J. Leonen Cases in Remedial Law

REMEDIAL LAW CASES PENNED BY:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MARVIC F. LEONEN
SUBMITTED BY:
SECTION 4D
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
REMEDIAL LAW 1
YEAR 2013
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.

OBEN, Petitioners, vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. Respondent.
G.R. No. 204700, Third Division, April 10, 2013
Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court, states: Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor, the court in which an action is pending may a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eagleridge (EDC) and sureties Naval and Oben are the defendants in a collection suit
initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB). By viture of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC‘s
outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron, a special purpose vehicle. Thereafter, Cameron filed
its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB, which was granted by the trial court. On February 22, 2018, petitioners
filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) referred to in
the Deed of Assignment. Cameron filed it comment alleging that petitioners have not shown ―good
cause for the production of LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. In response,
petitioners filed their Reply, pointing out that the claim of Cameron is based on an obligation purchased
after litigation had already been instituted in relation to it.
Citing Article 1634 of the New Civil Code which provides that ―when a credit or other
incorporeal right in litigation is sold, the debtor shall have a right to extinguish it by reimbursing the
assignee for the price the latter paid therefor, the judicial costs incurred by him, and the interest on the
price from the day on which the same was paid,‖ petitioners' alleged loan obligations may be reimbursed
up to the extent of the amount paid by Cameron in the acquisition thereof, it becomes necessary to verify
the amount of the consideration from the LSPA, considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on
this matter.
The trial court, however, denied petitioners‘ motion for being devoid of merit. It ruled that there
was failure to show “good cause” for the production of the LSPA and failure to show that LSPA is
material to the issue. Aggrieved, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that Article 1634 is
sanctioned by the Special Purpose Vehicle Law. However, the trial court still denied its motion.
Petitioners then filed their Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, to set aside RTC‘s
resolutions. However, it was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production and/or inspection of the
LSPA.
RULING:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court, states: Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; xxx The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of
the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also
the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the
trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar
access to relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to
due process. The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the
sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability.
According to the trial court, there is no need for the production of the LSPA in order to apprise
the petitioners of the amount of consideration paid by respondent in favor of EIB and that it is enough that
the Deed of Assignment has been produced by Cameron showing that it has acquired the account of the
petitioners pursuant to the SPV Law. As respondent Cameron‘s claim against the petitioners relies
entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent Cameron to allow
petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those documents which, by express
terms, were referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject
matter – the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioners‘ defense.
Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or
record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other,
and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by
respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by
explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by
petitioners. In this light, the relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily apparent. Fair play
demands that petitioners must be given the chance to examine the LSPA. Besides, we find no great
practical difficulty, and respondent did not allege any, in presenting the document for inspection and
copying of the petitioners. Incidentally, the legal incidents of the case a quo necessitates the production of
said LSPA.
Undoubtedly, the trial court had effectively placed petitioners at a great disadvantage inasmuch as
respondent effectively suppressed relevant documents related to the transaction involved in the case a
quo. Furthermore, the remedies of discovery encouraged and provided for under the Rules of Court to be
able to compel the production of relevant documents had been put to naught by the arbitrary act of the
trial court. It must be remembered that "litigation is essentially an abiding quest for truth undertaken not
by the judge alone, but jointly with the parties. Litigants, therefore, must welcome every opportunity to
achieve this goal; they must act in good faith to reveal documents, papers and other pieces of evidence
material to the controversy."
QUESTION AND ANSWER:
Q: What is the test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the
sufficiency of their description?
A: It must be one of reasonableness and practicability. Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing
or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner, vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
RUPERTO V. TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS, and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 171428 November 11, 2013
Even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat a
Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the
Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. When
this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule
65.
FACTS:
Ruperto Tankeh is the president of Sterling shipping lines. It was incorporated to operate ocean-
going vessels engaged primarily in foreign trade. Ruperto applied for a $3.5 million loan from DBP for
the partial financing of the M/V Golden Lilac. DBP required the following:
1. A 1st mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which was renamed to M/V Sterling
ace;
2. Ruperto, Alejandro Tankeh, Jose Marie Vargas, Vicente Arenas, and Sterling Shipping
lines should be jointly and severally liable for the loan;
3. The future earnings of the vessel be assigned to DBP;
4. DBP should be assigned 67% of the total voting shares of Sterling shipping lines.
According to Alejandro, Ruperto’s younger brother, Ruperto approached him sometime in 1980
to inform him that the latter was operating a shipping line. Ruperto allegedly gave him 1000 shares to be
a director. Alejandro signed the assignment of shares. Then sometime later, he signed a promissory note.
He was the last to sign the note. DBP approved the loan and the vessel was soon acquired. Sterling
shipping lines then executed the agreed assignment.
Alejandro wrote to Ruperto severing his ties with sterling shipping lines. He required that
theBoard of directors issue a resolution releasing him from liability. He also asked that DBP be notified
of the same. The accounts of Sterling shipping lines in the DBP was transferred to the Asset Privatization
trust later on. The vessel was sold in Singapore for $350,000. Alejandro informed DBP that the final price
was inadequate and the transaction, irregular. At this time, Alejandro was still bound as a debtor. He filed
several complaints against Respondents praying that the promissory note be nullified and to be absolved
of liability.
Alejandro alleges Ruperto, Arenas, and Vargas had exercised deceit and fraud in causing him to
bind himself to pay DBP. He alleged that he never invested any amount to the company and that he only
ever attended one meeting. He further claims that he had been deliberately excluded from participating in
the corporate affairs.
The trial court held that the note is null as far as Alejandro is concerned. The CA reversed the
RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Alejandro’s petition is one of Certiorari under Rule 65 and not a Petition for review
under Rule 45?
HELD:
No, the petition is a petition for review under Rule 45.
Before disposing of the main issue in this case, this Court needs to address a procedural issue
raised by respondents. Collectively, respondents argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Thus,
petitioner’s failure to show that there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
merited the dismissal of the Complaint.
Contrary to respondent’s imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a

Rule 45 Petition for Review. In Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, this Court made the distinction between a
Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari:
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction
is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of
law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy.
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the Court
of Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the appellate court failed to uphold the
findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the Court of Appeals’
exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process where a
case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45.
Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of Appeals
"committed grave abuse of discretion" did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of
certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a
Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to comply
with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.
Q: When may the court treat a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 as a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45?
A: Even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat
a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the
Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. When
this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule
65.
YEAR 2014
REPUBLIC rep. by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs.
ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. No. 171496. MARCH 3, 2014
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to
the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In
which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed
outright.
FACTS:
Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known as
Lot 5-B-2 with an area of 70,278 square meters in Pasig City.
Upon the request of the DPWH, respondent caused the segregation of its property into five lots
and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445
square meter portion of its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue. The C-5 Ortigas Avenue
flyover was completed in 1999 utilizing only 396 square meters of the 1,445sqm allotment for the project.
Consequently, respondent further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into two lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the
portion actually used for road widening, and Lot 5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized portion of Lot 5-B-
2-A.
Respondent filed with the RTC Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-A-
1. Respondent alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road widening
purposes. Finding merit in respondent’s petition, the RTC issued an order authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-
2-A-1 to petitioner Republic. Petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
an opposition, alleging that respondent’s property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the
government, citing Section 50 of PD No. 1529.
On June 29, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order, reiterating its
argument in its opposition. In an order dated October 3, 2001, RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the RTC’s order dated
October 3, 2001. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the ground that an order or
judgment denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner pointed
out that its reference in the notice of appeal to the October 3, 2001 order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was merely due to inadvertence. In any case, Rule 37, Section
9 of the Rules of Procedure contemplates as non-appealable only those orders which are not yet final. The
October 3, 2001 order was already final as it confirmed the June 11, 2001 judgment of the court.
In its resolution dated February 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals noted that even if the order
denying the motion for reconsideration was appealable, the appeal was still dismissible for lack of
jurisdiction because petitioner raised only a question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic’s appeal based on
technicalities.
RULING:
NO. The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is
whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of
the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the facts
presented. The issue raised before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The
proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45.
Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of
Court, which provides that "no appeal may be taken from an order denying a x x x motion for
reconsideration," is based on the implied premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not
completely dispose of the case. The pertinent portion of Rule 41, Section 1 provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory
order. Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for
reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if "it puts an end to a particular
matter," leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision.
An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a

complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. It is an appeal from a final decision or
order. The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration of
the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was not an
interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not
cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of
Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of appeal.
Q: What is the proper remedy from from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely
questions of law?
A: Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court
to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In
which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed
outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases,
be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An
appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of
fact and questions of law.
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION and the PHILIPPINE
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 193494. March 12, 2014
There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of default. Even when a
motion is filed within the required period, excusable negligence must be properly alleged and proven.
FACTS:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corp. entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a
parcel of land. On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of
Communications asking that payment of rent must be paid directly to them. Zuellig Pharma promptly
informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim. Lui Enterprises wrote to
Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent. Due to conflicting claims of
Lui Enterprises and the Phil. Bank of Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati.
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did not
have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation. Zuellig Pharma filed its
opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied for having been
filed late.
The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period. Thus, Lui Enterprises was declared in default.
RTC of Makati ruled that Lui enterprises was barred from any claim in respect of the rental
payments since it was declared in default. Thus, according to the trial court, there was no issue as o which
corporation had the better right over the rental payments.
On appeal, Court of Appeals found Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief insufficient. As to the denial
of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
In this petition for review on certiorari, Lui Enterprises argued that the Court of Appeals applied
“the rules of procedure strictly” and dismissed its appeal on technicalities. According to Lui Enterprises,
the Court of Appeals should have taken a liberal stance and allowed its appeal despite the lack of subject
index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of
issues in its appellant’s brief
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lui Enterprises complied with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief.
2. Whether or not the RTC of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of
default.
RULING:
1. NO.
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals
may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific
requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f):
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the
record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44.
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the record, and a
table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes cited:
Section 13. Contents of the appellant’s brief. – The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order
herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and
a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the
pages where they are cited;
(c) Under the heading “Statement of the Case,” a clear and concise statement of the nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature
of the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of
the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of
the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page
references to the record;
(f) Under the heading “Argument,” the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with
page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the
report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;
Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and table
of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
a. NO.
When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to
answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The defendant may also move
to dismiss the complaint “within the time for but before filing the answer.”
Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to answer with good defenses against the plaintiff’s
allegations in the complaint. Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of
summons either presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was prevented
from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence.
Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. –
(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof
and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take steps
to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set aside order of
default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only “conveniently blamed its x x x
counsel for the late filing of the answer” without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not
excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.
Q: Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take steps to
remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set aside order of
default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only “conveniently blamed its x x x
counsel for the late filing of the answer” without offering any excuse for the late filing. Is the excuse
proper and should be granted?
A: No. When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to
answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The defendant may also move
to dismiss the complaint “within the time for but before filing the answer.” Fifteen days is sufficient time
for a defendant to answer with good defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. Thus, a
defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either presents no defenses
against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was prevented from filing his or her answer within
the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
VILLAGRACIA vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI' A DISTRICT COURT
G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014
“Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with “existing civil courts” over real
actions not arising from customary contracts wherein the parties involved are Muslims.”
FACTS:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meterparcel of land located in

Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996, a TCT No. T-15633
covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B.
Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo
Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. It was
only on October 30, 2006, when Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed, found out that Vivencio
occupied the said parcel of land. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an
action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. In its
decision dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered
owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it
over to Roldan, and pay damages as well as attorney’s fees. A notice of writ of execution was sent to
Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. Meanwhile,
Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.
He cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and
argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are
Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, hence the respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
However, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for
lack of merit. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order to
enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution issued against Vivencio. Roldan argued that since
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession, he
argued that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file
his answer, he “effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a
District Court]” and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not
a Muslim.
2. Whether or not proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio.
RULING:
1.The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with “existing civil courts” over real actions not arising from customary contracts
wherein the parties involved are Muslims.
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. If
the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its possession
from the dispossessor. When the property involved is real, such as land, the action to recover it is a real
action; otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims
for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them. In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s
petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim.
When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not
dispute this claim. When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the
pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in
the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All
its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
2. In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore
to him the possession of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property. Thus,
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an action in personam. This action being in personam,
service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire
jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person. However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the
proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are
void.
Q: What are Shariah District Courts?
A: Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with “xisting civil courts over real actions
not arising from customary contracts wherein the parties involved are Muslims.
JULIET VITUG MADARANG AND ROMEO BARTOLOME, REPRESENTED BY HIS
ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT AND ACTING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES, RODOLFO AND
RUBY BARTOLOME VS. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES AND CAROLINA N. MORALES
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
“Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period was “a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their former counsel’s] age.”
This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens… There is also no showing that the negligence
could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by
their counsel’s negligence.”
“However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the
date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The
period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period.”
FACTS:
Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot located in BagoBantay, Quezon City. Spouses
Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome loaned P500,000.00 from them. The Spouses Bartolome agreed to pay
within two months with interest of five percent (5%) per month. To secure their loan, the Spouses
Bartolome mortgaged the BagoBantay property to the Spouses Morales.
The period to pay lapsed without the Spouses Bartolome having paid their loan. After demand,
the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the loaned amount. Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses
Morales, thus, filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the BagoBantay property against Juliet Vitug
Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.
The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented herself as Lita Bartolome
and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses Bartolome. Romeo and Rodolfo
Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of the Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne
Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome’s wife.
In their answer, defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage,
specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. They added that the complaint was
already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for failure to comply with an order of the trial court. In its decision the trial court ordered defendants to
pay the Spouses Morales P500,000.00 plus 7% interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but not
more than 120 days from entry of judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the BagoBantay property
shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. They amended
their motion for reconsideration and filed a request for a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to
examine the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s alleged signatures on the deed of real estate
mortgage. According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma
as defendants failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the
evidence or contrary to law. As to the request for a handwriting expert, the trial court ruled that the
“reasons given therein [were] not well taken.”
Thus, in its order, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment, and the
request for a handwriting expert. Defendants filed a notice of appeal. In its order the trial court denied
due course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. According to the trial court, defendants,
through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon, received a copy of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration on June 24, 2010. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the court.
Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial court’s
decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-
day period to appeal.
Defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed
to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon’s failure to
appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former
lawyer’s old age. The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court held that the
petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome filed the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied outright the petition for certiorari finding that
petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
that the Court of Appeals denied.
Petitioners filed the petition for review on certiorari with this court. They argue that they need
not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment because
the questions they raised in the petition for relief were pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence.
HELD:
NO. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in exceptional
cases. It is not available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal.
To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence must be so gross “that
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.” This is to prevent parties from
“reviv[ing] the right to appeal [already] lost through inexcusable negligence.”
Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period was “a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their former counsel’s] age.”
This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that a person with
advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary
diligence and prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel’s negligence. The petition lacks
merit. A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order.
Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel
received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on June
24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly
denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
Q: What is a petition for relief from judgmemt?
A: It is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not available if other remedies
exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal. To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the
negligence must be so gross “that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.” This
is to prevent parties from reviving the right to appeal already lost through inexcusable negligence.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.
ROBLES, Petitioner, vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
It is settled that "the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
FACTS:
On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles,
issued Office Order No. 119, series of 2006. The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña‘s designation as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her instead to handle
special projects and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her" by the
Administrator. On July 26, 2006, LRTA issued a formal charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification
of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding
Salvaña guilty of all the charges against her and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service
with all the accessory penalties.‖ The LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding
Committee. Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she] claimed that she
was denied due process and that there was no substantial evidence to support the charges against her."
On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No.
071364.The Civil Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was
meted a penalty of suspension for three months. LRTA moved for reconsideration of the resolution. This
was denied in a resolution dated May 26, 2008. LRTA then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On November 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil
Service Commission‘s finding that Salvaña was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also
ruled that Administrator Robles had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil
Service Commission because that right only belonged to respondent in an administrative case. Petitioner
argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission before the
Court of Appeals. It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia as basis for its argument that it can be
considered a "person adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the appeal of
administrative cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the
modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
RULING:
YES. An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or
modification of its original decision. It is settled that "the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law. If it is not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a
statute provides for it. When made available by law or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived
of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional requirement of due
process of law.
This court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be availed
of by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in decisions
prescribing a penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected are the
respondents that are charged with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial right that
may only be granted by statute, a government party cannot by implication assert that right as incidental to
its power, since the right to appeal does not form part of due process. In effect, this court equated
exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases wherein the State or the complainant
would have no right to appeal.
Procedural laws have retroactive application. As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect.
But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature.
Q: Is the right to appeal a statutory right?
A: No. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. If it is not
granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, represented by the CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. LIM vs. ESTER F.
MARAMBA, represented by her ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOHNNY FERRER
G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not
intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises
that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in
the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party
should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
Respondent Ester Maramba was a grantee of a DENR miscellaneous lease contract for a 284-
square- meter property in Poblacion, Dagupan City, for a period of 25 years. She caused the construction
of a commercial fish center on the property.
On December 20, 2003, petitioner city caused the demolition of the commercial fish center,
allegedly without giving direct notice to Maramba and with threat of taking over the property. This
prompted Maramba, through her attorney-in-fact, Johnny Ferrer, to file a complaint for injunction and
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
The complaint alleged that the demolition was unlawful and that the "complete demolition and
destruction of the previously existing commercial fish center of plaintiff is valued at Five Million
(₱10,000,000.00) pesos." The word, "ten," was handwritten on top of the word, "five." In the complaint’s
prayer, Maramba asked for a judgment "ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of Ten
Thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos for the actual and present value of the commercial fish center completely
demolished by public defendant." The word, "million," was handwritten on top of the word, "thousand,"
and an additional zero was handwritten at the end of the numerical figure. The handwritten intercalation
was not explained in any part of the records and in the proceedings.
The trial court decision (penned by Judge Laron), ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded 10
million as actual damages. In a separate order on the same date, the trial court also granted Maramba’s
motion for execution and ordered that "a writ of execution [be] issue[d] in the above entitled case upon
submission of the certificate of finality."
Petitioner city then filed a petition for relief with prayer for preliminary injunction dated October
29, 2004, together with an affidavit of merit.
Petitioner Dagupan:
The city alleged that "the decision, were it not for the City Legal Officer’s mistake, negligence
and gross incompetence, would not have been obtained by the plaintiff, or should have been reconsidered
or otherwise overturned, the damage award in the total amount of ₱11M being not only unconscionable
and unreasonable, but completely baseless." The trial court denied petitioner city’s petition for relief and
ordered that the writ of execution be implemented. The court stressed that "[t]he negligence of counsel
binds the client."
Petitioner city filed for reconsideration. The trial court (penned by Judge Castillo )granted the
petition for relief and consequently modified its July 30, 2004 decision. It reduced the award of actual
damages from 10 million to ₱75,000.00.
Respondent Maramba:
The Court of Appeals granted Maramba’s petition for certiorari. It held that petitioner city’s
motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing and was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the
period to appeal. The Court of Appeals also denied reconsideration, prompting petitioner city to elevate
the case before this court.
Issues:
1. Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is excusable negligence
that allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment.
2. Whether the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment, when reckoned from receipt of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration, is considered filed on time.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to
comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and
does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises
that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in
the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party
should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Maramba was able to file an opposition to petitioner city’s motion for reconsideration on the
ground thatthe motion was not set for hearing. The opposition prayed that the motion be stricken off the
records. In its one-page opposition, Maramba did not address the substantive issues raised by petitioner
city in its motion for reconsideration such as the excessive award of actual damages. Nevertheless, this
opposition was an opportunity to be heard for Maramba on the matters raised by petitioner city in its
motion for reconsideration.
This court has relaxed procedural rules when a rigid application of these rules only hinders
substantial justice. Procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in
order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel
bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
In this case, petitioner city received a copy of the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision on August
11, 2004. Its motion for reconsideration filed on August 26, 2004 was filed within the 15-day period. The
purposes behind the required notice of hearing — provide the time to study the motion for reconsideration
and give an opportunity to be heard — were satisfied when Maramba filed an opposition to the motion.
2. Yes.
The time for filing a petition for relief is found under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
which reads: SEC. 3 Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either
of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The double period required under this provision is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied
with. Otherwise, a petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period will be
dismissed outright. The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from actual
receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration when one is filed.
Petitioner city received a copy of the July 30, 2004 decision on August 11, 2004. It filed a motion
for reconsideration on August 26, 2004. On October 25, 2004, it received a copy of the October 21, 2004
trial court order denying its motion for reconsideration. Four days later or on October 29, 2004, it filed its
petition for relief from judgment. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment was considered filed on
time.
Q: Is lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration an excusable negligence whereby the filing
of a petition for relief of judgment may be allowed?
A: Yes. This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to
comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and
does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
The SC relaxed procedural rules when a rigid application of these rules only hinders substantial
justice. Procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel
bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
Q: What is the time for filing a petition for relief? Is it jurisdictional?
A: The time for filing a petition for relief is found under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which
reads: SEC. 3 Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The double period required under this provision is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with.
Otherwise, a petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period will be dismissed
outright. The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from actual receipt of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration when one is filed.
ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN,
BENJAMIN D. GOTHONG, AND CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC. (CAGLI),
RESPONDENTS
G.R. NO. 197530, July 9, 2014
Forum Shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.
Litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious." It requires the
concurrence of three (3) requisites: "(1)the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other."
FACTS:
On January 8, 1996, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation ("ASC"), principally owned by the Aboitiz
family, CAGLI, principally owned by the Gothong family, and William Lines, Inc.("WLI"), principally
owned by the Chiongbian family, entered into an agreement (the "Agreement"), whereby ASC and
CAGLI would transfer their shipping assets to WLI in exchange for WLI’s shares of stock. WLI, in turn,
would run their merged shipping businesses and, henceforth, be known as WG&A, Inc. ("WG&A").
ASC, CAGLI, and WLI agreed to pool their resources and merge businesses under WG&A. Their
agreement stipulated arbitration as a means of settling disputes. CAGLI gave more than what was
stipulated, but the excess was returned. Later on, CAGLI claimed that the excess was not yet returned. As
there was still a balance, CAGLI sent WG&A demand letters "for the return of or the payment for the
excess inventories." AEV alleged that to satisfy CAGLI’s demand, WLI/WG&A returned inventories
amounting to 120.04 million. As proof of this, AEV attached copies of delivery receipts signed by
CAGLI’s representatives
AEV acquired the shares of ASC and WLI and renamed the business to Aboitiz Transport System
Corporation. CAGLI filed an application for arbitration with RTC-Cebu against Chiongbian, ATSC,
ASC, and AEV for the return of the excess inventories. AEV filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that there
was no cause of action against it as there was no agreement to arbitrate between CAGLI and AEV.
RTC discharged AEV and ordered the other parties to proceed with arbitration. CAGLI filed
another application for arbitration in view of the return of the same excess inventories. AEV filed an
MTD on the grounds of forum shopping, failure to state cause of action, res judicata, and litis pendentia.
RTC denied MTD and subsequent MR hence this petition to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) is the proper remedy.
2. Whether the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-37004 constitutes forum shopping and/or is barred
by res judicata and/or litis pendentia.
3. Whether petitioner, Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc., is bound by an agreement to arbitrate with
Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc., with respect to the latter’s claims for unreturned inventories
delivered to William Lines, Inc./WG&A, Inc./Aboitiz Transport System Corporation.
HELD:
1. AEV was erroneous in seeking relief under Rule 45, but since the actions or RTC-Cebu are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will treat the petition as petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final
judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the
denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The proper recourse is for the movant to file an answer, but if the order denying the MTD is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, this may be assailed under Rule 65.
2. The complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-37004 constitutes forum shopping and is barred by res judicata.
Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts,
either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. It is an act
of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice
and adds to the already congested court dockets. What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts
and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of
the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action. (Top Rate Construction & Gen. Services, Inc. v.
Paxton Dev’t. Corp.)
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor
to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
(Yap v. Chua)
Litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious." It
requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: "(1)the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (2) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other."
In turn, prior judgment or res judicata bars a subsequent case when the following requisites
concur: "(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and
the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action."
Applying the cited concepts and requisites, we find that the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-
37004 is barred by res judicata and constitutes forum shopping. In this case: (1) CAGLI engaged in forum
shopping, (2) the second complaint was barred by res judicata; but (3) the second complaint was not
barred by litis pendentia.
Between the first and second complaints, there is identity of parties. CAGLI solely brought the
first complaint against Chiongbian, ATSC, and AEV; Gothong was joined as co-plaintiff in the second
complaint and ATSC was deleted as defendant. Even though the parties are not absolutely identical,
substantial identity of parties is enough to constitute forum shopping. What is ultimately at stake is the
extent to which CAGLI may compel AEV and Chiongbian to arbitrate for the former’s recovery of
inventories. Gothong is not a necessary party to the case as he signed the Annex SL-V only in a
representative capacity for CAGLI so his inclusion in the second complaint was a superfluity.
There is an identity in subject matter and cause of action. Both applications are (1) for the same
relief of arbitration so CAGLI may recover the value of the supposed unreturned inventories; (2)
grounded on the right to be paid for or to receive the value of excess inventories; (3) founded on the same
instrument, Annex SL-V.
Both also rely on the same factual averments: (1) WLI and CAGLI entered into an agreement
(Annex SL-V); (2) That certain CAGLI inventories will be transferred to WLI; (3) That the inventories
transferred were in excess of that agreed upon; (4) That WLI failed to return the excess; (5) That demands
have been made through letters and other communications but these did not elicit any response
The order of RTC-Cebu which dismissed the complaint against AEV attained finality when
CAGLI did not file an MR or appeal contesting the dismissal. The parties did not dispute that the
aforementioned order was issued by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Jurisdiction was acquired over CAGLI as plaintiff when it filed the complaint, and jurisdiction over the
defendants were acquired through service of summons.
The dismissal of the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment on the merits. A
judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits “when it determines the rights and liabilities
of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when
the judgment is rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. (Cabreza Jr. v. Cabreza)
Prior to issuing dismissal with respect to AEV, RTC allowed the parties to fully establish the
facts to ventilate their arguments relevant to the complaint admitting CAGLI’s opposition to the MTD,
AEV’s reply and opposition, CAGLI’s rejoinder, and AEV’s surrejoinder.
After going through the contentions and the arguments of the parties, RTC-Cebu made a
definitive determination that CAGLI had not right to compel AEV to subject itself to arbitration vis-à-vis
CAGLI’s claims under Annex SL-V.
There was no contract or existing document that bound the two to arbitrate CAGLI’s claim. AEV
was not a party involved in Annex SL-V. If such other document existed, it should have been attached to
the complaint, but it was not. There is no legal or factual basis for the application of arbitration with
respect to AEV.
The requisites for res judicata have been satisfied and the second complaint should have been
dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI committed forum shopping in filing the second complaint
asking for the same reliefs after obtaining an unfavorable judgment at least with respect to AEV.
However, at the time of the filing of the second complaint, AEV had already been discharged from the
proceedings relating to first complaint.
The first complaint was no longer pending at the time of the filing of the second complaint with
respect to AEV and CAGLI; thus, the second complaint could not have been barred by litis pendentia.
3. None of the parties alleged that the controversy is subject of compulsory arbitration as provided by
statute so it must necessarily be founded on contract. Four contracts have been cited: The Agreement,
Annex SL-V, the SPA, and the Escrow Agreement. The obligation for WLI to acquire CAGLI inventories
is contained in Annex SL-V so this must be the one considered. The Agreement’s arbitration clause does
not contemplate arbitration regarding disputes arising from Annex SL-V. Annex SL-V is only between
WLI and CAGLI, so it necessarily follows that WLI/WG&A/ATSC and CAGLI are the only ones bound
by it.
SPA, which AEV entered into, has a clause on arbitration but it stipulates that disputes only
arising from the SPA requires arbitration as a mode of settling disputes under that agreement. It made
AEV a stockholder of WLI/AG&A/ATSC but did not render AEV personally liable for the obligations of
the corporation. AEV is a stockholder of ATSC, but it is basic that a corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from its individual stockholders. Its status as a stockholder in itself is insufficient to
make it liable for ATSC’s obligations.
Q: What are the requisites of litis pendentia?
A: The elements are:
1. The identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
2. The identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and
3. The identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other."
Q: When is forum shopping committed?
A: Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. It is an act
of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice
and adds to the already congested court dockets.
OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION AND DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, PETITIONERS, VS.
BENJAMIN CASTILLO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 196251, July 09, 2014
Trial may be dispensed with and a summary judgment rendered if the case can be resolved judiciously by
plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers filed by the parties.
Facts:
Benjamin Castillo was the registered owner of a 346,918-square-meter parcel of land located in
Laurel, Batangas, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19972. The Philippine Tourism
Authority allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land... based on Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18493.
On April 5, 2000, Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo R.
Olivarez, entered into a contract of conditional sale over the property. Under the deed of conditional sale,
Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty Corporation for P19,080,490.00. Olivarez Realty
Corporation agreed to a down payment of P5,000,000.00.
As to the balance of P14,080,490.00, Olivarez Realty Corporation agreed to pay in 30 equal

monthly installments every eighth day of the month beginning in the month that the parties would receive
a decision voiding the Philippine Tourism Authority's title to the property.
Should the action against the Philippine Tourism Authority be denied, Castillo agreed to
reimburse all the amounts paid by Olivarez Realty Corporation.
As to the "legitimate tenants" occupying the property, Olivarez Realty Corporation undertook to
pay them "disturbance compensation," while Castillo undertook to clear the land of the tenants within six
months from the signing of the deed of conditional sale. Should Castillo fail... to clear the land within six
months, Olivarez Realty Corporation may suspend its monthly down payment until the tenants vacate the
property.
The parties agreed that Olivarez Realty Corporation may immediately occupy the property upon
signing of the deed of conditional sale. Should the contract be cancelled, Olivarez Realty Corporation
agreed to return the property's possession to Castillo and forfeit all the... improvements it may have
introduced on the property.
On September 2, 2004, Castillo filed a complaint against Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr.
Olivarez with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan City, Batangas.
Issues:
Whether the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment.
Ruling:
NO. The petition lacks merit. The trial court correctly rendered summary judgment, as there were
no genuine issues of material fact in this case.
In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as
agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set up the
following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file a case to void the Philippine Tourism
Authority's title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants; third, Castillo
allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is currently being litigated before a
Quezon City court.
Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez's answer tendered an issue,
Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However, the issues tendered by
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez's answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These are
issues that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
papers on file; otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.
Olivarez Realty Corporation's obligation to pay disturbance compensation is a pure obligation.

The performance of the obligation to pay disturbance compensation did not depend on any condition.
Moreover, the deed of conditional sale did not give the corporation a period to... perform the obligation.
As such, the obligation to pay disturbance compensation was demandable at once. Olivarez Realty
Corporation should have paid the tenants disturbance compensation upon execution of the deed of
conditional sale.
With respect to Castillo's obligation to clear the land of the tenants within six months from the
signing of the contract, his obligation was an obligation with a resolutory period. The obligation to clear
the land of the tenants took effect at once, specifically, upon the parties' signing of the deed of conditional
sale. Castillo had until October 2, 2000, six months from April 5, 2000 when the parties signed the deed
of conditional sale, to clear the land of the tenants.
Olivarez Realty Corporation, therefore, had no right to withhold payments of the purchase price.
As the trial court ruled, Olivarez Realty Corporation "can only claim non-compliance October 2000."
As demonstrated, there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case. These are issues that
can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on
file. As the trial court found, Olivarez Realty Corporation illegally withheld payments of the purchase
price. The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment.
Q: Distinguish Summary Judgment from Judgment on the Pleadings.
A: A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case decided through judgment
on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise... admits the material allegations
of the claimant's pleading.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed fails to tender any issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations in the complaint. On the other hand, in a summary judgment, the answer
filed tenders issues as specific denials and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are
sham, fictitious, or otherwise not genuine.
RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES, INC. vs. JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME
CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS
G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff.
Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if
the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
Facts:
It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties, among which was Po
Wing Properties, Incorporated (Po Wing Properties). It is also alleged that while he was unmarried, he
had children from two women. Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ching with
his common-law wife, Lucina Santos. She, however, disputed this, and maintains that even if Ramon
Ching’s birth certificate indicates that he was Antonio Ching’s illegitimate child, she and Antonio Ching
merely adopted him and treated him like their own. Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand,
claim to be Antonio Ching’s illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne.
While Ramon Ching disputed this, both Mercedes and Lucina have not. Lucina Santos alleged
that when Antonio Ching fell ill sometime in 1996, he entrusted her with the distribution of his estate to
his heirs if something were to happen to him. She alleged that she handed all the property titles and
business documents to Ramon Ching for safekeeping. Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from illness
and allegedly demanded that Ramon Ching return all the titles to the properties and business documents.
On July 18, 1996, Antonio Ching was murdered. Ramon Ching allegedly induced Mercedes Igne
and her children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and waiver to Antonio Ching’s
estate in consideration of ₱22.5 million. Mercedes Igne’s children alleged that Ramon Ching never paid
them.
On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of estate,
naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon himself the entirety of Antonio Ching’s
estate.Ramon Ching denied these allegations and insisted that when Antonio Ching died, the Ching
family association, headed by Vicente Cheng, unduly influenced him to give Mercedes Igne and her
children financial aid considering that they served Antonio Ching for years. It was for this reason that an
agreement and waiver in consideration of 22.5 million was made. He also alleged that he was summoned
by the family association to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate declaring him to be Antonio
Ching’s sole heir. After a year of investigating Antonio Ching’s death, the police found Ramon Ching to
be its primary suspect. Information was filed against him, and a warrant of arrest was issued.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 6. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91046 (the first case). On March 22, 1999,
the complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead additional defendants, including Po Wing
Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary stockholder. The amended complaint was for
"Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction." Sometime after, Lucina Santos filed a motion for intervention and was allowed
to intervene. After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, which was granted. Upon motion of the
Chengs’ counsel, however, the Chengs and Lucina Santos were given fifteen (15) days to file the
appropriate pleading. They did not do so.
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of
Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of
Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103319 (the
second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. When Branch 20 was made
aware of the first case, it issued an order transferring the case to Branch 6, considering that the case
before it involved substantially the same parties and causes of action. On November 11, 2002, the Chengs
and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case, praying that it be
dismissed without prejudice.
On November 22, 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the basis that
the summons had not yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they had not yet
filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the second case was made without prejudice.
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice
under the "two dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the
previous dismissal of the first case.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra
judicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-105251(the third case) and was eventually raffled to Branch 6. On December 10, 2002,
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed their comment/opposition to the application for temporary
restraining order in the third case. They also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, litis
pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. A series of responsive
pleadings were filed by both parties.
On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus order resolving both the motion for
reconsideration in the second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal of the second case was
without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing of the third case. On October 8, 2004, while their
motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a
petition for certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated
November 22, 2002 and the portion of the omnibus order dated July 30, 2004, which upheld the dismissal
of the second case. On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration in the third case. The denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (the second certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals.
On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision in the first certiorari case
dismissing the petition. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties filed this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case,
asper the "two-dismissal rule"; and
2. Whether respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the third case while the motion for
reconsideration of the second case was still pending.
Held:
1. No, the dismissal of the second case did not bar filing of the third case. The dismissal of the second
case was without prejudice in view of the "two-dismissal rule". However, while the dismissal of the
second case was without prejudice, respondents’ act of filing the third case while petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was still pending constituted forum shopping.
Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In all
instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals
upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss.
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.As a general
rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that
the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the
merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must be present:
a. There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;

b. Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
c. Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
d. When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground
that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only new
defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A motion
to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias failed to file the appropriate
pleading within fifteen (15) days, he violated the order of the court. This, they argue, made the original
dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a dismissal through
the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they argue that when respondents filed the second case and then caused
its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two
dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim. Unfortunately, petitioners’ theory is erroneous. The
trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. When it
allowed Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days to file an appropriate pleading, it was
merely acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiff’s counsel that had no bearing on the dismissal of the
case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does
not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was already a
dismissal prior to plaintiff’s default, the trial court’s instruction to file the appropriate pleading will not
reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss
the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands. The dismissal of the first case was done at the
instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter. Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling
the same claim that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved
to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s
instance. Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the
service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of right that is
not subject to the trial court’s discretion.
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one prior
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants. While it
is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily follow that the
re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The circumstances
surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this
case.Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the
appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as one without prejudice. In granting the
dismissal of the second case, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It is
only when the trial court’s order either is silent on the matter, or states otherwise, that the dismissal will
be considered an adjudication on the merits.
2. Yes, the respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the third case while the second case is
pending.
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a
favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping
trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court
dockets. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor
toask is whether the elements of litis pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
When respondents filed the third case, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
the second case was still pending. Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be
overturned upon reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court.
There is no question that there was an identity of parties, rights, and reliefs in the second and
third cases. While it may be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case when the third case
was filed, it failed to take into account that a motion for reconsideration was filed in the second case and,
thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal of the second case was the subject of the first
certiorari case and this present petition for review, it can be reasonably concluded that the second case, to
this day, remains pending. Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum shopping.
Any judgment by this court on the propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably affect the
disposition of the third case.
The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been dismissed and is now the
subject of a petition for certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains the better cause of action for
the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they are more comfortable with. Substantial
justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim to the labyrinth in the procedures that their
travails led them. It is for this reason that we deny the petition.
Q: What is forum shopping? When can it be resorted to?
A: Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades
the administration of justice and congest court dockets.
ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA, JR., MNSA, in his capacity as Regional Director of Regional
Office No. XVI, Civil Service Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato
City, Petitioner, vs. DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial
if the act should be performed under a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of the tribunal or corporation’s own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a
discretionary act wherein the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
FACTS:
In 2004, Dr. Parouk S. Hussin appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, in a temporary capacity. In
2005, Dr. Benito was reappointed Regional Governor Hussin reappointed, this time in a permanent
capacity. To change the status of Dr. Benito’s appointment from temporary to permanent, Regional
Governor Hussin requested the Civil Service Commission Regional Office for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao to attest to Dr. Benito’s permanent appointment. According to the Regional Office, Dr.
Benito did not possess the career executive service eligibility required for the position of Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent.
Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court to compel the Regional
Office to attest to his permanent appointment as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent. He argued
that the position does not belong to the Career Executive Service under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987. Consequently, the position of Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent does not require career executive service eligibility. He further claimed
that it was the Regional Office’s ministerial duty to attest to his appointment.
In his answer, Regional Director Buena claimed that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent meets the following criteria for positions in the Career Executive Service: The position is
career, ranks higher than Division Chief, has a salary grade of 25, and entails performance of executive
and managerial functions and supervisory responsibility over a division. The permanent appointee to the
position must, therefore, have career executive service eligibility. Moreover, the Regional Office
recognizes the autonomy of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. However, until the region
enacts its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall carry on with the Civil Service
Commission’s mandate under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service laws and rules. Lastly,
Regional Director Buena prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition for mandamus because Dr. Benito
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial court found that the petition for mandamus raised a purely legal question. Hence, it falls
within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. It granted Dr. Benito’s petition
for mandamus. On reconsideration, the trial court reversed itself and granted the Regional Office’s notice
of appeal.
The Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal and directed the parties to file their
respective memoranda. Dr. Benito filed his memorandum. As for the Regional Office, it filed a
manifestation, requesting representation by the Office of the Solicitor General and an additional 30 days
to file a memorandum. The 30th day within which to filea memorandum lapsed without the Regional
Office filing the required memorandum. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared the Regional Office’s
appeal abandoned and dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Civil Service Commission Regional Office
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’s appealfor its failure to file the required
memorandum. (NO)
2. Whether respondent Dr. Benito correctly availed himself of a petition for mandamus against the
Civil Service Commission’s refusal to attest to his appointment. (YES)
HELD:
1. NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Civil Service Commission’s appeal for failure
to file the required memorandum.
Failure to comply with the Rules or with any order of the court is a ground to dismiss the action.
Specifically on the appellant’s failure to file a memorandum with the Court of Appeals, Rule 44, Section
10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 10. Time for filing memoranda in special cases.— In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective
memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by
the clerk that all evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.
The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground
for dismissal of the appeal. Rule 50, Section 1 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to file the required
memorandum within the reglementary period is a ground for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal.
In this case, the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. Instead
of filing the memorandum, the Regional Office requested additional 30 days to file the pleading. The
additional period requested lapsed without the Regional Office filing the required memorandum. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal. The SC have ruled that heavy workload is no
excuse for failure to comply with the reglementary periods under the Rules.
2. YES. A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Civil Service Commission to attest
to the appointment of respondent
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting froman office, trust, or station. It may also be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by
law. This is opposed to a discretionary act wherein the officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.
In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil service, this court has ruled that the Civil
Service Commission’s attestation is a ministerial duty once it finds the appointee eligible for the position.
The Commission "is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the
person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law." If the appointee possesses the
required civil service eligibility, the Commission has "no choice but to attest to the appointment."
In this case, respondent Dr. Benito availed himself of the correct remedy. Given his claim that he
possesses the required civil service eligibility for the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, he correctly filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Commission to
approve his appointment.
In this case, the facts are undisputed. Respondent Dr. Benito is not career executive service
eligible. The question is whether the position for which he was appointed requires career executive
service eligibility. This is a purely legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
All told, respondent Dr. Benito did not err in filing a petition for mandamus with the trial court.
QUESTION AND ASWER:
Q: What is the period to file a memorandum in special cases with the Court of Appeals?
A: Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda
within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all
evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.
Q: What is the consequence for failure to file a memorandum within the period prescribed?
A: As provided in the second paragraph of Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the failure of the
appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 50, Section 1 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to file the required memorandum within the
reglementary period is a ground for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal.
Q: What is a petition for mandamus?
A: It is a petition which may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
Q: When is an act ministerial?
A: An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal
or corporation’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by
law.
Q: When is an act discretionary?
A: An act wherein the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
Q: What kind of act is required for mandamus to lie?
A: For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A.
"MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," VS. JOSE MARIA JED
LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
The spouse seeking to adopt his own children born out of wedlock must first obtain the consent of
his or her spouse. The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years
old or older. As their written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be
availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution
sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
FACTS:
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac,
Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth
Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. At the time of the
filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. According to the Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the
three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
Jose was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. The report mentioned that he was
once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. It also stated that he met and fell
in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and
Regina on March 1989. Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his
dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams
and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname.
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac,
Ilocos Norte. The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, having ruled that "[n]o opposition
had been received by this Court from any person including the government which was represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General." A certificate of finality was issued on February 9, 2006.
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage
had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to
congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months
because of the incompatibilities between them.
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later.
She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose
stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. She insisted, however, that
they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)"
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a
complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In her complaint, she
alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
years. She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose
had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to
the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and
consent. She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were
his illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with
Larry.
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly
duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined. He
also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having
committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000
decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption
proper? (NO)
2.Whether the petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was proper (YES) and that was
filed within the prescriptive period? (YES)
HELD:
1. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the
consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock. The provision is
mandatory. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse. In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment,
Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not
validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot
be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of
the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit.
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or
older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, the consent of the adopter's other children is
necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children
on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with
another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10
years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid. To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he
and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her
written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
2. Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition
for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only
when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Petitioners were correct when they argued that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the
adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from
discovery. Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this
petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
Q: When can the remedy under Rule 47 be availed of?
A: Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of
Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This
remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment
of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, -versus- RAMON ONG,
Respondent
G.R. No. 205249 October 15, 2014
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing
the summons to the defendant. What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the
person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
The three (3) requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in order to warrant the setting aside of an
order of default for failure to file answer, are: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has
knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious
defense.
FACTS:
Respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the RTC, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria. Ong
charged the Spouses Manuel with having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly owned. Ong filed an ―amended complaint.
On February 3, 2010, summons was issued directed to the Spouses Manuel. On April 23, 2010, Ong filed
with the RTC a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. Per the sheriff‘s return on summons, on
February 12, 2010, Sheriff Joselito Sales, along with Ong‘s counsel, Atty. Christopher Donaal, and a
certain Federico Laureano, attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their
address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet.
The Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time considering that
petitioner Sandra Manuel‘s mother was then critically ill. The sheriff‘s return further indicates that on
March 16, 2010, another attempt at personal service was made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally
explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the complaint, the latter refused to
sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely
tender the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their answer
within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked
that they be declared in default.
The RTC issued an order granting Ong‘s motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default.
Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court
granted. The RTC denied the Spouses Manuel‘s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the Spouses
Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, however, dismissed the Spouses Manuel‘s
Rule 65 petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of the spouses? (YES)
2. Are the spouses entitled to relief from the order of default? (NO)
RULING:
1. Yes. Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants Spouses was validly acquired. This is because
personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito
Sales on March 16,2010. Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained
in Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its
alternative substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant‘s address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires:
personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse
to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of
the defendant, not the locus of service.
2. No. This court noted that the three (3) requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in order to
warrant the setting aside of an order of default for failure to file answer, are: (1) it must be made by
motion under oath by one that has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper
showing of the existence of a meritorious defense.
Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, ―the remedy against an
order of default is a motion to set it aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. However, it is not only the motion to lift order of default which a defendant must file.
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel‘s motion to lift order of default was
not made under oath. We add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit specifying
the facts which would show that their non-filing of an answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16,
2010 was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Failing both in making their motion
under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel‘s motion to lift order of default
must be deemed pro forma.
Q: What are the three (3) requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in order to warrant the setting aside
of an order of default for failure to file answer?
A: The three requisites are:
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has knowledge of the facts;
(2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence; and
(3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious defense.
YEAR 2015
PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. CELSO E.

FUENTES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015
All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief
desired.
Facts:
Celso E. Fuentes (Fuentes) was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime in November
1999. At the time of Fuentes' employment, Protective assigned him to Picop Resources, Inc. He was
posted to a security checkpoint designated as Post 33.
On July 20, 2000, a group of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took agency-issued uniforms,
and several rifles, all with live ammunition and magazines, and inflicted violence upon Fuentes and the
other security guards present at Post 33, namely: Lindo, Jr., Cempron, and Wilson Maravilles. Francisco
Dalacan was employed by Protective, while the others were employed by Meshim Security Agency.
On the same day of the incident, Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the
Philippine National Police. After its initial investigation, based on the two (2) affidavits executed by
Lindo, Jr. and Cempron, the PNP found reason to believe that Fuentes conspired and acted in consort with
the New People's Army. The PNP, through Corda, Jr., filed before the MCTC a complaint for robbery
committed by a band against Fuentes, a certain Mario Cabatlao, and others.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued the Resolution dismissing the Complaint against
Fuentes after it found no probable cause to warrant the filing of an Information against Fuentes during
preliminary investigation.
On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint. Labor Arbiter Legaspi rendered his Decision in
favor of Protective ruling that Fuentes was not dismissed from the service much less illegally by the
respondents Protective and/or Ernie S. Dolina. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
reversed the Decision of Labor Arbiter Legaspi and found that Fuentes was illegally dismissed. Protective
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the National Labor Relations Commission. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
held that the Protective failed to discharge its burden to prove a just cause for dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
assailing the Decision of the NLRC, which reversed the findings of Labor Arbiter Legaspi.
Held:
Yes. In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court established the
proper mode of appeal in labor cases: Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean
and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Applying these cases, the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, this
court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as well as the
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals can conduct its own factual determination
to ascertain whether the National Labor Relations Commission has committed grave abuse of discretion.
In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.
There are exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding on this court. In Medina v. Asistio, Jr: It is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. The rule, however,
is not without exception. Thus, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon and
reviewed by this Court in the following instances, none of which obtain in the instant petition:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
In labor cases, if the petitioner before this court can show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC, the assailed CA ruling (in the Rule 65 proceedings) will be reversed. Labor officials commit
grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence. If the petitioner can show that the labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total
disregard of evidence material to the controversy, the factual findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected.
In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the NLRC, this
court may examine the records of the case and the questioned findings in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction. It is the petitioner's burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions to the general rule
for this court to conduct a factual review. In this case, we find that petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden.
Q: What is the proper mode of appeal in labor cases?
A: All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) VS. SOCORRO T. POSADA, RENATO BUENO,
ALICE BALIN, ADRIAN TABLIZO, TEOFILO TABLIZO, AND LYDIA T. OLIVO,
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, ALFREDO M. OLIVO, ALICIA O. SALAZAR, ANITA O.
ORDONO, ANGELITA O. LIM AND ADELFA O. ESPINAS
G.R. NO. 191945. MARCH 11, 2015.
When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the expropriation complaint should
be dismissed by the trial court. The case will proceed only if the trial court's order of expropriation
became final and executory and the expropriation causes prejudice to the property owner.
FACTS:
NPC instituted expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over
parcels of land owned by respondents Posada et al. The expropriation was for the construction and
maintenance of its Substation Island Grid Project. NAPOCOR offered the price of P500.00 per square
meter. In their Answer, respondents objected to the offer and alleged that the value of the properties was
P2,000.00 per square meter.
RTC Branch 43 of Catanduanes confirmed NPC’s right to expropriate the properties and ordered
the creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
NPC filed a Notice to Take Possession before the court on the basis of Rule 67, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court. It alleged that it was entitled to a Writ of Possession in view of its deposit with the LBP in
the amount of P3,280.00, alleging that it represented the provisional value of the properties.
NPC amended its Complaint stating that it needed to acquire portions of the properties, instead of
just an easement of right of way, for the construction of the Substation Island Grid Project. For this
reason, it deposited with LBP the amount of P580,769.93, alleging that this represented the value of the
3,954 square meters sought to be expropriated.
RTC granted the Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession and issued a
Writ of Possession. Respondents filed a Motion to Lift and/or Suspend the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession, which the trial court denied. Undaunted, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Grant
Defendants Time to Remove their Houses and Improvements as well as Additional Deposit for Use in
Land Acquisition and Expenses for Transfer of their Respective Residential Houses. RTC granted
respondents' Motion. It fixed the value of the structures and improvements on the land in the amount of
P827,000.00, based on the value determined by the commissioners. It ordered NPC to deposit an
additional amount of P262,639.17. NAPOCOR failed to deposit the additional amount.
RTC resolved the issue of just compensation fixes the just compensation at P2,000.00 per square
meter for the taking of the properties and cancelled the Writ of Possession granted to NPC for their failure
to comply with the Court's order and for misleading the court when it filed its Motion for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession. CA denied the appeal and held that "the writ of possession was correctly recalled by
the lower court." In the absence of proof that respondents were paid, the NPC cannot take possession of
the property. CA denied subsequent MR. Hence, NPC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the National Power Corporation may be allowed to withdraw its Petition for Review.
HELD:
YES. NPC requested the court for leave to withdraw the Petition on the ground that it was in the
process of acquiring a vacant lot owned by FICELCO, an alternative site. Thus, the Court ruled that
considering that NPC is no longer using respondents' properties for the purpose of building the Substation
Project, it may be allowed to discontinue with the expropriation proceedings. Eminent domain is the
taking of private property for public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the property to be
expropriated will not be for public use.
The rule is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is determined that it is not
for a public purpose, except when:
1. the trial court's order already became final and executory;
2. the government already took possession of the property; and
3. the expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner.
The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for public
use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction
over the proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is
always subject to judicial discretion.
Respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the National Power Corporation
was never able to take possession. The Court cannot determine whether damages have been suffered as a
result of the expropriation. Thus, the case needs to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
respondents have already been prejudiced by the expropriation.
The withdrawal of the Petition before the Court will have no practical effect other than to make
the trial court's order of condemnation final and executory. In order to prevent this absurdity, the NPC
should file the proper Motion to Withdraw before the trial court. It is now the burden of the NPC to plead
and prove to the trial court its reasons for discontinuing with the expropriation. Respondents may also
plead and prove damages incurred from the commencement of the expropriation, if any.
Q: When may expropriation of private land be dismissed?
A: The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for public use.
The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over
the proceedings.
The rule is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is determined that it is not for a
public purpose, except when:
1. the trial court's order already became final and executory;
2. the government already took possession of the property; and

3. the expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner.
DYNAMIC BUILDERS & CONSTRUCTION CO. (PHIL.), INC., Petitioner, v. HON. RICARDO

P. PRESBITERO, JR., MAYOR AND HEAD OF PROCURING UNIT OF THE MUNICIPALITY
OF VALLADOLID, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL; BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE,
MUNICIPALITY OF VALLADOLID, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL; AND HENRY L. JORDAN
AND/OR HLJ CONSTRUCTION AND ENTERPRISE, Respondents.
GR No. 174202, April 07, 2015
This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of Presbitero’s Decision and Resolution on the protest- the
same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition before the RTC. In essence, petitioner
seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This violates the rule
against forum shopping.
FACTS:
On December 28, 2005, the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and
Awards Committee, published an invitation to bid for the construction of a 1,050-lineal-meter rubble
concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline. The Committee conducted a pre-bid conference
attended by 6 prospective contractors including Dynamic Builders. The Committee affirmed the award of
contract to HLJ Construction for the Construction Shoreline Protection Project. The Committee informed
Dynamic Builders of the post-evaluation examination results showing Dynamic Builders' failure in its
Financial Contracting Capability. Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest with the head of the
procuring entity, Mayor Presbitero to set aside the Committee decision. Mayor Presbitero dismissed.
Dynamic Builders filed the Petition for Certiorari before the RTC assailing Mayor Presbitero's
Decision. Dynamic Builders also filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this court. Petitioner Dynamic Builders submits that
Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act implicitly
allowed it to simultaneously file a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court assailing the
protest case on the merits, and another Petition before this court for injunctive remedies. Presbitero
counters that petitioner "grossly violated the rules against splitting a single cause of action, multiplicity of
suits, and forum shopping.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Dynamic Builders violated the rules against the splitting of a cause of action,
multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping;
2. Whether or not petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when it filed a petition for prohibition
with this court.
RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 2, Sec 3 provides that "a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action."
Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in
any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of action
"violates the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts."
This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of Presbitero’s Decision and Resolution on the protest-
the same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition before the RTC. In essence,
petitioner seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This violates
the rule against forum shopping.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires the plaintiff or principal party to certify under
oath that he or she has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court. Forum shopping
is the practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to
increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping is present when, in two or
more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action,
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
2. Yes. This is consistent with Republic Act No. 8975's policy that "the State shall ensure the
expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects to
avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately
enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom."
This policy declaration does not distinguish between national and local government infrastructure
projects. Delay in the project will only mean additional costs for the government and prejudice to the
people of the Municipality of Valladolid who will directly benefit from the Construction Shoreline
Protection Project.
Q: What are the rules against splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping?
A: Rule 2, Sec 3 provides that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. The splitting of a cause of action violates the
policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of
the courts.
Forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the
same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping is present when,
in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs
prayed for and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND TERESITA
GENUINO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208792; July 22, 2015
A.M. No. 03-l-09-SC does not remove the plaintiff's duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court to
promptly move ex-parte to set his or her case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and
filed. While pre-trial promotes efficiency in court proceedings and aids in decongesting dockets, A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC did not give sole burden on the courts to set cases for pre-trial.
Facts:
On October 6, 2009, Bank of the Philippine Islands filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money/Judgment on the Deficiency against the Spouses Genuino before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati.The Complaint alleged that on May 27, 1997 and May 11, 1999, the Spouses Genuino executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 10,000-square-meter parcel of land in General Trias, Cavite City,
together with its improvements, to secure loans and other credit accommodations obtained or to be
obtained from the bank.The Spouses Genuino availed themselves of this credit accommodation in the
amount of ₱8,840,000.00 as evidenced by various promissory notes. They defaulted in their installment
payments, and their failure to pay despite demand resulted in the entire outstanding balance of the loan,
plus interests and other charges, becoming due and demandable.
On April 18, 2004, Bank of the Philippine Islands foreclosed the mortgaged property after due
notice and publication, and sold it to the highest bidder at the public auction for ₱2,900,000.00. A
deficiency of ₱27,744,762.49 remained after the tendered bid price had been deducted from the Spouses
Genuino’s total obligation of ₱30,644,762.49. The Spouses Genuino failed to pay the deficiency despite
written demands by the bank. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands filed the Complaint. It prayed for the
reduced amount of 10,626,121.69, waiving partly the stipulated interest, and waiving totally the late
payment charges and attorney’s fees.
On November 25, 2009, the Spouses Genuino filed their Answer with Special and Affirmative
Defenses. They argued nullity of the auction sale for lack of notice or demand made to them before and
after the alleged foreclosure. Even assuming the auction sale was valid, they argued that Bank of the
Philippine Islands waived the remedy of collection when it chose to foreclose the security. The Spouses
Genuino included a Compulsory Counterclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.
The Regional Trial Court, in its Order dated May 17, 2010, dismissed the case without prejudice
for lack of interest to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The Spouses Genuino’s
counterclaim was also dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 17, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, Bank of the Philippine Islands explained that the case folder was
misplaced in the office bodega together with the records of terminated cases. The assigned secretary of
counsel had already left the firm, and the bank could no longer seek an explanation for the misfiling of
the case after it had been unloaded by previous counsel. The bank argued for the application of A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC. The court denied reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated February 26, 2013, denied due course and dismissed
Bank of the Philippine Islands’ Petition for Certiorari. It found no grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court in dismissing without prejudice the bank’s Complaint. Hence, this present Petition assails the Court
of Appeals February 26, 2013 Decision that dismissed Bank of the Philippine Islands’ Petition for
Certiorari, and August 13, 2013 Resolution that denied reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case without
prejudice on the ground of failure to prosecute when Bank of the Philippine Islands failed to file a motion
to set case for pre-trial conference.
Held:
No, the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion when its dismissed the case for
failure to prosecute. The trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court. This dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court
Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures took
effect on August 16, 2004. This provides that within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the
plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to
file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
Respondents Spouses Genuino cannot rely on Olave v. Mistas as this involved a trial court Order
dated October 20, 1997 dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. The facts in Olave took place before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on August 16, 2004. Espiritu, et al. v. Lazaro, et al. quoted by
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands "clarified the application of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC to cases filed
after its effectivity on August 16, 2004": “In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their
case with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for
and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court dockets. Parallel to this is the defendants’
right to have a speedy disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their defenses
from being impaired.” Since the incidents occurred prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on
August 16, 2004, the guidelines stated therein should not be made applicable to this case. Instead, the
prevailing rule and jurisprudence at that time should be utilized in resolving the case.
Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for
pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the
said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of
time or failure to comply with the rules. Nevertheless, nowhere in the text of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does
it remove the plaintiff’s duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court to set the case for pre-trial
after the last pleading has been served and filed. Nowhere does it repeal Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court that allows dismissals due to plaintiff’s fault, including plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
Rules for no justifiable cause. Nowhere does it impose a sole burden on the trial court to set the case for
pre-trial. Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3 and Rule 18, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint upon plaintiff’s failure to show
justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the period provided by the Rules. Thus, trial
courts must consider the facts of each case.
Petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands’ explanation of misfiling by previous counsel’s

secretary of the case records together with terminated cases in the office bodega cannot be considered as
justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial. Jurisprudence has held that "a counsel is
required to inquire, from time to time, and whenever necessary, about the status of handled cases, as well
as motions filed for a client." Also, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is one of the oldest and more
established banks in the country. There is reasonable expectation that it has the necessary organizational
structures, system flows, and procedures to address urgent matters and meet litigation deadlines. Between
the parties, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is in a better position to bear the costs of a procedural
misstep of its own doing as compared with respondents Spouses Genuino. The bank may have had its
reasons to waive payment or the pursuit of its claims. For instance, it could have weighed that the costs of
pursuing its litigation against respondents Spouses Genuino outweigh the potential benefits. It could be
that their business with the bank was far more valuable than the incidental rupture in their relationship
caused by this transaction. In all these possible cases, respondents Spouses Genuino and other debtors
have a right to rely on the non-action of the plaintiff. In their view, the non-filing of the basic motion for
setting of pre-trial would have been, at best, a reasonable economic signal that the bank was no longer
interested. At worse, it was clearly negligence of an entity with enough institutional resources to maintain
a large arsenal of in-house and external counsel. The bank’s explanation for its own negligence is
unavailing. While it is true that A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does provide that the Clerk of Court set the date of
pre-trial, plaintiff should not be rewarded for his or her negligence.
Q: What is the effect of A.M. No. 03-l-09-SC to Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court?
A: A.M. No. 03-l-09-SC does not remove the plaintiff's duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court to promptly move ex-parte to set his or her case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served
and filed. While pre-trial promotes efficiency in court proceedings and aids in decongesting dockets,
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC did not give sole burden on the courts to set cases for pre-trial.
CELSO F. PASCUAL, SR. AND SERAFIN TERENCIO vs. CANIOGAN CREDIT AND
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
JOSE ANTONIO R. LEE, ATTY. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR., AND NESTOR P. TINIO
G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special
civil action for certiorari is made.
FACTS:
Petitioners Celso F. Pascual, Sr. (Pascual) and Serafin Terencio (Terencio) were appointed by
the former Board of Directors of Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative (CCDC) to act as the
cooperative's General Manager and Collection Manager, respectively, from start of operations until they
reach the compulsory age of retirement of 65. Despite their retirement they continued to serve.
The Board of Directors of CCDC passed two resolutions terminating Pascual's and Terencio's
services. Pascual and Terencio refused to vacate their positions.
CCDC and Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr. (newly appointed General Manager) filed a Complaint for
Injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
The RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Pascual and Terencio for a period of 20
days from performing the functions of their offices.
Pascual and Terencio filed a Motion to Dismiss. They questioned the RTC's jurisdiction because
the case allegedly involves a labor dispute in the guise of an injunction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing outright the Petition for Certiorari.
2. Whether the case is one of illegal dismissal of an employee which is subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter or of the National Labor Relations Commission.
RULING:
1) NO. The CA correctly dismissed petitioners' Rule 65 Petition.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special
civil action for certiorari is made. This is to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its
error, if any. An omission to comply with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of
certiorari applied for. We find no exceptional circumstance to justify petitioners' omission to file a
motion for reconsideration. There is no "extreme necessity and urgency" to excuse their direct resort to a
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
However, we disagree with the CA's observation that prior recourse to the modes of settlement
should have been made before seeking judicial relief. It is clear from the Complaint that the dispute was,
indeed, referred to the Regional Office of the Cooperative Development Authority for mediation and
arbitration. Despite its earnest efforts, no settlement was reached between the parties, prompting the
Authority to issue a certificate of non-resolution.
2) NO. The case involves an intra-cooperative dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. There is evidently no employment relationship between the parties.
An office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or
stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by
action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines
the compensation to be paid to such employee. (Tabang v. NLRC)
Here, petitioners were officers of respondent CCDC. They were appointed directly by the
former Board of Directors according to the by-laws of respondent CCDC, and their salaries were likewise
set by the same Board. Petitioners do not refute this fact. Their termination or removal is clearly an intra-
cooperative matter. It involves a dispute within the cooperative between two officers on one hand and the
Board of Directors on the other.
Q: Does the failure to file a motion for reconsideration justify the denial of a petition for certiorari?
A: Yes. A motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari
is made. This is to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. An omission to
comply with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied for.
SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS AND FIRST
ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015, LEONEN, J.
A person who is not a party in the main action cannot be the subject of the ancillary writ of
preliminary injunction. Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by
the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a
general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot
be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Facts:
In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo
City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway. The request was
approved through the enactment of Resolusyon Big. 027-99. In view of the same The Technical
Committee created by City Ordinance No. 08-98 posted notices to property owners that would be affected
by the construction of the city road.
Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner Sunrise Garden Corporation, through Cesar
T. Guy executed an Undertaking That I am willing to undertake and finance development of the City Park
and City Road connecting Marcos Highway to Marikina - San Mateo - Antipolo National Highway which
cost shall be applied to our [t]axes and other fees payable to the City Government;. That I am willing to
sign and execute all legal instrument necessary to transfer ownership of the same to the City government.
Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor began to position its construction equipment. However,
armed guards, allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's
contractor from using an access road to move the construction equipment. Sunrise Garden Corporation
filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. filed its Answer to the
Complaint. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on February 15, 2002, "directing Hardrock
to cease and desist from preventing/blocking the contractor in moving its equipments to the site of the
proposed city road however the latter continued with their acts. the trial court ordered the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, subject to the posting of a bond by Sunrise Garden Corporation. Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued.
While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed
city road. Filed a Motion and Manifestation to amend the preliminary injunction to include and all –
person or group in preventing or obstructing all of petitioner's etc. which was granted by the RTC.
Although the informal settlers complied with the order armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly
hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., blocked Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor's
employees and prevented them from proceeding with the construction.
A Motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt was filed on October 11, 2002 by Sunrise
Garden Corporation. K-9 Security Agency, joined by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and
represented by the same counsel, opposed the Motion to cite them in contempt, raising the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over their persons, since they were not bound by the Amended Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and issued an Order dated
November 22, 2002 requiring K-9 Security Agency to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration reiterating their arguments that since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
them, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction could not be enforced against them. – the same was denied by
the RTC. First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals, on
November 5, 2003, granted First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s Petition for Certiorari and
annulled the Amended.
Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the trial court, reasoning as: Indeed, public respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction when it sought the enforcement of its
amended writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, who was never a party to the pending case.
Worse, it threatened petitioner with contempt of court for not following an unlawful order.
Sunrise Garden Corporation argue that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
not dismissing the Petition outright due to insufficiency of form and substance Sunrise Garden
Corporation argues that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. failed to prove its ownership over
the properties in dispute. Thus, it did not establish any right that would entitle it to the reliefs prayed for.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over K9 and First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc.
Ruling:
No. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al., this court
discussed that voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of a
court.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes
a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.
While Rule 14, Section 20 212 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is
equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.” The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and
K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.
It may be argued that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. should have
intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.’s interests, or its properties, were not part of the issues raised in petitioner Sunrise
Garden Corporation’s Complaint. That Complaint was against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. and not
respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or its properties.
Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires that the party to be enjoined must be notified and
heard. Considering that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it sought to enforce the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.,
the Court of Appeals did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc.
Q: When is jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired?
A: Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of
legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. G & P BUILDERS,
INCORPORATED, SPOUSES ELPIDIO AND ROSE VIOLET PARAS, SPOUSES JESUS AND
MA. CONSUELO PARAS AND VICTORIA PARAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015
The distinction is important because the remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The reason behind the rule is to prevent
multiplicity of suits.
FACTS:
Respondent G & P Builders, Incorporated (G & P) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation. Among the
allegations in the Petition is that G & P obtained a loan from Metrobank and mortgaged twelve (12)
parcels of land as collateral. G & P's loan obligation amounted to P52,094,711.00 at the time of the filing
of the Petition before the trial court. The trial court issued a Stay Order. However, while the rehabilitation
proceedings were pending, Metrobank and G & P executed a Memorandum of Agreement (first MOA)
where the parties agreed that four out of the 12 parcels of land mortgaged would be released and
sold. The sale of the parcels of land amounted to P15,000,000.00.
The trial court approved the first MOA as a compromise agreement between parties.
Subsequently, Metrobank entered into a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement18 with Elite Union
Investments Limited (Elite Union). Metrobank sold G & P's loan account for P10,419,000.00.
G & P, Elite Union, and Spouses Victor and Lani Paras executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(second MOA) on September 15, 2006. Elite Union sold all its rights, titles, and interests over G & P's
account to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras for the amount of P10,419,000.00.
Thereafter, G & P filed a Motion for the Release of Unapplied Deposit with Metrobank. It cited
the September 26, 2003 Order, which approved the first MOA between G & P and Metrobank and
provided that the P15,000,000.00 proceeds of the sale of real properties that secured the loan obligation
be deposited with Metrobank.
Metrobank opposed the Motion and claimed that the deposit was not covered by the contract
transferring G & P's loan obligation to Elite Union.32 According to Metrobank, the release of titles was
conditioned on the understanding that the proceeds would be applied exclusively in favor of Metrobank.
The rehabilitation court granted G & P's Motion and ordered the release of unapplied deposit with
Metrobank.35 It held that: the record shows that creditor Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company sold the
loan account of petitioners to Elite Union Investment Ltd. Metrobank has absolutely and irrevocably sold,
assigned and conveyed all its rights, title and interests in and to the loan, including all the security
interest, mortgages, reimbursements rights, and similar rights and privileges related to such loan.
Metrobank then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order of the rehabilitation
court. According to the Court of Appeals, G & P has no interest nor personality in asking for the release
of the deposit since the loan account was finally sold to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras. The Court of
Appeals also observed that the Petition should have been dismissed outright since the Order was a mere
interlocutory order and could not be assailed through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found that Metrobank sold the entire obligation of G & P to
Elite Union;46 hence, Metrobank was not entitled to the P15,000,000.00 deposit.
ISSUE:
Whether the Orders of the trial court are interlocutory orders and, thus, not appealable to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner's argument is devoid of merit. Under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC,82 which provides for
the mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation, all decisions and final orders rendered by
the trial court shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court:
All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under
Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
This court has laid down the test to determine whether an order is final or merely interlocutory:
Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement
and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole
controversy. Conversely, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the
case.
In this case, the assailed orders of the trial court are interlocutory in nature. The orders pertained
to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15,000,000.00 deposit as proceeds of the sale of properties that
secured respondent G & P's loan obligation. In contrast, the main proceeding before the commercial court
concerns the approval of the rehabilitation plan under the Interim Rules. To resolve the merits of the case,
the trial court, sitting as commercial court, must either approve or disapprove the rehabilitation plan,
depending on the feasibility of the proposed plan to rehabilitate the corporation.
Petitioner committed a procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Appeals instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The distinction is
important because the remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. The reason behind the rule is to prevent multiplicity of suits:
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action
during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the
merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the
ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. Moreover, in contrast
to a final judgment or order, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of
an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
Q: What is an interlocutory order?
A: Interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides
some point or matter, but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.
Q: What is a final order?
A: A final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case.
MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, Petitioners, v. HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-
JABALDE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 74, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY OF
OLONGAPO; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. ALBERT F.
DEL ROSARIO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; HON. GEN.
GREGORIO PIO P. CATAPANG, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; HON. EMILIE FE DELOS SANTOS, CHIEF CITY PROSECUTOR OF
OLONGAPO CITY; AND L/CPL JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given
notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due
process.
FACTS:
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott
Pemberton (Pemberton). On October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling,
Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. On October
22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton
before the Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was issued on
December 16, 2014. Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-
Jabalde) on December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned.
On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media
Coverage. “The [M]otion was [scheduled] for hearing on December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m.” According to
petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton's counsel through registered mail. In
any case, they claim to have also "furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally ... at the hearing of the
[M]otion.”
On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the Petitioner to comply with the 3-day notice rule is justified.
RULING:
NO. The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified.
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party
be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural
due process.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a
mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.
The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare
properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because
Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to
procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated notice by arguing that
they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton's counsel.
They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the
Christmas season and the "series of legal holidays” where courts would be closed. To compound their
obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by Pemberton's
counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule.
These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion's deficiencies. Even granting that
Pemberton's counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally
was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his
counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was correct to deny the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo
City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice
Pemberton's rights as an accused.
Q: What is the 3-day notice rule? What is the effect of noncompliance?
A: Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be
given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural
due process.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere
scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided
doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The
adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly
and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was
not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due
process.
YEAR 2016
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A.

MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v. MARIO JOEL T.
REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may
cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may
include, but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court
completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
Facts:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of
several radio shows in Palawan. He was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro,
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested.
On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also
implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel,
Jr.
Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes
(former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima
issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a
Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her
husband's murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former
Marinduque Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon
Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo O. Edrad, and
several John and Jane Does were also implicated.
The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which,
among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes
and Edrad. While the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel.
The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. Department Order No. 710 ordered the
reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due process" to address the offer of additional
evidence denied by the First Panel in its Resolution. The Department Order also revoked Department
Order No. 091.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring former
Governor Reyes to appear before them and to submit his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the
First Panel's Resolution. Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrests. However, the warrants against former Governor Reyes
and his brother were ineffective since the two allegedly left the country days before the warrants could be
served.
The former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad
Cautelam assailing the Second Panel's Resolution. He also filed before the Court of Appeals a
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order impleading Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. In his
Supplemental Petition, former Governor Reyes argued that the Regional Trial Court could not enforce the
Second Panel's Resolution and proceed with the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void.
The Court of Appeals declared Department Order No. 710 null and void and reinstating the First
Panel's Resolutions. According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel. The Court of
Appeals found that she should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel instead of
issuing Department Order No. 710 and creating the Second Panel. Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and
the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for review on certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary
investigation is proper.
Ruling:
Yes, however, a petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in
any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment. Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any
motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sound
discretion of the court.
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by
the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore,
has transferred to the trial court. The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a
petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot
Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.
Any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may
be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In ascertaining whether the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his
determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to
establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner,
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it must amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but he transcended the
same or acted without authority.
Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is authorized
to issue Department Order No. 710. It is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No.
710 because she had reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may
cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to overturn the
findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including the
evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not
act in an "arbitrary and despotic manner, 'by reason of passion or personal hostility." The Secretary of
Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her- authority to affirm, nullify,
reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
Q: Is the determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause a quasi-judicial
proceeding?
A: No. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of
prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Q: To whom is may the writ of certiorari directed against?
A: Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
Q: What is a quasi-judicial function?
A: It is "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Otherwise stated, an
administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of
opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court.
Q: May the Secretary of Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city
prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor?
A: Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu proprio
reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even
without a pending petition for review
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. LEOVIGILDO DELOS REYES, JR.
G.R. No. 208976, February 22, 2016
The findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. xxx It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman that this court will entertain review of the assailed ruling or order.
FACTS:
The PCSO maintains On-line Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices.
The Marketing and Online Division of PCSO's Central Operations Department (COD) manages the
terminals in the main office and respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. (Delos Reyes) served as the COD
Division Chief.
PCSO auditors recommended that the lotto proceeds be deposited in a bank the next working day
instead of Delos Reyes keeping the lotto sales and proceeds in a safe inside his office.
Teresa Nucup (OIC-Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management Division) reported
unremitted collections in the amount of P428,349.00, subsequently reduced to P387,879.00 excluding
penalties.
The PCSO Legal Department found that the Lottery Operations Assistants turned over the lotto
proceeds and lotto ticket sales reports to Delos Reyes as the Division Chief. In case of his absence, the
proceeds and reports were turned over to Driz. Driz would then deposit the proceeds in the bank. If both
Delos Reyes and Driz were absent, the proceeds would be placed in the vault under Delos Reyes' control
and deposited the next banking day.
PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes and Driz were
criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, and administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)
(l) and (3) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in granting Delos Reyes' Petition for Certiorari.
RULING:
YES. It is the settled rule that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported
by substantial evidence are conclusive. Respondent failed to show arbitrariness on the part of the Office
of the Ombudsman to warrant judicial intervention.
The petitioner adduced substantial evidence to show how respondent flagrantly disregarded the
rules and acted with a willful intent to violate the law, thus, amounting to grave misconduct.
It must be reiterated that the liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked to justify a flagrant
disregard of the rules of procedure. Appeals of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman
that this court will entertain review of the assailed ruling or order. The rules and jurisprudence require the
dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals.
Q: Are findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman conclusive?
A: Yes. The findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman that this court will entertain review of the assailed ruling or order.
QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016
It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
fall under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. However, this is also true of regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying that respondent Department of
Education's Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 Department Order be nullified for being
unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that a writ of prohibition permanently enjoining the Department
of Education and all persons acting on its behalf from enforcing the assailed Department Order be issued.
The Petition also prays that, in the interim, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued, restraining the enforcement of the Department Order.
On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued
Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.
The Department of Education explained the reasons for the issuance of the Department Order as
follows: The Department Order sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No.
23, s. 2003 and was issued in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of
PTAs, such as, but not limited to (1) officers absconding with contributions and membership fees; (2)
non-disclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of financial statements; and (3) misuse of funds.
Issue:
Whether or not the (present) petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 filed by Quezon
City PTCA Federation before the SC violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Held:
YES. The Department of Education correctly points out that the present Petition was filed in
violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. On this score alone, the Petition should be dismissed.
It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure fall under the original jurisdiction of this court. However, this is also true of regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals.
This Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari. Indeed, concurrence of jurisdiction does not
allow unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Petitioner argues that the present Petition justifies direct recourse to this court considering the
pervasive effect of the assailed Department Order to all the different PTCAs or PTAs across the country
and in order to avoid multiple suits that would only serve to further clog the court's dockets.
This reason fails to impress. That the effects of the Department Order extend throughout the
country is a concern that can be addressed by recourse to the Court of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction,
much like this court's, also extends throughout the country. Moreover, the Court of Appeals is well-
equipped to render reliable, reasonable, and well-grounded judgments in cases averring grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recourse to the Court of Appeals is not a futile
exercise that results to nothing more than the clogging of court dockets.
Q: Do petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall
under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? If so, is it proper to file such petition directly with
the Supreme Court?
A: It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure fall under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. However, this is also true of regional
trial courts and the Court of Appeals.
The SC will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort
to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari. Indeed, concurrence of jurisdiction does not allow
unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum.
ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS VS. REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 208205, June 1, 2016
“…that all money claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit,
which, in turn, must act upon them within 60 days. Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim
can the claimant elevate the matter to this Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state.”
“This Court's decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent an order of
remand, we cannot allow attempts to adjust or vary the terms of the judgment of this Court. Neither the
Regional Trial Court nor its sheriff can, in any way, directly or indirectly, alter this Court's November 25,
1998 Decision through a writ of execution or a notice purporting to implement the writ.”
FACTS:
Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into an agreement with Pasay City for the
reclamation of the foreshore lands along Manila Bay. The latter authorized RREC to reclaim 300 hectares
of foreshore lands in the city.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) sued for recovery of
possession and damages with writ of preliminary injunction. The Republic questioned the agreement that
the subject of the contract is outside the commerce of man as the reclaimed area is a national park that the
Republic owns.
This Court upheld the Republic's argument. Both the agreement and Ordinance No. 121, allowing
the reclamation, were declared null and void for being ultra vires and contrary to Republic Act No. 1899.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area within
subject reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable was accomplished by them,
following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even
the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another, we believe; and so hold, that
Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and dredge-fill poured in, worth
P10,926,071.29, as verified by the former Ministry of Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in
its aforequoted letter dated June 25, 1981.This case, became final and executor on July, 27, 1999.
On May 11, 2007, Sheriff IV Reyner S. De Jesus (Sheriff De Jesus) issued a Notice of Execution
and Notice to Pay against the Republic for P49, 173, 064, 201.17 instead of the P10.9 million ordered by
this Court, to be divided between RREC and Pasay City.
The Republic filed before the Regional Trial Court a Very Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution and the Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay, but it was denied on July 3, 2007. The trial
court likewise denied the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration on February 28, 2008.
The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the trial court's
July 3, 2007 and February 28, 2008 Orders and seeking injunction against the writ of execution. The
Court of Appeals held that Sheriff De Jesus' "issuances wantonly disregarded and grossly violated
[Supreme Court Administrative Circular] No. 10-2000 dated October 25, 2000 . . . [and] [Commission on
Audit] Circular No. 2001-002 dated July 31, 2001," which govern the execution of government funds or
properties. Thus, the Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay is "patently null and void."
ISSUES:
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the case? (NO)
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus'
Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay as null and void? (YES)
HELD:
1. The case is premature. The money claim against the Republic should have been first brought
before the Commission on Audit. The Commission on Audit the power and mandate to settle all
government accounts. Thus, the finding that government is liable in a suit to which it consented does not
translate to enforcement of the judgment by execution.
As a rule, public funds may not be disbursed absent an appropriation of law or other specific
statutory authority. Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, requires
that all money claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit, which, in
turn, must act upon them within 60 days. Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim can the
claimant elevate the matter to this Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state.
2. The Court of Appeals correctly declared the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus' Notice
null and void. We find no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' February 27, 2009 Decision. This
Court's decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent an order of remand, we cannot
allow attempts to adjust or vary the terms of the judgment of this Court. Neither the Regional Trial Court
nor its sheriff can, in any way, directly or indirectly, alter this Court's November 25, 1998 Decision
through a writ of execution or a notice purporting to implement the writ.
A judgment, once final, is immutable and unalterable.
Q: Who has jurisdiction over money claims against the state?
A: Money claims against the Republic should be first brought before the Commission on Audit. The
Commission on Audit the power and mandate to settle all government accounts. Thus, the finding that
government is liable in a suit to which it consented does not translate to enforcement of the judgment by
execution.
As a rule, public funds may not be disbursed absent an appropriation of law or other specific statutory
authority. Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, requires that all
money claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit, which, in turn,
must act upon them within 60 days. Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim can the
claimant elevate the matter to this Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state.
ARIEL LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 212186, JUNE 29, 2016
To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be proven with certainty.
Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Further, a request for appearance issued by law enforcers to a person identified as a suspect is akin to an
invitation. Thus, the suspect is covered by the rights of an accused while under custodial investigation.
Any admission obtained from the request for appearance without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible
in evidence.
FACTS:
That on or about July 17, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, the above-mentioned accused,
with intent to gain with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously took, stole and carried away one (1) female carabao
valued at Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, more or less, belonging to Teresita D. Perez, to the latter's
damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount.
During trial, Mario Perez (Perez) testified that he purchased the female carabao from a certain
Enrique Villanueva. The purchase was evidenced by a Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle. Perez
narrated that he tied his carabao to a coconut tree located inside the property of a certain Constancio
Genosas. Around 5:00 a.m. on July 17, 2002, Perez discovered that the female carabao was missing. Perez
claimed that he searched for his carabao for over a month. After, he went to the Barangay Captain of
Wines to ask for assistance.
Prosecution witness Felix Alderete testified that he worked as an errand boy for Lopez from 2000
to 2002. Alderete claimed that he slept at Lopez's house on July 17, 2002. Around 3:45 a.m. of the next
day, Alderete and Lopez went to Constancio Genosas' property.
Lopez untied the carabao and allegedly told Alderete that he would "bring the carabao to his boss
named Boy Platan at Malagos." He ordered Alderete to deliver the carabao to Malagos. Alderete, not
knowing whether the carabao was owned by Lopez, followed Lopez's instructions. Lopez and Boy Platan
met Alderete in Malagos. From there, the carabao was loaded on a vehicle headed to Davao City.
The next day, Alderete learned that there was a commotion in Wines, Baguio District, regarding
Perez's lost carabao. Afraid of being accused for the loss of the carabao, Alderete sought help from the
barangay police. Teresita Perez (Teresita) testified that Barangay Police Moralde informed her and Perez,
her husband, that Lopez stole their carabao. Subsequently, a confrontation took place at the barangay
police station. During the confrontation, Lopez admitted to taking the carabao and promised to pay
indemnification.
PO3 Lozarito corroborated Teresita's testimony and stated that a request for Lopez's appearance
was issued, but no custodial investigation was conducted. He claimed that he simply allowed Lopez and
Teresita to "confront each other." He also stated that Lopez wanted to settle by paying for the carabao, but
the parties were unable to agree on the price.
Lopez testified that he knew Teresita because she "used to borrow rice and feeds from his
parents." He was surprised that she accused him of stealing her carabao. Lopez also testified that he went
to the police station where he denied stealing any carabao. 26 After his appearance at the police station, he
went home.
The trial court found Lopez guilty of cattle-rustling. It gave credence to Alderete's testimony that
Lopez ordered him to bring the carabao to Malagos. The trial court also noted Alderete's statement that
"he knew Lopez was engaged in the buy and sell of large cattle." In addition, the trial court discussed that
Lopez's defense of denial had no credence because during the meeting at the police station, Lopez offered
to reimburse the value of the carabao and even knelt in front of Teresita to ask for forgiveness. Lopez
filed before the Court of Appeals an appeal arguing that the prosecution was unable to prove that the
carabao allegedly stolen was the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.
ISSUES:
1. Whether this Court should deny the Petition for raising questions of fact;
2. Whether all the elements of the crime of cattle-rustling were proven; and
3. Whether petitioner’s uncounseled admission during the confrontation at the barangay police office is
admissible in evidence.
HELD:
1. The general rule is that a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law.
As provided under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, there are instances when this
Court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for review. There is a question of law "when there
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" and there is a question of fact "when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."
In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence and argues that the prosecution
was unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 79 Thus, petitioner raises a question of fact.
Nevertheless, this Court gives due course to the Petition because it falls under the exceptions as to
when this Court may entertain questions of fact. A review of the record shows that the trial court and
the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and their findings are contradicted by the evidence
presented.
2. The prosecution failed to prove one of the elements of cattle-rustling, specifically, that the lost carabao
of Mario and Teresita Perez is the same carabao allegedly stolen by petitioner.
The elements of cattle-rustling are: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the
taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means, method
or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished
with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Not all of the elements
of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The carabao transported by petitioner and Alderete
was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.
Alderete's description of the carabao is too generic. Alderete did not mention any
distinguishing mark on the carabao that petitioner allegedly stole. The prosecution was unable to
establish the date when the carabao was lost.
3. Petitioner's uncounselled admission during the confrontation at the police station is inadmissible in
evidence.
The Court of Appeals held that "the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in
an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime."
However, the record shows that petitioner's appearance before the police station was far from
being voluntary. In this case, the so-called "request for appearance" is no different from the
"invitation" issued by police officers for custodial investigation. The circumstances surrounding
petitioner's appearance before the police station falls within the definition of custodial investigation.
Petitioner was identified as a suspect in the theft of large cattle. Thus, when the request for
appearance was issued, he was already singled out as the probable culprit.
PO3 Lozarito testified that there was no custodial investigation because he did not ask
questions. He "let Teresita and petitioner confront each other." However, PO3 Lozarito's explanation
attempts to circumvent the law protecting the rights of the accused during custodial investigation.
People v. Chavez discussed that the so-called Miranda rights "are intended to protect ordinary
citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting." The confrontation between Teresita and petitioner
can be considered as having been done in a custodial setting because (1) petitioner was requested to
appear by the police; (2) the confrontation was done in a police station; and (3) based on his
testimony, PO3 Lozarito was inside the police station during the confrontation. When petitioner
appeared before Teresita at the police station, the "pressures of a custodial setting" were present.
Hence, PO3 Lozarito's statement on what transpired between petitioner and Mario and Teresita Perez
are inadmissible for being hearsay.
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his
own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not
testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay
evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it
is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as
affidavits.
Q: When does the rules on custodial investigation begin to operate?
A: The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody,
and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements
that the rule begins to operate.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CLARGES CORPORATION
GR No. 170060, Aug 17, 2016
The admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court, the discretion is with the trial court. If
leave is denied, the proper remedy is to file a complaint to be docketed as a separate case.
FACTS:
A parcel of land located in Makati City was registered under the name of Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (MMIC).To secure a loan, MMIC first mortgaged the property to Caltex
Philippines, Inc (Caltex). A second mortgage was constituted over the property, this time in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
MMIC failed to pay its loan obligations. Caltex foreclosed its mortgage on the property. As second
mortgagee, the DBP redeemed the property from Caltex and the property formed part of the DBP’s
physical assets.
DBP then offered the property for public sale, where Clarges Realty Corporation (CRC) emerged as
the highest bidder. DBP bound itself under the Deed of Absolute Sale to deliver a title to the property free
from any and all liens and encumbrances on or before December 15, 1987.
CRC demanded a clean title from the Development Bank of the Philippines, but the bank failed to
deliver a clean title. CRC filed before RTC Makati a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages.
DBP moved for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. DBP sought to implead the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) as a third-party defendant and maintained that APT had assumed the "direct and
personal" obligation to pay for MMIC's tax liability and to have the partially reduced tax lien cancelled
(under Proclamation No. 50). CRC argued that admitting the third-party complaint would cause
unreasonable delay and entail unnecessary costs.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint.
RULING:
NO. Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court governs the filing of third-party complaints:
SEC. 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. - A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a claim that
a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third
(fourth, etc.)-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent's claim.
APT would have been a valid third-party defendant as trustee of the National Government to whom
petitioner's assets were transferred under Proclamation No. 50, APT acquired the liabilities attached to
those assets. The tax lien over the property here is one such liability, and petitioner may ask APT for
contribution for the payment of the unpaid tax and the tax lien's consequent cancellation.
However, petitioner need not await for contribution from the APT before it can fulfill its obligation
to deliver a clean title. The tax lien may be enforced against any mortgagee. With petitioner capable of
having the tax lien cancelled, it cannot insist on the admission of its third-party complaint against the
APT. The admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court, the discretion is with the trial
court. If leave is denied, the proper remedy is to file a complaint to be docketed as a separate case.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in denying leave to admit the third-party complaint against
the APT. The rationale for permissive joinder of a third-party defendant who may be liable to the original
defendant is judicial economy. This practice avoids multiplicity of actions and saves time and
reduplication of effort by trying all issues together in one action. However, there is little economy in
waiting to join the third-party defendant after the original plaintiff rested its case, as DBP did in this case.
Not only will the probable delay prejudice CRC, there is also great possibility of prejudice to APT
because the latter will be unable to defend against CRC’s claim upon which its liability may depend.
Q: What is the proper remedy when a Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint is denied?
A: The admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court, the discretion is with the trial court.
If leave is denied, the proper remedy is to file a complaint to be docketed as a separate case.
E.I DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND CO., (assignee of inventors Carino, Duncia and Wong),
Petitioner vs. DIRECTOR EMMA C. FRANCISCO (in her capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE), DIRECTOR EPIFANIO M. VELASCO (in his
capacity as the DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PATENTS, and THERAPHARMA, INC.,
Respondents
G.R. No. 174379 August 31, 2016
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction. Courts
lose competence in relation to an order if it acts in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. A petition for review under Rule 45, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal intended to
correct errors of judgment. Errors of judgment are errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction.
This includes a review of the conclusions of law of the lower court and, in appropriate cases, evaluation
of the admissibility, weight, and inference from the evidence presented.
FACTS:
E.I. Dupont Nemours and Company is an American corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Delaware. It is the assignee of inventors David John Carini, John Jonas Vytautas Duncia, and
Pancras Chor Bun Wong, all citizens of the United States of America. In 1987, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed
Philippine Patent Application No. 35526 before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology
Transfer. The application was for Angiotensin II Receptor Blocking Imidazole (losartan), an invention
related to the treatment of hypertension and congestive heart failure. The product was produced and
marketed by Merck, Sharpe, and Dohme Corporation (Merck), E.I. Dupont Nemours' licensee, under the
brand names Cozaar and Hyzaar.
The patent application was handled by Atty. Nicanor D. Mapili, a local resident agent who
handled a majority of E.I. Dupont Nemours' patent applications in the Philippines.
On December 19, 2000, E.I. Dupont Nemours' new counsel, Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro,
Odulio, Calma, and Carbonell, sent the Intellectual Property Office a letter requesting that an office
action be issued on Philippine Patent Application No. 35526. In response, Patent Examiner Precila O.
Bulihan of Intellectual Property Office sent an office action marked Paper No. 2 on January 30, 2002,
which stated that reconstituted documents provided no documents that will show that the authority to
prosecute the instant application is now transferred to the present counsel. An official revocation of the
Power of Attorney of the former counsel and the appointment of the present by the applicant is therefore
required before further action can be undertaken.
On May 29, 2002, E.I. Dupont Nemours replied to the office action by submitting a Power of
Attorney executed by Miriam Meconnahey, authorizing Ortega, Castillo, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio,
Calma, and Carbonell to prosecute and handle its patent applications. On the same day, it also filed a
Petition for Revival with Cost of Philippine Patent Application No. 35526. On April 18, 2002, the
Director of Patents denied the Petition for Revival for having been filed out of time.
E.I. Dupont Nemours appealed the denial to the Director-General of the Intellectual Property
Office on August 26, 2002. In the Decision dated October 22, 2003, Director-General Emma C. Francisco
denied the appeal and affirmed the Resolution of the Director of Patents.
On November 21, 2003, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
seeking to set aside the Intellectual Property Office's Decision dated October 22, 2003. On August 31,
2004, the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Review.
In the interim, Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit the Attached Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 11, 2004 and argued that the Court of Appeals' August 31, 2004 Decision
directly affects its "vested" rights to sell its own product.
Therapharma, Inc. alleged that on January 4, 2003, it filed before the Bureau of Food and Drugs
its own application for a losartan product "Lifezar," a medication for hypertension, which the Bureau
granted. It argued that it made a search of existing patent applications for similar products before its
application, and that no existing patent registration was found since E.I. Dupont Nemours' application for
its losartan product was considered abandoned by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology
Transfer. It alleged that sometime in 2003 to 2004, there was an exchange of correspondence between
Therapharma, Inc. and Merck. In this exchange, Merck informed Therapharma, Inc. that it was pursuing a
patent on the losartan products in the Philippines and that it would pursue any legal action necessary to
protect its product.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued the Resolution granting the Motion· for Leave
to Intervene. E.I. Dupont Nemours moved for reconsideration on February 22, 2006, assailing the Court
of Appeals' January 31, 2006 Resolution. On August 30,. 2006, the Court of Appeals resolved both
Motions for Reconsideration and rendered the Amended Decision reversing its August 31, 2004 Decision.
On October 19, 2006, petitioner E.I. Dupont Nemours filed before this Court this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Petition for Review on Certiorari complied with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court when petitioner failed to attach certain documents to support the allegations in the complaint;
2. Whether petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
HELD:
1. YES. If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it may still be given due course if it
falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition
"be accompanied by ... such material portions of the record as would support the petition," the failure to
do so will not necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of the complaint.
In Magsino v. De Ocampo, this Court applied the procedural guideposts in Galvez v. Court of
Appeals in determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed a petition for review under
Rule 42 for failure to attach relevant portions of the record. Thus:
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, a case that involved the dismissal of a petition for certiorari to
assail an unfavorable ruling brought about by the failure to attach copies of all pleadings submitted and
other material portions of the record in the trial court (like the complaint, answer and position paper) as
would support the allegations of the petition, the Court recognized three guideposts for the CA to consider
in determining whether or not the rules of procedures should be relaxed, as follows:
 First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only
those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document
will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due
course to the petition.
 Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it
is shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found in another document already attached to
the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
 Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the
documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on
the merits.
Upon filing of its Consolidated Reply, petitioner was able to attach the following additional
documents:
(1) Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals;

(2) Letters dated July 18, 1995, December 12, 1995, and December 29, 1995;
(3) Declaration of Ms. Miriam Meconnahey dated June 25, 2002;
(4) Spreadsheet of petitioner's patent applications handled by Atty. Mapili;
(5) Power of Attorney and Appointment of Resident Agent dated September 26, 1996;
(6) Letter dated December 19, 2000 requesting an Office Action on Patent Application No. 35526;
(7) Paper No. 2 dated January 30, 2002;
(8) Petition for Revival dated January 30, 2002 with attached Power of Attorney and Appointment of
Resident Agent;
(9) Resolution dated July 24, 2002 by Director of the Bureau of Patents; and
(10) Notice of and Memorandum on Appeal before the DirectorGeneral of the Intellectual
Property Office.
The third procedural guidepost in Magsino was complied with upon the submission of these
documents. Petitioner, therefore, has substantially complied with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court.
2. NO. Generally, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie to raise this issue in
a limited manner. There must be a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion for writ of certiorari to be
issued. However, when the Court of Appeals has already resolved the question of intervention and the
merits of the case, an appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the proper remedy.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction.
Courts lose competence in relation to an order if it acts in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. A petition for review under Rule 45, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal
intended to correct errors of judgment. Errors of judgment are errors committed by a court within its
jurisdiction. This includes a review of the conclusions of law of the lower court and, in appropriate cases,
evaluation of the admissibility, weight, and inference from the evidence presented.
Intervention results in an interlocutory order ancillary to a principal action. Its grant or denial is
subject to the sound discretion of the court. Interlocutory orders, or orders that do not make a final
disposition of the merits of the main controversy or cause of action, are generally not reviewable. The
only exception is a limited one, in that when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where it
can be shown that the court acted without, in excess, or with such grave abuse of discretion that such
action ousts it of jurisdiction.
Judicial economy, or the goal to have cases prosecuted with the least cost to the parties, requires
that unnecessary or frivolous reviews of orders by the trial court, which facilitate the resolution of the
main merits of the case, be reviewed together with the main merits of the case. After all, it would be more
efficient for an appellate court to review a case in its entire context when the case is finally disposed.
The question of whether intervention is proper is a question of law. Settled is the distinction
between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of fact arises when there is doubt as to the
truth or falsity of certain facts. A question of law, on the other hand, arises when "the appeal raises doubt
as to the applicable law on a certain set of facts."
The test often used by this Court to determine whether there is a question of fact or a question of
law "is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact."
Petitioner raises the question of whether Republic Act No. 165 allows the Court of Appeals to
grant a motion for intervention. This necessarily requires a determination of whether Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court applies in appeals of cases filed under Republic Act No. 165. The determination of this question
does not require a review of re-evaluation of the evidence. It requires a determination of the applicable
law.
Q. What is the test of relevancy whether a document will support the material allegations in the
petition?
A. The test is whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Q. May a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record be given due course or
reinstated if earlier dismissed?
A. Yes. Upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
Q. Distinguish a special civil action under Rule 65 as against petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
A. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction. Courts
lose competence in relation to an order if it acts in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. A petition for review under Rule 45, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal intended to
correct errors of judgment. Errors of judgment are errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction. This
includes a review of the conclusions of law of the lower court and, in appropriate cases, evaluation of the
admissibility, weight, and inference from the evidence presented.
Q. Distinguish a question of fact as against a question of law.

A. A question of fact arises when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of certain facts. A question of
law, on the other hand, arises when "the appeal raises doubt as to the applicable law on a certain set of
facts."
The test often used by this Court to determine whether there is a question of fact or a question of law "is
not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact."
Q. Are interlocutors order reviewable?
A. Interlocutory orders, or orders that do not make a final disposition of the merits of the main
controversy or cause of action, are generally not reviewable. The only exception is a limited one, in that
when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where it can be shown that the court acted
without, in excess, or with such grave abuse of discretion that such action ousts it of jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF THE LATE IRENEO AND CARIDAD
ENTAPA, NAMELY: ROSARIO ENTAPA-ORPEZA, JULIANNE E. HAMM,1 CERINA G.
ENTAPA, WINSTON G. ENTAPA (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS SPOUSE, NINFA
LAMISTOZA-ENTAPA, FRANKLIN G. ENTAPA, MARINA E. SCHACHT, AND ELVIRA G.
ENTAPA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 215072, September 07, 2016
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
FACTS:
On December 5, 1973, Caridad Entapa (Entapa) and her children, Julianna E. Hamm and Winston
Entapa, executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Joseph Gonzaga (Gonzaga) to enter into legal
transactions on their behalf. Gonzaga executed a real estate mortgage over Lot No. 2665 in favor of the
Philippine National Bank to guarantee his loan of P30,600.00. Gonzaga failed to pay the loan. 11 The
property was foreclosed and was sold at a public auction. The Philippine National Bank emerged as the
winning bidder.12 A Certificate of Sale was issued in the bank's favor on December 29, 1983. Entapa's
other heirs had no knowledge of Gonzaga's Special Power of Attorney. They learned of the foreclosure
sale only after the public auction. Rosario Entapa Orpeza (Orpeza), representing Entapa's other heirs,
went to the Philippine National Bank at Lacson Street, Bacolod City to ask about the repurchase of the
property and to request for a restructuring and recomputation of Gonzaga's loan in accordance with the
guidelines of Republic Act No. 7202. Restructuring was approved. In compliance, Orpeza sent a bank
transfer of 9,797 German Deutschmark equivalent to P178,336.19, 20% of the recomputed amount. 19 She
also paid the realty taxes on the property. Orpeza alleged that after she deposited the amount, she
discovered that five (5) families were already residing and planting crops on Lot No. 2665, by virtue of
Certificates of Land Ownership (CLOA) issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform. As a result,
Orpeza demanded the return of the downpayment she made with the Philippine National Bank and asked
for the annulment of the CLOAs. As the bank still refused to refund the amount despite demand, Orpeza
and her siblings instituted a complaint for collection of sum of money against the Philippine National
Bank on October 5, 1998.
In its defense, the Philippine National Bank insisted that before it approved Orpeza's request for
restructuring and recomputation, it verified that Lot No. 2665 was not included in the transfer of
properties to the Department of Agrarian Reform. 30 It also alleged that when Lot No. 2665 was offered to
the Department of Agrarian Reform on September 30, 1989, it had no knowledge nor information as to
the status of its application as it had not received any payment from the Land Bank of the Philippines.
RTC ruled in favor of Respondents. CA Reversed but still ruled in favor of the Respomdents.
ISSUES:
Whether the Court of Appeals adjudicated on the merits of the case despite ordering its remand to
the trial court.
RULING:
NO. The CA cannot rule on the merits on the case for the issues were raised first time on appeal.
Rule 36 SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
Q: What are the requisites of a valid judgment?
A: A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SPS. MARGARITO ASOQUE AND TARCINIA
ASOQUE
G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
“The valuations suggested by the commissioner as just compensation for respondents' land that
was utilized by petitioner were merely recommendatory. The final determination of just compensation
was left to the court a quo as it rests within the exclusive domain of the latter… Hence, absent any
express limitation in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of Court Arty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the
court-appointed Commissioner, may make factual findings and recommendations on the valuation of the
property. Indeed, the Commissioner's recommendation could have been necessarily rejected had it been
an ultra vires act.”
FACTS:
Spouses Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land located in Barangay
Bugtong, Calbayog City. Sometime in November 1995, the National Power Corporation entered the
Spouses Asoque's land to install transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power
Transmission Line Project. Spouses Asoque allege that beforehand, they were made to understand that the
National Power Corporation would pay them the value of the portion of the land used and all
improvements that would be destroyed for the National Power Corporation's project.
The National Power Corporation only paid for the improvements destroyed and refused to pay for
the actual value of the 4,352-square-meter area utilized for the project. The National Power Corporation
claimed that it was only liable to pay for right of way at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended.
Spouses Asoque filed before the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City a Complaint for payment
of just compensation and damages. The National Power Corporation denied Spouses Asoque's claims that
it had illegally utilized their property. It alleged that it entered the property with Spouses Asoque's
consent, as shown by the acknowledgment receipt for P9, 897.00 as payment for damaged improvements
and waiver of claims to improvements damaged.
When Civil Case No. 737 was called for pre-trial on May 8, 2000, the case was ordered dismissed
by the trial court due to the non-appearance of both parties and their counsel. However, the case was
reinstated after Spouses Asoque's counsel explained to the trial court the reason why he arrived late. The
pre-trial of the case was reset to May 24, 2000. Noting the absence of the National Power Corporation
and its counsel, allowed Spouses Asoque to present their evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
Commissioner. It simultaneously dismissed the National Power Corporation's counterclaim.
On June 6, 2000, the trial court denied National Power Corporation's Urgent Manifestation and
Motion to Reset Pre-trial, finding it to have been filed out of time and also moot and academic. National
Power Corporation's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the trial court's Order dated
June 21, 2000.
On June 22, July 24, and August 28, 2000, Spouses Asoque presented evidence ex parte before
Atty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, Branch Clerk of Court, who was appointed Commissioner by the trial court.
Spouses Asoque then filed their Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits on September 6, 2000, to which
the National Power Corporation filed its Comment/Objection, citing the inadmissibility of the exhibits
presented.
The National Power Corporation further argues that the trial court's appointment of a
commissioner and the latter's appraisal of the fair market value of the property and the improvements
made were defective and ultra vires. It contends that Rule 18, Section 2(f) of the Rules of Court does not
give the Commissioner such authority but merely allows him to assist in defining the issues to be resolved
during the trial. Petitioner also points out that the May 8, 2000 Order merely designated a commissioner
to receive respondents' evidence and nothing more. There is likewise no showing that the Commissioner
took an oath before performing his function, as required by the Rules. In response, spouses Asoque aver
that this was proper and sanctioned by the Rules; that the Commissioner's preliminary determination of
just compensation was merely recommendatory and did not make the ex parte proceedings invalid; and
that the final determination of the amount of just compensation still rests on the trial judge.
ISSUE:
Whether the court-appointed Commissioner exceeded his authority when he conducted an

appraisal of the property and recommended a valuation for just compensation.
HELD:
NO. The petition of National Power Corporation lacks merit. When a reference is made, the clerk
shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the order of reference. The order may specify or
limit the powers of the commissioner, and may direct him to report only upon particular issues, or to do or
perform particular acts, or to receive and report evidence only, and may fix the date for beginning and
closing the hearings and for the filing of his report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in
the order, the commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every hearing
before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of
his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and
unless otherwise provided in the order of reference, he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The
trial or hearing before him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.
The report of the commissioner shows clearly that he received and evaluated [respondents']
evidence which were adduced ex parte. His preliminary determination of the just compensation of the
property [in] issue would not necessarily render invalid the ex parte proceedings conducted by him. The
valuations suggested by the commissioner as just compensation for [respondents'] land that was utilized
by [petitioner] were merely recommendatory. The final determination of just compensation was left to the
court a quo as it rests within the exclusive domain of the latter. Simply stated, the court a quo was still at
liberty to reject or adopt the recommendations of the commissioner. Hence, absent any express limitation
in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of Court Arty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the court-appointed
Commissioner, may make factual findings and recommendations on the valuation of the property. Indeed,
the Commissioner's recommendation could have been necessarily rejected had it been an ultra vires act.
Q: Can a court-appointed Commissioner, who conducted an appraisal of the property, recommended a

valuation for just compensation?
A: YES, the valuations suggested by the commissioner as just compensation are merely recommendatory.
The final determination of just compensation was left to the court a quo as it rests within the exclusive
domain of the latter.
The commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every hearing before
him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties
under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless
otherwise provided in the order of reference, he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or
hearing before him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.
RUEL TUANO Y HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016
Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions for the
substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of
the death of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions.
FACTS:
Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged and convicted with violation of Article II,
Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165 before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
having in his possession one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams of shabu. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
Accused moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. The
accused filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, but the Court affirmed the
decision of Court of Appeals.
The accused moved for reconsideration. On June 27, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution
acquitting the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, on July 22, 2016, this Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of
Corrections a letter dated July 15, 2016 informing this Court that accused died on March 1, 2015, prior to
the issuance of this Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the counsel remiss on his duty when he failed to inform the court of the death of
his client
HELD:
Yes. Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides that:
“Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply
with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the
counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs.”
Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions
for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the
court of the death of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature of
the action, courts cannot be expected to assume the death of the party without the counsel's proper
manifestation.
Counsels for accused were grossly remiss in this duty. Accused died on March 1, 2015. However,
his counsels continued to file pleadings on his behalf, including a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Reply dated September 16, 2015 and a Reply dated September 22, 2015. It was only through the July 15,
2016 letter of the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections did this Court find out that accused had
already died:—one (1) year, four (4) months, and 15 days after its occurrence.
This Court notes that accused was represented by the Public Attorney's Office. Notwithstanding
their heavy case workload and the free legal assistance they provide to indigents and low-income persons,
however, counsels from the Public Attorney's Office are still obliged to pursue their cases with
competence and diligence. This is consistent with their commitment to public service.
Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer who accepts the
cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients." Additionally, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly states that "a lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and
convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession."
Counsels for accused have shown inefficiency in the performance of their duties. Relying on their
representations in their pleadings, this Court was led to believe that the criminal action against accused
subsisted. Consequently, this Court issued a resolution even after accused's death. Had counsels for
accused informed this Court earlier of the death of their client, this Court would have been saved precious
time, effort, and resources, which could have been devoted to other pending cases that call for this Court's
resolution and judgment.
Given these circumstances, counsels for accused are directed to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them in light of their failure to inform this Court of accused's death.
Q: What are the duties of the counsel when his client dies pending the final judgment of the case?
A: it shall be the duty of the counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof and to give the name and address of the deceased’s legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action (Rule 3, Section 16 of
the Rules of Court)
Q: Is Rule 3, Section 16 likewise applicable to criminal cases?
A: Yes, although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions
for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the
court of the death of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature of
the action, courts cannot be expected to assume the death of the party without the counsel's proper
manifestation.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING v. PABLITO O. LIM
GR No. 172948, Oct 05, 2016
FACTS:
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (hereafter PASAR) is a corporation

duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged in copper smelting and
refining.On the other hand, Pablito Lim, Manuel Agcaoili and Consuelo Padilla (collectively referred to
as petitioners) were former senior officers and presently shareholders of PASAR holding 500 shares each.
An Amended Petition for Injunction and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, dated February 4, 2004 was filed by PASAR seeking to restrain petitioners
from demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent records.
On April 14, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting PASAR's prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The RTC held that the right to inspect book should not be denied to the stockholders,
however, the same may be restricted. The right to inspect should be limited to the ordinary records as
identified and classified by PASAR.
On May 26, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
on the ground that the petition is insufficient. Petitioners claim that the enforcement of the right to inspect
book should be on the stockholders and not on PASAR.
On January 10, 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order, denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by
petitioners on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules on
Intra-Corporate Controversies under the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). The Motion for
Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise denied on the ground that the writ does not
completely result in unjust denial of petitioners' right to inspect the books of the corporation.
Aggrieved, Lim, Agcaoili, and Padilla filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
The Court of Appeals held that there was no basis to issue an injunctive writ, thus:We agree. The
act of PASAR in filing a petition for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction is uncalled
for. The petition is a pre-emptive action unjustly intended to impede and restrain the stockholders' rights.
If a stockholder demands the inspection of corporate books, the corporation could refuse to heed to such
demand.
ISSUE:
Whether injunction properly lies to prevent respondents from invoking their right to inspect.
RULING:
NO. For an action for injunction to prosper, the applicant must show the existence of a right, as
well as the actual or threatened violation of this right. In Almeida v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed
how important it is for the applicant for an injunctive writ to establish his right thereto by competent
evidence:
An injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an. actual existing right would not justify injunctive relief in his
favor.
Thus, an injunction must fail where there is no clear showing of both an actual right to be
protected and its threatened violation, which calls for the issuance of an injunction.
The Corporation Code provides that a stockholder has the right to inspect the records of all
business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting at reasonable hours on business
days. The stockholder may demand in writing for a copy of excerpts from these records or minutes, at his
or her expense
The right to inspect under Section 74 of the Corporation Code is subject to certain limitations.
However, these limitations are expressly provided as defenses in actions filed under Section 74.
In this case, petitioner invokes its right to raise the limitations provided under Section 74 of the
Corporation Code. However, petitioner provides scant legal basis to claim this right because it does not
raise the limitations as a matter of defense. As properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals
The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient authority to conclude that
an action for injunction and, consequently, a writ of preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is
generally unavailable to prevent stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Specifically,
stockholders cannot be prevented from gaining access to the (a) records of all business transactions of the
corporation; and (b) minutes of any meeting of stockholders or the board of directors, including their
various committees and subcommittees.
The law takes into consideration the potential disparity in the financial legal resources between
the corporation and an ordinary stockholder. Good faith and a legitimate purpose are presumed. It is the
duty of the corporation to allege and prove with sufficient evidence the facts that give rise to a claim of
bad faith as to the existence of an illegitimate purpose.
Q: When is an injunctive remedy available in court proceedings?
A: An injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an. actual existing right would not justify injunctive relief in his favor.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), represented by SEC.
HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR, and METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, represented by CHAIRMAN BAYANI F. FERNANDO, Petitioners vs. CITY
ADVERTISING VENTURES CORPORATION, represented by DEXTER Y. LIM, Respondent
G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an
existing right before trial, a material and substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary
injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
FACTS:
City Advertising Ventures Corporation is a company engaged in the advertising business, such as
putting up banners and signages within Metro Manila.
Sometime in 2005, City Advertising Ventures Corporation entered into a lease agreement with
the MERALCO Financing Services Corporation for the use of 5,000 of Manila Electric Company's
lampposts to display advertising banners. Under this contract, City Advertising Ventures Corporation
obtained sign permits from Quezon City's Department of Engineering, Office of the Building Official,
Signboard Permit Section. It obtained similar permits for the cities of Pasay and. Makati. It likewise
obtained permits for setting up pedestrian overpass banners in Quezon City.
When Typhoon Milenyo hit in September 2006, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown
by strong winds and fell. In its wake, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, issued Administrative Order No. 160 directing the Department of Public
Works and Highways to conduct field investigations, evaluations and assessments of all billboards and
determine those that are hazardous and pose imminent danger to life, health, safety and property of the
general public.
On October 6, 2006, the Department of Public Works and Highways announced that they would
start dismantling billboards. During its operations, it was able to remove 250 of City Advertising
Ventures Corporation's lamppost banners and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian
overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps.
City Advertising Ventures Corporation then filed before the Regional Trial Court of its
Complaint for Violation of Administrative Order No. 160, Tort, and Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
Asserting that Administrative Order No. 160 pertained specifically to billboards and not to small
advertising fixtures such as its signages and banners, it claimed that the Department of Public Works and
Highways exceeded its authority when it dismantled its banners and other fixtures. The Regional Trial
Court issued the Order granting City Advertising Ventures Corporation's prayer for a temporary
restraining order and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In response, the
Department of Public Works and Highways and the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Order and for the Dissolution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. They asserted that City Advertising Ventures Corporation failed to show a clear
legal right worthy of protection and that it did not stand to suffer grave and irreparable injury. They
likewise asserted that the Regional Trial Court exceeded its authority in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, it filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which was alsi denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in issuing its November 21, 2006 and
April 11, 2007 Orders.
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court, in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondent,
acted in a manner that was practically bereft of or violative of legally acceptable standards.
RULING:
1. NO. The Court cannot entertain petitioners' prayer that the Regional Trial Court be ordered to dismiss
Civil Case No. 06-899. After seeking relief from the Court of Appeals through the remedy of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioners came to the Supreme Court through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
A Rule 65 petition is an original action, independent of the action from which the assailed ruling
arose. A Rule 45 petition, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the case
subject of the appeal. As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
court below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the
first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule.
Rule 45 petitions engendered by prior Rule 65 petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition are,
therefore, bound by the same basic issue at the crux of the prior Rule 65 petition, that is, issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. When Rule 45 petitions are brought before this Court, they
remain tethered to the "sole office" of the original action to which they owe their existence: the correction
of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
When petitioners sought relief from the Court of Appeals, what they sought to remedy was the
Regional Trial Court's issuance of its November 21, 2006 and April 11, 2007 Orders. These were
interlocutory orders pertaining to a temporary relief extended to respondent, that is, a writ of preliminary
injunction. These orders were not judgments that completely disposed of Civil Case No. 06-899.
2. NO. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued in order to prevent threatened or continuous

irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, it will be
issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated.
In the case, Respondent satisfied the standards for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The Regional Trial Court acted in keeping with these standards and did not gravely abuse its
discretion in extending temporary relief to respondent.
Q: What id the difference between Rule 45 and Rule 65?
A: A Rule 65 petition is an original action, independent of the action from which the assailed ruling
arose. A Rule 45 petition, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the case
subject of the appeal.
Q: Why is a writ if preliminary injunction issued?
A: It is issued in order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. For a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued, the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and
substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury.
Q: What is the aim of a writ if preliminary injunction?
A: Its aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
SPOUSES GEMINO C. MIANO, JR. AND JULIET MIANO, Petitioners, v. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY [MERALCO], Respondents.
G.R. No. 205035, November 16, 2016
The review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion." The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed
under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts.
Facts:
Spouses Miano are users of the electric service provided by the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO). In 1996, their first electric meter with Service ID No. 551211301 was installed to service
their residence. In 2002, their second electric meter with Service ID No. 911978601 was installed to
service their sari-sari store.
On March 7, 2002, MERALCO personnel conducted an inspection of Spouses Miano's electric

meters and discovered that there were two jumpers on their meter service connection. MERALCO
disconnected the electrical service for Spouses Miano's residence (Service ID No. 551211301) and issued
a billing differential in the amount of P422,185.20, representing the unbilled amount of electricity
consumed due to the jumpers.
On December 18, 2002, MERALCO also disconnected the electrical service for Spouses
Miano's sari-sari store (Service ID No. 911978601) because of "illegal/flying service
connection." MERALCO found that Spouses Miano drew electricity from their sari-sari store to service
their residence.
MERALCO refused to reconnect Spouses Miano's electricity service due to their non-payment of
the billing differential.
On January 10, 2003, Spouses Miano filed a Complaint for damages and injunction with Urgent
Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against MERALCO.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Complaint filed by Spouses Miano and ordered them to
settle the billing differential being collected by MERALCO. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified
the Regional Trial Court's Decision and ruled that due to MERALCO's failure to notify Spouses Miano
prior to disconnection, MERALCO should pay Spouses Miano P100,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. MERALCO was also ordered to
restore their electricity connection; but ordered Spouses Miano to pay the billing differential.
In their Petition for Review on Certiorari, Spouses Miano pray that the portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision ordering them to pay the billing differential of P422,185.20 be reversed and set aside.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue of payment of the billing differential is a proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari.
Held:
No. Considering that the lone issue in this appeal pertains only to the billing differential of Php
422,185.20 allegedly due to MERALCO, petitioners will reiterate the narration of facts of the trial court
and the Honorable Court of Appeals related to the said issue and determine if the same is in accordance
with the evidence presented by the parties. Petitioners admit that the only issue for resolution before this
Court is a question of fact, yet they claim that the present Petition falls under the exceptions to the general
rule.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court may
review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.
While there are well-settled exceptions to the general rule, none of the exceptions to justify the
re-evaluation of the findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are present in this
case. On the contrary, the findings of fact by the lower court are well-supported by the evidence on
record.
Q: Is review of appeals a matter of right?
A: No, the Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion.
Q: What are the questions which may be raised on appeal?
A: The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's
function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.
Q: What are the exceptions for the general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45?
A: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
LUZ ANATOLIA E. CRISPINO, CARIDAD O. ECHAVES REESE AND ZENAIDA ECHAVES
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, REUBEN CAPILI ECHAVES vs.
ANATOLIA TANSAY AS SUBSTITUTED BY LILIAN YAP
G.R. No. 184466, December 05, 2016
The Court of Appeals' power to receive evidence to resolve factual issues in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction is qualified by its internal rules. In an ordinary appeal, the Court of
Appeals may receive evidence when a motion for new trial is granted based on newly discovered
evidence.
Facts:
Respondent Anatolia Tansay, now deceased, was twice widowed. In 1947, Anatolia established
her residence in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental. There, she met 20-year old Zenaida Capili who was then
single. Anatolia took in Zenaida and treated her as her own child.Subsequently, Anatolia and Zenaida
moved to Cebu City, where Anatolia acquired a 3,107 sq. m. parcel of land (Lot No. 1048) known as the
Tansay Compound. Anatolia subdivided the compound into three lots: (1) Lot No. 1048-A-1 with an area
of 617 sq. m., (2) Lot No. 1048-A-2 with an area of 555 sq. m., and (3) Lot No. 1048-A-3 with an area of
1,845 sq. m. In 1957, Anatolia constructed her abode over a portion of Lot No. 1048-A-3.Zenaida
eventually got married to Ben Ricaredo Echaves and had several children, among whom are petitioners
Luz Anatolia E. Crispino and Caridad C. Echaves. Zenaida and her family lived in Anatolia's house.
Anatolia had a close relationship with the Echaves family. By virtue of two deeds of sale, Anatolia
allegedly sold Lot No. 1048- A-1 in favor of Zenaida on July 6, 1981 and tot No. 1048-A-3 in favor of
Luz Anatolia and Caridad on July 11, 1989.
In 1991, Zenaida returned from abroad and discovered that the titles of the lots were missing from
her room where she had left them. Hence, she filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City for reconstitution of the certificates of title, which was granted.Meanwhile, Anatolia filed Civil Case
No. CEB-14547 entitled Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of Transfer, and Cancellation of Title
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.Zenaida alleged that Anatolia sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 in her
favor for P6,170.00. One of Zenaida's daughters, Lourdes Behaves de Leon, testified that since 1975, her
sisters, Luz Anatolia and Caridad, deposited sums of money in Anatolia's bank account for the purchase
of Lot No. 1048- A-3. However, Anatolia merely turned over the sums she received to Zenaida since she
was not in need of money.
Based on the evidence on record, the trial court found that Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad
did not pay any monetary or other valuable consideration for the transfer of the properties in their names.
Hence, the deeds of sale could not have been valid. In addition, the trial court found that Anatolia never
intended to sell the lots despite executing the deeds of sale. Rather, she merely constituted Zenaida, Luz
Anatolia, and Caridad as trustees of the properties. The trial court also questioned the validity of
Zenaida's Petition for Reconstitution of Titles considering that Anatolia presented the Original
Certificates of Title of the properties in court.
Issues:
1. Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed in an appeal of the appellate court's Decision.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating petitioners' motion to remand as a motion for new trial
under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
1. No, as a general rule, an Interlocutory Order cannot be assailed via Appeal.
A final judgment or order, from which an appeal may be taken, is one that finally disposes of the
case and leaves nothing more to be done by the court (e.g. an adjudication on the merits of the case on the
basis of the evidence). In contrast, an interlocutory order is one that merely resolves incidental matters
and does not finally dispose of the case. When an interlocutory order is issued, the court is still tasked
with adjudicating on the merits of the case.
The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal but a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The reason for the prohibition is to prevent multiple appeals in a
single action that would unnecessarily cause delay during trial. Faced with an interlocutory order, parties
may instantly avail of the special civil action of certiorari. This would entail compliance with the strict
requirements under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Aggrieved parties would have to prove that the order
was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and that there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
This notwithstanding, a special civil action for certiorari is not the only remedy that aggrieved
parties may take against an interlocutory order, since an interlocutory order may be appealed in an appeal
of the judgment itself. In Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals it was held: Unlike a "final" judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually' be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.
The Court of Appeals' Resolution dated July 25, 2006, which denied petitioners' motion to
remand, was an interlocutory order. It did not finally dispose of the case because the appellate court still
had to determine whether the deeds of sale executed by Anatolia were valid. Rather than availing of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners opted to wait for the Court of Appeals to
render its decision before challenging the July 25, 2006 Resolution. Petitioners did not commit any
procedural infirmity in assailing the interlocutory order in an appeal of the Court of Appeals' decision.
Though petitioners could have filed a petition for certiorari, they would have been burdened to prove that
the Court of Appeals: committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to remand. Moreover,
petitioners still had the option to assail the July 25, 2006 Resolution in an appeal of the Court of Appeals'
final decision.
2. Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly treated petitioners' motion to remand as a motion for new trial
under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Section 9 or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is empowered to receive evidence to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. However, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended, should be read and construed together with the Court of Appeals' internal rules.
Although the Court of Appeals has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded
powers under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this power is not without limit. The Court of
Appeals cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If the interpretation were otherwise,
then there would be no end to litigation. Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the Court of Appeals may only
receive evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This notwithstanding,
the Court of Appeals cannot accept any kind of evidence in a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial
under Rule 53 is limited to newly discovered evidence.
The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does not fall under the
concept of newly discovered evidence. The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales
was allegedly executed on January 15, 1998, three years after the Regional Trial Court rendered its
decision. Hence, it could not have been discovered by petitioners prior to trial by the exercise of due
diligence.
However, the document is not of such character that would probably change the lower court's
judgment. The nature of the deeds of sale executed would not have been affected even if the Confirmation
of Previous Sales was admitted in evidence since the validity of a contract is determined by law and not
by the stipulation of the parties. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals can determine whether the deeds of
sale were valid independent of said document. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioners'
motion to have the Confirmation of Previous Sales admitted in evidence.
Q: When can the CA receive evidence in an ordinary appeal?
A: In an ordinary appeal, the Court of Appeals may receive evidence when a motion for new trial is
granted based on newly discovered evidence.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1271 COMMITTEE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHAIR OF THE COMMITTEE, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, AND BENEDICTO ULEP, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY vs.
GLORIA RODRIGUEZ DE GUZMAN, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
LORENZO MA. G. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 187291, December 05, 2016
GLORIA RODRIGUEZ DE GUZMAN, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,

LORENZO MA. G. AGUILAR vs. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1271 COMMITTEE, RAUL
M. GONZALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ANTONIO B. NACHURA,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SOLICITOR GENERAL, BENEDICTO B. ULEP, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, AND JUANITO K.
AMPAGUEY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY
G.R. NO. 187334
The doctrine of the law of the case provides that questions of law previously determined by a
court will generally govern a case through all its subsequent stages where the determination has already
been made on a prior appeal to a court of law resort.
Res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment precludes the questioning of a fact or issue in a

second case if the fact or issue has already been judicially determined in the first case between the same
parties.
FACTS:
Act No. 636 was enacted to provide for the allotment of property as a government reservation in
Baguio, Benguet. CFI of Benguet decreed as public properties all lands, buildings, and real rights within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, with the exception of areas inside established reservations and lands
adjudicated to private claimants named in these reservations. All other private claims not pursued in the
Civil Reservation Case No. 1 were barred forever.
Several interested parties filed a Petition before the CFI of Baguio and Benguet to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1. The PD No. 1271 reiterated the nullity of the titles issued in relation to the
reopening of the case. However, it provided that innocent third parties could have their properties
validated upon compliance with all the conditions.
The governing body tasked to implement the provisions of PD No. 1271 is the Presidential Decree
No. 1271 Committee (Baguio Validation Committee or BVC). It is composed of the Secretary of Justice
as Chair, and the Solicitor General and the Director of the Land Management Bureau as members.
Gloria Rodriguez De Guzman (Rodriguez) acquired the properties derived from Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 123 and 128. The Register of Deeds of Baguio issued a total of nine (9) Transfer
Certificates of Title to Rodriguez.
Consequently, Rodriguez filed separate applications for validation for seven (7) of her titles.
Pending her applications, Rodriguez filed before the RTC of Baguio a Petition seeking to correct the
caption of Resurvey Subdivision Plan and the technical descriptions of TCT Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-
12830, T-12831, and T-12832 to conform to the resurvey plan (docketed as LRC Case No. 445-R).
The OSG opposed the Petition and alleged that there was an increase in the area of the subdivided
lots covered by the TCTs.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the doctrine of law of the case applies.
2) Whether these TCTs must be validated based on res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
RULING:
1) NO. The ruling on TCT Nos. T-12824 and T-12825 cannot apply to TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-12827.
The law of the case does not apply to bar any ruling on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
12826 and T-12827. There is no attempt to change any legal finding with regard to TCTs that would
warrant the calling for its application.
Second, the ruling of the CA is not a ruling that can bind or limit this Court on another matter.
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of all legal questions brought before it.
Third, the facts that constitute the controversy are different. Rodriguez did not file any
application for the validation of the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-12824 and T-12825 before the
BVC. These titles are void and are of no effect unless validated. On the other hand, for TCT Nos. T-
12826 and T-12827. These titles were given application numbers and Rodriguez submitted applications to
BVC for its evaluation and decision.
2) NO. TCT Nos. T-12828 to T-12832 cannot be validated based on res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment.
There are two concepts of res judicata: (i) res judicata by bar by prior judgment; and (ii) res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Res judicata by bar by prior judgment precludes the filing of a
second case when it has the same parties, same subject, and same cause of action, or otherwise prays for
the same relief as the first case. On the other hand, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment precludes
the questioning of a fact or issue in a second case if the fact or issue has already been judicially
determined in the first case between the same parties.
If, in the first judgment and in the second case, the causes of action are different such that only
the parties and the issues are the same, there is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
In LRC Case No. 445-R, the RTC did not determine whether there was a fraudulent expansion
of the properties covered by the TCTs. What the it stated was that no collateral attack can be made on the
TCTs. The denial of the OSG opposition on the ground that it is a collateral attack on the TCT is not a
judgment on the validity of the TCT. It made no finding on the validity of the titles. It did not consider
any evidence of fraud.
Since there is no judicial determination of fraud, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment
cannot apply. The RTC Ruling cannot bar the issue of whether there was a fraudulent expansion of the
property covered by the TCTs, and they may still be questioned in a direct action seeking its nullification.
It is, thus, of no moment that the RTC Ruling became final and executory and has been
executed. What may no longer be questioned is the correction of the caption of the resurvey plan and the
technical descriptions on the TCT, not their validity.
Q: What is the doctrine of law of the case? What is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment?
A: The doctrine of the law of the case provides that questions of law previously determined by a court
will generally govern a case through all its subsequent stages where the determination has already been
made on a prior appeal to a court of law resort. Res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment on the other
hand precludes the questioning of a fact or issue in a second case if the fact or issue has already been
judicially determined in the first case between the same parties.
YEAR 2017
HEIRS OF TEODORA LOYOLA, represented herein by ZOSIMO L. MENDOZA,

SR., Petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ALICIA R. LOYOLA, Respondent
G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017
As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved.
FACTS:
This case involves a 4,419-square-meter parcel of land located in Lingatin, Morong, Bataan,
known as Lot No. 780, Cad. 262 of the Morong Cadastre. The land is formerly a public agricultural land
planted with nipa and coconut.
On May 19, 2003, the Heirs of Teodora Loyola, represented by Zosimo Mendoza, Sr., filed a
Complaint for annulment of free patent and original certificate of title, reconveyance of ownership and
possession, and damages against respondent Alicia Loyola.
The Heirs claimed that the property belonged to the parents of their mother, Teodora Loyola, who
had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. Teodora inherited the property from her
parents upon their demise. In turn, when Teodora died in 1939, the Heirs inherited it from her.
The Heirs insisted that they since maintained open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession until the present. However, Alicia was allegedly able to obtain Free Patent No. (III-14)
001627 and Original Certificate of Title No. 1784 over the property through fraud and
misrepresentation. Alicia was the wife of their deceased cousin Gabriel Loyola, who was given
permission to use part of Teodora's property.
Alicia denied the allegations of fraud and illegality on the registration of the free patent and
issuance of the original certificate of title. She countered that the Complaint was barred by laches and
prescription as the free patent was registered as early as December 1985.
The RTC did not rule on the merits, but it dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to
implead an indispensable party. The trial court found that the successors of one of the heirs, Guillermo
Mendoza (Zosimo's deceased brother), were not impleaded as party-plaintiffs.
The CA found that the RTC erred in finding that there was a failure to implead an indispensable
party as the heirs of Guillermo Mendoza were not indispensable parties and judgment could be rendered
without impleading them as party-plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found that the evidence
presented by the Heirs was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the free patent and
original certificate of title issued to Alicia.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in going beyond the issues raised on appeal. They insist that their appeal
focused only on the procedural aspect of jurisdiction over indispensable parties. Thus, the Court of
Appeals should have ruled on this matter alone.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it went beyond the issue
of dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency of petitioners evidence before the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
No, The petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy. They should have filed a petition
for review under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners'
Complaint. It had jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the case, and there is no showing
that it whimsically or capriciously exercised this jurisdiction. At most, it may have committed an error of
procedure, as petitioners question its ruling on the merits of the case and not just on the issue of dismissal
for failure to implead indispensable parties. As petitioners fail to avail themselves of the proper remedy,
the Petition ought to be dismissed
As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Rule 51, Section
8 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered
unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
This provision likewise states that the Court of Appeals may review errors that are not assigned but are
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error. The Court of Appeals is allowed discretion if it
"finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case."
Jurisprudence has established several exceptions to this rule.
(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving
at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to
raise or which the lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent.
Thus, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to consider the issue and address the matter where
its ruling is necessary (a) to arrive at a just and complete resolution of the case; (b) to serve the interest of
justice; or (c) to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. This is consistent with its authority to review the
totality of the controversy brought on appeal.
Petitioners' appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint for
failure to implead an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on whether
petitioners were able to prove their claim. It had the discretion to properly consider this separate issue in
order to arrive at a complete resolution of the case.
Q: In appeal, what matters may be resolved by the Court of Appeals?
A: Only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. However, Rule 51, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court provides that Court of Appeals may review errors that are not assigned but are closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error. Example of this are: (1) Grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case
or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) Matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on
the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) Matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) Matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25, 2017
A motion for production of documents may be availed of even beyond the pre-trial stage, upon showing of
good cause as required under Rule 27. We allowed the production of documents because the petitioner
was able to show "good cause" and relevance of the documents sought to be produced, and the trial court
had not yet rendered its judgment.
FACTS:
On September 17, 2004 and September 22, 2004, San Miguel Corporation filed before the Court
of Tax Appeals Petitions for Review, docketed as CTA Case Nos. 7052 and 7053, assailing the denials of
its Protest/Request for Reconsiderations of the deficiency excise tax assessments. To prevent the issuance
of additional excise tax assessments on San Mig Light products and the disruption of its operations, San
Miguel Corporation paid excise taxes at the rate of P13.61 beginning February 1, 2004. On December 28,
2005, San Miguel Corporation filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue its first refund claim. The claim
sought the refund of P782,238,161.47 for erroneous excise taxes collected on San Mig Light products
from February 2, 2004 to November 30, 2005.
Due to inaction on its claim, on January 31, 2006, San Miguel Corporation filed before the Court
Tax Appeals a Petition for Review docketed as CTA Case No. 7405. The Court of Tax Appeals, upon
motion, later consolidated CTA Case No. 7405 with CTA Case Nos. 7052 and 7053. The Court of Tax
Appeals First Division, in its Decision39 dated October 18, 2011, granted the Petitions in CTA Case Nos.
7052 and 7053 and partially granted the Petition in CTA Case No. 7405.
The Commissioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Production of Documents
praying that San Miguel Corporation be compelled to produce the following: (a) "Kaunlaran" publication
for the months of October 1999 and January 2000; (b) 1999 Annual Report to stockholders; and (c) copies
of the video footage of two (2) San Mig Light commercials as seen in its website.42 The Commissioner
claimed "that the admission of said documents would lead to a better illumination of the outcome of the
case."
The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc, in its Decision dated October 24, 2012, dismissed the
Petition and affirmed the Division. It also denied reconsideration through the Resolution dated February
4, 2013. Hence, the Commissioner on Internal Revenue filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 205723.
On August 30, 2007, San Miguel Corporation filed its second refund claim with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue in the amount of P926,389,172.02.50 Due to inaction on its claim, San Miguel
Corporation filed before the Court Tax Appeals a Petition for Review, docketed as CTA Case No. 7708,
on November 27, 2007. The Court of Tax Appeals Third Division, in its Decision dated January 7, 2011,
partially granted the Petition. It also denied reconsideration. On September 20, 2012, the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc affirmed the Division and thereafter also denied reconsideration.
Hence, the Commissioner on Internal Revenue filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 205045. The two (2) cases were consolidated.Respondent San Miguel Corporation
filed its Comment on the Petitions, to which petitioner filed its Reply. The parties then filed their
respective memoranda.
Issues:
Whether a motion for production of documents and objects may be availed of after the court has
rendered judgment.
Held:
In Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., we

held that a motion for production of documents may be availed of even beyond the pre-trial stage, upon
showing of good cause as required under Rule 27. We allowed the production of documents because the
petitioner was able to show "good cause" and relevance of the documents sought to be produced, and the
trial court had not yet rendered its judgment.
In this case, petitioner filed its Motion for Production of Documents after the Court of Tax
Appeals Division had rendered its judgment. According to the Court of Tax Appeals Division, the
documents sought to be produced were already discussed in the Commissioner's Memorandum dated
October 21, 2010 and were already considered by the tax court when it rendered its Decision. If petitioner
believed that the evidence in the custody and control of respondent "would provide a better illumination
of the outcome of the case," it should have sought their production at the earliest opportunity as it had
been already aware of their existence. Petitioner's laxity is inexcusable and is a fatal omission.
Under these circumstances, there was indeed no further need for the production of documents and
objects desired by petitioner. These pieces of evidence could have served no useful purpose. On the
contrary, the production of those documents after judgment defeats the purpose of modes of discovery in
expediting case preparation and shortening trials.
We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in affirming the Division's
denial of petitioner's Motion for Production of Documents.
Q: Can a motion for production of documents may be availed of even beyond the pre-trial stage?
A: Yes. A motion for production of documents may be availed of even beyond the pre-trial stage, upon
showing of good cause as required under Rule 27. We allowed the production of documents because the
petitioner was able to show "good cause" and relevance of the documents sought to be produced, and the
trial court had not yet rendered its judgment.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. ROYAL FERRY SERVICES,
INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017
This Court has declared that dismissal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. It is judicial policy
to determine a case based on the merits so that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause
and defenses.
If there is a specific law that covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply.
FACTS:
On August 28, 2005, Royal Ferry Services Inc. filed a petition for Voluntary Insolvency before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In its Petition stated therein , in the year 2000, the company suffered
business losses. Efforts were made to revive its financial condition but failed. The business ceased its
operations. A special board meeting was held and was approved and authorized by the members of the
board to allow the company to file a Petition for insolvency.
In retrospect of the company, it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine
Laws and was holding its principal business office address in Bangkal Street, Makati City but holds its
Office at Room 203 at Bf condominium Building , Intramuros , Manila at the time the Petition was filed.
On December 19, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an order, granting the petition
declaring the Royal Ferry Services insolvent. On December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Formal Notice of Claim
and a Motion to Dismiss. In the Notice of Claim, Pilipinas Shell asserted that Royal Ferry owed them the
amount of ₱2,769,387.67. In its Motion to Dismiss, Pilipinas Shell alleged that the Petition was filed in
the wrong venue. It argued that the Insolvency Law provides that a petition for insolvency should be filed
before the court with territorial jurisdiction over the corporation's residence. Since Royal Ferry's Articles
of Incorporation stated that the corporation's principal office is located at 2521 A. Bonifacio St., Bangkal,
Makati City, the Petition should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and not before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On January 30, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued the Order21 denying Pilipinas
Shell's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It found Royal Ferry to have sufficiently shown full
compliance with the requirements of the Insolvency Law on venue and that it had abandoned its Makati
office and moved to Manila. The Regional Trial Court also noted that when the Branch Sherriff
confiscated Royal Ferry's books and personal assets, the properties were taken from a Manila address, at
Room 203, BF Condominium Building, Andres Soriano comer Streets, Intramuros, Manila. Pilipinas
Shell moved for reconsideration on February 24, 2006.
In the Order dated June 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court reconsidered the denial of Pilipinas
Shell's Motion to Dismiss. It held that a corporation cannot change its place of business without amending
its Articles of Incorporation. Without the amendment, Royal Ferry's transfer did notproduce any legal
effect on its residence. The Regional Trial Court granted the dismissal of the Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency.
Aggrieved, Royal Ferry filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2006. On November 7, 2006, the
Regional Trial Court forwarded the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision dated
January 30, 2009, the Court of Appeals reinstated the insolvency proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of Royal Ferry's appeal despite its violation
of Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court? (Yes)
2. Whether the Petition for Insolvency was properly filed. (No)
RULING:
1. On the issue of the formal defects of respondent's appeal, we uphold the Court of Appeals Decision to
rule on the merits of the case.
Petitioner alleges that respondent's Appellant's Brief has failed to comply with Rule 44, Section
13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h) of the Rules of Court:
a. First, the Appellant's Brief is bereft of page references to the record in its "Statements of Facts
and of the Case" and its discussion supporting its assignment of errors, in violation of Section 13
(c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.
b. (b) Second, the Appellant's Brief failed to include a statement of the issues of fact or law to be
submitted to [the Court of Appeals] for judgment, in violation of Section 13(e), Rule 44.
c. (c) Third, the Appellant's Brief does not contain the page of the report on which the citation of
authorities is found, in violation of Section 13(f), Rule 44.
d. (d) Fourth, the table of cases is not alphabetically arranged, in violation of Section 13(a), Rule 44.
e. (e) Fifth, the Appellants Brief does not contain, as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or final
order appealed from, in violation of Section 13(h), Rule 44.
On the other hand, respondent argues that it has substantially complied with the requirements
under the law. It claims that the absence of page references to the record in its "Statements of Facts and of
the Case" has not automatically resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. Further, as the records of this case
are not voluminous, the Court of Appeals was not inconvenienced by the lapse.
Respondent likewise claims that although the Appellant's Brief did not specifically contain the
phrase "statement of issues," the three errors in issue were identifiable through a reading of the Brief. It
claims that its failure to append a copy of the trial court Order has been mooted because the Court of
Appeals has issued the Resolution requiring them to submit copies of the assailed Order. Lastly,
respondent argues that it only cited five (5) cases in the Brief. Hence, a citation of authorities was
unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the merits. The term
"may" in Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of Appeals has discretion to
dismiss an appeal based on the enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion when it
decided that the interest of justice would be better served by overlooking the pleading's technical defects.
Time and again, this Court has declared that dismissal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. It is
judicial policy to determine a case based on the merits so that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate
their cause and defenses. The Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal.
2. We cannot sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the "petition for voluntary insolvency [was
filed] in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part of one region." This is untenable.
Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides several judges to preside over the different branches
assigned to Manila and Makati. Thus, the two venues are distinct. Also, there is a specific law that covers
the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply. Section 14 of the Insolvency Law specifies that the
proper venue for a petition for voluntary insolvency is the Regional Trial Court of the province or city
where the insolvent debtor has resided in for six (6) months before the filing of the petition.
RULE 4: Venue of Actions
SECTION 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.
Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated as two distinct venues. To deem
them as interchangeable venues for being in the same region has no basis in law. Respondent is a resident
of Manila. The law should be read to lay the venue of the insolvency proceeding in the actual location of
the debtor's activities. If it is uncontroverted that respondent's address in its Articles of Incorporation is no
longer accurate, legal fiction should give way to fact. Thus, the Petition was correctly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Q: When is the rule on venue not applicable?
A: Under RULE 4: Venue of Actions:
SECTION 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. APO CEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 193381, FEBRUARY 8, 2017
“A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and belief
produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.”
FACTS:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue sent Apo Cement Corporation (Apo Cement) a Final Assessment
Notice (FAN) for deficiency taxes for the taxable year 1999. Apo Cement protested the FAN. The Bureau
issued the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment which contained deficiency. T he Commissioner of
Internal Revenue admitted that Apo Cement had already paid the deficiency assessments reflected in the
Bureau's Final Decision on Disputed Assessment, except for the documentary stamp taxes. They should
have paid documentary stamp taxes based on the zonal value of property with mineral/quarry content, not
on the zonal value of regular residential property. the petitioner was directed to submit a sufficient
verification within five (5) days from notice. Petitioner did not comply.
Petitioner through the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
present Petition, Deputy Commissioner Estela V. Sales of the Legal and Inspection Group of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue states that the contents of the Petition are true and correct of her own "knowledge and
belief based on authentic records. They argued that while the verification still stated "belief," it was
qualified by "based on authentic records." Hence, "the statement implies that the contents of the petition
were based not only on the pleader's belief but ultimately they are recitals from authentic records."
Respondent contended that the petitioners do not fully complied with the procedural requirements
of verification
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a defective verification.
RULING:
YES. The amendment to Section 4, Rule 7 entirely removed any reference to "belief' as

basis.33 This is to ensure that the pleading is anchored on facts and not on imagination or speculation, and
is filed in good faith. Mere belief is insufficient basis and negates the verification which should be on the
basis of personal knowledge or authentic records. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative. In this case, petitioner did not submit a corrected verification despite the order of this Court.
This alone merits the denial of the Petition outright. The court find respondent had fully complied with
the requirements of Republic Act No. 9480. Hence, the Court of Tax Appeals properly cancelled the
remaining assessment for deficiency documentary stamp taxes.
Q: How to verify pleadings?

A: It is verified by an affidavit. This affidavit declares that the:
1. Affiant has read the pleading; and
2. allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
(Sec. 4 Rule 7)
ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG. GEN.
ARTHUR ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, AND LT. COL. HAROLD
CABUNOC, AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
Confidentiality rule requires only that “proceedings against attorneys” be kept private and confidential.
It is the proceeding against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential. A lawyer who regularly
seeks attention and readily welcomes, if not invites, media coverage, cannot expect to be totally sheltered
from public interest, himself. When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as in this
case, it would be an abuse of our contempt power to stifle the subject of his attention. A lawyer who uses
the public fora as his battleground cannot expect to be protected from public scrutiny.
The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in
court processes. The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote the
proper administration of justice. The power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of
expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters.
FACTS:
After news broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo, petitioner with his
clients, the family of the slain Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude went to Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to
demand to see Pemberton.
Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced their way inside the premises of the
Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and gained entry despite having been instructed by
Military Police personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were closed. Respondents
alleged that petitioner fomented disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter fence, to see
Pemberton. Moreover, respondents claimed that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having
been subject of various national television, radio, internet, and print media publications.
In response to the events that transpired, respondents released a press statement that they were
considering filing disbarment proceedings against petitioner.
Roque, for his part, said that he is not at all threatened by the AFP move to have him disbarred,
saying that the military move will clarify a lawyer's role in pushing the victims' rights and national
sovereignty. In return, Roque said he would also be filing graft charges against the AFP for allowing the
US to have custody over Pemberton at Camp Aguinaldo. He added that his filing of charges against the
AFP is without prejudice to the filing of contempt charges against those who have repeatedly and publicly
threatened him with disbarment.
AFP Public Affairs chief Lieutenant Colonel Harold Cabunoc said AFP chief of staff Gregorio
Catapang ordered the military's legal office to file the case against Roque in relation to the inappropriate
actions he displayed during the intrusion of Laude's family in restricted areas at the AFP headquarters in
Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City.
Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section 18, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.[26] Further, petitioner claims that respondents' acts put to question his professional and
personal reputation. Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the contumacious acts
prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The subject of the disbarment case pertains to a
serious breach of security of a military zone. The statements were official statements made in the
performance of a public function to address a public concern.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the AFP officers are guilty of indirect contempt
HELD:
NO. The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as
a tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere. Thus, the general rule is that publicly
disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with contempt. However, the confidentiality in
disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be applied under any circumstance, to all
disclosures of any nature.
As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. Accordingly,
matters of public interest should not be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the
confidentiality rule. In disbarment proceedings, a balance must be struck, due to the demands of the legal
profession.
In this case, the confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept
private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential.
This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to the press. However,
the rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.
As such, the Court declined to exercise their contempt power under the conditions of the case.
Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed public threats
of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement that they had filed a
disbarment complaint. The Court held that where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is
nothing to keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and
there was no proceeding to keep private.
Furthermore, prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner even made his own public statement
regarding respondents' possible filing of a disbarment complaint. Even before any case against him had
been filed, media reported that petitioner tweeted publicly that he looked forward to answering the
complaint before the AFP. In the articles cited by petitioner as evidence of respondents' violation of the
confidentiality rule, he, too, is quoted, saying "the case is a chance for him to 'clarify a lawyer's role in
pushing victims' rights and sovereignty." It is unlikely that petitioner's reputation could be further
damaged by a factual report that a complaint had actually been filed. Petitioner has made it even more
public by filing the instant case against the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines, instead of targeting
only the individuals who participated in the disclosure.
The Court agrees with respondents that they should not be faulted for releasing a subsequent
press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner. The statements were
official statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to address a matter of
public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of security.
Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for responding publicly to
such public actions.
When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as in this case, it would be an
abuse of our contempt power to stifle the subject of his attention. A lawyer who uses the public fora as his
battleground cannot expect to be protected from public scrutiny.
Q: How is the power of contempt be exercised by courts?
A: The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order
in court processes. The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote the
proper administration of justice. The power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of
expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters.
MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN, Petitioner vs.FRANCISCO DOLOR (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
HEIRS) AND HERMOGENA DOLOR, Respondents
G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017
When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges
this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual.
Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof, however, of ineffectual
service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's claim of when service was made
at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when service was made is
distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not made. A party who
fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
Facts:
In a Complaint for Reconveyance of Property and Damages filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, the Dolor Spouses alleged that on February 17, 1984, they, as buyers, and Manuel Cammayo
(Cammayo), as seller, executed a Deed of Sale over a 300 square meter parcel of land located in
Novaliches, Quezon City. This 300 square meter parcel was to be segregated from a larger landholding.
On March 27, 2006, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 223 rendered a Decision
ordering Gatmaytan to convey the lot to the Dolor Spouses. On June 16, 2006, Gatmaytan filed her
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on August 28, 2006. Gatmaytan then
filed an Appeal with the Court of Appeals.
In its assailed March 24, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, dismissed
Gatmaytan's Appeal. It ruled that the Regional Trial Court's March 27, 2006 Decision had already
attained finality as Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15- day period.
In its assailed August 9, 2011 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Gatmaytan's Motion for
Reconsideration. It emphasized that the Receipt at the back of the last page of the Regional Trial Court's
Decision indicated that a copy of the same Decision was received by a certain Maricel Luis (Luis), for
and on behalf of Atty. Palad, on April 14, 2006. The Court of Appeals added that previous orders of the
Regional Trial Court were likewise received by Luis, and that Luis' authority to receive for Atty. Palad
had never been questioned.
Gatmaytan filed the Present Petition.
Gatmaytan insists that the Regional Trial Court's March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained
finality as the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel's former address (at No. 117 West Avenue,
Quezon City) as opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue,
Quezon City) that her counsel indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed with the
Regional Trial Court. Gatmaytan adds that the Regional Trial Court noted the change of address in an
Order of the same date, and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and processes was to
be made at her counsel's updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue,
Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court's Decision has already attained finality thus, precluding
the filing of petitioner Mercedes S. Gatmaytan's appeal with the Court of Appeals
Ruling:
It is elementary that “appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege.” As such, one
who wishes to file an appeal “must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to
appeal is lost.” It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon
as it becomes final and executory; “nothing is more settled in law.” Once a case is decided with finality,
the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, [a final judgment] may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses
jurisdiction, and any modified judgment that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose are
null and void.
In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become final. In
turn, Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allows for
15 days from notice of a judgment or final order within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be
filed.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. Reckoning
the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final order subject of his or
her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the manner by which the judgment of final order was served
upon the party himself or herself.
When, however, a party is represented and has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be
made upon his or her counsel.
To reiterate, service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties
themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers. The
reason is simple—the parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of
procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be
unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is
best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure—either the lawyer
retained by the party or the party him/herself if s/he does not intend to hire a lawyer.
We sustain petitioner's position that the service made on her counsel's former address was
ineffectual. We find however, that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proving the specific date -
allegedly June 1, 2006 - in which service upon her counsel's updated address was actually made. Having
failed to establish the reckoning point of the period for filing her Motion for Reconsideration, we cannot
sustain the conclusion that petitioner insists on, and which is merely contingent on this reckoning point:
we cannot conclude that her Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to discharge her
burden of proof, we are constrained to deny her petition.

Q: When is service deemed effected?
A: When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges
this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual.
Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof, however, of ineffectual
service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's claim of when service was made
at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when service was made is
distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not made. A party who
fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
AQUILINA B. GRANADA, CARLOS B. BAUTISTA, AND FELIPE
PANCHO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017
“At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of certiorari is not the proper remedy to
challenge a judgment conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, decisions
and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as Nava's Petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Section 2 of
Rule 45, this Court treated it as an appeal and did not dismiss it outright. While procedural rules should
be treated with utmost respect since they serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in support of the
speedy disposition of cases mandated by the Constitution, a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
Facts:
Lagmay, Intencion, and Reyes of the Commission on Audit submitted a Joint-Affidavit with an

attached Special Audit Report to the Commission on Audit Director. The Special Audit Report disclosed
that the various school forms and construction materials purchased by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, now Department of Education, Division Office of Davao for the Elementary School
Building Program were priced above the prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to
overpricing. The auditors recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a criminal or
administrative action against the public officials who participated in the transactions. The Office of the
Ombudsman found that there was sufficient evidence to indict several Department of Education, Culture
and Sports officials for violating Section 3(g) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioners Nava,
Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz were subsequently charged with Violation of Section 3(g) of Republic
Act No. 3019 in an Information.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioners. It also
ruled that there was a concerted effort by the petitioners to facilitate the release of funds and make it
appear that a public bidding took place.
On January 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Nava,
Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz. Nava filed a petition for certiorari, while Cabahug, Granada and Dela
Cruz filed their respective petitions for review of the Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution.
Issue:
Whether Nava's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to take.
Held:
NO. The proper remedy to take is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides the mode of appeal from judgments, final
orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to

appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
The assailed Decision and Resolution convicted Nava and the other petitioners of the crime of
entering into a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract or transaction on behalf of the
government. Thus, the proper remedy to take is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as Nava's Petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under
Section 2 of Rule 45, this Court treated it as an appeal and did not dismiss it outright. While procedural
rules should be treated with utmost respect since they serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in
support of the speedy disposition of cases mandated by the Constitution, a liberal interpretation of the
rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
Q: Is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 a substitute for a lost appeal? Is the remedy of appeal under
Rule 45 limited to questions of law?
A: No, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 a substitute for a lost appeal. The proper remedy to take is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 190389 April 19, 2017
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the
review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the
review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we
have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of
whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly
aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged
before it.
FACTS:
On June 27, 2002, the labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP),
which represented the employees of PLDT, filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. MKP charged PLDT
with unfair labor practice "for transferring several employees of its Provisioning Support Division to
Bicutan, Taguig." On November 11, 2002, while the first notice of strike was pending, Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas filed another notice of strike.
On December 23, 2002, MKP went on strike. On December 31, 2002, PLDT declared only 323
employees as redundant as it was able to redeploy 180 of the 503 affected employees to other positions.
Labor Secretary: Certified the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, the strike
staged by the Union is hereby enjoined. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within
twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were terminated due to redundancy.
The employer is hereby enjoined to accept the striking workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any
act that might worsen the situation.
MKP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, challenging the Secretary of
Labor and Employment's Order insofar as it created a distinction among the striking workers in the
return-to-work order.
On October 28, 2005, the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas' charges of unfair labor practices against Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company. It found that the redundancy program was due to the decline of subscribers for long distance
calls and to fixed line services produced by technological advances in the communications industry. The
National Labor Relations Commission ruled that the termination of employment of Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company's employees due to redundancy was legal.
On May 21, 2007, MKP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, assailing the August 11,
2006 Resolution and March 16, 2007 Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. CA consolidated
CA-G.R. SP No. 94365 with CAG.R. SP No. 98975, and dismissed MKP's appeals on August 28, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's 2002 redundancy program
HELD:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited
only to questions of law. In labor cases, a Rule 45 petition "can prosper only if the Court of Appeals fails
to correctly determine whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion." A court or tribunal is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
acts or whimsically exercises judgment to be "equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Furthermore, the abuse
of discretion must be so flagrant to amount to a refusal to perform a duty or to act as provided by law.
Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, citing Montoyav. Transmed, provides the
parameters of judicial review for a labor case under Rule 45:
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In one case, we discussed the
particular parameters of a Rule 45 appeal from the CA's Rule 65 decision on a labor case, as follows:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast

with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45
limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for
legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for
certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of
whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC
decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not
a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
The guidelines to be followed in reviewing a petition for review under Rule 45:
If the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence,
then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss
the petition. If grave abuse of discretion exists, then the CA must grant the petition and nullify the
NLRC ruling, entering at the same time the ruling that is justified under the evidence and the
governing law, rules and jurisprudence. In our Rule 45 review, this Court must deny the petition
if it finds that the CA correctly acted.
We shall adopt these parameters in resolving the substantive issues in the Petition.
Q: When is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 a mode of appeal?
A: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited only to
questions of law. In labor cases, a Rule 45 petition "can prosper only if the Court of Appeals fails to
correctly determine whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion." A court or tribunal is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
acts or whimsically exercises judgment to be "equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Furthermore, the abuse
of discretion must be so flagrant to amount to a refusal to perform a duty or to act as provided by law.
STEVEN R. PAVLOW VS. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the
availability of extra-territorial services does not preclude substituted service.
FACTS:
Petitioner, an American citizen, married Maria Sheila, a Filipino. Barely three months into their
marriage, Sheila filed a complaint for slight physical injuries including maltreatment in relation to Anti-
Violence Against Women and Children Act (VAWC). Makati Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint for failure to substantiate the allegations. The mother of Petitioner, Cherry Mendenilla
(Mendenilla), filed a Petition praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order(TPO)or
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) against the Petitioner. When the service of summons with the TPO
was served, Petitioner was out of the country, hence, it was served to one of his employees who was also
residing in the same building.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not Mendenilla had the personality to file the Petition;
b. Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s person;
c. Whether or not there was forum shopping.
RULING:
a. Yes. Mendenilla had the personality to file the Petition.
The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC
Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is
suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent
Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed.
b. Yes. The Court acquired jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s person
We see no reason for holding as ineffectual the substituted service of Summons. Jurisprudence
has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the availability of
extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to substituted service has long been
held to be fair, reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary, restrictive view is that which
defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents who temporarily leave their residence are
responsible for ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that, upon their return, they shall attend to
exigencies that may have arisen. Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to
"if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served within a reasonable time."
Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and
how, by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service
was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner
during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who
also resided at petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over petitioner's person was then validly acquired,
and the dismissal of respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla's petition on this score was correctly held by Judge
Natividad Giron-Dizon to be unwarranted.
c. No. There was no forum shopping
The filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her own
petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level of the
prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of a
protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's Complaint- Affidavit did
not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding of
forum shopping by her mother.
Q: Is substituted service available to residents temporarily out of the Philippines?
A: Yes. With respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the availability of extraterritorial
services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to substituted service has long been held to be fair,
reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary, restrictive view is that which defeats the ends of
justice. It has been emphasized that residents who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for
ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that, upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may
have arisen. Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to "if, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be personally served within a reasonable time."
MAKILITO B. MAHINAY, Petitioner vs. DURA TIRE & RUBBER INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 194152 June 5, 2017
The period to redeem a property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not extendible. A pending
action to annul the foreclosure sale does not toll the running of the one (1)-year period of redemption
under Act No. 3135.
FACTS:
A&A Swiss International Commercial owns a parcel of land which was mortgaged to Dura Tire
and Rubber Industries as security for credit purchases to be made by Move Overland Venture and
Exploring. Under the mortgage agreement, Dura Tire was given the express authority to extrajudicially
foreclose the property should Move Overland fail to pay its credit purchases.
On June 5, 1992, A&A Swiss sold the property to Mahinay for the sum of ₱540,000.00. In the
Deed of Absolute Sale, Mahinay acknowledged that the property had been previously mortgaged by A&A
Swiss to Dura Tire, holding himself liable for any claims that Dura Tire may have against Move
Overland.
On August 21, 1994, Mahinay wrote Dura Tire, requesting a statement of account of Move
Overland’s credit purchases. Mahinay sought to pay Move Overland’s obligation to release the property
from the mortgage. Dura Tire, however, ignored Mahinay’s request.
For Move Overland’s failure to pay its credit purchases, Dura Tire applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the property on January 6, 1995. Mahinay protested the impending sale and filed a third-
party claim before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu.
Despite the protest, Sheriff proceeded with the sale and issued a Certificate of Sale in favor of
Dura Tire, the highest bidder at the sale.
Subsequently, Mahinay’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals and held that Mahinay
had no right to question the foreclosure of the property. Mahinay, as “substitute mortgagor,” was fully
aware that the property he purchased from A&A Swiss was previously mortgaged to Dura Tire to answer
for Move Overland’s obligation. Considering that Move Overland failed to pay for its credit purchases,
Dura Tire had every right to foreclose the property.
Relying on the Court of Appeals’ finding that he was a “substitute mortgagor,” Mahinay filed a
Complaint for judicial declaration of right to redeem on August 24, 2007. Mahinay contends that the one
(1)-year period of redemption should be counted from the time the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory on August 8, 2007. Mahinay theorizes that his right of redemption
only arose when he was judicially declared “entitled to redeem the property” in this decision.
Dura Tire counters that nothing prevented Mahinay from exercising his right of redemption
within one (1) year from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. Dura Tire argues that Mahinay’s filing
of an action for annulment of foreclosure sale did not toll the running of the redemption period because
the law does not allow its extension. Since the one year period of redemption already lapsed, Dura Tire
maintains that Mahinay can no longer redeem the property at the bid price paid by the purchaser.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the one year period of redemption was tolled when Mahinay filed his Complaint
for annulment of foreclosure sale.
RULING:
NO. The period to redeem a property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not extendible. A
pending action to annul the foreclosure sale does not toll the running of the one year period of
redemption under Act No. 3135.
Contrary to Mahinay’s claim, his right to redeem the mortgaged property did not arise from the
Court of Appeals’ judicial declaration that he was a substitute mortgagor of A&A Swiss. By force of law,
specifically, Section 6 of Act No. 3135, Mahinay’s right to redeem arose when the mortgaged property
was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction.
The date of the sale referred to in Section 6 is the date the certificate of sale is registered with the
Register of Deeds. This is because the sale of registered land does not take effect as a conveyance, or bind
the land until it is registered.
The right of redemption being statutory, the mortgagor may compel the purchaser to sell back the
property within the one-year period under Act No. 3135. If the purchaser refuses to sell back the property,
the mortgagor may tender payment to the Sheriff who conducted the foreclosure sale. Here, Mahinay
should have tendered payment to Sheriff Laurel instead of insisting on directly paying Move Overland’s
unpaid credit purchases to Dura Tire.
The one (1)-year period of redemption is fixed, hence, non-extendible, to avoid prolonged
economic uncertainty over the ownership of the thing sold. Since the period of redemption is fixed, it
cannot be tolled or interrupted by the filing of cases to annul the foreclosure sale or to enforce the right of
redemption.
With Mahinay failing to redeem the property within the one-year period of redemption, his right
to redeem had already lapsed.
Q: What is the period to redeem a property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale?
A: One year from the date the property was foreclosed.
Q: Is the period of redemption fixed? Explain your answer.
A. Yes. It is non-extendible to avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the ownership of the thing
sold.
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners vs.
HON. GEORGE E. OMELIO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 14,
SHERIFF ROBERTO C. ESGUERRA, CECILIO G. ABENION, and 1,842 OTHER PLAINTIFFS
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 95-45, Respondents
G.R. No. 189102 June 7, 2017
The Supreme Court will dismiss petitions that are directly filed before it if relief can be obtained from the
lower courts. Trial courts and the Court of Appeals are in the best position to deal with causes in the first
instance. Nevertheless, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be justified when there
are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition.
Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into by
the parties. A writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of the parties under a judicially
approved compromise agreement is void.
FACTS:
Thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries instituted class suits for damages
in the United States against 11 foreign corporations which includes the petitioner. The banana plantation
workers claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide used against
roundworms and threadworms that thrive on and damage tropical fruits, in the 1970s up to the 1990s
while working in plantations that utilized it. As a result, these workers suffered serious and permanent
injuries to their reproductive systems.
The United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens14 and
directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home countries. Filipino claimants filed a
complaint for damages against the same foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court in Panabo
City, Davao del Norte, Philippines. The petitioners and other foreign corporations involved entered into a
worldwide settlement in the United States with all the banana plantation workers. The Compromise
Agreement provided, among others, that the settlement amount should be deposited in an escrow account,
which should be administered by a mediator. After the claimants execute individual releases, the mediator
shall give the checks representing the settlement amounts to the claimants' counsel, who shall then
distribute the checks to each claimant.
The Regional Trial Court approved the Compromise Agreement by way of judgment on
compromise. Several claimants moved for the execution of the judgment on compromise. However,
Petitioner and other corporations opposed the execution on the ground of mootness. They argued that they
had already complied with their obligation under the Compromise Agreement by depositing the
settlement amounts into an escrow account, which was administered by the designated mediator, Mr.
M.A. "Mickey" Mills (Mr. Mills). Hence, there was nothing left for the court to execute.
Chiquita pointed out that the claimants' execution of individual quitclaims, denominated as
"Release in Full," was an acknowledgement that they had received their respective share in the settlement
amount. The quitclaims proved that the claimants entered into a compromise agreement and that
petitioners complied with its terms.
The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion for Execution because there was no proof that the
settlement amounts had been withdrawn and delivered to each individual claimant. Although the parties
admitted that the funds were already deposited in an escrow account, the Regional Trial Court held that
this was insufficient to establish that Chiquita, Dow, Occidental, Shell, and Del Monte had fulfilled their
obligation under the Compromise Agreement.
Petitioners questioned the orders issued by the RTC by filing a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, they argue that the Writ of Execution should never have been issued because the
dismissal of Civil Case was based on the trial court's approval of the quitclaims executed by the
claimants. Hence, "there was nothing left" for the trial court to execute. Consequently, the Omnibus Order
issued, which directed the implementation of the Writ of Execution, is likewise a patent nullity.
On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy
of courts by directly filing the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. While there may be
exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when the assailed orders are patently null or when there
are special and important reasons, none of these is present in the case.
ISSUES:
A.) Whether the case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
B.) Whether respondent court committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders and writs "
HELD:
A. YES. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts prohibits "parties from directly resorting to this Court
when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The Supreme Court will dismiss petitions
that are directly filed before it if relief can be obtained from the lower courts. Trial courts and the
Court of Appeals are in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance. Nevertheless, a
direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be justified when there are compelling
reasons clearly set forth in the petition. Immediate resort to this Court may be warranted:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
The Supreme Court may take cognizance of this case "in the interest of judicial economy and
efficiency.” The records of this case are sufficient for the Court to decide on the issues raised by
the parties. Any further delay would unduly prejudice the parties.
B. YES. A judicial compromise is regarded as a "determination of the controversy" between the

parties and "has the force and effect of [a final] judgment." In other words, it is both a contract
and "a judgment on the merits." It may neither be disturbed nor set aside except in cases where
there is forgery or when either of the parties' consent has been vitiated. The doctrine on
immutability of judgments applies to compromise agreements approved by the courts in the same
manner that it applies to judgments that have been rendered on the basis of a full-blown trial.
Thus, a judgment on compromise that has attained finality cannot be "modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land."
A judgment on compromise may be executed just like any other final judgment. The writ
of execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce and must essentially
conform to the judgment's terms. It can neither be wider in scope nor exceed the judgment that
gives it life. Otherwise, it has no validity. Thus, in issuing writs of execution, courts must look at
the terms of the judgment sought to be enforced.
There was nothing in the Compromise Agreement that required petitioners to ensure the
distribution of the settlement amount to each claimant. Petitioners' obligation under the
Compromise Agreement was limited to depositing the settlement amount in escrow. On the other
hand, the actual distribution of the settlement amounts was delegated to the chosen mediator, Mr.
Mills. To require proof that the settlement amounts have been withdrawn and delivered to each
claimant would enlarge the obligation of petitioners under the Compromise Agreement.
Consequently, the Omnibus Order which directed the implementation of the Writ of
Execution, is likewise void.
Q: What is a judicial compromise?
A: A judicial compromise is regarded as a "determination of the controversy" between the parties and
"has the force and effect of [a final] judgment." In other words, it is both a contract and "a judgment on
the merits." It may neither be disturbed nor set aside except in cases where there is forgery or when either
of the parties' consent has been vitiated.
BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N. MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N.
MOJICA, JOSEFINA PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF
GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioners vs. LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent
G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice,
and dignity. There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii) indirect contempt.
Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before it.” Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under
Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers by respondent
Laurita Custodio (Custodio), petitioner Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Josefina),
Monsignor Felix Perez, and Brother Vernon Poore. These five incorporators served as St. Francis
School's Board of Trustees until the latter two passed away.
Custodio was subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum
Administrator. On October 3, 2002, Custodio filed a complaint against petitioners for violating the
Corporation Code. She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the
school and to declare void all their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively. She likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to enjoin the remaining board members from
holding meetings and to prevent Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their functions as
members, trustees, and officers of St. Francis School. October 8, 2002, the Regional Trial Court heard
Custodio's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after the
hearing for the Temporary Restraining Order, the counsel for petitioners went to St. Francis School to
instruct several parents not to acknowledge Custodio's administration as she had been removed and that
her complaint had been dismissed. The parents were also allegedly directed to pay the students'
matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner (Alejandro).
Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court clarify to whom the
school's fees should be paid while her Complaint and Manifestation and Motion were still pending.
Petitioners allegedly manifested that the payment of matriculation fees must be made to Alejandro.
However, Custodio pointed out that Alejandro was not the school cashier and that the Rural Bank of
General Trias, Inc. was not authorized to receive payments for St. Francis School. She also manifested
that prior to October 8, 2002, the school cashier was Ms. Herminia Reynante (Reynante).
On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order designating Reynante to act as
school cashier "with authority to collect all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts." The
trial court also directed all parties in the case to submit a report on and to turn over to Reynante all money
previously collected.
On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance. They
alleged that they partially complied with the October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the
tuition fee collections and by turning over to Reynante a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64
payable to St. Francis School. The amount allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees from
October to December 2002. However, they alleged that Reynante refused to accept the check and required
that the amount be turned over in cash or in a check payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed the check in
the custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping.
Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that only she and Reynante
were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts of St. Francis School since petitioners allegedly made
salary payments to four (4) employees who had resigned.
On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another Order directing petitioners to fully
comply with its earlier order to submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had
collected.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion, praying,

among others, that the trial court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts
which were not covered in its October 21, 2002 Order. On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court
issued an Order denying all motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance,
Exception and Motion and declared that they had not complied with the March 24, 2003 Order.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification. They alleged that the bulk of the money ordered to
be turned over to Custodio and Reynante was allotted to St. Francis School's teachers' retirement fund.
Considering that it must be preserved, petitioners raised several queries. They wanted to know if Custodio
and Reynante would use the money for other purposes other than for the teachers' retirement benefit and
if Custodio and Reynante would be required to file a bond to guaranty its safekeeping and exclusive use
as teacher's retirement compensation. Finally, they asked who would be held liable in case of Custodio
and Reynante's unlawful use of this fund.
On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. She likewise prayed that an order be issued reiterating the Orders
dated October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003.
In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued an Order dated October
8, 2003 clarifying that the retirement fund was to be held in trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also
directed Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of P300,000.00 each. Later, it ordered petitioners to
comply with the mandate in the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose
to the court the total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for teachers' retirement benefit and its
bank detail.
In its Decision dated February 6, 2008, the Court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for
failing to comply with the Orders dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly
and severally pay a fine of P30,000.00.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, it found that it was sufficiently established that
petitioners did not remit all the money they had previously collected despite the trial court's October 21,
2002 Order. The CA ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to contumacious conduct, which
"tended to prejudice St. Francis School's operations due to lack of operational funds.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt (Yes)

RULING:
YES. This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect
contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority,
justice, and dignity. It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice" or
"interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation."
Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or

interrupt the proceedings before it. Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated
under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through "disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, orj udgment of a court” (Sec. 3b, Rule 71). The wording of the
October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do not pertain only to the matriculation fees but to all
collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also states that petitioners were to render a report and turn over
all the amounts they had previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were to be
handed over. This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly expand the scope of
the October 21, 2002 Order as petitioners argue. The October 21, 2002 Order itself already directed that
all fees be turned over to Reynante.
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other employees who had
already resigned, violating the court order that only Reynante and Custodio were authorized to pay the
outstanding accounts of St. Francis School. Thus, it cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious
prayer for the turnover of funds not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. She simply stated that
petitioners failed to substantially comply with the October 21, 2002 Order and specified the other
amounts that petitioners needed to turn over. When she prayed for the turnover of the other amounts, she
merely sought petitioners' compliance of the trial court October 21, 2002 Order.
The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified more particularly the
amounts that needed to be remitted.
However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with the March 24, 2003
Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18,
2003, praying that the trial court exclude the other amounts, which were allegedly not included in the
October 21, 2002 Order.
The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion
in its August 5, 2003 Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is a
prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
(A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). The trial court noted that petitioners still had not complied with its March 24,
2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn over all the money they had collected.
This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over the stated amounts was
that, the amounts constituted teachers' retirement fund, which consequently did not belong to St. Francis
School and was not covered by the assailed Orders. However, the trial court lent credence to Joseph's
testimony that the amounts deposited in the Special Savings Accounts were funds for the operations of
the school. Petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court orders just because they opined that
they were invalid. It is not for the parties to decide whether they should or should not comply with a court
order. Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the implementation of the trial court orders nor was
there an injunction to prevent the trial court from hearing and ruling on the contempt case. Petitioners'
stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because they were convinced of its invalidity. Their resort to the
processes of questioning the orders does not show that they are in good faith.
In this case, petitioners were given several opportunities to comply with the trial court orders.
Even after the trial court clarified which funds to turn over, they still refused to obey. While petitioners
questioned the legality of these orders, they are immediately executory. Moreover, the parties do not have
the power to determine for themselves what should and should not be excluded from the orders. Their
failure to turn over the amounts showed petitioners' defiance and disregard for the authority of the trial
court.
Their defense that they were denied due process deserves little consideration. Petitioners had
attended hearings and had filed several pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to
present their position on the matter. All these were considered before the trial court rendered its orders.
Q: What id direct contempt?
A: Direct contempt consists of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before it.
Q: What is indirect contempt?
A: Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court.
EDWARD THOMAS F. JOSON, PETITIONER, V. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
AURELIO M. UMALI, GIOVANNI AGTAY, ALEJANDRO R. ABESAMIS, EDILBERTO M.
PANCHO, AND JAIME P. PALLANAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 09, 2017
FACTS:
In his Affidavit-Complaint (Complaint) dated August 6, 2008, petitioner Edward Thomas Joson

charged private respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman with gross violation of Anti-graft and
corrupt practices act, violation of Art 113, 215, 216, 217 and RA 6713 and grave abuse of discretion,
misconduct in office, and irregularity in the performance of du[t]ies.
Joson alleged that on September 21, 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by the
Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija and Ryan Angelo Sweets and Catering Services (Ryan Angelo
Catering), which was owned by Cleopatra Gervacio (Cleopatra). Under this Agreement, Ryan Angelo
Catering's services for two (2) years “shall include regular serving of meals for breakfast, lunch, dinner,
and snacks at the canteen and the convention center, special meals and catering services shall be provided
as may be required."
Joson claimed that another caterer was hired during Gov. Aurelio M. Umali's oath-taking
ceremony on July 4, 2007. However, Agtay asked Ryan Angelo Catering, through Cleopatra, for a receipt
of P1,272,000.00 under the name of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, Joson claimed that
Giovanni Agtay made this request to make it appear that Ryan Angelo Catering actually catered and to
justify the withdrawal of P1,344,000.00 from the treasury of Nueva Ecija's provincial government.
According to Joson, the misrepresentations committed by Agtay caused the issuance of a

P1,272,000.00 check to Ryan Angelo Catering. The check was received by Cleopatra's daughter-in-law,
Jocelyn R. Gervacio (Jocelyn).
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner Edward Thomas F. Joson's late filing of his motion for reconsideration
bars him from instituting a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65;
2. Whether or not petitioner Edward Thomas F. Joson's resort to Rule 65 instead of Rule 43 is
proper; and
RULING:
Anent the first issue, under the Office of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved
party may file a motion for reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed
decision in a criminal case or (b) within 10 days from receipt of notice of the Office of the Ombudsman's
decision in an administrative case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the required period. Petitioner received
a copy of the December 4, 2009 Joint Resolution on February 8, 2011. He could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision in the criminal case within five (5) days from receipt or until February 13,
2011, or that in the administrative case within 10 days from receipt or until February 18, 2011. However,
he filed his Motion for Reconsideration only on February 23, 2011, which was 10 days late with respect
to the criminal case and five (5) days late with respect to the administrative case.
Anent the second issue, the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman absolving the private respondents
of the administrative charge possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject to appeal. Section 7,
Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules provides:
SECTION 7. Finality of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration often (10)
days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition
for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
Though final and unappealable in the administrative level, the decisions of administrative
agencies are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave
abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion. Specifically, the correct
procedure is to file a petition for certiorari before the CA to question the Ombudsman's decision of
dismissal of the administrative charge. Joson, however, failed to do this. Hence, the decision of the
Ombudsman exonerating the private respondents from the charge of grave misconduct had already
become final. In any event, the subject petition failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any
reversible error on the part of the Ombudsman to compel this Court to overturn its assailed administrative
ruling.
The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with
this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Here, petitioner's failure to avail of the correct
procedure with respect to the administrative case renders the Office of the Ombudsman's decision final.
Furthermore, the present case fails even on its merits.
Q: Is the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman absolving the private respondents of the administrative charge
subject to appeal? What is the remedy?
A: Under the Office of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision in a criminal case or
(b) within 10 days from receipt of notice of the Office of the Ombudsman's decision in an administrative
case.
ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. KEIHIN-EVERETT FORWARDING
COMPANY INC.
G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017
Inappropriately impleading the lower court as respondent does not automatically mean the dismissal of
the appeal. This is a mere formal defect.
FACTS:
On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service Agreement with
Matsushita. In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett about a column in the issue of the tabloid
newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002 interception by Caloocan City police of a stolen
truck filled with shipment of video monitors and CCTV systems owned by Matsushita. When contacted
by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight stated that the tabloid report had blown the incident out
of proportion. Thereafter, Matsushita terminated its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with Keihin-
Everett, effective July 1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence for terminating the contract, stating
that Keihin-Everett's way of handling the April 17, 2002 incident and its nondisclosure of this incident's
relevant facts "amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard of the rule of law. Keihin-Everett sent a
letter to Orient Freight, demanding P2,500,000.00 as indemnity for lost income. It argued that Orient
Freight's mishandling of the situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with Matsushita.
When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a complaint dated October 24, 2002 for
damages. In its complaint, Keihin-Everett alleged that Orient Freight's "misrepresentation, malice,
negligence and fraud" caused the termination of its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with
Matsushita. Keihin-Everett prayed for compensation for lost income, with legal interest, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit. The RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of Keihin-Everett. It found that Orient Freight was "negligent in failing to investigate properly the
incident and make a factual report to Keihin [-Everett] and Matsushita. Orient Freight appealed the said
Decision to the Court of Appeals. Keihin-Everett filed its Comment arguing that the petition does not
contain the names of the parties in violation of Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to state the names of the parties in this Petition for Review, in
accordance with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, is a fatal defect
RULING:
The petition does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court for failing to state the
names of the parties in the body. The names of the parties are readily discernable from the caption of the
petition, clearly showing the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the respondent. The
Court of Appeals had also been erroneously impleaded in the petition. However, this Court in Aguilar v.
Court of Appeals, et al. ruled that inappropriately impleading the lower court as respondent does not
automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal. This is a mere formal defect.

Q: Is the failure to state the names of the parties in a Petition for Review, in accordance with a fatal
defect?
A: No. Failure to state the names of the parties in the body of the petition does not violate Rule 45,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court. This is a mere formal defect and does not automatically mean the
dismissal of the appeal.
MARIO MAGAT, SR., MARIO S. MAGAT, JR. MARIO S. MAGAT, III, MA. MARGARITA M.
ESTAVILLA, MA. MARJORIE S. MAGAT, ALL SUBSTITUTE PARTIES AND HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED PARTY, JULIANA S. MAGAT, Petitioners, v. TANTRADE CORPORATION AND
PABLO S. BORJA, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017
Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial extension may
be given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a
deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension,
Rule 42 permits a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be "for
the most compelling reason."
FACTS:
On December 15, 2006, respondent Tantrade Corporation filed a Complaint for Collection of a
Sum of Money with Damages praying that the original defendant, now deceased Juliana S. Magat, be
ordered to pay P266,481.50 plus interest, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages, for
unpaid purchases of construction materials.
Juliana appealed before the Regional Trial Court but passed away while her appeal was pending.
Hence, she was substituted by her heirs, now petitioners in this case.
On May 23, 2011, one (1) day before the lapse of the 15-day period to file a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 (First Motion for Extension). They asked for an additional
15 days from May 24, 2011, or until June 8, 2011, to file their appeal. They justified their First Motion for
Extension by citing financial constraints. They explained that they were still reeling from expenses due to
the long hospitalization and death of Juliana, and thus, could not immediately finance their appeal.
Petitioners' counsel further stated that petitioners' inability to finance their appeal had also prevented him
from timely preparing the Petition for Review.
The Court of Appeals denied the First Motion for Extension. It faulted petitioners for
"procrastination" as they filed a motion for extension a day before the end of the reglementary period.
Petitioners filed their Second Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (Second Motion for
Extension). They had not yet received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution
by this time. They sought another 15 day extension, or until June 23, 2011, to file their Petition for
Review. Petitioners' counsel explained that petitioners remained hard-pressed with their finances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the extensions
sought by petitioners and in dismissing their appeal.
RULING:
Yes. Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial extension
may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a
deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension,
Rule 42 permits a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be
"for the most compelling reason."
The grants of both first and second extensions are addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
of Appeals. Mere compliance with the requirements of timely filing a proper motion, tendering payment
and making a deposit, and averring compelling reasons does not guarantee the Court of Appeals'
solicitude. The general rule remains to be the filing of a verified petition "within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration." Extensions are proper only under exceptional circumstances.
This Court finds petitioners here to have effectively pleaded grounds that warrant the extensions
prayed for. More basic, however, this Court finds it to be a serious error for the Court of Appeals to decry
petitioners' supposed "procrastination" when, to begin with, petitioners acted well within the periods
sanctioned by Rule 42. Petitioners did not ask the Court of Appeals to sanction an aberrant situation
beyond Rule 42, Section 1's contemplation. Thus, this case is not even about suspending, relaxing, or
extraordinarily applying Rule 42, Section 1.
Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same period, appellants are
expressly permitted by the penultimate sentence of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for extension. It is
true that in seeking an extension, rather than immediately filing a petition, appellants wager on the Court
of Appeals' favorable action. Still, it remains that they have 15 days to seek an extension. They should not
be faulted for maximizing the period that Rule 42 allows. In doing so, they are not "procrastinating" but
are merely exercising a legitimate option. If the Court of Appeals takes issue with the filing of motions
for extension a day before the end of the proper period, it should advocate a revision of Rule 42 instead of
faulting parties which act within the bounds of this rule.
Q: How many extensions can be availed of under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court?
A: Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial extension may be
given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a deposit
for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension, Rule 42
permits a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be "for the
most compelling reason."
ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL, JUANITO SINGSON CORTAL, NENITA CODILLA,
GENEROSO PEPITO LONGAKIT, PONCIANA BATOON, AND GREGORIA SABROSO,
petitioners, vs. INAKI A. LARRAZABAL ENTERPRISES, represented by INAKI P.
LARRAZABAL, JR., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGIONAL OFFICE NO.
VIII, TACLOBAN CITY and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY in his capacity as chairman of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), respondents.
G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017,.
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases [so] [c]ourts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." They provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the
interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a "policy of liberal
construction."
FACTS:
Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises) owned three (3) parcels of land. These
three (3) parcels were placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27.
Pursuant to the Scheme, Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-
beneficiaries, petitioners included.
Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the Department of
Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid,
for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just compensation requirement. Petitioners
denied non-payment of just compensation. They presented certifications issued by the Land Bank that
certain amounts had been deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal Enterprises.
Regional Adjudicator Diloy noted that there was nothing in the records to show that just
compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels. Hence, he ruled in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and
ordered that it be restored to ownership of the lots. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB and reversed the
Decision of Regional Adjudicator. It gave credence to the certificates issued by Landbank, which
confirmed the payment of just compensation
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals but dismissed their
Petition.The assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on account of several technical defects. First was an inconsistency between the
listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion for Extension of Time and subsequent Petition for
Review, in which the accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping were laden with
this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was the non -inclusion of the original Complaint filed
by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. And last was petitioners' counsel's
failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his payment of annual membership dues to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors noted by the Court
of Appeals.
RULING:
No, the dismissal was not justified by the errors.
Appeal is the remedy available to a litigant seeking to reverse or modify a judgment on the merits of a
case. The right to appeal is not constitutional or natural, and is not part of due process but is a mere
statutory privilege. Thus, it must be availed in keeping with the manner set by law and is lost by a litigant
who does not comply with the rules.
Nevertheless, appeal has been recognized as an important part of our judicial system and courts
have been advised by the Supreme Court to cautiously proceed to avoid inordinately denying litigants this
right.
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases so courts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." They provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the
interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a "policy of liberal
construction." Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest
opportunity to properly ventilate and argue his or her case, "free from the constraints of technicalities."
Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that
justice is better served.
In its assailed September 30, 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal
for purely formal defects and without discussing the merits of the case. Contrary to the Court of Appeals'
conclusion, this Court does not consider these defects to have been so fatal as to peremptorily deny
petitioners the opportunity to fully ventilate their case on appeal.
Jurisprudence has considered the lack of verification as a mere formal, rather than a
jurisdictional, defect that is not fatal. Thus, courts may order the correction of a pleading or act on an
unverified pleading, if the circumstances would warrant the dispensing of the procedural requirement to
serve the ends of justice.
Equally not fatal to petitioners' appeal was their supposed failure to show competent evidence of
identities in their petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping. As is evident from Rule
IV, Section 2 (b) (2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the need for a competent evidence of identity
is not an absolute requirement. It is imperative only when the signatory is not personally known to the
notary. 79 When the signatory is personally known to the notary, the presentation of competent evidence
of identity is a superfluity.
Petitioners' failure to attach a copy of the complaint originally filed by Larrazabal Enterprises
before the DARAB should not have been fatal to their Rule 43 petition. Its inclusion was not absolutely
required, as it was certainly not "the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from." If, in the
Court of Appeals' judgment, it was a material document, the more prudent course of action would have
been to afford petitioners time to adduce it, not to make a justification out of it for dispossessing
petitioners of relief.
Indicating the place of issue of the official receipt of the lawyers’s payment of their annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not even a requirement. While its inclusion
may certainly have been desirable and would have allowed for a more consummate disclosure of
information, its non-inclusion was certainly not fatal. As with the other procedural lapses considered by
the Court of Appeals, its non-inclusion could have very easily been remedied by the Court of Appeals'
prudent allowance of time and opportunity to petitioners and their counsel.
In this case, the Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the opportunity to
exhaustively ventilate and argue their case. Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of
Appeals should have been impelled by the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better
consideration of the intricate issues of the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social
justice, expropriation, and just compensation. The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB could
have been taken as an indication that the matters at stake were far from being so plain that they should be
ignored on mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards
petitioners.
Q. Does the counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his payment of annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is a ground for the denial of the petition?
A. Indicating the place of issue of the official receipt of the lawyers’s payment of their annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not even a requirement. While its inclusion
may certainly have been desirable and would have allowed for a more consummate disclosure of
information, its non-inclusion was certainly not fatal.
MIGUEL D. ESCOBAR, EUGENE L. ALZATE, PERLA C. MAGLINTE, CESAR M CAGANG,
AND VIVENCIA S. TELESFORO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017
“Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan”
FACTS:
The accused public officers by reason of the duties of their office[s], conspiring and
confederating with one another, while committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of
their respective positions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert, and
misappropriate the public funds and despite demand, the said accused failed to return the said amount to
the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest.
Petitioners argue that conclusiveness of judgment bars these determinations of the Sandiganbayan
on material facts from being litigated again. Petitioners argue that the rule can be raised under different
claims or causes of action and that it only requires identity of parties and issues to be invoked.
The Sandiganbayan relied on the testimonies of Gadian and Cailing and held that petitioner
Escobar is not an accountable officer for purposes of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. It also held
that there is nothing that shows that petitioner Escobar was aware of the anomalies in the transaction or
that he participated in the falsification of the fictitious documents. The Sandiganbayan also found that
petitioner Escobar could not be liable based only on signing the disbursement voucher and the project
proposal after petitioner Maglinte certified the legal assistance as legitimate and lawful. Respondent
argues that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable because this case is not a
continuation of Criminal Case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in Criminal Case binds the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
The principle of conclusiveness has no application in criminal cases.
This Court has held that conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of issues already
litigated and settled in litigation between identical parties in different causes of action, and on occasion,
has applied this principle in criminal cases. However, this Court takes this occasion to reiterate that the
concept of res judicata is a civil law doctrine, not to be applied in criminal proceedings, except with
respect to civil cases impliedly instituted.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or
employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This
simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public
officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal
sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to
suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is
separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does
not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject
of the administrative complaint.
Q: What is the two-fold purpose of Principle of conclusiveness of judgments?
A:
1. To avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and
2. To put an end to judicial controversies at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist.
SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased), survived and assumed by his heirs, namely: ELISEO
PIEDAD (deceased),** JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT
PIEDAD, ABEL PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and LEE PIEDAD vs. CANDELARIA LINEHAN
BOBILLES and MARIANO BOBILLES
G.R. No. 208614 November 27, 2017
Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the process of substitution of parties when the
original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the claim.
The prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right
within five (5) years from the entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is
converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a complaint for the revival of
judgement in a regular court within ten (10) years from finality of judgment.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale
against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 435-T and raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over
by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola). On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in Piedad‘s favor
and declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery. Candelaria and Mariano appealed the
trial court‘s Decision, but on September 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the trial court‘s ruling. The Court of Appeals‘ Decision became final and executory on November 1,
1998. Judge Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition and later on, denied
Candelaria‘s Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Gaviola then issued a Writ of Demolition against
Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones (Sheriff Bellones) for its
implementation. That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently
and that it be raffled to another branch.
Candelaria‘s Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad was
eventually docketed and raffled to Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by Judge
Gaudioso D. Villarin (Villarin). On May 16, 2002, Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones to
restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. Judge Cesar O. Estrera (Judge Estrera), Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City and Presiding Judge of Branch 29, ordered the raffle of
the petition against Sheriff Bellones. A few days later, after summarily hearing the case, Judge Estrera
issued a restraining order against Sheriff Bellones. Upon Candelaria‘s motion, he consolidated the cases
before Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City. On May 27, 2002, again upon Candelaria‘s motion,
Judge Villarin of Branch 59 extended the temporary restraining order against Sheriff Bellones for 17
days.
The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but he never resolved them:
(1) a motion to dismiss, as amended; (2) a motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction
order; and (3) a joint motion to resolve the motions. On February 28, 2007, the Heirs of Piedad filed an
administrative complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The administrative complaint charged them
with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and Unreasonable Delay in Resolving
Motions. On December 16, 2009, this Court found both Judges Estrera and Villarin administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, and Judge Villarin liable for undue delay in rendering an order. Civil
Case No. 435-T before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City was eventually transferred to Branch
29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, where the Heirs of Piedad likewise filed their Motion Praying that
an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ
of Demolition.
In his Order dated May 15, 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of Branch
29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City denied the motion. Judge Altubar opined that since more than 12
years had passed since the Court of Appeals‘ September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory,
the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival of judgment, not a mere motion.
Judge Altubar then denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Heirs of Piedad. They the appealed the
denial of their motions with a petition under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy and also denied the Heirs of Piedad‘s Motion
for Reconsideration.
Consequently, petitioners Heirs of Piedad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court, where they adopted the findings of fact in the administrative case against Judges Estrera and
Villarin. As they assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
their motion for the resumption of the writ of demolition and their motion for reconsideration. And chide
Judge Altubar for being equally ignorant of the law as Judges Estrera and Villarin.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality to file the petition as heirs of Simeon
Piedad; and
2. Whether or not the motion to revive judgment was timely filed.
RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the process of substitution of parties when
the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the claim. And the petitioners
claim to be Piedad‘s children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties-in-interest to the action begun
by their father. On the other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad
upon his death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival of judgment.
However, Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad‘s rightful heirs not only by the
Court of Appeals but also by this Court. This Court upheld petitioners‘ personality to sue in Heirs of
Simeon Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the current
case is merely an offshoot of their father‘s original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.
2. Yes, Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the two (2) ways of executing a final
and executory judgment where the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and executory
judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the entry of judgment. And if no motion is filed
within this period, the judgment is converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by
instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of
judgment. However, in the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when the Decision of
the Court of Appeals became final and executory, 12 years and 1 day had already elapsed when the
instant motion was filed on November 2, 2010. There may be instances that execution may still pursue
despite the lapse of ten years from finality of judgment but it should be a result of a well-justified action
for revival of judgment, not a mere motion, as can be found in the cited Supreme Court‘s Decision.
The Regional Trial Court likewise referred to Bausa v. Heirs of Dino to support its denial of
petitioners‘ motion, claiming that the case at bar is very similar with Bausa. However, a careful reading
of Bausa shows that while it contains similarities with the case at bar, the factual circumstances and
ruling in Bausa tend to support petitioners‘ motion for revival, not its denial.
Q: How can an original party to a pending action who dies may be substituted?
A: Under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative
or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail
to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
Q: How can a final and executory judgment be executed where the prevailing party may move for the
execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the entry of
judgment?
A: Under Rule 39, Section 6: Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
Q: What if no motion is filed within the period set forth in Rule 39, Sec. 6?
A: The judgment is converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a
complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of judgment.
YEAR 2018
EVANGELINE CHUA, et al., PETITIONERS, V. HSY MARKETING LTD., CO., et al.,

RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 207354, January 10, 2018
Factual findings of labor officials exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded great respect and even
finality by the courts when the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, in labor cases, the
issues in petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals are limited only to whether the National
Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion. However, this does not mean that the
Court of Appeals is conclusively bound by the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
Court of Appeals may also review factual findings if quasi-judicial agencies’ findings are contradictory
to its own findings. Thus, it must reexamine the records to determine which tribunal’s findings were
supported by the evidence.
For a pleading to be verified, the affiant must attest that he or she has read the pleading and that the
allegations are true and correct based on his or her personal knowledge or on authentic records.
Otherwise, the pleading is treated as an unsigned pleading. A pleading may be verified by attesting that
the allegations are based either on personal knowledge and on authentic records, or on personal
knowledge or on authentic records. The certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the
litigant, not his or her counsel.
FACTS:
Respondents are engaged in manufacturing and selling goods under the brand Novo Jeans & Shirt
& General Merchandise (Novo Jeans).
Sometime in May 2010 and June 2010, several Novo Jeans employees went to Raffy Tulfo's radio
program to air their grievances against their employers for alleged labor violations. The employees
claimed that they were not allowed to enter the Novo Jeans branches where they were employed in. They
further averred that while Novo Jeans sent them a show cause letter the next day, they were in truth
already dismissed from employment. They sent a demand letter on July 19, 2010 to amicably settle the
case before the DOLE but no settlement was reached. They alleged that upon learning that the DOLE was
not the proper forum to address their grievances, they decided to file a notice of withdrawal and file their
complaint with the Labor Arbiter.
On the other hand, Novo Jeans claimed that these employees voluntarily severed their
employment but that they filed complaints later with the DOLE. They alleged that the employees' notice
of withdrawal was not actually granted by the DOLE but that the employees nonetheless filed their
complaints before the Labor Arbiter.
LA Anni dismissed the complaints. He found that other than the employees' bare allegations that
they were dismissed, they did not present any other evidence showing that their employment was
terminated or that they were prevented from reporting for work. He likewise ruled that the employees
voluntarily severed their employment since the airing of their grievances on Raffy Tulfo's radio program
"was enough reason for them not to report for work, simply because of a possible disciplinary action by
[Novo Jeans]. NLRC reversed LA’s ruling and found that the employees were illegally dismissed. CA
reversed NLRC and reinstated LU decision
Petitioner, in the instant Petition, argued that respondents were unable to substantially comply
with the verification requirement before the CA. They submit that respondents' counsel would have been
privy to the antecedents of the case so as to have personal knowledge and not merely knowledge as
relayed by his clients. They add that respondents "deliberately withheld the Annexes of the Position Paper
of the Petitioners submitted to the Labor Arbiter; hence, said Position Paper cannot be considered
authentic."
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals may, in a petition for certiorari, review and re-assess the
factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission; and
2. Whether or not verification based on facts relayed to the affiant by his clients is valid
HELD:
1. Factual findings of labor officials exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded great respect
and even finality by the courts when the findings are supported by substantial evidence. However,
this does not mean that the CA is conclusively bound by the findings of the NLRC. If the findings
are arrived at arbitrarily, without resort to any substantial evidence, the NPC is deemed to have
gravely abused its discretion
Moreover, the CA may also review factual findings if quasi judicial agencies' findings are
contradictory to its own findings. Thus, it must re-examine the records to determine which tribunal's
findings were supported by the evidence.
In this instance, the LA and the National NLRC made contradictory factual findings. Thus, it was
incumbent on the CA to re-examine their findings to resolve the issues before it. The CA also found that
the findings of the NLRC were not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, were rendered in
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the determination of whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion, the CA may re-examine facts and re-assess the evidence.
2. All petitions for certiorari are required to be verified upon filing. A pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which
contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and
belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Thus, for a
pleading to be verified, the affiant must attest that he or she has read the pleading and that the
Otherwise, the pleading is treated as an unsigned pleading.
Thus, for verification to be valid, the affiant must have "ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition." Facts relayed to the counsel by the client would be
insufficient for counsel to swear to the truth of the allegations in a pleading. Otherwise, counsel would be
able to disclaim liability for any misrepresentation by the simple expediency of stating that he or she was
merely relaying facts with which he or she had no competency to attest to. For this reason, the Rules of
Court require no less than personal knowledge of the facts to sufficiently verify a pleading.
Respondents' counsel, not having sufficient personal knowledge to attest to the allegations of the
pleading, was not able to validly verify the facts as stated. Therefore, respondents' Petition for Certiorari
before the CA should have been considered as an unsigned pleading. Respondents' certification of non-
forum shopping is likewise defective. The certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the
litigant, not his or her counsel. The litigant may, for justifiable reasons, execute a special power of
attorney to authorize his or her counsel to sign on his or her behalf. In this instance, the verification and
certification against forum shopping was contained in one document and was signed by respondents'
counsel, Atty. Daclan.
While courts may simply order the resubmission of the verification or its subsequent correction, a
defect in the certification of non-forum shopping is not curable unless there are substantial merits to the
case. However, respondents' Petition for Certiorari before the CA was unmeritorious. Thus, its defective
verification and certification of non-forum shopping should have merited its outright dismissal.
Q: Are findings of quasi-judicial agencies binding with the Court of Appeals?
A: Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, i.e. labor officials exercising quasi-judicial functions, are
accorded great respect and even finality by the courts when the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. However, this does not mean that the CA is conclusively bound by the findings of such
agencies. If the findings are arrived at arbitrarily, without resort to any substantial evidence, said agency
is deemed to have gravely abused its discretion
Moreover, the CA may also review factual findings if quasi judicial agencies' findings are contradictory
to its own findings. Thus, it must re-examine the records to determine which tribunal's findings were
supported by the evidence.
Q: When is a pleading deemed verified?
A: For a pleading to be verified, the affiant must attest that he or she has read the pleading and that the
Otherwise, a pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and
belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RAUL T. MANZANO, JOSE R. JUGO, RAMON H.
MANZANO, and HEIRS OF PILAR T. MANZANO
G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018
“The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or

limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.”
“Execution of a judgment pending appeal is governed by Sec 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Execution thereof is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be
executed, it must be strictly construed. Thus, execution pending appeal should not be granted routinely
but only in extraordinary circumstances.”
FACTS:
The respondents were the owners of 4 parcels of agricultural land planted with rubber trees.
With the enactment of RA 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law has placed suitable
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP.
On January 12, 1998, respondents voluntarily offered their landholdings for agrarian reform,
proposing the selling price of PHP100,000 per hectare to the government. They later lowered their offer
to PHP83,346.76 per hectare.
DAR issued an Administrative Order to implement and fill in the details of the CARL. The
Admin. Order proves for the formula in computing just compensation for rubber lands. DAR endorsed the
matter of land valuation to Landbank as one of the implementing agencies and the duly designated
financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and the custodian of the Agrarian
Reform Fund. According to the Landbank, respondents‘ land were planted with more than 30-year-old
rubber trees that were no longer productive. Thus, Landbank gave a lower counter-offer to respondents
ranging from PHP21,414.66 to PHP66,118.06 per hectare.
Respondents refused to accept petitioner‘s counter-offer. The matter of land valuation was
referred to the DAR Adjudication Board for preliminary determination of just compensation. In view of
the deadlock on the purchase price, administrative cases for land valuation were filed by the respondents
against Landbank and DAR. These cases were endorsed to the PAR Adjudicator of Isabela for summary
administrative proceedings.
During the proceedings, respondents moved for the revaluation of their properties. The PAR
Adjudicator found merit in their motion and directed Landbank to conduct a revaluation survey.
Landbank recomputed the value of the land, the total land value, however, posted a net decrease.
Respondents rejected the new valuation for being ―too low and unreasonable
The PAR Adjudication Board adopted Landbank and DAR‘s revaluation, stating that this was
done in accordance with the relevant administrative issuances on land valuations. According to the Board,
respondents did not present contrary evidence to reject the revaluation. It also ruled that should
respondents disagree with its findings, they may bring the matter to the RTC designated as Special
Agrarian Court.
Respondents filed separate complaints for judicial determination and payment of just
compensation before the RTC Special Agrarian Court. The RTC consolidated the complaints, and
appointed 3 commissioners to examine and ascertain the valuation of the properties. Meanwhile,
Landbank deposited the judgment award, through cash and Landbank bonds, as provisional compensation
for the acquired properties. Respondents later withdrew these amounts.
The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of the area and interviewed some of its
occupants and tenants. The tenants and tillers said that the landholdings may be sold from PHP180,000 to
PHP200,000 per hectare if the rubber trees were young and productive, while the less productive land
with mature rubber trees may range from PHP90,000 to PHP120,000 per hectare.
The commissioners conducted another ocular inspection. They were joined by the Isabela City
Assessor‘s Office Assessment Operations Officer and respondent’s representatives. The commissioners
interviewed more people and other owners of rubber lands in the neighboring areas to verify the
declarations of the tenants and tillers on their first inspection.
According to the commissioners, the figures were more or less the same fair market value derived
from the persons interviewed on the first ocular inspection and from the findings of Cuervo Appraisers.
Based on their findings, the commissioners gave the following recommendation for the payment of just
compensation. It also recommended that the amount of just compensation be reckoned from the date the
properties were transferred to the Republic, until fully paid, and that DAR and Landbank pay all legal
fees and costs of the case.
Opposing the recommendations, Landbank filed its comment to the consolidated

Commissioners‘Report. Landbank argued that the just compensation. Should not be more that
respondents‘sworn valuation, as shown in their tax declarations.
The RTC substantially adopted the Consolidated Commissioners‘ Report.
Landbank filed a Petition for Review before the CA. Meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. The RTC issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal
ruling that the ownership and possession of respondents‘properties were already transferred to the
government in 1999. Subsequently, the government through respondent DAR distributed and awarded the
land to the tenant-beneficiaries of the CARP. Consequently, petitioners were virtually deprived not only
of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the property but also the fruits and income thereof since the land
was taken in 1999. A denial of respondents‘Motion is an infringement of their constitutional rights which
in effect states that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation. If we add up the time difference from the period of this judgment to the date when the
issue of just compensation shall have been decided with finality by the appellate courts, the delay would
probably take more than one decade or so before payment can be received by petitioners. Certainly, the
monetary value of respondents‘properties as fixed by this court will no longer be the same if they are to
be paid several years from the date their properties have been taken.
Landbank filed an Urgent Verified Motion/Application for the Issuance of TRO/Preliminary

Injunction before the CA. The CA denied Landbank‘s Urgent Motion. Landbank did not appeal the CA
Resolution but the RTC found Landbank liable for indirect contempt for failing to comply with the writ of
execution pending appeal. The RTC maintained that it had the residual authority to resolve an incident
that was perfected before the appeal was given due course.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether the RTC can simply adopt the Consolidated Commissioners‘Report? (YES)
2.) Whether there may be execution pending appeal? (YES)
HELD:
1.Under Rule 67, the RTC may accept the Consolidated Commissioners‘Report, recommit it to
the same commissioners for further report, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept only a
part of it and reject the other parts.
The final determination of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court must be respected.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or limited
by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.
RA 6557 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation. Sec. 16 of the same law also provides that
―any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation. The use of the word ―final in the statute should not be
construed to mean that the Special Agrarian Court serves as an appellate court that must wait for the
administrative agencies to finish their valuation. There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies
through the PAR Adjudicator, RAR Adjudicator or the DAR Adjudication Board before a party can go to
the Special Agrarian Court for determination of just compensation,
2.The CA properly upheld the RTC‘s issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
The RTC found that the respondents have been deprived of their and since 1999. They were
dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties, which were taken from them 19
years ago without compensation. Thus, the denial of the execution pending appeal will infringe on their
constitutional right against taking of private property without just compensation.
Moreover, the just compensation is not wholly payable in cash, 65% of the payments is in bonds,
which will mature only after 10 years. By then, the monetary value of the properties would no longer be
the same. Denying the execution pending appeal can also stall the payment of respondents‘ properties
through the filing of frivolous motions and appeals.
Execution of a judgment pending appeal is governed by Sec 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Execution thereof is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be
but only in extraordinary circumstances.
Thus, this Court agrees with the RTC that for reasons of equity, justice and fairplay, respondents
should be paid to enable them to cope up with the loss they sustained as a result of the taking and for their
economic survival.

Q: Explain the concept of judgment pending appleal.
A: Execution of a judgment pending appeal is governed by Sec 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Execution thereof is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be
but only in extraordinary circumstances. It is for reasons of equity, justice and fairplay,
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION vs.OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint
must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint.
FACTS:
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it

administered to Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease:
Baluarte De San Andres, Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao, and Revellin De Recoletos. All three
(3) properties were leased for five (5) years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. All
their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations,
which included a provision for lease renewals every five (5) years upon the parties' mutual
agreement.
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises.

However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore
Construction's non conformity with Presidenti al Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th
centuries' Philippine Spanish architecture in the area.-- Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a
complaint against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism before the Manila Regional Trial
Court.
Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement which the Manila Regional
Trial Court approved. In the Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the validity of the two
(2) lease contracts but terminated the one over Revellin de Recoletos. The Compromise A
greement retained the five (5)year period of the existing lease contracts and stated the areas that
may be occupied by Offshore Construction. emand letters.
During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental
fees, despite several d Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore
Construction would pay its arrears.
To settle its arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the Department of Tourism's
monthly operational expenses for lights and so und equipment, electricity, and performers at the
Baluarte Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and the Department of Tourism accepted the
offer, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement covering the period of August 15,
2004 to August 25, 200 5. However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to pay its
arrears.Offshore Construction received Intramuros' latest demand letter.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court.
On July 12, 2010, Offshore Const ruction filed a Motion to dismiss. The MTC granted the
same, it found that while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Offshore Construction's motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matt er. The MTC held that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint. While there
were lease contracts between the parties, the existence of the other contracts between them made
Intramuros and Offshore Construction's relationship as one of concession. Under th is concession
agreement, Offshore Construction undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District,
for which it incurred expenses.
Intramuros appealed to the RTC which affirmed the decision of the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC has jurisdiction.
RULING:
YES. To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in
the complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the
complaint of a case for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
A review of petitioner's Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these allegations were made.
 First, petitioner alleges that respondent is its lessee by virtue of three (3) Contracts of
Lease. The validity of these contracts was later affirmed in a Compromise Agreement,
which modified certain provisions of the previous leases but retained the original lease
period. Respondent does not dispute these contracts' existence or their validity.
 Second, following respondent's failure to pay rentals, petitioner alleges that it has
demanded that respondent vacate the leased premises.
 Third, respondent continues to occupy and possess the leased premises despite petitioner's
demand. This is admitted by respondent, which seeks to retain possession and use of the
properties to "recoup its multimillion pesos worth of investment."
 Fourth, petitioner filed its Complaint f or Ejectment on April 28, 2010, within one (1)
year of its last written demand to respondent, made on March 18, 2010 and received by
respondent on March 26, 2010. Contrary to respondent's claim, the one (1)year period to
file the complaint must be reckoned from the date of last demand, in instances when there
has been more than one (1) demand to vacate.
The Metropolitan Trial Court seriously erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction
over petitioner's complaint because the parties' situation has a llegedly become "more complicated"
than one of lease. Respondent's defense that its relationship with petitioner is one of concession
rather than lease does not determine whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction
over petitioner’s compla int. The pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or motion
to dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction. In Morta v. Occidental:
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it , are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
"Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserte d therein a matter
resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to
depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such
were the rule, the question of jurisdicti on would depend almost entirely upon the defendant."
Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will remove
the Metropolitan Trial Court's jurisdiction over the complaint. To emphasize, physical possession,
or de facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the
claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over an
ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been alleged,
such as in this case. Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by requiring
parties to resort to legal means to recover possession of real property.
Q: What are the jurisdictional facts that must be evident on the face of the complaint of a case for
unlawful detainer to determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court?
A: The following are the jurisdictional facts that must be alleged in an unlawful detainer case:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, VICENTE MONTERO, MR. BONDOC, AND MR. BAYONA
vs NORDEC PHILIPPINES AND/OR MARVEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, DR. POTENCIANO R. MALVAR
G.R. No. 196020, THIRD DIVISION, April 18, 2018
A cause of action "is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." For a cause of
action to exist, there must be, first, a plaintiff's legal right; second, defendant's correlative obligation;
and third, an injury to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's violation of plaintiff's right. The
beneficial users of an electric service have a cause of action against this distribution utility.
Facts:
Meralco was contracted to supply electricity to Marvex Industrial Corporation (Marvex) under an
Agreement for Sale of Electric Energy. Marvex was billed according to the monthly electric consumption
recorded in its meter.
Later, Meralco service inspectors found that the main meter terminal and cover seals of Marvex's
electric metering facilities had been tampered with. Meralco assessed Marvex a differential billing, and
sent demand letters therefor. With its demands unheeded, Meralco disconnected Marvex's electric service.
Nordec, the new owner of Marvex, sued Meralco for damages. It alleged that Meralco's service inspectors
conducted the inspections without its consent or approval.
Following the inspections, Meralco's inspectors gave an unnamed Nordec employee a Power
Field Order that did not mention the alleged defects in the metering devices.
The Court of Appeals issued its Decision, setting aside the Regional Trial Court Decision. It
found that Meralco was negligent in discovering the alleged tampering only four (4) months after it first
found irregularities in the metering devices, despite the monthly meter readings.
Issue:
Whether or not Nordec Philippines has a cause of action against Manila Electric Company.
Held:
Yes. A cause of action "is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." For a
cause of action to exist, there must be, first, a plaintiff's legal right; second, defendant's correlative
obligation; and third, an injury to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's violation of plaintiff's
right. Here, the Regional Trial Court found that Nordec had no cause of action against Meralco since they
had no contractual relationship, as Meralco's service contract was with Marvex.
The beneficial users of an electric service have a cause of action against this distribution utility.
In Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Chua, it was the beneficial users who were awarded damages due
to the unjust disconnection of the electric supply, even though the service contract with Meralco was
registered in the name of another person.
Further, Meralco is deemed to have knowledge of the fact that Nordec was the beneficial user of
Marvex's service contract with Meralco. It admits that the inspections of the metering devices were
conducted in the presence of Nordec's maintenance personnel and with the consent of its manager. It
further admits that it corresponded with Nordec regarding the differential billing, and entertained
Nordec's demand for an explanation on the finding of tampering and the recomputation of the amount to
be paid by Nordec. Clearly, Meralco knew that it was dealing with Nordec as the beneficial user of the
electricity supply.
Q: What is a cause of action?
A: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. For a cause of
action to exist, there must be, first, a plaintiff's legal right; second, defendant's correlative obligation;
and third, an injury to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's violation of plaintiff's right.
RENANTE B. REMOTICADO, PETITIONER, VS. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADING
CORP. AND ROMMEL M. ALIGNAY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 206529, April 23, 2018
It is basic that factual issues are improper in Rule 45 petitions. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rulesof Civil
Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS:
Petitioner Renante B. Remoticado's services were engaged by Typical Construction Trading

Corporation (Typical Construction) as a helper/laborer in its construction projects, the most recent being
identified as the Jedic Project at First Industrial Park in Batangas.
In separate sworn statements, Pedro Nielo (Nielo), Typical Construction's Field Human
Resources Officer, and two (2) of Remoticado's co-workers, Salmero Pedros and Jovito Credo, recalled
that on December 6, 2010, Remoticado was absent without an official leave. He remained absent until
December 20, 2010 when, upon showing up, he informed Nielo that he was resigning. Prodded by Nielo
for his reason, Remoticado noted that they were "personal reasons considering that he got sick.” Nielo
advised Remoticado to return the following day as he still had to report Remoticado's resignation to
Typical Construction's main office, and as his final pay had yet to be computed.
Remoticado returned the following day and was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He protested,
saying that he was entitled to "separation pay computed at two (2) months for his services for two (2)
years.” In response, Nielo explained that Remoticado could not be entitled to separation pay considering
that he voluntarily resigned. Nielo added that if Remoticado was not satisfied with P5,082.53, he was free
to continue working for Typical Construction. However, Remoticado was resolute and proceeded to sign
and affix his thumb marks on a Kasulatan ng Pagbawi ng Karapatan at Kawalan ng Paghahabol, a
waiver and quitclaim.
On January 10, 2011, Remoticado filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Typical
Construction and its owner and operator, Rommel M. Alignay (Alignay). He claimed that on December
23, 2010, he was told to stop reporting for work due to a "debt at the canteen” and thereafter was
prevented from entering Typical Construction's premises
In a Decision dated October 11, 2011, Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz dismissed Remoticado's
Complaint for lack of merit. He explained that Remoticado's employment could not have been illegally
terminated as he voluntarily resigned. National Labor Relations Commission denied Remoticado's appeal.
Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission. In its assailed March 26, 2013 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Remoticado's
Motion for Reconsideration.
Undeterred by the consistent rulings of the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz, Remoticado filed the present Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not factual issues are proper in Rule 45 petitions.

RULING:
Determining which between two (2) alternative versions of events actually transpired and
ascertaining the specifics of how, when, and why one of them occurred involve factual issues resting on
the evidence presented by the parties.
It is basic that factual issues are improper in Rule 45 petitions. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have
expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio,
Jr.:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7. The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
10. The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
No exception avails in this case.
Quite glaring is the sheer consistency of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the National
Labor Relations Commission, and Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz. Not only are these findings uniform, but they
are also sustained by evidence. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that there is no showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Q: Are factual issues are proper in Rule 45 petitions?
A: No. It is basic that factual issues are improper in Rule 45 petitions. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
Jr.:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7. The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
10. The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
DISSENTING OPINION
Quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public
office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings.
FACTS:
The Republic, through the OSG, seeks the nullification of respondent's appointment, asserting
that her failure to file the required disclosures and her failure to submit the same to the JBC show that she
is not possessed of "proven integrity" demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary. As such, the Republic,
represented by SolGen Calida, filed the Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust
and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.
The Republic entreats the Court to declare Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (respondent) ineligible to
hold the highest post in the Judiciary for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as
a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice,
of the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law, and the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Petitioner’s contention
The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo warranto is the proper remedy to
question the validity of respondent's appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is seasonably filed
within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court since
respondent's transgressions only came to light during the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice
on the allegations of the impeachment complaint filed against her. Alternatively, the Republic claims that
it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit
regi.
Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC
disqualifies her, at the outset, from being candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs,
respondent has not proven her integrity which is requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus
concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity,
she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
Respondent’s contention
Respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent contends that the use of the
phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
It is likewise the argument of respondent that since petition for quo warranto may be filed before
the RTC, such would result to conundrum because judge of lower court would have effectively exercised
disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank
and is contrary to Sections and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the Supreme Court
disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof. She theorizes that if a
Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress'
"check" on the Supreme Court through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Moreover, respondent argues that the petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides that
petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the "cause of ouster" and not from the
"discovery" of the disqualification. Respondent contends that the supposed "failure" to file the required
SALNs allegedly took place for several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the "cause of ouster" existed even
before the respondent was appointed as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012. Therefore, as early as her
appointment, the Republic, through the OSG, already had a cause of action to seek her ouster. .
Respondent also stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no
bearing on one's integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among the additional documents which
the JBC had required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the
non-filing of SALN is not a ground for disqualification unless the same was already the subject of a
pending criminal or administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally convicted for a
criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case, respondent points out that the JBC was
made aware as early as July 20, 2012 that respondent had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as a U.P.
professor and yet none of them invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule."
Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position of Chief
Justice is a person of "proven integrity" is a question "constitutionally committed to the JBC" and is
therefore a political question which only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the affirmative when it
included respondent's name in the shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice.
Court’s Ruling
The language of Sec. 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers. The provision reads:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion
and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. The Court have consistently held that the term
"may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is
vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by impeachment
admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
Therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution
of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated
on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer's
appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his
title to the office he holds. The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for
impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even
when he is clearly disqualified from holding it Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible
public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they
are successfully removed from office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. In addition, the Court ruled that when the government is the real party in
interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
prescription. The basic principle that “prescription does not lie against the State” applies in this case.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE LEONEN
ISSUES:
1. Whether quo warranto is a proper remedy to oust an impeachable officer
2. Assuming quo warranto is a proper remedy, whether said remedy already prescribed
3. Whether Respondent’s failure to submit copies of her SALN to the JBC meant that she failed “to
pass the test of integrity”
4. Whether the Court’s power of supervision gives it the authority to interfere with the JBC’s
discretion in performing its constitutional mandate
OPINION:
1. NO. The petition should have been dismissed outright and not given due course. A process to
oust an impeachable officer and a Justice of the Supreme Court is a legal abomination that
gravely diminishes judicial independence and threatens the Court’s ability to assert the people’s
fundamental rights. Granting the quo warranto is tantamount to granting the Solicitor General the
competence to reconsider the determination of the JBC and the President as to the qualifications
of any appointed judge or justice.
The solution to address the problems relating to a Chief Justice is for this Court to call her out or
for her to be tried using the impeachment process if any of her actions amounts to the grave offenses
enumerated in the Constitution. She also has the alternative to have the grace and humility to resign from
her office to protect the institution from a leadership which may not have succeeded to address the
divisiveness and the weaknesses within.
Granting a Petition for Quo Warranto against the Chief Justice - an impeachable officer - is not
the right way to address her inability to gain the respect of the branch of government that she was
entrusted to lead. This is clear from a deliberate, impartial, conscious, and contextual reading of the
entirety of the text of the Constitution. This is the unclouded conclusion if this Court appreciates the true
value of judicial independence.
Granting the Quo Warranto Petition as the majority proposes, is tantamount to empowering the
Solicitor General, a repeat litigant representing the current political administration, far more than any
other constitutional officer. The Solicitor General will be granted the competence to what amounts to a
reconsideration of the determination of the Judicial and Bar Council and the President as to the
qualifications of any appointed judge or justice.
A verba legis or plain reading of Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution is not proper. The
words therein, “may be removed,” should be read in accordance with the Constitutional framework and
the subsequent jurisprudence over the text under consideration. To focus on the word “may” precludes the
importance of the entire document and provides a myopic and unhistorical view of the framework on
which legal order rests. The framers of the Constitution did not use “SHALL be removed” as it
communicates that removal through impeachment and conviction was mandatory, as opposed to “may”
which should mean that it was an option to remove. Nor was “may ALSO be removed from office…”
used, as it would clearly state the intent for processes other than impeachment and conviction to remove a
sitting Chief Justice. The phrase “may ONLY be removed from office” was not also used. But this should
be interpreted within the context of the provision. Specifically, the following must be taken into
consideration: (i) that the Constitution reserves the process of removal through impeachment and
conviction to heads of Constitutional organs; (ii) that the process of removal is deliberately cumbersome,
such as the one year time bar to avoid harassment suits against impeachable officers and disruption of
public service; (iii) that the grounds for impeachment are weighty and serious to shield impeachable
officers from malicious or bothersome suits. Constitutional heads are expected to make difficult
decisions. In this light, the Constitution should be read as to provide them incentive to do their duties.
Thus, “may be removed” should be read in light of the principle that impeachment and conviction should
be read as the only process to remove them from their respective office.
The majority’s reference to the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal as evidence that
a petition for quo warranto is not precluded as a method to remove impeachable officers is misplaced.
Such reference ignores the fact that the said Rules only pertain to the President and the Vice President,
which are the only impeachable officers elected by the public. Granting the quo warranto undermines the
sole constitutional mandate given to the JBC to prepare a short list of nominees as well as the President’s
constitutional mandate to select from the JBC’s shortlist. The rule is that impeachable officers are only
removable by impeachment and no other proceeding, such as disbarment. Even the majority concedes this
point.
Granting the quo warranto threatens and undermines judicial independence. Allowing a judicial
mechanism for investigating judicial colleagues suppresses candor and undermines the spirit and practice
of collegiality that has been so entrenched in the Supreme Court. Such a mechanism for exacting
accountability threatens and effectively erodes the principle of independence that the Constitution has
protected. It may even stifle free speech.
Granting the quo warranto would result in dire consequences, as follows:
 First, the Solicitor General, who is not even a constitutional officer, is given awesome
powers.
 Second, since quo warranto is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, we will be ushering in the
phenomena of a trial court judge ousting a colleague from another branch or another
judicial region or a Court of Appeals division ousting another justice belonging to
another division or working in another region. The logical consequence is to diminish the
concept of professional collegiality and independence also among lower courts.
 Third, this Decision would inexorably empower appellate court judges to exercise
discipline and control over lower courts through acting on Petitions for Quo Warranto
against other lower court judges. This will take away this Court's sole constitutional
domain to discipline lower court judges.
 Fourth, there will be no security of tenure for justices of this Court who will consistently
dissent against the majority.
 Fifth, this precedent opens the way to reviewing actions of the Judicial Bar Council and
the President. It is an illicit motion for reconsideration against an appointment, even long
after the exercise of judicial power.
 Sixth, we have effectively included another requirement for the selection of judges and
justices even though we are not constitutionally mandated to do so. Through the majority
opinion, we now require the submission of all the Statements of Assets and Liabilities of
a candidate.
2. YES. Even assuming that this Court can take cognizance of the petition, an action for quo
warranto is limited in time regardless of who institutes the action. It can only be instituted within
one (1) year after the cause of action arises. This is clear from Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that: “Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position, arose…”
It is in the public's best interest that questions regarding title to public office be resolved and laid
to rest as soon as possible. This is the rationale behind the one (1)-year prescriptive period. Public service
demands stability and consistency. In the same manner, public officers cannot rest easy with the threat of
being unseated at any time looming over their heads. The right of civil servants to occupy their seats must
not be subjected to constant uncertainty. A public officer cannot afford to be distracted from his or her
duties. When public officers cannot do their work effectively, it is not just the office that deteriorates. The
nature of the office is such that it is the public that is inconvenienced and ultimately suffers. It is, thus,
imperative that a quo warranto petition be filed within the one (1)-year prescriptive period so as to
establish immediately and with finality any nagging questions regarding title to public office.
The public policy behind the prescriptive period for quo warranto is to provide stability and
consistency in the service by limiting the uncertainty to the title to public office. Additionally, the
prescriptive period also aims to protect public funds by way of disbursing salary for two persons, one
illegally holding public office, and another not rendering service although entitled to do so.
The majority cannot refer to Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code to claim that prescription does not
lie against the State in light of the filing of the quo warranto petition. Such article refers to acquisitive and
extinctive prescription as regards acquisition or ownership of real rights, and not prescription in general.
The position of Chief Justice does not fall within the ambit of this article since a public office is not a
property right, hence no proprietary title can attach to it. This is affirmed jurisprudentially as the phrase
“prescription does not lie against the State” was limited to actions of reversion to the public domain of
lands.
3. NO. The finding of the majority based simply on the non-existence of the Respondent’s SALN is
untenable. While the Constitution provides the qualifications of the members of the Judiciary, it
also gives the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own rules and procedures.
JBC-009, which is the internal rules in place at the time the Respondent applied for the position
of Chief Justice, shows that the determination of integrity is so much more nuanced than merely
submitting documents like SALN or clearances from government agencies. Sound discretion to
ascertain an applicant’s integrity and general fitness for the position lies with the JBC. The duty
of the Court in this matter is to only provide them with context – not to supplant decisions.
Article XI, Section 17 of the Constitution requires the submission of SALN upon assumption of
office. Meanwhile, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. 6713, Section 8) and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019,
Section 7) statutorily requires government employees to submit their SALN on an annual basis.
As practiced, however, the JBC did not always require the submission of SALN as part of the
documentary requirements for applications or recommendees to the Judiciary. It only did so during the
vacancy left by Chief Justice Corona’s impeachment. Clearly, the JBC recognized that the SALN is a
mere tool in determining if an applicant possesses integrity and is not an actual measure of integrity. The
JBC’s own internal rules recognize integrity as the collection of attributes that tend to show “the quality
of a person’s character.”
Failure to disclose assets or the misdeclaration of assets in a SALN only translates to dishonesty
if the accumulated wealth of the public servant is grossly disproportionate to their source(s) of income,
and which cannot be properly explained or accounted for. Ultimately, it is within the discretion of the
JBC to decide that the mere failure to file a SALN or a misdeclaration or omission of assets therein,
without any evidence of disproportionate wealth, cannot be said to be reflective of one’s lack of integrity.
Thus, there is no transgression of the Constitution when the JBC says so.
4. NO. The Court’s power of supervision over the JBC cannot be read as authority to interfere with
the JBC’s discretion in performing its constitutional mandate. At most, the Court’s supervision is
administrative in nature. Supervision is the authority to ensure that the rules are followed, but
without the power to lay down rules nor the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, the power of supervision involves the authority to order the work done or re-done.
The JBC is a fully independent body. The Court cannot intervene with the JBC’s authority to
discharge its principal function unless the Council commits grave abuse of discretion. In which case, the
Court will then have the right to exercise its power of supervision by means of a judicial review.
In which case, the constitutional transgression must be nothing less than “arbitrary, capricious,
and whimsical.”
Questioning any perceived grave abuse of the JBC must also be subject to a time period.
Allowing the Solicitor General of the current administration to now question the previous
administration’s appointment six (6) years ago would undermine the security of tenure of magistrates.
It is with all conviction that I vote to dismiss this Quo Warranto Petition. In my view, it should
not even have been given due course. I am convinced that the majority opinion will weaken the role of the
Judiciary to deliver social justice and assert our fundamental rights.
QUESTION AND ANSWER OF J. LEONEN’S DISSENT:
Q: May a petition for quo warranto be initiated to oust an impeachable officer?

A: NO. Under Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution, the words, “may be removed,” should be read in
accordance with the Constitutional framework and the subsequent jurisprudence over the text under
consideration. To focus on the word “may” precludes the importance of the entire document and provides
a myopic and unhistorical view of the framework on which legal order rests. The framers of the
Constitution did not use “SHALL be removed” as it communicates that removal through impeachment
and conviction was mandatory, as opposed to “may” which should mean that it was an option to remove.
Nor was “may ALSO be removed from office…” used, as it would clearly state the intent for processes
other than impeachment and conviction to remove a sitting Chief Justice.
The phrase “may ONLY be removed from office” was not also used. But this should be
interpreted within the context of the provision. Specifically, the following must be taken into
consideration: (i) that the Constitution reserves the process of removal through impeachment and
conviction to heads of Constitutional organs; (ii) that the process of removal is deliberately cumbersome,
such as the one year time bar to avoid harassment suits against impeachable officers and disruption of
public service; (iii) that the grounds for impeachment are weighty and serious to shield impeachable
officers from malicious or bothersome suits. Constitutional heads are expected to make difficult
decisions. In this light, the Constitution should be read as to provide them incentive to do their duties.
Thus, “may be removed” should be read in light of the principle that impeachment and conviction should
be read as the only process to remove them from their respective office.
Granting the quo warranto threatens and undermines judicial independence. Allowing a judicial
mechanism for investigating judicial colleagues suppresses candor and undermines the spirit and practice
of collegiality that has been so entrenched in the Supreme Court. Such a mechanism for exacting
accountability threatens and effectively erodes the principle of independence that the Constitution has
protected.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner, v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS AND THE MONETARY BOARD, Respondent
G.R. No. 200678, June 04, 2018
Any petition for certiorari against an act or omission of Bangko Sentral, when it acts through the
Monetary Board, must be filed with the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank was declared to be in receivership but then voided
the order for closure and receivership thereof. Banco Filipino then filed several complaints among them a
claim for damages. Thereafter, the bank asked for financial assistance to BSP. Banco Filipino was
required to comply with the requirements and to submit a rehabilitation plan approved by BSP before
emergency loans could be granted. BSP informed Banco Filipino that its business plan could not be acted
upon since it was neither "confirmed nor approved by [Banco Filipino's Board of Directors]." After
negotiations, both parties failed to reach a settlement.
Banco Filipino filed a Petition For Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction in RTC. It assailed the alleged "arbitrary,
capricious and illegal acts" of Bangko Sentral and of the Monetary Board in coercing Banco Filipino to
withdraw all its present suits in exchange of the approval of its Business Plan. RTC granted the petition.
BSP filed a Petition For Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with the CA. It granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and
enjoined the trial court from conducting further proceedings in pending a decision on the merits.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not trial courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari against acts
and omissions of the Monetary Board;
2. Whether or not respondents Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Monetary Board should have filed a
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss before filing their petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals; and
3. Whether or not the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over respondents Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas and the Monetary Board.
RULING:
1. A closed bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation. Under Republic Act No. 7653, when the Monetary Board finds a bank insolvent,
it may "summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the
Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking
institution." When petitioner was placed under receivership, the powers of its Board of Directors and its
officers were suspended. Thus, its Board of Directors could not have validly authorized its Executive
Vice Presidents to file the suit on its behalf. The Petition, not having been properly verified, is considered
an unsigned pleading.
A defect in the certification of non-forum shopping is likewise fatal to petitioner's cause.
Considering that the Petition was filed by signatories who were not validly authorized to do so, the
Petition does not produce any legal effect. Being an unauthorized pleading, this Court never validly
acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
2. Even assuming that the Petition did not suffer from procedural infirmities, it must still be denied for
lack of merit.Unless otherwise provided for by law and the Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari against
a quasi-judicial agency are cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. The Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner against respondents.
Respondent Bangko Sentral exercises a myriad of functions, including those that may not be
necessarily exercised by a quasi-judicial agency. It is settled, however, that it exercises its quasi judicial
functions through respondent Monetary Board. Any petition for certiorari against an act or omission of
Bangko Sentral, when it acts through the Monetary Board, must be filed with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case before the Regional Trial Court since the
trial court did not have jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner against respondents.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's contention that a Court of Appeals decision already
provided for an exception to Rule 65. A Court of Appeals decision, no matter how persuasive or well
written, does not function as stare decisis. Neither can a Court of Appeals decision amend the Rules of
Court. As it stands, Rule 65 and jurisprudence hold that petitions for certiorari against the Monetary
Board must be filed with the Court of Appeals.
3. Petitioner assails respondents' failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of its
motion to dismiss before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that there be "no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" available before a petition for certiorari can be filed.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely an interlocutory order of the court as it does not finally
dispose of a case.
In this instance, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the petition filed by petitioner against
respondents, an issue which respondents properly asserted before the Court of Appeals when they filed
their Petition for Certiorari. They were, thus, excused from filing the requisite motion for reconsideration.
Q. What is the proper remedy from the decisions of the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board?
A. Bangko Sentral exercises a myriad of functions, including those that may not be necessarily exercised
by a quasi-judicial agency. It is settled, however, that it exercises its quasi judicial functions through
respondent Monetary Board. Any petition for certiorari against an act or omission of Bangko Sentral,
when it acts through the Monetary Board, must be filed with the Court of Appeals.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (DARMPC),
Petitioner, v. CARMENCITA DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY MARY CATHERINE M. DIAZ;
EMMA CABIGTING; AND NINA T. SAMANIEGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 206331, June 04, 2018
Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it, within the
period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a party's loss of right to appeal. It is settled that
appeal, being a mere statutory right, must "be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid
down by law." Failure to file one's appeal within the reglementary period is fatal to a party's cause,
"precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case."
FACTS:
Respondents, Carmencita Diaz (Diaz), Emma Cabigting (Cabigting), and Nina T. Samaniego
(Samaniego) were illegally dismissed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(the Cooperative). Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Cooperative before the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint and found that
they were mere members of the cooperative and not employees thereof. On appeal, NLRC reversed the
findings and ruled that they were employees of the Cooperative, but the dismissal was based on just
cause.
The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari finding that respondents were illegally
dismissed. The Cooperative filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on the decision of the
CA. In the motion which was filed out of time, the Cooperative’s counsel, Atty. Tamaca, admits that due
to his secretary's resignation, he failed to know that the Court of Appeals May 11, 2012 Decision had
become final and that the period to appeal had already lapsed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this Petition for Review should be denied for being filed out of time? (YES)
RULING:
Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court clearly provides for the period within which a petition
for review must be filed:
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.
Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it, within the
In this case, the lapse of more than six (6) months from petitioner's receipt of the September 12,
2012 Resolution until the filing of the Petition on April 5, 2013 is beyond the contemplation of Rule 45,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court. The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with, and allowing
them to be ignored or lightly dismissed to suit the convenience of a party like the petitioner was
impermissible.
No court, not even this Court, may thereafter modify, alter, or let alone reverse a final and
immutable judgment. The only exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries that
cause no prejudice to the parties, and void judgments. Even when there are facts or circumstances that
would render the execution of a final judgment unjust and inequitable, it must be shown that they arose
after the finality as to warrant a court's modification or alteration. As respondents point out, "all litigation
must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear."
Q: The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari finding that respondents were illegally
dismissed. The Cooperative filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on the decision of the
CA. In the motion which was filed out of time, the Cooperative’s counsel, Atty. Tamaca, admits that due
to his secretary's resignation, he failed to know that the Court of Appeals May 11, 2012 Decision had
become final and that the period to appeal had already lapsed. Should the petition for review be denied for
being filed out of time?
A: Yes. Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it, within the
BELINA CANCIO AND JEREMY PAMPOLINA, PETITIONERS, VS. PERFORMANCE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 182307, June 06, 2018
FACTS:
Performance Forex is a corporation operating as a financial broker/agent between market

participants in foreign exchange transactions.
Sometime in 2000, Belina Cancio and Jeremy Pampolina accepted broker Rolando Hipol's
invitation to open a joint account with Performance Forex. Cancio and Pampolina deposited the required
margin account deposit of US$10,000.00 for trading. The parties executed an application for the opening
of a joint account, with a trust/trading facilities agreement between Performance Forex, and Cancio and
Pampolina. They likewise entered into an agreement for appointment of an agent between Hipol, and
Cancio and Pampolina. They agreed that Cancio and Pampolina would make use of Performance Forex's
credit line to trade in the forex market while Hipol would act as their commission agent and would deal
on their behalf in the forex market.
The trust/trading facilities agreement between Performance Forex, and Cancio and Pampolina
provided:
6. Orders: You hereby irrevocably authorize us to act upon any instructions, whether in writing,
by cable, telex, facsimile or telephone given or purported to be given by you or your agent or
representative which appear whether on their respective faces (in the case of writing, cable, telex or
facsimile) or otherwise to be bonafide. We shall not be responsible and you shall indemnify us for any
losses incurred as a result of acting upon such instructions should there in fact be any error commission
ambiguities or other irregularities therein or therewith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for petitioners' failure to attach necessary
pleadings.
RULING:
The failure to attach material portions of the record will not necessarily cause the outright
dismissal of the petition. While Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition "be
accompanied by ... such material portions of the record as would support the petition,” this Court may still
give due course if there is substantial compliance with the Rules. Rule 45, Section 7 states:
Section 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required; sanctions. - For purposes of
determining whether the petition should be dismissed or denied pursuant to section 5 of this Rule,
or where the petition is given due course under section 8 hereof, the Supreme Court may require
or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary
within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate, and impose the
corresponding sanctions in case of non-filing or unauthorized filing of such pleadings and
documents or non-compliance with the conditions therefor.
In this instance, petitioners submitted the assailed Court of Appeals January 31, 2008 Decision in
their Petition, which quoted substantial portions of the Regional Trial Court June 15, 2006 Decision; the
Regional Trial Court's records; and the Court of Appeals' rollo. They likewise attached in their Reply a
copy of the Complaint, the Balance Ledger for Dealings, and the Purchase Order Forms presented before
the Regional Trial Court. These documents more than suffice to substantiate petitioners' claims.
Q: Will the petitioner’s failure to attach necessary pleading cause the dismissal of the petition?
A: The failure to attach material portions of the record will not necessarily cause the outright dismissal of
the petition. While Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition "be accompanied by
such material portions of the record as would support the petition,” the Court may still give due course if
there is substantial compliance with the Rules.
JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioner, v. GONZALO BENJAMIN A. BONGOLAN, ELMER
NONNATUS A. CADANO, MELINDA M. ADRIANO, RAFAEL P. DELOS SANTOS, CORAZON
G. CORPUZ, DANILO C. JAVIER, AND JIMMY B. SARONA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199625, June 06, 2018
The exoneration of public officers by the Ombudsman in a charge alleging grave misconduct and a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g) is generally unappealable. However, if it is shown that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, then the complainant may file a Rule 65 Petition
with the proper court. Furthermore, any appeal to the Supreme Court from such a case cannot be
initiated by one who does not stand to be benefited or injured by the results of the suit.
It is incumbent upon Canlas to prove that the Ombudsman gravely abused her discretion such that she
acted whimsically, arbitrarily, or grossly as to amount to a refusal to perform her duty.
However, Canlas did not argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the case at
bar. What Canlas contends is that the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision is still
appealable because respondents are being accused of an offense penalized with dismissal from service.
FACTS:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II) executed a
Joint Venture Agreement to implement the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (the
Project), with the former as government implementing agency and the latter as developer. The Manila
Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (Harbour Centre) is covered by the Project.
Aside from being the developer, R-II was also responsible for sourcing the funding for the
Project's Phase 1 through securitization, or the issuance of secured instruments backed by assets. To
support the Project's securitization and to make the security instruments more appealing to investors,
National Housing Authority and R-II engaged Home Guaranty Corporation (Home Guaranty) to act as
guarantor.
On September 26, 1994, National Housing Authority, R-II, Home Guaranty, and the Philippine
National Bank entered into the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement (Trust
Agreement), which provided for the mechanics to implement the Joint Venture Agreement.
In the Trust Agreement, the parties agreed to employ the "asset-backed securitization method" to
finance the Project.Under this method, Philippine National Bank, as the trustee of the asset pool, would
issue to investors Regular Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Participation Certificates (Participation
Certificates). These Participation Certificates were subject to government redemption and interest, and
were guaranteed by Home Guaranty. The assets in the asset pool were used as securities for the
Participation Certificates.
On the same day they executed the Trust Agreement, the parties also executed a Contract of
Guaranty. Under the Contract of Guaranty, the trustee of the asset pool was authorized to execute a Deed
of Assignment and Conveyance of the entire asset pool in favor of Home Guaranty should the latter be
called to pay the total outstanding value of the matured Participation Certificates.
On October 24, 2002, the Participation Certificates matured. At this point, Planters Development
Bank (Planters Bank) had become the trustee.Because of the asset pool's inability to pay for the
Participation Certificates, Planters Bank called on Home Guaranty's guaranty.
On February 6, 2003, Home Guaranty's Board of Directors approved the call. R-II did not
object to it. Thus, on July 30, 2004, Planters Bank transferred the entire asset pool properties to
Home Guarant through a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance. To recover its exposure, Home
Guaranty published a Notice of Saleon July 21, 2006 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, seeking to sell
the properties in the asset pool.
In response to this Notice of Sale, Alfred Wong King Wai (Wong) proposed to purchase
two (2) lots in the asset pool located in Manila Harbour Centre, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) Nos. 233421 and 233422 with a combined area of 28,926 square meters.
Wong offered to pay P14,000.00 per square meter. However, this price was reduced to
P13,300.00 per square meter because Home Guaranty allowed a 5% cash discount as an incentive
for spot cash purchases. Thus, on July 21, 2008, Home Guaranty soldthe lots to Wong for
P384,715,800.00, or P13, 300.00 per square meter.
Canlas claimed that the Home Guaranty Officers were guilty of grave misconduct and of
entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the government under Section 3(g) of Republic
Act No. 3019. He alleged that the lots were sol d below their actual or appraised fair market
value, and that the government suffered damages in the amount ranging from P121,489,200.00 to
P309,508,200.00.
In the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision,the complaint was dismissed
for lack of proof that the questioned transaction was disadvantageous to the government. Canlas
elevated the matter to the Court of Appealsafter the Office of the Ombudsman denied his
Motion for Reconsideration in its December 29, 2010 Order. In its August 11, 2011 Decision,the
Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman and dismissed the appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Jerome R. Canlas has the legal standing to file the administrative case.
RULING:
NO. Canlas has no standing to file the instant appeal. There is no showing that Canlas filed the
instant case as an authorized representative of RII or Harbour Centre, or that he was authorized by
these two (2) entities to file the instant case. He only admitted that he was connected to these
two (2) entities in his Consolidated Reply dated September 28, 2012 and in his Memorandum
dated May 30, 2013, after respondents had pointed out this circumstance.
In his personal capacity, there is no showing that he stands to be benefited or injured by
the finding of guilt of respondents. He is not a party to the Trust Agreement or the Contract of
Guaranty. Neither did he allege that he i nvested in the Project nor was he a holder of any
Participation Certificate. He did not claim to own any of the properties in the asset pool, or to
have any claim in the properties covered by the contract of sale between Home Guaranty and
Wong.
Assuming Canlas has the legal standing to question the ruling of the Ombudsman, he may
only do so if the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Generally, a decision by the Ombudsman absolving respondents is unappe alable.
However, if it is shown that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, then the
complainant may file a Rule 65 Petition with the proper court. In Dagan v. Office of the
Ombudsman:
However, petitioner is not left without any remedy. In Republic v. Francisco decisions of
administrative or quasi , we ruled that administrative agencies which are declared by law final and
unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
gross abuse of discreti on, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasijudicial
bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the
Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may
be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when, as in
this case, they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when the re is grave abuse of
discretion by the Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. In reviewing
administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again except when there is serious
ground to be lieve that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.
It is incumbent upon Canlas to prove that the Ombudsman gravely abused her discretion such that
she acted whimsically, arbitrarily, or grossly as to amount to a refusal to perform her duty.
However, Canlas did not argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the
case at bar. What Canlas contends is that the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision is
still appealable because respondents are being accused of an offense penalized with dismissal from
service.
However, in determining whether the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision is
appealable, the deciding factor is the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in the decision itself. It is not
determined by the penalty imposed for the offense as provided under the law.
Thus, even if grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal under the rules, it is the decision that
determines whether it is appealable or unappealable to the higher courts. If the Ombudsman finds that
respondents are not guilty and imposes no penalty, the decision is unappealable. Respondents were
absolved by the Ombudsman from Canlas' administrative charges. Thus, this finding is unappealable.
Q: Can the act of the Ombudsman in exonerating public officers in the ground of grave misconduct be
made subject of an appeal?
A: The exoneration of public officers by the Ombudsman in a charge alleging grave misconduct and a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g) is generally unappealable. However, if it is shown that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, then the complainant may file a Rule 65 Petition
with the proper court. Furthermore, any appeal to the Supreme Court from such a case cannot be initiated
by one who does not stand to be benefited or injured by the results of the suit.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. IMELDA R. MARCOS
G.R. No. 185484, JUNE 27, 2018
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only pertain to questions of law.
FACTS:
This case involves 33 consolidated criminal cases, for violations of Section 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, or the Central Bank Act. Similar
exchanges between the state prosecutor and star witness Del Rosario were repeated many times during the
course of the trial with respect to the signatures of the late President Marcos and Mrs. Marcos. But the
most absurd of all was when on cross-examination, Del Rosario could not identify the signature of Martin
Grossman, the person who issued the Certificate of Authenticity of the Swiss bank documents used by the
prosecution in these caseS. The Regional Trial Court also noted that the documents presented were
photocopies and that the prosecution had not established any basis for presenting them instead of the
original documents. Thus, the Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution failed to present competent
proof of the alleged offense and of the conspiracy among the accused.
Chavez argued that the acquittal was in violation of the Court of Appeals injunction, pointing out
that the injunction dated July 20, 2007 stated that it would subsist "pending final resolution of the present
petition or unless a contrary order is hereafter issued by this Court." He insisted that his case before the
Court of Appeals was still pending final resolution because of his motion for reconsideration and that
there had been no order dissolving the injunction.
Judge Pampilo made it impossible for petitioner or for Department of Justice State Prosecutor
Yarte to appear at the hearing dates set by the court. By orally denying the Motion to Inhibit on April 24,
2007, Judge Pampilo essentially forced the prosecution to present its evidence on the very same day, or
end its presentation of evidence. Judge Pampilo acted with grave abuse of discretion for promulgating his
decision in violation of a subsisting injunction, and for abruptly terminating petitioner's testimony. He
insists that his testimony would have been sufficient to render admissible the documents which Judge
Pampilo found inadmissible as evidence.
Respondent Imelda argues that the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact.
Further, the undisputed facts on record constitute sufficient justification for Judge Pampilo's decision to
terminate the prosecution's presentation of evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court Decision acquitting respondent Imelda R. Marcos was
issued in violation of a subsisting injunction
RULING:
1. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only pertain to questions of law. Further, the
Rules of Court mandate that petitions for review distinctly set forth the questions of law raised.
Essentially, petitioner takes issue with how the Court of Appeals interpreted the acts of Judge
Pampilo and found no manifest partiality, which are clearly not questions of law. He did not even
attempt to frame the issues as questions of law. By claiming that Judge Pampilo violated a writ of
injunction, petitioner attempts to cloak the second alleged error with some semblance of being a
question of law. However, petitioner does not provide any legal basis or coherent legal argument
to support the claim that a writ of injunction was violated, and this claim is totally specious.
2. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 28, 2007 and promulgated on March 10, 2008 was
not issued in violation of the Court of Appeals writ of injunction. When this Regional Trial Court
Decision was promulgated, the writ of injunction had already been dissolved.
In other words, the Court of Appeals' decision denying the petition for certiorari carried with it a
contrary order dissolving the injunction. Petitioner fails to address this point and does not show
how it is an error of law. Thus, the argument that a subsisting injunction was violated is clearly
frivolous, if not misleading, and intended only to make it appear as though the petition has some
semblance of basis.
Q: When can Question of fact be raised in an action for certiorari?
A: GR: Only established or admitted facts can be considered.
XPN: When it is necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of grave abuse of
discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Q: When can there be issuance of Writ of Injunction to enjoin criminal prosecution?
A: Public interest requires the criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection
of society.
GERALDINE C. ORNALES, ROSENDO R. EGUIA, VINCENT U. VERGARA, RODOLFO A.
DE CASTRO, JR., AND RAMIRO V. MAGNAYE, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, ROBERTO RICALDE, MODESTO DE LEON, ALICIA
MANGUBAT, AND LENELITA BALBOA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 214312, September 05, 2018
Orders and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court via
a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals via a Rule 43 petition.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery, Batangas (Sangguniang Bayan) issued Resolution

authorizing Mayor Bendaña to enter into an P8,250,000.00 loan agreement with Land Bank of the
Philippines (Landbank) for the computerization of the municipality's revenue collection system. Bendaña
and Amellar Solutions executed an agreement for the computerization of Lemery's revenue generation
system. The Commission on Audit disallowed the municipality's direct procurement of computer
equipment and software from Amellar Solutions. Roberto Ricalde (Ricalde), Modesto De Leon (De
Leon), Alicia Mangubat (Mangubat), and Lenelita Balboa (Balboa) filed a complaint affidavit before the
Office of the Ombudsman. They accused members of the Sangguniang Bayan of violating Republic Act
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government
Procurement Reform Act, when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a direct contract with Amellar
Solutions.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution, indicting the
Sangguniang Bayan members for violating Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3,
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. It also recommended that they be found guilty of grave
misconduct. It pointed out that in authorizing Bendaña to enter into a direct contract with Amellar
Solutions, the Sangguniang Bayan members usurped the functions of the Bids and Awards Committee,
thereby violating Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, or usurpation of authority or official functions. It
likewise found that the Sangguniang Bayan members dispensed with the required public bidding under
the law when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a direct contract with Amellar Solutions, violating
both Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 9184. Petitioners Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De Castro, and Magnaye
assailed the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's February 7, 2013 Joint Resolution and October
7, 2013 Order with a Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. They also impleaded the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in their petition.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and averred that it only had jurisdiction over
issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases and that jurisdiction over
the Office of the Ombudsman's issuances in criminal cases lay with the Supreme Court. Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration before CA but was denied. Petitioners filed Petition for Review before SC
and pointed out that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their case outright for lack of jurisdiction
when it actually had jurisdiction to determine the other issue of whether there was substantial evidence to
hold petitioner Magnaye guilty of grave misconduct, which is administrative in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO. This Court has repeatedly pronounced that the Office of the Ombudsman's orders and
decisions in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court in a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be raised on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition questioning public respondent's finding of probable
cause for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners' failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the
criminal case renders public respondent's decision final. Furthermore, the present case fails even on its
merits. The Court also took note of the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, it held that "under the present Rule 45,
appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari, but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi
judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies."
The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency falling under Rule 43. As the Court
succinctly stated: "It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to 'ordinary
quasi-judicial agencies,' but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a 'high constitutional body.' We
see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby
disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of
the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily-created body. Thus, as a quasi-
judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may only
be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition. While Republic Act No. 6770 may have
been silent on the remedy available to a party aggrieved with the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause in a criminal case, Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario clarified that the remedy in this instance is not
an appeal, but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before this Court.
Q: What is the mode of appeal of Orders and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases?
A: Orders and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court
via a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals via a Rule 43 petition.
ELMER P. LEE vs. ESTELA V. SALES, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER LEGAL AND
INSPECTION GROUP; EFREN P. MARTINEZ, CHIEF PERSONNEL INQUIRY DIVISION;
NESTOR S. VALEROSO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REVENUE REGION NO. 8; and ALL OF
THE BIR AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR ORDERS OR BEHALF
G.R. No. 205294; JULY 4, 2018
The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman does not stay
the immediate execution of the penalty of dismissal imposed upon a public office.
FACTS:
In a June 11, 2010 Complaint, the Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, through
Associate Graft Investigation Officer I Dennis G. Buenaventura, charged the spouses Elmer and Mary
Ramirez Lee (collectively, the Spouses Lee) with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. The Spouses Lee were both employed at the Bureau of Internal Revenue
as Revenue Officer I.The Complaint charged that the Spouses Lee were members, stockholders, or
incorporators of four (4) corporations, but did not disclose their interest in these corporations in their 2001
to 2006 Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). The Spouses Lee also allegedly
declared certain vehicles in their SALNs, but there were no documents to validate these vehicles'
existence. However, the Land Transportation Office system database disclosed that one (1) vehicle was
registered under their names. The Complaint alleged that the Spouses Lee acquired wealth in the amounts
of ₱2,353,785.93 and US$13,414.17, which were disproportionate to their legitimate incomes. It claimed
that in 2002, the Spouses Lee had a total aggregate income of ₱252,840.00 but had cash in bank
amounting to ₱334,929.93 and US$8,414.17, and a declared vehicle worth ₱640,000.00. In 2004, they
had a total aggregate income of ₱259,152.00 but had cash in bank in the amounts of ₱380,000.00 and
US$3,000.00, an ₱800,000.00 vehicle, and personal effects amounting to 'Pl 50,000.00. In 2005, they had
a total aggregate income of ₱259,152.00 but had cash in bank in the amounts of ₱290,000.00 and
US$2,000.00, a ₱500,000.00 vehicle, and personal effects amounting to ₱30,000.00.
In its July 16, 2012 Decision, the Ombudsman found the Spouses Lee guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct. It found that they separately filed their SALNs from 2001 to 2006, apart from 2003 for
which they filed a joint SALN. However, even though they filed separate SALNs in 2001 and 2002, the
entries on the assets, real and personal liabilities, and business interests and financial connections were
the same. This proved that they commonly owned the assets in the SALNs, and confirmed the regime of
absolute community of property controlling their property relations. In their 2004 to 2006 SALNs, the
entries were entirely different, which could be explained by their claim that they separately owned those
real and personal assets. But, despite the separate filings of SALNs and their claim that they were
separated, there was no evidence on record of any judicial decree of separation that would have dissolved
the absolute community of property. The Ombudsman found that they were not legally separated and that
they continued to be governed by the same property regime. Further, they failed to declare their business
interests and financial corporations in all the SALNs they filed, whether jointly or separately. The
Ombudsman held that they had the willful intent to violate Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1379, when they failed to declare their true, detailed, and sworn
statements of their business and financial interests. They did not initiate to correct their earlier non-
declaration of these interests in their subsequent SALNs, which confirmed their persistent disregard of the
existing laws. The Ombudsman found that these acts amounted to gross misconduct, and ordered them to
be "dismissed from service effective immediately with forfeiture of all of their benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, with prejudice to their reemployment in the government."
On September 11, 2012, Elmer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the
Ombudsman's Decision. While the motion was still pending, he received a September 18, 2012 letter
from Martinez, Chief of the Personnel Inquiry Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, through
Regional Director Valeroso. The letter directed Elmer, among others, to turn over all government assets
and documents to the head office, transfer his accountabilities, and surrender his Bureau of Internal
Revenue Identification Card to the Human Resource Management Unit in the Regional Office. It further
prohibited him from reporting to the office, representing the office, instructing staff members on official
matters, and signing any documents, among others. 16 In an October 1, 2012 letter, Elmer informed
Martinez and Valeroso of his pending motion for reconsideration, and that the Office of the Ombudsman's
July 16, 2012 Decision was not yet final and executory. However, Sales, the Deputy Commissioner of
the Legal Inspection Group, as well as Martinez, insisted on Elmer's dismissal. On October 12, 2012,
Elmer filed a Petition for Injunction and/or Prohibition and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-72104,
with Branch 105, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. He prayed for the trial court to enjoin herein
respondents from executing his dismissal from service. He claimed that the Office of the Ombudsman's
Decision was not yet final and executory due to his pending motion for reconsideration, as the
Ombudsman's Administrative Order No. 07 did not categorically state the effects of the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. He claimed that his dismissal pre-empted and rendered moot his motion for
reconsideration.
In its January 16, 2013 Order, the Regional Trial Court denied Elmer's prayer for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissed the case for
injunction and/or prohibition. The Regional Trial Court found that since there was a five (5) day period
within which the Ombudsman must resolve a motion for reconsideration, his remedy should have been a
petition for mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to resolve his motion.23 Moreover, in the Office of the
Ombudsman's Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, decisions and resolutions of the
Ombudsman shall not be stayed by a motion for reconsideration or petition for review filed before it.
Since the Office of the Ombudsman's July 16, 2012 Decision was immediately executory, Elmer was not
entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction. The Regional Trial Court held that it could not interfere with
the Ombudsman's judgments or orders by way of injunction, citing Office of the Ombudsman v.
Samaniego.
On February 6, 2013, Elmer filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
before this Court, assailing the January 16, 2013 Order of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner argues that
the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that a motion for reconsideration does not stay the execution of a
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. First, he claims that direct resort to this Court, without filing
any motion for reconsideration with the trial court, is proper. He argues that he raises only pure questions
of law, and that his Petition is consistent with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. International
Exchange Bank. Second, he claims that since Administrative Order No. 07 did not expressly state the
effects of filing a motion for reconsideration, then the Rules of Court should apply in a suppletory
manner. Applying by analogy Rule 37, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 39,
Section I of the Rules of Court, the Office of the Ombudsman's July 16, 2012 Decision was not yet final
and executory due to Elmer's pending motion for reconsideration. Third, he claims that the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over his Petition for Injunction and/or Prohibition. He points out that the case was
directed against the officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and not against the Office the
Ombudsman. Finally, he alleges that he is entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for his
reinstatement to the Bureau of Internal Revenue's payroll, and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the Bureau of Internal Revenue from implementing the Office of the Ombudsman's July 16, 2012
Decision.
On August 15, 2013, respondents filed their Comment to the Petition, in accordance with this Court's
February 18, 2013 Resolution. Respondents contend that Administrative Order No. 07 was amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, and now provides for the immediate execution of the decisions of the
Ombudsman. They further point to Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, which clarifies that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does
not stay the implementation of its decisions, orders, or resolutions. They argue that JP Latex Technology,
Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc. and Lapid v. Court of Appeals as cited by Elmer are inapplicable.
They claim that Lapid has already been superseded by, among others, In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH and Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals and Macabulos. 41 Moreover, Samaniego applies to this case since both involve the immediate
execution of the Ombudsman's decisions.As to the Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction, respondents argue
that the relief Elmer sought in his petition for injunction and/or prohibition was tantamount to a prayer for
the reversal of the Office of the Ombudsman's decision on the merits. They claim that he should have
awaited the notice of the Ombudsman's denial of his motion for reconsideration and thereafter file a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, an application for injunctive relief
before the appellate court should also be denied, following Samaniego.Finally, respondents claim that
Elmer was not entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction as he had no
clear legal right to a stay of the enforcement of the Ombudsman's decision.
On August 6, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the Petition and
ordering the parties to submit their memoranda. Respondents filed their Memorandum on October 9,
2014, while Elmer submitted his Memorandum on October 23, 2014. These Memoranda were noted in
this Court's January 12, 2015 Resolution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a pending motion for reconsideration stays the execution of a decision of the
Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service; and
2. Whether or not a Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition or injunction
directed against the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman
HELD:
1. No, a pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Office of the Ombudsman does
not stay its immediate execution. This is clear under the rules of the Office of the Ombudsman and our
jurisprudence.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, Rule III, Section 7, which states:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.
In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined to
implement all Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions in administrative disciplinary cases,
immediately upon receipt thereof by their respective offices.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the
Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman
decisions, orders or resolutions. Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, stays the immediate implementation of the
said Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006 were issued
by the Ombudsman, an independent Constitutional office, pursuant to its rule-making power under the
1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to effectively exercise its mandate to investigate any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office, or agency, when this act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. For the Supreme Court to not give deference to the Ombudsman's
discretion would be to interfere with its Constitutional power to promulgate its own rules for the
execution of its decisions. The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of
public service, and must be beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted a
general policy of non-interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and
investigatory powers. The execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which this
Court gives deference.
Notably, at the time the Office of the Ombudsman's July 16, 2012 Decision was issued in this
case, the amendatory Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006,
had already been issued. Thus, respondents did not err in implementing petitioner's dismissal from office.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Petitioner alleged therein that in denying his application for a preliminary injunction, the Court
of Appeals gravely abused its discretion; that pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07, the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman suspending him from office is not immediately
executory; and that in enforcing its Decision suspending him from the service during the pendency of his
appeal, the Office of the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
and the rulings of this Court in Lapid v. Court of Appeals; Lopez v. Court of Appeals, and Ombudsman v.
Laja.
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held in Laja, citing Lopez, that "only
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the
penalties of public censure, reprimand or suspension of not more than one month or a fine not equivalent
to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right
to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse
of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order,
directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that
the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the
stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory."
However, as aptly stated by the Office of the Ombudsman in its comment, Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended by Administrative Order No. 17. Clearly, considering
that an appeal under Administrative Order No. 1 7, the amendatory rule, shall not stop the Decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman from being executory, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for injunctive relief.
Petitioner relies on JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc. to support his
claim that a motion for reconsideration stays an execution pending appeal, but that case is inapplicable
here. JP Latex Technology, Inc. involved the execution of a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a civil
case, which is governed by the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 39. Here, petitioner's case is an
administrative action specifically governed by the special rules of procedure issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. "When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said
case must prevail over the other." Petitioner does not present any reason for this Court to reexamine the
doctrine established in the above-cited cases.
2. No, the RTC cannot enjoin the execution of a Decision of the Ombudsman.
Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal, it follows
that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive writ. It bears noting that for an injunction to
issue, the right of the person seeking its issuance must be clear and unmistakable. However, no such right
of petitioner exists to stay the execution of the penalty of dismissal. There is no vested interest in an
office, or an absolute right to hold office. Petitioner is deemed preventively suspended and should his
motion for reconsideration be granted or his eventual appeal won, he will be entitled to the salary and
emoluments he did not receive in the meantime. Further, it is the legally mandated duty of respondents to
implement the Office of the Ombudsman's decision. If they refused or failed to comply with the
Ombudsman's order to dismiss petitioner from service, then they would be liable for disciplinary action,
pursuant to Rule Ill, Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended.
As correctly ruled by the Regional Court, petitioner's proper recourse should have been to file a
petition for mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to resolve his motion for reconsideration within the
five (5)-day period prescribed in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, he
should have awaited the Ombudsman's ruling on his motion for reconsideration, then, in the event of a
denial, file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
Q: What is the effect of the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman?
A: It does not stay the immediate execution of the penalty of dismissal imposed upon a public office.
DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY, Petitioner vs. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES
ROBERTO C. TAN, SECRETARY OF FINANCE MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE
GOVERNOR OF BANG KO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), Respondent
G.R. No. 192223 JULY 23, 2018
The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of tax offenses is a
discretionary quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. It is not a legally
mandated ministerial duty.
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over
petitions for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting administrative
remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and
when their filing amounts to an act of forum shopping.
FACTS:
The case is a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment,
praying that former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan), former Secretary of
Finance Margarito B. Teves (Secretary Teves), the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to deliver to Danilo A.
Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) the amounts of ₱11,875,000,000,000.00 and ₱50,000,000,000.00, and several
government lands as informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role for the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos), his family, and their
cronies.
Lihaylihay identified himself as a Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic
Act No. 2338, duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two letters to Atty. Eliseo Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the
former head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task
Force, concerning information on former President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
The first letter concerned gold bullions and diamonds. The second letter concerned alleged dollar
deposits at the Union Bank of Switzerland.
Almost 20 years later, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Jose Mario
C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag), demanding payment of informer's reward on the amount supposedly
recovered by the Philippine government through compromise agreements with the Marcoses.
Sometime in 2010, without waiting for official actions on his letters, Lihaylihay filed the present
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents to deliver to him proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's reward.
HELD:
NO. A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two situations: first, "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second, "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled."
The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a
correlative duty incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by
law.
Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a prospective
entitlement that is yet to be settled. Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to
perform the act mandated by law. The mere existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of its
performance does not suffice.
The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. A court cannot
subvert legally vested authority for a body or officer to exercise discretion.
Q: When is a writ of mandamus may be issued?
A: A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two situations:
first, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station;
second, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, DIRECTOR JOSEPH B. ANACAY AND
SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA L. AGUSTIN, respondents.
G.R. 222710, July 24, 2018
(Dissenting Opinion only on substantive aspect but still concurred on the procedural aspect)
The Petition for Review filed by Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) before the
Commission on Audit (COA) Commission Proper was filed out of time, and even if the rules of procedure
were to be liberally construed, the petition would still not prosper because PhilHealth personnel are not
public health workers.
FACTS:
The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into law. Accordingly, public health
workers (PHWs) were granted allowances and benefits, among others, the longevity pay. Pursuant to RA
No. 7305, which mandates the payment of longevity pay to public health workers, former Department of
Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued a Certification declaring PhilHealth officers
and employees as public health workers. he Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in its
Opinion 064 stated that the term health-related work includes not only the direct delivery or provision of
health services but also the aspect of financing and regulation of health services. Thus, in its opinion, the
PhilHealth officers and employees were deemed engaged in health-related works for purposes of
entitlement to the longevity pay.
The PhilHealth Board passed and approved Resolution No. 1584, S. 2012, which among others,
confirmed the grant of longevity pay to its officers and employees for the period of January to September
2011 in the amount of PhP5,575,294.70. However, on post-audit of the Personal Services account for
Calendar Year (CY) 2011, COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) 2012-09 (11) which
found lack of legal basis for the grant of longevity pay, thus recommended the discontinuance of the grant
thereof.
PhilHealth asserted that PhilHealth personnel were public health workers and therefore entitled to
the grant of longevity pay under RA No. 7305. However, the COA found unsatisfactory the justifications
for the grant of longevity pay, and thus issued ND No. H.O. 12-005 (11). Philhealth received the ND No.
H.O. 12-005 (11).
Philhealth filed its appeal memorandum before the COA Corporate Government Sector. The
COA Corporate Government Sector upheld the ND No. H.O. 12-005 (11) in its Decision. The COA ruled
that PhilHealth personnel were not public health workers but merely engaged in paying and utilization of
health services by its covered beneficiaries.
PhilHealth filed a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days, from March 30, 2014 to April
30, 2014, to file the petition for review. Thereafter, on April 30, 2014, PhilHealth filed its petition for
review before the COA Commission Proper (CP).
The COA CP dismissed the petition for being filed out of time.
Aggrieved, PhilHealth filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO and WPI
before the Court on the ground that COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in failing to consider Philhealth's appeal and dismissing outright the same for being filed out
of time.
ISSUE:
Whether COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing outright the PhilHealth's appeal.
HELD:
NO. The Petition for Review filed by Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)
before the Commission on Audit (COA) Commission Proper was filed out of time, and even if the rules
of procedure were to be liberally construed, the petition would still not prosper because PhilHealth
personnel are not public health workers.
PhilHealth filed the current special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64,
to set aside or nullify the COA Decision and COA Resolution, disallowing the payment of longevity pay
to PhilHealth officers and employees which amounts to P5,575,294.70
The Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA (COA Revised Rules of Procedure) states that an
appeal from the decision of the auditor to the director must be taken by filing an appeal memorandum
within six (6) months after receipt of the decision appealed from. Rule VII of the aforementioned rules
provides that a party aggrieved by the decision of the director may appeal to the COA Commission Proper
via a petition for review filed within the time remaining of the six (6) months period under Section 4,
Rule V.
In the case at bar, PhilHealth asserts that the six (6) months period shall be counted from the
exact date of the month up to the day prior to the same date of the following month, while the COA
believes that the six (6) months period shall be computed as 180 days. With the foregoing, it is clear that
the Petition for Review of PhilHealth before the COA Commission Proper was filed out of time.
However, the Court, even as it has at times acknowledged that procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard, has likewise, from time to time, recognized exceptions based on the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to it would defeat rather than serve the ends of
justice. Indeed, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court is
called upon to relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
Thus, despite the Petition for Review having been filed out of time, the Court should entertain it to finally
put to rest the question of whether PhilHealth personnel are public health workers and whether they are
entitled to the benefits granted to public health workers.
Q: Is there an exception to the strict interpretation and implementation of the rules of procedure?
A: Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, has likewise, from time to time,
recognized exceptions based on the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to it would defeat
rather than serve the ends of justice. Indeed, where strong considerations of substantive justice are
manifest in the petition, the Court is called upon to relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in
the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
ERNESTINA A. PAGDANGANAN, RODERICK APACIBLE PAGDANGANAN, MARIA
ROSARIO LOTA, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ERNESTINA A.
PAGDANGANAN, ERNEST JEROME PAGDANGANAN, AND SANDRA APACIBLE
PAGDANGANAN, AS THE HEIRS AND SUBSTITUTES OF DECEASED ISAURO J.
PAGDANGANAN, ALFONSO ORTIGAS OLONDRIZ, AND CITIBANK N.A. HONG KONG,
Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MA. SUSANA A.S. MADRIGAL, MA. ANA A.S.
MADRIGAL, MA. ROSA A.S. MADRIGAL, MATHILDA S. OLONDRIZ, VICENTE A.S.
MADRIGAL, ROSEMARIE OPIS-MALASIG, MARIA TERESA S. UBANO, EDUARDO E.
DELA CRUZ, AND GUILLER B. ASIDO, RESPONDENTS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202678, September 05, 2018
Any issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case, however, becomes an exercise in futility. The Court of
Appeals cannot be compelled to resolve a case it has already fully resolved. This Petition must be
dismissed for being moot.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through Pagdanganan, a minority stockholder, filed a
complaint for interpleader before the RTC of Manila. The complaint was filed because of the alleged
conflicting claims between the Madrigals and Citibank N.A. Hongkong over the shares of stock
previously held by the late Antonio P. Madrigal. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-118329.
While said civil case was pending, the Madrigals called for a Special Stockholders' Meeting to be held on
November 26, 2007 wherein new members of the Board of Directors were elected.
On December 17, 2007, Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan amended their complaint in Civil Case
No. 07-118329 to implead as additional defendants the newly elected directors and officers and sought to
nullify the stockholders' meeting and election of the directors and officers.
On January 18, 2008, newly elected Corporate Secretary Ma. Teresa S. Ubano filed an Urgent
Motion for Permission to Take Custody of the Stock Transfer Book and Other Corporate Records of Solid
Guaranty before the RTC. On May 16, 2008, Ubano filed another motion for the purpose of registering
the transfer of stock from Balek, Inc. to newly elected General Manager Guiller Asido and Terri
Madrigal. The RTC granted Ubano's second motion, considering that the shares of stock to be transferred
were not subject of the interpleader suit.
On June 19, 2008, Ubano called for the holding of a Special Stockholders' Meeting to be held on
June 30, 2008 for the approval of the Minutes of the November 26, 2007 Special Stockholders' Meeting
and the ratification of the acts of the newly elected Board of Directors. Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan
filed a motion with the RTC to prevent the holding of the meeting but the RTC issued a Joint Order
authorizing the holding of the meeting.
On July 11, 2008, Solid Guaranty, Pagdanganan, another minority stockholder, Alfonso, and
Citibank filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals. They alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the holding of the June 30, 2008 stockholders' meeting despite the pendency of the interpleader
suit.
Solid Guaranty, Pagdanganan, Alfonso, and Citibank filed a Motion for Leave to File First,
Second, and Third Supplemental Petition. In its October 22, 2009 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the case could have already been submitted for decision but was deferred because of
the subsequent filing of the Second and Third Supplemental Petitions. Nonetheless, it directed the filing
of comments on the Third Supplemental Petition.
On October 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution expunging from the record the
Second and Third Supplemental Petitions. It also deemed the case submitted for decision. On October 29,
2010, Solid Guaranty, Pagdanganan, Alfonso, and Citibank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
October 6, 2010 Resolution. On March 24, 2011, Pagdanganan passed away; thus, counsel moved for the
substitution of parties.
On January 2, 2012, Solid Guaranty, the Heirs of Pagdanganan, Alfonso, and Citibank filed a
Motion for Mediation with the Court of Appeals. On March 1, 2012, they likewise filed a Motion for
Resolution. While the Motions were pending with the Court of Appeals, or on August 2, 2012, the Heirs
of Pagdanganan, Alfonso, and Citibank filed this Petition for Mandamus against the Court of Appeals, the
Madrigals, Mathilda, Vicente, Malasig, Ubano, Dela Cruz, and Asido before this Court. They allege that
the Court of Appeals committed inordinate delay in resolving their Petition filed on July 11, 2008. They
claimed that the Court of Appeals' "continued inaction on the case is clearly a neglect of its judicial
duties."
In their Comment/Opposition, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not neglect its
duty to resolve the instant case. They attribute the delay in the resolution of this case to the numerous
supplemental petitions filed by petitioners for which the Court of Appeals had to afford respondents an
opportunity to be heard.
In its December 14, 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Mediation as it
was unilaterally made. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration of its October 6, 2010 Resolution. It
again deemed the case submitted for decision
On February 8, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition as the
questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court were not rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
respondents filed a Manifestation attaching a copy of the Court of Appeals February 8, 2013 Decision and
praying that this Court dismiss this case as the issues raised have already become moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition has already become moot in view of the Court of Appeals February 8, 2013
Decision.
HELD:
YES. A petition for mandamus may be filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person who is alleged to have unlawfully neglected the performance of a duty arising from that office,
trust, or station.
In Baldo v. Commission on Elections:
A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical
legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
In this Petition, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of
Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 104291. However, the Court of Appeals already rendered a Decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291 on February 8, 2013. It also resolved petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
on March 10, 2014. Despite the occurrence of these subsequent events, petitioners, in their Memorandum,
reiterated their prayer for this Court to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 104291.
Any issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case, however, becomes an exercise in futility. The
Court of Appeals cannot be compelled to resolve a case it has already fully resolved. This Petition must
be dismissed for being moot. Even assuming that this Court could still pass upon the substantive issue in
this case, the Petition would still be denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not delay in
resolving CA-G.R. SP No. 104291. The Court of Appeals is given a 12-month period to resolve any case
that has already been submitted for decision. Any case still pending 12 months after submission for
decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary action, such as a petition for
mandamus, to protect their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
In this case, however, petitioners' invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is
misplaced since the Court of Appeals has resolved the petition in a timely manner within the period
provided by law.
From the above mentioned facts, petitioner Pagdanganan died on March 24, 2011 and had to be
substituted as party. It was only after the substitution of his heirs that the Court of Appeals directed the
filing of comment on the Motion for Reconsideration on October 21, 2011. Petitioners' Vigorous
Opposition was filed on December 5, 2011.
Seemingly undeterred by the number of pleadings in this case now pending before the Court of
Appeals, petitioners filed a Motion for Mediation on January 3, 2012. On December 14, 2012, the Court
of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Mediation. It
was only on December 14, 2012 that the Court of Appeals declared with finality that CA-G.R. SP No.
104291 was deemed submitted for decision. The Court of Appeals finally resolved the Petition in its
February 8, 2013 Decision, or less than two (2) months from its final pronouncement submitting the case
for decision. It was, thus, inaccurate for petitioners to accuse the Court of Appeals of delay in resolving
their petition filed in 2008 without taking into account the numerous pleadings they had filed while the
petition was pending. The Court of Appeals repeatedly explained to petitioners that their case could have
been resolved sooner had they not filed their numerous motions.
Q. When is a case considered moot?
A. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in
which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case
presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature
of things, cannot be enforced.
Q. What is a petition for mandamus?
A. It is a petition which may be filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person who is
alleged to have unlawfully neglected the performance of a duty arising from that office, trust, or station.
MAYOR "JONG" AMADO CORPUS, JR. AND CARLITO SAMONTE VS. HON. JUDGE
RAMON D. PAMULAR OF BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, MRS. PRISCILLA
ESPINOSA,* AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FLORO
FLORENDO
G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
“The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the
original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and the insertion of the
phrase "conspiring and confederating together." The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic
theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelita. Hence, the amendment is
merely formal.”
FACTS:
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on
June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was
arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against
him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits
ensued.
The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed a complaint-affidavit
captioned as Reply-Affidavit dated September 8, 2008 after the prosecution presented its second
witness. She also filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses
were also filed before the prosecutor's office, which included the affidavit executed by Alexander Lozano
(Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. In response to
Priscilla's Reply-Affidavit, Corpuz filed a Rejoinder Affidavit. He also filed a Counter-Affidavit against
witness Lozano's affidavit.
In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelita's
murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before the Regional Trial Court. Corpus and
Samonte opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation averred that Judge Pamular's action
was premature considering that the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing.
Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9, 2009 before the Department of
Justice. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court,
asking it to desist from acting further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review
filed with the Department of Justice.
Despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, which granted the motion to amend the information
and to admit the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.
Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with a
prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he conducted further proceedings on the Amended
Information and consequently issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase "conspiring and
confederating together" in the amended information. Before an accused enters his or her plea, either
formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court.
After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of court and it
does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment
except if it is beneficial to the accused. Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can
invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.
Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already
been included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime
charged is only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime,
affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
accusation.
The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the
original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and the insertion of the
phrase "conspiring and confederating together." The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic
theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelita. Hence, the amendment is
merely formal. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General: Even if one or all of the
elements of the crime of murder as alleged in the original information filed against petitioner Samonte is
not proven, the addition of conspiracy in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any way
result to his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of
murder. The addition of conspiracy would only affect petitioner Corpuz, if together with the crime of
murder leveled against petitioner Samonte, both circumstances are duly proven by the prosecution.
Q: What is a formal amendment, and when can it be made?
A: It is any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already
been included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime
charged. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.
It can be made at anytime.

JERSON E. TORTAL, Petitioner, v. CHIZURU TANIGUCHI, Respondent.
G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018
Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two (2) grounds for an action for
annulment or judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud cannot be
considered a valid ground in an action under Rule 47 "if it was availed of, or could have been availed of,
in a motion for new trial or petition for relief."
Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if based on extrinsic
fraud, should be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction,
then before the action is barred by laches or estoppel.
Facts:
Tortal Married Taniguchi. They lived in a house and lot at BF Homes, Paranaque city registered
in the name of Tortal married to Taniguchi. Taniguchi filed a petition for the nullity of her marriage with
Tortal. The petition was granted by the RTC and the house was declared as Tortal’s exclusive property.
While the petition for nullity of marriage was pending, Sales fled a collection suit against Tortal.
Sales and Tortal eventually entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the court.
The house and lot was levied upon in accordance with the compromise judgment. It was then sold
at a public auction.
Taniguchi filed a complaint for reividication of title and annulment of sale in execution as well as
damages against Tortal and Sales. The RTC granted Taniguchi’s application for injunction. The sale was
also nullified and the injunction was made permanent.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Tortal argued that Taniguchi had no right to own property in the Philippines for she was not
Filipino. He also assailed the nullity of their marriage, the first time on appeal.
Respondent’s Contention
1. That Taniguchi had no right to own property in the Philippines
2. That the Judgment nullifying his marriage was invalid for he had no notice of it.
Issue:
Whether Tortal may assail a final and executory judgment nullifying his marriage with Taniguchi
in his appeal with the CA.
Held:
No. Petitioner claims that he failed to participate in the proceedings for the nullity of his marriage
with respondent before Branch 260, Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City because summons was never
served on him, either personally or by substitution.
If indeed summons was not properly served on petitioner, then his remedy was to file a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of
judgment is an equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases,
such as when there is no more available or other adequate remedy.
A petition for the annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts may be given due course if it
is sufficiently proven that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."
Furthermore, Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two (2) grounds
for an action for annulment or judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic
fraud cannot be considered a valid ground in an action under Rule 47 "if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief."
Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if based on extrinsic
fraud, should be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction,
then before the action is barred by laches or estoppel.
In the action for the nullity of his marriage with respondent, petitioner claims that respondent
deliberately indicated a non-existent address, instead of his real address; thus, he never received the
summons and the Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over him.
However, instead of directly assailing the Regional Trial Court August 25, 2003 Decision, which
granted the nullity of his marriage in an action for annulment of judgment, petitioner chose to tackle the
issue in his appeal of the Regional Trial Court October 28, 2011 Decision, which nullified the levy and
sale by auction of the house and lot to Sales. This is clearly not the correct remedy.
Q: What are the rules in availing of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47?
A: A petition for the annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts may be given due course if it is
sufficiently proven that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."
Furthermore, Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two (2) grounds for an
action for annulment or judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud
cannot be considered a valid ground in an action under Rule 47 "if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief."
Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if based on extrinsic fraud,
should be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then
before the action is barred by laches or estoppel.
NAREDICO, INC., Petitioner, v. KROMINCO, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 196892, December 05, 2018
In deference to its technical knowledge and expertise on matters falling within its jurisdiction, the
findings of fact of the Mines Adjudication Board, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on
the Court of Appeals and on this Court. Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
acknowledging the primacy and deference accorded to decisions of quasijudicial agencies, states that the
factual findings of a quasi-judicial agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on
the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Krominco entered into an Operating Contract with the Government. They aimed to explore,
develop, exploit, and use the chromite deposits. Thereafter, Krominco and the Government entered into a
second Operating Contract. Minister of Natural Resources Maceda canceled both contracts due to
violations of their terms and conditions. Krominco moved for reconsideration of the cancellation.
However, while its motion was pending, it negotiated a new agreement to replace the cancelled Operating
Contracts.
Vitug, Naredico's president, applied for an Exploration Contract with the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB). The application covered approximately 500 hectares of mineral reservation land in
Dinagat Island and the Province of Surigao Del Norte.
Krominco and the Government signed a new Operating Contract. It covered an area of
approximately 729 hectares within the subject area. The boundaries and locations of its final operating
area were still "subject to actual survey and verification by deputized geodetic engineers acceptable to
both parties.
Vitug wrote MGB to request for the revision of Naredico's earlier application. He asked for a
conversion of the pending application for an Exploration Contract into a mineral production sharing
agreement. He also asked that the area originally applied for be increased to 1,620 hectares.
Director Muyco approved Krominco's Amended Survey Plan for the final contract area of its
Operating Contract. Director Muyco informed Vitug that the area sought to be covered by Naredico's
proposed mineral production sharing agreement overlapped with a portion of Krominco's final operating
area. He suggested including a colatilla which states that the contract area shall exclude those covered by
valid and subsisting mining rights. Provided, that in the event that such area is eventually abandoned by
the former grantee of mining rights or operator, the same shall be deemed part of the contract area. Vitug
agreed to the proposed colatilla. Thus, the Government and Naredico executed a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement. The colatilla was incorporated as Section IV of the Agreement.
Engineer Illana submitted a Technical Report comparing Naredico's Agreement with Krominco's
Operating Contract and approved Amended Survey Plan. He concluded that there was no overlapping
areas between the Agreement and Operating Contract. However, he noted that Krominco's Amended
Survey Plan pertained to an area different from what was described in its Operating Contract, with several
portions going outside the Operating Contract and encroaching the contract area of Naredico's
Agreement. He observed that the overlap was around 445.50 hectares.
Naredico filed a Petition before the DENR to cancel Krominco's Operating Contract and declare
its Amended Survey Plan as null. Secretary Alcala declared the Amended Survey Plan as null. He found
no conflict in the contract areas of Naredico's Agreement and Krominco's Operating Contract, as the
overlap only arose with the Amended Survey Plan.
Krominco filed before the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Panel of Arbitrators a Petition against
Naredico. It prayed that the overlap area be excluded from Naredico's Agreement, and that its exclusive
rights over the overlap area be recognized.
The Panel of Arbitrators (PAs) ruled that Krominco had a better right than Naredico over the
overlap area. Naredico appealed the PAs’ Decision before the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The
MAB modified the PA’s Decision. Recognizing the validity of the contracts entered into by the parties, it
awarded the area occupied with Krominco's structures to Krominco, and the free area to Naredico.
Acting on Krominco's Appeal, the CA reversed the MAB’s decision and reinstated the PAs’
Decision. Hence, Naredico filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Naredico asserts that the CA erred in
failing to take judicial notice of Secretary Alcala's factual findings. In the same vein, it faults the CA for
not adopting the findings of MAB and the results of the Joint Relocation Survey.
Respondent argued that the CA was not bound by Secretary Alcala's factual findings that the
Amended Survey Plan was void, since these were not supported by substantial evidence. It contends that
the law at that time authorized the MGB not the Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, to
approve survey plans. In this case, the MGB approved its Amended Survey Plan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board
HELD:
YES. The Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board. In
deference to its technical knowledge and expertise on matters falling within its jurisdiction, the findings
of fact of the Mines Adjudication Board, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the CA
and on this Court.
As the administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes relative to mining rights, the Mines
Adjudication Board's findings should be treated with deference in recognition of its expertise and
technical knowledge over such matters. Additionally, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
acknowledging the primacy and deference accorded to decisions of quasijudicial agencies, states that the
factual findings of a quasi-judicial agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court upholds the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board and
reinstates its Decision.
In modifying the Panel of Arbitrators' Decision, the Mines Adjudication Board acknowledged
that petitioner's and respondent's mining contracts were perfected, and ruled that there was a need to
harmonize their stipulations. It ordered a Joint Relocation Survey, which confirmed that while
respondent's mine pit and ore body were within its contract area, some of its structures lay outside its
contract area and within the contested area. Taking both contracts' validity into account, the Mines
Adjudication Board modified the Panel of Arbitrators' Decision by identifying the actual areas occupied
by respondent's structures and dividing the contested area between the parties.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the structures which include Krominco's mill plant, administrative
building, staffhouse, assay laboratory, refilling station, dynamite and ammo magazines, motor pool and
mill waste dump sites that are within the contested area should properly belong to the contract area of
Krominco with the precise/specific metes and bounds covered by each with allowable setbacks to be
determined by the survey to be conducted by a surveyor authorized by the Regional Office of the DENR,
the cost of which is to be equally shared by Naredico and Krominco; the rest of the area, even those
portions in between those areas covered by the enumerated Krominco structures properly belong to the
contract area of Naredico.
Q: Are findings of quasi-judicial agencies binding with the Court of Appeals?
A: YES. Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, acknowledging the primacy and deference
accorded to decisions of quasijudicial agencies, states that the factual findings of a quasi-judicial agency,
when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. The technical
knowledge and expertise on matters falling within the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial agencies shall be
binding to the Court of Appeals.
ROEL DEGAMO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS
G.R. No. 212416, DECEMBER 5, 2018
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. Without proof of
grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with public respondent's determination of
probable cause.
FACTS:
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (Council) requested the release
of P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental province (provincial government) to finance the rehabilitation
of various infrastructures damaged by Typhoon Sendong and a 6.9-magnitude earthquake. The Office of
the President, through Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., approved the request, charging the amount
against the Calamity Fund for Fiscal Year 2012, subject to availability. Letter to Budget and Management
Secretary Florencio Abad (Abad), Public Works and Highways Secretary Rogelio L. Singson requested
the Department not to indicate the recipient local government unit in the Special Allotment Release Order
yet, since the Department of Public Works and Highways needed to evaluate the local government units'
capability to implement projects prior to the release of a fund. Thus, Abad ordered Relampagos to
withdraw the previously issued Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation.
Relampagos informed Degamo that the Department is withdrawing the Special Allotment Release Order
because its release did not comply with the guidelines on large-scale fund releases for infrastructure
projects. He said this withdrawal was effective until the Department of Public Works and Highways could
determine that the local government units are able to implement the projects. Degamo filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions against
Relampagos.
Degamo alleged that when Relampagos wrote the letter-advice, Relampagos falsely posed
himself to have been authorized by President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III. Degamo added that
Relampagos usurped the official functions of the Executive Secretary, who had the sole authority to write
and speak for and on behalf of the President. Degamo filed this Petition for Certiorari, arguing that public
respondent, the Office of the Ombudsman, gravely abused its discretion when it held that there was no
probable cause to indict private respondent Relampagos of the crime charged. Releasing funds to the
implementing agency requires the approval of the President with favorable recommendation of the
Council. Hence, there was no need for the Department of Public Works and Highways' prior
determination before the Special Allotment Release Order could be released.
Relampagos maintained that he wrote the letter as the Department's Undersecretary for
Operations. He claimed that he acted upon Abad's instructions, and that the Office of the President was
informed of the withdrawal.
Private respondent counters that he withdrew the Special Allotment Release Order as the
Undersecretary for Operations, He claims that nowhere in his letter did he assume acting [on] behalf of
the President or the Executive Secretary as he signed it under his name, using the words, "By Authority of
the Secretary." He maintains that private respondent's cancellation of the Special Allotment Release Order
and Notice of Cash Allocation is contrary to law. The Department, he asserts, "relinquishes its
jurisdiction, disposition and control of public funds once a [Notice of Cash Allocation] is issued." Thus,
private respondent no longer had authority to cancel both documents pertaining to the calamity fund
already deposited to the provincial government's account.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Complaint for
usurpation of authority or official functions, which petitioner filed against private respondent, for lack of
probable cause.
RULING:
Petition is dismissed.
As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its
constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government
employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is
armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or
weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a
trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion
of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. Without
proof of grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with public respondent's determination of
probable cause.
Q: When is there grave abuse of discretion?
A: Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.
YEAR 2019
QUIRINO T. DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 215545, January 07, 2019
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only pertain to questions of
law. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. While several exceptions to these rules
were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this
Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.
FACTS:
In an October 15, 2001 Information, a certain Sonny H. Villarias was charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 after he was arrested on October 13, 2001 for allegedly possessing two (2)
firearms without permits.
On August 15, 2002, Villarias filed before the National Police Commission a Complaint-
Affidavit, where he narrated what happened when he was arrested. He narrated that at about 8:00 p.m.
that night, he was awakened by four (4) uniformed officers, namely: SPO4 Dela Cruz, PO1 Cantorna,
whom he said he had known, and two others. He said that SPO4 Dela Cruz poked an armalite rifle at him,
pulled him up, and frisked him without any explanation despite him repeatedly asking what he had done
wrong.
Villarias stated that while he was handcuffed to the vehicle, he saw his common-law wife,
Claudia Nicar (Nicar), approaching their house. When the officers returned to the vehicle, they had with
them eight (8) of Villarias's most valuable fighting cocks, a large plastic bag containing items from his
house, two (2) air guns, and two (2) bolos. After the officers left with Villarias, Nicar, Villarias’ wife,
took photos of their personal belongings in the house, which had been left in disarray when the officers
ransacked their home. While Villarias was in jail, she informed him that the police officers had stolen a
pair of wedding rings, a necklace, a coin bank filled with P5.00 coins, cash worth P12,000.00, and a bottle
of men's cologne. At the precinct, the officers told Villarias to admit to owning two (2) old and defective-
looking handguns, which SPO4 Dela Cruz had earlier shown him.
Later, Villarias learned that his arrest had been instigated by the complaint of his neighbor, Ruby
Carambas, whom he said was angry at him because he refused to let her build a house on a lot of which
he was a caretaker. He also learned that Carambas had previously filed a complaint against him for Illegal
Discharge of Firearm and Grave Threats against him.
Based on Villarias's Complaint, the National Police Commission, represented by Inspector IV

Pedro T. Magcinnon, Acting Chief, Technical Service Division, National Capital Region, filed an
Administrative Complaint against SPO4 Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna. Pending resolution of the
administrative complaint against SPO4 Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna, Villarias was exonerated by the
Regional Trial Court in its July 23, 2009 Decision.
In its January 12, 2010 Decision, the National Police Commission declared SPO4 Dela Cruz and
PO2 Cantorna culpable of grave misconduct.
SPO4 Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the National Police
Commission December 15, 2010 Resolution. In its Resolution, the National Police Commission found
that SP04 Dela Cruz neither presented newly discovered evidence nor cited errors of law or irregularities
that would affect the assailed Decision. Further, it found that he filed the Motion on September 21, 2010,
well beyond the ten (10)-day non-extendible period after he received the Decision on September 8, 2010.
Undaunted, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the Civil Service Commission an Appeal, which was
dismissed. In its September 11, 2012 Decision, the Civil Service Commission found that the Appeal had
been filed out of time, as SPO4 Dela Cruz did so on January 14, 2011, beyond the fifteen (15)-day period
after the Decision for review was promulgated on December 15, 2010. Thus, the questioned Resolution
had attained finality.
SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed for
lack of merit. In its November 18, 2014 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Dela Cruz's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Thus, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Respondent
then filed its Comment, to which petitioner was directed to file a reply, and was then granted two (2)
extensions of time to file it. Eventually, petitioner manifested that he would no longer file one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it sustained the Civil Service Commission's
dismissal of petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time.
RULING:
NO. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only pertain to
questions of law. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. While several exceptions
to these rules were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the
parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.
Both of petitioner's arguments are questions of fact not proper for review in this case. The date he
received the assailed National Police Commission Resolution is a question of fact that was resolved by
the Civil Service Commission. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the Civil Service Commission might
have resolved his motion for reconsideration differently, had petitioner substantiated his claim with
evidence that he received the National Police Commission Resolution on January 4, 2011. Yet, petitioner
failed to do so. It is not this Court's role to review the evidence to resolve this question. Further, petitioner
has not addressed the December 15, 2010 Resolution of the National Police Commission, which found
that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. Thus, the January 12, 2010 Decision would have
already attained finality when he failed to timely seek its reconsideration, regardless of whether the
December 15, 2010 Resolution was received on January 4, 2011.
Q: Can questions of fact be the subject of a petition for review?
A: NO. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only pertain to
questions of law. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. While several exceptions
to these rules were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the
parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.
Q: What are the exceptions to said rule?
A: In the case of Pascual vs. Burgos, these exceptions are: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
REMEDIAL LAW 2
YEAR 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN LENNON", Accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
Child Witness: As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, the chid’s testimony
deserves full weight and credence. Testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and
credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and
sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true.
FACTS:
AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio
City, testified that on November 29, 2005, she went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch.
On her way home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the
bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants and then inserted his
penis into her vagina. According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he
withdrew his penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (₱5.00) before she went back to
school. This happened for more than 10 times on separate occasions. Gutierez admitted that he has known
AAA for a long time since his family rented the house of AAA's grandfather from 2001 to 2004; that he
had a relationship with AAA's sister, and they even lived together as common-law spouses, and that a
similar complaint was filed against him by AAA's mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled
the case at the barangay level. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape by the trial
court up to the Court of Appeals.
AAA's testimony fell short of the requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He
argued that she did not cry for help when her family's house was just nearby, which was cause for
reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate.
Gutierez’s conviction can be sustained by AAA’s testimony.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant
was guilty of statutory rape punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code by the testimony
of AAA.
HELD:
Yes. By her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that
was done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony
deserves full weight and credence. Testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and
credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and
sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her
candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will-as in this
case-motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that when a woman, more so
when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
On AAA’s failure to cry out for help, it should be noted tha Rodrigo was referred to by the child-
victim as "Uncle Rod." He admitted that AAA's family had known him for a long time, thus, he had the
trust and respect that any elder in the family of AAA had. Instead of providing the moral guidance that his
status allowed him, he took advantage of AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal desires. To
cover this up and seemingly justify his actions, he gave his child-victim the measly sum of five pesos.
With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume that even the child-victim's desire for
help would be muffled by her fear of her "Uncle Rod." Whether she cried for help is immaterial in a
charge of statutory rape since the law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not
and cannot have a will of her own.
Q: May an accused in cases involving the rape of a minor be convicted on the basis of the sole
testimony of his victim?
A: Yes. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full
weight and credence. Testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and credence.
Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is
unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid
narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will-as in this case-
motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that when a woman, more so when
she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The
accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
(People v Gutierez, G.R. No. 208007, April 2, 2014)
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS,
INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the.
prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if,
upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
FACTS:
Juno Cars alleged that it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. Juno Cars’
Dealer/Operator Rolando Garcia conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5)
cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission. The
partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the
payments in favor of Juno Cars. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s
custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the
files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the
unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, it suffered damages.
On the other hand, Alfredo argued that Juno Cars’ failed to prove ownership over the five (5) cars
or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered
damage.
The Prosecution issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an
information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa. While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was
still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified
theft and estafa were filed before the RTC. Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause
before the latter court.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to find
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.
CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the case. It ruled that the RTC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with its own findings of
insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause.”
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own
independent finding of lack of probable cause.
HELD:
YES. There is a difference between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one
hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the
discretion of the public prosecutor.
If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he
or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court. Once the information has been filed,
the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to
determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial
determination of probable cause exists.
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. In this
case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that
"the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa." Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent evidence" that the vehicles
alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these
vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. Accordingly,
Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Q: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINED BY THE

PROSECUTOR AND PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE?
A: Determination of Probable Cause by the Prosecution is the evaluation of evidence to find sufficient
basis to find probable cause whether he or she shall cause the filing of the information to the Court.
Whereas, the Determination of Probable Cause by the Judge is the evaluation of the resolution made by
the prosecution to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HON. DARLENE
MAGNOLIA R. ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 199439 : April 22, 2014
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It
is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
FACTS:
Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series
of 2008, creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. This was
patterned after Executive Order No. 366 dated October 4, 2004 entitled Directing a Strategic Review of
the Operations and Organizations of the Executive Branch and Providing Options and Incentives for
Government Employees who may be Affected by the Rationalization of the Functions and Agencies of
the Executive Branch and its implementing rules and regulations.
Mayor Pedro B. Acharon, Jr. declared the city’s byword of Total Quality Service in his State Of
The City Address in 2005. This was followed by the conduct of a process and practice review for each
department, section, and unit of the local government. The product was an organization development
masterplan adopted as Executive Order No. 13, series of 2009. This was followed by Resolution No. 004,
series of 2009, requesting for the mayors support for GenSan SERVES, an early retirement program to be
proposed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules
and regulations, designed to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail
of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package. This contextual background in
the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on Audit.
The ordinance, as amended, provides that qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but
not less than fifty (50) years and sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty
(40) years may avail of the incentives under the program. In other words, the ordinance provides for
separation benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement age.
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010021 on March 25, 2010. The
opinion explained that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary retirement benefit
plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, prohibits
government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or pension plans from the time the
Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while those plans already existing when the
charter was enacted were declared abolished.
In fine, since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement Program] of the City
Government of General Santos, a law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the absence,
however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a necessary consequence.
Petitioner city, through then mayor, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., filed a letter-reconsideration dated
June 7, 2010. Respondent Commission on Audit treated these letters as an appeal. On January 20, 2011, it
rendered its decision denying the appeal and affirming COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021.21 It also denied
reconsideration by resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the Commission on Audit may be questioned before the Court
HELD:
YES. This court has consistently held that findings of administrative agencies are generally respected,
unless found to have been tainted with unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the
COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. We have ruled that not every error in the
proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion has been defined as follows:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Q: May the decision of COA be questioned before the Court?
A: Yes. Findings of administrative agencies are generally respected, unless found to have been tainted
with unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion. There is grave abuse of discretion when there
is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, vs. VICTOR COGAED y
ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.The police officer must also inform
the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her
objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, received a text message from
an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) would be
transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
La Union.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order to intercept the suspect. PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
Jaime Taracatac, Jr, a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of
passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The

jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barrio mate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and Dayao and brought them to the police
station. Cogaed and Dayao were still carrying their respective bags inside the station.
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit requested
Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was four rolled pieces of suspected
marijuana fruiting tops, and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.
PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects
obtained were indeed marijuana.
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, waiting for a
jeepney to take him to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and
Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly asked for Cogaed’s help in carrying his things, which
included a travelling bag and a sack. Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.
At the police station, Cogaed said that SPO1 Taracatac hit him on the head. The bags were also
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.
RTC found Cogaed guilty and dismissed the case as regards Dayao because he was only 14 years
old at the time the crime was committed. The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal
considering that Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
shown that he was about to do so or that had just done so. However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed waived his right to object to such irregularity when he
did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag. CA affirmed
the decision of RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana

2. Whether or not the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted
HELD:
1. No, the search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with
all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
In the case of Cogaed, he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney.
There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
2. None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.
The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For
there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the
time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest. Also, there can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if
we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously
stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment
brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.The police officer must also
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his
or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires
no less. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Q: What are the requisites before there can be a valid waiver of accused’s constitutional right?
A: The police officer must inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will
amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is
about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that
the accused fully understands his or her rights.
Q: Can the accused’s silence be taken as a consent to be searched?
A: No, the prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right
is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed.
Q: What is the effect of the evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures
A: It shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to
commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests
to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
FACTS:
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a),
qualified by Section 6(a).
In 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with

the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. A team was deployed to
the Queensland Motel, where the transaction was supposed to take place.
The decoys (PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso) testified that they proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street,
Cebu City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo
dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?). After a few negotiations, accused left, and later on returned with AAA
and BBB, private complainants. Their services were fixed at Php500 each. The police officers convinced
accused to come with them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1 Veloso handed the
marked money to accused. Thereafter, the rest of the team proceeded to the room, arrested the accused,
and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked money from accused.
Accused was found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section
4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 up to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there was
no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation.
HELD:
YES. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the
criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the
resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of
the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
Prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment operation’s validity. A prior surveillance is
not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no
rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However, the police carry out its
entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the
courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance. This flexibility is even more important in cases involving
trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate
action on the part of the law enforcers.
Q: Distinguish between Entrapment and Instigation.
A: There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to
commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests
to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
YEAR 2015
ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
GR No. 204644, Feb 11, 2015
The fact of conspiracy "must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the
agreement of the parties," that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
In the Information dated October 28, 1994, Rebecca Agbulos (Agbulos) and Angelita Cruz
Benito (Benito) were charged with estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Agbulos and Benito were arraigned on July 10, 1995, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial
ensued. The prosecution presented as witnesses complainant, Dorie Cruz-Abadilla (Abadilla); her friend,
Concepcion Quinonez Pamintuan (Pamintuan); and Estela Diloria (Diloria), a pawnshop appraiser of E.
Ochoa Pawnshop.
On June 9, 1994, Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos
would return the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued
Abadilla a check for the value of the jewelry received.
Agbulos received another batch of jewelry from Abadilla on June 14, 1994. She again issued
Abadilla a check, this time for P828,000.00. They likewise agreed that Agbulos would return the jewelry
in the afternoon should she fail to sell them. On June 16, 1994, Agbulos received the last batch of jewelry
from Abadilla, issuing a check in the amount of P453,000.00. On June 21, 1994, Abadilla called Agbulos
on the phone, asking for security for the pieces of jewelry she gave Agbulos. Agbulos then gave as
security the owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 438259. However, upon verification with
the Land Registration Authority, the certificate of title turned out to be spurious.
Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulos issued to her, and all were dishonored by reason of
"closed account." Abadilla then tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found. After
several months, Abadilla learned from Agbulos' sister-in-law that the latter received pawn tickets from a
friend. Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn tickets. She learned
that the items pawned were among the pieces of jewelry she turned over to Agbulos, specifically, a men's
diamond ring and a set of diamond ring and earrings. She also learned from Diloria, the pawnshop
appraiser, that the "Linda Chua" who pawned her jewelry was Benito. Benito denied that she was the
"Linda Chua" who pawned Abadilla's jewelry. According to her, on June 8, 1994, she was at the house of
Agbulos' mother, working as a cook and taking care of Agbulos' children. She denied being with Agbulos
when the latter transacted with Abadilla and that she only knew of Abadilla when the latter looked for
Agbulos.
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit estafa. According to the trial court, Agbulos and Benito
received the pieces of jewelry in trust for Abadilla. They undertook to sell the jewelry for
Abadilla or return them in the afternoon should they fail to sell them. However, in violation of
that trust, they failed to return the unsold jewelry. Worse, they had the jewelry pawned under a different
name. Benito appealed before the Court of Appeals sustained the finding that Benito was the "Linda
Chua" who pawned Abadilla's jewelry as testified to by the pawnshop appraiser, Diloria.
Issues:
Whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in committing estafa punished
under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
Despite Benito raising questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari, we nevertheless
take cognizance of her Petition. The trial court and Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts of this
case.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Proof of conspiracy
may be direct or circumstantial.
We find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy between
Benito and Agbulos. Agbulos' statement was an admission against her interest. The statement negated the
alleged "common design or purpose" between her and Benito and would lead to her being solely liable for
the crime. It also means that she admitted that her companion's acts can never be attributed to her.
However, the identification of Benito as the "Linda Chua" who pawned the jewelry is "open to
serious doubt." As testified to by Diloria, she saw Benito in E. Ochoa Pawnshop only on two occasions:
on June 6 and 17, 1994. Moreover, there is evidence that Diloria was not the pawnshop appraiser who
entertained "Linda Chua" but a co-worker named Mary Ann. Further, based on Diloria's testimony,
"Linda Chua" first went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop on June 6, 1994. This date was prior to the first time
Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla on June 9, 1994. There is thus some reasonable doubt
as to... whether the jewelry "Linda Chua" pawned on June 6, 1994 belonged to Abadilla.
When Agbulos failed to return in the afternoon the jewelry she received on June 9, 14, and 16,
1994, she was already presumed to have misappropriated the jewelry. There would be no more need to
present any act to prove the misappropriation. Consequently, the estafa had already been consummated
when "Linda Chua" allegedly pawned the jewelry on June 17, 1994. Benito, who was allegedly "Linda
Chua," cannot be held criminally liable with Agbulos. "There can be no ex post facto conspiracy to do
that which has... already been done and consummated." Benito is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Q: When is there a question of fact? How about question of law?
A: A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts. On the other hand, a question of law exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts.
ABS-CBN v. FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT JR., MARISSA L. FLORES, JESSICA A.
SOHO, GRACE DELA PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T. MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES.
G.R. No. 195956, MARCH 11, 2015
“Thus, unless clearly provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of copyright protections should
be considered malum prohibitum. It is the act of infringement, not the intent, which causes the damage.
To require or assume the need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual property protection.
Nevertheless, proof beyond reasonable doubt is still the standard for criminal prosecutions under the
Intellectual Property Code.”
FACTS:
Petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against GMA for alleged act of copyright
infringement because the respondent aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela
Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner’s consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an agreement with
Reuter’s that the petition will contribute news and content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange
of the latter’s news and video material, and Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN’s materials cannot be
aired in the country. The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter’s and CNN live feeds. After it received
the live feed of dela Cruz’s arrival ad homecoming it immediately aired the video from that news feed.
The respondent alleged that its news staff was not aware that there was agreement between ABS-CBN
and Reuters.
Petitioner ABS-CBN argues that lack of notice that the Angelo dela Cruz was under embargo is
not a defense in copyright infringement
Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The Intellectual Property
Code is a special law. Copyright is a statutory creation. The general rule is that acts punished under a
special law are malum prohibitum. "An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent
is completely immaterial. Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of
copyright infringement, the Philippines does not statutorily support good faith as a defense. Other
jurisdictions provide in their intellectual property codes or relevant laws that mens rea, whether express or
implied, is an element of criminal copyright infringement.
ISSUE:
Whether the criminal prosecution for infringement of copyrightable material such as live
rebroadcast can be negated by good faith.
RULING:
No. Respondents cannot invoke the defense of good faith to argue that no probable cause exists.
Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of copyright infringement, the
Philippines does not statutorily support good faith as a defense. The law is clear. Inasmuch as there is
wisdom in prioritizing the flow and exchange of ideas as opposed to rewarding the creator, it is the plain
reading of the law in conjunction with the actions of the legislature to which the Court defers.
Respondents argue that live broadcast of news requires a different treatment in terms of good faith, intent,
and knowledge to commit infringement; however, respondents are involved and experienced in the
broadcasting business. They knew that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN's footage in
their broadcast. That is why GMA-7 allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN's logo
and reporter. To admit a different treatment for broadcasts would mean abandonment of a broadcasting
organization's minimum rights, including copyright on the broadcast material and the right against
unauthorized rebroadcast of copyrighted material. The nature of broadcast technology is precisely why
related or neighboring rights were created and developed. Carving out an exception for live broadcasts
would go against our commitments under relevant international treaties and agreements, which provide
for the same minimum rights. Moreover, the lack of knowledge of infringement is not a valid defense.
Q: What is Good faith?
A: Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and
it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim and absence of intention to
overreach another.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING
ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any
of its members, the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.
The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous
regard to personal liberty” Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which
rightful; custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The primary purpose of the
writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
FACTS:
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) together with
other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. He returned to the Philippines on
December 20, 2009. On August 3, 2010, Salibo found out that the police officers ofDatu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspect him to be Butukan S. Malang who is one of the 197 suspects of 57 counts
of murder in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. Malang has a pending warrant by the trial
court. Salibo presented himself to the police officers to clear his name saying that he is not Malang and
that he could not have participated in the massacre as he was in Saudi Arabia at that time- as evidence, he
presented the pertinent portions of his passport, boarding pass, and other documents to that effect. The
police initially assured Salibo that he will not be arrested but he was apprehended afterwards by the police
who also tore the pages in his passport evidencing his departure for Saudi Arabia. He was detained at the
police station for 3 days. On August 20, 2010 he was transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex.
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed a petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his
detention while maintaining that he is not Malang. CA issued the writ and ordered the warden of QCJA to
bring Salibo to court on the hearing scheduled on September 27, 2010 before the RTC. On October 1,
2010 the return on the writ was heard and Solicitors Salo and Pepito, appearing in behalf of the warden
who issued the return, alleged that the Petition for Habeas Corpus must be dismissed because Salibo was
charged under a valid Information and was detained under warrant. RTC held that Salibo was not
charged under a valid resolution nor was he validly arrested and detained as there is no Information or
Warrant of Arrest under the name Datukan Malang Salibo. His absence in the country was further
established by the Certification issued by the Saudi Arabian Airlines regarding his departure from
and arrival in Manila conforming to his initial statements. RTC issued the writ of habeas corpus and
ordered the immediate release of Salibo.
On appeal by the Jail Warden, CA reversed the ruling and instead held that Salibo was detained
under a valid Information and warrant. CA further ruled that even assuming that Salibo was not the
Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that the orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked.
According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest.
In his appeal before the Supreme Court, in addition to his foregoing claims, Salibo contend that
respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the RTC before the CA. Although the CA
delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's
Decision should be deemed a Decision of the said appellate court. Therefore, respondent Warden should
have directly filed his appeal before this court.
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even
assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo
should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
ISSUES:
1. Is Decision of the RTC on Salibo’s petition for habeas corpus appealable to CA?
2. Is it the proper remedy for Salibo to file a petition for habeas corpus?
HELD:
1. Respondent correctly appealed to CA. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made
through a petition filed before this court or any of its members, the Court of Appeals or any of its
members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the
writ is then conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is
made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue
of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the
petition. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
Here, the trial court acquired power and authority to determine the merits of the petition, and the
decision thereafter rendered was the decision of the trial court not that of the Court of Appeals.
Since CA is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the trial court,
respondent warden correctly appealed in the Court of Appeals.
2. As to the second issue, the writ of habeas corpus is also called the “great writ of liberty.” It was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraints,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous regard to personal
liberty” Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, habeas corpus shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which
rightful; custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The primary purpose
of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to
the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when
there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right,
courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. The Supreme Court in the
case of Gumabon, et al versus Director of the Bureau of Prisons ruled “that the writ of habeas
corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ- its ability to cut through barriers of
form or procedural mazes- have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers.”
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of
the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained
of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the
legality of the restraint. Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for
its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion
the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Although the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when public safety
requires it, the writ itself may not be suspended. The writ cannot be issued when the person
allegedly deprived of his liberty s restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The
restraint then becomes legal and the remedy of habeas corpus has become moot and academic.
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed. In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of
a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must
pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a
motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information.
Here, Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He
was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his
liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. The Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S.
Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre. Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113,
Section 5 provides for the instances where a warrantless arrest may be lawful; (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of
these instances is present in this case. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself
before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu
Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner
Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to
arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due
process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
People of the Philippines vs. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case
pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims and 197 accused, two (2) of which have
become state witnesses. As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and
have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.
To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his
liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he
is not Butukan S. Malang. In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his
guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived
of his liberty without due process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the
resources at [its] command" to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of
the citizen. Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the
proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is
illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
Q: What is the remedy of habeas corpus?
A: An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or
any of its members, the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.
The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous
regard to personal liberty” Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which
rightful; custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The primary purpose of the
writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
NILO MACAYAN, JR. y MALANA, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 175842 March 18, 2015
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence in
criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an
accused must be acquitted.
Facts:
On February 16, 2001, Macayan, with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation,
robbed private complainant, Annie Uy Jao of the amount 4000php. Macayan allegedly threatened to
destroy Jao and her whole family and to kidnap them unless she him 200000php. The threats resulted in
Jao giving Macayan the 4000php.
The prosecution presented Jao, Rodrigo Mapoy (team leader of entrapment operatio against
Macayan), and Resurrecion Bajado (forensic chemist) as witnesses. Macayan was the sole witness in the
defense.
Jao acknowleged that Macayan and his wife used to be jer employees at Lanero and that she
allowed her employees to work for other companies, provided that they will focus on Lanero. Macayan
and her wife allegedly worked at a rival company. This led to Jao telling them to focus on Lanero.
Macayan ignored Jao and after their second confrontation, Macayan told Jao, “Kung gusto mo, bayaran
mo nalang ako at aalis ako.” Macayan stopped going to work.
To Jao’s surprise, Macayan filed an illegal dismissal case against her. After postponement of one
of the conferences for the labor case, the incident on the 16 th of February happened. Jao’s secretary was
allegedly present at that time.
Mapoy testified to the circumastances of the entrapment.
Macayan,in his testimony, alleged a trouble-free employment with Jao. He alleged that after his
wife gave birth he discovered that Jao was not remitting required premiums to the SSS. As his child was
confined in the hospital, he asked Jao about his medicare benefits. This displeased Jao. The following
day, Jao prevented Macanay from doing work. Macayan took this as harassment.
Macayan then filed the illegal dismissal case. Jao’s secretary, Angel, allegedly called Jao
informing her that Macayan was ready to settle the labor dispute. The original place of meetup,
Mcdonald’s Banawe was changed to Mcdonald’s EDSA. When Macayan went to the meetup place, he
saw Angel outside who then lead him inside to where Jao was. Jao then gave the bills to Macayan. Then a
man claiming to be an NBI perative, struck him and told him, “Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito wala ka
kasama, ikaw ngayon me kaso”.
He was then physically abused. He was taken to different police stations hoping that the inquest
fiscal was available. He was then charged with robbery.
The illegal dismissal case was decided in Macayan’s favor. He was awarded 180000php. The
NIRC found Macayan entitled to unpaid benefits though he was legally dismissed. The CA affirmed.
The RTC convicted Macayan of robbery. It accorded the presumption of regularity of the
entrapment operation. Macayan appealed to the CA. The office of the Solicitor General recommended
that Macayan be acquitted. The OSG noted that Jao was never in any of the conferences and that the sole
witness that Jao was in fact threatened was never presented. The CA affirmed the conviction. It ruled that
Jao’s sole testimony, uncorroborated, was positive and credible.
Issue:
Whether Macayan’s guily beyond reasonable doubt was established?
Held:
No.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence
in criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly.
Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on
the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
accused must be acquitted.
We ruled in People v. Ganguso:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of
course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the
offense charged.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on
the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. (Citations omitted)
The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court appreciates evidentiary
matters in relation to the requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual
issue.
This court, however, is not a trier of facts. Consistent with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, "[a]s a
rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45." More specifically, "in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record."
Nevertheless, there are exceptions allowing this court to overturn the factual findings with which
it is confronted. Speaking specifically of criminal cases, this court stated in People of the Philippines v.
Esteban that "in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters . . . this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]." Below are
the recognized exceptions to the general rule binding this court to the factual findings of lower courts:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Here, Macayan asserts that the lower courts committed a serious misapprehension of facts,
thereby wrongly concluding that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution falls seriously short of the quantum of evidence required to convict him. He
specifically draws attention to the following:
 First, Jao’s claim that, immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in
the illegal dismissal case and in the presence of Angel, Macayan threatened to harm and/or kidnap
the members of her family, despite the records in the same case showing that Jao never attended
any of the 11 conferences that were set or conducted;
 Second, the prosecution’s unjustified failure to present Angel as a witness and its sole reliance on
Jao’s testimony, considering that it was Angel who can confirm if, indeed, Macayan threatened
Jao’s family immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference;
 Third, Jao’s reliance on nothing more than how she was addressed as "Madam" by the person
speaking to her on the phone as basis for concluding that it must have been Macayan who was
supposedly calling and threatening her and her family;
 Fourth, the inconsistency and absurdity of Jao’s conduct in considering Macayan’s threats of such
serious nature that she needed to report it to the National Bureau of Investigation for the
prospective conduct of an entrapment operation, and yet not telling her husband about the threats
simply because he would easily get annoyed; and
 Lastly, the inconsistent claims of Jao and prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, the NBI operations
team leader, as to who Macayan called on the evening of February 16, 2001 to reset the rendezvous
to McDonald’s EDSA. Jao claimed that Macayan called Angel, while Rodrigo Mapoy claimed that
Macayan called Jao herself.
Macayan’s position is buttressed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the public institution
otherwise charged with the task of pursuing the prosecution’s case on appeal. As the Office of the
Solicitor General stated:
In the instant case, however, clues of untruthfulness in the testimony of Annie Uy Jao are
abundant while incentives for fabrication of a story not wanting. The only way to eliminate any doubt in
Annie Uy Jao’s assertions would have been to find independent confirmation from the other sources, as
by way of unambiguous testimony of a competent and credible witness. Sadly, no such confirmation
could be had as the prosecution’s evidence on the most crucial elements of the crime was limited to that
testified on by Annie Uy Jao.
Q: What is the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases and who has the burden of proving the
same?
A: Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence in
criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly,
it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be
acquitted.
SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, Petitioners, vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015
Two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the
four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
FACTS:
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City.
Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu. They
entered into an "Agreement for supply of aggregates."
In their complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in December 1994, Lucia was
approached by Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase gravel and sand from her. Kimwa allegedly
asked that it be "assured" of 40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her
concession area was due to be rechanneled on May 15,1995, when her Special Permit expires. Thus, she
emphasized that she would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa "provided the forty thousand
cubic meter[s] would be withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15 May 1995. Kimwa then
assured Lucia that it would take only two to three months for it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates. Convinced of Kimwa’s assurances, Lucia and Kimwa entered into the Agreement.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after
this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates.
Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, spouses Paras filed the Complaint for
breach of contract with damages that is now subject of this Petition.
In its answer, Kimwa argues that the quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper
limit or the maximum quantity it could haul; that it neither made any commitment to haul said quantity
before May 15, 1995; nor represented that that hauling of this quantity could be completed in two to three
months. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing
evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parol evidence rule can be admitted.
RULING:
YES. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence
Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
1. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

2. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
3. The validity of the written agreement; or
4. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
Two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any
of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases
such as "mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is
evident that the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement
"entered into on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the parties’ supposed understanding
that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of respondent Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995,
lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area.
This assertion is the very foundation of petitioners’ having come to court for relief.
Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and put this in issue in their
Complaint is how respondent Kimwa felt it necessary to respond to it or address it in its Answer.
Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners
Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties’ true
intent, may be admitted and considered. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.
This basic evidentiary stance, taken with the supporting evidence petitioners Spouses Paras
adduced, respondent Kimwa's awareness of the conditions under which petitioner Lucia Paras was bound,
and the Agreement's own text specifying exclusive allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports petitioners
Spouses Paras' position that respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on
or before May 15, 1995. As it admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable
for breach of contract in respect of the remaining 30,000 cubic meters.
Q: When can parol evidence be admitted?
A: Two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the
four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
YEAR 2016
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming
into airports or ports of travel. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit
in airport security procedures.
FACTS:
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming
back and forth taking a vessel." One day, while buying ticket at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go
home to Iloilo, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to
purchase a ticket. He then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray
scanning machine for inspection. Flores, the operator of the x-ray machine, saw firearms inside Dela
Cruz’s bag. She saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.
Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of the port personnel. Asked if he was the
owner of the bag, Dela Cruz answered in the affirmative. When asked whether he had the proper
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of
Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms, but was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Dela Cruz explained that he
left his luggage with a porter to buy a ticket, and that a considerable time of fifteen minutes went by
before he could secure the ticket while his luggage was left sitting on the floor with only the porter
standing beside it. Someone must have placed the unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he
was away from it.
Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. With the
circumstances attending the search of his luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his right
against warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that when his luggage would pass through the
routine x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be recovered. He believed that no incriminating
evidence would be found.
There was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure. Dela Cruz was
"caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went
through the x-ray machine in the Cebu Domestic Port. This case is similar to valid warrantless searches
and seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures. Dela Cruz
also voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and seizure. The trial court found that Dela
Cruz voluntarily gave his consent to the search.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. (YES)
2. Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case. (YES)
HELD:
1. There was a waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, an airport officer was called to inspect petitioner’s bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, there are exceptions where warrantless
searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain
view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In cases involving the waiver of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show
that petitioner presented his bag for scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray
machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port
authorities. It was after the port personnel’s inspection that another officer was called and the bag was
inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.
There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of his
personal effects. Hence, the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed
the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence
against [the] accused. Petitioner is now precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search when he
voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition, petitioner’s consent to the search at the
domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive circumstances.
The defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not automatically
negate valid consent to the search when incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured
against the totality of the circumstances. Petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port security
measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since he had been
traveling back and forth through the sea port.
2. The search and seizure was VALID.
There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
Thus, in this case, the port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used
x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed
the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of
petitioner’s bag. Dela Cruz did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.
Q: Are routine baggage checks valid?
A: Yes. Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when
coming into airports or ports of travel. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit
in airport security procedures.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RUBEN BARON, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 213215 January 11, 2016
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
Ruben Baron (Baron) was charged with the rape and killing of a seven-year-old girl identified as
AAA. Sometime in 1999 said accused, through force, threat and intimidation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with AAA against her will and having succeeded in
raping the seven year old girl kill the latter by drowning her at the river.
Eight witnesses testified for the prosecution: AAA’s mother, Alcid Flores, Arsenio Valguna,
Barangay Captain Segundina Morales, Ma. Concepcion Tacorda, Gennivive Belarma, Dr. Tito D.
Doromal, and rebuttal witness Romeo Inocencio. On the other hand, three witnesses testified for the
defense: Baron, Trinidad Palacios, and Flordeliza Baron, Baron’s wife. Baron resorted to a denial.
Baron is of the position that the prosecution has not established his involvement with certainty.
He bewails the prosecution’s reliance only on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant Ruben Baron’s guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES. The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are settled. Rule 133,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
Moreover, the factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court
is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and
substance.
A multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses and duly

established from the evidence, points to no other conclusion than that Baron was responsible for the rape
and killing of the seven-year-old child, AAA.
Testimonies regarding the details of the incident were given by disinterested witnesses whom
Baron himself had not managed to discredit for having any ill-motive against him. Two (2) of the
prosecution witnesses are even children of tender age.
Q: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction?
A: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.
January 11, 2016 G.R. No. 174673
Violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the
proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty.
The court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed in cases involving the state’s
policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth.
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The difference between the admissibility of
evidence and the determination of its probative weight is canonical.
FACTS:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez
Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired
by the Gimenez Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda Marcos.
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented
the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses testified
on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.
The Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 to file its formal offer of
evidence.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic
failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days
from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the
filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006. He
argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.
According to the the Sandiganbayan, the reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to
timely file the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade this Court.
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules. The court also noted that the documentary evidence
presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons who certified
the documents as copies of the original were not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this
court.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions; (YES)
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived
the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe
Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence; (YES) and
3. Whether the granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to Evidence was proper
(NO)
RULING:
1. Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also
called civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 1379 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees who "have acquired during his or her incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his or her salary as such public officer or
employee and to his or her other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
which property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."
Violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though
the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty.
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No.
1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to an
acquittal.
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Hence, the
Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer

to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of
appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
2. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets
and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees. Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of
procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19
years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of
Evidence.
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner
incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth,
this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to
submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
3. The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence
should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable
therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when
there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.
Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented
and offered during trial warranted consideration and analysis. The Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded
these testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:
Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence, petitioner
still had testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It behoved then
upon the Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.
With the Courts ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of
Evidence, what should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is
sufficient to entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is required to
establish preponderance of evidence.
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save
for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is
the contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court.
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit.,
pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without
need for accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed
(Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x
Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence
to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of
evidence on which petitioner built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from
the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by
petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial
evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of
petitioner’s witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and
her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties. Petitioner presented five (5)
witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the
PCGG:
Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the control
of spouses Gimenezes. Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The difference between the admissibility of
evidence and the determination of its probative weight is canonical.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its
evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the
letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question
him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter
renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.
Q: What is the proper remedy to assail Sandiganbayan Resolutions involving reconveyance, revision,
accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth which are in the nature of civil forfeiture
proceedings?
A: In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of
appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
Q: When may a demurrer to evidence be sustained?
A: A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence
should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable
therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when
there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and
PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 174471 January 12, 2016
DISSENTING OPINION
(Voted for the acquittal of Preciosa Gomez y Campos)
Law enforcement agents must conduct their investigation properly to avoid instances when the line-up
bears doubtful validity due to the presence of suggestive influences. For a line-up to be truly fair, it
should be composed of individuals-including the suspect-who fit the description of the perpetrator as
provided by a witness. If there is a high probability that a random individual merely relies on the prior
description of the eyewitness to select a suspect from a line-up, this line-up is not fair. To supplement the
totality of circumstances test, courts must evaluate whether there are undue suggestions made during out-
of-court-identification.
FACTS:
Two men and a woman forcibly took Edward Tan from his workplace at Kilton Motors in
Parañaque City. Jerry Pepino, one of Edward's kidnappers, contacted Edward's father and Edward's wife
to ask for a ransom. The family of Edward complied to the request of the kidnappers. Thus, Edward was
released. Five (5) months after the incident, Edward and his wife Jocelyn were invited to the NBI to
identify Edward's kidnappers among the individuals in the custody of the NBI. The identification
procedure involved a line-up of seven (7) individuals. Edward and Jocelyn identified Pepino while only
Edward identified two others: Gomez and a certain Mario Galgo. Only Pepino and Gomez were arraigned
for the kidnapping of Edward.
The RTC convicted both accused for the crime charged. Both Pepino and Gomez filed appeals
before the Court of Appeals. However, Pepino withdrew his appeal.
Gomez, on her appeal, argued that her guilt could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt because
at the time Edward was on board of the vehicle, his eyes were covered. Hence, he cannot identify that the
one seating in front of the car is she. She also argued that even if it were shown that Edward recognized
her as the woman inside the car, her mere presence in the car did not show that she was part of the
conspiracy to commit the offense. Furthermore, she also contended that when she was presented by the
DOJ in the media, she was already branded as a kidnapper, according to her, a violation of his
constitutional right of presumption of innocence. She contends that by reason of such publicity, Edward
easily identified her as one of the perpetrators. Gomez questioned the identification procedure that
identified her as an accused in this kidnapping case on the ground that she was already presented to the
media as a suspect a day before the police line-up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Presumption of Innocence of the
Accused Gomez
HELD:
YES, there is a violation because there are lapses in identifying Gomez as one of the perpetrators.
Hence, a violation of her constitutional right of presumption of innocence. Under the Constitution and
under the Rules of Court, an accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Adopting the totality of circumstances test and the arguments presented by Gomez and the
Solicitor General, the prosecution witness, Edward, could not have positively identified Gomez beyond
reasonable doubt. The out-of-the-court identification is dangerous to apply in this case. First, the other
witness in this case, Jocelyn, failed to identify Gomez. Second, Edward is Chinese-Filipino, a different
race from Gomez, who is Malay-Filipino. Cross-racial identification is often a problem due to the general
observation in psychology that "people are better at recognizing faces of persons of their own race than a
different race." Third, a considerable amount of time, five months, had elapsed before identification was
made. Fourth, several persons committed the crime, making it more difficult to remember faces.
The prosecution did not present countervailing evidence to show that the prejudicial exposure to
the media did not take place. Hence, there was a presumption that media reported the appearances of
these arrested "kidnappers" and were immediately featured in the news across varying media platforms.
At that time, high media attention was given to the crackdown of kidnapping, which was a prevalent
social ill. The appearance of the alleged kidnappers could have influenced the memories on the
kidnapping incident. On the day of the identification, December 9, 1997, Tuesday, kidnap-for-ransom-
related news were featured in the headlines for the broadsheets. The probability that Edward saw the news
reports before the line-up identification exists. The prejudicial media exposure is enough to create
reasonable doubt on the identification of Gomez. The image of Gomez being labelled as a kidnapping
suspect by the press makes an impression on its viewers. The influence or suggestiveness of this
impression is subtle and unconscious.
Law enforcement agents must conduct their investigation properly to avoid instances when the
line-up bears doubtful validity due to the presence of suggestive influences. For a line-up to be truly fair,
it should be composed of individuals-including the suspect-who fit the description of the perpetrator as
provided by a witness. If there is a high probability that a random individual merely relies on the prior
description of the eyewitness to select a suspect from a line-up, this line-up is not fair. To supplement the
totality of circumstances test, courts must evaluate whether there are undue suggestions made during out-
of-court-identification.
Q: When can a police line-up be valid as a factor in determining the guilt or innocence of an accused?
A: For a line-up to be truly fair, it should be composed of individuals-including the suspect-who fit the
description of the perpetrator as provided by a witness. If there is a high probability that a random
individual merely relies on the prior description of the eyewitness to select a suspect from a line-up, this
line-up is not fair.
HOWARD LESCANO Y CARREON @ "TISOY", Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence.
"Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of

the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of
these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused."
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, an informant alleged that drug-pushing activities were taking place
at the corner of Tulio and Tabacuhan Streets. Acting on this tip, P/Insp. Javier then instructed them to
conduct a buy-bust operation.
A briefing for the operation took place. The informant introduced PO3 Javier to Lescano.
Lescano asked PO3 Javier how much marijuana he was willing to buy. PO3 Javier responded by handing
the marked PI 00 bill to Lescano. Lescano then gave PO3 Javier a medium-sized plastic sachet
supposedly containing marijuana. At this, PO3 Javier gave the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team.
PO1 Mataverde frisked Lescano and recovered the buy-bust money.
Upon arraignment, Lescano entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.In his testimony,
Lescano denied that he was selling marijuana. He claimed that he was at Tulio Street just sitting and
passing time when P/Insp. Julius Javier arrived and introduced himself as a police officer. P/Insp. Javier
then frisked Lescano but the search turned out futile as nothing was recovered from him.
Regional Trial Court found Lescano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Court of Appeals denied Lescano's Motion
for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165.
HELD:
NO. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
As regards corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as

amended by Republic Act No. 10640 stipulates requirements for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.
Compliance with Section 21's requirements is critical. "Non-compliance is tantamount to failure
in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will,
thus, engender the acquittal of an accused."
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the
integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects:
first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or
items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their
seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in
possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting,
contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a

failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that chain of custody of the illicit
drug seized was compromised. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot
be applied in this case.
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the
obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is
made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record
suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where
the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we
noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory and
photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it
must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was
supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing
must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures,
these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items
were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution
Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the
person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and
second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative
of the media may be present in his or her place.
It is glaring that despite the prosecution's allegations that a buy-bust operation was carefully
planned and carried out, it admitted that Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was
not faithfully complied with. While an inventory was supposed to have been conducted, this was done
neither in the presence of petitioner, the person from whom the drugs were supposedly seized, nor in the
presence of his counsel or representative. Likewise, not one of the persons required to be present (an
elected public official, and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media) was shown
to have been around during the inventory and photographing.
With the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime for which petitioner was charged is cast in
doubt, it follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner must be
acquitted. Petitioner Howard Lescano y Carreon is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: Is the requirement on the presence of at least three persons during inventory for violations of Art. 9165
mandatory?
A: Yes. Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized;
second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service. There
are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from
whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or
her counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media
may be present in his or her place. Otherwise, there is no basis to find accused guilty.
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY
AS THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JUDGE ROLINE GINEZ- JABALDE, IN HER CAPACITY
AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 74 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
OLONGAPO CITY, AND MARILOU LAUDE Y SERDONCILLO, Respondents
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016 SECOND DIVISION
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead
a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person
charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable
belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a
conviction.
Facts:
A complaint for murder was filed by the PNB-Olongapo city and Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo
against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton. Pemberton received a subpoena issued by the City Prosecutor
of Olongapo city giving him 10 days from receipt to file a counter affidavit. Laude filed a motion praying
that the City prosecutor issue subpoenas ordering Pemberton to present himself for the lifting of his
fingerprint and of buccal swabs. Pemberton opposed the motion and likewise filed his own motion for
clarification, to declare absolute absence of probable cause, and in the event that there is no declaration of
probable cause, to reduce the charge to homicide.
During the preliminary investigation, the city prosecutor stated that Pemberto’s right to submit
counter-affidavits has been waived. On October 29, 2014, the city prosecutor ordered the PNP to obtain
latent fingerprint and buccal swabs for Pemberton. Pemberton filed a manifestation with omnibus motion
to determine probable cause on the basis of evidence and for reconsideration of the October 29 order of
the City prosecutor.
The city prosecutor continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular inspections in
connection with the preliminary investigation. The city prosecutor found probable cause against
Pemberton for the crime of murder. An information was filed against Pemberton before the RTC of
Olongapo City.
Pemberton filed his pettion for certiorari before the DOJ. He also filed a motion to defer
proceedings with the RTC.
DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima denied the petition. Pemberton then filed a petition for certiorari
with application for issuance or TRO. He argued that De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion when
De Lima took account additional evidence which the city prosecutor allegedly had no authority to receive,
denying him of due process of law as well as finding that there is probable cause to charge him with
murder when the evidence on record does not support it.
De Lima argues that the Petition Is procedurally infirm. She claims that errors of judgment may
not be remedied by certiorari.
Petitioner’s contention
1. That DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion when she took into
account additional evidence which the City prosecutor had no authority to receive, denying him
due process of law.
2. That the evidence on record do not support the charge against him, thus there should be no
probable cause
Respondent’s contention
1. Certiorari may not remedy errors of Judgment
2. There is probable cause to sustain the charge against petitioner.
Issues: Whether De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of probable
cause?
Ruling:
No. There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously scrutinized the evidence on
record. Based on respondent De Lima's assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to establish
probable cause that petitioner murdered the victim:
o First, the killing of Laude has been indubitably confirmed.

o Second, the various pieces of evidence so far presented in this case, i.e., the CCTV footage of
Ambyanz showing Gelviro, Laude and respondent leaving the club together; the unequivocal
testimonies of Gelviro and Gallamos positively identifying respondent as the person who was last
seen with Laude on the night he died; the result of the general physical examination conducted on
respondent showing abrasions and light scratches on different parts of his body; his latent print on
one of the condoms found at the crime scene; and the unequivocal testimonies of respondent's
fellow Marine servicemen who were with him on that fateful night, lead to no other conclusion
than that respondent was the perpetrator of the crime.
o Third, the results of the physical examination conducted on respondent and Laude's cadaver, as
well as the ocular inspection of the crime scene, demonstrate the attendant qualifying
circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty.
o Finally, the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide as provided under the RPC, as amended.
Hence, the charge of murder.
The convergence of the foregoing circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and
reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through treachery, abuse of
superior strength, and cruelty.
Maintaining his innocence, respondent points out the lack of any direct evidence linking him to
the crime. We are not persuaded.
Absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of probable cause. It has been the
consistent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that, in such cases, the prosecution may resort to
circumstantial evidence. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment
is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons
who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
In view of the importance of the qualifying circumstances as the bases for respondent's
indictment for the crime of murder, the same are heretofore discussed and explained.
There is treachery when these two elements occur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
give the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Treachery clearly attended the killing of Laude. The evidence reveals that respondent choked him
from behind. The autopsy results as well as the examination conducted by the NCIS indicate that there
were visible pressure marks and a circular purplish discoloration around his neck. In addition, the Medico
Legal Report No. A14-163RCLO5 shows that the external portion of the right horn of his larynx is
contused and that there is hematoma on the upper inner portions of the larynx below the glottis. It is
apparent that the manner of attack employed by respondent rendered Laude unable to defend himself or to
retaliate.
It has been repeatedly held that the essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. We note that
the short span of time it took to kill Laude indicates the suddenness of the attack. According to the
separate testimonies of certain witnesses, the lifeless body of Laude was discovered thirty (30) minutes
after Gelviro left the room.
Moreover, the absence of provocation on the part of Laude to warrant such vicious attack need
not be debated. He went with respondent on his own volition to engage in sexual acts in exchange for
money. Thus, he most probably did not expect to be in danger and, consequently, he was unlikely unable
to defend himself against the unwarranted attack.
In appreciating the element of abuse of superior strength, it is not only necessary to evaluate the
physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both
sides, but it is also necessary to analyse the incidents and episodes constituting the total development of
the event. We aptly note that respondent is a member of [the] United States Marine Corps, which is
known to have the strictest recruitment standards among the Uniformed Services of the United States
Armed Forces. In view of the rigorous physical and mental training requirements for enlistment, all
members of the Marine Corps possess superior strength and exceptional combat skills. On the other hand,
Laude, albeit biologically a man, is a transgender who chose to adapt (sic) a woman's physical appearance
and behavior. Thus, it is clear that there is manifest physical disparity between respondent and Laude and
that the former took advantage of his superior strength to cause the death of Laude, as evidenced by the
multiple abrasions and contusions found on the latter.
On the other hand, there is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim
suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal
act. The test is whether respondent deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another
wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or
scoffed at his person or corpse. The autopsy results that Laude died of "asphyxia due to drowning and
strangulation" shows that while he was still breathing, respondent drowned him by forcefully submerging
his head in the water inside the toilet bowl. This grisly scenario, coupled with Laude's other major
injuries, clearly show that he suffered excessively prior to his death. Respondent opted to kill him in a
manner that increased his suffering and caused him unnecessary physical pain before his death. Drowning
Laude in a toilet bowl evidently indicates respondent's intention to degrade him. (Citations omitted)
Respondent De Lima's finding of probable cause against petitioner was not rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. Rather, her determination was based on a careful evaluation of evidence presented.
Q: Define Grave abuse of discretion.
A: "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Q: Define probable cause. What is its basis?
A: Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person
charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating
officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspect.
VIRGINIA DIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND,
respondents.
G.R. No. 208146, June 8, 2016
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an
amended Information.
For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of authority to file it, the lack of the
authority must be evident on the face of the information.
FACTS:
Timothy Desmond is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, of which Virginia Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors.
On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel. The former
alleged that on July 6, 2002, Dio, with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and
reputation of Desmond, sent electronic messages to the offended party and to other persons
namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson.
The email stated:
“NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD SURVIVED, YOU
SHOULD STOP YOUR NONSENSE THREAT BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED
YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE PAY YOUR EXHORBITANT SALARY, HOUSE YOU ADN
SUPPORT ALL YOUR PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED IN DOING THIS.
AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING EXCEPT A PERSON WHO IS
TRYING TO SURVIVED AT THE PRETEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL
PROTECTOR. YOU ARE PADI TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL YOUR WORK IN THE WORK.
AT THE SAME TIME, YOU BLOATED THE PRICE OF EACH ANIMAL YOU BROUGHT TO
THE PHILIPPINES from US$500,000.00 to US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned more
shares that you should. Please look into this deeply.
IF YOU INSISTS TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR IN
OUR COUNTRY, THEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE SHOULD STOP BLEEDING THE COMPANY
WITH YOUR MONTHLY PAYROLL OF ALMOST P1 MILLION A MONTH.“
Such electronic message was defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond.
On July 13, 2002, , Dio, with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and
reputation of Desmond, sent electronic messages to Atty. Winston Ginez and Fatima Paglicawan,
to the offended party, Timothy Desmond and to other persons namely: Hon. Felicito Payumo,
SBMA Chariman, Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and Gail Laule.
The email stated:
“Dear Winston and Fatima:
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER OF SBME, AS OF THIS DATE THE COMPANY HAD INCURRED A LOSS OF
MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLION. A BALANCE SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY
THEIR ACCOUNTANT JULIET REFLECT AND ASSETS OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS, 50% OF WHICH IS OVERVALUED AND NON-EXISTENT. TIM
DESMOND AND FAMILY HAD ACCUMULATED A SHARES OF MORE THAN 70% OF THE
RECORDED PAID UP CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF THE ASSETS CONTRIBUTION,
PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN COMPANY IN THE USA, ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, TIM
DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED THE COMPANY FROM DATE OF INCORPORATION TO
PRESENT FOR AN AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION PER MONTH FOR THEIR PERSONAL
GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ETC.“
Such electronic message was defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond.
Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not covered under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner claims that this is bolstered by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known as the Anti-Cybercrime Law, which widened the
scope of libel to include libel committed through email, among others.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an Information’s failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by
amendment before arraignment.
2. Whether or not a defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is ground to quash an Information.
HELD:
1. Yes, If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order
that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
In People v. Sandiganbayan the Court ruled that, when a motion to quash is filed challenging the
validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny
the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be
corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured
by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging
the proceedings, are avoided.
In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court applies. If the information is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to
amend it before it may be quashed.
2. NO, Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the
time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an
information, to wit:
1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

2. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
3. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
4. That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
5. That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
6. That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
7. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
8. That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
9. That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed
before the fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper ground. There must have
been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint
or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon
it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As
the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar
to petitioner's subsequent prosecution.
For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of authority to file it, the lack of
the authority must be evident on the face of the information. The Informations here do not allege that the
venue of the offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face of the
Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file them.
Q: May an Information be amended before it may be quashed?
A: Yes, when a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution
to file an amended Information.
Q: What are the grounds for motion to quash?
A: Rule 117, Sec. 3

1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
2. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
3. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
4. That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
5. That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
6. That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
7. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
8. That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and
9. That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
JAIME DICHAVES, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
GR. NOS. 206310-11 (OMB-0-01-0211 and OMB-0-01 0291; Sandiganbayan Special Division-
Criminal Case No. 26558), December 07, 2016
The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the
"existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge ofthe prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted."
In dealing with probable cause as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
FACTS:
The consolidated complaints trace their roots to the contents of the sealed second envelope,
Estrada's impeachment trial, and his plunder trial before the Sandiganbayan in People v. Estrada
(Criminal Case No. 26558).
On November 13, 2000, the House of Representatives impeached Estrada. After Estrada's
impeachment, it was reported that Dichaves fled the country "and cooled his heels off in China[.]"
On January 16, 2001, 11 senators voted against opening a sealed second envelope allegedly
containing damaging evidence against Estrada and Jaime Dichaves, among others. By January 20, 2001,
Estrada was considered resigned as president, and, therefore, no longer immune to criminal prosecution.
On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information charging Estrada, Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio
Tan (also known as Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy), Jane Doe (also known as Delia Rajas), and several
John and Jane Does with plunder before the Sandiganbayan. Dichaves was subsequently identified as one
of the John Does. While the preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being
conducted, Dichaves was nowhere to be found in the Philippines.
On September 13, 2001, the Ombudsman jointly resolved OMB-0-01-0211 and OMB-0-01-0291,
finding probable cause to also indict Dichaves for plunder under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080.
On January 29, 2002, a warrant of arrest was issued against Dichaves, but he could not be located
as he had already slipped out of the country. No subpoena was served on him.
During the Senate and the Sandiganbayan trials of Estrada, Equitable-PCIBank Senior Chief
Legal Counsel Atty. Manuel Curato and Vice President Clarissa Ocampo established that the Jose
Velarde-owner of the "Jose Velarde" account, and Estrada, are the same person. On September 12, 2007,
Estrada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of plunder. The Sandiganbayan ruled that
Estrada was the real and beneficial owner of the "Jose Velarde" account (Savings Account No. 0160-
62501-5).
After Estrada's conviction and pardon, Dichaves resurfaced on November 19, 2010. He filed a
Motion to Quash and/or Motion for Reinvestigation, seeking for a preliminary investigation of his case as
none was conducted. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the
Ombudsman to conduct/complete the preliminary investigation of Dichaves' case. The Sandiganbayan
held in abeyance further proceedings until after the preliminary investigation was completed. On
September 18, 2011, it resolved to recall Dichaves' warrant of arrest. Meanwhile, the anti-graft court
denied Dichaves' motion to quash, ruling that "the material facts in the Amended Information sufficiently
establish the elements of the crime of Plunder."
On December 7, 2011, the Ombudsman commenced the preliminary investigation, and Dichaves
was ordered to submit his counter-affidavit on the consolidated cases. On March 14, 2012, the Office of
the Ombudsman Special Panel issued a Joint Resolution, finding probable cause to charge Dichaves with
plunder. On February 4, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman denied Dichaves' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Thus, Dichaves was indicted for conspiring with the former President in amassing ill-gotten
wealth through profits and commissions from the purchase of Belle Corporation shares by the
Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System.
The Special Division of the Sandiganbayan set Dichaves' arraignment on April 5, 2013. However,
on April 4, 2013, Dichaves filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, assailing the March 14, 2012 Joint Resolution and February 4, 2013 Order of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Dichaves moved to suspend the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan in view of the
Petition for Certiorari filed with this Court. The motion was denied on April 18, 2013, and his
arraignment was re-set to July 26, 2013.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable
cause against petitioner.
HELD:
NO. The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing
into the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted."
The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better
position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.
Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with the Office of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause.
Invoking an exception to the rule on non-interference, petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion. According to him: (a) he was not given the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses, (b) the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the
preliminary investigation, and (c) there is no probable cause to charge him with plunder.
Petitioner's assertions are erroneous.

First, there is nothing capricious or whimsical about petitioner's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to present such evidence "as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that [the respondent in a criminal complaint]
is probably guilty thereof." It does not 'call for a "full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence[.]"
Thus, petitioner has no right to cross-examine the witnesses during a preliminary investigation.
At this early stage, the Ombudsman has yet to file an information that would trigger into operation the
rights of the accused (found under Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution). "It is the filing of a
complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action[,]" and carries with it all the
accompanying rights of an accused.
Only when a person stands trial may he or she demand the right to confront and cross-examine
his accusers. This right cannot apply to petitioner, who has yet to be arraigned and face trial as he left the
country at the time he was initially charged with plunder.
Petitioner's failure to cross-examine the witnesses during the trial in People v. Estrada was, thus,
his own fault. His disappearance during such a crucial period in our history necessarily meant that he
could not cross-examine the witnesses at the time of Estrada's plunder trial. Petitioner cannot
conveniently impute this fault on the Ombudsman now, more than a decade later. It is injustice, not to
mention a grave error, to attribute to the Ombudsman the dire consequences of petitioner's own actions.
Second, the public prosecutor is not bound by the technical rules on evidence.
The Ombudsman merely depends on evidence of such facts and circumstances amounting to a
"more likely-than-not" belief that a crime has been committed. As the Office of the Ombudsman's
conclusion is based on a belief or an opinion, the technical rules on evidence cannot be made to apply to
it. Thus, at the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility of evidence is
premature for petitioner to raise.
Petitioner erroneously claims that the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented
during the preliminary investigation. No part of the ruling in the March 14, 2012 Joint Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman was based on the proceedings in Estrada's impeachment and plunder trials or
their records. All references to the impeachment and plunder trials were made only by way of
summarizing the initial allegations and reply of complainants in OMB-0-01-0211 and OMB-0-01-0291.
Notably, the present case is an offshoot of the proceedings in Estrada's impeachment and plunder
trials. Petitioner was identified as one of the John Does in Estrada's plunder case. Both People v. Estrada
and this case are docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558. Thus, the Sandiganbayan's pronouncements in
People v. Estrada may be taken judicial notice of. That case, which was decided in 2007, had long
become of public knowledge, when the Ombudsman proceeded with petitioner's preliminary investigation
on December 7, 2011. More importantly, it has long formed part of Philippine jurisprudence, which the
Office of the Ombudsman may accord full faith and reliance on.
In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Given the supporting evidence it has on hand, the Ombudsman's
exercise of prerogative to charge petitioner with plunder was not whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary.
Finally, it must be emphasized that only opinion and reasonable belief are sufficient at this stage.
Thus, petitioner's "other defense contesting the finding of probable cause that is highly factual in nature
must be threshed out in a full-blown trial, and not in a special civil action for certiorari before this Court."
Q. What is the purpose of Preliminary Investigation?
A. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to present such evidence "as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the respondent in a criminal complaint
is probably guilty thereof." It does not 'call for a "full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence."
Q. Can a party cross examine the witness during preliminary investigation?
A. No. A party has no right to cross-examine the witnesses during a preliminary investigation. "It is the
filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action" and carries with it all the
accompanying rights of an accused.
Only when a person stands trial may he or she demand "the right to confront and cross-examine his or her
accusers."
Q. Is the Ombudsman armed with the power to investigate?
A. Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better
probable cause.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE (BIR), Petitioner, v. GMCC UNITED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOSE C.
GO, AND XU XIAN CHUN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191856, December 07, 2016
The Court has consistently adopted the policy of non interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the
prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too,
cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive.
Facts:
On March 28, 2003, the Bureau of Internal Revenue National Investigation Division issued a
Letter of Authority, authorizing its revenue officers to examine the books of accounts and other
accounting records of GMCC United Development Corporation (GMCC) covering taxable years 1998
and 1999. On April 3, 2003 GMCC was served a copy of said Letter of Authority and was requested to
present its books of accounts and other accounting records. GMCC failed to respond to the Letter of
Authority as well as the subsequent letters requesting that its records and documents be produced.
In light of the discovered tax deficiencies, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, on October 7, 2005,
filed with the Department of Justice a criminal complaint for violation of Sections 254, 255, and 267, of
the National Internal Revenue Code against GMCC, its president, Jose C. Go, and its treasurer, Xu Xian
Chun. On May 26, 2006, the Department of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, issued a
Resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against the GMCC officers.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the Secretary of Justice did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when he found no probable cause and dismissed the tax evasion case against the
respondent officers of GMCC.
Ruling:
We are convinced that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the ruling
of the Secretary of Justice that there was no probable cause to file a tax evasion case against the
respondent officers. Since the assessment for the tax had already prescribed, no proceeding in court on the
basis of such return can be filed.
This Court has a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. In First
Women's Credit Corporation v. Baybay the Court said:
It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in
court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer
of the findings of public prosecutors. The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, albeit in extreme cases, exceptional
circumstances have been recognized. The rule is also consistent with this Court's policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a
supposed offender. While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of probable cause, their findings are subject to review by the Secretary of Justice.
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, any disposition of the case, e.g., its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the Court.
Accordingly, the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the
prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too,
cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive.
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law. This error
or abuse alone, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of
the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion
he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained.
Based on the foregoing, absent any indication that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his
discretion in not finding probable cause for the complaint against respondent officers to prosper, the
dismissal stands.
Q: What is the policy of non-interference?
A: The policy of non interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the prosecution of one against whom the
prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too, cannot substitute their own judgment
for that of the Executive.
YEAR 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MONIR JAAFAR Y

TAMBUYONG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT;
G.R. NO. 219829 January 18, 2017
Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt
on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in
the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
FACTS:
On September 11, 2009 at Barangay Port Area, Isabela City, Zamboanga Peninsula, Philippines
the above named accused not being authorized by law unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to POl
Look one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing
0.0604 grams which when subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to the tests for the
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug.
According to the prosecution, at 8:00 a.m. on September 10, 2009, a male civilian informant
reported to Chief Larubis that a certain "Mana" was selling shabu at the port area barangay located just
beside the police station. Mana was later identified as Jaafar, who sold shabu between 12:00 m.n. and
4:00 a.m. to facilitate the sale of the drug and evade arrest. Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his house.
Chief Larubis instructed SPO4 Morales to form a team composed of SPO3 Tabunyag, PO3 Perez,
P03 Hasim, PO2 Canete, PO2 Bucoy, POl Insang, and PO1 Look and to schedule a buy-bust operation
the next day. He also instructed the team to coordinate with agents from the PDEA. PO1 Look was
designated as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent Mark Dela Cruz were designated as
the arresting officers.
Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door of his house and asked them if they were
buying shabu. PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked ₱500.00 bill. Jaafar called
for Gani and he came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1
Look, who immediately lit a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team. The
police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to escape. Jaafar threw away the marked bill as he
ran. Eventually, the arresting officers caught up with him. Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked
the confiscated sachet of shabu with his initials. He then turned over the sachet and the marked bill to
their team leader, SPO4 Morales. The team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for
investigation.
In his defense, Gani testified that he was at an internet cafe located near the police station at 2:00
a.m. on September 11, 2009. After stepping out of the establishment, Gani was suddenly apprehended by
unknown persons, who later identified themselves as PO1 Look and P02 Bucoy. He was detained at the
police station for two (2) days and was subsequently transferred to the BJMP. Gani claimed that he did
not know the reason for his arrest.
Meanwhile, Jaafar testified that he was at the internet cafe at 12:00 m.n. on September 11, 2009,
watching people play video games. He left after two (2) hours and made his way home. Upon entering an
alley, Jaafar saw six (6) persons headed towards him. One of them pointed a gun at him and told him not
to run. Out of fear, he ran towards the main road. However, the six (6) persons, who turned out to be
police officers, caught up with him. They conducted a body search but found nothing since Jaafar was
only wearing boxer shorts and a t-shirt. Jaafar was detained after his arrest and brought to the Office of
the City Prosecutor at the City Hall of Isabela the next day.
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution clearly established all the elements of the
crime of illegal sale of drugs. Although the chain of custody rule was not strictly complied with, the trial
court ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu sachet had been duly
preserved. It applied the legal resumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers.
The RTC convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it
acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence.
Jaafar filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and raised the following errors: (1) the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the arresting team violated the
chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of accused appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the
non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
HELD:
This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Monir Jaafar Tambuyong.
Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and nature, they
must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration,
tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused
are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody,
as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are
removed.
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal
to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground
that justifies departure from the general rule.
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Although the buy-bust team marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of
shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet had been photographed. Furthermore, there is
absolutely no evidence to show that the physical inventory was done in the presence of accused-appellant
or his representative, representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elected public
official.
The buy-bust team had an entire day within which to coordinate with the persons required by law
to be present during the physical inventory of the seized drugs. The Chief of Police received the
confidential tip early in the morning. He immediately instructed SP04 Morales to form a buy-bust team
and coordinate with agents from the PDEA. The buy-bust team had ample time to contact an elected
public official and representatives from the media and the Department of Justice.
The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buy bust operation had been
carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the prosecution
relied heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule. The prosecution did not even offer any
explanation on why they failed to comply with what was mandated under the law. Indeed, if the police
authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation, then there was no reason for them to neglect
such important requirements. They cannot feign ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. Police officers are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged
with executing.
Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 casts
doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates reasonable
doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165.
Q: What does chain of custody in drug cases mean?
A: It means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AND RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, Petitioners vs. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, in his capacity as
Officer-in-Charge Provincial Prosecutor, ANTONIO LL. LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN,
and EDDIE C. GUTIERREZ, in their capacity as members of the panel of investigating
prosecutors, and RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents
G.R. No. 187094 February 15, 2017 SECOND DIVISION
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Facts:
Petitioners Liza Maza, Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casifio, and Rafael Mariano are former
members of the House of Representatives. Liza represented Gabriela, Saturnino and Teodoro represented
Bayan Muna, and Rafael, Anak Pawis.
Police Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo wrote to the Provincial prosecutor of Cabanatuan a charge
of murder against Liza et al and 15 others. They were allegedly responsible for the deaths of Carlito
Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.
Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted and an information for

murder be filed against the 19 individuals.
Investigating prosecutor Antonio Lapus, Jr issued a subpoena requiring Liza et al to testify at

hearings scheduled on February 16 and 23, 2007.
Liza et al filed a special appearance with Motion to Quash Complaint/Subpoena and to expunge
supporting affidavits. They argue that the Provincial Prosecutor has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation without a proper complaint filed against them. They claimed that the preliminary
investigation was highly irregular; and that the subpoena issued against them was defective denying them
due process.
The motion was denied by a panel of investigating prosecutor and they were ordered to submit
counter-affidavits.
Liza et al complied and together with their counter-affidavits they also filed a Motion for
clarificatory hearing and to allow them to submit written memoranda.
The motion was dismissed. Liza et al moved for reconsideration but was denied.
The Panel pf prosecutors found probable cause for murder in the killing of Bayudang and Peralta,
and for the kidnapping and killing of Felipe. One of the suspects. Julie Flores, was considred to be a state
witness. 2 information were filed. One for murder before the RTC of Palayan and the other for
kidnapping and murder at the RTC of Guimba.
Liza et al filed a motion for Judicial determination of probable cause with prayer to dismiss the
case outright on the Guimba case. The Panel of prosecutors opposed. Judge Napoleon Sta. Romana
dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. A same motion was filed in the Palayan case. Judge Evelyn
Atienza-Turla found that the proper procedure for preliminary investigation was not followed.
Judge Turla found that the principal witnesses were not presented to the panel of prosecutors. She
also reasoned out that the charge against Liza et al was 2 counts of murder, a non-bailable offense. The
gravity of the crime and the position of the suspects as party list representatives should have merited a
deeper preliminary investigation. Judge Turla remanded the Palayan case to the provincial prosecutor for
a complete preliminary investigation.
Liza et al moved for partial reconsideration but was denied. They then filed a Petition for
certiorari prayer for issuance of writ of injunction against Judge Turla and the Panel of prosecutors before
the SC.
Issue:
1. Whether Liza et al’s petition before the Supreme court violated the hierarchy of courts?
2. Whether Judge Turla’s remanding of the case proper?
3. Whether the issue of admissibility of evidence is properly addressed during the trial on the merits
and not on the preliminary investigation?
Ruling:
1. No. The petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided
exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases,
the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression,
no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the
United States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that
may guide the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this
court held that: it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.
Fifth, Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ ...
Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort
to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the
past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving
modernization of voters' registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.
2. No.
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge
has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause.
The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation
of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by the
trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is
an executive function
Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was
incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a personal
evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if
she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no
option for her to remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation.
In doing so, she acted without any legal basis.
3. Yes.
The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond
To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is not a trial on the
merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would
have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused," the admissibility
or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.
Q: What are the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts?
A:
a. when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time;
b. when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
c. cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court;
d. the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court;
e. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court;
f. the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
g. no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and
h. the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to
be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."
Q: What are the duties of the judge after the receipt of an information?
A: A plain reading of Sec. 5, Rule 112 shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has
the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause.
The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation of the
prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by the trial court
judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an
executive function.
Q: Is evidence ruled upon in a preliminary investigation?
A: In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond
EDWIN GRANADA REYES, Petitioner vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, and PAUL JOCSON ARCHES, Respondents
G.R. No. 208243 June 5, 2017
employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman”. The Office of the Ombudsman has
the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case
against an accused. This function is executive in nature.
Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable cause
exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present during
trial. It is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
FACTS:
In 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance No.
357, prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up ('pagpabuto') of those pyrotechnics
products allowed by law, commonly called 'firecrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises of buildings 1
and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market." On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a
permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009 to
January 1, 2010. On December 27, 2009, a fire befell the Bansalan Public Market, which caused
extensive damage and destroyed fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District. Subsequently, private
respondent Arches filed a complaint against Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Ombudsman-Mindanao). Arches questioned the approval and issuance of a mayor's permit agreeing to
sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. By order of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
Chief of Police de Castilla, Fire Marshall Andres, and Permits and Licensing Officer Designate Domingo
were made respondents in the case, considering that they recommended the approval of the mayor's
permits.
After concluding the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution, finding
probable cause to charge Reyes and his co-respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019. The Ombudsman appreciated the evidence presented and found that Reyes and his co-respondents a
quo were aware of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. Despite this, Reyes approved and issued a mayor's
permit allowing the vendors to sell firecrackers on December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010 at Public
Market, Bansalan, Davao del Sur.
ISSUE/S:
1. May the Court, under the circumstances in this case, interfere w/ the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
mandate, on the ground of the latter’s grave abuse of its discretion? (NO)
2. Whether Petitioner may insist on him being furnished a copy of his co-respondents’ affidavits.
(NO)
HELD:
1. No.
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman”. The Office of the Ombudsman has
the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case
against an accused. This function is executive in nature.
An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or personal hostility. Thus, for the Petition to prosper, petitioner would have to show
this Court that the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law. Petitioner has failed to do this.
First, a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause. Probable cause
is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence
to entertain an honest· and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the
investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer
acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. Here, the Ombudsman properly
performed its duty to determine probable cause as to whether petitioner and his co-respondents violated
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Second, the Ombudsman was able to show that undue bsenefit
was given to the vendors. The approval and issuance of the mayor's permit was clearly without basis as it
was, in fact, in violation of a municipal ordinance and the Fire Code of the Philippines. It gave a group of
vendors the benefit and advantage of holding the business of selling firecrackers in the public market
despite existing prohibition. Third, the Ombudsman was able to sufficiently explain its finding of bad
faith. Respondents' action was patently tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least, gross
inexcusable negligence. Respondents were well aware of Municipal Ordinance No. 357 which expressly
prohibits "the storing, displaying, selling and blowing up ("pagbubuto") of those pyrotechnics products
allowed by law, commonly called as "firecrackers" or "pabuto" within the premises of buildings 1 and 2
of Bansalan Public Market." In clear violation of this ordinance, respondents approved and issued a
mayor's permit. Furthermore, the vendors were not issued a Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC)
because they did not co.mply with fire safety requirements. The issuance of a FSIC by the Bureau of Fire
Protection is a prerequisite to the grant of permits by local governments. Reyes was informed of this lack
of safety requirements, and despite of this, he recommended for approval the application for the subject
mayor's permit.
2. No.
Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable
cause exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present
during trial. It is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
A person's rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural
law. Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted
by his or her co-respondents. As the Court held in Estrada v Office of the Ombudsman:
First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint
and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit
is issued to the respondent.
Second, a respondent's "access to evidence on record" in Section 4 (c), Rule II of the

Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of "the
complainant or supporting witnesses".
Third, Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he
respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent's right to examine
refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the
Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the
co-respondents should be furnished to a respondent.
Therefore, Reyes’ non-receipt of Andres' affidavit did not violate his procedural rights during
Q: Does the accused have the right to demand, during a preliminary investigation, that he be furnished
copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents?
A: No. Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable
cause exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present
during trial. It is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
A person's rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law. Under
procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or
her co-respondents.
MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 200370, Jun 07, 2017
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, the police informed him that a certain alias "Baho” was on the way
to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2
Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San
Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana." PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested
and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station. The Regional Trial
Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
Petitioner argues that he did not act in any manner that would give the police officers reasonable
ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or that he was committing a crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest that would vest the court with jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is
about to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that
the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would
give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable
persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police
had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. Checkpoints per se
are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of individuals and
ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in danger.
Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a certain extent,
they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine inspections must be
limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform
warrantless searches.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable
limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law
except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The
checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.
Q: What are the instances of a valid warrantless arrest?
A: There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
b. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 224974 July 3, 2017
“The trial court's failure to comply with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion
and may be the subject of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.”
FACTS:
In an Information, Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an
Uninhabited Place and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal
and a copper pipe worth ₱72,000.00 collectively. Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of
₱12,000.00.
The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance stating
that he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz. Assistant City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by Regional Trial Court, City of Malabon.
Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond. The Regional Trial
Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through desistance and not through
acquittal. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Francisco was likewise denied.
Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash
Bond.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.
The Court of Appeals anchored its dismissal on the ground that Cruz and Francisco should have
filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to Release Cash
Bond. The Court of Appeals further stated that it could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal
since the period for appeal had lapsed before its filing.
Cruz and Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this Petition
was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper
RULING:
No. An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." In order
to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the
wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it.
The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was only
due to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that the crime was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the
dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond.
There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not specify any costs of court that he must
answer for. There was, thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate release. Considering
these circumstances, petitioners could not have been faulted for filing a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals since there was no legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to deny their Motion to
Release Cash Bond.
Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.
Instead of addressing the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals instead chose to focus on
procedural technicalities, dismissing the petition for certiorari based on cases that did not actually
prohibit the filing of a petition for certiorari. While procedural rules are necessary for the speedy
disposition of justice, its indiscriminate application should never be used to defeat the substantial rights of
litigants.
Q: In a case where the accused was charged with Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a Band, the
accused posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of ₱12,000.00. The private complainant sought to
withdraw its action against the accused by filing a desistance. The accused, through his bondsman, filed a
Motion to Release Cash Bond. The Regional Trial Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case
was dismissed through desistance and not through acquittal. The accused filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. It anchored its
dismissal on the ground that accused should have filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to
question the denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond. The Court of Appeals further stated that it
could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal since the period for appeal had lapsed before its
filing. Is the dismissal proper?
A: No. An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion
has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." In order to
determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong
remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion
as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it. Considering that the trial court blatantly
disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for
certiorari with the proper court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR ALLAN CORPUZ Y FLORES
G.R. No. 208013: July 3, 2017
An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court.
He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If an
intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.
Facts:
BBB testified that her sister-in law, DDD, told her that AAA was raped. BBB found out from a
psychiatrist that it was Allan who raped her daughter. She revealed that Allan had also raped CCC.
However, that case was settled since Allan was her brother-in-law. CCC affirmed that sometime in 2002,
AAA allegedly informed her that she was not having her period. She advised AAA to "drink something
bitter" and to ask their aunt EEE about her condition. At that time, CCC found out that AAA was
pregnant. EEE who lived near AAA's house, averred that in the morning of February 14, 2003, AAA
entered her house while drinking from a cup. EEE asked what AAA was consuming. AAA responded that
it "was something to induce menstruation.AAA then asked EEE to massage her aching stomach. When
EEE was about to do so, she observed that it was noticeably bulging. AAA began to cry, confessing that
she thought she was pregnant.
At that time, AAA's parents were in Baguio City, so EEE called AAA's uncle GGG instead.
When GGG arrived, AAA was still crying when she told them, "Jnkastanak ni Allan, " pertaining to
Allan. GGG brought AAA to Asingan Community Hospitai and to the police station to enter the incident
in the police blotter. GGG attested that his sister-in-law EEE called him on February 14, 2003. When he
arrived at EEE's house, he saw AAA crying. He found out that AAA was pregnant. When he confirmed
AAA's pregnancy through a medical examination, EEE told him that AAA was raped by Allan.
After entering the incident in the police blotter, he also reported it to the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dagupan City.Brenda Tablizo, a Psychologist II of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila, testified that she conducted AAA's neuropsychiatric examination and evaluation on February 26,
2003 upon the request of Agent Gerald Geralde (Agent Geralde) of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Dagupan City. Which stated that:AAA had a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months and an IQ
of 42. Her intelligence level was equivalent to Moderate Mental Retardation. She also found AAA to be
an egocentric and self-centered individual and had difficulty in her interpersonal relations. Poor impulse
control was likewise evident in her.
AAA underwent another neuropsychiatric examination before taking the witness stand. Dr.
Rachel Acosta testified that she found that AAA had a "mild degree of mental retardation" and an
Intelligence Quotient of 70.Although AAA was already 19 years old at the time of examination, her
mental age was that of a child aged five (5) to seven (7) years. That AAA's "manner of speech is quite
incomprehensible in some words only but most of the simple words are well spoken but some words that
are being spoken with slur and slang manner and defective phonation. It seems that there is an air coming
out from the nose when she talks."She concluded that AAA was fit to testify as a witness depending on
her emotional condition when she testifies although she was "not oriented to time, date and place." Her
degree of honesty was great because, with mental age of 5 to 7 years old, she does not know what is right
or wrong. AAA was already 20 years old when she testified. She confirmed that XXX was her four (4)-
year-old child. She identified Allan as XXX's father.
AAA was asked how Allan became XXX's father. She responded, "Iniyot nak, sir." (He had sex
with me, sir.) She attested that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with her on four (4) occasions,
each of which he gave her money. On the other hand, Allan and his daughter, Almeda, testified for the
defense. The testimony of Almeda was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed to accept her proposed
testimony. She testified that when she asked AAA about her pregnancy, AAA failed to disclose who
impregnated her. Allan denied the accusations and insisted that all the charges against him were merely
fabricated by AAA's father, FFF. Upon motion before the trial court, the defense applied for (DNA)
paternity test, which was granted. Forensic Biologist III Dela Cruz affirmed that the comparison of their
DNA profiles revealed a "100% proof that the accused is the biological father of XXX." Forensic Chemist
Mary Ann Aranas conducted a confirmatory test, which affirmed the test result of the DNA paternity test.
Regional Trial Court convicted Allan of four (4) counts of Simple Rape. In his appeal, Allan
insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the records were bereft of any
credible proof indicating that he raped AAA four (4) times. AAA failed to testify when and where she
was raped as she was not oriented with place, date, and time. The Court of Appeals affirmed Allan's
conviction and held that carnal knowledge of an intellectually disabled person is rape under paragraph 1
of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.
Hence, an appeal before this Court was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not an intellectually disabled person is disqualified to testify as witness?
Ruling:
No, To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he [or she] can perceive and, perceiving,
can make known his [or her] perception to others."
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following

persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying
in court. "He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows." If an
intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.
Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person
with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her perception to
others. Given that AAA's qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA's mental state also does not
prevent her from being a credible witness. The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person
is upheld provided that she is capable and consistent in narrating her experience.
Furthermore, Dr. Acosta explicitly stated that "AAA's degree of honesty is great" despite her
condition. AAA's degree of honesty is "great" because, with her mental age, she does not know what is
right or wrong. Indeed, in light of her mental state, AAA's simple narration of what happened to her is
indicative of her honesty and naïve.
Moreover, it would be unlikely for AAA to fabricate charges against Allan. When there is no proof
showing that the witness was moved by any improper motive, his or her identification of the offender as
the perpetrator of the crime shall be upheld.
In affirming the finding of the accused's guilt, this Court is aware that when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that she had indeed been raped. If her
testimony withstands the test of credibility, like in this case, "the rapist may be adjudged guilty solely on
that basis.
Therefore, Allan cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt since AAA was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AANs failure to offer any testimony
as to when and where she was raped does not matter. This Court underscores that the date, place, and time
of the incidents need not be accurately established since these are not elements of rape.
Q. How can an intellectually disabled person be qualified to testify as witness?
A. To qualify as a witness, the basic test is whether he can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his
perception to others. An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from
testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she
knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible.
HEIRS OF CASCAYAN VS. SPOUSES GUMALLAOI ET. AL.
G.R. 211947, 03 JULY 2017
As a general rule, the findings of fact of the CA bind the Supreme Court, and the CA had already
thoroughly examined the evidence and found it lacking in probative value.
Facts:
The Heirs of Cayetano Cascayan, co-owners of a lot through a free patent application, filed a civil
complaint with the Regional Trial Court for vacation of possession, recovery of possession, demolition of
structures, and payment of damages, against their neighbours, the Spouses Gumallaoi, who allegedly
ignored repeated notices given to them by the Heirs that the Spouses had repeatedly encroached on the lot
of the Heirs after the construction and renovation of the Spouses’ residential house.
The Spouses filed a counterclaim with the RTC to have the FPA of the Heirs be declared null and
void, with payment of damages, and contended that they were the true owners of both lots, and that the
Heirs had acquired the FPA, through manipulation, deception, and fraud.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses, and this was later affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, the Heirs filed a Motion for New Trial on grounds of “mistake” with the RTC, but
this was denied. The RTC and the CA both ruled that the collective evidence presented by both of the
parties proved the claims of the Spouses, as the evidence of the Heirs was full of inconsistencies. The
Heirs filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, claiming that it was already
proven that they owned their own lot, as shown through their tax declarations.
Issue:
Did the CA properly appreciate the evidence?
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, the findings of fact of the CA bind the Supreme Court, and the CA had
already thoroughly examined the evidence and found it lacking in probative value. The only evidence
presented were only tax declarations, and the assertions of the Heirs explaining the inconsistencies were
just mere factual allegations, and they were neither well-substantiated or adequately-discussed facts to
compel the SC to review the CA’s appreciation of the evidence.
Q: Can the Supreme Court review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals?
A: As a general rule, the findings of fact of the CA shall bind the Supreme Court. However, if such a
finding is made with grave abuse of discretion, then it is subject to review by the Supreme Court.
MARLON BACERRA Y TABONES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204544, 03 July 2017
The probative value of direct evidence is generally not superior to circumstantial evidence. The same
quantum of evidence is still required by the court, which is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is a qualitative test and not quantitative.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with simple arson before the RTC of Pangasinan, and was eventually
convicted. He appealed to the CA, arguing that he was not positively identified as the person who burned
the nipa hut. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC, alleging that the CA erred
in upholding his conviction based on circumstantial evidence as it is only based on conjecture and falls
short of proof beyond reasonable doubt. No direct evidence was presented to prove petitioner actually set
fire to the hut.
Petitioner further argued that his intoxication and voluntary surrender despite the absence of
warrant of arrest should have been appreciated as mitigating circumstances. Lastly, he argued that
temperate damages should not have been awarded as the private complainant could have proven actual
damages in trial.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that an accused may be convicted based on
circumstantial evidence as long as the combination of circumstances leads to the conclusion that accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, intoxication must be shown to not be habitual in order to be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, while voluntary surrender shall only be considered if it shown
to have been spontaneous. The temperate damages were properly awarded as the burning of the hut led to
pecuniary loss of the private complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the
circumstantial evidence during trial.
RULING:
Yes. The probative value of direct evidence is generally not superior to circumstantial evidence.
The same quantum of evidence is still required by the court, which is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is a qualitative test and not quantitative.
There is no requirement that only direct evidence can be used to convict. In fact, Sec. 4 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court enumerates the 3 requisites in order to sustain a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, namely: [i] there is more than 1 circumstance; [ii] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and [iii] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The commission of the crime, identity of the perpetrator, and finding of guilt may all be
established by circumstantial evidence. In this case, none of the witnesses actually saw the accused start
the fire, but the accused had motive and previously had attempted to set the complainant’s house on fire.
He was also present at the scene of the crime before and after the fire occurred, and was in fact seen
throwing stones at the complainant’s house before the fire and even threatened to burn the complainant,
which was heard by other persons. The stoning incident and the fire cannot be taken as separate incidents.
Q: What are the requisites in order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence?
A: The following are the requisites in order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
namely: [i] there is more than 1 circumstance; [ii] the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and [iii] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME SEGUNDO y IGLESIAS
G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link,
thus it is vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference.
Negligible departures from the procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 would not certainly absolve the
accused from his or her charges. Nonetheless, "when there is gross disregard of the procedural
safeguards prescribed in the substantive law ... serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the
seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence."
FACTS:
In July 6, 2003, a tip was received by the Mandaluyong Police Station from a "confidential
informant" about Segundo's sale of illegal drugs in Barangay Malamig, Mandaluyong City.
A buy-bust team was created upon the order of Officer in Charge P03 Victor Santos to PO2
Yumul who was team leader of the operatives at the Drug Enforcement Unit. POl Claveron was assigned
as the poseur-buyer. Two ₱100.00 bills served as marked buy-bust money. When the police officers
reached their destination, PO1 Claveron and the confidential informant came near Segundo, who was then
positioned along an alley. Segundo was initially hesitant but the confidential informant persuaded him to
finally sell illegal drugs.
POl Claveron gave the buy-bust money to Segundo. In return, Segundo handed him "one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet" with shabu. P02 Yumul allegedly saw this exchange although he could
not tell what Segundo gave PO1 Claveron, considering his distance. PO1 Claveron made the pre-arranged
signal, which prompted the other member to make the arrest. Segundo ran to his house and was pursued
by PO2 Yumul, PO1 Occeña, and POS Adriano.
Inside Segundo's house, the police officers coincidentally saw Gubato "repacking prohibited
drugs scattered on the floor." POS Adriano pursued Segundo while PO2 Yumul apprehended Gubato and
PO1 Occeña collected the evidence. Later, POS Adriano arrested Segundo.
PO1 Occeña made a body search on Segundo and Gubato. He retrieved "one (1) heat[-]sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) suspected shabu and one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing marijuana" from Gubato's right pocket. PO2 Yumul marked these items in the
presence of the two (2) accused as "JSI 1" to "JSI 10," where "JSI" stood for "Jaime Segundo y Iglesias."
During cross examination, PO1 Claveron testified that he only knew the names of the accused
during the investigation. He identified Segundo as the person who gave him the alleged shabu after taking
the ₱200.00 buy-bust money. Further, PO1 Claveron admitted that P03 Santos did not give him a receipt
for the bills used as marked money but he photocopied them in their office. He averred that Segundo and
Gubato did not have counsel when they were brought in for investigation. PO2 Yumul attested that he
made the inventory and took the photographs of the pieces of evidence collected. However, he admitted
that the photos were lost and could not be submitted to the prosecutor for inquest. PO1 Occeña averred
that he did not know Segundo prior to their operation and confirmed that "there was no representative of
the media and the Barangay when the markings were placed on the recovered evidence."
On the other hand, the defense presented Segundo, who denied all the accusations against him
and accused the police officers of extortion. Gubato was reportedly at large since November 15, 2005. For
this reason, the defense had no other witness to present. Hence, the case was submitted for decision.
The RTC found Segundo guilty of selling dangerous drugs. In his appeal, Segundo assailed the
broken chain of custody in handling the alleged confiscated shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a broken chain of custody in handling the alleged confiscated shabu.
RULING:
YES. In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish
the following elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The rule on chain of custody plays this role in buy-bust operations, warranting that there are no
doubts on the identity of evidence. "Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence,
not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined
are the same drugs presented in court." This is a pre-condition "for conviction as the drugs are the main
subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for
the crime to exist."
Although the meaning of chain of custody is not explicitly provided for under Republic Act No.
9165, it is defined in Section l(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:
b. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Compliance with the chain of custody is necessary due to the unique nature of narcotics. The
prosecution offered testimonies to establish the identity of the buyer and seller, as well as the
consideration that sustained the alleged deal and how the sale had transpired. It failed, however, to
comply with the chain of custody that would supposedly ensure that the miniscule amount of 0.03 grams
of shabu offered as evidence in court was the one retrieved from Segundo at the time of the operation.
The initial procedural safeguard provided for under Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No.
9165, the then prevailing law. In this case, a perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
reveals that the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 9165 was not complied with "despite [its]
mandatory nature as indicated by the use of 'shall' in the directives of the law."
The varying testimonies on the photographing of the articles direct this Court to a conclusion that
there were really no photos taken during the seizure of the items. Apart from this, nothing in the records
shows that there was "genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives" specified under
the law. Despite having enough time to contact the needed parties after the tip was received, the police
officers merely dispensed with this requirement. To note, it is the prosecution who had the concomitant
part to "establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated" under
the law.
Section 21 sets out "matters that are imperative." Accomplishing acts which seemingly exact
compliance but do not really conform with the pre-conditions provided for under Section 21 are not
enough. "This is especially so when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug
paraphernalia is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case here."
Moreover, a perusal of the Informations against Segundo and Gubato creates doubt whether the
seized items were properly marked. As pointed out by Segundo, both Informations explicitly contained
the markings "JSI-1." Based on the prosecution's narration of the story, the articles allegedly retrieved
from Segundo were different from the ones seized from Gubato. Supposedly, these separate items should
be marked differently to identify which among the articles were seized from Segundo and which ones
were from Gubato.
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. However, the two (2) Informations both
involve an article similarly marked as "JSI 1" that creates confusion. Hence, it casts doubt on whether the
prosecution was able to establish the identity of the alleged seized shabu.
Negligible departures from the procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 would not certainly
absolve the accused from his or her charges. Nonetheless, "when there is gross disregard of the procedural
safeguards prescribed in the substantive law serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the
seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence."
Q: What should the prosecution establish in sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of prohibited drugs?
A: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Q: What is chain of custody?
A: "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v PRICE RICHARDSON CORPORATION
et.al.
G.R. No. 197032, JULY 26, 2017
“The general rule is that the determination of probable cause is an executive function which courts
cannot pass upon. As an exception, courts may interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable
cause only when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion constitutes "a refusal to act
in contemplation of law or a gross disregard of the Constitution, law, or existing jurisprudence,
[accompanied by] a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction."
FACTS:
Respondent Price Richardson Corporation (Price Richardson) is a Philippine corporation, its

primary purpose is "to provide administrative services which includes but is not limited to furnishing all
necessary and incidental clerical, bookkeeping, mailing and billing services. Its former employee,
Michelle S. Avelino, executed a sworn affidavit alleging that Price Richardson was "engaged in boiler
room operations, wherein the company sells non-existent stocks to investors using high pressure sales
tactics."
The Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Price Richardson was neither licensed nor
registered "to engage in the business of buying and selling securities within the Philippines or act as
salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer." The Securities and Exchange Commission
averred that they obtained their investors' confidence by comporting themselves as legitimate stock
brokers. Thus, when they failed to return the investments they received, their act "constituted
misappropriation with abuse of confidence." Petitioner claims that Secretary Gonzalez committed grave
abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to indict respondents.
The incorporators and directors denied knowing or agreeing to the offenses charged. They
countered that they already transferred their respective shares to various individuals in December 2000, as
shown by their registered Deeds of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stock. Velarde-Albert denied the
Securities and Exchange Commission's allegations against her while Resnick did not submit any evidence
refuting the charges.
The respondent argued that the determination of probable cause is an executive function and is
reviewable by courts only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Department of Justice did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for
violation of the Securities Regulation Code. Former employees' sworn statements contained factual
claims that were outside their personal knowledge or conclusions of law that were beyond their capacity
to make.
ISSUES:
Whether courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
RULING:
Courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause only upon a showing of
grave abuse of discretion. It has long been established that the determination of probable cause to charge
a person of a crime is an executive function, which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor and the justice secretary. The court may not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor's
determination of the existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its correctness. It
does not review the determination of probable cause made by the prosecutor. It does not function as the
prosecutor's appellate court. Thus, it is also the public prosecutor who decides "what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause." However, if the public prosecutor erred in its determination of
probable cause, an appeal can be made before the Department of Justice Secretary. Simultaneously, the
accused may move for the suspension of proceedings until resolution of the appeal.
Upon filing of the information before the court, judicial determination of probable cause is
initiated. The court shall make a personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting
evidence. Unlike the executive determination of probable cause, the purpose of judicial determination of
probable cause is "to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused." This
determination is independent of the prosecutor's determination of probable cause and is a function of
courts for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Q: When may courts pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause?
A: Courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion. The court may not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor's determination of the
existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its correctness. It does not review the
determination of probable cause made by the prosecutor. It does not function as the prosecutor's appellate
court. Thus, it is also the public prosecutor who decides "what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause." However, if the public prosecutor erred in its determination of probable cause, an appeal
can be made before the Department of Justice Secretary. Simultaneously, the accused may move for the
suspension of proceedings until resolution of the appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL GO CAOILI ALIAS "BOY TAGALOG"
G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against a person need not be alleged
with the highest degree of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts are alleged with sufficient
clarity that allows the accused to understand what acts he is being made liable for in order to enable him
to make a defense.
Facts:
On July 7, 2006, an Information was filed charging accused Caoili, alias "Boy Tagalog," of
forcefully having sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old daughter. The Information read:
That, on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more
or less, in Purok Masipag, Barangay Matin-ao, Mainit, Surigao del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with full freedom and intelligence, with lewd design, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with one AAA, a minor,
fifteen (15) years of age and the daughter of the herein accused, through force,
threat and intimidation and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in the
amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of R.A. 8353, with the aggravating
circumstance that the accused is the father of the victim and R.A. 7610.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. The trial court found accused guilty of sexual
assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused appealed the trial court's June 17, 2008 Decision finding him guilty of sexual assault.
He argued that since the information charged him of rape by sexual intercourse, he could not be convicted
of sexual assault.
The Court of Appeals found that the accused was guilty of sexual assault. However, sexual
assault was not charged in the Information. Thus, the case was remanded to the trial court in accordance
with Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119.
The accused and People of the Philippines filed their separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against him was violated when he was convicted of rape by sexual assault, notwithstanding that he was
charged for the crime of rape by sexual intercourse.
Justince Leonen’s Dissenting Opinion:
The accused may be convicted of rape by sexual intercourse without violating his due process
rights and his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him as provided in
Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and reproduced in Rule 115, Section 1(b) of our Rules of
Procedure.
The importance and purpose of this rule has been explained by this Court in People v. Quitlong:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against a person need not be
alleged with the highest degree of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts are alleged with sufficient
to make a defense.
The ponencia insists that rape by sexual intercourse and sexual assault are so materially different
and substantially distinct that an accused charged with one (1) mode cannot be convicted of the other
mode without violating the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against a person. Since the accused cannot be convicted of sexual assault, the ponencia
proposes that he instead be convicted of the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under lascivious
conduct under Article III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, which provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium perio
The information substantially charged the accused with forced carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse. It is sufficiently clear to inform the accused what acts he is being made liable for. It is
sufficient to enable him to form a defense.
Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that carnal knowledge without valid consent
constitutes rape:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed- Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidence of lack of valid consent and carnal knowledge is, therefore, already sufficient to convict
an accused of rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The
prosecution already established that the accused inserted his finger in his daughter's vagina. This already
qualifies as carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse.
This Court's refusal to convict the accused of rape by sexual intercourse despite the proper
allegation in the information and the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence is based on this Court's
restrictive definition of sexual intercourse.
Carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse is a broad term that can be subject to several
interpretations. Understandably, albeit without sensitivity to gendered meanings, past decisions even of
this Court reduced this broad term to penile penetration. A more enlightened gender and culturally
sensitive meaning expands this concept especially since rape is now no longer a crime against chastity but
a crime against persons.
Having carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse is a powerful expression of intimacy. It is an act

which requires the shedding of all inhibitions and defenses to allow humans to explore each other in their
most basic nakedness. It is an act that brings out the best in humanity when it is neither required nor
coerced but chosen by the partners. This autonomy that begets choice is what is protected by law. It is that
choice that can complete expression and can define him or her who makes that choice. After all, as social
beings, humans are defined by how they choose to be intimate, with whom, and how deeply.
It is the violation of this choice—this autonomy—that inspires the punishment for rape. Penile
penetration was the traditional way to determine whether sexual intercourse has happened. But it should
no longer be exclusively so. We should increasingly take the point of view of the victim. For her most
fundamental autonomy to choose her intimate partner was violated when her father kissed her, mashed
her breasts, inserted her finger into her vagina, and satisfied his lust for her for 30 minutes. She is as much
a victim of coerced sexual intercourse as any other woman would be if it was the penis that was inserted.
Except that in this case, she is not simply a woman: she is the daughter of the accused.
By maintaining fatuous classifications, this Court fails to recognize that we create, through our
interpretation, a dissonance between the law and the actual scenarios to which they apply. In this case, we
would be saying that this father did not rape his daughter as much as he would have raped another woman
by forcing his penis in her vagina. We would then go back to the feudal concept of protecting the
powerful and graduating his liabilities by traditional but irrational categories. Instead, we should look at
the victim and read the law from her perspective as a human being.
Doing so means that we pronounce that the entirety of what this father did to his daughter was
"sexual intercourse" as charged in the information equivalent to "carnal knowledge" in Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code as amended.
In other words, we square the interpretation of the law with the victim's reality. She was raped by
sexual intercourse.
Hence, sexual intercourse encompasses a wide range of sexual activities not limited to those
involving penetration, genitals, and opposite sexes. Sexual intercourse is a sexual activity that is
participated in by at least two (2) individuals of the same or opposite sex for purposes of attaining erotic
pleasure.45 It may be penetrative or simply stimulative. It may or may not involve persons of opposite
sexes. When forced, sexual intercourse constitutes rape.
This understanding of sexual intercourse would prevent courts from unnecessarily and unjustly
convicting persons of lesser crimes when they are undoubtedly guilty of rape.
Q: Is the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him violated
when he was convicted of rape by sexual assault, notwithstanding that he was charged for the crime of
rape by sexual intercourse?
A: Yes. The accused may be convicted of rape by sexual intercourse without violating his due process
rights and his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him as provided in
Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and reproduced in Rule 115, Section 1(b) of our Rules of
Procedure.
The importance and purpose of this rule has been explained by this Court in People v. Quitlong:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against a person need not be alleged
with the highest degree of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts are alleged with sufficient
to make a defense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE. VS. ABUNDIO M. SARAGENA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition. This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution failed to follow the chain of
custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted on a certain Saragena alias “Tatay” on June 2005, at 7:00pm
and a plastic pocket containing 0.03 gram of dangerous drug was said to be seized thereof. The trial court
convicted the accused Saragena of the crime charged. The CA found that the police officers failed to
comply with the compulsory procedure on the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs under Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165 or the chain of custody rule. Nevertheless, it justified the noncompliance by
applying the exception in the same provision and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused-appellant Abundio Mamolo Saragena is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. (NO)
2. Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of custody
rule.(NO)
RULING:
1. Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant is presumed innocent of the crime
charged. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty; it only requires
moral certainty or the "degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind,"
Thus: Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability after such investigation to let the mind rest ea[sy] upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. The legal presumption
of innocence prevails if the judge's mind cannot rest easy on the certainty that the accused
committed the crime.
2. Courts must subject "the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, the
presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every
circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused." In deliberating the accused's guilt,
courts must exercise "utmost diligence and prudence." More importantly, they must be on their
guard in trying drug cases; otherwise, they risk meting severe penalties to innocent persons. Here,
there is reasonable doubt that the sale of shabu took place. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
penalizes any person who sells a dangerous drug, regardless of quantity. To successfully convict
an accused under this provision, the prosecution must establish the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the item sold, and the consideration given for it.
There must be an actual sale, consummated through delivery and payment. Finally, the
corpus delicti must be presented in court as evidence. Even if there was a sale, the corpus delicti
was not proven as the chain of custody was defective. This case arose from a buy-bust operation.
While a buy-bust operation can indeed enable authorities to uncover illicit transactions otherwise
kept under wraps, this Court has recognized that such an operation poses a significant drawback
—that is, "it is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion." To avert such possibility, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the dangerous drug offered during trial was the same that was bought during the buy-bust
operation.
The chain of custody rule under Republic Act No. 9165 fulfills this rigorous requirement.
Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 01-02, which implements Republic
Act No. 9165, explains chain of custody rule as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. This Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the prosecution failed to follow the chain of custody rule under Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165.
The prosecution's procedural shortcut finds no basis in fact or law. Its failure to comply
with the chain of custody rule is equivalent to its failure to establish the corpus delicti, and
therefore, its failure to prove that the crime was indeed committed. In People v. Dela Cruz: Non-
compliance [with the chain of custody rule] is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of
corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus,
engender the acquittal of an accused. Accused-appellant is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution had the burden of overcoming such
presumption, which it miserably failed to do so.
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted on a certain Saragena alias “Tatay” on June 2005, at 7:00pm and
a plastic pocket containing 0.03 gram of dangerous drug was said to be seized thereof. The trial court
convicted the accused Saragena of the crime charged. The CA found that the police officers failed to
comply with the compulsory procedure on the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs under Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165 or the chain of custody rule. Nevertheless, it justified the noncompliance by
applying the exception in the same provision and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Is the application of the
exception proper?
A: No. The prosecution's procedural shortcut finds no basis in fact or law. Its failure to comply with the
chain of custody rule is equivalent to its failure to establish the corpus delicti, and therefore, its failure to
prove that the crime was indeed committed. In People v. Dela Cruz: Non-compliance [with the chain of
custody rule] is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the
offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of
these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused. Accused-appellant is
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution had the burden
of overcoming such presumption, which it miserably failed to do so.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEGFRED CABELLON CABAÑERO,
Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 207229 September 20, 2017
The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the chain of custody.
Absent this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the
dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself.
Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous drug must be
clearly established. Narcotic substances are highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or
contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very
same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method
of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.
There are four (4) links that should be established by the prosecution to constitute an unbroken chain of
custody: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
FACTS:
A buy bust operation was planned to capture Cabellon in the act of selling drugs. The team was
composed of PO2 Barangan, PO3 Bucao, and PO3 Abellar. The asset poseur-buyer transacted with
Cabellon in an alley, while the police officers observed them from a distance. Once they saw the poseur-
buyer scratch his head, their pre-approved signal, the police officers descended upon Cabellon, who then
ran away upon noticing the approaching officers. A chase ensued, but the police officers caught up with
Cabellon inside the house, whom they thereafter frisked. They recovered the marked bills from him.
After Cabellon's arrest, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu he purchased from
Cabellon to PO3 Bucao. That same date, a sachet marked with "SCC 04/13/06" was turned over to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for examination. The Request for Laboratory Examination
was received by a certain PO1 Domael. P/S Insp. Salinas, a forensic chemist, confirmed executing
Chemistry Report No. D-698-2006. She testified that she had examined a heat-sealed plastic sachet of
white crystalline substance labelled with "SCC 04/13/06." The chemistry report bore the signatures of P/S
Insp. Salinas and P/Supt. Myrna P. Areola. The specimen weighed 0.03 grams and tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Appellant Cabellon was charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not accused-appellant Siegfred Cabellon's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
despite the non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. (NO)
HELD:
No. While the prosecution may have proven that a transaction took place, it was not as
convincing in its presentation of the alleged corpus delicti as evidence.
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous
drug must be clearly established. Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their
composition and nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also
highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs
allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court
as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts
involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.
There are four (4) links that should be established by the prosecution to constitute an unbroken
chain of custody: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
The Court was not convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the shabu
supposedly seized from the accused. PO3 Bucao claimed that the poseur-buyer turned over to him the
sachet purchased from the accused and that he had custody of the sachet until he reached the police
station. Said sachet was then handed to PO3 Abellar, who supposedly prepared the request for the
chemical analysis of the seized item. However, PO3 Bucao failed to identify who placed the markings on
the sachet.
Undeniably, a noticeable gap exists in the chain of custody with the prosecution's failure to
present evidence that the seized sachet was actually marked by any of the three (3) apprehending officers.
The prosecution likewise did not present evidence that the seized sachet was inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused or his representative, a representative from the media or the
Department of Justice, and an elected public official. Neither did it provide an explanation as to why the
police officers did not follow the requirements provided under the law.
PO3 Bucao also testified that he turned over the unmarked seized sachet to PO3 Abellar, who
then prepared the request to the Philippine National Police for chemical analysis. However, a careful
review of the Request for Laboratory Examination shows that not only did it refer to a marked sachet, it
was also signed by P/Superintendent Romeo Pagal Perigo, not PO3 Abellar, who supposedly prepared it.
The prosecution utterly failed to proffer evidence on who placed the markings on the sachet Furthermore,
it also failed to account for the seized sachet's transfer from PO3 Bucao to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination, creating another gap in the chain of custody.
This blatant lack of compliance with the safeguards established in Republic Act No. 9165 is made
even more egregious by the fact that the seized sachet only contained 0.03 grams of shabu, no more than a
grain of rice. The danger of tampering and planting of evidence was, thus, heightened, which should have
put the lower courts on guard and not have so easily relied on the presumption of regularity accorded to
police officers in the performance of their official acts.
Cabellon was ACQUITTED.

Q: What are the 4 Links at should be established by the prosecution to constitute an unbroken chain of
custody?
A:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
YEAR 2018
TEODORO C. TORTONA, RODRIGO C. TORTONA, PEDRO C. TORTONA, ERNESTO C.

TORTONA, AND PATRICIO C. TORTONA, Petitioners, v. JULIAN C. GREGORIO,
FLORENTINO GREGORIO, JR., ISAGANI C. GREGORIO, CELEDONIA G. IGNACIO,
TEODOCIA G. CHAN, LEONILA G. CAAMPUED, CONCORDIA G. MIJARES, ROMEO C.
GREGORIO, EDNA S. TAN, NELIA S. REYES, CECILIA S. FRIEDMAN, LAMBERTO
SUANTE, JULIUS SUANTE, CORAZON YASAY-GREGORIO, DONALDO Y. GREGORIO,
ELMER Y. GREGORIO, AND ROY JOHN Y. GREGORIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018 THIRD DIVISION
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a
wide latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual
circumstances of the case.
Facts:
During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with other siblings 2 parcels of land. The 1 st
was shared in equal 1/10 portions. The said property was located in Longos, Bacoor, Cavite. The 2 nd was
shared in equal 1/5 portions located in Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite.
When Rufina was still alive, she collected her 1/10 and 1/5 share in the income of the 2
properties. After her death, the petitioners continued to collect their mother’s share.
Sometime in 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real property with damages.
They alleged that their cousin, Emilio Casimiro offered them a balato of 50,000 for the sale of the Longos
property with the DPWH. They asked why they were not given a tenth of the proceeds instead. Emilio
allegedly replied that according to respondents, the 2 parcels of land were already sold by Rufina to
Rafaela during their lifetime.
Petitioners verified the sale with the Registry of deeds. It was confirmed that Rafaela’s share to
the Longos property was sold to Rafaela. The same goes for the 1/5 share from the Talaba property. It
also became apparent that Respondents executed a Declaration of Heirship and extrajudicial partition.
Rufina’s shares to the 2 properties were included in the respondents’ shares.
Petitioners allege that their mother was illiterate and that she only affixed her thumb mark and
when she does so, she is assisted by one of her children. They presented documents bearing Rufina’s
thumbmark. They also presented NBI fingerprint examiner Eriberto Gomez, Jr., as witness. He noted that
he compared Rufina’s thumbmark with other standard documents. He concluded that the thumbmark
appearing in the deed of sale was not Rufina’s.
In his 2nd report, Gomez observed that the thumbmarks appearing in the documents presented by
petitioners as evidence were faint, blurred, and lacking the necessary ridges.
The RTC ruled that the deed of absolute sale was a forgery. It found credible Gomez’ 1 st report.
The CA reversed ruling the deed of absolute sale as a notarized document and enjoys the presumption of
regularity. It also emphasized Gomez. 2nd report.
Issue:
1. Whether the authenticity of Rufina’s thumbmark, being a factual issue may be raised in a petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?
2. Whether the Presumption of regularity of enjoyed by the Deed of Absolute sale has been
sufficiently disputed by the Petitioners?
3. Whether an NBI fingerprint examiner is qualified to be an expert witness in the authentication of
a thumbmark?
Held:
1. Yes. The matter of the authenticity of Rufina Casimiro's thumbmarks is a factual issue resting
on the evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45
petitions as, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of exceptions. In
Pascual v. Burgos:
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of
the appellate courts are "final, binding [,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt" when
supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor
disturbed on appeal to this court.
Jr.:
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court involving civil,
labor, tax, or criminal cases.
Several exceptions exist in this case. Most evident is how the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals conflict with those of the Regional Trial Court. More significant than these conflicting
findings, this Court finds the Court of Appeals' appreciation of evidence to be grossly misguided.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, a more circumspect consideration of the evidence sustains the
conclusion that Rufina's purported thumbmarks were false and merely simulated to make it appear that
she had consented to the alleged sale to her sister, Rafaela.
2. Yes. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution.
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity.
The contentious Deed of Absolute Sale in this case is a notarized document. Thus, it benefits
from the presumption of regularity. The burden of proving that thumbmarks affixed on it by an ostensible
party is false and simulated lies on the party assailing its execution. It is then incumbent upon petitioners
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the seller's thumbmarks, as appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale, are forged and are not their mother's.
With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina's apparent thumbmarks on the Deed of
Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks on authentic documents. They demonstrated disparities that
lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks on the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are
forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a disputable presumption, and sought to affirm this
presumption through the self-serving testimony of the notary public, whose very act of notarizing the
Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose credibility was shown to be wanting, and who is
himself potentially liable for notarizing a simulated document. They also endeavored to undermine
petitioners' expert witness by dismissively characterizing him as "just an ordinary employee."
3. Yes. Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may
admit the testimonies of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing "special knowledge, skill,
experience or training":
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a
wide latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual
circumstances of the case:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight
they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight
and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in
favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities
for study or observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which
serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is
to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur.,
1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of an abuse of that discretion.
Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of forged documents, the
expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful. These handwriting experts can help
determine fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the
standard or sample specimen signatures, as well as the movement and manner of execution strokes.
Respondents here assail the qualification of National Bureau of Investigation fingerprint

examiner Gomez, pejoratively branding him as "just an ordinary employee." In support of this dismissive
casting of Gomez, respondents noted that he performed such functions as securing fingerprints from
applicants for National Bureau of Investigation clearances and taking fingerprints of people involved in
crimes.
In this case, the Regional Trial Court's May 31, 2005 Decision detailed the circumstances leading
to the National Bureau of Investigation's examination of the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale,
respondents' incessant attempts at preventing the examination, and how Gomez took the witness stand and
presented his findings. The Regional Trial Court's recollection indicates, most notably, that Gomez was
not handpicked by petitioners. Rather, following petitioners' request, Gomez appeared to have been
designated by the National Bureau of Investigation itself to conduct the examination. Thus, any such
determination of Gomez's expertise was not borne by petitioners' innate preference for him or of their
insistence upon him, but by the National Bureau of Investigation's own confidence in him.
Q: When may the Supreme Court try issue of facts?

A: At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.
Q: What are the rules in disputing public documents?

A: It can be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary: It is true that notarized documents
are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents
enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence
that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
Q: What are the rules on expert testimony?

A: Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may admit the testimonies
of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing "special knowledge, skill, experience or training":
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a wide
latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual
circumstances of the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee vs. JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS,
Accused-appellant,
G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018
Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Facts:
In two (2) separate Informations, both dated July 27, 2003, accused-appellant Que was charged
with violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On July 30, 2003, Que
filed a Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest and Admission to Bail. He pleaded not guilty
to both charges when he was arraigned on June 7, 2004.
PO3 Lim of the Philippine National Police Zamboanga City Mobile Group recounted that in the
morning of July 26, 2003, an informant reported that a person identified as "Joshua," later identified as
Que, was selling shabu. Acting on this report, P/C Insp. Nickson Babul Muksan (P/C Insp. Muksan)
organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. PO3 Lim and the informant then left for
the area of Fort Pilar. There, the informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he
intended to purchase ₱100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed him shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In
turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the marked ₱100.00 bill and gave the pre-arranged signal to have Que
arrested.
After the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from Que. Que was
then brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned over to the
investigator, SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), 9 who then marked these items with his initials. He also
prepared the letter request for laboratory examination of the sachets' contents. Arresting officer SPO1
Jacinto also testified to the same circumstances recounted by PO3 Lim.
P/C Insp. Diestro recounted their office's receipt of a request for laboratory examination of the
contents of two (2) plastic sachets. She noted that these contents tested positive for shabu.
On January 24, 2007, the Regional Trial Court denied Que's plea for bail. Trial on the merits
followed. In lieu of presenting evidence, the prosecution manifested that it was adopting the testimonies
of the witnesses presented in the hearings for bail.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Joshua Que's guilt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
NO. Accused-appellant Joshua Que y Utuanis is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless
he is confined for some other lawful cause.
Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite quantum of proof:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not demand
absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of
establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not merely engendered by abstruse
ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional imperative:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on
the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
accused must be acquitted. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused
must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.
Q: What is proof beyond reasonable doubt?
A: Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, SSGT. EDGARDO L.
OSORIO, PETITIONER, VS. ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C. NAVERA;
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA; ASSOCIATE PROSECUTION
ATTORNEY ETHEL RHEA G. SURIL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANILA;
COLONEL ROBERT M. AREVALO, COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP PHILIPPINE ARMY; COLONEL ROSALIO G.
POMPA, INF (GSC), PA, COMMANDING OFFICER, MP BATALLION, HHSG, PA; AND
CAPTAIN TELESFORO C. BALASABAS, INF PA, AND/OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO
MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF SSGT. EDGARDO L. OSORIO,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 223272, February 21, 2018
A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court.
FACTS:
Together with his superior officer, SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations before
Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines
students Karen E. Empeño and Sherlyn T. Cadapan. Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio
which caused the arrest of the latter by Colonel Yambing. SSgt. Osorio was turned over to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City and was detained in Bulacan
Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City where he is currently detained. Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty,
SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. He mainly argued that
courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case
considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the offense charged was allegedly "service-
connected. “In the alternative, he argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because among his co-accused was
Major General Palparan, a public officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus is SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy?
HELD:
NO. The "great writ of liberty" of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom." Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." The arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued
by the court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal;
hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is already moot and academic. SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to
pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would be a motion to
quash, filed before arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so. Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It
cannot be done in a soldier’s official capacity. If a soldier nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders of
a superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before the civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the
argument that only courts-martial have jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.
Q: Is the remedy of Writ of Habeas Corpus available when a person deprived of Liberty is under the legal
custody of the law?
A: No. A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint has then become legal. Therefore, the
remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
KIM LIONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018
Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the testimony of the witness
incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. "When cross-examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent."
FACTS:
Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank, despite
demand, a total of US$50,955, which was erroneously deposited in his dollar account.
The first prosecution witness, Antonio· Dela Rama, was finally presented as scheduled on June 8,
2006. His direct examination was terminated on January 25, 2007, and the initial date for his cross
examination was set on March 15, 2007. On March 15, 2007, Atty. Danilo appeared as collaborating
counsel of Atty. Jovit Ponon, Liong's counsel of record. Atty. Banares then moved for the resetting of the
hearing to April 19, 2007.
On April 19, 2007, the hearing was again reset on the instance of Liong because Atty. Ponon was
allegedly a fraternity brother of the private prosecutor, Atty. Pacheco. Thus, Liong terminated the services
of Atty. Ponon and the hearing was reset to June 28, 2007. On July 31, 2008, the hearing was again reset
to October 16, 2008 because Dela Rama had suffered a stroke.
On February 5, 2009, Atty. Banares failed to appear in court. Liong subsequently filed a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and, eventually, a Motion to Dismiss. The hearing was reset to May 7, 2009,
which seems to have been cancelled again.
On August 27, 2009, Atty. Banares again failed to appear in court. Thus, private prosecutor
Atty. Ma. Julpha Maningas moved that Liong be declared to have waived his right to cross-examine
Dela Rama. The Motion was granted by the trial court in its August 27, 2009 Order.
Liong, through a new counsel, Atty. Arnold Burigsay, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion
for Reconsideration. Liong argued that his former counsel, Atty. Banares, was grossly negligent in
handling his case as he repeatedly failed to attend hearings, including the August 27, 2009 hearing where
Liong was declared to have waived his right to cross-examine Dela Rama. He did not even file a motion
for reconsideration of the August 27, 2009 Order. According to Liong, Dela Rama was a vital witness,
and to allow his testimony to remain on record without Liong having to cross-examine him would be
extremely damaging to the defense. Thus, Liong prayed that the trial court reconsider its August 27, 2009
Order and grant him another chance to cross-examine Dela Rama.
Liong filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the trial court judge and denied Liong's Petition. It held that what is essential is for an accused to be
granted the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, not to actually cross-
examine them. In other words, when an accused fails to avail himself or herself of this right, he or she is
deemed to have waived it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring as waived petitioner Kim
Liong's right to cross-examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela Rama.
RULING:
No, Presiding Judge Morallos did not gravely abuse his discretion in deeming as waived
petitioner's right to cross-examine prosecution witness Dela Rama.
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court with its lone section is devoted entirely to the rights of the accused
during trial. Rule 115, Section 1 (f) on the right to cross-examine provides:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights: (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at
the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent."
However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It "is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination." When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it,
the accused shall be deemed to have waived this right. The witness' testimony given during direct
examination will remain on record. If this testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation
of the right of confrontation.
No gross negligence is attributable to petitioner's counsel. Ordinary diligence and prudence could
have prevented the cancellation of the hearings. If there is any negligence in this case, it is that of
petitioner himself. For failure to avail himself of the several opportunities given to him, he is deemed to
have waived his right to confront and cross-examine witness Dela Rama.
When the accused abuses its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to
have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of postponements and changes
of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent. Petitioner should have been dissuaded by any of the
lawyers, unless they, too, connived in such an amateurish strategy, which wastes the time and resources
of our judicial system.
Q: What are the rights of the accused during trial?
A: Rule 115, Section 1, paragraph (f), provides,

Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights: (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or
cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify,
given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony
is thereby rendered incompetent."
Q: May the right to cross-examine be waived?
A: Yes. like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It "is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. "
When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused
shall be deemed to have waived this right. The witness' testimony given during direct examination will
remain on record. If this testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation of the right of
confrontation.
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA RACHO TANAKA," Petitioner, v. SEIICHI
TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a
foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in that foreign country
FACTS:
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro
Manila. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted.
She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the
Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated by an authentication officer of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where
she was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the
Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition
of divorce. She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was
refused by the City Registrar since there was no court order recognizing it. On May 19, 2010, she filed a
Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry12 with the Regional Trial Court,
Las Piñas City.
The RTC rendered a Decision,13 finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained
a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not
competent evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself.
Petitioner’s Contention:
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective
upon notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends
that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the
Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that she and her
husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.
Respondent’s Contention:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that a divorce by agreement is not the divorce
contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code. Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be"
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse," OSG posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce
proceedings.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a
divorce between petitioner Racho and respondent Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to
his national law
2. Whether the divorce was valid
RULING:
1. YES. Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are
kept in a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an

Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan,
certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an
official in and for Japan. The Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132,
Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of
divorce between petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of Japan, a divorce by
agreement "becomes effective by notification.” Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly
obtained according to respondent's national law.
2. YES. Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce
proceedings.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in
the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos
from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
The RTC found that there were two (2) kinds of divorce in Japan: Judicial Divorce and Divorce
by Agreement. Petitioner and respondent’s divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement, which is a
valid divorce according to Japan’s national law.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that while petitioner was able to prove that the
national law of Japan allows absolute divorce, she was unable to "point to a specific provision of the
Japan[ese] Civil Code which states that both judicial divorce and divorce by agreement will allow the
spouses to remarry."
The Regional Trial Court duly admitted petitioner’s presentation of respondent’s national law.
Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan as quoted by the Office of the Solicitor General states:
1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if after the death of either husband or wife, the surviving spouse
declares his or her intention to terminate the matrimonial relationship.
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains no other qualifications that
could limit either spouse's capacity to remarry.
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is terminated
by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the
divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie.
Q: How do official records that are kept in a foreign country become admissible in the Philippine Courts?
A: Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in
a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in that foreign country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018
MAIN DECISION (VELASCO JR., J.)

Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen
Suppression of evidence, regardless of its nature, is enough to violate the due process rights of the
accused.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by the FIO I of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Labay for
representing the Farmerbusiness Development Corporation (FDC) in the alleged anomalous utilization of
the PDAF of Rep. Cagas IV. The Ombudsman directed those charged to file their respective counter-
affidavits, but copies of this Order could not be served on petitioner Labay. It appears that the
Ombudsman attempted to serve copies of the September 1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay at his
office at the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and at his last known residence. However, the
copies were returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that office and he was unknown at
the given residential address. As such, the Ombudsman proceeded with the preliminary investigation
without any counter-affidavit or participation from petitioner Labay.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and his co-respondents for
conspiracy in the commission of two counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, one count of
Malversation of Public Funds, and one count of Malversation thru Falsification.
Upon learning from press releases of the Ombudsman about the criminal charges against him,
petitioner Labay, through his daughter, Atty. Labay, attempted to secure information on the cases from
the Central Records of the Ombudsman. Upon being advised to submit a written request, Atty. Labay sent
the Ombudsman a letter dated October 4, 2016 in compliance with the said directive. In response to Atty.
Labay's letter request, the Ombudsman replied to Atty. Labay's request through a letter dated October 10,
2016 and served on her copies of its May 10, 2016 Resolution. In the letter, the Ombudsman directed
Atty. Labay to file a motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution within five days from receipt
thereof.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information
with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents dated November 16, 2016,
praying, among others, that a reinvestigation be conducted on his behalf, asserting that he was not
afforded an opportunity to present his defense and to participate during the preliminary investigation
since he had neither been notified that a complaint had been filed against him nor was furnished a copy of
the same. Petitioner also prayed that he be furnished copies of the complaint-affidavit and other
supporting documents and that he be given time to gather his evidence and submit his answer to the
complaint. However, the Ombudsman denied petitioner Labay's Omnibus Motion, ruling that his right to
due process had not been violated since he had the opportunity to be heard when he filed the Omnibus
Motion.
Aggrieved, petitioner Labay filed another Omnibus Motion essentially reiterating his arguments
in his first omnibus motion, but additionally argued that the filing of the first omnibus motion did not cure
the defects in the Ombudsman's failure to observe due process when it failed to serve on him copies of the
complaint affidavit. The Ombudsman treated this second Omnibus Motion as a second motion for
reconsideration and denied the same for lack of merit in its Order dated February 1, 2017.
Thereafter, on March 24, 2017, the Ombudsman filed four (4) Informations before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Labay and his co-accused. It was only on March 28, 2017 that petitioner
Labay was furnished a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit and its supporting evidence.
Upon receiving copies of the Informations filed by the Ombudsman, petitioner Labay
immediately filed an Extremely Urgent Motion with the Sandiganbayan arguing that he is entitled to a
reinvestigation of the case to prevent injustice against him brought about by the wrongful filing of
charges without affording him his right to a complete preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan,
however, sustained the Ombudsman's position in the assailed Resolution dated July 10, 2017, ruling that
petitioner's right to due process was not violated since he was afforded reasonable opportunity to address
the charges against him when he filed two motions with the Ombudsman.
ISSUE/S: Was there a violation of Petitioner’s right to due process? (YES)
HELD:
Petitioner's constitutional right to due process was violated when he was not furnished a copy of
the complaint affidavit and its attachments during the preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and be formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right. It is a substantive right since
the accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense, and the right to an opportunity to avoid a painful process is a valuable right.
Both under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman and Sec. 3 Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an accused in a criminal case has the right to be informed of the charges against him,
to submit a counter affidavit, and to have access to and examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant. The OSP, however, seeks refuge in paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure which provides that in cases where the respondents cannot be served with the order to file their
counter-affidavit, or having been served but does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.
While the Ombudsman was correct in resolving the complaint based on the evidence presented in
accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, the situation, however,
effectively changed when petitioner made himself available to the Ombudsman when he requested access
to the case records. The Ombudsman had a clear opportunity to furnish petitioner with copies of the
complaint affidavit and its supporting documents. Instead, it merely decided to furnish petitioner with a
copy of its May 10, 2016 Resolution. The Ombudsman should have exercised its duty to inform petitioner
of the charges filed against him by furnishing him copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting
documents. Or at the very least, it should have directed and allowed petitioner to access these records at
its office. This, however, was not done by the Ombudsman.
The Court did not subscribe to the Sandiganbayan's justification that petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to address the charges against him since he was able to file a motion for
reinvestigation with the Ombudsman. By the mere fact that petitioner was not yet even furnished a copy
of the complaint affidavit at the time he received the Ombudsman's May 10, 2016 Resolution, it is clear
that he could not effectively and sufficiently address the allegations against him. Petitioner Labay should
not be blamed for being unable to raise any substantive defense in either the omnibus motions he filed
with the Ombudsman since he had not even seen any of the allegations filed against by the FIO. More
importantly, he could not have been expected to seek appropriate evidence to support his defense when he
was not even given any access to the documents submitted by the FIO in support of its complaint. In fact,
the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process is made even more evident when the
Ombudsman unceremoniously denied his request to be furnished copies of the complaint affidavit and its
supporting documents in the first omnibus motion that he filed, and reiterated in his second omnibus
motion. In both orders denying the two omnibus motions, the Ombudsman seemingly ignored petitioner's
requests and effectively denied petitioner of his right to secure copies of the complaint affidavit.
Suppression of evidence, regardless of its nature, is enough to violate the due process rights of the
accused. In the present case, it was not only the prosecution's evidence which was withheld from
petitioner. In denying petitioner Labay's multiple requests for copies of the complaint affidavit, the
Ombudsman deprived him of his right to sufficiently and reasonably know the charges and accusations
against him. This is a patent violation of his constitutional right to due process.
DISSENTING OPINION (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE/S:
 Due process in a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right but merely a statutory
privilege.
 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
There was no violation of Due Process.
The case should have been elevated to the Court En Banc as it is contrary to the doctrine
established in De Lima v. Reyes, Pemberton v. De Lima, Napoles v. De Lima, and Cambe v. Office of the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process in the preliminary investigation before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Not having been deprived of due process, there is no reason for the Office of the
Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the complaint against him. In any case, the filing of the
Information with the Sandiganbayan already vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction to determine the
existence of probable cause.
The constitutional rights accorded to an accused in a criminal prosecution should not be confused
with the rights accorded to a respondent in a preliminary investigation. Due process in a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right but merely a statutory privilege. A preliminary investigation is
not properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the
accused guilty thereof. The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
constitution. At most, it is statutory. And rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in
preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights
are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law."
While the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner even before he was aware of the
investigation against him, this finding of probable cause was not yet final. There was no information yet
against petitioner filed with any court.
The facts of the case tell us that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated May 10, 2016 finding
probable cause to charge petitioner with conspiracy in the commission of two (2) counts of Violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, one (1) count of Malversation of Public Funds and one (1) count
of Malversation thru Falsification. Petitioner was made aware of this only in October 2016. Upon a letter
request to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman, on October 10. 2016, furnished petitioner with a copy of the
May 10, 2016 Resolution. However, instead of merely furnishing petitioner with a copy of the Resolution
finding probable cause, the Ombudsman allowed petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution within five (5) days from receipt. In other words, the Ombudsman gave petitioner the
opportunity to overturn her finding of probable cause by giving him time to submit his counter-affidavit
and any other controverting evidence he might have. Petitioner was in an even better position than his co-
respondents to refute the charges against him since he would have already been made aware, through the
May 10, 2016 Resolution, of the specific evidence the Ombudsman found to have been convincing
enough to find probable cause. But of taking this opportunity, petitioner instead filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-
Affidavit and Supporting Documents.
The essence of due process is simply an “opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain

one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." Petitioner
was granted an opportunity to be heard. Thus, he was not denied the right to due process.
Q: What is a Preliminary Investigation? What is the nature of the right to a preliminary investigation?
A: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and be formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical
right. It is a substantive right since the accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense, and the right to an opportunity to avoid a
painful process is a valuable right.
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION,
QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 206438, EN BANC, July 31, 2018
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay in the
resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against
the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.
FACTS:
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's (Cagang) Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-
CRM0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457. G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for
Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the Order and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion to Quash Order of Arrest in Criminal Case
Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457. Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to
quash the Informations and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's
alleged inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. The criminal complaint
against petitioner was filed on February 10, 2003. On August 11, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner.
This Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution dated October 18, 2004, which
ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigation against some of the other respondents in the case.
This further fact-finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 2005.
On August 8, 2011, or six years after the recommendation to file informations against petitioner
was approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the
informations for Ombudsman Carpio Morales' review. Informations against petitioner were filed on
November 17, 2011.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of the
preliminary investigation against petitioner.
HELD:
No. Respondent did not commit an inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of the
preliminary investigation against petitioner. There is no showing that the case was attended by malice.
There is no evidence that it was politically motivated. Neither party alleges this fact. Thus, this
Court must analyze the existence and cause of delay. Six years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-
finding of ninety days. The burden of proving the justification of the delay, therefore, is on the
prosecution, or in this case, respondent. Respondent alleged that the delay in the filing of the informations
was justified since it was still determining whether accused Mary Ann Gadian (Gadian) could be utilized
as a state witness and it still had to verify accused Felipe Constantino's death.
The recommendation, however, to utilize Gadian as a state witness was approved by Tanodbayan
Marcelo on December 20, 2004. Felipe Constantino's death was verified by the Sandiganbayan in its
November 14, 2006 Order. There is, thus, delay from November 14, 2006 to August 8, 2011. The
Supreme Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since 2003, petitioner only invoked
his right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations were filed on November 17, 2011.
Unlike in Duterte and Coscolluela, petitioner was aware that the preliminary investigation was
not yet terminated. Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights
during this period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed against him with the
Sandiganbayan.
Furthermore, the case before the Sandiganbayan involves the alleged malversation of millions in
public money. The Sandiganbayan has yet to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioner. In the
Decision dated June 17, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan acquitting petitioner in Crim. Case No. 28331: “We
wish to iterate our observation gathered from the evidence on record that the subject transaction is highly
suspect. There is a seeming acceptance of the use of questionable supporting documents to secure the
release of public funds in the province, and the apparent undue haste in the processing and eventual
withdrawal of such funds. However, obvious as the irregularities may be, which can only lead to distrust
in the ability of public officials to safeguard public funds, we are limited to a review only of the evidence
presented vis-a-vis the charges brought forth before this Court.
Thus, We cannot make any pronouncement in regard to such seeming irregularities.” The records
of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and numerous. As respondent points out,
there were over a hundred individuals investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have
been involved in 81 different anomalous transactions.
The Supreme Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of
cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely, granting the present
Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the
due process rights of the State.
Q: Is delay on the part of the prosecution during preliminary investigation sufficient to dismiss the case?
A: Yes. However, in the case of Cagang vs Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that inordinate delay
was absent notwithstanding the fact that it took six years before the information was filed. The case at
hand involves records and transactions which are complex and numerous. As respondent points out, there
were over a hundred individuals investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been
involved in 81 different anomalous transactions. Thus, mere inordinate delay cannot be deemed malicious
which would warrant the dismissal of the case in the absence of proof.
MELKY CONCHA AND ROMEO MANAGUELOD, PETITIONERS, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT;
G.R. NO. 208114 October 3, 2018
An out-of-court identification such as a police show-up is inadmissible if it is tainted with improper

suggestions by police officers.
FACTS:
On February 15, 2006, in the municipality of Tumauini, Isabela, Philippines the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, armed with assorted firearms, and by means
of force and intimidation, that is by pointing their firearms towards Michael Macutay who was the driver
and in possession of a Honda Wave 100 cc motorcycle owned by one Eugenio Cacho, and at gunpoint,
steal and bring away the said motorcycle bearing Plate No. BI-8085 valued at PhP 44,000.00 against the
will and consent to the said Michael Macutay, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner, in the
aforesaid amount of PhP 44,000.00.

At about 11:00 p.m., as Macutay's group was traversing the road between Lallauanan and
Liwanag, the motorcycle had a flat tire. The group decided to push the motorcycle. While doing so, they
chanced upon a parked white car on the highway. As they got near the car, four (4) armed persons
emerged from it and one of them pointed a gun at Macutay and declared "holdup." The armed men then
took his Seiko watch, t-shirt, and wallet, which contained P400.00 in cash and his license. Macutay and
his group then hid as the armed men took his motorcycle and left the sidecar behind. One of the armed
men drove the motorcycle while the others returned to the white car and left. Subsequently, around 1:00
a.m. or 2:00 a.m. of February 16, 2006, Macutay reported the incident to the Philippine National Police
stationed at Tumauini. Macutay and the police went to the location of the incident. He showed them
where the motorcycle was taken, their positions when it was taken, and the place where he jumped.

On February 20, 2006, the Tumauini police received information from the police station at
Cabagan, Isabela that they had recovered a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number PYT 415.
Tumauini police SPO4 Anapi went to Cabagan to inspect and verify the white car since he had been
previously informed that a white car was missing. Upon arrival, SPO4 Anapi asked permission from
Chief Alobba of the Cabagan Police Station to open the white car. Chief Alobba gave his consent. When
SPO4 Anapi opened the car's trunk, he and Chief Alobba discovered Plate No. BI-8085, the plate of
Cacho's Honda Wave motorcycle. This discovery was also witnessed by a certain PO3 Bautista, a certain
PO1 Albano, a certain Police Officer Paguirigan, and other police officers; and also by Macutay and a
person named Arnold Balabbo.

On February 21, 2006, the Tumauini police proceeded to Macutay's house in Liwanag and asked
him to accompany them to Cabagan Police Station to identify the persons suspected to be responsible for
the crime. At the police station, the police presented to Macutay five (5) persons that they had
apprehended. Macutay pointed to Managuelod, Concha, and Caliguiran as the persons who robbed him.
He claimed that Managuelod was the one who declared "holdup" and drove the motorcycle, while Concha
wore the t-shirt they got from him.

Concha and Managuelod denied involvement in the carnapping as they were both taken and
locked up the police from their work and home. They both claimed that they did not know why they were
locked up as they denied any involvement in any illegal acts.

On November 10, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Joint Decision finding both Concha
and Managuelod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping.

On June 30, 2011, Concha and Managuelod filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and
prayed for the reversal of the Regional Trial Court November 10, 2010 Joint Decision. They argued that
the out-of-court identification was not valid as it was conducted through a police show-up, not a lineup,
since only the four (4) suspects were presented to Macutay for identification.

On January 31, 2013, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision, affirming the Regional Trial
Court November 10, 2010 Joint Decision. It held that, contrary to Concha and Managuelod's allegations,
there was no impermissible suggestion when Macutay positively identified them in the police lineup.
They were identified as the perpetrators since Macutay recognized them as part of the group that aimed a
gun at him and coercively took the Honda Wave motorcycle.

Furthermore, Macutay's identification in open court of the appellants as the carnappers dispels
any doubt as to their proper identification. We are satisfied that Macutay's testimony, by itself, is
sufficient identification of the accused-appellants.

The Court of Appeals did not give merit to Concha's and Managuelod's defense of alibi
considering that they did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that could have
corroborated their claims. Between their uncorroborated alibi and Macutay's positive identification, the
Court of Appeals found the latter more credible.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the out-of-court identification of Melky Concha and Romeo Managuelod is
admissible.
HELD:

The out-of-court identification of petitioners could have been disregarded altogether since it was
not shown that they were assisted by counsel. However, this Court recognizes that the "probative weight
of an in-court identification is largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification. Thus, it is necessary
to determine if the conduct of the latter is above suspicion. People v. Teehankee, Jr. enumerated the ways
on how the police may conduct out-of-court identification and provided guidance on its admissibility,
thus:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption
of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of
constitutional due process.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
At the outset, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the out-of-court
identification conducted by the police was a police lineup. What was conducted was a police show-up,
since only four (4) persons were shown to the prosecution's witness for the purpose of identifying his four
(4) assailants. This was stated by SPO4 Anapi in his testimony and admitted by respondent in its
Comment.

As to whether the out-of-court identification of petitioners satisfied the totality of circumstances
test, this Court finds that it did not. Although there was no significant lapse of time from the day of the
incident up to the day when Macutay identified his supposed assailants, his identification fell short on the
remaining factors.

First, Macutay failed to provide descriptions of his attackers when he reported the incident to the
police. Despite insisting that the place was illuminated at the time of the carnapping and claiming that he
was able to observe his assailants when he hid after jumping from the edge of the road, Macutay did not
describe them as to their height, skin color, clothes, or any distinguishing mark that could have made
them stand out. Without any of these descriptions, any group of four (4) men is susceptible of being
identified as the perpetrators.

Second, Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his degree of attention. His
disorientation was apparent when he gave his watch, wallet, and even his t-shirt to his assailants as soon
as he heard "holdup." He did not even wait for them to tell him what they needed from him.

Third, it was not shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of petitioners. Without any
prior description, the basis of his identification is questionable. It also remains uncertain whether the t-
shirt that petitioner Concha wore during the police show-up was the same t-shirt that Macutay gave to his
assailants, since he failed to describe that piece of clothing in his report before the police.

Finally, the out-of-court identification was tainted with improper suggestion. To reiterate, the
police in Cabagan Police Station showed Macutay only four (4) persons to be identified.

When Macutay, the sole witness, was invited by the police to identify his assailants, his mind was
already conditioned that he would come face-to face with the persons who robbed him. He knew that the
group that attacked him consisted of four (4) persons. Consequently, when he was shown four (4) persons
in the police show-up, it registered to him that they were the perpetrators. With no prior description of his
assailants, it was highly likely that Macutay's identification was tainted with apparent suggestiveness.
Therefore, there was no positive and credible identification made by the prosecution's witness.

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification
by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified person
matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The unbiased
character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.

The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness identification are two (2)-pronged: on one
level, eyewitness identifications are inherently prone to error; on another level, the appreciation by
observers, such as jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers of how an eyewitness identifies supposed
culprits is just as prone to error.

Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, this Court holds that the gross corruption of
Macutay's out-of-court identification through the improper suggestion of police officers affected the
admissibility of his in-court identification.

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not require
absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. It is the degree of proof that appeals to a magistrate's
conscience. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused
need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for
the offense charged.

Q: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out–of–court identification of suspects, courts have

adopted the totality of circumstances test. What are the factors that are considered?
A:

1. The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. The witness’ degree of attention at that time;
3. The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
5. The length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure
YEAR 2019
ELENITA S. BINAY, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 213957-58. August 7, 2019
“This Court will not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause,
unless there is a clear and convincing showing of grave abuse of discretion”
FACTS:
The Commission on Audit records revealed that on March 14, 2001, the City of Makati, through
its General Services Department Head Ernesto A. Aspillaga (Aspillaga) and former Mayor Binay, entered
into a contract with Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies (Apollo). The total amount of the items is
P1,190,850.00. To facilitate the payment of the hospital items, Check No. 06279, covered by
Disbursement Voucher No. 1730, was issued on April 30, 2001. This, however, only covered the amount
of P35,106,910.91.
The audit revealed that there are some anomalies with regards the contract which was awarded
without the benefit of public bidding. Moreover, the manufacturer's invoice for the transaction showed
that the items' actual total cost was merely P2,447,376.14, which was well below P36,431,700.00, the
amount paid to Apollo.
As a result of these findings, the Commission on Audit filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Overall Deputy Ombudsman issued a Resolution 15 finding probable cause to indict 15
officials for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for malversation of public funds
through falsification. No probable cause was found against Mayor Binay, relying on the Arias Doctrine,
stating that the evidence showing that she had relied in good faith on the representations of City Officers,
that the transaction was regular on its face.
Two Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan based on the Ombudsman Resolution..
Former City Administrator Santiago and Former City General Services Head Aspillaga argued that they
could not be held liable for malversation because they were not the funds' custodians. They averred that it
was Mayor Binay who not only was the custodian, but was also the approving authority in their
disbursement.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a Consolidated Resolution recommending the
inclusion of Mayor Binay as an accused for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
resolution contained that, the Arias doctrine cannot be properly invoked by Binay so as to relieve her
from any liability. It claimed that Binay extensively participated in the most decisive parts of the
procurement process and in the eventual disbursement of funds. She cannot feign good faith in claiming
that she merely relied in the representations of Aspillaga and Santiago.
Ombudsman Morales approved the Consolidated Resolution. Subsequently, the

Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan were amended to reflect the recommendation.
Mayor Binay filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied.
Hence, Mayor Binay comes to this Court through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of
Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted without or in excess its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner Mayor Elenita S. Binay
RULING: The Petition lacks merit.
This Court does not find that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it determined the existence of probable cause against petitioner.
Settled is the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. In Alvarez v. People, this Court decreed: The Ombudsman is not
precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke, repeal or
abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office. And Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez teaches
that new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance
for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its
findings and the evidence already submitted.
In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for review.
It matters not that the complainants did not seek a reinvestigation or reconsideration of the dismissal of
the charges against petitioners. Consistent with its independence as protector of the people and as
prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, the Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in
its review by the action or inaction of complainants. On the other hand, it is clear from Section 15 of R.A.
6770 that the Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do not go
unpunished.
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]"
An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the
sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an
accused. This function is executive in nature.
The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into
the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted."
The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.
Q. Can a sitting Ombudsman revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in
office?
A. Settled is the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. In Alvarez v. People, this Court decreed: The Ombudsman is not
precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke, repeal or abrogate the
acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office. And Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez teaches that new matters
or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in
this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already
submitted. In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for
review.
POLICE SUPERINTENDENT HANSEL M. MARANTAN, PETITIONER, v. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, NATIONAL
PROSECUTION SERVICE (REPRESENTED BY PROSECUTOR GENERAL CLARO A.
ARELLANO), AND MEMBERS OF THE PANEL OF PROSECUTORS (SENIOR DEPUTY
STATE PROSECUTOR THEODORE VILLANUEVA, CITY PROSECUTOR VIMAR
BARCELLANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR HAZEL DECENA-VALDEZ,
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR NIVEN CANLAPAN, AND PROSECUTION ATTORNEY
CESAR ANGELO CHAVEZ III), RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 206354, March 13, 2019
Since the DOJ Secretary’s statements did not appear to be based on a prejudice against petitioner, but
were simply reactions to an ongoing investigation that had developed as the investigation proceeded, the
finding of probable cause was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
News outlets reported that on January 6, 2013, a shootout occurred in Atimonan, Quezon between
the combined forces of the Philippine National Police PRO-4A (police personnel) and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines' First Special Forces Battalion (armed forces personnel) on one (1) side, and 13 fully
armed men riding a convoy of vehicles on the other.
Then President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III ordered the NBI to investigate what was called the
Atimonan Encounter. Marantan, together with a number of soldiers represented by their respective
counsel, wrote the head of the National Bureau of Investigation and requested that, upon the
investigation's conclusion, any action against those allegedly responsible for the shooting incident be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the DOJ.
On March 12, 2013, Marantan filed a Letter-Motion, praying that the Department of Justice
inhibit from conducting the preliminary investigation, and instead forward its records to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action. This was denied. Marantan and his co-respondents were directed
through a Subpoena to appear before the Panel on April 8, 2013 for a preliminary investigation hearing.
Thus, on April 8, 2013, Marantan filed this Petition. The Panel then conducted the preliminary
investigation and found probable cause to charge petitioner, along with his co-respondent police officers,
with the crime of multiple murder.
It found that the checkpoint itself was highly suspicious and irregular. Moreover, the physical
evidence did not support the claim that there was a Shootout—it belied the possibility that the victims
fired at the officers from within their vehicles, or that there was a legitimate firefight. The Panel found no
probable cause to charge the armed forces personnel observing that even they were surprised by what the
police personnel had done. Petitioner insists that he has compelling reasons to justify the non-application
of the principles of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies due to respondent
Department of Justice Secretary De Lima's alleged prejudgment of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion during the
HELD:
NO. Petitioner has failed to show that respondent Department of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding probable cause against him.
Petitioner failed to show that she had any ulterior motives or bias against him. Her statements did
not appear to be based on a prejudice against petitioner, but were simply reactions to an ongoing
investigation that had developed as the investigation proceeded.
He broadly claims that the Panel was not an impartial tribunal and, because their superior had
already prejudged petitioner to be guilty, they had no choice but to arrive at the same conclusion and
tailor their resolution fit to find probable cause against petitioner. 56 However, aside from failing to
establish respondent Department of Justice Secretary De Lima's bias against him, petitioner also failed to
show that the Panel's conclusion was wrong, much less tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Panel's conclusions appear to have been well-reasoned evidence-based. It listed the evidence
and circumstances it relied on to conclude that the police personnel had, in conspiracy, killed the victims.
Q: May a prosecutor commit grave abuse of discretion during preliminary investigation?
A: Yes, when ulterior motives were shown by the prosecutors and statements are made based on a
prejudice against the accused. Moreover, when the conclusions do not appear to be evidence-based, the
prosecutor may be held liable for grave abuse of discretion.
MARIA TUPAZ, SHIELA HUBAHIB vs THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR
THE VISAYAS; ATTY. FERNANDO ABELLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS; and MACRINA
ESPINA.
G.R. Nos. 212491-92 March 6, 2019
Public prosecutors must address the different dimensions of complaints raised before them. When
they provide well-reasoned resolutions on one (1) dimension, but overlook palpable indications that
another crime has been committed, they fail to responsibly discharge the functions entrusted to them. This
amounts to an evasion of positive duty, an act of grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
FACTS:
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed the Criminal Complaint for
falsification and violation of Section 3(e) 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed by petitioner
Maria Shiela Hubahib Tupaz against private respondents Atty. Fernando M. Abella, Registrar of Deeds of
Catarman, Northern Samar, and Macrina Espifia, a private individual and the person at whose urging
Abella allegedly acted.
In her Complaint-Affidavit Tupaz stated that her mother, Sol Espina Hubahib was the registered
owner of a property but Atty. Abella canceled the Original Certificate of Title in its stead, issued a new
TCT in favor of Genaro Espina, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Macrina.
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed Tupaz's Complaint for being "premature and
declined to file criminal informations-both for falsification and graft and corrupt practices-against Atty.
Abella and Macrina. It reasoned: Upon scrutiny of the present complaint, it is found that the issue on the
possible criminal liability of the respondents and the administrative liability of respondent ABELLA is
closely intertwined with the issue on ownership of the subject property. It hinges on which party has the
better right over the lot in question.
If the transfer of the title of the property in favor of respondent ESPINA is upheld as valid, the
present charges for falsification and dishonesty, etc. against the respondents would have no leg to stand
on. Hence, the issue presented before this Office cannot be resolved without first touching on the
overarching issue on ownership which is not within our jurisdiction to determine. This matter should be
brought before the proper forum wherein questions regarding the transfer of title can be adjudicated.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas further denied Tupaz's MR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable cause to
charge private respondent Fernando M. Abella, along with private respondent Macrina Espifia, with
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
RULING:
Yes. Probable cause for the filing of an information is "a matter which rests on likelihood rather
than on certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on 'clear and convincing evidence." We likewise
stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term
itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral
certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary
investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
The determination of probable cause is an executive, not a judicial, function. It is generally not
for a court to disturb the conclusion made by a public prosecutor. This is grounded on the basic principle
of separation of powers. However, "grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor's resolution if he
or she arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In such cases, consistent
with the principle of checks and balances among the three (3) branches of government, a writ of certiorari
may be issued to undo the prosecutor's iniquitous determination.
Assessing the evidence before them, public prosecutors are vested "with a wide range of
discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge. As such, "[t]he prosecuting attorney
cannot be compelled to file a particular criminal information. Public prosecutors are not bound to adhere
to a party's apparent determination of the specific crime for which a person shall stand trial. Their
discretion "includes the right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued.
When, however, "there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor in declining to prosecute specific persons for specific offenses, a writ of certiorari may be
issued to set aside the prosecutor's initial determination.
Accordingly, this Court concluded that "certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no
finding at all on respondent’s possible liability for violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019. From the evidence adduced by petitioner, there is basis to maintain a reasonable belief that private
respondent Abella enabled the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title and issuance of new
transfer certificates of title. This was despite manifest and unequivocal deficiencies, most notably in the
owner's duplicate copy, the Certificate Authorizing Registration, and the Deed of Conveyance that had
been presented to him. Private respondent Abella admitted canceling Original Certificate of Title after he
was presented an owner's duplicate that "consists of only two pages which is somewhat defaced.
Q: Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed the Criminal Complaint for falsification
and violation of Section 3(e) 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Atty. Catarman and
Atty. Macrina. He further dismissed petitioner Tupaz's Complaint for being "premature and declined to
file criminal informations-both for falsification and graft and corrupt practices-against Atty. Abella and
Macrina. It reasoned: Upon scrutiny of the present complaint, it is found that the issue on the possible
criminal liability of the respondents and the administrative liability of respondent ABELLA is closely
intertwined with the issue on ownership of the subject property. It hinges on which party has the better
right over the lot in question. What is the basis for the probable cause for the filing of an information?
A: Probable cause for the filing of an information is "a matter which rests on likelihood rather than on
certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on 'clear and convincing evidence." We likewise stress
that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term itself
implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral certainty; it
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary
investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. GAJIR ACUB Y ARAKANI
A.K.A. "ASAW," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 220456, June 10, 2019
To sustain a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that a
transaction took place and the corpus delicti or the illicit drug must be presented into evidence. Although
not easily identifiable, the identity of the illicit drug must be clearly established since its very existence is
essential to convict an accused.

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01003-MIN, affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant Gajir Acub y Arakani a.k.a. "Asaw" (Acub) for violation of Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act.

A confidential informant tipped Senior Police Officer 1 Amado Mirasol (SPO1 Mirasol) of the
Zamboanga City Police Station that a certain Asaw, later identified as Acub, had been selling illegal
drugs at Ayer Village. SPO1 Mirasol informed Chief Police Inspector Ibrahim Jambiran (Chief Inspector
Jambiran) of the tip, and the latter planned a buy-bust operation against Asaw.

Chief Inspector Jambiran directed PO2 Ronald Cordero (PO2 Cordero) to act as the poseur-
buyer, with PO3 Ajuji as back-up. Chief Inspector Jambiran gave PO2 Cordero a P500.00 bill, which the
latter then marked with his initials.

Upon arriving at Ayer Village, PO2 Cordero and the informant walked toward a small alley,
where they then saw Asaw. The informant talked to Asaw and pointed to PO2 Cordero as a buyer. When
Asaw asked for the money, PO2 Cordero gave him the marked P500.00 bill.

As PO2 Cordero grabbed Asaw's arm and introduced himself as a police officer, PO3 Ajuji
rushed to the scene and searched Asaw for weapons and the marked bill. He then informed Asaw of his
constitutional rights in the Tausug dialect, before bringing him to the police station.

At the police station, PO2 Cordero marked the seized sachet with his initials before turning it and
Asaw over to PO3 Arlan Delumpines (PO3 Delumpines).

PO3 Delumpines then marked the sachet with his own initials, prepared a request for laboratory
examination, and delivered the request and the seized sachet to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office. At
about 8:20 p.m., PO1 Joel Bentican received the request with the sachet, and turned them over to Police
Inspector Melvin Ledesma Manuel (Inspector Manuel) at 2:00 a.m. the following day.

Inspector Manuel examined the specimen and found it positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. He summarized his findings in a Chemistry Report.

The Regional Trial Court, found Acub guilty of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Accused-appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with Section 21 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The police officers have not marked, inventoried, and
photographed the sachet of shabu upon seizure and in the presence of the required
representatives. Furthermore, accused-appellant notes that the prosecution failed to offer a justifiable
ground for the officers' noncompliance with Section 21.

ISSUE/S:
Whether accused-appellant Gajir Acub y Arakani's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: No.

To sustain a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that a transaction
took place and the corpus delicti or the illicit drug must be presented into evidence.

Although not easily identifiable, the identity of the illicit drug must be clearly established since
its very existence is essential to convict an accused.

Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640,
provides the manner of custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia. Section 21, as amended, imposes the following requirements when it comes to
custody of drugs or drug paraphernalia prior to the filing of a criminal case:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and
a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and. the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items;

2. Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

3. A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided,
That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame,
a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities
of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a
final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and
certification.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that strict compliance is the expected standard when it
comes to the custody and disposition of seized illegal drugs, to prevent tampering and planting of
evidence.

The law is clear that for the saving clause to apply, the twin requirements must be met: (1) the
noncompliance was justifiable; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved. Not only must the prosecution explain why the requirements were not strictly complied with, it
must also prove during trial the justifiable grounds for noncompliance.
State agents must strictly comply with the legal safeguards established in Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165, as amended, for the custody and disposition of seized illegal drugs, to ensure that the
evidence was not tampered with, substituted, or planted. For the saving clause in Section 21 to apply, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that noncompliance was justified and that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved.
Q: Is the rule on Chain of Custody under Section 21 of RA 9165 absolute?
A: No. A saving clause under Section 21 of RA 9165 provides that that non-compliance with the
requirements under Section 21 under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.

The law is clear that for the saving clause to apply, the twin requirements must be met: (1) the
noncompliance was justifiable; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved. Not only must the prosecution explain why the requirements were not strictly complied with, it
must also prove during trial the justifiable grounds for noncompliance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROLANDO TERNIDA Y
MUNAR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 212626, June 03, 2019
The failure of law enforcers in buy-bust operations to photograph seized drugs in accordance with Article
II, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, combined with the prosecution's failure to address this omission,
raises doubt on the identity of the drugs seized, especially when the amount of dangerous drugs allegedly
taken from the accused is minuscule.
FACTS:
Rolando Ternida was charged with selling 0.0402 gram of shabu, in violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The version of the prosecution is as follows: a confidential informant told the San Fernando City
Police that an illegal drug transaction involving Ternida would take place in five (5) days at Quezon
Avenue, San Fernando City, La Union. Acting on the tip, the San Fernando City Police formed a buy-bust
team and carried out the operation. The officers spotted Ternida along Quezon Avenue. PO2 Annague
approached him, while PO3 Batnag stayed at a distance where he could observe the transaction.
Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague said P1,000.00
worth. Ternida then gave PO2 Annague one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of crystalline substance in
exchange for PO2 Annague's P1,000.00 bill, which had been designated as the buy-bust money. After
securing the sachet, PO2 Annague gave the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Batnag, who immediately
approached and arrested Ternida. A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently prepared. The seized
plastic sachet was then sent to the crime laboratory for forensic examination, where it tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In his defense, Ternida denied that there had been a buy-bust operation. He claimed that he was
about to cross Quezon Avenue on his way to Golden Society Restaurant when three men, whom he later
identified as Inspector Quesada, PO3 Batnag, and PO2 Annague, arrested him. Inspector Quesada held
his neck, while PO3 Batnag and PO2 Annague handcuffed him.
After frisking him, the officers took his cell phone and coin purse containing P150.00. They then
brought him under a tree, where they took photos of him beside the plastic sachet. Afterwards, they
brought him to the police station, where he was detained.
The Regional Trial Court found Ternida guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
On appeal, Ternida argued that the prosecution failed to preserve the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti. He pointed out that the seized item was not marked with the date of seizure, which meant that it
could not be distinguished from other evidence that may have been in the police officer's possession.
Moreover, he claimed that the drugs allegedly seized were not photographed. He asserted that the
prosecution did not give justifiable grounds for the apprehending officers' failure to comply with the chain
of custody requirements under the law. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rolando Ternida is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.
HELD:
NO. To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must not only
prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence. In doing this, the
prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized items to prove with moral certainty the
identity of the dangerous drug seized.
Noncompliance with this legally mandated procedure, upon seizure, raises doubt that what was
submitted for laboratory examination and as evidence in court was seized from an accused.
Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs were
photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused. That no photograph of the seized drugs was
offered in evidence raises questions as to whether the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was
seized from accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. Worse, the prosecution did not even address the
apprehending team's failure to photograph the seized items. In this case, the prosecution has failed to
perform such duty.
Nonetheless, the arresting officers' failure to photograph the seized drugs, to explain this failure,
and to establish that the integrity of the seized drugs was preserved despite the failure, are sufficient to
reverse accused appellant's conviction based on reasonable doubt.
Q: What is the corpus delicti of a violation of R.A. 9165?

A: The dangerous drug seized from the offender.
Q: What is the effect of noncompliance with the rule on chain of custody?

A: Noncompliance with this legally mandated procedure, upon seizure, raises doubt that what was
submitted for laboratory examination and as evidence in court was seized from an accused. It may cause
the dismissal of a case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DIOSCORO COMOSO
TUREMUTSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019
Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items.
Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which
prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the
very claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.
When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21, the second element
of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remains wanting. It follows then, that this non-
compliance justifies an accused's acquittal.
Facts:
The Anti-Drug Special Operation Task Force and Drug Enforcement Action Division planned a
buy-bust operation after receiving information from their civilian asset that a certain "Coro" was selling
illegal drugs in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City. The team prepared four (4)
P100.00 bills, with Serial Nos. KU494857, MB020653, QQ011743, and DD744924.
At around 2:30 p.m., Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and Police Officer 3 Jose
Fernandez (PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation. They parked their motorcycle and
walked about 50 meters to the target area, where the asset told them to wait since their target, later
identified as Comoso, was still playing tong-its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset
waited in front of Comoso's house.
Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing marijuana
in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, removed his hat—the pre-arranged signal
that the transaction had been consummated.
Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the scene and
arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet from the asset, while PO3
Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a lighter.
PO2 Aquino then marked both the plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials "FJA."
As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick and lighter.
He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.
About two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police Superintendent Julita T. De Villa
(Superintendent De Villa), a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Regional Crime
Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the samples of seized items and a letter-request for laboratory
examination. In Chemistry Report No. D-017-05, she found that the specimens tested positive for
marijuana.
Comoso, a fisher residing on Liberty Road, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City, solely
testified in his defense. He alleged that in the afternoon of March 26, 2005, on his way home from
delivering his catch, he was grabbed and frisked by two (2) armed men, whom he figured were police
officers. They first brought Comoso to the airport, then to the police station, where he would be detained.
The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had earned from selling fish.
He denied having sold illegal drugs.
The Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Comoso's appeal and affirmed his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
despite not strictly complying with the requisites for preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti.
Held:
NO. Failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases will result in an
accused's acquittal.
Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." In buy-bust
operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer. The confidential informant here,
despite also acting as the poseur-buyer, was never presented to testify to the transaction. Nonetheless,
PO2 Aquino testifying that he had witnessed the entire transaction suffices to prove the offense's first
element—that the transaction took place absent any irregularity in the performance of law enforcers'
duties. This, however, does not suffice to overcome the presumption of innocence. To do so, the
prosecution must prove the second element of the offense, or the existence of the corpus delicti.
In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution must establish compliance with the
chain of custody requirements.
Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic sachet from
accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that he had also prepared the
Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items to the crime laboratory. However, it
remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the inventory before accused-
appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the items over
to an investigating officer. The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the
forensic chemist, only received the seized items 10 working days after the buy-bust operation. This is
obviously beyond the 24-hour period required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able
to explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic chemist
was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant.
This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering
of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the amount was as little as 0.02
grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may not be the same items allegedly seized by the
buy-bust team from accused-appellant. The doubt that the break created should have been enough to
acquit accused-appellant. Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present
and sign the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned entrapment operation. Moreover,
the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody.
Q: Who has the burden of proof in proving the guilt of the accused?
A: The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden warrants an accused's
acquittal. A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense.
Q: What are the elements in order to secure conviction in the sale of illegal drugs?
A: The prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
Q: What is the chain of custody in the seizure of illegal drugs?
A: It is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 211214. MARCH 20, 2019
For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally observed
by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act.
Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right
to privacy.
FACTS:
Sometime in 2010, Larry Manibog was charged with violation of the Omnibus Election Code
(Gun Ban). During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that police officers arrested Manibog and seized his
firearm for not having a permit from the COMELEC. The issue was later narrowed down to whether an
illegal search and seizure attended Manibog's apprehension and confiscation of his gun.
Chief Inspector Beniat received information from a police asset that Manibog was standing
outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked in his waistband. He
saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour.
He then went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object on his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun.
He disarmed Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster, after which he arrested him for
violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding.
As defense, Manibog did not deny that he was carrying a gun when the police officers arrested
him. However, he claimed that while Chief Inspector Beniat was frisking him, the police officer
whispered an apology, explaining that he had to do it or he would get in trouble with the police provincial
director. Manibog further testified that at the police station, Chief Inspector Beniat asked him to relay his
apologies to Dingras Mayor Marinette Gamboa (Mayor Gamboa) since Manibog had worked closely with
her.
The Regional Trial Court found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals
affirmed said decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search made upon petitioner Larry Sabuco Manibog was unlawful,
and, consequently, whether the gun confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
NO. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried
out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. Any evidence
resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
However, the constitutional proscription only covers unreasonable searches and seizures.
Jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern – based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on
petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather,
what transpired was a stop and frisk search.
Chief Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner, whom he knew as a kagawad and
security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun outside the Municipal Tourism Office during an
election gun ban. With a few other police officers, he went there and spotted petitioner right in front of
the building with a suspicious-looking bulge protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police
officer deduced this to be a firearm based on the object's size and contour. His testimony was
corroborated by P02 Caraballa, who was part of the team that investigated the report on petitioner. The tip
on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object
tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun
ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under
Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers' observation of a
gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to
conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner. Hence, the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of
the warrantless search on petitioner.
Q: When is a stop and frisk search valid?
A: It is valid when the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting
officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act. A warrantless
arrest not based on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LAHMODIN AMERIL Y ABDUL
@ "AMOR/MHONG", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 222192 March 13, 2019
The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its existence must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." When there is doubt on its
identity, conviction cannot be sustained.
FACTS:
A confidential informant came to the National Bureau of Investigation Reaction Arrest Division,
and told the Division Chief, Atty. Ruel Lasala, Jr. (Chief Lasala), that one (1) alias "Amor," later
identified as Ameril, was selling prohibited drugs in Metro Manila. Chief Lasala then instructed Special
Investigator Fernandez to confirm the information. The informant called Ameril and introduced Special
Investigator Fernandez as a prospective buyer. An arrangement was made whereby Fernandez would be
buying Php30,000 worth of shabu from Ameril. In the morning of April 17, 2006, the informant
confirmed to Special Investigator Fernandez that Ameril would deliver the shabu at Solanie Hotel, Leon
Guinto, Malate, Manila, at around 2:00 p.m. that day. Special Investigator Fernandez then prepared the
boodle money consisting of two (2) P500 bills placed on top of cut bond papers. Special Investigator
Fernandez placed his initials on the bills, but forgot where he actually marked them.
Ameril arrived at the hotel, where the informant introduced him to Special Investigator
Fernandez. After a few minutes of conversation, Ameril asked Special Investigator Fernandez if he had
the money, to which Special Investigator Fernandez replied that Ameril should first show the shabu.
Ameril showed him a black paper bag, inside of which were three (3) small transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. Convinced that the sachets contained shabu, Special Investigator
Fernandez gave the boodle money to Ameril. As soon as Ameril gave the paper bag to Special
Investigator Fernandez, the latter made the pre-arranged signal. Special Investigator Fernandez introduced
himself as a National Bureau of Investigation agent, while the other team members rushed to the area.
Special Investigator Saul recovered the boodle money from Ameril.
After the arrest, SI Fernandez marked the three (3) plastic sachets with Ameril's initials: (1)
"LLA-1"; (2) "LLA-2"; and (3) "LLA-3." The marking was made in the presence of Kagawad Analiza E.
Gloria (Kagawad Gloria) and Norman Arcega (Arcega) of media outlet Police Files Tonite. Special
Investigator Fernandez also took photos and inventory of the seized items. Both Gloria and Arcega signed
the inventory. Special Investigator Fernandez submitted the seized items to the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation. Police Senior Inspector Felicisima Francisco (PSI
Francisco) conducted a qualitative examination on the seized items, which tested positive for shabu.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Ameril, ruling that the prosecution had successfully
established his guilt by presenting sufficient evidence that showed the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The RTC, however, noticed that although the Information stated that the three (3)
plastic sachets seized from Ameril were marked: (1) "LAA" containing 4.4112 grams; (2) "LAA-2"
containing 4.4350 grams; and (3) "LAA" containing 3.9727 grams, the evidence presented showed that
the plastic sachets seized from Ameril were actually marked LLA-1, LLA-2, and LLA. Despite this
inconsistency, the Regional Trial Court still convicted Ameril for the second plastic sachet containing
4.4350-grams of shabu on the ground that Ameril was informed that he was accused of selling it. CA
affirmed his conviction. It ruled that the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not in any way
broken; that even if there was a variance in the marking of the seized illegal drugs, the Court of Appeals
ruled that Ameril was still substantially apprised of the crime charged against him.
Appellant’s Contention: Ameril argues that the inconsistencies in the markings of the seized illegal
drugs "compromised the integrity of the seized items."
Appellee’s Contention: Conviction should be sustained.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Ameril’s conviction was proper considering the inconsistencies in the evidence
presented against him. (NO)
HELD:
No. In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, "the following elements must
first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."
The Information filed against accused-appellant provided that he was caught selling three (3)
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance known as shabu, marked "LAA," "LAA-
2," and "LAA." However, the evidence presented during trial showed that accused-appellant sold three (3)
plastic sachets with the markings "LLA-1," "LLA-2," and "LLA." Nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court
brushed aside this discrepancy and still convicted the accused-appellant.
Contrary to the Regional Trial Court's findings, the integrity of the seized illegal drugs was not
preserved. The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its existence must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be
observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." When there is doubt on its
identity, conviction cannot be sustained. In People v. Garcia, this Court acquitted the accused. It held that
the discrepancy in the markings of the seized items raised doubts if the items presented in court were the
same ones taken from the accused upon arrest. Here, like in Garcia, there is a discrepancy in the markings
of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellant. This raises doubts if the items presented in court were
the exact ones taken from accused-appellant. That the integrity of the corpus delicti had been
compromised was further magnified by the gap in the chain of custody. Special Investigator Fernandez
merely testified that he submitted the seized illegal drugs to the Forensic Chemistry Division for
examination and safekeeping. He did not identify the person to whom he gave the seized illegal drugs
upon delivery.
The seized illegal drugs were referred to using three (3) sets of markings. The Regional Trial
Court, having evaluated the evidence presented firsthand, should have been more cautious in convicting
accused-appellant despite the obvious discrepancy in the markings of the seized drugs and procedural
lapses committed by the arresting officers in handling the same. The glaring inconsistency in the
markings of the seized illegal drugs should have warned the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
something was amiss.
Ameril was ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Q: In a case involving a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act where there are inconsistencies in the
details in the Information and the markings on the actual evidence presented before the court, is the
judgment of conviction proper?
A: No, because the integrity of the seized illegal drugs was not preserved. The illegal drug itself
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its existence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof
beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus
delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed." When there is doubt on its identity, conviction cannot be
sustained. A discrepancy in the markings of the illegal drugs seized from accused raises doubts if the
items presented in court were the exact ones taken from accused.
(People v Ameril, G.R. No. 222192, March 13, 2019)
AUGUSTO REGALADO Y LAYLAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G. R. No. 216632, March 13, 2019
What sustains petitioner's conviction is his damning admission in open court despite the lapses of the law
enforcers to follow the chain of custody rule.
FACTS:
On December 17, 2002, a team of five (5) police officers led by SPO2 Peñascosas conducted a
buy-bust operation. At around 2:00 p.m. that day, PO1 Pedrigal went to Regalado's house. PO1 Pedrigal
asked Regalado's wife, Marilyn, "Meron kayo ngayon, bibili ako?” Marilyn informed him that her
husband was not in the house and that she would ask her daughter to fetch him. When Regalado arrived,
Regalado then asked PO1 Pedrigal the quantity he sought to buy. Regalado went into his house, returning
with a plastic sachet suspected to contain marijuana, which he then exchanged with PO1 Pedrigal's
marked bills. Regalado took the money and put it in his pocket. At this point, PO1 Pedrigal scratched his
head—the pre-arranged signal signifying to the team that the transaction had been consummated. The rest
of the team rushed to Regalado's house and arrested Regalado.
Upon the arrest, PO1 Pedrigal asked Regalado, "Meron pa itong kasamahan?" to which Regalado
admitted having more, pointing to the roof of his house. He turned over to PO1 Pedrigal a milk box that
allegedly had two (2) plastic sachets and four (4) sticks of marijuana. PO1 Pedrigal kept all the
confiscated pieces of evidence.
After the arrest, they brought Regalado to the police station. At the police station, PO1 Pedrigal
marked with initials "AR" the three (3) plastic sachets and four (4) sticks of suspected marijuana. He later
turned them over, along with the marked money, to the investigator, PO2 Llante. PO2 Llante then brought
the seized evidence to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to have them tested for the
presence of illegal drugs. The forensic chemist confirmed upon a laboratory examination that the
confiscated items were indeed marijuana.
In his defense, Regalado alleged that he was ploughing the field in his farm when his son, Alvin,
told him to come home. There, he was met by a teenager who want to purchase marijuana. As soon as
Regalado gave the teenager marijuana, he stated that five (5) police officers arrived and arrested him.
PO1 Pedrigal recovered from him the alleged marked money, which the teenager had handed him. When
asked about the rest of his stash, Regalado immediately divulged its hiding place and surrendered the
marijuana "because he was scared." Regalado denied handing the marijuana to PO1 Pedrigal and
maintained that the latter took it from the teenager. He claimed that he signed the confiscation receipt
despite not understanding it as he did not know how to read.
Regalado argued that the trial court erred when it appreciated the evidence despite the
apprehending team's failure to prove the integrity and identity of the seized items. He maintains that there
was no elected official, media representative, or Department of Justice representative present during the
physical inventory of the seized items. Moreover, no photographs of the seized items were presented in
court. Petitioner further claims that the seized items were not immediately marked after his arrest, casting
doubt on their origin. He insists that there was no sufficient evidence to establish the chain of custody.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a
representative from the Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation, as well as the non-
presentation of the photographs of the seized marijuana before the trial court warrants petitioner Augusto
L. Regalado's acquittal.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled laments the prosecution's apparent nonchalance in observing the
procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical
inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done.
As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether
the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and
photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of
warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.
As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21(1) required the presence of all of the
following, in addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel": First, a representative from the media OR; Second, a
representative from the Department of Justice; AND Third, any elected public official.
Here, none of the three (3) people required by Section 21(1), as originally worded was present
during the physical inventory of the seized items. Yet, not only did the prosecution fail to establish that
earnest efforts were employed in securing the presence of the three (3) witnesses; it did not even bother to
offer any justification for the law enforcers' deviation from the law's requirements.
Nevertheless, what sustains petitioner's conviction is his damning admission in open court that
the police officers had found the three (3) plastic sachets and four (4) sticks of marijuana in his possession
during his arrest on December 17, 2002. He admitted telling the law enforcers where he had hidden the
rest of the marijuana because he was scared. Ultimately, petitioner's free and conscious possession of the
dangerous drug has been established, warranting his conviction.
Q: WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF

CONFISCATED, SEIZED, AND/OR SURRENDERED DRUGS AND/OR PARAPHERNALIA?
A: There are 2 procedures to be followed: First, Physical Inventory and Second, Photographing. As to
when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the
seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and
photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of
warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs- LINA ACHIENG NOAH,
G.R. No. 228880, March 6, 2019
Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized items at each
stage, from seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
Facts:
On April 16, 2012, an Information was filed charging Noah with violation of Article II, Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9165 for transporting and bringing to the Philippines a total of 5,941.9 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Noah pleaded not guilty. Customs Examiner Marius Landicho testified that at NAIA, Noah, a
Kenyan national who arrived and she was asked by Landicho to open her luggage and upon inspection, it
revealed seven (7) rectangular packages, wrapped in vacuum-sealed aluminum foil, on which Landicho
affixed his initials and signature.
Landicho then prepared an Inventory Report, in the presence of required officers and then turned
over it to PDEA. Special Agent I Alejandro R. Noble corroborated the testimony of Landicho.
Upon testing samples, the white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Special Agent I Noble added that before Noah's arrest, he asked her if she could
understand English. When she said yes, he apprised her of her Miranda rights.
Agent Adrian Fajardo PDEA, testified that he brought the seized items to Forensic Chemist
Ariane Arcos for proper documentation and laboratory examinations. The test results showed that the
seized items contained shabu, with a confirmatory test yielding the same outcome. In her defense, Noah
denied transporting the illegal drugs. Accused stresses that the chain of custody in handling the evidence
against her had gaps, which raise serious doubts on the authenticity of the seized shabu. She argues that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the packages recovered from her were not preserved. While
Landicho testified to marking the seized items, she points out that the records show that the marking was
neither immediately made upon seizure nor was it made in her presence.
RTC found Noah guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The trial court ruled that
the presumption of regularity of duty on the airline personnel's placing of the bag tags at the airport of
origin established that Noah was the real owner of the luggage. It ruled that there was compliance with
Article II, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The CA affirmed Noah's conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the drug seized from
accused-appellant.
Ruling:
Yes. To sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs, the
transportation and the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This is because the confiscated drug is the corpus delicti of the crime. Since it is not readily identifiable
by sight or touch and may be easily tampered with, its preservation is paramount. The chain of custody
ensures that there would be no unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence. Chain of
custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized items at each stage, from
seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
The chain of custody was also established by the prosecution. The four links of chain of custody
of evidence were proven: (1) Landicho seized and marked the shabu obtained from accused-appellant; (2)
he turned them over to Agent Fajardo; (3) Agent Fajardo delivered them to Forensic Chemist Arcos; and (
4) from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the drugs were presented in court. The Court of
Appeals summarized the sequence of events showing that the shabu seized from accused-appellant was
the very same shabu tested and later identified in court. This Court is convinced that the apprehending
officers have complied with the requirements under Section 21. Based on the records, there was an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized shabu from the time of its discovery up to its presentation in
court.
The prosecution established that in the exclusion room, Landicho continued inspecting the
luggage before airport officers, government agents, and accused-appellant herself. There were even
pictures showing that accused-appellant was present during the field test, marking, and inventory of the
seized items. Contrary to accused-appellant's claim, Landicho properly marked the seized shabu. Both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court found that the Inventory Report had confirmed that members of the
Customs Task Force, Anti-Narcotics Group, Fabroa, Barangay Councilor Bajada, and Prosecutor Rillera
witnessed the marking and inventory proceedings. The testimonies of Landicho, Special Agent I Noble,
and Agent Fajardo corroborated the contents of the Inventory Report. Against all these, accused-appellant
cannot possibly claim the opposite.
Clearly, there were no lapses in the disposition and handling of the seized shabu to even prompt
the relaxation of the procedure under Section 21. The prosecution complied with the standard in handling
the evidence and in establishing the chain of custody. Indeed, it proved beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant is guilty of illegally transporting 5,941.9 grams of shabu as penalized under Section 5
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Q. What is the four links of chain of custody? Explain.
A. The following are the four links of chain of custody:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDGARDO ROYOL
G.R. NO. 224297. FEBRUARY 13, 2019
Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 ensures the integrity of the
seized items, it follows that noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti. Furthermore, noncompliance with Section 21 means that critical elements of the offense of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs remain wanting. Such noncompliance justifies an accused's acquittal.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edgardo A. Royol (Royol), a garbage collector, was charged with violating
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
According to the prosecution, at around 9:00 a.m. on November 27, 2007, a confidential
informant went to the Tarlac Provincial Police Office in Camp Makabulos, Tarlac City and reported that
Royol had been selling illegal drugs in Barangay Lourdes, Bamban, Tarlac. The informant allegedly told
P02 Baquiran that he was due to meet Royol that morning.
A buy-bust team was formed. P02 Baquiran was provided with two (2) marked P500.00 bills. The
buy-bust team proceeded to the bridge in Barangay Lourdes, the informant's supposed meeting place with
Royol. Royol arrived some 20 minutes after P02 Baquiran positioned himself in the area. Upon meeting
Royol, P02 Baquiran showed him the two marked P500.00 bills and told him that he intended to purchase
half a kilogram of marijuana. Royol exchanged half a brick of marijuana with P02 Baquiran 's marked
bills.
RTC found Royol guilty as charged.

CA likewise affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
Contention of the Petitioner:

Upon seeing PO2 Baquiran make the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team rushed
to arrest Royol. Royol gave chase but was shortly apprehended by Inspector Silva and PO2 Soriano. He
was then brought to the Tarlac Provincial Police Office, where the brick of marijuana was supposedly
marked. PO2 Baquiran then personally brought the marijuana to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office, where, upon examination by Police Inspector Jebie C. Timario, it tested positive for marijuana.
Contention of the Respondent:

Royol testified in his defense. He recalled that in the morning of November 27, 2007, while collecting
garbage, two (2) men approached him asking if he knew a certain Edgardo Saguisag (Saguisag). They left
him after he said that he did not know the man. A few minutes later, the men returned with two (2)
teenagers who pointed to him as Saguisag. The men then ordered him to raise his hands. He was
handcuffed and made to lie face on the floor. He asked the men why they handcuffed him, but they did
not reply. Instead, they searched his pockets, found P140.00, and took it. They then compelled him to
board a red car and brought him to Makabulos. He was also shown marijuana and asked if it was his, to
which he answered in the negative.
ISSUE:
W/N the prosecution established Royol 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
HELD:
No. Royol must be acquitted.
The case of People v. Holgado explained that compliance with the chain of custody requirements
protects the integrity of the confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in
four aspects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the
substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly
causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to
have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities
for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.
Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 ensures the integrity
of the seized items, it follows that noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of the
corpus delicti. Furthermore, noncompliance with Section 21 means that critical elements of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs remain wanting. Such noncompliance justifies an accused's acquittal.
Here, the case against accused-appellant is woefully lacking in satisfying these requirements.
There is no semblance of compliance with Section 21(1). All the prosecution has to support its assertions
on the integrity of the marijuana that was allegedly obtained from accused-appellant is its bare claim that
it was marked at the Tarlac Provincial Police Office. Neither P02 Baquiran nor Inspector Silva testified
on the conduct of a proper inventory and photographing. The prosecution's claims are sorely lacking in
accounting how the marijuana was actually marked, including the safety measures undertaken by police
officers. Worse, the prosecution failed to account for the presence of even just one of the persons required
by Section 21(1) to be present during the inventory and photographing.
The prosecution did not even maintain that accused-appellant, himself, was present.
Jurisprudence has been definite on the consequence of noncompliance. This Court has categorically stated
that noncompliance negates whatever presumption there is on the regularity of the manner by which
officers gained and maintained custody of the seized items. Thus, failing compliance with the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, acquittal of Royol must ensue.
Question: Accused-appellant Edgardo A. Royol (Royol), a garbage collector, was charged with violating
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. According
to the prosecution, at around 9:00 a.m. on November 27, 2007, a confidential informant went to the
Tarlac Provincial Police Office in Camp Makabulos, Tarlac City and reported that Royol had been selling
illegal drugs in Barangay Lourdes, Bamban, Tarlac. The informant allegedly told P02 Baquiran that he
was due to meet Royol that morning.
A buy-bust team was formed. P02 Baquiran was provided with two (2) marked P500.00 bills. The buy-
bust team proceeded to the bridge in Barangay Lourdes, the informant's supposed meeting place with
Royol. Royol arrived some 20 minutes after P02 Baquiran positioned himself in the area. Upon meeting
Royol, P02 Baquiran showed him the two marked P500.00 bills and told him that he intended to purchase
half a kilogram of marijuana. Royol exchanged half a brick of marijuana with P02 Baquiran 's marked
bills. Upon seeing P02 Baquiran make the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team
rushed to arrest Royol. Royol gave chase but was shortly apprehended by Inspector Silva and P02
Soriano. He was then brought to the Tarlac Provincial Police Office, where the brick of marijuana was
supposedly marked. P02 Baquiran then personally brought the marijuana to the Tarlac Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office, where, upon examination by Police Inspector Jebie C. Timario, it tested positive for
marijuana.
Did the prosecution established Royol 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Answer: No. Royol must be acquitted.
Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 ensures the integrity of the
seized items, it follows that noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti. Furthermore, noncompliance with Section 21 means that critical elements of the offense of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs remain wanting. Such noncompliance justifies an accused's acquittal.
SIMEON LAPI Y MAHIPUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. 210731, February 13, 2019
The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel, fails to
object to its validity before arraignment. Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of
irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived
such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea
during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before
his arraignment.
FACTS:
Petitioner, with Allen Sacare and Kenneth Lim were charged with the violation of Article II,
Section 15 of the Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
At pre-trial, Sacare and Lim changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentenced to rehabilitation for six
months at a government-recognized center. Only Lapi was subjected to trial on the merits. The Regional
Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was caught
in flagrant delicto. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. Hence, this case.
Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering his plea,
his warrantless arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be used against him.
He argues that PO2 Villeran committed "a malevolent intrusion of privacy" when he peeped through the
window; had he not done so, he would not see what the people in the house did. He contends that this
intrusion into his privacy "cannot be equated in plain view[;] therefore[,] petitioner cannot be considered
caught in flagrante delicto." He submits that to "rule otherwise would be like giving authority to every
police officer to intrude into the private homes of anyone in order to catch suspended drug offenders.
Respondent, on the other hand, counters that petitioner prays for a review of the facts and
evidence, which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. It asserts that the warrantless
arrest was valid, as "[t]he act of having a pot session is clearly the overt act required under the law, which
indicates that petitioner is actually committing an offense." It argues that what prompted PO2 Villeran to
enter the house was not the noise from one (1) of the houses, but what he saw petitioner and his
companions were doing in the house where they were apprehended.
Further, respondent claims that since petitioner was not the owner of that house, he had no
"reasonable expectation of privacy that must be upheld."It submits that "[a] houseguest who was merely
present in the house with the consent of the householder cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his host's home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner validly waived his right to question the warrantless arrest by his
failure to question it during arraignment.
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the
accused, assisted by counsel, fails to object to its validity before arraignment. For a warrantless arrest to
be valid, the arrest must have been committed under the following circumstances mentioned in Rule 113.
In this case, petitioner was seen by police officers participating in a “pot session”. Also, petitioner
admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He did not move to quash
the information against him before entering his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea. Otherwise. The objection is
deemed waived.
The court further ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest
if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before arraignment. And since the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in
the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he
actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his
appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively
participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.
It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information has
been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered
against him.
Accused-appellant was not even denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, because
of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and
counsel assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.
Q: Can the failure to question the warrantless arrest during arraignment be considered as a waiver of the
accused of his right to question such warrantless arrest?
A: Yes. An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused
may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

J. Leonen Cases in Remedial Law

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Can the failure to question the warrantless arrest during arraignment be considered as a waiver of the accused of his right to question such warrantless arrest?

Can the failure to question the warrantless arrest during arraignment be considered as a waiver of the accused of his right to question such warrantless arrest?

What are the circumstances mentioned in Rule 113 for a warrantless arrest to be valid?

What are the circumstances mentioned in Rule 113 for a warrantless arrest to be valid?

REMEDIAL LAW CASES PENNED BY:

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.

G.R. No. 204700, Third Division, April 10, 2013

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

G.R. No. 171428 November 11, 2013

No, the petition is a petition for review under Rule 45.

Contrary to respondent’s imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

G.R. No. 171496. MARCH 3, 2014

An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

G.R. No. 193494. March 12, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014

On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meterparcel of land located in

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: What are Shariah District Courts?

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: What is a petition for relief from judgmemt?

G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: Is the right to appeal a statutory right?

G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: What is the time for filing a petition for relief? Is it jurisdictional?

G.R. NO. 197530, July 9, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: What are the requisites of litis pendentia?

A: The elements are:

Q: When is forum shopping committed?

G.R. No. 196251, July 09, 2014

As to the balance of P14,080,490.00, Olivarez Realty Corporation agreed to pay in 30 equal

Whether the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment.

Olivarez Realty Corporation's obligation to pay disturbance compensation is a pure obligation.

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: Distinguish Summary Judgment from Judgment on the Pleadings.

G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014

a. There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;

Q: What is forum shopping? When can it be resorted to?

G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014

QUESTION AND ASWER:

Q: What is a petition for mandamus?

Q: When is an act ministerial?

Q: When is an act discretionary?

Q: What kind of act is required for mandamus to lie?

G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

Q: When can the remedy under Rule 47 be availed of?

G.R. No. 205249 October 15, 2014

QUESTION AND ANSWER:

A: The three requisites are:

PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. CELSO E.

G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015

Q: What is the proper mode of appeal in labor cases?