Warm v. Innermost - Order On MTD

Case 2:21-cv-04402-MWF-SHK Document 98 Filed 04/26/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:2093
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Title: Corinna Warm and Studio Warm LLC v. Innermost Ltd. et al.
Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge
Deputy Clerk: Court Reporter:

Rita Sanchez Not Reported
Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant:

None Present None Present
Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS INNERMOST LIMITED
AND IM DESIGN CONCEPT LLC’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [75]
Before the Court is Defendants Innermost Limited and IM Design Concepts

LLC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the “Motion”), filed on March 14,
2022. (Docket No. 75). Plaintiffs Corinna Warm and Studio Warm LLC filed an
Opposition on March 21, 2022. (Docket No. 78). Defendants filed a Reply on March
28, 2022. (Docket No. 83).
The Court has read and considered the Motion and held a hearing on April 11,
2022.
For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part:
 The Motion is DENIED as to the copyright claims, as Defendants have

not shown that the lampshades are not separable from their utilitarian
functions and thus unable to be copyrighted.
 The Motion is GRANTED as to the right of publicity claims. Plaintiffs

have not set forth evidence demonstrating that any republications of
Corinna Warm’s name occurred within the two-year statute of limitations
as required by the Single Publication Rule.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 1


 Because Defendants prevail on the right of publicity claims, a fee award is
mandatory per statute.
BACKGROUND
The Court has previously summarized the background of this case in connection
with the December 15, 2021 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend the Deadline
to Amend Pleadings/Add New Parties, dated December 15, 2021 (the “Amendment
Order”). (Docket No. 55). The Court incorporates by reference the factual
background set forth in the Amendment Order.
LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the Court applies
Anderson, Celotex, and their Ninth Circuit progeny. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). “The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
The Ninth Circuit has defined the shifting burden of proof governing motions for
summary judgment where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial:
The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Where the non-moving party
bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove
that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case. Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts
demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. This burden
is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. The non-moving party must
do more than show there is some “metaphysical doubt” as to the
material facts at issue. In fact, the non-moving party must come forth
______________________________________________________________________________


with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in
the non-moving party’s favor.
Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1259 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010)).
“A motion for summary judgment may not be defeated, however, by evidence

that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘is not significantly probative.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249–50. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of
proof at trial, ‘it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed
verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v.
Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Houghton v. South,
965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ first, second,

third, seventh, twelfth, and thirteenth claims for relief. (See Motion at 1). In
particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ first through third claims for copyright
infringement fail because lighting fixtures are useful articles not copyrightable and that
Plaintiffs’ “publicity claims” (seventh claim for false endorsement and twelfth and
thirteenth claims for statutory and common law violation of right to publicity) fail
because Corinna Warm’s name, image, and likeness were never used without
permission. (See Memorandum (Docket No. 75-1) at 1).
A. Copyright Infringement
Defendants’ primary argument is that the at-issue lampshades cannot be

copyrighted because they are useful articles and their designs cannot be separately
identified from the usefulness of the article. (See id. at 6–8 (citing, inter alia, Star
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1009 (2017)).
“To prevail on [a] copyright infringement claim, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate

(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
______________________________________________________________________________


that are original.” Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir.
2010), overruled on other grounds by Skidmore as Tr. for Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v.
Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Although copyright protects only original expression, it is not difficult to
meet the famously low bar for originality.” Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1069 (citing Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)). “[O]riginality
requires at least ‘minimal’ or ‘slight’ creativity — a ‘modicum’ of ‘creative spark’ —
in addition to independent creation.” Id. at 1071 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46,
362).
“A valid copyright extends only to copyrightable subject matter.” Star

Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1008 (citing 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[A] (2010)). As
relevant here, a “‘sculptural featur[e]’ incorporated into the ‘design of a useful article’
is eligible for copyright protection if it (1) ‘can be identified separately from,’ and (2)
is ‘capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.’” Id. at
1010 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (modification in original). The parties do not dispute
that the products at issue are useful articles—lamps— and should be reviewed under
this standard. The parties also appear to assume that the question of copyrightability is
one of law to be decided by the Court; courts similarly seem to assume that this is the
case, although as the Court noted at the hearing the outcome of Star Athletica was
mandated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute, which is clearly a
question of law.
“The first requirement—separate identification— is not onerous. The

decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two- or
three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
qualities.” Id. (citing 2 Patry § 3:146, at 3–474 to 3–475). Here, Defendants challenge
that Plaintiffs have “identified any separable element,” arguing that “Plaintiffs refer to
‘features’ of the lighting products, but [] never say what those features are or identify
any separable elements.” (Memorandum at 8 (emphasis removed)).
“The independent-existence requirement is ordinarily more difficult to satisfy.

The decisionmaker must determine that the separately identified feature has the
______________________________________________________________________________


capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Star Athletica, 137 S.
Ct. at 1010 (citation omitted). “[T]o qualify as a . . . sculptural work on its own, the
feature cannot itself be a useful article or ‘[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful
article’ (which is itself considered a useful article).” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
“The focus of the separability inquiry is on the extracted feature and not on any aspects
of the useful article that remain after the imaginary extraction.” Id. at 1013.
Defendants argue that any sculptural components of Plaintiffs’ identified

lampshades cannot be separated from the utilitarian functions, rendering the
lampshades uncopyrightable as a matter of law. (See Memorandum at 8–13). At the
hearing, Defendants also reiterated the argument that any separability is of the
lampshades only, which are “normally part of a useful article” and therefore considered
a useful article that cannot be copyrighted. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
Defendants further contested that there were any sculptural elements of the lampshades
that were not wholly constrained by their utilitarian aspects, limiting their separability.
It cannot be definitively said that neither of the lampshades has sculptural

elements that can be identified separately from the usefulness of the articles and are
capable of existing independently of their use as lampshades given the standard set
forth by the Supreme Court. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010. The lampshades
could be conceptualized to serve as sculptural pieces in an art display instead of
lampshades, without any cord or bulb.
Defendants largely appear to be contending either that lampshades in and of

themselves are wholly utilitarian and unworthy of copyright protection or that these
lampshades in particular are not creative enough to warrant copyright protection.
Neither argument appears to square with the law as set forth by Star Athletica. See,
e.g., Silvertop Assocs. Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg. Inc., 931 F.3d 215, 220–222 (3d Cir.
2019) (evaluating the “combination of design elements in a work” and “sum of [the
work’s] non-utilitarian parts” in determining costume could be imagined separably as a
sculpture and finding costume copyrightable).
______________________________________________________________________________


In Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., for example, the district court considered
separability in the context of a “Tear Drop Light Set,” a set of “ornamental string
lights” with “a series of molded, decorative tear shaped covers with a wire frame over
the covers.” 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017).
Star Athletica was decided during the pendency of the motion for summary judgment
in Jetmax, leading the district court to request supplemental briefing from the parties.
See id. at *4–*5.
The district court concluded that the decorative covers of the Tear Drop Light
Set were separable from the useful article of the string lights, as the light set
“undoubtedly has three-dimensional decorative covers that have sculptural qualities,”
and “[t]he decorative covers are sculptural works that are capable of existing apart
from the utilitarian aspect of the light set, i.e. the light bulbs and other components that
cause the Tear Drop Light Set to light a room.” Id. at *6.
The primary issue in Jetmax was originality, not separability. See id. at *3
(defendants argued the lights at issue were not copyrightable because they were useful
articles and also unoriginal). Additionally, the case here is closer, as the Court
acknowledged at the hearing after arguments by both parties, and what satisfies the
“independent-existence requirement” of Star Athletica is not yet well-defined in the
context of the extreme breadth with which something can be construed to be a
sculpture or sculptural.
In this case, though, it would appear that the lampshades “are sculptural works
that are capable of existing apart from the utilitarian aspect of the light set, i.e., the
light bulbs and other components that cause the [lamps] to light a room.” Id. at *6. As
Defendants have pointed out, removing the lampshades leaves primarily a cord and
bulb, and while a lampshade is indeed part of a useful article, under Star Athletica the
shapes of the lampshades appear to have “the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian
aspects of the article.” 137 S. Ct. at 1010. Defendants do have a strong argument that
a lampshade, when conceptualized separately from a lamp, is part of a useful article.
However, considering “[t]he ultimate separability question” of whether the lampshades
would have been protectible if they “had [] originally been fixed in some tangible
______________________________________________________________________________


medium other than a useful article before being applied to a useful article,” it seems
that the lampshades could very much have been copyrighted as metal sculptures first
and later converted to use as lampshades. Id. at 1011.
Because Defendants have not shown that the lampshades are not separable and
thus not protectible by copyright, the Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ first, second,
and third claims.
B. Publicity Claims
Plaintiffs bring claims asserting false endorsement (Complaint ¶¶ 140–50, First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Docket No. 82) ¶¶ 142–52), violation of California
Civil Code section 3344 prohibiting the use of name, image, and likeness (Complaint
¶¶ 169–75, FAC ¶¶ 171–77), and misappropriation of name likeness (Complaint ¶¶
176–79, FAC ¶¶ 178–81). Defendants argue Plaintiffs have set forth no evidence to
support their claims and further 1) that any initial use of Plaintiff Corinna Warm’s
biography was with consent, and 2) any additional claims are time-barred. (See
Memorandum at 13–19).
In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have continued to produce

new publications and republications using Warm’s name. (See Opposition at 17 (citing
Warm Decl. (Docket No. 79) ¶¶ 29–30, Ex. C., Erikson Decl. (Docket No. 80) Ex. D)).
The parties agree that California’s Single Publication Rule governs, as set forth
in California Civil Code section 3425.3. The Single Publication Rule prohibits
successive tort claims based on publication of a communication, limiting any claims to
accrue on the first publication of the disputed communication rather than with any
successive republishing. See Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1166–67 (9th
Cir. 2011). “In print and on the internet, statements are generally considered
‘published’ when they are first made available to the public.” Yeager v. Bowlin, 693
F.3d 1076, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Roberts, 660 F.3d at 1167).
A two-year statute of limitations applies to both common law right to privacy

and statutory right to publicity claims. See id. at 1081 (citing Christoff v. Nestle USA,
______________________________________________________________________________


Inc., 47 Cal.4th 468, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 (2009)). “Under the single-publication rule,
the statute of limitations is reset when a statement is republished. (citation). A
statement in a printed publication is republished when it is reprinted in something that
is not part of the same ‘single integrated publication.’” Id. at 1082 (citing Roberts, 660
F.3d at 1167, Christoff, 47 Cal.4th at 476).
Acknowledging the difficulty of determining what constitutes a “republication”

on the Internet, the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded in Yeager that “under California
law, a statement on a website is not republished unless the statement itself is
substantively altered or added to, or the website is directed to a new audience.” Id.; see
also Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2007). Though the
California Supreme Court does not appear to have directly addressed Yeager, the
California Court of Appeals has, in an unreported opinion, noted agreement with this
proposition. See Allen v. Bander, 2015 WL 7180732, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 16,
2015).
Plaintiffs argue that they have identified multiple instances where Warm’s name
was used after the end of the parties’ contractual relationship (including a sell-off
period) in March 2018, including on various parts of Innermost’s website. (See Warm
Decl. Ex. C at 2–3). Plaintiffs also identify several instances where Warm’s name is
used on websites by alleged customers of Defendants or other third parties. (See, e.g.,
id., Erikson Decl. Ex. D).
In Reply, Defendants provide the Declaration of Russell Cameron, co-founder of

Innermost. (See Cameron Decl. (Docket No. 83-10)). Cameron provides evidence that
all of the uses of Warm’s name identified on Innermost’s website were published 2018
at the latest, with several published earlier while the parties’ contractual relationship
was still in effect, and that Innermost has no relation to the third parties identified as
using Warm’s name. (See id. ¶¶ 6–9).
Therefore, the question becomes when Plaintiffs’ claims accrued, given the end
of their contractual relationship with Defendants and the rescission of consent that
followed. Yeager upheld a district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of
______________________________________________________________________________


the statute of limitations. There, the district court found that the plaintiff’s claims for
relief accrued in October 2003, the last date when the defendants “added any
information about” or “changed any of the challenged statements about Yeager on their
website.” 693 F.3d at 1081. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the statements were not
republished after October 2003, as the statements were not “substantively altered or
added to.” Id. at 1082.
The district court in Youngevity Int’l, Corp. v. Smith agreed. See 224 F. Supp.
3d 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2016). In Youngevity, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs’
claims timely as they were brought “within one month” of the accrual of their claims –
while the defendants asserted that the claims accrued as soon as plaintiffs’ likeness was
used with consent, the district court found the claims accrued after consent was
withdrawn. Id. at 1027. The district court affirmed this conclusion on summary
judgment, finding that the claim “did not accrue until March 21, 2016 when Plaintiffs
revoked their consent to Defendants’ use of Dr. Wallach’s likeness.” Youngevity, 350
F. Supp. 3d 919, 922 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City
of La Habra, 25 Cal.4th 809, 815, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 369 (2001)).
Additionally, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal agreed

with the Ninth Circuit, ruling that where a claim was based on an internet posting made
by the plaintiff’s employer in May 2002, the cause of action accrued in 2004 when the
plaintiff was terminated. See Kinney v. Barnes, 2014 WL 2811832, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 23, 2013) (citing NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Ct., 225
Cal.App.4th 1222, 1231, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (2014)).
Following this precedent, Plaintiffs’ claims accrued either 1) two years after the
date of the end of the parties’ contractual relationship, for uses published prior to that
date; or 2) two years after the date of publication of any use after the contractual
relationship ended. See Yeager, 693 F.3d at 1081 (two-year statute of limitations).
Almost none of the uses identified by Plaintiffs of Warm’s name on the

Innermost website include dates (Warm Decl. Ex. C at 2–3) and the date on the IM
Design Concepts website is 2017 (Erikson Decl. Ex. D at 27). In contrast, Defendants
______________________________________________________________________________


have set forth evidence that each of the uses on Innermost’s website was published no
later than 2018, and that it has no control over any of the third party uses identified by
Plaintiffs. (See Cameron Decl. ¶¶ 6–9).
Under the Single Publication Rule and Yeager, no one of Plaintiffs’ identified
statements is actionable. The last possible time the statute of limitations ran on any of
the identified claims was December 18, 2020, assuming solely for the sake of argument
that the edits made on December 18, 2018 were substantial enough to qualify as a
republication. (See Cameron Decl. ¶ 6, #3 (identifying December 18, 2018 as last
modified date)).
Plaintiffs provide no evidence to controvert Defendants’ offered evidence that

each of the identified statements by Innermost falls outside of the statute of limitations
or that any of the third-party statements are attributable to Defendants. In Opposition,
Plaintiffs request additional discovery on the publicity and false endorsement claims.
(See Opposition at 19).
There is also no explanation why Plaintiffs’ current discovery is inadequate, and

Plaintiffs do not argue in their papers that Defendants have failed to provide documents
or that Plaintiffs’ opportunity to conduct discovery has been limited. At the hearing,
Plaintiffs argued that Defendants have not produced documents in response to several
of Plaintiffs’ document requests, noting that the parties have met and conferred at
length, though no motion to compel has yet been brought. The Court is disinclined to
grant permission for what is likely to be, based on the description in the Opposition, a
fishing expedition when Plaintiffs have made no showing of their diligence in
discovery or that their lack of evidence is through no fault of their own.
Additionally, as the Court noted at the hearing, Plaintiffs seem to attempt to seek
additional discovery under Rule 56(d), but have set forth no detail concerning what
specific facts the requested discovery would uncover and how those facts would
controvert Defendants’ proffered evidence, which is sufficient to deny the request.
See, e.g., Dragan v. Valladolid, 2022 WL 77911, at *1 (9th Cir. 2022) (district court
did not abuse discretion when denying request for additional discovery where the
______________________________________________________________________________


plaintiff did not comply with requirements of Rule 56(d) and Ninth Circuit case law),
Pac. Rim Land Dev., LLC v. Imperial Pac. Int’l (CNMI), LLC, 2021 WL 4872460, at
*1 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court denial of discovery where party “identified
the documents sought but not the facts within those documents that would assist [the
party] in opposing summary judgment”).
Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to any of the identified

statements, the Motion must be GRANTED as to claims seven, twelve, and thirteen.
C. Fees
Defendants seek an award of fees for prevailing on the Motion. (See Motion at
19–20). The Court considers solely fees on the right of publicity claims.
Under California Civil Code section 3344(a), “[t]he prevailing party in any
action under this section shall also be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.” See, e.g.,
Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 951 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming award of fees under Cal.
Civ. Code section 3344 where right of publicity claim was dismissed), Cain v. J.P.
Prods., 11 F. App’x 714, 715 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting award of fees under section 3344
is required as emphasized by “shall”).
Plaintiffs did not offer argument on the issue of fees. An award of fees is
mandatory under the statute as Defendants are the prevailing party through the grant of
summary judgment on the publicity claims. Defendants are accordingly entitled to
attorney’s fees solely as they relate to Plaintiffs’ seventh, twelfth, and thirteenth
claims.
CONCLUSION
The Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is

DENIED as to the copyright claims, as Defendants have not shown that the
lampshades are not separable from their utilitarian functions and thus unable to be
copyrighted.
______________________________________________________________________________


The Motion is GRANTED as to the right of publicity claims (Claims 7, 12 and
13). Judgment will be entered on these claims at the conclusion of the action.
Defendants may move for attorneys’ fees at that time using the procedure in Local
Rule 54-7.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________________________________________________________

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Case 2:21-cv-04402-MWF-SHK Document 98 Filed 04/26/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:2093

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Deputy Clerk: Court Reporter:

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant:

Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

Before the Court is Defendants Innermost Limited and IM Design Concepts

 The Motion is DENIED as to the copyright claims, as Defendants have

 The Motion is GRANTED as to the right of publicity claims. Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

“A motion for summary judgment may not be defeated, however, by evidence

Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ first, second,

Defendants’ primary argument is that the at-issue lampshades cannot be

“To prevail on [a] copyright infringement claim, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

“A valid copyright extends only to copyrightable subject matter.” Star

“The first requirement—separate identification— is not onerous. The

“The independent-existence requirement is ordinarily more difficult to satisfy.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Defendants argue that any sculptural components of Plaintiffs’ identified

It cannot be definitively said that neither of the lampshades has sculptural

Defendants largely appear to be contending either that lampshades in and of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Plaintiffs bring claims asserting false endorsement (Complaint ¶¶ 140–50, First

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have continued to produce

A two-year statute of limitations applies to both common law right to privacy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Acknowledging the difficulty of determining what constitutes a “republication”

In Reply, Defendants provide the Declaration of Russell Cameron, co-founder of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Additionally, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal agreed

Almost none of the uses identified by Plaintiffs of Warm’s name on the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Plaintiffs provide no evidence to controvert Defendants’ offered evidence that

There is also no explanation why Plaintiffs’ current discovery is inadequate, and

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to any of the identified

The Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. CV 21-4402-MWF (SHKx) Date: April 26, 2022

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