The Dynamics of Awareness

Pong Wing Yan Dept. of Curriculum Studies University of Hong Kong

Paper presented at 8th European Conference for Learning and Instruction August 24 - 28, 1999, Gteborg University, Gteborg, Sweden

This paper is under revision for submission to a research journal for publication.

Abstract

The theory of the structure of awareness posits the relationship between variation and discernment from the experiencers perspective. With data from a study on students understanding of the economic phenomena of price and trade, my presentation will illustrate the space of micro-variations in meaning and focus, both across different contexts and within a specific context in which the economic phenomenon is presented. In other words, I will show in a dynamic sense how changes in awareness of the meaning of a phenomenon run parallel with the changes in focus.

1. Introduction The study of student conceptions has since the 1960s developed into a distinct area of research within the field of student learning. Most of the work that can be found in this area has focused on science learning and was based on a cognitively oriented constructivist framework. These studies have produced a lot of interesting and surprising findings about the ways children and young people experience aspects of the physical world in their everyday life. These ways of experiencing, variously dubbed as childrens ideas, nave theories, alternative conceptions, prior knowledge, and so on, are often found to be robust and incongruent to the scientific ways of thinking. Efforts were then made to find ways to help children re-structure their ideas and form new ideas, so that the incorrect conceptions are replaced by correct, scientific ones. Instructional strategies designed were derived, invariably from a cognitive conflict model (Posner, Strike et al. 1982). That is, by deliberately presenting the learner with surprising or discrepant events, it is hoped that the learner will become dissatisfied with his/ her current conceptions. The dissatisfaction will then drive the search for a new, more fruitful conceptual schemes that replace the old ones. In short, it is conflict-leading-to-replacement strategy. However, the cognitive conflict strategy was less successful than expected or desired. In many experimental studies, students were found to have ignored, rejected, excluded, held in abeyance, and reinterpreted anomalous data (Chinn and Brewer 1993). It was also found that even when students were able to demonstrate the

use of scientific conceptions in certain formal testing situations, they went back to their old, non-scientific conceptions in their practical encounters with physical phenomena in the everyday context. As a result, researchers put greater focus on other links to conceptual change, such as the individual learners ontological beliefs and epistemological commitments (Chinn and Brewer 1993). Others focused on the role played by other factors such as motivational factors and hence the difference between warm and cold conceptual change (Pintrich, Marx et al. 1993). In terms of theory construction, some researchers are beginning to acknowledge the futility in defining learning as conceptual change, and advocate what is known as the multiple conceptions perspective. This ranges from arguing that conceptual change is a gradual process while multiple conceptions co-exist during the transition (e.g. Gunstone 1994) to suggesting that science learning is not to abandon old ideas in favour of new ones, but rather to extend our repertoire of ideas about the physical and cultural world, to refine their organization and coherence (Caravita and Hallden 1994, p. 106). Linder (1993) suggests that the conceptual change depiction of learning should be extended to include conceptual fitting based upon context. The notion of multiple conceptions can be taken as a challenge to the theory of conceptual change. If people can be viewed as holding multiple conceptions of the same phenomenon, it would no longer be possible to assume conceptual stability, an idea that is central to the conceptual change framework. Besides, concept nodes would become fuzzy and dependent upon the context in which they appear, giving rise to severe problems for determining their locations and measurements. Other researchers have abandoned the notion of conceptual change as learning to take up a situated perspective of learning, arguing that learning should be studied as a social, collective phenomenon and evidenced by the changing participation of the learner in the community of practice (Lave 1996). School learning is then characterized and criticized as individually based, often unaided, learning that only results in decontextualized knowledge (Brown et al 1989). The alternative, they propose, is to honour the situated nature of knowledge, as in cognitive apprenticeship where students are enculturated into authentic practices through activity and social interactions in a way similar to craft apprenticeship. 2. Phenomenography The study of conceptions has been a major research interest within phenomenography. However, it has refrained from positing any cognitivistic explanations or mental models of cognition. It argues that human understanding is necessarily a human-world relation, rather than the result of some kind of general cognitive functioning system possessed by the individual. In research endeavours, phenomenography has insisted on a purely descriptive knowledge interest of investigating the qualitatively different ways in which people experience certain phenomena or certain aspects of the world. These ways of understanding, or conceptions, are then revealed in the form of categories that capture the critical differences of understandings from a certain interest or viewpoint. As conceptions are posited as human-world relations, the descriptions are contentoriented. They are not seen as the qualities of the individuals but as concrete cases of human functioning (Marton 1981, p. 77). Whether the same individual would manifest a particular conception over time is thus an empirical question investigated, not assumed. The assumption that conceptions are relational in character brought phenomenographers to employ a particular way to analyze them. From text comprehension studies, it was found that the outcome of learning is always related to the approach the learner employed to arrive at it. Similarly, in the study of conceptions, they found that peoples understandings of phenomena are related to ways they approach them. A way of experiencing is thus discernible as containing both a what and a how aspect. Marton (1988) explained this in terms of the theory of the gestalt, which purports that for whatever we see or experience, we perceive a gestalt quality, that is, a significative whole (figure) which is discernible from its surrounding (ground). In addition, a gestalt is never without a structure, as a gestalt can be defined as an ensemble of items which mutually support and determine one another (Gurtwistch 1964). Marton (1993) wrote: Awareness has a particular structure also as far as the theme is concerned. The theme appears to the subject in a certain way; it is seen from a particular point of view. The specific experience (or con-

ception) of a theme or of an object, can be defined in terms of the way in which it is delimited from, and related to, a context and in the way its component parts are delimited from, and related to each other, and to the whole. (p. 10) 3. A Theory of Awareness Based on the theory of gestalt, theme and thematic field, Marton and Booth (1997) recently advanced a theory concerning the structure of human awareness. They took the way of experiencing as the basic unit, analysed it from a structural viewpoint, and suggested two constituting aspects of awareness (a) the delimitation of a theme from the context; and (b) the discernment of the parts that contribute to the theme. The delimitation of a theme further suggests that certain elements or aspects of the context come into our focal awareness to constitute the theme (or figure) whilst other aspects recede into the background or form the backdrop (or ground) of a particular understanding. Thus, in our experiencing of a phenomenon, there are always certain aspects of the phenomenon given to us simultaneously in our focal awareness. Marton and Booth (1997) used understanding Archimedes principle as an example. What does it take to understand Archimedes principle? They argue: Being focally aware of the weight of a body immersed in some fluid as compared to its weight when not immersed, of the fact that a certain volume of the fluid is displayed by the act of immersion, of the weight of the fluid displayed all at the same time amounts to what it takes to discover, or to understand, Archimedes principle. (p. 101) It must then be noted that being aware of these aspects does not mean that we are not aware of other aspects of the situation, only that they have not been in focus and therefore become discerned. Furthermore, in no way does this preclude the possibility of another gestalt, way of experiencing, or conception be formed with other aspects of phenomenon simultaneously occupying our focal awareness at other time. But how can a certain aspect (or any aspect) of the phenomenon become one that occupies our focus and become discerned? Marton and Booth sought the answer in variation. They argue that without variability, many of the concepts that we employ would not have been there (e.g. gender would not be noticed if there were only one!). Quoting the work of Ueno, Arimoto and Fujita (1990), they suggest that the difference between Newtonian and commonsense ways of thinking about motion lies in the former discerning motion as a dimension of variation whilst the latter taking objects-at-rest as the frame of reference. In short, discernment depends on variation. In a phenomenography workshop in 1997, Marton summarised the new theory of awareness as addressing the relationship among discernment, simultaneity and variation. He suggested: The qualitatively different ways of experiencing various phenomena can thus be understood in terms of the differences in discernment, simultaneity and variation at a deeper layer of the field of awareness connecting the person and the world. One salient feature of this new theory of awareness is that it has provided a way for understanding the dynamic and contextual nature of conceptions, whilst maintaining a focus on the way of experiencing as a unit of study and hence an account of individual differences in learning. 4. The Present Study The study reported here is an attempt to use the theory of awareness to analyse a set of data obtained from interviewing 40 Canadian high school students on two economic themes price and trade. In the interviews, a set of pre-designed questions were used as conversation openers. To allow opportunistic questioning and respondent elaboration, not all the questions in the set were asked in a particular interview. However, most of the students interviewed answered more than one question per theme (i.e. price and trade). The inter-

views are reproduced below: Price: 1. 2. 3. 4. Mary is a friend of mine. She bought a condominium unit some two years ago at the price of $250000. She lived there since and now she's got to move in order to live elsewhere. However, the best price she can find for her condo unit was $180000. Why do you think that happened? Tom works as a sales rep in a Disney store. There is a doll in the store which always gets strange remarks from his customers. The doll costs $400. Why is it so expensive? Last week I bought a can of Coke from one of the school's machines. It cost me a dollar. Two days ago, I drank one in the lounge of the downtown Sheraton hotel and it cost four dollars. Why is there such a difference? A lot of people here collect baseball cards. I know that some of these cards are really expensive. They can go as high as a few hundred dollars. But others are not worth much. Why is there such a big difference between their prices?

Trade: 5. 6. 7. 8. Why do people or businesses trade with each other? Have you ever traded anything with anybody? Jane asked her father this question, "Isn't it true that businesses make money from what they sell, but the customers who pay to get their products are all losing their money?" Would you have any comments to this? What do you think of the free trade deal? The federal government says that all nations gain and no one loses. Do you think so? Canada imports from and exports to other countries. Should countries trade with each other if they are able to produce themselves what they need?

5. Results 5.1. Conceptions Identified Four qualitatively different ways of conceptualizing price were discerned from the interviews. A. B. C. D. Price is a property of the object concerned. Price is related to the demand conditions of the market in which the object is situated. Price is related to the supply conditions of the market in which the object is situated. Price is related to the opposing forces of demand and supply conditions of the market in which the object is situated.

The following are typical examples for each of the above conceptions: Conception A: (Question 2) S39: I have to see the doll to know why it costs so much money. I: Why do you say that? S39: Why do I have to see it? Well, I have to see it to know why it has so much value. It must be something you have to see. People give so much to it. It must be something original. With so much money there must be something behind it. I: What would you say as the possible reason why it costs so much? S39: Just like what I have said. If it has some attractions to it. I: Attractions. S39: It could be huge, like a very big doll. It could talk, it could walk, it could do anything.

Conception B: (Question 1) S02: I understand that the economy is worse now so that people do not have much money and things are cheaper. Since not many people want to buy houses prices have to be lowered to entice people to buyHousing prices have gone downIt is not much use to advertise the house at $300000 and nobody is willing to buy itIf you sell at $200000, you get $200000." Conception C: (Question 4) S25: I think when it's the really, really old players from a long time ago, their cards are valuable now, so they are expensive. And also, it depends on how many of a particular card is manufactured. The more that's manufactured, the less value, so the less it costs. That's allAnd so, when you're collecting sports cards, you want to find cards that are rare. 'Cause those are very valuable. Conception D: (Question 4) S11: I guess mainly how much were made. My friends told me now that they are not worth buying anymore because they are mass manufactured. There are so many. I guess the popularity of the player also. People may want somebody's cards. That is the need again. I guess the rarity and the need for the card. Two qualitatively different ways of conceptualizing trade, which make up the outcome space, are discerned from the interviews. A. Trade is a win-win activity for both trading partners. B. Trade is a zero-sum, trade-off activity. Conception A: (Question 5) S19: I'd give you something and you'd give me something in return. I: Right, why should that happen? S19: Because let's say I'm a farmer and I grow all this corn. And you're a farmer, and you're a dairy farmer and you have cows and there's milk. So, if I have all this corn, that's cool for a while, I can make corn bread, and popcorn and all sorts of corn. But after a while, I could get sick of it and I'd really like some milk to go with my corn bread. So then I go to you and I say, I can't have all this corn, so here's a bunch for you, so you give me some milk and then I have milk and you have corn and everyone's happy. I: Am I taking advantage of you? S19: No it's fair. Everything's cool. 'Cause I need milk and you need corn. So we're trading. Conception B: (Question 5) I: People also make analogies from kids, like trading baseball cards with each other. So I have these baseball cards and you have those baseball cards, so we trade with each other because I don't have what you have and you don't have what I have. So trade benefits you as well as well as ... S38: Yeah, but also, with that there isn't money coming into it. It's not like, Okay, I'll offer you this card and two dollars for your one card. So you got a card you need plus two dollars. And that's what would happen because you'd be making money off me... I'd be making the cards but I'm still not gonna have the same because I've been paying you as well as giving you stuff... for the cards.

If it was just trade, if it was just based on pure trade and money not involved, then this idea has potential. That's not gonna happen. It's the money... it's not like, back where beaver pelt, where in the old days you could give them a beaver pelt and they'd give you a dozen eggs or whatever. 5.2. Referential and structural aspects of the conceptions The following tables summarize the referential aspect and structural aspects of the conceptions. The referential aspect refers to the overall meaning the student gives to the phenomenon, whilst the structural aspect refers to the aspect(s) of the phenomenon being focused upon, as evidenced by the variation brought about. Price:

Category A

Referential Aspect Price is a property of the object concerned.

B C D

Price is related to the demand conditions of the market in which the object is situated. Price is related to the supply conditions of the market in which the object is situated. Price is related to the opposing forces of demand and supply conditions of the market in which the object is situated.

Structural Aspect Focused on the features of the subject in question. Variation brought about on quality of the object Focused on macroeconomic factors Variation brought about on one or more of these factors Focused on the availability of the object Variation brought about by changes in supply conditions Focused on: both supply and demand aspects simultaneously Variation brought about: changes in both aspects in bringing the price change.

Trade:

Conception A B

Referential Aspect Trade is a win-win activity for both trading partners. Trade is a zero-sum, trade-off activity.

Structural Aspect Focus on the products involved in trade Variation brought about on the products to be traded Focus on the money involved in trade Variation brought about the amount of money received from selling in relation to that spent on buying.

5.3. Inter-contextual conceptual shifts The data showed that many students interviewed manifested more than one conception for a particular economic phenomenon. For those who took up more than one question per theme, some shifted from one conception to another as they went from one story or another. For the price questions, 28 out of the 34 students who responded to multiple questions demonstrated inter-contextual shifts. For the trade questions, the corresponding numbers were 14 out of 16. The results suggest that the students took the cases as separate and particular contexts whilst it could be argued, from a theoretical point of view, they belonged or pointed to the same economic phenomenon that is, price or trade. It is also almost impossible to ascribe a certain conception of price or trade to a particular individual.

However, some stories attracted a greater frequency of a particular conception (see table below). For example, for question 1 and 2 (i.e. the condo and the doll questions) were more conducive to Conceptions A of price (i.e. the object notion of price), whilst question 3 and 4 were conducive to Conception C (i.e. the supply notion of price). In terms of trade the first two questions, which pertained to inter-personal trade, captured most of the win-win conceptions; the last two questions that dealt with trade at the inter-national level, had most of the zero sum notion of trade.

Price Question Condo Doll Soft Drink Card No. of subjects 38 20 29 12 A 30 (50.8%) 14 (48.3%) 9 (24.3%) 2 (16.7%) B

Conception C 1 (1.7%) 4 (13.8%) 11 (29.7%) 5 (41.8%) D 4 (6.8%) 3 (10.3%) 9 (24.3%) 3 (25.0%) Total 59 (100%) 29 (100%) 37 (100%) 12 (100%)

24 (40.7%) 8 (27.6%) 8 (21.7%) 2 (16.7%)

Trade Question Personal Jane Nafta Canada Total No. of subjects 11 6 24 7 48 A 11 (84.6%) 6 (85.7%) 6 (22.2%) 6 (54.5%) B

Conception Total 13 (100%) 7 (100%) 27 (100%) 11 (100%) 58

2 (15.4%) 1 (14.3%) 21 (77.8%) 5 (45.5%)

5.4. Intra-contextual conceptual shifts Apart from inter-contextual shifts, when the interview data was studied in detail, it was observed that many students expressed more than one conception when attending to a particular question during the interivew, and hence intra-contextual shifts. For the price questions, 36 instances of intra-contextual shifts were recorded against 99 counts of price questions being asked. For the trade questions, 10 intra-contextual shifts were recorded against the 48 times that the trade questions were asked. Many of these shifts occurred spontaneously and naturally as the course of the conversation developed, without any prompting or probing on the part of the interviewer. These natural shifts, as can be seen from the illustration below, came only after a short cause or with a simple adverb such as also or sometimes. The presence of intra-contextual shifts made it even more difficult to tie a particular student to a particular conception. However, it was quite clear that these shifts were accompanied by changes in focus, as shown by the changes in the dimension of variation brought about.

Example 1: S03 responded to my question on the price of the Coke first by focusing on the Coke, and as a result, sought a variation of features of the object the cup, the ice cubes, thus resulting in an object notion of price Conception A. Without any prompting, her focus then switched to the place where similar products were sold the hotel lounge then to the bar then to Canadas Wonderland, an amusement park of the city, forming another view of price which was dominated by the non-competitive supply Conception C. When I reminded her of the hotel lounge later, her focus then turned to the customers of the hotel, and contributed the higher price to the willingness of some people who were willing to pay more, and hence a demand notion of price Conception B. I: Why is the same can of Coke costs more in some places than in others? You know, if you go into a hotel lounge, you pay more. S03: Yes, but you are not just paying for the Coke when you go to a hotel lounge, you are paying for the service, right? They usually put it in a cup or ice cubes, and you are paying that extra bit to have ice cubes (Conception A). More like you buy beer in a liquor store and in a bar. OK. In terms of the liquor store, if you go to any liquor store, you can pick which is cheaper and then go for that one, so that the store is forced to lower the price of beer to be competitive. I don't want to talk about beer more. In case of a pizza, if you go to Canada's Wonderland, you are in a park and you can't get out and you have only that one choice that you have to buy like that kind of pizza, so that they can raise the price, because they are not letting people go outside to a nearby convenience store that other people can buy from. That isn't fair, is it? I guess people can sneak them into Wonderland and drink their own pop instead, but you are not supposed to do (Conception C). I: So how about the hotel lounge? S03: In that case, I am not sure people would buy as much. But it is more convenient for the hotel occupants to stay in the hotel than to go to a store. Or, they would bother to walk across the street to buy from a convenience store. In most cases, if people are going to buy Coke in a hotel they run to the nearest machine on their floor, right, which probably costs more, and you are not getting anything new, but it is closer, you don't have to put on a jacket or whatever, or if they are in the hotel lounge, then it is because they want to sit comfortable while they are waiting for somebody else. In fact, they are paying for the convenience as well (Conception B). Schematically, the sequence of the shifts can be represented by the following table.

Sequence 1st 2nd 3rd

Aspect focused upon Object Shop Customer

Variation Cup, ice cubes Liquor store vs bar; Canadas Wonderland vs convenience store People wanting more comfort or not, willing to pay more or not

Conception A C B

The shifts in conceptions: A-C-B corresponded to changes in the aspect of the context which S03 brought into focus the object, the shop and the customer. Example 2: There were also some shifts which can be understood as being triggered off or provoked by the interviewers efforts to ask for clarification or elaboration. Again, changes in conception were closely accompanied by changes in the dimension of variation that the student focused upon. S02 was initially asked the question on the free trade agreement, to which he indicated a clear zero-sum view of trade - Unites States and Mexico gain and Canada loses. His focus at that time was entirely on money. At a later moment, S02 reflected on the issue on trade, trying to grapple with the meaning of trade suggested by the interviewer - that trade leaves everyone better off. He was puzzled how it would be possible, which triggered a momentary shift of focus from money to product, as he said, The businesses make profit, but the people who are buying these things are losing. Well, not actually losing because they are getting what they want. However, he was unconvinced of the win-win argument of trade as he went back to a money (peoples earnings) focus. S02: OK, yes, everyone will win because no one has to pay these excessive tariffs. And then the government's theory is that the government does not make as much money as with the tariffs but that free trade encourages people to do more trade so that they'll get more money anyway. The country will prosper more. OK. That's fine, but I think the problem now is people go to America to do business because I guess it's freer there or things are cheaper. So if things stay the same except for the taxes, then we would profit. But the point is, people would still go where it is cheapest so they go to the United States, or Mexico. And that's how people lose. (Conception B) I: Don't you think it's kind of puzzling that people say, "With free trade, everyone gains. Canada gains. America gains. Mexico gains. Everyone is better off with no one being worse off. S02: I had this discussion with my Dad last night. It wasn't about free trade but it was just about how everyone can gain. I guess the people who lose money are the consumers who pay. The point is that if more businesses come then the government makes money. The businesses make profit, but the people who are buying these things are losing. Well, not actually losing because they are getting what they want. So, yes, I guess it can work like a circle. Everyone pays so he gets something from someone else. I don't know. I guess it can work. I guess that's what growth is. (Conception A) (pause) I: Don't strain yourself too hard. (Laugh) S: It's a difficult concept to grasp - Everyone gains when there is no more money available (Conception B). I: I am interested in listening to how the government could argue that everyone can gain with free trade. I just want to understand the logic in the government's argument. S: I can see that generally you can make it most people could prosper. I don't believe like that everyone is equal. It's good to promote equality but there are always people who don't work and they are never to earn their money. You can't make everyone prosper. You just can't. Never can people be equal because they can never work as each other. You can generally increase the prosperity of the country in general. So, if the government says everyone gains, I think that's an exaggeration (refuting Conception A) I: So what you are saying is that there is only a possibility for everyone to gain.

S: It just sounds as nice as you say, "everyone could".

Sequence 1st 2nd 3rd

Aspect focused upon Money Product Money

Variation Government and businesses make money, customers lose money What people want Who earns money

Conception B A B

6. Discussion The influence of contexts or situations on manifested conceptions has been witnessed and reported by other phenomenographic studies. For example, in a report titled Conceptions of price as a function of the questions asked, Dahlgren (1979) detailed a study on childrens conceptions of price and showed how the conceptions were influenced by the temporal order of the questions asked. Svensson (1989) by employing a set of cases, probed university students understandings of force and motion, and reported that in most instances the students did not begin their reasoning with a conceptual framework or abstract concepts. He wrote: The students do not try to abstract certain general characteristics but try to describe/explain each case with the help of whatever concepts and principles they have access to and seem to fit the meaning given to specific aspects and parts of the cases focused upon. (p. 543) The influence of context is well observed in the present study. The contextual shifts clearly show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe an all time conception of price or trade to a particular individual. This finding is in line with the conclusions Svenssion made in the above, as well as a phenomenographic argument often made that it is inappropriate to take conceptions as a personal trait or ability whilst the same categories of description could apply at a group level (e.g. Marton and Booth, 1997, p. 114). Furthermore, the influence of context on manifested conceptions is also demonstrated by the fact that some of the questions captured a disproportionate amount of a particular category of conceptions. For example, the condo question was highly conducive to the object notion of price whilst the baseball question easily predisposed the students into using a supply notion of price. In trade, questions concerning inter-personal trade afforded more easily a win-win conception of trade but questions about international trade usually resulted in a zero-sum, trade-off view of trade. However, what is shown well in the present study is the almost perfect correlation between two aspects of awareness i.e. focus and meaning. Repeatedly observed from the data is the fact that when the individual student focused on certain aspects of the situation, a certain conception ensued. This result supports Marton and Booths (1997) theory of the structure of awareness, in which they suggested that qualitatively different ways of experiencing something can be understood in terms of the differences in the structure or organisation of awareness at a particular moment or moments (p. 100). The unstable character of conceptions is further shown by the intra-contextual shifts, which demonstrated how effortlessly individuals, without taking any notice themselves, moved from one conception to another as they changed their focus. It is also interesting to note that whilst in most cases, a shift in focus was followed by a shift in meaning, in some cases a provoked change in meaning could also cause a change in focus. This is best illustrated in some of the interview sections on trade when the researcher tried to bring out a new meaning by saying Can you imagine that they both gained? and the student then shifted attention to focus on the commodities being traded. In a way, the very flexible, accommodating but inquisitive attitude of the researcher in allowing the students

10

to explore the situation and to express themselves could also have contributed to these micro shifts and for them to be observed. A number of tentative conclusions regarding the pedagogy of awareness are hence drawn. Firstly, if the relationship between focus and meaning is accepted, it would then suggest that educators should pay more and closer attention to the structural aspects of the conceptions expressed in the intended content of the curriculum as well as those expressed by their students in the learning situation. For example, it would be important to understand that the understanding of the Newtonian notion of force is related to a focus on velocity, whilst the ordinary, everyday experience would have the learner focused on motion instead of velocity. Secondly, the relationship will help teachers to understand individual differences in terms of the differences in the structure of awareness in their encounters with the phenomenon, instead of attributing to underlying personal traits or cognitive structures. Thirdly, the meaning-structure relationship will also help us to analyse complex and abstract scientific concepts in terms of the aspects of the phenomenon that appear in our focal awareness in a simultaneous manner. For example, for a genuine understanding of the market notion of price, the student must be able to take into account both the demand and supply aspects of the situations in a relational manner. Fourthly, the theory of variation may give teachers a handle in designing instruction for more complex ways of understanding and experiencing phenomena. Through contextual variation, it is possible for teachers to construct cases or provide experiences that highlight certain aspects of the phenomenon in order for certain meanings to be generated and understood. However, a distinction must be made between a mere manifestation of a particular way of experiencing the phenomenon through contextual variation and a conception arrived at through active, reflective understanding. As the results of this study shows, students are capable of manifesting multiple conceptions, and as Svensson (1989) suggests, students are capable of fitting meaning given to aspects that they focus upon, it may not be so difficult to construct cases in order to milk the appearance of certain conceptions. The appearance of these conceptions, however, must be distinguished from any conscious and mindful attempts to identify the conceptions themselves as abstractions, so that they can come to our focal awareness through careful reflection of our own ways of experiencing as well as comparing them with other peoples ways of experiencing. Formal education is often criticized as too concerned with symbolic knowledge. Very often, the criticism is valid as schools try to skip the experiential aspect of learning and not providing the contextual variation that is necessary for meanings to emerge. It is, however, equally inappropriate to assume that the careful and systematic reflection on our ways of experiencing be achieved entirely through contextualization or contextual variation. Genuine learning depends on cycles of action and reflection.

References
Brown, J. S., Collins, A., Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, January-February: 32-42. Caravita, S. and O. Hallden (1994). Re-framing the Problem of Conceptual Change. Learning and Instruction 4: 89-111. Chinn, C. A. and W. F. Brewer (1993). The Role of Anomalous Data in Knowledge Acquisition: A Theoretical Framework and Implications for Science Instruction. Review of Educational Research 63(1): 1-49. Dahlgren, L. O. (1979). Children's conception of price as a function of questions asked. Goteborg, The Institute of Education, University of Goteborg: 9.

11

Gunstone, R. F. (1994). The importance of specific science content in the enhancement of metacognition. The Content of Science: A Constructivist Approach to its Teaching and Learning. P. J. Fensham, Gunstone, R.F., White, R.T. London, Falmer Press. Gurtwistch, A. (1964). The field of consciousness. Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press. Lave, J. (1996). Teaching, as Learning, in Practice. Mind, Culture, and Activity 3(3): 149-164. Linder, C. (1993). A Challenge to Conceptual Change. Science Education 77(3): 293-300. Marton, F. (1981). Phenomenography - describing conceptions of the world around us. Instructional Science 10: 177-200. Marton, F. (1988). Describing and Improving Learning. Learning Strategies and Learning Styles. R. R. Schmeck. New York, Plenum Press: 53-82. Marton, F. (1993) Towards a Pedagogy of Awareness, Unpublished Article Marton, F. and S. Booth (1997). Learning and Awareness. New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum. Pintrich, P. R., R. W. Marx, et al. (1993). Beyond Cold Conceptual Change: The Role of Motivatinal Beliefs and Classroom Contextual Factors in the Process of Conceptual Change. Review of Educational Research 63(2): 167-199. Posner, G., K. Strike, et al. (1982). Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education 66(2): 211-227. Svensson, L. (1989). The conceptualization of cases of physical motion. European Journal of Psychology of Education 4(4): 529-545. Ueno, N., N. Arimoto, et al. (1990). Conceptual models and points of view. Learning via making a new stage. Paper presented at AERA, Boston.

12