Sookman TCLG Year in Review 2011
Sookman TCLG Year in Review 2011
Sookman TCLG Year in Review 2011
Toronto Computer Lawyers Group The Year in Review: Developments in Computer, Internet and E-Commerce Law (2010-2011)
Barry B. Sookman [email protected] 416-601-7949
McCarthy Ttrault LLP / mccarthy.ca
Privacy
Leons Furniture Limited v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2011 ABCA 94
The identifiable individual term has two components. Firstly, the individual must be identifiable. Generic and statistical information is thereby excluded, and the personal information (here the relevant number) must have some precise connection to one individual. Secondly, the information must relate to an individual. Information that relates to objects or property is, on the face of the definition, not included. The key to the definition is the word identifiable. Further, to be personal in any reasonable sense the information must be directly related to the individual; the definition does not cover indirect or collateral information. Information that relates to an object or property does not become information about an individual, just because some individual may own or use that property. Drivers licence numbers are PI but licence plate numbers are not. The respondent [Privacy Commissioner] is not empowered to direct an organization to change the way it does business, just because the respondent thinks he has identified a better way. So long as the business is being conducted reasonably, it does not matter that there might also be other reasonable ways of conducting the business.
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2010 FC 736
Is the collection of evidence by an insurer acting for one of its insured in the defence of a third party tort action a commercial activity within the meaning of PIPEDA? I conclude that, on a proper construction of PIPEDA, if the primary activity or conduct at hand, in this case the collection of evidence on a plaintiff by an individual defendant in order to mount a defence to a civil tort action, is not a commercial activity contemplated by PIPEDA, then that activity or conduct remains exempt from PIPEDA even if third parties are retained by an individual to carry out that activity or conduct on his or her behalf. The primary characterization of the activity or conduct in issue is thus the dominant factor in assessing the commercial character of that activity or conduct under PIPEDA, not the incidental relationship between the one who seeks to carry out the activity or conduct and third parties. In this case, the insurerinsured and attorney-client relationships are simply incidental to the primary non-commercial activity or conduct at issue, namely the collection of evidence by the defendant Ms. Vetter in order to defend herself in the civil tort action brought against her by Mr. Gaudet.
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CTB v. News Group Newspapers Ltd & Anor [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB)
Mr Spearman argues ...that in effect privacy injunctions (and no doubt other forms of injunction also) have ceased to serve any useful purpose in the age of the Internet. Not only can information be put out on various networks from within this jurisdiction, but it can obviously be done also by anyone who wishes in other jurisdictions. Should the court buckle every time one of its orders meets widespread disobedience or defiance? the law nowadays is required to protect information in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy... It is fairly obvious that wall-to-wall excoriation in national newspapers, whether tabloid or "broadsheet", is likely to be significantly more intrusive and distressing for those concerned than the availability of information on the Internet or in foreign journals to those, however many, who take the trouble to look it up. Moreover, with each exposure of personal information or allegations, whether by way of visual images or verbally, there is a new intrusion and occasion for distress or embarrassment. Mr Tomlinson argues accordingly that "the dam has not burst". For so long as the court is in a position to prevent some of that intrusion and distress, depending upon the individual circumstances, it may be appropriate to maintain that degree of protection. The analogy with King Canute to some extent, therefore, breaks down.
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A broad holding concerning employees' privacy expectations vis--vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.
McCarthy Ttrault LLP / mccarthy.ca
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I conclude that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy from state intrusion in the personal use of his work computer and in the contents of his personal files on its hard drive. However, his expectation of privacy was modified. He had no expectation of privacy with respect to access to his hard drive by his employers technician for the limited purpose of maintaining the technical integrity of the schools information network and the laptop.
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Developments in India
New privacy regs issued in April 2011 and prescribed how PI may be collected and used by virtually all organizations in India Regs appear to apply to info of both Indian residents and foreign nationals This means that transaction or sales calls must conform to Indian standards Appears to apply to controllers, processors and intermediaries touching PI Sensitive PI involves heightened obligations, including prior consent by letter, fax, or e-mail No exceptions on basis of necessity Right to withdraw consent Officer must be nominated to deal with grievances Security control measures must be documented and may be audited Subjects have right to review and correct data Failure to comply can result in jail term of up to 3 years or fine of approx. $4,500
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Absent legislative intervention, the courts will generally give effect to the terms of a commercial contract freely entered into, even a contract of adhesion, including an arbitration clause. Section 172 is clearly designed to encourage private enforcement in the public interest. It was open to the legislature to prefer the vindication and denunciation available through a well-publicized court action to promote adherence to consumer standards. The legislature understood that the policy objectives of s. 172, would not be well served by a series of isolated low-profile, private and confidential arbitrations. All other causes of action including breach of Trade Practices Act and common law claims subject to arbitration clause.
McCarthy Ttrault LLP / mccarthy.ca
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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 2011 WL 1561956 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2011)
Issue: whether AT&Ts consumer contracts requiring arbitration and precluding class arbitration were enforceable under the US the FAA.
Court reversed 9th Circuit which held such clauses unconscionable, overruling Californias Discover Bank rule. The overarching purpose of the FAA...is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.
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Grosvenor v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc., 2010 WL 3906253 (D. Colo. 2010)
The Qwest Subscriber Agreement and the Arbitration Clause do not appear on the same scroll down box or page as the I Accept and the I Do Not Accept buttons...the Subscriber Agreement is referenced by the Legal Agreements page but it is not expressly incorporated into the Clickwrap Agreement. As presented, the Clickwrap Agreement does not clearly incorporate the Subscriber Agreement by reference and to reach the arbitration clause requires the user to leave the installation program, log onto the Internet (if possible), navigate to the proper page, and read the Subscriber Agreement, then return to the installation program's scroll down window to read the remaining ten pages of the High-Speed Internet Modem Installation Legal Agreement before choosing whether to agree to the terms... This creates an ambiguity regarding recourse in the event of a dispute. These circumstances demonstrate a genuine issue of fact.
McCarthy Ttrault LLP / mccarthy.ca
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Roling v. E*Trade Securities, LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Is a term in an online brokerage agreement that permits E*TRADE to modify its fee structure at any time by posting a modified structure on its Web site and requires customers to check E*Trade's website for modifications enforceable? In sum, E*Trade is unable to cite to any case, whether under New York law or California law, that undercuts plaintiffs' allegation that a contractual provision that allows a party to unilaterally change the terms of the contract without notice is unenforceable.
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Patco Const. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United Bank, 2011 WL 2174507 (D.Me. May 27, 2011)
In addition, by virtue of the posting online of the Modified eBanking Agreement, Patco effectively agreed to monitor its commercial accounts daily. While Patco protests that it did not actually ever see the Modified eBanking Agreement and thus was never properly notified of its existence or bound by it... the Bank reserved the right, in the Original eBanking Agreement, to modify the terms and conditions of that agreement at any time effective upon publication...There is no dispute that Patco reviewed and agreed to the terms of the Original eBanking Agreement....The online publication of the Modified eBanking Agreement hence was binding upon Patco. See, e.g., Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 2d 696, 708 (D.Md. 2008) (unilateral modification of Internet-based service contract held effective when prior agreements permitted modification at any time and stated that modifications would be effective after they were posted for 30 days).
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Distinct Fortune Ltd. v. Hyndland Investment Co. Ltd. [2010] HKEC 2013
Does SMS message satisfy HK Conveyancing and Properties Ordinance. The plaintiff submitted that the CPO should be given an updated construction by making allowances for social and technological changes; that SMS was in a visible form and was a personal way of communication by electronic means; that the principal function of a signature is to demonstrate an authenticating intention of the signor and the sending of an SMS should constitute the signing of it by the sender. On the question of signature, I think the SMS is not a signed document... I agree with leading counsel of the defendant that there is not even the expression of (sd.). If the clicking of the send button would amount to the signing of the SMS, then all SMS and emails are signed documents. This cannot be right.
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De Beers UK Ltd. v. Atos Origin It Services UK Ltd. [2010] EWHC 3276 (16 December 2010)
In my judgment, the demands made by Atos, particularly in the e-mail of 2 June 2008, did not reflect its contractual entitlement and, in putting them forward, it was not undertaking to continue to perform the Contract. For a start, what Atos was willing to do was "to complete the project on a time and materials basis at our own internal standard rates". That is an expression of an intention to complete the work on different terms, not upon the terms originally agreed. Second, this offer was itself subject, amongst other things, to DB's agreement to waive any claim that it may have against Atos in relation to Atos's delivery to date. That also was something upon which Atos had no right to insist. The fact that Atos repeatedly asserted its willingness and wish to complete the project is neither here nor there. There is a very significant difference between being willing to complete a project, and being willing to fulfil a contract. Atos may have been genuinely prepared to do the former, on its own terms, but that was itself inconsistent with a willingness to do the latter.
McCarthy Ttrault LLP / mccarthy.ca
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Commissioner has no discretion to deviate from the Canadian patent law and its interpretation by the Courts. The Commissioner erred in adopting a policy role inconsistent with established Canadian legal principles. The Commissioners reasons for excluding business method patents can no longer be a barrier to obtaining a patent for a business method in Canada.
There is no requirement that eligible subject matter exhibit a technical character or that it support a technical contribution.
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The Court rejects Microsofts contention that a defendant need only persuade the jury of a patent invalidity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. There, tracing nearly a century of case law, the Court stated, inter alia, that there is a presumption of [patent] validity [that is] not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence. New evidence supporting an invalidity defense may carry more weight in an infringement action than evidence previously considered by the PTO. The Court is in no position to judge the comparative force of the parties policy arguments as to the wisdom of the clear and convincing-evidence standard that Congress adopted.
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Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 563 U.S. ___(2011)
Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor. The question here is whether the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 commonly referred to as the BayhDole Actdisplaces that norm and automatically vests title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors. We hold that it does not.
Stanford's reading of the phrase invention of the contractor to mean all inventions made by the contractor's employees is plausible enough in the abstract; it is often the case that whatever an employee produces in the course of his employment belongs to his employer. No one would claim that an autoworker who builds a car while working in a factory owns that car. But, as noted, patent law has always been different: We have rejected the idea that mere employment is sufficient to vest title to an employee's invention in the employer. Against this background, a contractor's inventionan invention of the contractordoes not automatically include inventions made by the contractor's employees.
McCarthy Ttrault LLP / mccarthy.ca
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Copyright
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Supreme Court granted leave to appeal: Tariff 22 is a download a communication to the public. Tariff 22 is an internet preview a fair dealing for research purposes. K-12 fair dealing in the K-12 educational sector.
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Google v Copiepresse et al, Brussels Court of Appeal (9th Chamber) May 5, 2011
The decision canvasses many issues including the choice of law to apply to evaluate the claims of infringement, whether Googles caching of news articles is infringement, whether the transmission of article titles and short extracts violates the reproduction and communication to the public rights, whether Google News violates the moral rights of authors, whether statutory fair dealing defenses apply, whether Google can rely on implied licenses from publishers and authors to publish Google News, and whether intermediary safe harbors are available under Belgium law for providers of these services. See, Is Google News legal? http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/05/17/is-google-news-legal/
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