NIGER DELTA UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF LAW
OVOM
YENAGOA
BAYELSA STATE

GROUP 1
PRESENTATION ON THE RULE IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER
(STRICT LIABILITY TORT)
COURSE TITLE: LAW OF TORT (SECOND SEMESTER)
COURSE CODE: PPL 302

SUBMITED TO: DR. GINA ELVIS-IMO

October 2021

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 GROUP 1 MEMBERS

NAME MARIC NO:

1. APUTU FUNKIYE PHOEBE UG/18/1371

2. AWERIBO JUSTICE EBIAPADEI UG/18/1372

3. EBIKEFE CLINTON UG/17/0999

4. BAGOU KENDRA UG/18/1373

5. ABAREOWEI B. AYIBADIMIE UG/17/0985

6. CHICO EBIMOBOERE MARY UG/17/0995

7. BILEKE ABIDEKEARE SANDRA UG/18/1374

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 TABLE OF CONTENT

Topic page

Introduction……………….………………………………………………………..…4

Meaning of Strict Liability. ................................................................................4

Definition of the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher, Purpose and Examples...............8

Degree of Care to be Exercised ......................................................................11

Elements of the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher....................................................13

Remedies for Rylands v Fletcher....................................................................17

Defences for Rylands v Fletcher……………… …………………………………20

Difference between the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher and Nuisance..................25

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..26

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INTRODUCTION

Much in every way to start, this brief work sheds light and exposes on the ginosis
regarding the tenents and rudiments of the common law doctrine of Rylands and
Fletcher, otherwise known as Strict Liability Tort. In order to know the purport of the
term strict liability, it is pertinent to dissect the phrase into ‘strict’ and ‘liability.’ The
term “strict” according to Arcus Dictionary means incapable of compromise or
inflexibility, rigid, severity, stringent. According to the English Dictionary strict
means not allowing or admitting deviation, exact in correspondence or adherence to
something. According to the Cambridge Dictionary “strict” means correct. The legal
definition of the word strict is found in the Black’s Law Dictionary, it defines “strict”
as narrow; restricted, rigid, exacting, absolute, requiring no showing if fault.

Liability is a state if being responsible for something. The Arcus Dictionary defined
“liability” as being legally obliged and responsible for something. According to the
English Dictionary it is a condition of being liable, an obligation, debt or
responsibility owed to someone. The Black’s law Dictionary defined liability as the
quality or state of being legally obligated or accountable; the legal responsibility to
another or society, enforceable by civil remedy or punishment. “It is also the bond of
necessity that exists between the wrongdoer and the remedy of the wrong.

MEANING OF STRICT LIABILITY

4
Strict liability is a liability without fault. The principle of strict liability means that a
wrongdoer is liable once the Actus reus is done or occurs, irrelevant of the state of
mind of the doer at the material time. Strict liability is the imposition of liability on a
party without finding of fault such as negligence or tortious intent. 1 Strict liability is a
theory that imposes legal responsibility for damages or injuries even if the person who
was found strictly liable did not act with fault or negligence 2. Strict liability is a
concept applied both in criminal and civil law that holds a person responsible for their
actions regardless of their intent at the time 3. Strict liability is a standard of liability
under which a person is legally responsible for the consequences flowing from an
activity even in the absence of fault or criminal intent on the part of the defendant4.

Sir John Salmond explained that liability is strict where a man acts at his peril and is
responsible for accidental harm, independently, off the existence of either wrongful
intent, or negligence. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary strict liability is
liability without fault. The term strict liability means that someone is at fault even if
they do not intend to cause harm. A person will be liable for a victim’s damages even
if they did not do anything wrong. What it means is that it is irrelevant if the
individual could have done anything differently to avoid the accident and it does not
matter whether the defendant caused the accident on purpose. The only relevant
element is that the victim got hurt because of what the defendant did or omitted to do.
In strict liability it is irrelevant whether the wrongdoers mind was blameworthy at the
material time, the only relevant element is the Actus reus and not the Mens rea.
Therefore, the mere occurrence of an act without more renders the doer liable.

The sum if strict liability is to discourage reckless behavior and needless loss by
forcing potential defendants every possible precaution ad evident in the case of
Rylands v Fletcher5. To win a strict liability case a person must be injured and

1
Https//www.justia.com>last accessed 11 October 2021
2
Ibid
3
Https//www.hansnerlaw.com>last accessed 11 October 2021
4
Https//www.en.w.wikipedia.org> last accessed 11 October 2021
5
(1866)LR 1 Exch 265; (1861-1873) ALL ER 1 .Affirmed in (1866)LR HL 330

5
secondly, the person must also prove that the defendant actions or products caused the
injury.

Strict liability exists in various degrees and they are:

1) The rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

2) Liability for animals
3) Liability for defective products and consumer protection generally.
4) Liability for breach of statutory duty, where a statute imposes a strict duty.
5) Liability for libel and so forth.

DEFINITION OF THE RULE IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER

The facts in Rylands v Fletcther6 were that B, a mill owner, employed independent
contractors, who were apparently competent, to construct a reservoir on his land to
provide water for his mill. In the course of the work the contractors came upon some
old shafts and passages on B’s land. They communicated with the mines of A, a
neighbor of B, although no one suspected this, for the shafts appeared to be filled with
earth. The contractors did not block them up, and when the reservoir was filled the
water from it burst through the old shafts and flooded A’s mines. It was found as a
fact that B had not been negligent, although the contractors had been. A sued B and
the House of Lords held B liable. The decision of the House affirmed that of the Court
of Exchequer Chamber.

In Rylands, Justice Blackburn held;

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person
who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
6
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265; (1861-1873) ALL ER 1. Affirmed in (1868) LR HL 330.

6
 collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape7.”

Under the rule, a person who allows a dangerous element on their land which, if it
escapes and damages a neighbor is liable on strict liability basis. It is not necessary to
prove negligence on the part of the landowner from which has escaped the dangerous
substance.

Essentially, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher

1. Bringing and keeping on one’s land on non-natural user,

2. Duty to keep it therein at one’s own peril,
3. Escape of the thing: and
4. Liability for the natural consequences of its escape.

Ordinarily, liability in the tort known as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is strict, thus
liability may attach, even though there has been no negligence on the part of the
defendant or agent hired by him, and although the act in question is quiet innocent.

7
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265 at 279-280. Tenant v Gold wyn (1704) 91 ER 20.

7
THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER

The essence of the tort known as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is not different from
the reason why we have other laws, such as criminal law and so forth. The purpose for
establishing the tort known as rule in Rylands v Fletcher is that

 Everyman must so use his own land as not to damage another8.

 One is bound to use anything that is his so as not to hurt another by such use9.
 He whose stuff it is must keep it that it may not trespass.10

Thus, a person is free to own such property as he may, provided that he must use it so
as not to cause harm to another person. Explaining the scope of the law, in Rylands v
Fletcher. Blackburn J said:

“He can excuse himself by showing that the escape

was owing to the plaintiff’s default or perhaps that the
escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of
God but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is
unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be
sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on
principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten
down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose
mine is flooded by the water from his neighbor’s
reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his
neighbor’s privy, or whose habitation is made
unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his
neighbors’ alkali works, is indemnified without any
fault of his own and it seems but reasonable and just
that the neighbor, who has brought something on his

8
Ibid at 283
9
Ibid
10
Ibid at 286

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 own property which was not naturally there, harmless
to others so long as it is confined to his own property,
but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his
neighbors’, should be obliged to make good the
damage which ensues if he does not succeed in
confining it to his own property. But for his act in
bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and
it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it
there so that no mischief may accrue or answer for the
natural and anticipated consequences. And upon
authority, this we think is established to be the law
whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or
filth, or stenches.”11

Thus, if a person buys or accumulated or his land anything which if it should escape
may cause damage to his neighbor, he does so at his peril. If he does escape and
causes damage, he is liable, however careful he may have taken to prevent damage

EXAMPLES OF THE RULE IN RYLANDS AND FLETCHER

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher was established as a judge made law in the case of
John Rylands Jehu Horrolks v Thomas Fletcher. However, the rule applies to damage
caused by the escape to many things today. The rule in Rylands v Fletcher has been
held to apply to damage resulting from escape of so many things which may include
the following;

11
Ibid at 280; (1861-73) ALL ER 1 at 7

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  Electricity12
 Yew trees
 Gas
 Fire13
 Water
 Explosive Industrial waste etc

A chair or plane operated on afar ground, and so forth in rare instances, human
beings, though it is usually better to bring action in nuisances or claim on both
grounds. Generally, any non-natural user that escapes from the land on custody of the
keeper and causes harm on any person should probably come under the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher and attract liability and appropriate compensation or remedy. In
addition, in the case of Umudje v Shell B.P Pet. Dev. Co. Of Nig. Ltd 14 In the course
of its oil exploration activities, the defendant respondent company diverted a natural
stream, thereby denying the plaintiff appellant of water and fish. Oil waste
accumulated by the defendant respondent also escaped and caused damage to the
plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff appellant sued for damages. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the defendant respondent company was liable for the escape of the
crude oil waste that caused damage to the plaintiff’s land and killed fish therein.
However, it held that they were not liable for diverting the course of the natural
stream, as there has been no flooding of the plaintiff’s land, but only a denial of the
plaintiff of water and fish.

More so, in the celebrated case of Tubervil v Stamp15 the defendant, who was a
farmer, set fire to burn the stubble on his land. Owing to the negligent management of
the fire, it escaped or spread to the plaintiff’s land who was his neighbor and burnt his
12
Northwestern Utilities Ltd v London Guarantee & Accident Co (1936) AC 108.
13
Musgrave v pandelis (1919) 2 KB 43. Balfour v Barty-King (1957) 2 WLR 84 CA
14
(1975) 11 SC 155. Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Plc (1994) 2 AC 264 HL.
15
(1697) 90 ER 846.

10
growing corn. The court held: that the defendant was liable for damage caused by the
fire that spread from the land of the defendant.

DEGREE OF CARE TO BE EXERCISED

Historically, since 1866, the rule in Ryland v Fletcher has been used to impose
liability on owners or occupiers of land concerning damages caused by the escape of a
dangerous thing from such land, regardless of whether or not the owner or occupier
was negligent. In justification of the rule in Ryland v Fletcher the question is if it is a
distinct tort or species of nuisance, is a harbinger of a new general rule of strict
liability for dangerous activities, or a relic of a medieval conception of liability given
brief renewal through hostility to the industrial enterprises. In Australia, These
question were treated in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Property Ltd.

The majority Justice of the high Court held that the rule in Ryland and Fletcher should
be seen as absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence.

According to the majority, the rule in Ryland V Fletcher has become qualified and the
principles of the law of negligence has developed to the extent that negligence will
now confer a remedy in practically all cases of liability under the rule in Ryland v
Fletcher.

Therefore, according to the authorities or anyone who allows an independent

contractor to introduce a dangerous substance or undertake a dangerous activity on the
premises is under a non-delegable duty is in favor of a person lawfully outside the
premises to ensure that the contractor uses a reasonable care.

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This is a general rule that a degree of duty of care must be exercised by a person who
brings any dangerous thing to his land or a community, it should be equal to the
amount of risk posed by the dangerous thing under consideration. In the case of
North Western Utilities Limited v London Guarantee and Accident Co, the court held
that the degree of care to be shown by the defendant must be proportionate to the
degree of risk Included. The city might be carrying out operation at any time on their
sewers, in the vicinity of the appellant and it is the duty of the defendant to watch the
operations, Which was from the public nature and conspicuous character and from the
time during which they went on, such that a failure on their part to exercise due care
in the interest of the member of the public likely to be affected. Although under the
exception to the rule of Ryland V Fletcher, the appellants were operating under a
statutory authority and were not liable for damages caused without default on their
part, not for the act of a third party. However, they were negligent in failing to
foresee and guard against damages and were therefore liable for the negligence.

Lord Wright in his judgement stated that: Gas is a dangerous thing within the rules
applicable to things dangerous in themselves is beyond question. Therefore the
appellant who are carrying their mains, the inflammable and explosive gas are prima
facie within the principle of Ryland V Fetcher that is to say that though they are doing
nothing wrongful in carrying the dangerous thing so long as they keep it in their pipes,
they come prima facie within the rules of strict liability, If the gas escapes, the gas
constitutes an extraordinary danger created by the appellants for their purposes and
the rule in Ryland V Fletcher requires that they act at their penny and must pay for
damages caused by the gas , if it escapes, even though without negligence on their
part. The rule is not limited to cases where the defendant has been carrying on or
accumulating the dangerous thing on his land it applies equally in a cases where the
appellant when carrying the gas to mains land on the property of the city, that is the
sub soil in the exercise of a franchise to do so carrying cross electricity supply.

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Also the degree of the duty of care is also illustrated in the case of Nepa v Akpata the
plaintiff respondent, owner of the bungalow at Effurun near Warri for which he got
the building approved and was completed in 1977. Sometime in 1980 the defendant
appellant Nepa completed the erection of high tension electric transmission line from
Ogorode Power Terminal Sapele, which passed over high above the said plaintiffs
buildings. The plaintiff went to court on the ground that the transmission lines was
negligently over his building and that the building was as a result inhabitable. On
appeal, the court held that the defendant appellant Nepa, was liable, Delivering the
judgement of the court in this case Ejiwunmi JCA as he then was said that “While a
defendant acting under a statutory power is prima facie protected. In the exercise of a
statutory power, he may however be liable if it is established that the defendant was
negligent in the manner in which he acted under the statutory power given to him and
damage was caused to that other as a result. Therefore, the degree or duty of care to be
taken by the defendant should be proportionate to that of the risk involved in that
material time in the cause of carrying out one’s operation in one’s premises, failure to
observe that duty of care will make the defendant liable.

ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE

For a claim based on the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to succeed the plaintiff must have
the capacity to sue before he can bring an action relying on this rule. According to the
words of Nueberger J. in Makenna v. British Aluminum Ltd:

“In order for a claim to be brought in Rylands v.

Fletcher, the plaintiff must have an interest in the land
which would be sufficient to justify his claim in
bringing in nuisance”.

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However, there are important elements within the rule in Rylands v Fletcher which
must be present for the rule to apply, they are;

1. Dangerous thing or anything likely to do mischief if escapes

2. The defendant must have brought and accumulated the thing on his land
3. Escape
4. Non-natural user

Dangerous Things or Anything Likely to do Mischief if it Escapes:

Things within the rule that may likely do mischief could either be dangerous – such as
explosives and munitions, gas and petrol, noxious fumes, vibrations, poisonous plants
– or relatively innocuous things which posed danger when accumulated in large
quantities, such as water, crude oil, sewage and slag. 16 What is important is not
whether these thing are inherently dangerous or naturally innocuous but the scale of
the risk presented by the defendant’s activity: it is suggested that a box of matches or
a glass of water do not fall within the rule, but a million boxes of matches in a store or
a reservoir may do so.17

The plaintiff must be able to establish that the damage was caused by the escape of
such a thing. In general, the defendant would only be liable for damage which was
reasonably foreseeable. This requirement was encapsulated in the case of Cambridge
Water v Eastern Counties Leather Plc.18 In the said case, the defendant owned a
leather tanning business. During their work, small quantity of solvent known as Per
chloroethene (PCE) was spilt on the floor of the building in which the defendants
carried out their activities. These solvents eventually seeped through the building
floor and into the spoil, which eventually contaminated the claimant’s borehole. The
House of Lords held that the spillage of the solvents which eventually seeped
16
Elvis-Imo Gina, ‘Environmental Pollution Control and Strict Liability in Nigeria’s. Niger Delta University Law
Journal. Vol.1 No.1 May 2016. Pearl Publishing International Ltd, PH. p 79
17
Winfield and Jolowicz op cit
18
[1994] 2 AC 264

14
unforeseeably through the floor of the defendants building into percolated water
underground did not give rise to liability because the damage was of an unforeseeable
kind which is not recoverable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

The Defendant Must have brought and accumulated the Thing on his Land:

The defendant will be liable if he brings and accumulates the dangerous thing on his
land. However, where the thing, example water, was naturally on the land, the
defendant would not be liable under the rule should it find its way to the plaintiff’s
land. The defendant would also not be liable in the case of natural vegetation but
would be liable for the escape of anything which he plants on his land. Thus, for
example, if water flows from the defendant’s underground’s tunnels into the
plaintiff’s mines, whether by percolation or by force of gravity, the defendant will not
be liable under the rule if the water is naturally on the defendant’s land and he has
done nothing to accumulate it there.19

Escape:

Viscount Simon in the case of Read v. Lyons and Co. Ltd 20, defined escape as ‘escape
from a place where the defendant has occupation or control over land to a place
which is outside his occupation or control.’

Lord Porter in the same case also described escape as, ‘escape from the place in
which the dangerous object has been maintained by the defendant to a place not
subject to his control.’

In this sense, the plaintiff must establish that the thing on the defendant’s land
escaped into the plaintiff’s land. Where the plaintiffs fail to prove the existence of an
escape of a thing (non-natural user), his claim would not lie in Rylands v. Fletcher.

19
Wilson v. Waddell (1876) 2 App. Cas. 95
20
(1947) AC 156

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This was applied in the case of Ponting v. Noakes,21 where poisonous tree was on the
defendant’s land and its branches never extended over to the boundary of the
plaintiff’s. The plaintiffs horse reached over the boundary and ate the leaves and died.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for damage. The court held that the defendant was not
liable as there was no escape of a dangerous thing under the rule in Rylands V.
Fletcher. However, the House of Lords emphasized that the absence of an “escape”
was the basis of their decision.

Non-natural User:

In the case of Berlett v. Tottenham,22 Lawrence J. defines non-natural user as ‘things

artificially brought or kept on the defendant’s land’. Also Lord Moulton in Rickards
v. Lothian,23 explained non- natural user as follows:

It must be some special use bringing with it increased

danger to others and must not merely be the ordinary
use of the land or such a use as is proper for the
general benefit of the community.

It is instructive to note that the thing brought by the Defendant must be a non-natural
user that is “things artificially brought or kept on the defendant’s land.” In the case of
Crowhurst v. Amershan Burial Board24, the defendant planted Yew trees on the
boundary of his land and the branches of the yew tree protruded into the land of the
plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff’s horse ate some of the leaves, which were
poisonous and died. The court held: that the defendant was liable for bringing
poisonous yew trees on his land. It was a non-natural user of the land to plant
poisonous trees such as yew trees.

21
(1894) 2 QB 281
22
(1932) 1 Ch 114 at 131
23
(1913) AC 263 at 279
24
(1878) 4 Ex. D 5. Mason v Levy Auto Parts Ltd. (1967) 2 QB 530

16
However, it is important to know that what is a non-natural user of land would vary
with time and place as determined by the changing social needs and technological
advancement. Thus as a result of this, what may seem as extraordinary to one
generation may seem ordinary to its successor.25 Thus Lord Porter in the case of Read
v. Lyons26 in deciding the question of non-natural user stated:

All the circumstances of time and practice of mankind

must be taken into consideration so that what may be
regarded as dangerous or non-natural may vary
according to the circumstances.

REMEDIES TO THE RULE OF RYLAND AND FLETCHER

There are a lot of remedies open to a plaintiff who is a victim of the defendant's
actions liable for the tort of strict liability under the rule of Rylands v Fletcher. These
remedies open to a plaintiff include:

1. AWARD OF DAMAGES

As usual, an award of damages is monetary compensation for the wrongs committed

by the defendant. A claimant who therefore succeeds in establishing and proving the
defendant's liability in strict liability is entitled to the award of damages
proportionally compensatory to the wrong committed.

The primary aim of awarding damages is to place the plaintiff in as good as a good a
position so far as money can do it.27 This is an award of monetary compensation to the

25
Elvis-Imo Gina op cit
26
(1947) AC 156 at p. 176
27
Malemi E.O, Law of Torts (2nd Edition Princeton publishing Co, Lagos, 2013) p.605

17
plaintiff for the injury done to his reputation and the consequential losses suffered by
him.

2. INJUNCTION

An injunction is a legal and equitable remedy in the form of a special court order that

compels a party to do or refrain from specific acts. "When a court employs the
extraordinary remedy of injunction, it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with
the backing of its full coercive powers." A party that fails to comply with an
injunction faces criminal or civil penalties, including possible monetary sanctions and
even imprisonment. Therefore, an injunction is an order restraining the commission or
continuance of some wrongful act or the continuance of some wrongful omission.
There are several kinds of injunction which includes:

i. Interim Injunction: An interim injunction is a temporary injunction that is

issued by the court to maintain the status quo until the hearing of the case
on merits.28 The court on an application for an interim injunction does not
profess to anticipate the outcome of the action and since it is always
possible that when the case comes to trial the defendant may be found to
have been in the right, after all, the claimant may be required, as a condition
of the grant of an interim injunction, to give an undertaking in damages—
that is, to undertake to pay damages to the defendant for any loss suffered
by him while the injunction was in force, should it prove to have been
wrongly issued. In practice, the parties often treat the application for an
interim injunction as the trial of the action. In cases of great urgency, the
claimant can obtain an interim injunction in the absence of the defendant
which will remain in force for a few days until there can be a hearing.

28
Malemi E.O, Law of Torts, Op. Cit., p.606

18
 ii. Interlocutory injunction: An Interlocutory Injunction is a court order to
compel or prevent a party from doing certain acts pending the final
determination of the case. It is an order made at an interim stage during the
trial and is usually issued to maintain the status quo until judgment can be
made.29

iii. Mandatory Injunctions Although the court is vested with wide discretion

to fashion injunctive relief, it is also restricted to restraint of a contemplated
or threatened action. It also might compel specific performance of an act. In
such a case, it issues a mandatory injunction, commanding the performance
of a positive act. Because mandatory injunctions are harsh, courts do not
favor them, and they rarely grant them. Such injunctions have been issued
to compel the removal of buildings or other structures wrongfully placed
upon the land of another.

iv. Permanent Injunctions A permanent or perpetual injunction is granted by

the judgment that ultimately disposes of the injunction suit, ordered at the
time of final judgment. This type of injunction must be final relief.
Permanent injunctions are perpetual, provided that the conditions that
produced them remain permanent. They have been granted to prevent
blasting upon neighboring premises, to enjoin the dumping of earth or other
material upon the land, and to prevent pollution of a water supply.30

v. Quia Timet injunction: Quia Timet Injunction is an injunction to restrain

wrongful acts which are threatened or imminent but have not yet
commenced.31

29
Available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interlocutory_injunction> Last Accessed October 16, 2021.
30
Available at <https://law.jrank.org/pages/7647/Injunction-Types-Injunction.html> Last Accessed October 16,
2021
31
Available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quia_timet> Last Accessed October 16, 2021

19
DEFENCES FOR THE RULE IN RYLANDS VS FLETCHER

Generally, there are many defenses to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher that is why it
bamboozles me, leaves me flabbergasted and bewildered that this rule is described as
a Strict Liability Tort. The defences available to a defendant, if successfully raised
will exculpate a defendant in a claim under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. They
include but not limited to the following:

 Act of God
 Fault of the Plaintiff
 Contributory Negligence
 Consent of the Plaintiff
 Act of Stranger or Third Party
 Statutory Authority, etc.

1. Act of God

A defendant is not liable, if he proves that the escape of a thing and the consequent
damages occasioned were due to an act of God. The defense of Act of God was
successfully pleaded in the case of Nichols v Marsland32. On the other hand, in Smith
v. Kendrick33 damage was occasioned to the plaintiff's mine by the natural flow or
percolation of water from the defendant’s land into the mine. The plaintiff went to
court claiming damages for the flooding of his mine. The defendant successfully
32
(1876) 2 Ex D. 1.
33
(1849) 137 ER 205. Omotayo v Arbuckle Smith & Co LTD (1954) WACA 515. Greenock Corp v Calandonian Ry
(1917) AC 556.

20
pleaded Act of God. The court held that the defendant was not liable. There is no
obligation on the defendant to protect the plaintiff against the natural flooding of his
land. It was the plaintiff’s business to erect or leave a sufficient barrier to keep out
water from his land, or to adopt proper means to so conduct the water, so that it
should not impede him in the working of his mine. The water in question, was only
left by the defendant to flow in its natural course. Through his land to the plaintiff’s
land.

2. Fault of the plaintiff

Where a plaintiff is responsible for the escape of a harmful thing by his own conduct,
he has no cause of action. For instance if a person is responsible for the escape of a
vicious animal from its cage and is subsequently injured by it, no cause of action
would lie as the plaintiff saw the danger and invited it to himself whether directly or
indirectly.

3. Contributory Negligence

The defense of contributory negligence is similar to the defense of Fault of the

plaintiff. A defendant may plead that the plaintiff was also at fault in the event that led
to his injury. In such a case, the defendant will only be liable to the extent to which
he himself was blamable for the injury that was occasioned to the plaintiff and no
more. Accordingly, in Dunn v Birmingham Cannel Co 34. The plaintiff was working a
mine under the water Cannel of the defendant company, knowing fully well that the
water would seep into and flood the mine from the Cannel immediately above the
mine. In the course of time he could no longer work the mines due to flooding. He

34
Eastern & Southern African Telegraph Co v Cape Town Tramways (1902) AC 381. Hoare &Co v MCAphine
(1923) 1 Ch. 167. Ige v Tylor Woodrow Nig Ltd (1963) LLR 140.

21
sued the Cannel Company for damages. Court held that he could not sue in Rylands
vs Fletcher for the damage done by the water. COCKBURN CJ said inetr alia:

“The plaintiffs saw the danger and may be said to have courted it.”

4. Consent of the Plaintiff

Where a plaintiff consented to the bringing, keeping, accumulation or existence on the

defendant's land or property, of a thing likely to cause mischief if it escapes, then he
may not turn around to sue on it. Examples are where facilities and fittings are
installed on a land for the common benefit of the occupiers of the place. Furthermore,
when there is common benefit from a facility or structure, such common benefit is
usually interpreted as evidence of consent. If there is injury from such a thing, the
injured party may not be heard to complain. However, generally, an occupier is not
presumed to have consented to an installation being left in a dangerous or unsafe
condition, except evidence of his conduct points to consent.

Things which are usually fitted for common benefit of tenants or occupiers of a
premise includes facilities for collecting rainwater from the roof, water closet, water
pipes, fire extinguishers, electrical fittings and what have you. This is a defense that
the damage was caused by an installation or an artificial work done for the common
benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant. Therefore, installation that are necessary for
the ordinary use, occupation and enjoyment of a land or house may be installed, if
conveniently done without subjecting those who installed or permitted them to be
installed to a legal action. Thus, in Peters v Prince of Wales theatres Ltd 35: The
defendant theatre let a building to the plaintiff. The theatre to the knowledge of the
plaintiff, contained a water sprinkler system, installed against fire risk, which system
extended to the plaintiff’s shop. During a frost, water poured from the system and
damaged the plaintiff's stock. He sued claiming damages under the rule in Rylands vs

35
(1943) KB 73, A.G. v Corry Brothers (1921) 1 AC 521

22
Fletcher. The court held that the defendant is not liable. Reasons being that the water
sprinkler had been installed for the common benefit and protection of the plaintiff and
the defendant, and there was no negligence on the part of the defendant in the
installation and maintenance of the system.

5. Act of Stranger or Third party

Regardless of the fact that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a Strict Liability Tort, a
defendant may escape liability if he is able to prove that the escape was due to the
independent act of a third party. For example, a thief, trespasser or a stranger over
whom he has no control. In Rickards v Lothian36 the defendant appellant was the
lessee of a building. He sub-let the second floor to L the plaintiff. An unknown third
party, blocked the waste pipe of a wash basin on the fourth floor, which was in the
defendant's control and turned the tap on. The plaintiff's stock on the second floor was
damaged. By the overflow of water from the tap. The court held that the defendant
was not liable, since the damage was due to the act of a stranger which the defendant
could not reasonably have prevented. More so, in the celebrated case of Shell Pet.
Dev. Ltd. v. Okoto37: the plaintiff respondent sued the defendant petroleum exploration
company claiming injury arising from the deprivation of the use of the Adonai River
and creeks in Rivers State, the desecration of their Shrine, pollution of the drinking
water, death of fishes and other living creatures as a result of the spillage of crude oil
caused by the act of a stranger or third-party who removed a bolt from the manifold of
the defendant company, and without negligence on their part at all. On appeal, the
court of Appeal held that the defendant appellant company was not liable.

In this regard Omosun J CA as he then was stating the applicable principle of law
said:

36
(1913) AC 263, (1911-13)All ER 71)
37
(1990) 6 NWLR pt 159,p. 693 SC.

23
 “In law the owner of a dangerous thing is not liable,
if the thing…escaped through the independent act of a
third party, and there has been no negligence on his
part.”

On the other hand, Singleton LJ said:

“If the mischievous, deliberate and conscious act of a

stranger causes the damage, the occupier can escape
liability. He is absolved.”

6. Statutory Authority

A public officer, an agency or statutory authority, may rely on the statutory authority
immunity or power conferred on it by a statute to escape liability under the rule in
rylands vs fletcher. For instance, a public or statutory authority supplying, water, gas,
electricity and other utilities or carrying out other public services, are sometimes
exempted from liability for injuries resulting to persons from their actions, as long as
the public body took the reasonable care expected of it or expected of a prudent
person. Such public body may escape liability provided that:

 The terms of the statute exempting it from liability are clear; and
 There has been no negligence on the defendant's part.

Accordingly, in Green v Chelsea Waterworks38: the defendant water works was

authorized by statute to lay water mains for the supply of water in the town of
Chelsea, England. A water pipe burst, and water flooded the plaintiff's premises. The
court held: that the defendant water corporation was not liable, as there was no
negligence on the part of the defendant waterworks.

38
(1891-94) All ER 543.

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However, where negligence is established on the part of a defendant, it will be held
liable for its acts under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

Furthermore, in the case of Buckland v Guildford Gas Light Co39: the defendant light
company installed high voltage electric wires across the top of a tree in a field; the top
of the tree had been cut down to permit the passage of the wires. A girl of thirteen
years climbed the tree when it was in full leaf and encountered the wires and was
electrocuted to death. Court held that the electricity company was liable. They should
have foreseen that someone might climb the tree and been unable to see the wires due
to the dense foliage, will accidentally encounter the electric wires and be
electrocuted.40

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RULE IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER AND

NUISANCE

The rule in Ryland’s v Fletcher is an offshoot of the tort of nuisance. Some issues
may give rise to liability under both torts, but there are some basic differences:

a) The rule in Ryland’s v Fletcher requires a non-natural use of land, while nuisance
requires use of land;

b) Ryland’s v Fletcher is exclusive to the accumulation of physical objects which

escape and do damage; nuisance is not so, but covers interference caused by
intangibles such as noise and smells.

c) In Ryland’s v Fletcher there must be an escape of the accumulated material from

the defendant's land to a place outside that land; in nuisance an escape is not
necessary.

39
(1949) 1 KB 410.
40
Ese Malemi Law of Tort 2nd Ed (2017) Princeton Publishing Company p. 508-513

25
d) A plaintiff who is not an occupier of adjoining land may sue under Ryland’s v
Fletcher, whereas such a person could not sue in private nuisance.

e) Liability under Rylands v Fletcher is confined to cases of non-natural user of land;

there is no such limitation in nuisance.

CONCLUSION

Comparatively, it is safe to say that the law of Tort has some sort of connection or
relationship with some notions of criminal law. More often than not; in our
jurisprudence; acts classified as tortious can equally amount to a criminal offence
(though not in all cases). For instance, the tort of conversion is tantamount to the
offence of stealing in criminal law. Accordingly, it is a trite principle under criminal
law that for one to be said to have committed an offence worthy of punishment the
elements of Mens rea, in essence, the criminally guilty mind and Actus raus which is
the substantive act or omission amounting to an offence must of necessity be present.
As seen in section 24 Criminal code:41

“Subject to the express provisions of this code relating

to… acts and omissions, a person is not … responsible
for an act or omission which occurs independently of
the exercise of his will or for an event which occurs by
accident….”

On the other hand, though the law of tort unlike criminal law is not punitive in
nature. Rather, under the umbrella of civil law, it is primarily concerned with
awarding damages and granting injunctions in the interest of parties. The rule in
Rylands v Fletcher under the law of Tort as a strict liability tort does not require a
blameworthy mind, negligence, intention or fault. The mere act or omission without
more makes a defendant liable. Provided the plaintiff can establish the elements of the
41
S. 24 Criminal Code Act

26
tort. Notwithstanding, the strict liability nature of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher does
not do away with the availability of recognized defences such as Act of God, Fault of
the plaintiff, Contributory negligence, act of Stranger or Third party and Statutory
authority. Particularly when raised successfully under the right circumstances
absolves the defendant and defeats or renders impotent the strict liability purport of
the rule. Nevertheless, generally, the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a strict liability
tort.

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