location of areas which should have restricted access, such as navigation bridge, machinery
spaces and other control stations
- The location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship;
- Cargo spaces and stowage arrangements;
- The locations of the ships stores and where essential maintenance equipment is stored;
- The locations where unaccompanied baggage is stored;
- Location of the emergency and stand-by equipment to maintain essential services;
- Existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and ships personnel;
- Escape and evacuation routes and assembly stations which have to be maintained to ensure the
orderly and safe emergency evacuation of the ship ; lighting, access control and other appropriate
systems.

5. Divided the survey into the following sections:-

- Physical Security
- Structural Integrity
- Personnel Protection Systems
- Procedural Policies
- Radio and Telecommunication Systems
- Other Areas
6 Structural integrity for vessels and other structures The subdivision of passenger ships into
watertight compartments must be such that after assumed damage to the ship's hull the vessel
will remain afloat and stable.

Requirements for watertight integrity and bilge pumping arrangements for passenger ships are
also laid down as well as stability requirements for both passenger and cargo ships.
7. Components and operations of systems to protect vessel personnel

In order to protect ships personnel and the vessel from attack it is necessary to keep a watch for and
prevent the bringing of instruments of destruction on board. Further, it is likely that the attacker will
try to smuggle his weapons on board. If, for instance, a gun is smuggled on board in a dismantled
condition it is unlikely that normal crew on board will be able to recognize it. It is therefore important
that the ship's personnel have a basic knowledge of these weapons and what they look like.

8. Role of proper procedures in preventing and mitigating security incidents. When there is a security
threat, the ship may be advised of security level by the Administration where the port facility is
located. If the ship is operating at security level 1 and the master or SSO considers that there exists a
security threat, appropriate action must be taken to mitigate the threat. The master or SSO should
also report the threat to the Administration and Contracting Government of the
port facility.

Where there is a breach of security, the master should:

- Activate ship security alert system,
- Have the crew on emergency stations,
- Report to the Contracting Government of the port facility,
- Prepare to abandon ship,
- Prepare to leave the port
- Follow the Contingency Response Plan for whatever the threat is, for example Hijack, Bomb Threat,
Unidentified Object/ Explosive on Ship, Bomb Threat/ Damage, Destruction to Port Facility, Pirate or
Stowaway or whatever.
9 Use of information technology and communications systems in vessel operations and in
maintaining security with regard to ISPS, communication between the ship and outside stations
can be done by ship security alert system whereby an alert is sent directly to the company or a
competent authority designated by the Administration. Such an alert would indicate the ship's
identity, its location and that her security is under threat or has been compromised. The security
alert is not sent to other ships, does not raise any alarm on-board the ship and continues
until deactivated and/ or reset.

The ship security alert system shall:

 Be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one
others location; and
 Conform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the
Organization.
 Shall be so designed so as to prevent the inadvertent initiation of the security
alert.

The requirement for a ship security alert system may be complied with by using the radio
installation fitted for compliance with the requirements of SOLAS provided all requirements of the
ISPS Code are complied with. When an Administration receives notification of a ship security alert,
that Administration shall immediately notify the State (s) in the vicinity of which the ship is
presently operating.

When a Contracting Government receives notification of a ship security alert from a ship which is
not entitled to fly its flag, that Contracting Government shall immediately notify the relevant
Administration and, if appropriate, the State (s) in the vicinity of which the ship is presently
operating.

Additionally, there is GMDSS is installed on board as communication system. There is also a

portable transceiver for on board communication. Communication may be made verbally, or by
using load speaker and transceiver. For security related communication, the master can specify
the frequency to be used.

10 Areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or
operations aboard the vessel or within a port facility. If a ship is at a port of a State which this
Code does not apply or, is interfacing with fixed or floating platforms or a mobile drilling units on
locations outside the purview of this code or, is interfacing with a port or port facility which is not
required to comply with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, the ship can come across areas that
may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or operations
within the ship or the port facility.
11 Identification of vulnerabilities in the above areas and the preparation of counter measures to
address them
12 The importance of having in place emergency plans to deal with contingencies.
 5. Security Equipment

1 Security equipment an d systems Before, the only method of ensuring security was physical
examination of people and baggage and cargo etc. with large and quick movement of persons and
cargoes now taking placing and the increasingly sophisticated methods of smuggling
contraband into ships and planes. It is no more possible to ensure security through physical
inspection alone. In order to detect and nab today's smugglers highly sophisticated detection
equipment is necessary. Besides sniffer dogs, there are electronic sniffing devices, x-ray machines,
walk through arches, explosive detection systems (eds) and other baggage and container
screening devices used at port and airport entry points.

5.3 Testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment and systems.

 The SSO is responsible for the storage, testing, calibration, maintenance of and
control of all shipboard security equipment.

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS)

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS)

 6. Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response

6.1 Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices. Threats to a ship
can be varied and change of rapidly. The ship's location, the time of the day, or international
events can dramatically alter the threat to a ship. It is therefore necessary for the SSO to regularly
monitor events to determine potential threats during the passage of a ship from port to port.

1. To preempt a terrorist attack it is necessary that the instruments of destruction are prevented
from getting on board. It is likely that the terrorist may try to smuggle them in an unrecognizable
dismantled condition so it is necessary that the personnel on board have at least a basic
knowledge of these instruments and what they look like. An AK 47 assault rifle is a particular
favorite with terrorists and this is what it looks like

AK 47 ASSAULT RIFLE

6.2 Physical searches and non- intrusive inspections Physical Searches are best carried out in
booths as privacy minimizes embarrassment and increased effectiveness. People being searched
should not be given the opportunity of selecting a particular searcher. One person (a supervisor)
should observe people waiting and note suspicious behavior and allocate passengers to available
searchers to ensure no over- loading.

Baggage Screening. Metal detectors are of little use for screening baggage and personal
belongings since most bags and brief-cases have locks, hinges and other metal components which
would result in a very high alarm rate. Moreover, hand- held detectors have a limited depth of
effective penetration.
 AK 47

AK 56
HAND GRENADES

CARBINE
 DETONATORS

EXPLOSIVE POWDER
6.3 Execution and coordination of searches
1. The importance of planning a search and the practice of carrying out searches as a drill.
A ship’s security plan should incorporate a search procedure aimed at ensuring that the vessel
can be searched quickly and effectively when this is considered necessary. The master of each
ship, together with the ship’s security officer, should be responsible for establishing search
procedures. In the interests of good security, as well as good ship husbandry as much gear as
possible should be stowed away.
3 Equipment the search team should carry for conducting a search.
The search team should be familiar with the list of basic equipment that may be employed in
conducting searches. This list includes
 Flashlights and batteries;
 Screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars;
 Mirrors and probes;
 Gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear;
 Plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence;
 Forms on which to record activities and discoveries.

5 Places of concealment on board a vessel Searches should bear in mind that weapon and other
dangerous devices may be intentionally placed to match its context as a means of disguise, such
as a toolbox in an engine room. Participants in the search should be acquainted with the fact that
there are many places on board a vessel where weapons, dangerous substances, and devices can
be concealed.
Some of these are
Within cabins and offices
Companionways
Toilet and showers
Deck
Engine room
Galleys and Stewards’ stores
6.4 Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of persons posing potential
security risks
1. General characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security
Ship’s personnel should learn to recognize suspicious patterns of behavior, while realizing the
importance of Examples of suspicious behaviors include;
 Unknown persons photographing vessels or facilities. Unknown persons attempting to gain
access to vessels or facilities.
 Individuals establishing businesses or roadside food stands either adjacent or in proximity to
facilities.
 Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity of vessels or port facilities for extended periods of
time.
 Vehicles with personnel in them loitering and perhaps taking photographers or creating
diagrams of vessels or facilities.
 General aviation aircraft operating in proximity to vessels or facilities.
 Persons who may be carrying bombs or participating in suicide squad activities.
 Unknown persons attempting to gain information about vessels or facilities by walking up to
personnel or their V families and engaging them in a conversation.
 Vendors attempting to sell merchandise.
 Workmen trying to gain access to vessels to repair, replace, service, or install equipment.
 E-mails attempting to obtain information regarding vessels, personnel, or standard
operating procedures.
 Package drop-offs/attempted drop-offs.
 Anti-national sentiments being expressed by employees or vendors.
 Anti-national pamphlets or flyers distributed to employees or placed on windshields in
parking lots.
 Out-of-the-ordinary phone calls.
 Recreational boaters or persons aboard refugee craft posing as mariners in distress to
attract assistance from other vessels.

2. In order that the points above are noticed and suspicious persons recognized as such it is of
utmost importance that the ship’s personnel be observant continuously.
6.5 Techniques used to circumvent security measures
1. Summarizes the techniques that may be used to circumvent security measure Ship’s
personnel must be made aware that no security equipment or measure is infallible. They
should also know that there are techniques that can be employed to evade, security systems
and controls, and circumvent security
measures such as the disabling of alarm systems, picking of locks, jamming of radio signals,
etc.
6.6 Crowd management and control techniques
1. Basic psychology of a crowd in a crisis situation
A crowd is a large gathering of personnel at a specific place with one singular point of
attraction or aim. Ports and passenger ships will at times be faced with situations where they
are required to deal with crowds. Unorganized movement of a crowd could endanger the
safety of the vessel, crows members and property and individuals in the vicinity.
Therefore it is absolutely necessary that crowds are 1 controlled. Facility crowd management
therefore, has the primary responsibility for assuring safe conditions in compliance with
applicable statutes and reasonable standards. Cruise ships are places where people gather in
hordes. And this huge milling causes unwanted problems and situations. The concept of crowd
control has emerged as a solution to this problem and crowd control management essentially
forms a part of the effective management of risks and emergencies involved in cruise ships.
Crowd safety, is not just about trying to merely control the crowd, it involves using the right
kind of communication and effectuating proper leadership skills to manage a crowd. This is
why the crowd control safety program has been recommended by the STCW stipulations.
Inform Passengers in Case of Emergency Information to passengers must be given high
priority Officers and crew must be prepared for stress reactions from passengers and
crew members The information must be controlled The crew must be better informed than the
passengers. Officers and crew must never lose their credibility They must introduce themselves
(name and title) and keep their voices under control.
They must talk slowly and clearly and inform without being talkative. Technical language
must be avoided.
The messages must agree with what the passengers themselves are experiencing.
Report everything that the passengers can perceive or understand themselves.
Do not make light of real risks. Passengers may suspect that the truth is being kept from
them. Therefore, tell what has happened
 Give them an appraisal of the situation
 Give details about what measures have been taken
 State the expected outcome
 State whether the situation has been reported ashore
 Point out that the crew is trained for the task and that the passengers must follow their
instructions
 Give information frequently
- Every 10 to 15 minutes during an active phase.
- Every half hour or hour during a more stable phase.
- Restrict yourself to instructions and information only.
- Specify the precise time for the next announcement and keep the time punctually.
- Repeating previous information is also informative.
- Uncertainly is the worst state.
Help passengers find their relatives and travel companions.
 7. Ship Security Actions
7.1 Actions required by different security levels There are three security levels
Security Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures
shall be maintained at all times.
Security Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures
shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a transportation
security incident.
Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be
maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation security incident is probable or
imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
1 The three security levels and the actions required for each level.
LEVEL 1-- NORMAL LEVE L
- In normal level, both ships and port operations are carried out in general way.
- Minimum security measures are always maintained on board and in port.
- Ship and port operations are carried out as per ship and port facility security plans.
- Port facility ensures to keep the ‘no access’ areas under surveillance at all times.
- Ship and port authorities mutually supervise loading and unloading operations of cargo
and stores, ensuring access control and other minimum security criteria.
- Minimum access in the ship is maintained at all times.

LEVEL 2 – Heightened Ris k

In level 2, the threat to the security is higher than the normal level. All the routine and cargo
operations are carried out with an increase in security measures in both ships and ports. Look
outs in no access zones and waterside areas are to be increased by port and ship authorities.
Access control is maintained all the time with escorting the visitors and use of security
equipment like metal detector etc. Communication between port authority and ship
administration is always maintained in case of increase in security level. Preparing a full or
partial search operation of ship.
A declaration of security is undertaken between port, state and ship administration.
LEVEL 3 – Imminent danger
Level 3 is imposed when the probability of a security threat to the ship or port authority is at
the highest or imminent and specific protective measures are to be maintained.
In level 3 all ship and port operations are stopped and frequent security rounds and duties are
carried out by both ship staff and port authorities. Boat patrols are done by port state on the
water side.
Main propulsion plant is always kept ready for moving the ship out of port if required.
No personnel is allowed to access the ship without the authorization of port state official.
Only one access point is maintained on board at all times.
Preparing a full search operation of ship or under water hull search operation with port facility.
Preparation for evacuation of ship by its staff. A declaration of security is undertaken between
port state and ships administration.
7.2 maintaining security of the vessel/port interface
1 Prior to entering a port, the ship shall confirm that the port is subject to the IPS code and hold
the Port Facility Security Plan. When the port has a Port Facility Security Plan, the CSO or SSO
shall liaise with the PFSO and confirm the security level of both side. When a Declaration of
Security is required by Contraction Government or PFSO, the master shall instruct SSO to
prepare this Declaration of Security. When the ship has a higher security level than that of the
port facility, the master shall inform this fact * Contraction Government and PFSO, and require
him to prepare a Declaration of Security to coordinate the appropriate Security actions. When
the port does not hold Port Facility Security Plan the ship shall liaise with Contracting
Government, inform them the ship’s Security level, and require appropriate security measures.
The ship shall request the port to prepare a Declaration of Security.
A ship has to give her security level (SL 1,2 or 3) 24 hours before arrival in port. It is the
designated authority of the government of the flag state that decides about the SL of its ships.
The master of the ship can take extra security measures if he wants, but he cannot put his SL on
a higher level. Only emergency safety measures can overrule he security measures provided in
the SSP (ship Security Plan). If the SL of the port facility is higher than that of the ship, then the
SSO (Ship Security Officer) has the obligation to equalize the security level of the ship when the
ship has a higher security level than that of the port facility, the SSO together with the PFSO
(Port Facility Security Officer) have to make up a DOS (Declaration of Security).
It is the designated authority of the government f the port that decides about the SL of the port
facilities in the port area. The Security measures for each SL are written in the PFSP (Port Facility
Security Plan).
The security measures are more severe when the SL is higher and also depend on the risk that
can be encountered at the port facility. For instance a dangerous goods terminal, a passenger
terminal or a container terminal will be fenced and guarded. An open bulk terminal, with no
dangerous commodities, will only be fenced and guarded on the ship/shore interface when we
have an SL 2 or 3. At security level 1 we have business as usual, without any economic
constraints. Requirements Unique to the United States In THE United States, the Coast Guard
requires that each vessel and port facility owner or operator ensure procedures are established
for requesting a DoS and for handling DoS requests from the interfacing entity. A DoS must be
completed with regard to any interface involving a cruise ship or a manned vessel carrying
Certain Dangerous Cargoes in bulk. For interfaces involving a cruise ship or a manned
vessel carrying Certain Dangerous Cargoes in bulk , the security needs and procedures are to be
coordinated and agreed prior to arrival and the DoS is to be signed by both the ship and the port
facility or another vessel prior to
commencement of passenger embarkation/disembarkation or cargo operation. At Maritime
Security (MARSEC) level 2 or 3, the security needs and procedures are to be coordinated and
agreed prior to arrival and the DoS is to be signed by other the ship and the port facility or
another vessel for all interfaces involving a manned vessel and either a port facility or another
vessel. The port facility owner or operator must ensure that, in the event of a charge in the
MARSEG level, any ships moored at the facility and any ships scheduled to arrive within 96 hours
are promptly notified of change and that the DoS are revised as necessary.
Control Measures
Failure of the ship to complete a DoS when it has interfaced with a port facility or other ship
subject to, but in violation of, the ISPS Code or Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS convention constitutes
clear grounds for a port state control official of a Contracting government to exercising control
measures with regard to the ship. Control measures utilized must proportionate, but may involve:
(1) Inspection of the ship:4
(2) Delaying the ship;
(3) Detention of the ship;
(4) Restriction of operations, including movement within the port; or
(5) Expulsion of the ship from port. For ships intending to enter a port of a Contracting
Government, where there are clear grounds for believing that the ship is in violation of the ISP
XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, the port state control officials may:
(a) Require rectification of non-compliance prior to entry;
(b) Require that the ship proceed to a specified location in the territorial sea or internal waters
of the nation;
(c) Inspect the ship in the territorial sea of the nation; or
(d) Deny entry into the port. If control measures are exercised, the port state control officials
must forthwith inform in writing the flag Administration of the control measures imposed and
the reasons there of. The port state control officials must also inform the recognized security
organization (RSO), if any, and the international Maritime organization (IMO) when control
measures have been imposed.

Denial of entry into port or expulsion from port may only be imposed where the port state
control officials have clear grounds to believe that the ship poses an immediate threat to the
security or safety of personas or of ships or other property and there are no other appropriate
means for removing that threat. Summary Proper use of the DoS is important, not only as a
means of coordinating security arrangements between ships and port facilities, but also as a
method of documenting appropriate implementation of the ISPS code and related maritime
security requirements. This becomes crucial when a ship calls at a port facility that is not in full
compliance with the ISPS Code and does not have and an approved security plan. A ship
calling at such a port facility must not only institute additional security measures (as provided
for in the ISPS Code
 and its ship security plan), but it must also to demonstrate to port state control officials at
subsequent , port call that it took the appropriate steps. The way to demonstrate this full
compliance with the ISPS code is to complete and retain on board a DoS fully documenting the
ship’s security measures while at this non-compliant port facility. Welcome to the new world of
security through paperwork.
7.4 Execution of security procedures
1 Vessel Security Officer to carry out regular security Inspections which shall include, but are
not limited to:
 Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the Ship Security
plan, including any amendments to the plan; (Sample of Ship Security
Plan conform to ISPS Code).
 Co-coordination the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s
stores with other shipboard personnel and with the relevant PFSO;
 Proposing modifications to the Ship Security Plan;
 Reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non-conformities identified
during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and
verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;

The SSO should address the following elements on board or within the ship:
- Physical Security;
- Structural Integrity;
- Personnel Protection Systems;
- Procedural Policies;
- Radio and telecommunication system, including computer system and networks; and
Other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to
Persons, property, or operations on board the ship or within a port facility.
Ensure the performance of all vessel security duties.
2 Security measures and procedures at the three security levels Access to the ship At security level 1,
the SSP should establish the security measures to control access to the ship, where the following may
be applied:
1 check the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirm their reasons for doing so by
checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger tickets,
2 in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that designated secure areas are established
in which inspections and searching of persons, baggage (including carry-on items), personal effects,
vehicles and their contents can take place;
3 in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to be loaded car
carriers, ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with
the frequency required in the SSP;
4 segregate checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons and their personal
effects;
5 segregate embarking from disembarking passengers;
6 identify access points that should be secures or attended to prevent unauthorized access;
7 secure, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas to which
passengers and visitors have access; and
8 provide security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, and establish procedures for
reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and emphasize the need for vigilance.
At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship should be liable to search. The frequency of such
searches, including random searches, should be specified in the
approved SSP and should be specifically approved by the Administration. Such searches may best
be undertaken by the port facility in close proximity to it. Unless there are clear security grounds
for doing so, members of ship’s personnel should not be required to search their colleagues or
their personal effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into
account the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to protect against
a heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance and tighter control, which may
include:
1 assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter unauthorized
access;
2 limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed and the means of
adequately securing them;
3 deterring waterside access to the ship, in liaison with the port facility, providing boat patrols;
4 establishing a restricted area on the shore – side of the ship, in close cooperation with the port
facility;
5 increasing the frequency and detail of searches of persons, personal effects, and vehicles being
embarked or loaded onto the ship;
6 escorting visitors on the ship;
7 providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any identified threats, re-
emphasizing the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities and stressing
the need for increased vigilance; and
8 carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the
security incident or threat. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by
the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:
 Limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;
 Granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat;
 Directing of persons on board;

 Suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;

 Suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries etc;
 Evacuation of the ship;
 Movement of the ship; and
 Preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.
Embarkation of persons and their effects
 Searches of personnel seeking to board ship are conducted at the discretion of the SSO, in
accordance with the applicable Security level. Persons refusing to comply with this policy will
be denied access to the ship. Searches can be random and shall be undertaken by the port
facility in close cooperation with the ship and in close proximity to it. (Note: The Company
should set a frequency for these searches at each
 Security Level.
All items brought on board the ship are/subject to control, monitoring, inspection and search.
Persons refusing to comply with this policy will be denied access to the ship. Everyone
 boarding the ship, including visitors, contractors, and crew ar subject to be checked for the
carriage of weapons, ammunition, incendiaries
and explosives, narcotics and paraphernalia.
 Carry-on articles will be inspected in accordance with the applicable
Security Level.
 A designated secure area on board or in liaison with a port facility is established to conduct
inspections and screening of people, baggage (including carry-on items), personal effects,
vehicles and the vehicles
contents.
 Ship personnel are not required to engage or be subjected to screening, or the person or of
personal effects, by other ship personnel, unless security clearly requires it. Any such
screening must be conducted in a way that takes into full account individual human rights
and preserves the
individual’s basic human dignity. In liaison with the port facility, ensure a defined percentage
 of vehicles to be loaded aboard car carriers, RO-RO and passenger ships are screened prior
to loading {The company should assign what percentage is appropriate} Checked persons
and personal effects are segregated from unchecked persons and personal effects.

In liaison with the port facility, ensure that all unaccompanied vehicles to be loaded on
passenger ships are screened prior to loading.
 Monitor restricted areas to ensure only authorized persons have access. Restricted areas shall
only be accessed by ship’s company;

Restricted areas shall only be accessed by ship’s company shore staff, contractors, vendors, and
other visitors as authorized by the Master. All restricted areas are secured by means of door lock
keypad, the combination of which is changed quarterly and after every dry and wet dock availability
period. Combinations are only issued to personnel authorized access to these restricted spaces. All
other areas without such locks are to be secured by means of key lock. Access to keys is permitted to
only authorized personnel.
Monitor deck areas and areas surrounding the vessel The ship should have the capability to monitor
the ship, the restricted areas on board and areassurrounding the ship.
Such monitoring capabilities may include use of:
 Lighting;
 Watch-keepers, security guards and deck watches including patrols; and
automatic intrusion detection devices should activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a
location that is continuously attended or monitored. The SSP should establish the procedures
and equipment needed at each security level and the means of ensuring that monitoring
equipment will be able to perform continually, including consideration of the possible effects of
weather conditions or of power disruptions.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied which may be a
combination of lighting, watch keepers, security guards or use of security and surveillance equipment
to allow ship’s security personnel to observe the ship in general, and barriers and restricted areas in
particular.
The ship’s deck and access points to the ship should be illuminated during hours of darkness and
periods of low visibility while conducting ship\port interface activities or at a port facility or anchorage
when necessary. While underway, when necessary, ships should use the maximum lighting available
consistent with safe

navigation, having regards to the provisions of the International Regulations for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea in force. The following should be considered when establishing the appropriate level
and location of lighting:

- The ship’s personnel should be able to detect activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side
and the waterside;
- Coverage should include the area on and around the ship;
- Coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and
- Coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility.
Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied to
enhance the monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may include:
 Increasing the frequency an detail of security patrols;
 Increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting or the use of security and
surveillance and equipment;
 Assigning additional personnel as security lookouts; and
 Ensuring coordination with waterside boat patrols, and foot or vehicle
patrols on the shore-side, when provided.

Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a security incidents.
When necessary, the additional lighting requirements may be accomplished by coordinating with the
port facility to provide additional shore side lighting.
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the
security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken
by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:
 Switching on of all lighting, or illuminating the vicinity of the ship;
 Switching on of all on board surveillance equipment capable of recording activities, or in the
vicinity of the ship;
 Maximizing the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to record;
Preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and initiation
asures, including revolution of the ship’s propellers, if slow practicable, to deter
t e
h underwater access to the hull of the ship.
Security aspects of cargo handling and of vessel stores. The security measures relating to cargo
handling should: Prevent tampering; and Prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being
accepted and stored on board the ship. The security measures, some of which may have to be
applied in liaison with the port facility, should include inventory control procedures at access points to
the ship. Once on board the ship, cargo should be capable of being identified as having been
approved for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures should be developed to ensure
that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during cargo
handling, which may include
 Routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo
operations;
 Checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation;
 ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board car carriers, ro—ro
and passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency
required in the SSP; and
 checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering Checking of cargo may be
accomplished by the following means:
 visual and physical examination; and
 using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical device, or dogs.
When there are regular, or repeated, cargo movements the CSO or SSO may, in consultation with the
port facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargoes covering off-
site checking, sealing , scheduling, supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be
communicated to the agreed with the PFSO concerned.

Security Level-2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during
cargo handling, which may include:
 detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces;
 intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded;
 intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car- carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships; and
 increased frequency and detail in checking of seals or other methods used to prevent
tampering.
Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:
 increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination;
 increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or
dogs; and
 co-ordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other responsible party in
accordance with an established agreement and procedures.
Security Level 3
At security level3 , the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the
security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be
taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may
include:
 suspension of the loading or unloading of cargo; and
 verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances carried on board, if
any, and their location.
The security measures relating to the delivery of ship’s stores should:
 ensure checking of ship’s stores and package integrity;
 prevent ship’s stores from being accepted without inspection;
 prevent tampering ; and
 prevent ship’s stores form being accepted unless ordered. For ships regularly using the port
facility it may be appropriate to establish procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the
port facility covering notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation
 . There should always be some way of confirming that stores presented for delivery are
accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered by the ship.

Security Level 1
At security level1 , the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during
delivery of ship’s stores, which may include:
 checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board; and
 ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship’s stores.

Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures To be applied
during delivery of ships stores by exercising checks Prior to receiving stores on board and
intensifying inspections.

Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to
the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could
be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which
may include:
- subjecting ship’s stores to more extensive checking;
- preparation for restriction or suspension of handing of ship’s stores; and
- refusal to accept ship’s stores on board the ship. Security Communication
must be readily available Procedures and equipment for communicating responses to security
threats and communicating with port, port state, and flag State must be readily available at all
times Security Personnel must have ready access to communications to transmit electronic
notices of arrival, crew lists, certificates and records, as well as
maintenance of a continuous ship to port security communications to various authorities ship to
flag, ship to shore, SSO to security personnel etc. Appropriate and timely communication is
essential during an emergency. The ERP( Emergency response Plan) should identify clear
communication channels within the ship and externally. As part of your ERP, the vessel should
maintain internal and external notification lists that contain information on all appropriate entities
to be contacted, including their names, titles, mailing addresses, e-mail addresses, all
applicable land line and cellular phone numbers, and these lists should be updated as necessary.
In a major event ( e.g. a terrorist attack), it may not be possible to use normal channels of
communication. Provisions need to be made for an efficient and fail-safe form of communication
to be available during conditions when the use of normal means may not be possible. An
effective two-way communication system with the CSO is to be provided so that any unlawful act
against the ship or person can be reported immediately using theappropriate format and must
provide the following information:

 Location of ship ( Lat/ Long/ Time)

Name 7 Nationality/ Dates and Place of Birth of Victim
Name /Nationality/Dates and Place of Birth of Person(s) committing
 unlawful act.
 Nature and extent of severity of injuries sustained ,if any.
VHF radios are employed as the primary means of communication, with ship intercom/phone
used as a backup Maintain radio contact during operations:
 Within the ship---- radio contact will be maintained between bridge or control room for al
ingress and egress points.

 Between ships--- radio contact will be maintained between ships in port at all times to relay
security concerns.
 Between ship and port---radio contact will be maintained between Port personnel and
Company Representatives at all times to relay security concerns.
Privately owned, hand held radio communication devices are not authorized for use on board
this ship. Failure to comply will result in confiscation and retention of radio. Distress and
Duress: Procedures for indicating that the SSO or Security Officer is in distress, or is
communicating under duress are the responsibility of the SSO. Appropriate ship’s personnel
are trained in these procedures.
Communications with terminal operator’s personnel will be coordinated through the ship’s
agent with preference given to VHF radio and/or telephone. For security purposes, direct
communications links are established between ship personnel and the security personnel in
the port facility. Those links are subject to periodic testing and failure to maintain telephone
communication is to be reported to the SSO. SSOs communicate directly with the CSO, via or
e-mail as necessary to co-ordinate shipboard security operations and support requirements,
and provide updated port contact information.
• Ship’s Call Sign
• Satcom Numbers: Telephone:
• Fax: Telex:
• IMO No:
 8. Emergency Preparedness, Drills and Exercises

General----- Drills and exercises must test the proficiency of vessel personnel in assigned security
duties at all Security Levels and the effective implementation of the Ship Security (SSP). They
must enable the Ship Security Officer( SSO) to identify any related security deficiencies that need
to be addressed.
 The SSO must ensure that at least one/ security drill is conducted at least every 3 months,
except when a vessel is out of service due to repairs or seasonal suspension of operation,
provided that in such cases a drill must be conducted within one week of the vessel’s
reactivation. Security drills may be held in conjunction with non-security drills where
appropriate.

8.1 Execution of contingency plans

Contingency Planning. An essential part of security is the preparation of contingency plans in

response to incidents which could occur and the planning of measures introduced in response to
any increase in the level of threat. These plans need to cover different levels of response from the
company (operator/ owner) and the master, officers and crew. They might also encompass the
establishment of a “ Threat Level” procedure, identifying various measures which might be
adopted by vessels in response to the perceived level of threat to the vessel in a vessels in
response to the perceive level of threat to the vessel in a particular place, at a particular time.

1 Action in case of a breach of security

Respond to security threats or breaches of security and maintain critical ship and ship-to-
facility interface operations, including:
 Prohibit entry into affected area;
 Deny access to the ship, except to those responding to the emergency;
 Stop cargo-handling operations; and I
 Notify shore side authorities or other ships of the emergency;

2 Contingency plans for :

Hijacking-is the forcible seizure of a means of transport by terrorist or criminal group as a way
of furthering their cause, reaching their objective, making good their escape or even using the
ship itself, and/or its cargo, as a threat or as weapon. Aircraft have been hijacked by a single
person armed only with imitation weapons and, in the right place one armed person could be
enough on a ship. However, a planned terrorist hijack of a vessel is much more likely to
involve a group with real weapons. The major task facing the would be hijackers is to board
the vessel with their weapons, and security measures aimed at preventing this should be
introduced when the threat level warrants it. Measures devised in respect of threats from
piracy or armed robbery should be appropriate.
 The key objective must be to prevent unauthorized access to the vessel. Although in most
parts of the world the threat of this kind of action is low, shipping companies and masters
need to have a range of measures available to introduce as and when the threat level
warrants it. Terrorists may seek to board a vessel by infiltration, ruse or assault. In each case
the best defenses for both the deterrence and prevention of unauthorized access are crew
awareness and control of access to the vessel and to key points on the vessel such as the
bridge, engine room and communication facilities.

In port, if the threat warrants it, access points should be manned, in certain circumstances by
two persons, who should be fully briefed on their duties, the action to take in the event of an
incident or emergency and the planned response to an alarm. They need to be provided with
a torch, a whistle to summon assistance and communications to remain to touch with the
Duty Officer. They need to hold a full list of all crew members, shore officials and expected
visitors. All visitors should be asked to identify. Strangers should be challenged. Vessels at
anchor should regularly check anchor cables and hawse pipe covers. At sea, hijackers may try
to gain access to the vessel, particularly close to land or in narrow waters where
maneuverability is limited. Attempts Could be mounted from small boats, dhows, junks,
fishing , boats that appear to have broken down or by any means that relies on the
traditional assistance which seafarers offer each other. The best protection against this sort
of ruse is an awareness of the possibilities and keeping a sharp look-out for small behaving
suspiciously or approaching. Should a master decide to allow people to board, this should be
one at a time , each one searched if necessary, while a good look-out is maintained on the
other side of the ship. Particular care needs to be exercised during the hours of darkness
when a surreptitious approach could be carried out more easily. When underway. If there is
any doubt about the identity or motive of craft attempting to attract attention, their actions
should be ignored. If it is safe to do so, and circumstances warrant it, speed

should be increased and/or navigation lights and upper deck lighting extinguished. Attempts
should be made to identify or photograph any craft behaving strangely and details reported
ashore by the speediest means available. If another vessel approaches the ship at sea in a
suspicious or threatening manner:
- Increase speed and alter course if sage to do so: give no opportunity for the other vessel
- to come alongside and make no response to messages by radio, light or loud hailer.Keep
personnel clear of the upper deck.
- Note details of the other vessel and photograph it if possible.
- At night, direct searchlights at the approaching vessel and switch off upper deck lighting:
if safe to do so, navigation lights should also be switched off.
Report details of any harassment to the company and, if appropriate, to a representative of
the government claiming authority over the area. A terrorist assault is more likely to occur in
harbor than at sea. If the measures recommended for controlling assess are in force and prove
inadequate, it will demonstrate the determination and ruthlessness of the terrorists involved.
Unless the terrorists are very poorly armed and equipped, no attempt should be made to resist
an armed terrorist assault.
If despite all efforts at deterrence and prevention a vessel is hijacked, the master and crew
should try, wherever possible, to prevent any loss of life.
 Bomb threat Ships are vulnerable to explosive or incendiary devices:
 In accompanied passenger cars, freight vehicles or coaches
 In unaccompanied vehicles, export cars or semi- trailers
 In misdeclared cargo
 Carried on board by current passengers, or by those from a previous sailing leaving a timed device
 In luggage placed in a baggage trolley
 In ship's stores
 In the post
 Carried on board by shore workers in port
 Carried on board by contractor's personnel.

Travelling as a foot passenger, the saboteur has to contend with customs and
immigration authorities, and with being challenged by ship's staff if he attempts to disembark
prior to sailing. There is also the possibility that a determined terrorist may plant a device and
remain on board.

In addition to bomb threats, the potential use of radiological, biological and chemical weapons
against ships and the people on them, although unlikely, should also be considered.

 Unidentified objects/ explosives on vessel

 Covert entry and quick- plant device.
 The saboteur wishing to attack a ship alongside to cause specific damage or immobilize
particular equipment may wish to board the ship undetected, plant an explosive or incendiary
device and disembark before it detonates. Sabotage attacks differ from

 Hostage- taking attacks in that there are no negotiations over demands. If publicity is the
saboteur's aim, it is likely that the incident will be "claimed" after the event.

Sabotage attacks of this sort are likely to be directed at the ship of a particular nationality,
against the shipping company's policies, or the justification may be entirely local. Since saboteurs
on this type of mission need to board and leave the ship without being detected, access control
arrangements may not always deter them. To guard against this type of attack, vulnerable
compartments should be locked and watch-keeping personnel should make random visits to look
for signs of tampering. A saboteur need not only use explosive or incendiary devices, he may
try to damage the vessel's machinery. Extra vigilance is needed immediately, prior to sailing, or
following a bomb warning. Crew members should immediately be suspicious of unexpected
objects in unusual places.

 Sabotage by remotely controlled or delayed action device- The saboteur may use some
convenient means of concealing and smuggling on board delayed- action bombs or incendiary
devices in passenger's or crew's baggage, in deliveries of ship's stores or as misdeclared cargo.
Crew members should be warned not to accept packages from strangers and made aware that
devices could be introduced in seemingly innocent receptacles. Gas cylinders or oxygen bottles,
for example, make ideal containers for explosive devices. Deliveries which have been cleared
could be bound with colored tape for departmental identification, or automatically strapped using
polypropylene strapping tape.

Damage to/ destruction of facility

External sabotage- Major damage to a ship and facility can also be caused by a saboteur
reaching the hull, either from another vessel or underwater and placing an explosive device in a
vulnerable area. The saboteur's objectives in mounting such attacks can be block berths or
narrow channels, or to immobilize a particular vessel or damage a facility. Such attacks require
considerable knowledge and technical skill and lie within the capability of only fairly sophisticated
terrorist groups. To be effective, some precision is required in placing the charges and this
requires trained swimmers..

Preparedness and contingency planning measures to provide protection include:-

 Over-the- side lighting giving an even distribution of light on the whole hull and waterline;
 Keeping a good watch from the deck, to look out for bubbles (divers), floating refuse ( which
may hide swimmers) or small boats. All approaching boats should be challenged. If unidentified,
they should be prevented from coming alongside;
 A boat patrol, carried out at frequent but irregular intervals and towing barbed wire or fish
hooks, is an effective defense against frogmen or swimmers;
 If the ship is known to be under attack from swimmers, turning propellers ahead and astern
turbulence in the water and makes swimming more difficult;
 If it is thought likely that a device has been fixed to the outside of the hull below the water-
line, the assistance of local authorities should be sought.

Some of the above measures may seem fanciful or far-fetched, but they have all been used in
the past with some success and are included to show the sort of protective measures which are
needed when the threat demands it.
 Piracy and other depredations

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) requires ships security assessments
(SSA) and ships security plans (SSP) to be periodically reviewed, audited, and amended in
response to experience or changing circumstances.

Recognizing that civilian and commercial vessels operating in pirate infested waters off Somalia
or in the Gulf of Aden constantly take risk- based measures to mitigate the threat of pirate
attacks and boarding's, it is recommended that as Counter Piracy Action Measures
 Vessels in those areas operate at their fastest speeds ( those operating under 16
knots with a low freeboard (less than six meters) should consider themselves at extremely
high risk.
 Vessels that are unable to out run pirate vessels should change course repeatedly (consistent
with safe navigation) and conduct night time transits.
 Vessels should take measures including, where necessary, changing their operational
procedures to make it more difficult for pirates to board their vessels while underway.
 Obstacles should be placed in the way to prevent or delay the pirates gaining vessel control in
the event that pirates board the vessel. Examples may include safe- areas for crews to muster
and physical barriers to control areas.
 Vessels to use appropriate non- lethal measures such as netting, wire, electric fencing, long-
range acoustical devices, and fire hoses to prevent boarding.
 Vessels should take on properly certified unarmed security consultants on vessels transiting
the region. Such consultants should be encouraged to provide security measures, including
intelligence reports for vessels in transit, on-board training and non- lethal use of force
capabilities, and night vision equipment.
 Vessels, in appropriate circumstances take on properly screened and certified third- party
security providers with firearms, operating in compliance with applicable coastal, port, and flag
State laws to provide an effective deterrent to pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. Other self-
protection measures to avoid detection, attack, boarding and hijack by pirates can be to:
Stay outside high threat area, Navigate in rough seas, Continuous area- wide threat awareness,
Circumnavigation, AIS and LRIT switched on, Military Convoy, Massive water Curtain, Speed >
18 knots, Razor wire/ Spikes Group transit, Ejectable obstacles (e.g. timber) Extra lookouts,
Freeboard > 8 m Towed obstacles ( alongside/ aft of ship), water HOSES Night Vision Goggles,
Evasive Maneuvers, Laser guns, Sound blasters, Dummy lookouts, Restrict access, CCTV' Restrict
movements inside, Personal Protection Gear Deny use of ship's tools, Deploy smokescreen inside
Report movements to authorities Stowaways Ship owners and Masters face the problem of
identifying the presence of stowaways before a ship leaves port or preventing their boarding the
vessel in the first place. However, most stowaways are only discovered once a vessel has sailed.
Dealing
with an incident involves the Master and owner in time consuming negotiations with club,
agents and authorities. The cost alone from disruptions to the ship's schedule alone can be
considerable.

There are a number of preventive measures the Master and crew can take before the ship
enters port, during the stay in port and after departure. Therefore a thorough risk assessment
should be considered; identifying the potential hazards present in the ship's area of operation,
the physical surroundings of the ship upon loading! Discharging and potential hazards present
on board the ship Vessel's surroundings and port areas Normally the ship owner has little or no
influence on port security and has to concentrate on preventing stowaways from gaining access
to the ship. Stowaways are typically able to gain access to the ship due to inadequate security
and watch keeping, or, are hidden in containers which are subsequently loaded on board, while
these are at the terminal.

As far as security and watch keeping inadequacy are concerned, a number of measures can be
taken depending on the potential risk of stowaways in the particular port. The core strategy is
to ensure that no unauthorized personnel are able to gain access to the ship, and that all those
who have been authorized to board disembark before sailing. Given the pressure often put on
watchmen, the best solution is to have two watch keepers at each entrance. However, with the
small numbers of crew serving on modern ships this is usually not a feasible alternative, the
choice being either to recruit local guards, or to arrange for the temporary attachment to the
ship of a professional maritime security officer.

Engaging guards or a maritime security officer may seem extravagant. However, if the threat is
considerable the costs involved could well be justified. Repatriation of stowaways also gain
access to ships by hiding in containers, cars or other types of cargo units subsequently loaded
on board. If the voyage is short the unit will probably be unloaded undisturbed, but more
frequently the stowaways are discovered and ways have to be found to provide them with food
and of releasing them.

The chances of discovering stowaways secreted away in cargo stored at the terminal will
depend on the time available to undertake a thorough search and the amount of money the
owner is prepared to spend.

Obviously not every container or car can be checked. Whilst soft top containers can be
inspected quite easily, this is not the case with standard steel top containers. Sophisticated
equipment is available to search for stowaways in containers; however, these gadgets are
expensive and will normally be used by the port security authorities as opposed to ship owners
and operators. Port security- Many ports have adequate security; whilst at others security is
non- existent. Whatever the circumstances, it is not recommended to rely solely on port
security. The stowaway business is so financially attractive that to rely on local security staff
merely offers an easy path for a potential stowaway. It is sensible, however, to ensure that the
agent knows of your full intention not to sail with stowaways on board, and that he is
repeatedly asked to ensure that all safety measures available at the port are mare to work in
the interest of the ship.
The crew has little or no influence on port security and has to focus on preventing stowaways
from gaining access to the ship. The high risk threat is from ports and terminals where the ISPS
Code is not being implemented in a thorough manner. The task of preventing the stowaways
from coming on board in these ports is more difficult and it is here that Masters and ship
owners must focus their efforts. Crews should be issued the correct instructions and A
procedures to enable the ship to provide a determined deterrent, and stopping stowaways from
boarding.

Reducing the risk - port area

 Given the myriad of people who often surge on board when a ship arrives in port, a pass
system can be of valuable assistance.
 Ask the agent if the port is capable of providing adequate security. If not, the agent can be
asked to arrange additional protection.

Risk assessment and preventive measures

 If there are doubts as to the efficiency of locally supplied guards in ports where a large
number/ of stowaways are known to board vessels, the short- term employment of a
professional maritime security officer should be considered.

If stowaways are discovered during the search, the immigration authorities should be notified
immediately in order that the stowaways can be removed from the ship.

Reducing the risk- Acces s points

Review procedures to ensure that there is a watchman on duty at every access point which have
to remain unlocked whilst the vessel is in port and that this watchman is familiar with the
procedures when visitors, repairmen, stevedores etc., wish to come on board. The simple rule is:
" no unauthorized personnel come on board, and all authorized personnel disembark before
sailing". Check to ensure that all locks are locked and that places which cannot be locked are
sealed with tamper- proof or wire seals.
Different harbors and ports have different access points that are commonly used.
In general; some access point entries can be:
 Climbing the mooring ropes,
 Climbing from the sea using hooks,
 Boarding the vessel as stevedores with fake dock identification papers. At some ports
stevedores are supposed to wear special clothing with branded overalls and helmets. Bear in
mind that stowaways may have access to these overalls and helmets too.
Recent stowaway interviews have revealed that crew on board have also been involved in the
safe passage of stowaways. On A some ships stowaways have had to pay a "ticket" to one of the
crew on board. Consider offering financial rewards to those crew members who discover and
prevent stowaway incidents and ensure that all crew members are aware of the advantages of
preventing stowaways sailing with the ship. Check security equipment, close- circuit television,
alarms and locks.
8.2 Security drills and exercises

1 Requirement for conducting drills and exercises.

 The Company Security Officer and The Ship Security Officer must have knowledge and have
received training, taking into account the guidance given in Part B of the ISPS code.

Drill and exercise requirements

 General- Drills and exercises must test the proficiency of vessel personnel in assigned
security duties at all Security Levels and the effective implementation of the Ship Security Plan
(SSP). They must enable the Ship Security Officer (SSO) to identify any related security
deficiencies that need to be addressed.

Examples of drills include unauthorized entry to a restricted area, response to alarms, and
notification of law enforcement authorities.
 If the vessel is moored at a facility on the date the facility has planned to conduct any drills,
the vessel may, but is not required to, participate in the facility is scheduled drill.
 Drills must be conducted within one week whenever the percentage of vessel personnel with
no prior participation in a vessel security drill on that vessel exceeds 25%.
Drills and Training for Rest of Ship's Crew In addition to the specific training for personnel that
are involved in implementing security actions, all of the ship's crew should receive security
awareness training as part of their general orientation and training activities. This awareness
training should issues such as:
 Limiting discussion about specifics of the ship ( e.g., cargo, routes, equipment, crew size)
with non---company personnel to those personnel that need to know in order to service the
ship
 Reporting suspicious acts or behavior related to the ship both on/near the ship and when
personnel are on shore leave
 Protection of company---supplied identification cards or other documentation A high level of
awareness by company personnel of these simple measures can help prevent the ship from
becoming an easy target.
 9. Security Administration
9.1 Documentation and records
Records should be available to duly authorized officers of Contracting Governments to verify that
the provisions of the Ship Security Plans are being implemented.
Records may be kept in any format but should be protected from unauthorized access or
disclosure. 1 documents that shall be available on board at all times Records of the following
activities addressed in the Ship Security Plan must be kept on board at all times and be made
available to the government authorities upon request for at least the time frame covering the
previous 10 ports of call.
--Training , drills and Exercises;
--security threats and security incidents;
--breaches of security
--changes in security level;

Communications relating to the direct security of the ship such as specific threats to the ship or
to port facilities the ship is in, or has been;
--internal audits and reviews of security activities;
--periodic review of the Ship Security Assessment;
--periodic review of the Ship Security Plan;
--implementation of any amendments to the plan; and
--maintenance, calibration and testing of security equipment, if any including testing of the
ship security alert system.

 Annual internal audits of the SSP. For each annual audit, a letter certified by the SSO stating
the date the audit was completed
--Annual periodic reviews of the SSA and the SSP maintained.
--Required security records must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.
--Records must be kept in the working language or languages of the ship or translation in
either English, French or Spanish.
--Security related records required under the international requirements and any additional
records specified by a classification society shall be kept for 5 years to allow ‘ internal audit
review and to provide evidence of program compliance for periodic verification.
 10. Anti - Piracy

Risk Awareness: - Prior to entering area of risk

10.1 Appraise the strength and vulnerabilities of crew and ships

Prior to transiting the high Risk Area, ship operators and Masters should carry out a through
Risk Assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel,
based on the latest available information. The output of the Risk Assessment should identify
measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory
regulations with supplementary measures to combat piracy. It is important that the Risk
Assessment is ship and voyage specific, and not generic.

10.2 Know the Anti-Piracy Measure Factors to be considered in the Risk Assessment should
include, but may not be limited to, the following:

10.2.1- Crew Safety

 The primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew. Care should be
taken, when formulating measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to the
accommodation, that crew members will not be trapped inside and should be able to escape
in the event of another type of emergency, such as, for example fire.
 Careful consideration should be given to the location of a Safe Muster Point of Citadel.
( See Section 8.13 )
 Consideration should also be given to the ballistic protection afforded to the crew who may
be required to remain on the bridge during a pirate attack, recognizing that pirates
increasingly fire at the bridge of a vessel to try to force it to stop. ( See section 8.3)

10.2.2 – Freeboard

 It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship being attacked at the lowest point above
the waterline, making it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often on either
quarter or at the vessel’s stern.
 Experience suggests that vessels with a minimum freeboard that is greater than 8 metres
have a much greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt than those with less.
 A large freeboard will provide little or no protection if the construction of the ship
provides access to pirates seeking to climb onboard, and thus further protective measures
should be considered.
10.2.3-Speed
 One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using speed to try to outrun
the attackers and /or make it difficult to board.
 To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has
been proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate tactics and techniques
may develop to enable them to board faster moving ships.
  Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed, or at least 18 knots where they are
capable of greater speed, throughout their transit of the High Risk Area.
 It is very important to increase to maximum safe speed immediately after identifying any
suspicious vessel and as quickly as possible in order to try to open the CPA ( Closest Point of
Approach) from any possible attackers and /or make the vessel more difficult to board.
 If a vessel is part of a ‘Group Transit’( see section 7.9 for further details of Group Transits)
within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor( IRTC), speed may be required to
be adjusted.
 It is recommended that reference should be made to the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre
and MARLO websites for the latest threat guidance regarding pirate attack speed capability.

10.2.4 – Sea State

 Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft (skiffs), even where they are supported
by larger vessels or Motherships which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea states.
 It is likely to be more difficult to operate small craft effectively in sea state 3 and above. A
large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.

10.3 Understanding the contents of the Best Management Practices( BMP) The purpose of the
Industry Best Management Practices ( BMP) is to assist ships to avoid , deter or delay piracy
attacks in the High Risk Areas. Experience and data collected shows that the practices content in
the BMP can and will make a significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of
piracy. The potential consequence of not following BMP can be severe. There have been
instance of pirates subjecting their hostages to violence and other ill treatment. The average
length of a hijacking of vessel and her crew is over 7 months.
 For the purposes of the BMP the term piracy includes all acts of violence against ships, her crew
and cargo. This includes armed robbery and attempts to board and take control of the ship,
wherever this may take place. Somali pirates have to date, sought to hijack a vessel, her cargo
and crew and hold them until a ransom demand is paid. Not all ship Protection Measures
discussed in BMP4 may be applicable to every ship type.

Some of the salient points to remember as per BMP:-

1) Do not be Alone:- Use the Internationally recommended Transit corridor ( IRTS) and
group transit scheme or independent convoy & keep AIS turned on.
2) Do not be detected :- Keep track of NAVWARNS and visit relevant websites for known
pirate operating location. Use navigation lights only.
3) Do not be Surprised :- Increased vigilance-lookouts, CCTV and Radar
4) Do not be Vulnerable :- Use visible ( deterrent) and physical (preventive) ship protection
measures. These could include: Razor wire, use of water foam etc. Provide additional
personal protection to bridge teams.
5) Do not be Boarded : - Increase to maximum speed & maneuver vessel.
6) Do not Controlled :- Follow well practiced procedures and drills. Deny use of tools,
equipment, access routes

10.4 Pirates business module

 The pirates always carry out surprise attacks and catch the vulnerable vessels unaware
when such vessels are under prepared to repel pirate attacks. Commonly, two small high
speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or ‘Skiffs’ are used in attacks, often approaching from
either quarter or the stern. Skiffs are frequently fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger
single 6hp engine.
 Pirate Action Groups operate in a number of different boat configurations. To date
whatever the configuration the attack phase is carried out by skiffs. Pirate Action Group boat
configurations include:
 Skiffs only- usually two
 Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel often towing 2 or more attack
skiffs.
 Motherships which have included the very largest of merchant ships, fishing vessels
and dhows.
 These Motherships have been taken by the pirates and usually have their own
crew onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and
attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much larger area and are significantly
less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed behind the Motherships.
Where the size of the Mothership allows it, skiffs are increasingly being carried
onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances of interdiction by Naval/ Military forces.
Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades(RPGs) in an
effort to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to
board. The use of these weapons is generally focused on the bridge and
accommodation area. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important to
maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing where possible, and using careful maneuvering to
resist the attack Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being
attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently use
long lightweight ladders and ropes, or a long hooked pole with a knotted climbing
rope to climb up the side of the vessel being attacked.
Once onboard the pirate ( or pirates) will generally make their way to th bridge to try
to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge the pirate/pirates will demand that
the ship slows/stops to enable further pirates to board. Attacks have taken place at
most times of the day. However, many pirate attacks have taken place early in the
morning, at first light. Attacks have occurred at night, particularly clear moonlit nights,
but night time attacks are less common. The majority of piracy attacks have been
repelled by ship’s crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage and
applied the BMPs.

 11 Pirate Attack
11.1 Examine the implication of piracy attack

If the crew of a vessel suspects that it is coming under a pirate attack there are
specific actions that are recommended to be taken during the approach stage
and the attack stage. It should be noted that the pirates generally do not use
weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel, therefore any period yup
until this stage can be considered as ' approach', and gives a vessel valuable
time in which to activate her defenses and make it clear to pirates that they
have been seen and the vessel is prepared and will resist. Once under pirate
attack with a fear of siege the crew may face following situation:-

 Extreme fear, shock and panic

 Sense of physical vulnerability
 Fight amongst crew members
 State of Shock

Statistics have been gathered to understand how people have reacted in crisis
situation in all walks of life. There is no specific research currently available for
piracy related incidents but it is envisaged that reactions experienced are likely to
be broadly similar. It is stated that in an emergencies, human behavior may be
categorized in three groups:-
 Group 1 :- 60% may do little, or may engage in appropriate behaviors,
whilst awaiting the initiatives of others.
 Group 2 :- 25% may act rationally, perhaps attacking the threat, closing
doors or warning others.
 Group 3 :- 15% may be almost totally paralyzed by the seriousness of the
situation.

11.2 Assess how to defend the crew and the ship

11.2.1 Watch keeping and Enhanced Vigilance

Prior to entering the High Risk Area, it is recommended the preparations are made
to support the requirement for increased vigilance by:
 Providing additional lookouts for each Watch. Additional lookouts should be
fully briefed.
 Considering a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximize
alertness of the lookouts.
  Ensuring that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced Bridge Team,
preferably anti glare.
 Considering use of night vision optics.
 Maintaining a careful Radar Watch.

Well constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the vessel can give
an impression of great numbers of people on watch

11.2.2 Enhanced Bridge Protection

The bridge is usually the focus for any pirate attack. In the initial part of the
attack, pirates direct weapons fire at the bridge to try to coerce the ship to stop. If
they are able to board the vessel the pirates usually try to make for the bridge to
enable them to take control. The following further protection enhancements might
be considered:
 Kevlar jackets and helmets available for the bridge team to provide a level of
protection for those on the bridge during an attack. (If possible, jackets and
helmets should be in non-military color).
 While most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying
glass can be provided by the application of security glass film, often called
Blast Resistant Film.
 Fabricated metal, (steel/aluminum), plates for the side and rear bridge
windows and the bridge wing door windows, which may be rapidly secured
in place in the event of an attack.
 The after part of both bridge wings, (often open), can be protected by a wall
of sandbags.
 The sides and rear of the bridge, and the bridge wings, may be protected
with a double layer of chain link fence which has been shown to reduce the
effect of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens are also available.

11.2.3 control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces

It is very important to control access routes to deter or delay pirates who have
managed to board a vessel and are typing to enter accommodation or machinery
spaces. It is very important to recognize that if pirates do gain access to the upper
deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the
accommodation section and in particular the bridge. It is strongly recommended
that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the
pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge.
 All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and
machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened
by pirates.
 Careful consideration should be given to the means of securing doors and
hatches in order to afford the ship the maximum protection possible.
 Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned
compartment, it is essential that it can be opened by a seafarer trying to exit
by that route. Where the door or hatch is locked it is essential that a key is
available, in a clearly visible position by the door or hatch.
 It is recommended that once doors and hatches are secured, a designated
and limited number are used for routine access when required, their use
being strictly controlled by the door or hatch.
 Consideration should be given to blocking or lifting external ladders on the
accommodation block to prevent their use, and to restrict external access to
the bridge.
 Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertight integrity,
ensure all clips are fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where
possible, additional securing such as with wire strops may enhance hatch
security.
 Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The
fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to
shatter the window.
 Prior to entering the High Risk Area procedures for controlling access to
accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be set out and
practiced.

11.2.4 Physical Barriers

Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope
attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels
underway. Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to
gain access to vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an
attacking pirates.
 Razor Wire
Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier but only
 when carefully deployed. The barbs on the wire are designed to have a
piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken when selecting
appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and
type will vary considerably. Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be
effective. Three main types of razor wire are commonly available:
 Unclipped (straight strand)
 Spiral (like a telephone cord) and
 Concertina (linked spirals).

11.2.5 Water Spray and Foam Monitors

The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in
deterring or delaying pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can
make it difficult for a pirates skiff to remain alongside and makes it significantly
more difficult for a pirate to try to climb onboard. Options include:
 Fire hoses and foam monitors - Manual operation of hoses and foam
monitors is not recommended as this is likely to place the operator in a
particularly exposed position and therefore it is recommended that hoses
and foam monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover
likely pirate access routes. Improved water coverage may be achieved by
using fire hoses in jet mode but by utilizing baffle plates fixed a short
distance in front of the nozzle.
 Water cannons - These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping
arc thus protecting a greater part of the hull. Many of these have been
developed from tank cleaning machines.
 Ballast pumps – Where possible to do so ships may utilize their ballast
pumps to flood the deck with water thus providing a highly effective water
curtain over the ship’s side. This may be achieved by allowing ballast tanks
to over-flow on to the deck, by using existing pipework when in ballast
condition, or by retrofitting pipe work to allow flooding of the decks whilst in
loaded condition. Care must be taken to ensure that ballast tanks are not
over-pressurized causing damage to the hull and tanks, or vessel stability
compromised. If in doubt it is recommended that the relevant Classification
Society be contacted for advice.
 A Steam – Hot water, or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam has also
been found to be very effective in deterring attacks.
 A Water spray rails – some ships have Installed spray rails using a Glass
 Reinforced Plastic (GAP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water
curtain to cover larger areas.
 A Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel’s standard Fire
Fighting Equipment (FEE) stock. Foam is effective as it is disorientating and
very slippery making it difficult to climb through.

The following points are also worthy of note:

 Once rigged and fixed in position it is recommended that hoses and foam
monitors are in a ready state, requiring just the remote activation of fire
pumps to commence delivery of water.
 Where possible no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel’s sea
water systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order to
utilize all pumps additional power may be required and therefore these
systems should also be ready for immediate use.
 Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the
results achieved by the equipment, provide effective coverage of vulnerable
areas.

11.2.6 Alarms
Sounding the ship’s alarms/whistle serves to inform the vessel screw that a piracy
attack has commenced and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker
that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. If approached, continuous
sounding of the vessel’s foghorn/whistle distracts the pirates and as above lets
them know that they have been seen. It is important to ensure that:
 The piracy alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms,
potentially leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location outside the
accommodation.
 Crew members are familiar with each alarm, Including the signal warning of
an attack and an all clear, and the appropriate response to it.
 Exercises are carried out prior to entering the High Risk Area.

10.2 H) Maneuvering Practice

Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior to entry into the High Risk Area will be
very beneficial and will ensure familiarity with the ship’s handling characteristics
and how to effect anti-piracy maneuvers whilst maintaining the best possible
speed. (Waiting until the ship is attacked before practicing this is too late!)
11.2.7. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Once an attack is underway and pirates are firing weaponry at the vessel, it is
difficult and dangerous to observe whether the pirates have managed to gain
access. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of the progress of
the attack from a less exposed position:
 Consider the use of CCTV cameras to ensure coverage of vulnerable areas,
particularly the poop deck.
 Consider positioning CCTV monitors at the rear of the bridge in a protected
position.
 Further CCTV monitors could be located at the Safe Muster Point/Citadel
(see section 8.13)
 Recorded CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack

11.2.8. Upper Deck Lighting

It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:
 Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing
lighting on the poop deck, consistent with Rule 20(b) of the international
Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea.
 Search lights for immediate use when required.
 It is, however, recommended that ships proceed with just their navigation
lights illuminated, with the lighting described above extinguished. Once
pirates have been identified or an attack commences, illuminating the
lighting described above demonstrates to the pirates that they have been
observed.
 Navigation lights should not be switched off at night.

11.2.9. Approach Stage – If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open
the distance. Try to steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed. Initiate
the ship’s pre-prepared emergency procedures.
 Activate the Emergency Communication plan
 Sound the emergency alarm and make a ‘Pirate Attack’ announcement in
accordance with the Ship’s Emergency Plan.
 Report the attack Immediately to authorities ashore.
  Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS). Which will alert your
Company Security officer and Flag State. Make a ‘Mayday’ call on VHF Ch.
16.

11.2.10. Attack stage

 Reconfirm that all ship’s personnel are in a position of safety.
 As the pirates close in on the vessel, Masters should commence small
alteration of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs form lying
alongside the vessel in preparation for a boarding attempt. These
maneuver’s will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs.
 Substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to
significantly reduce a vessel’s speed.

11.3 Coping in a hostage situation

11.3.1 Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment
Pirates generally board vessels with little in the way of equipment other than
personal weaponry. It is important to try to deny pirates the use of ship’s tools or
equipment that may be used to gain entry into the vessel. Tools and equipment
that may be of use to the pirates should be stored in a secure location.
Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck Small arms and other
weaponry are often directed the vessel and are particularly concentrated on the
bridge, accommodation section and poop deck.
 Consideration should be given to providing protection, in the form of
sandbags or Kevlar blankets, to gas bottles (i.e. oxy-acetylene) or containers
of flammable liquids that must be stored in these locations.
 Ensure that any excess gas bottles or flammable materials are landed prior
to transit.

11.3.2 If the Pirates take Control

 Try to remain calm.
 Before the pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO. Ensure that the
SSAS has been activated, and ensure that the AIS is switched on.
 Offer no resistance to the pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the
bridge the pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated, and possibly
under the influence of drugs (including khat, an amphetamine like
 stimulant), so remaining calm and cooperating fully will greatly reduce the
risk of harm.
 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be
stopped and all way taken off the vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe
to do so). All remaining crew members should proceed to the designated Safe
Muster Point with their hands visible.
 12. The Release Process

12.1 Discuss the additional danger associated with the release process.
 On Board
 The ship will sail to a safe port where criminal debriefing and other debriefs
will be conducted.
 The Master or his replacement should take command of the vessel.
 The seafarers need to resume their normal onboard routines and duties.
 Seafarers should have direct communication with family members as soon
as possible for just a short time which will allow all crew to call quickly.
 During this call seafarers should be encouraged not to talk about the piracy
incident but about themselves and their families.
 Seafarers should receive medical care and be prescribed appropriate
medication.
 The ship should be provided with disinfectants, cleaning materials and
toiletries remembering to encourage the crew not to clean away forensic
evidence.
 The seafarers should be provided with clothing.
 The Master should encourage crew to talk and share their feelings amongst
themselves and if possible to make notes.

 Post-Release Response Ashore

The company should consider:
 Gathering together the crew.
 Providing interim hotel accommodation for the crew.
 Providing practical support such as haircuts, personal hygiene and clothing.
 Providing medical and emotional support.
 Arranging operational debriefs.
 Allowing further communication with families.
 Making available personnel trained to provide practical and emotional
support.
 13. Sea Farers Family
13.1 Enables seafarers to consider what they may wish to share with their
family concerning the risk of piracy
 The seafarers Family Possible Reactions during a Crisis are Confusion,
Uncertainty, Worry, Fear, Anxiety, Shock, Anger, Distrust etc, Including
concerns regarding financial situation, Family strife and loss of trust with
the company.
 The reactions of the family following an attack or during a hostage situation
are very similar to those of the seafarer. There will be a confusion fo
information as for the first few days there may be little or no communication
from the ship. This will lead to feeling of uncertainty, worry, fear, anxiety,
shock, anger and loss of faith with the company. There will be need for
credible information from the company and other support. It is important
that the seafarers family is in contact and is supported by the
company/agent at this time.
 Ensure that the family has the correct contact details of the company in the
event of a piracy attack. Ensure that the company has the up-to –date
family contact details.
 Seafarers and their families need to ensure that they have contact details of
the company in the case of a piracy attack. They also need to make sure
that the company has up to date family contact details.
 Seafarers should know of their legal rights and contractual entitlements
during and after a period of piracy.

13.2 Discussion with participants and assessment.