ISSN: 0974-5823 Vol. 6 (Special Issue, Nov.-Dec.

2021)
International Journal of Mechanical Engineering

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY WITH

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF
PROPANE YARD
Muthukumar K1, Sabarikanth KK2*,
1
Professor, Industrial Safety Engineering, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Bannari Amman Institute of Technology,
Sathyamangalam, Erode District, India
2
PG Scholar, Industrial Safety Engineering, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Bannari Amman Institute of Technology,
Sathyamangalam, Erode District, India

Abstract
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is one of the safety management techniques and it is a qualitative study, quantitative risk
assessment (QRA) is the risk identification technique in the form of quantitative. In this study, the propane yard which is located
in TVS motor company is taken and studied. HAZOP study is to check the design, decide what is the safety equipment needed;
check running instructions, to improve the safety of existing facilities. The study is done by dividing the system into various nodes
and each node is analyzed with deviations, causes, and consequences of failure, and recommendations are given if needed to
improve the system. In case of accidental release of propane gas, there may be the chance for effects like Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), jet fire, and pool fire as propane is high flammable liquid gas this study helps to prevent
this kind of effects. QRA analysis is done with a probability of occurrence, the severity of consequences, and risk assessment for
identifying the most risk that has taken place in the propane yard. Propane is used for the paint shop, decoding, cooking, and
boilers and it is the heart of TVSM. Based on the findings, several preventative and mitigating actions have been implemented to
lessen the severity of the consequences of accidents, therefore improving the safe environment.
Keywords: Probability, severity, HAZOP, QRA, recommendation, investigated.

1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most thorough and rational qualitative hazard detection approaches is the HAZOP research. However, it necessitates
the use of multidisciplinary words and is a time-consuming and repetitive effort. [1] If in the design of the machine, a systematic
research approach that considers the operator's safety is proposed, it may add to the safety of the process plant if it is developed via
the follow-up investigations. [2] The incidence of accidents due to leakage, fire, explosion, and other causes has grown as the use
and complexity of natural gas pipelines have increased. they proposed a QRA simulation model for natural gas pipeline, combined
with a different level grid-based pre-warning model, based on (QRA) As a consequence, they may implement a targeted and firm
strategy in places where there are some possible flaws ahead of time, and even resurrect urban planning, reconstructing it to
eliminate the danger. [3] Hazard and Operability Study were used to identify the possibility of unintended mishaps in the oil
storage farm (HAZOP). Second, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was used to examine all of the detected dangers and successfully
identify the fundamental events (BES) that cause them. [4] Natural Gas must be in a liquid form for transportation, and liquefying
it necessitates lowering the temperature to a very less. This necessitates extreme temperatures and pressures. This article says a
risk assessment research on a Node in the Natural Gas Plant, which is a propane heat exchanging unit that progressively lowers the
temperature of the flow to remove heavy liquids at the start. HAZOP, DMRA, and LOPA are three risk assessment methodologies
that are used. [5] The dangers in a double-shell stainless-steel tank for high-level radioactive liquid waste storage were identified
using a hazard and operability (HAZOP) technique, and a risk matrix was utilized to estimate the risks caused by the hazard.
Relevant process parameters and guidewords were chosen to define the storage tank deviation, and the causes and likely
implications of deviations, as well as current protective mechanisms, were assessed during the HAZOP process. [6] This
information, when combined with the plant's operational, technical, and theoretical knowledge, permitted for the evaluation of
deviations for operational factors such as temperature, pressure, and level, among others, in identifying potential hazards
associated scenarios during anhydrous ammonia storage. To decrease or avoid accidents that hurt people, the ecosystem, or the
firm, suggestions were suggested based on the HAZOP study. The qualitative aberrations and variables that demand constant
monitoring and control for safe anhydrous ammonia storage are the subject of this study case. [7] The petroleum and chemical
industry is a tool for discovering safety hazards in existing facilities as well as those under development or construction. The risk
assessment approach used in this study was designed to underline the significance of safety when pipetting from the a tanker truck
to an underground tanks or from an underground tank to barrel filling equipment. Xylene is very flammable and may cause a
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion, often known as a (BLEVE). We utilised the risk analysis (HAZOP) technique to

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International Journal of Mechanical Engineering
974
identify the relevant probable hazards and apply the appropriate controls to reduce or eliminate the possibility of fire or explosion
during this explosion since it might result in death or major property damagethe decanting of toluene storage to dispatch. [8]
The study offers better value for money than the daily list approach inside the art of identifying risks, and can also be used for (a)
future developments and (b) as just a support document for trying to prepare a 'Safety Case' for experienced a significant events as
well as establishing fault/event trees for the further frequency analysis. [9] According to the report, the industry's reactor and
storage units are particularly prone to accidents and require complex safety measures. [10]
2. METHODOLOGY
It is the step by step process, from selecting the node and analyzing the node with help of parameters and guide words and
identifying the deviation which helps us to provide the action that can reduce the hazards
QRA study is done with help of probability, severity, and risk matrix with this we can identify most risks and we can reduce the
risk according to risk priority. And this is shown in the tables below.
Table1. QRA probability
P PROBABILITY OF MEANING
OCCURRANCE
1 <0.0001 VERY LESS
2 0.001-0.0001 LESS
3 0.01-0.001 MEDIUM
4 0.1-0.01 HIGH
5 >0.1 VERY HIGH

Table2. Severity
S LOSS (INR) HARMS
1 <83,960 NO HARMS
2 83,960 - 8,39,600 MINOR HARMS
3 8,39,600 – 83,96,000 SERIOUS HARMS
4 83,96,000 – 8,39,60,000 1 DEATH
5 >8,39,60,000 >1 DEATH
Table3. Risk assessment
RISK R= P X S
1–3 NON HAZARDOUS
3–7 LOW HAZARDOUS
8 – 25 HAZARDOUS

Figure1. Risk matrix

3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Liquefied propane from the road truck is unloaded in the mounded storage bullet. The liquid propane is unloaded using a liquid
transfer pump and the vapor propane is unloaded using the compressor. Provision to unload liquid propane by pressurizing the
road truck using vapor sucked from the compressor is also available for unloading propane from road truck to mounded bullet.
Liquid propane is stored in the mounded bullet and two number of bullets are provided. The vaporizer is installed to increase the
temperature and thereby increase the pressure of propane vapor. The liquid outlet valve on the bottom of the tank is opened and
the liquid is passed through a pressure regulating station and can be ultimately used in the system. Two types of vaporizers are
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International Journal of Mechanical Engineering
975
used to generate propane electrical heater vaporizer and heater less vaporizer. Then the vapor is transferred to the user end with the
help of pipelines. A simplified P and I diagram are shown in figure 3.

.
Figure2. Flow chart for process

Figure4. Simplified P and I diagram

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International Journal of Mechanical Engineering
976
5. RESULTS
Selected vaporizer as the node point for HAZOP study which is located in propane yard.

PARAME DEVIA CAUSES P CONSEQUE SAFETY S R PREVENTIVE MEASURE

TER TIONS NCE FUNCTIONS

NODE: VAPORIZER

1.1 possible
increase of 1.1 limit switch
temperature in 1.2 level switch
water bath of interlock to open
vaporizer and solenoid valve
decreases of
1.3 flow
water level
indication
resulting in
damage of transmitter
heater 1.4 Field
1. No flow of instrument 1. Review safeguard /
1.2. decrease
liquid propane in flow rate of 2.1 remote interlocks for flame off at user
from bullet to vapour operated valve end and also include re ignition
vaporizer propane interlock with sequence as of un burnt
indication alarm accumulation of propane
2. no flow of 1.3 flame off
liquid propane in user end 2.2 flow 2.provide RTD indication on
NO to vaporizer indication PLC and also add interlock to
FLOW 3 2.1 possible 2 6
FLOW due to solenoid transmitter trip heater when high
valve fail close flame off in temperature
burner in user 2.3 Pressure
3.no flow of end indication 3. Provide solenoid valve at
cooling water transmitter inlet PRS upstream of
to vaporizer 4 2.2 Increase of vaporizer and provide interlock
due to pump pressure 2.4 safety relief to close solenoid valve in
failure upstream of valve liquid trap.
solenoid valve
3.1 pump
3.1 no running
vaporization of indication
liquid propane 3.2 pressure
in vaporizer 4
gauge
resulting in
flow of liquid 3.3 field
propane to instrument
user leading to
fire explosion
1. Decrease
rate of
Low flow of vaporization
1. Field Provide solenoid valve at inlet
cooling water liquid at user
LOW instrument PRS upstream of vaporizer and
FLOW to vaporization 2 point 2 4
FLOW 2. pressure provide interlock to close
pump suction 2. Possible dry
gauge solenoid valve in liquid trap
strainer choke run of pump
leading to
damage

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International Journal of Mechanical Engineering
977
 1. high
pressure is 1.1 leak/
blocked rupture from
section blocked
between inlet section due to 1.1 PLC (HPS)
and outlet vaporization indication used
HIGH isolation valve liquid propane Provide TRV in the blocked
PRESSUR of with heater 2 2.1 pressure
PRESS 2.1 damage of gauge 3 6 section between inlet and
E vaporizer
URE equipment and outlet isolation valve
2. high release of 2.2 audio visual
pressure in propane to alarms
vaporizer 4 atmosphere
propane line leading to fire
due to external and explosion
fire
High level in
vaporizer Overflow of
HIGH
water bath due 1 water leads to 2 2
LEVEL
to solenoid loss of utility
valve open
1. provide RTD indication on
LEVEL Damages to PLC and also add interlock to
Low level in Level switch is trip heater when high
heater if level
vaporizer interlock to temperature
LOW goes low
water bath due 2 close liquid 1 2
LEVEL decrease in 2. provide interlock to trip
to solenoid propane inlet
vaporization heater and propane feed to
valve close valve
rate vaporizer on low level in water
bath.
1. increase of
pressure and
1. pressure
temperature of
indication
propane
High transmitter
downstream of
temperature in vaporizer 2. temperature provide RTD indication on
water bath of indication
TEMPER 2. damage of PLC and also add interlock to
HIGH vaporizer due 2 transmitter 2 2
ATUE pipeline / trip heater when high
to excessive
equipment 3. PLC (HPS) is temperature
heating by
heater leading to fire interlock with
and explosion solenoid valve
hazard if meet
4. alarms
with an
ignition source

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International Journal of Mechanical Engineering
978
 Decrease in 1. Review safeguard /
Low Level switch is
vaporization rate interlocks for flame off at user
temperature in interlock to
and flow of liquid end and also include re ignition
water bath of close liquid
LOW 1 propane to user 2 2 sequence as of un burnt
vaporizer due propane inlet
leading to unsafe accumulation of propane
to heater valve and
condition in user
failure solenoid valve
side
1. decrease of level
in vaporizer 1-3
water bath and
damages to heater if
COOLI level goes low
NG decrease in Level switch is
vaporization rate interlock to
UTILITY WATE Cooling water
2 close liquid 3 6
FAILURE R failure 2. decrease of level propane inlet
FAILU in vaporizer water valve
RE storage tank for
damages to heater if
level goes low
decrease in
vaporization rate
1. decrease in
efficiency of heater
vaporizer
2. decrease in rate
CORROTI HIGH Corrosion / of vaporization of Periodic inspection of heater
ON\ CORR scaling in coil 2 liquid propane in 2 4 coils to be carried out for
EROSION OSION of vaporizer vaporizer resulting corrosion and scaling
in flow of liquid
propane to user
leading to fire
explosion
Release of propane
into atmosphere Audio visual
MORE Vaporizer leak 2 2 4
leading to fire and alarm
explosion hazard
LEAKAG Ingress of water into
E propane leading to Provide solenoid valve at inlet
Vaporizer 4 carryover of liquid PRS upstream of vaporizer and
MORE 2 Level switch 2 4
tube leak to user end resulting provide interlock to close
in fire and explosion solenoid valve in liquid trap
in user side

6. CONCLUSION
Propane is stored in the form of liquid in the bullet which has the capacity of 72tons and is used as gas. This study used the
HAZOP and QRA techniques to Identify and analyze the propane-related operability hazards. vaporizer in TVSM, taking into
account operational, technical, and conceptual aspects. Based on the findings, several preventative and mitigating actions have
been implemented to lessen the severity of the consequences of accidents, therefore improving the safe environment.

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the TVSM safety officers and the involvement of supporting staff for their support in conducting this
study successfully.

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