Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A.

Rajappa [AIR 1978

SC 548]
This case was decided by a Bench of seven-judge bench was constituted, headed by Chief
Justice M.H. Beg on 21st February 1978. A seven-judge bench was constituted especially to
examine the definition of “industry” and lay down the law on the subject. The bench was
presided over by Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer who assumed the role of a crusader-legislator and
drafted a new definition of the term “industry”. Their ruling was a result of the various
disputes arising in establishments that are not manufacturing industries but belong to
categories of hospitals, educational and research institutions, Governmental departments,
public utility services, professionals and clubs. The definition was accordingly expanded to
cover those establishments which involved an employer-employee relationship, irrespective
of the objectives of the organization in question.

Facts:
The respondent employees were fined by the Appellant Board for misconduct and various
sums were recovered from them. Therefore, they filed a Claims Application No. 5/72 under
Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, alleging that the said punishment was imposed
in violation of the principles of natural justice.
The appellant Board raised a preliminary objection before the Labour Court that the Board, a
statutory body performing what is in essence a regal function by providing the basic
amenities to the citizens, is not an industry within the meaning of the expression under
section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and consequently the employees were not
workmen and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the claim of the workmen.

This objection being over-ruled, the appellant Board filed two writ petitions before the
Karnataka High Court at Bangalore. The Division Bench of that High Court dismissed the
petitions and held that the appellant Board is industry within the meaning 'of the expression
under section 2(i) of the Industrial, Disputes Act, 1947.
Issues:
The issues raised in the case were regarding the scope of the term Industry under Section 2(j)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
1. Whether a sovereign function of the government would come under the ambit of the term
‘industry’?
2. Whether Charitable institutions, hospitals, non-profit making organizations, educational
institutions, professionals qualify as an industry?

Held:
It was held that the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board will fall under the
definition of the industry and by justifying this it gave an elaborating definition of industry.
Any activity will come under definition of Industry if it fulfills the triple test which is as
follows:
(i) Systematic activity,
(ii) Organized by co-operation between employer and employee, (the direct and substantial
element is chimerical)
(iii) For the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human
wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services
geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale, prasad or food), prima facie, there
is an 'industry' in that enterprise.
The court laid down a dominant nature test, which by its very name suggests that if the nature
of relationship between the employer and employee is not dominant but only constitutes a
minimal part, it would not be an industry. The dominant nature test:
(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption, others not, involves
employees on the total undertaking, some of whom are not 'workmen' as in the University of
Delhi Case or some departments are not productive of goods and services if isolated, even
then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments as
explained in the Corporation of Nagpur, will be true test. The whole undertaking will be
'industry' although those who are not 'workmen' by definition may not benefit by the status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, alone
qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by
government or statutory bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are
industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within
Section2(j).
(d) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative provisions may well remove from the
scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.”

It was held that small units who hired employees for some minor works and in their original
capacity did not employ a large number of workmen would be exempted from being
classified as an industry since there wasn’t a regular relationship between an employer and an
employee.

Consequences of the case:

In 1982, Parliament amended the definition of “Industry” under section 2 of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The Parliament intervened and substituted the definition of `industry' by
including within its meaning some activities of the government and excluding some other
specified governmental activities and `public utility services' involving sovereign functions.
For the past 23 years, the amended definition has remained unenforced on the statute book. 

State of U.P vs. Jai Bir Singh [(2005) 5 SCC 1]

The interests of the employees have been favoured over the interests of the employer. The
court felt that the case strayed away from the main objective of the Act, which was to
regulate this employer-employee relation without giving preference to any one class. The
court went on to say that there was a need to correct the definition of an industry and reduce
its scope to comply with the wishes of the employers as well as the employees.
Reservations about the correctness of BWSSB case-Requested the CJI to constitute a larger
bench than BWSSB case to explain what is industry? In 2017, a seven-judge Bench of the
Supreme Court passed an order for the constitution of a nine-judge Bench in light of the 2005
referral order. In 1978, a seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court had given a wide
interpretation to the word ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘ID Act’). Since
a higher threshold of labour rights flow from the definition of an industry, a need for a
revision of the definition of ‘industry’ has been expressed. The Supreme Court also raised
doubts about the correctness of the 1978 decision. Accordingly, a nine-judge Bench will be
constituted to clarify the definition of the word ‘industry’.

Facts:
The present case was brought about on the question, if ‘social forestry’ department of state,
which was a welfare scheme undertaken for improvement of the environment, would be
covered by the definition of ’Industry’ under S. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
court decided to go into the BWS case and analyze if the judgement can be followed or not.

Issues:

1. Can social forestry be included in the definition of industry?

2. Can the BWS case be considered as an authoritative precedent?

Holding:

Referred to a larger bench (9 judges). Order passed in 2017 to form the same. No further
action taken.

Rationale:

The Supreme Court gave the following reasons for a reference to a larger bench with respect
to the

BWS case:

 Composition of judges and their opinions

 Judgement meant to be only temporary till the legislature and executive came up with
an amended definition of ‘Industry’
 J. Krishna Iyer’s majority opinion regards the Industrial Disputes Act solely as a
worker/employee-oriented act
 Huge number of Industrial and labour cases came up
 Understanding of Sovereign functions
 Executive had been ‘inhibited’ because of the BWS case from notifying the
amendment
 Safdarjung Hospital and Madras Gymkhana cases were correct in interpreting
‘Industry’
 Hospitals and educational institutions performed services to community and can’t call
strikes or lock outs
 Analysis:

The court gave reasons for reference to a larger bench and it still has to be seen if BWS
will continue to be the law of the land or if the legislature will finally enforce a new law
defining the word ‘industry’ or if the court will finally set up a nine judge bench 15
years after the Supreme Court referred the case to a larger bench of 9 judges and
change the interpretation of the word industry

State of Bombay vs. Hospital Masdoor Sabha

Facts:
The group of Hospitals consists of five Hospitals. First, being established in the year 1845.
Most of the expenses were met by the Appellant. The group is under the administrative
control of the Surgeon- General of the Appellant and its daily affairs are controlled by the
Superintendent who is an employee of the Appellant and their salaries are paid entirely by the
Appellant. This group serves as a clinical training ground for students of a Government
Medical College run of the Appellant. The group is thus run and managed by the appellant to
provide medical relief and to promote the health of the people of Bombay.

Issues:
1) Whether Government Hospitals form part of the industry and can such disputes be referred to
tribunal Under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
2) Whether the retrenchment order of two employees is invalid due to non-compliance of
Section 25F of the Act?

Held:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar. The Court held that
Section 2(j) does not define “industry” in the usual manner because the second clause
deliberately refers to several other items of industry and brings them in the definition in an
inclusive way. The words used in an inclusive definition denote a wide meaning and it cannot
be restricted. The Doctrine of “noscuntur a sociis” cannot be applied in the present case
because the Object and Scope of the Act are very wide and the Categories mentioned in
Section 2(m) of the Act makes the Doctrine inapplicable.
The Court also held that the absence of profit motive or absence of capital investment does
not make any material difference. If a hospital is run by a private person without charging
any fee it would still be an undertaking under Section 2(j). It doesn’t matter whether the
hospital is run by a private person or government. The addition of the hospital under Section
2(n)(vi) also shows the intention of the legislature which means that the hospital is an
undertaking under the Act. The Court framed a working principle that any systematic activity
for production or distribution of goods or services done with help of employees in the manner
of a trade or business is an industry. The services in the hospital were held to be material
service and hence Hospitals are industry under the Industrial Disputes Act.
The Supreme Court held that the activity held by the institutions involves the habitual
production and distribution of goods or rendering of materials services to the community at
large. Similarly the activity should neither be only for pleasure nor be of a casual nature.

Corporation of the city of Nagpur vs. Its employees

Facts:
Disputes arose between the Corporation and the employees in various departments of the
Corporation in respect of wage scales, gratuity, provident fund, house rent, confirmation,
allowances etc. The Government of the State of Madhya Pradesh by its order dated October
23, 1956, referred the said disputes under section 39 of the Act to the State Industrial Court,
Nagpur and the reference was numbered as Industrial Reference No. 18 of 1956. The
appellant filed a statement before the Industrial Court questioning the jurisdiction of that
Court, inter alia, on the ground that the Corporation was not an industry as defined by the
Act. On February 13, 1957, the Industrial Court made a preliminary order holding that the
Corporation was an industry and that the further question whether any department of the
Corporation was an industry or not, would be decided on the evidence. The appellant
challenged the correctness of that order by filing a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur, but that petition was dismissed, as the
award was made before its hearing.  The High Court rejected its contention that the
Corporation was not an industry within the meaning of the said section and remanded the
case to the Industrial Court for determination as to which of its departments fell within the
definition and making an award accordingly.
Issues:
1. Whether corporation would be an industry within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial
disputes Act, 1947?
2. Whether the Industrial Disputes Act was invalid inasmuch as it allowed the Tribunal to
reinstate employees and to that extent trenched on the power of the chairman to appoint and
dismiss employees?
3. Whether and to what extent the municipal activities of the Corporation of 943 Nagpur City
fell within the term ‘industry’?

Held:
The court held that Act was not invalid, as it was in pith and substance a law in respect of
industrial and labour disputes and that the conservancy service rendered by the municipality
was an industry and the dispute between the municipality and the employees of the
conservancy department was an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
The court held that the activity by the institutions must involve the satisfaction of the material
needs, and not spiritual needs. The activity should not be done merely for the government
purposes.

University of Delhi vs. Ramanath [AIR 1963 SC 1873]

Facts:
In this case, the two petitioners no. 1 is the University of Delhi and The Principle and no. 2 is
Miranda House, University college for women. The case was filed by the two respondents no.
1 Ram Nath and no.2 Asgar Masih under section 33C of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
against the petitioners alleging that they both are drivers employed by the principal and later
they had been discharged from the job with one-month advance salary in lieu of notice. But
both the respondents argued that the education institution does come under industry and they
both are liable to get compensation from the institution. This case was entertained before the
Tribunal and the tribunal rejected the petitions made by the appellants and gave the decision
in the favour of the respondents and stated that the respondents should get the compensation
of Rs. 1050/- to each respondent. Later the decision was appealed in the Supreme Court
where it is discussed that whether the educational institutions can come under the definition
of an industry under the Industrial Dispute Act 1947.
 Issues:
1. Whether the respondents are liable to get compensation from the Petitioner?
2. Whether an educational institution can be considered as an industry?

Held:
Firstly, judgement was given by the Tribunal in the favour of the respondents stating that the
respondents are liable to get the compensation amount of Rs. 1050/- to each respondent from the
petitioner. Then the case was appealed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court arguing that an
educational institution does not come under, the definition of an industry, under the Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947.
This judgement in the favour of the petitioners where the court held that the appeal from the
petitioners should be allowed and the case filed by the respondents should be dismissed and the
petitioners are not liable to pay the compensation amount to the respondents as it is discussed in
the judgement that an educational institution does not come under the definition of an
industry.

Cricket Club of India vs. Bombay Labour union [AIR 1969 SC 276]
Facts:
The Club is admittedly a Members' Club and is not a proprietary Club, though it is
incorporated as a Company under the Indian Companies Act. At the relevant time, the Club
had a membership of about 4800 and was employing 397 employees who claimed to be
workmen. The principal objects of the Club are to encourage and promote various sports,
particularly the game of cricket in India and elsewhere, to lay out grounds for the 603 game
of cricket, and also to finance and assist in financing cricket matches and tournaments. In
addition, it provides avenue for sports and games as well as facilities for recreation and
entertainment for the Members. It maintains Tennis Courts in pursuance of another outdoor
activity. The indoor games for which provision is made include Billiards, Table Tennis,
Badminton and Squash.  a dispute between the Cricket Club of India Ltd. (hereinafter
referred to as “the Club”) and the workmen employed by it in respect of various demands
made by the workmen relating to classification of employees, dearness allowance, leave
facilities, payment for overtime, permanency, shift allowance, etc. A preliminary objection
was taken on behalf of the Club that it is not an industry and, consequently, the provisions of
the Act were inapplicable and no reference could be competently made under s. 10(2) of the
Act. The Tribunal rejected this preliminary objection holding that the Club came within the
definition of “industry” in s. 2(j) of the Act and made a direction that the case be set down for
hearing on merits. The Club has appealed against this interim award of the Tribunal on the
preliminary question, by special leave.

Held:
Even when a trade, business, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers results in
production of material goods or rendering of material services, such an undertaking engaged
in trade, business, manufacture or calling of employers will not be an "industry, if it is run on
charitable principles or is run by Government or local body as part of its duty. In other words,
whenever an undertaking is engaged in activity which is not done with a view to exploit it in
a trading or commercial sense, but for public interest and without any profit motive or in the
form of social service or in the form of activity intended to benefit the general public, it will
not be an industry. The activities of the Indian Standards Institution fall within the category
of undertaking analogous to trade or business and constitute an "industry" within the meaning
of s. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Clubs activity is basically promotion of the
game of Cricket. It is not set up for earning profits.

D.N.Banerji v P.R. Mukherjee [AIR 1953 SC 58]

Facts:
Sanitary Inspector and Head Clerk were suspended by Budge Budge Municipality and the
Workers’ Union had raised dispute demanding reinstatement. In the Supreme Court, the
Municipality pleaded that it is discharging sovereign function under the Bengal Municipal
Act and hence, it is not industry and thus the dispute is not an industrial dispute.
Issue:
Whether municipalities are covered under the definition of industry under section 2(j) of
Industrial Disputes Act?

Held:
The Court observed that the definition is intended to include even those activities that
cannot be called trade or business. It held that Municipality is an industry because
sanitation and conservation is an undertaking which is comparable to trade and industry. 
Management of Sardarjung Hospital vs. Kuldipsingh Sethi [AIR 1970 SC
1407]
Facts:
In 1960, Hospital Mazdoor Sabha Case brought hospitals within ambit of industry. This case
involved payment of retrenchment compensation to workmen in JJ Hospitals, Mumbai.
The Management of Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi was the respondent in a petition
under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in a petition by the present
respondent Kuldip Singh Sethi, a Lower Division Clerk in the Hospital, for computation of
the amount of salary etc. due to him in the pay scale of store keepers.
The Management pleaded that the Hospital was not involved in any trade or business and
hence they are not industry. Court framed a working principle that any systematic activity for
production or distribution of goods or services done with help of employees in the manner of
a trade or business is an industry. 

Issue:
Is Hospital an industry? 

Held:
The services in the hospital were held to be material service and hence Hospitals are
industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. Kuldip Singh Sethi is a 'workman' and hence he
is entitled to take recourse to section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On merits his
claim is found sustainable and he is given an award for Rs. 914.
The reason for giving a wide interpretation to the word Industry was that the Court wanted to
bring organizations within fold of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 so that a large number of
agitations and strikes could be curtailed and industrial peace could prevail. Material services
involve an activity carried on through co-operation between employers and employees to
provide the community with the use of something such as electric power, water,
transportation, mail delivery, telephones and the like. Such material services qualify to be
included as Industry. 
Burmah Shell Storage Distribution Co; of India ltd vs. Management Staff
Association [(1970) 2LLJ590]
Facts:
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd., Bombay (hereinafter
referred to as "the Company") and a set of employees who were designated as junior
management staff and were members of the Burmah Shell Management Staff Association
registered as a trade union. The reference was confined to the members of the junior
management staff working in Maharashtra region. The main business of the Company is
marketing of petroleum products and oils and the Marketing Area is the whole of India which
is divided into four areas, viz, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi. This reference related to
the Bombay area. The organisation and management of each area is divided into four
functions, Marketing, Distribution, Personnel and Finance. Each one of the four Areas is
itself divided into several Marketing Divisions and each Division is further sub-divided into
five or seven sales districts as the case may be. For the sale of commodities, in which the
Company deals, there are various outlets, such as petrol pumps, storage depots, etc. The
Company also undertakes the work of fuelling of aircraft at the Airfields which work is done
by the Airfield Service Stations. For purposes of storage and distribution of products handled
by the Company, the Company maintains port installations as well as upcountry depots. The
staff concerned in this reference is employed at the installations or the depots in the
Maharashtra region.
The members of the Association are described as junior management staff, they claimed that
they were workmen as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. On that basis,
industrial dispute relating to salary, etc. was raised. The Association served a charter of
demands on the Company on 29th November, 1966. The Government referred the dispute to
the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal gave its finding on the preliminary issue as an interim
award on 9th January, 1970. Out of 10, members of 6 categories were held to be workmen
and these are: (1) Transport Engineer (2) District Engineers (3) Foreman (Chemicals) (4)
Fuelling Superintendent. (5) Chemists. (6) Sales Engineering Representatives, Members
belonging to 4 categories were held not to be workmen. These categories are: - (1) Blending
Supervisors (2) Foreman (3) Depot Superintendents (4) District Sales Representatives Civil
Appeal No. 1477 of 1970 has been brought up by the Company challenging the decision of
the Tribunal in respect of the 6 categories held to be workmen, while Civil Appeal No. 1478/
1970 has been filed by the Association challenging the correctness of the decision of the
Tribunal in respect of the 4 categories held not to be workmen.

Issue:
Whether the Sales Engineering Representatives and District Sales Representatives employed
in the company were workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act?

Held:
The effect of the decision of the Tribunal is that 98 employees belonging to 4 categories have
been held not to be workmen, while 42 employees belonging to 6 categories have been held
to be workmen. The decision in these appeals can, however, have wider repercussions
because, in the whole of India, the total number of persons belonging to these categories
would be 648. If the Tribunal's decision is upheld, 154 of them would workmen and 494
would be non-workmen. It may also be noticed that the majority of the persons concerned in
this reference originally started at a salary of Rs. 100/- to Rs. 200/- per mensem and it is only
as a result of promotions, revision of salaries and length of service that they are now drawing
basic pay at the rates mentioned above. All persons appointed to the posts now held by them
were originally described as Supervisors or field staff; but, in the year 1962, they came to be
designated as 'junior management staff’. 

May and Baker(I) Limited vs. Workmen [(1961) 2 LLJ 94 (3judges)]

Issue:
Whether the medical representative of the company, who was discharged from service, was a
workman under the Industrial Disputes Act?

Held:
Wanchoo, J. was observed that: "As ’workman’ was then defined as any person employed in
any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward.
Therefore, doing manual or clerical work was necessary before a person could be called a
workman. This definition came for consideration before industrial tribunals and it was
consistently held that the designation of the employee was not of great moment and what was
of importance was the nature of his duties. If the nature of the duties is manual or clerical,
then the person must be held to be a workman. On the other hand if manual or clerical work
is only a small part of the duties of the person concerned and incidental to his main work
which is not manual or clerical, then such a person would not be a workman. It has, therefore,
to be seen in each case from the nature of the duties whether a person employed is a workman
or not, under the definition of that work as it existed before the amendment of 1956. The
employee Mukerjee involved in that case was not a workman under section 2(s) of the Act
because he was not mainly employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work
for hire or reward, which were the only two classes of employees who qualified for being
treated as ’workman’ under the definition of the expression ’workman’ in the Act. The nature
of the duties assigned to Mukerjee that his main work was that of canvassing and any clerical
or manual work that he had to do was incidental to his main work of canvassing and could
not take more than a small fraction of the time for which he had to work. In the circumstances
the tribunal’s conclusion that Mukerjee was a workman is incorrect.
The Court held that would not necessarily mean that the employee's duties were mainly
manual or clerical. The Court held that from what the Tribunal itself had found, it was clear
that the employee's duties were mainly neither clerical nor manual and, therefore, he was not
a workman. Hence the Court set aside the Tribunal's direction for reinstating the employee.
That, however, would not necessarily mean that Mukerjee’s duties were mainly manual or
clerical. the employee Mukerjee involved in that case was not a workman under section 2(s)
of the Act because he was not mainly employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or
clerical work for hire or reward, which were the only two classes of employees who qualified
for being treated as ’workman’ under the definition of the expression ’workman’ in the Act.

Sundarambal vs. Govt of Goa [(1989)1LLJ61]

Facts:
The appellant, Miss A. Sundarambal, was appointed as a teacher in a school conducted by the
Society of Franciscan Sisters of Mary at Caranzalem, Goa. Her services were terminated by
the Management by a letter dated 25th April, 1975. After she failed in her several efforts in
getting the order of termination cancelled, she raised an industrial dispute before the
Conciliation Officer under the Act. The conciliation proceedings failed and the Conciliation
Officer reported accordingly to the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu by his letter dated
2nd May, 1982. On receipt of the report the Government considered the question whether it
 could refer the matter for adjudication under Section 10(l)(c) of the Act but on reaching the
conclusion that the appellant was not a 'workman' as defined in the Act which alone would
have converted a dispute into an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act, it
declined to make a reference. Thereupon the appellant filed a writ petition before the High
Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench, Goa for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus requiring
the Government to make a reference under Section 10(l)(c) of the Act to a Labour Court to
determine the validity of the termination of her services. After hearing the parties concerned,
the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the appellant was not a workman by
its judgment dated 5th Sept. 1983. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the
appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

Issues:
1. Whether a teacher employed in a school falls within the definition of the expression
'workman' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
2. Whether the school was an industry?

Held:
The Supreme Court held that teachers in the schools cannot be termed as employees under
the Labour Laws so long as they are engaged in teaching. The teachers employed by
Educational Institutions whether they are imparting Primary, Secondary, Graduate or
Postgraduate Education, cannot be called as workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of
the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of Teachers cannot be considered
as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. A
Teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes
them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of Teachers. The
clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching.

S.K.Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra [(1983)Lab.I.C1483]

Facts:
In this case, Jitendra Sharma is the appellant, G.L. Sanghi and D.N. Mishra is the
Respondent. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Chinnappa Reddy. J. The Central
Government, the appropriate Government within the meaning of section 2 (a) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi: "Whether the action of the management of the Life
Insurance Corporation of India, New Delhi in dismissing Shri S.K. Verma, Development
officer in Jullunder Branch of the Corporation, with effect from February 8,1969 is justified ?
If not, to what relief is the workman entitled?" The Life Insurance Corporation promptly
raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the reference on the ground
that Shri S K. Verma was not a workman. The Industrial Tribunal upheld the preliminary
objection and ruled that Development Officers in the Life Insurance Corporation of India are
not workmen within the meaning of section 2 (s) of the Industrial Dispute, Act. The reference
was therefore held to be incompetent. Writ Petition filed by S.K. Verma was dismissed in
limine by the Delhi High Court. S.K. Verma has come before us under Article 136 of the
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether the action of the management of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, New Delhi
in dismissing Shri S.K. Verma, Development officer in Jullunder Branch of the Corporation,
with effect from February 8, 1969 is justified?
Held:
Development officers in the Life Insurance Corporation are workmen' within the meaning of
section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court, therefore, held that to decide the
question whether the Development Officers in the LIC were workmen or not, it should adopt
a pragmatic and not a pedantic approach and consider the broad question as to on which side
of the line the workman fell, viz., labour or management, and then to consider whether there
were any good reasons for moving them over from one side to the other. The Court then
noticed that the LIC Staff Regulations classified the staff into four categories, viz., (i)
Officers, (ii) Development Officers, (iii) Supervisors and Clerical Staff, and (iv) Subordinate
Staff. The Court pointed out that Development Officers were classified separately both from
Officers on the one hand and Supervisors and Clerical Staff on the other and that they as well
as Class III and Class IV staff other than Superintendents were placed on par inasmuch as
their appointing and disciplinary authority was the Divisional Manager whereas that of
Officers was Zonal Manager. The Court also referred to their scales of pay and pointed out
that the appellation 'Development Officer' was no more than a glorified designation. The
Court then referred to the nature of duties of the Development Officers and pointed out that a
Development Officer was to be a whole-time employee and that his operations were to be
restricted to a defined area and that he was liable to be transferred. He had no authority
whatsoever to bind the Corporation in any way. His principal duty appeared to be to organize
and develop the business of the Corporation in the area allotted to him, and for that purpose,
to recruit 9 active and reliable agents, to train them, to canvass new business and to render
post- sale services to policyholders.

H.R.Adyanthaya vs. Sandoz (India) Limited [(1995)1LLJ303 SC]

Issue:
Whether the 'medical representatives' as they are commonly known, are workmen according
to the definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

Held:
The Bench has held that since the Medical representatives are not workmen within the
meaning of the Maharashtra Act, the complaint made to the Industrial Court under the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices
Act, 1971 was not maintainable. The acceptance of the contention of Mr. Reddy that
respondent no.3 in view of Sandoz case is not a ‘workman’ within the meaning of the U.P.

Muir Mills NTC Limited vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava [(2007)1 SCC
491]

Facts:
The appellant in the present matter is Muir Mills a subsidiary of the National Textile
Corporation Ltd. of State of Uttar Pradesh. The respondent No.1 was offered appointment as
Legal Assistant in the litigation section on a probation period of 1 year (in the pay scale of
Rs. 330-560) on 04.06.1982. The appointment letter stated that the said appointment was on a
probationary basis. On 23.11.1982, a letter was written by the Senior Legal Assistant to the
General Manager of the Mill stating that respondent No.1 had completed 6 months of
probation but was not able to understand fully the work of his post and stated that "His work
is not up to the mark; therefore he is of no use to us". However, it was decided to give the
respondent No.1 an opportunity to improve his performance. It is the case of the appellants
that the respondent No.1 was orally informed about the above decision of the appellants.
 On the expiry of the probation period of the respondent No.1, a letter dated 04.06.1983 was
issued to the respondent No.1 stating that, "Your performance has not been found satisfactory
and as such, you have failed to complete the probationary period successfully".
On 06.02.1985, respondent No.1 raised an industrial dispute which was referred for
adjudication by respondent No.2 the State of Uttar Pradesh, to the Labour Court in the
following terms, "Is termination of the services of the workman Swayam Prakash Srivastava
(son of Hori Lal Srivastava), Legal Assistant by the employers vide their order dated
04.06.1983 is right and/or legal? If not, the concerned workman is entitled to which
benefit/relief and along with which other details."
On 25.05.1987, the Labour Court delivered an award holding that, the respondent No.1 was a
workman and the termination was illegal and that respondent No.1 has to be reinstated within
a month of the order with backwages. The Labour court also observed that the Industrial
adjudicator had no power to examine the validity of the termination of the services of a
probationer before the completion of probation period. Aggrieved by this order of the Labour
Court, the appellant preferred a writ petition being WP No.22193 before the High Court of
Judicature, Allahabad challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 25.05.1987. By an
interim order dated 02.12.1987, the High Court stayed the operation of the award of the
Labour Court subject to the deposit of one half of the decreed backwages.
On 01.11.2002, the High Court dismissed the writ petition No.22193 of 1987 holding that the
High Court will not interfere with the order of the Labour court as the same has neither been
shown to be perverse, nor suffering from any error of law.

Issue:
1. Whether 'legal assistant' falls under the definition of workman under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947?

Held:
In this case, the court held that any person designated as a professional cannot be termed
as workman under any law. The respondent is not a workman; he will not be entitled to
payment of half of the decreed amount which was ordered to be deposited.
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea estate vs. Dimakuchi Tea estate
[(1958)1LLJ500S.C]
Facts:
The appellants are the workmen of the Dimakuchi Tea Estate represented by the Assam Chah
Karmachari Sangha, Dibrugarh. The respondent is the management of the Dimakuchi tea
estate, District Darrang in Assam. One Dr K.P. Banerjee was appointed Assistant Medical
Officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1, 1950. He was appointed
subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his
letter of appointment: “While you are on probation or trial, your suitability for permanent
employment will be considered. If during the period of probation you are considered
unsuitable for employment, you will receive seven days' notice in writing terminating your
appointment. If you are guilty of misconduct, you are liable to instant dismissal. In February
1951 Dr Banerjee was given an increment of Rs 5 per mensem, but on April 21, Dr Banerjee
received a letter from one Mr Booth, Manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated: “It has
been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will
of course receive one month's salary in lieu of notice”. As no reasons were given in the notice
of termination, Dr Banerjee wrote to the Manager to find out why his services were being
terminated. To this Dr Banerjee received a reply to this effect: “The reasons for your
discharge are on the medical side, which are outside my jurisdiction, best known to Dr Cox
but a main reason is because of the deceitful manner in which you added figures to the
requirements of the last medical indent after it had been signed by Dr Cox, evidence of which
is in my hands.” The cause of Dr Banerjee was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the
Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the Secretary of that Sangha wrote to the Manager of
the Dimakuchi tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr Banerjee's discharge. The
Manager wrote back to say that Dr K.P. Banerjee was discharged on the ground of
incompetence in his medical duties and the chief medical officer (Dr Cox) had found that Dr
Banerjee was incompetent and did not have sufficient “knowledge of simple everyday
microscopical and laboratory work which befalls the lot of every Assistant Medical Officer in
tea garden practice”. The matter was then referred to a Board known as the Tripartite
Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of
the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha
respectively. This Board recommended that Dr Banerjee should be reinstated with effect from
the date of his discharge. Then, on December 23, 1953, the Government of Assam published
a notification in which it was stated that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen between the
appellants and the respondent herein and whereas it was expedient that the dispute should be
referred for adjudication to a tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Act, the Governor of
Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U.K. Gohain, Additional District and Sessions
Judge, under clause (c) of sub-Section (1) of Section 10 of the Act.
person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act still falls within the scope of the
definition clause in Section 2(k). If we analyse the definition clause it falls easily and
naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute or difference; second, the dispute or
difference must be between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen
or between workmen and workmen; third, the dispute or difference must be connected with
the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of
labour, of any person. On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the conditions referred
to in the first and second parts of the definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case,
because there is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of Dr K.P. Banerjee
and the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely, the management of the
Dimakuchi tea estate on one side, and its workmen on the other, even taking the expression
“workmen” in the restricted sense in which that expression is defined in the Act. Learned
counsel for the appellants has submitted that the expression “of any person” occurring in the
third part of the definition clause is an expression of very wide import and there are no
reasons why the words “any person” should be equated with “any workman”, as the tribunals
below have done. 

Issue:
Whether a dispute raised by the workmen (relating to a person who was not a workman)
could be an Industrial Dispute under Section 2(k) of the IDA 1947, as it stood before the
amendments of 1956?

Held:
The Tribunal held that Dr Banerjee was not a workman as defined in the Act and, therefore,
the dispute referred was not an industrial dispute and consequently, it had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon such a dispute. The workmen preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate
Tribunal. That Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr Banerjee was not a workman
within the definition of that term in the Act and as the dispute was connected with his
employment or non-employment, it was not an industrial dispute, and was, therefore beyond
 the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. From that decision the present appeal by the
workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by Supreme Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution. 
The court can come to the conclusion that a dispute concerning a person who is not a
workman may be an industrial dispute within S. 2(k). As it has not been said that the dispute
was not an industrial dispute, the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that
dispute and should have done so.

Standard Vacuum refining co; of India Limited vs. The workmen [(1960) 2
LLJ 233SC]
Facts:
The workers of the Standard Vacuum Refining Co.  raised an industrial dispute with respect
to the contract labour employed by it for cleaning and maintenance of the refinery. They were
demanding the abolition of the contract system that prevailed in the company and asked that
the workers be absorbed into the regular service of the company. The system, they said,
resulted in the denial of security at work and the rights and benefits they were entitled.
The workmen claimed bonus for the year 1956 equivalent to nine months' total earnings on
the ground that the employers had admitted their capacity to pay and that there was a big gap
between the wage actually received and the living wage.
The employers contended that they were paying the workmen a living wage and they were
not entitled to any bonus. The employers relying mainly on the Report of the Textile Labour
Committee, 1940, contended that if the living wage in 1940, i.e., Rs. 55/- was multiplied by
35 (due to rise in prices) it gave Rs. 192.50 as the living wage in 1956 and they were paying
their workmen at a higher rate. The workmen relied on the recommendations of the Indian
Labour Conference, 1957, to show that Rs. 209.70 approximated to the standard of the need-
based minimum wage and that the average wage paid by the employers was nothing more
than this. The Tribunal held that the wages paid were fair but that there was still a gap
between the actual wage and the living wage and awarded bonus equivalent to five months'
basic wages.

Issues:
1. Whether a dispute raised by the permanent workmen regarding abolition of contract labour is
an industrial dispute under s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and
2. Whether the directions given by the Industrial Tribunal abolishing the contract system was
justified?

Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Industrial Tribunal abolishing contract labour on the
ground that the employment of contract labour would not have served to keep down the costs
of the employer on the ground that there would not be sufficient work for the workmen if
permanent labour was employed.
The court also held that the principal employer and the Contractor were liable for prosecution
under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, if they made non-
compliance of section 7 and section 12 of the Act, respectively. Further, it was held that the
employee employed through the contractor did not become the employees of the principal
employer. The dispute in the present case was an industrial dispute within the meaning of
section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Churakulam Tea estate- workmen [(1969) 2 LLJ 407 SC ( 3 Judge Bench)]

Facts:
The appellant owns the Churakulam Tea Estate, in Kottayam, Kerala State. From 1946
onwards, the Planters' Association of Kerala (South India) used to enter into agreements, with
the representatives of the workmen, from time to time, for the payment of bonus. The first
agreement, in 1946, related to the payment of bonus for the years 1947, 1948 and 1949; and
by Exhibit W-5, the said agreement was extended for the years 1950 and 1951. A fresh
agreement, Exhibit W-15, was entered into in 1955, for payment of bonus for the years 1952.
1953 and 1954 and there appear to have been subsequent agreements also. There is no
controversy that the appellant paid bonus for nine years, i.e., from 1947 to 1951 and 1953 to
1956. There is also no- controversy that the payment of bonus, for these years, was not at a
uniform rate. For instances, from 1946 to 1949 bonus was paid at 4% of the total earnings
whereas, for the year 1950, it was increased to 8 1/2% of the total earnings. So far as the year
1952 was concerned, the appellant's case was that it had not paid any bonus, as such, but, on
the other hand, it had made an ex gratia payment of Rs. 3/- to each worker; but the Tribunal
has not accepted this plea and it has held that the said payment must be treated as one having
been made towards bonus. According to the appellant, it paid bonus for the years, mentioned
above, because it was earning profits. So far as tea estates are concerned, the agreement
provides for payment of bonus, at a particular percentage of the annual total earnings of a
worker, for the three years in question, depending upon the total extent of the estates
concerned. The Tribunal was also of the view that the strike of the factory workers, on
November 30, 1961, was both legal and justified and hence directed the appellant to pay
wages for that day. The Tribunal further held that the lay-off, of the workmen, by the
management, for eight days from December 1, 1961, was without just cause and it was done
as a retaliatory measure. It made the management liable for payment of wages to the
workmen for this period.

Issue:
Whether workmen who proceed on strike, whether legal or illegal, are entitled to wages  for
the  period  of  strike?

Held:
It was held that strike must be both legal and justified to entitle the workmen to the wages.
The award of the Industrial Tribunal in so far as it granted bonus to the workmen for the
years 1957 to 1959, is set aside, and the appeal is allowed to that extent; in other respects, the
appeal stands dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.

Syndicate Bank and Ors vs. Umesh Nayak [AIR 1995 SC 319,( 5Judges)]
Facts:
On 10 April 1989, a memorandum of settlement was signed by the Indian Banks’ Association
and the All Indian Bank Employees’ Unions including the National Confederation of Bank
Employees as the fifth bipartite settlement. The appellant Bank through its employee
federation was bound by the said settlement. Three separate settlements were entered into
between the appellant bank and its employee federation on 9 June 1989. Under these
settlements, the employees of the appellant were entitled to certain advantages except for
those provided under the Bipartite Settlement. However, the appellant bank did not
immediately implement the settlement because of which the employee Federation had to send
a telex message to the appellant on 22 June 1989 calling upon it to implement the same
without further loss of time or else an agitation would be launched for its implementation.
The bank replied that it needs the government’s approval to implement the said settlement
 and it is making efforts to obtain the same and hence the federation should cooperate with it.
On 24 July 1989, the federation again made the same request to the appellant only this time
with a threat of a token strike. The response of the appellant was the same as earlier. On 1
September 1989, the Federation issued a notice of the strike, to be held on three different
days beginning from 18 September 1989, demanding immediate implementation of all
agreements/ understandings reached between the parties. At this stage, Deputy Chief Labour
Commissioner and Conciliatory Officer took cognizance of the dispute and initiated
conciliatory proceedings to resolve the same. While the proceedings were pending, the
employee federation on 6 October 1989 filed a writ petition before the High Court for the
immediate implementation of the three settlements dated 9 June 1989. In the petition, the
court ordered the immediate implementation of the settlement agreed between the parties. On
12 October 1989 the Bank issued a circular stating therein that if the employees went ahead
with the strike on 16 October 1989, the Management of the Bank would deduct the salary for
the days the employees would be on strike. In spite of the circular, the employees went on
strike on 16 October 1989 and on 17 October 1989, wrote a letter to the conciliatory officer
requesting him to deem the proceedings to be closed from their side and filed a writ petition
on 7 November 1989 to quash the circular of 12 October 1989 and to direct the Bank not to
make any deduction of salary for the day of the strike. The writ petition was admitted and the
High Court issued an interim injunction restraining the bank from deducting the salary. As
the arguments advanced the learned Single Judge ruled in the favour of the Bank while when
the matter went in appeal to the Division Bench it overruled the judgment given by the Single
Judge and ruled in the favour of the employees. It is because of these two conflicting the said
appeal has been filed and the matter has been referred to this court.

Issue:
1. Whether the strike is legal or illegal?
2. Whether the decision given by the Division Bench needs to be set aside?

Held:
The Court stated that a strike will be illegal if it is in contravention of the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 
The Act states that no workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on
strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lockout
during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after the
conclusion of such proceedings.
The Court established that there was neither a violation of a provision of any statute to render
the strike illegal nor in the circumstances it could be held that the strike was
unjustified. Strikes have to be justified and legal in order to receive wages. The legality of the
same would be checked by the Industrial tribunal and no other authority. However, legality
alone doesn’t guarantee wages. The court observed the fact that the legality of the strike
depends on the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the justifiability of the strike
depends on the conditions of the strike such as urgency of the situation, nature of the issue or
demand, working conditions, or why the dispute was not resolved without resorting to strike.
It directed the Central Government to refer the dispute with regard to the deduction of wages
for adjudication to the appropriate authority under the Act within eight weeks.

The Indian Banks'

Association and the All
Indian Bank Employees'
Unions signed a
memorandum of settlement
on April 10, 1989. The
appellant Bank was
obligated by the
settlement through its
employee federation. On
September 1, 1989, the
Federation issued a strike
warning for three days
commencing on September 18,
1989. In October 1989,
employees of the
Bank of Zambia went on
strike. The High Court ordered
an injunction preventing the
bank from
deducting their wages. The
matter has been referred to this
court by the conciliatory
officer, who
has filed an appeal.
The Indian Banks'
Association and the All
Indian Bank Employees'
Unions signed a
memorandum of settlement
on April 10, 1989. The
appellant Bank was
obligated by the
settlement through its
employee federation. On
September 1, 1989, the
Federation issued a strike
warning for three days
commencing on September 18,
1989. In October 1989,
employees of the
Bank of Zambia went on
strike. The High Court ordered
an injunction preventing the
bank from
deducting their wages. The
matter has been referred to this
court by the conciliatory
officer, who
has filed an appeal.
Management of Chandramalai Estate, Kerala vs. Workmen, [AIR 1960 SC
902]
The management having refused to comply with some of the demands raised by workmen,
the matter was referred for conciliation. Efforts at conciliation failed on November 30, 1955.
on the very next day the union gave a strike notice and actually went on strike with effect
from December 9, 1958. On January 3, 1956, the Government referred the dispute to the
Industrial Tribunal and the strike was called off on January 5, 1956. The Tribunal took the
view that both the parties were to blame for the strike and that the workmen were entitled to
get 50% of the emoluments for the period of strike.

Issue:
Whether the workmen were entitled to get wages for the period of the' strike was along with
some other grounds referred to the Tribunal?

Held:
It was held that on the facts of the case the strike was unjustified and that the workmen were
not entitled to any wages for the period.

Bharath Sugar Mills Limited vs. Jai Singh [(1961) 2LLJ 644 SC]
Facts:
The appellant company (Sugar Mill Company) carries on the business of manufacturing
tyres, tubes and several other products in Bombay. The workmen in the company's tyre-
curing department adopted a deliberate "go-slow" policy resulting in fall in production. On
September 14, 1967 the management put up a notice asking the workmen to desist from
continuing with the go-slow tactics. The notice, however, had no effect and from October 4,
1967 the workmen in the tyre-curing department went on a strike. Between October 27 and
31, 1967 the management issued charge sheets to 102 workmen alleging that they had
resorted to wilful go-slow. The workmen refrained from participating in the inquiries
conducted by three inquiry officers and the inquiry reports went against the workmen. The
management accepted the findings of the inquiry officers and dismissed the workmen other
than those who were "protected workmen" as defined in the explanation to section 33 (3) (b)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; an application was made under the said provision for
permission to dismiss the "protected workmen". As a reference concerning an earlier dispute
was pending before the Tribunal, an application was also made under section 33 (2) (b) of the
Act for approval of the action of the management in dismissing the workmen. Subsequently,
on April 17, 1968 the parties reached a settlement. Under the settlement the strike was
withdrawn, the dispute concerning the dismissal of the workmen was referred for
adjudication by a joint application made by the parties under section 10 (2) of the Act, and 76
of the dismissed workmen were re-employed till the disposal of the adjudication by the
Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal by its award dated December 9, 1976 directed the company
to reinstate these 12 workmen on the ground, inter alia, that they were denied for no valid
reason the same treatment meted out to 76 other workmen and that the management was thus
guilty of discrimination and unfair labour practice.

Held:
In an application under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when there has been
no domestic enquiry or when the domestic enquiry has not been properly conducted. It is the
duty of the Tribunal to take evidence of both sides and to decide whether the alleged
misconduct has been made out. The evidence produced before the Tribunal clearly
established that 13 out of the 20 workmen were guilty of deliberate go slow. Go slow was a
pernicious and dishonest practice which was a misconduct punishable with dismissal under
the standing orders. Actual participation in go slow was serious misconduct and the
management could not reasonably be accused of mala fides or revengefulness if it proposed
punishment of dismissal for such conduct.
The Supreme Court explained the legality of go-slow in the following words:
“Go-slow which is a picturesque description of deliberate delaying of production by
workmen pretending to be engaged in the factory is one of the most pernicious practices that
discontented and disgruntled workmen sometimes resort to. Thus, while delaying production
and thereby reducing the output, the workmen claim to have remained employed and entitled
to full wages. Apart from this, ‘go-slow’ is likely to be much more harmful than total
cessation of work by strike. During a go-slow much of the machinery is kept going on at a
reduced speed which is often extremely damaging to the machinery parts. For all these
reasons, ‘go-slow’ has always been considered a serious type of misconduct.”

India Marine Services Private Limited vs. Workmen [(1963) 1 LLJ 122]
Facts:

B, a clerk in the appellant company, was found shouting and behaving in a rude and insolent
manner with his superior officer. In consequence of this incident a charge-sheet was issued to
him and he was asked to give his explanation for his behavior; he was also asked to give
explanation in respect of certain purchases made by him for the company.
Eventually an enquiry was held by the Managing Director at which he found that two charges
were made out, and on the basis of the findings the company dismissed B from his post.
The Industrial Tribunal considered that the findings were based not merely on the charges set
out in the charge-sheet but on certain other charges which B was not given on opportunity to
explain, and, therefore, the enquiry was vitiated and the dismissal could not be sustained.
The Tribunal proceeded to consider the evidence and held that the allegation of
insubordination against B was not proved. On account of a sudden strike launched by the
workmen on November 13, 1958, the company declared a lock-out. The lock-out continued
till January 5, 1959, on which date the company's works were reopened, It was found that
while the strike was unjustifiable and the lock-out when it was ordered on November 13,
1958, was justified, its continuance for 53 days was wholly unreasonable and, therefore,
unjustified.

Issue:
Whether the workmen are justified in stopping overtime as and when they like?

Held:
In this case where the strike is unjustified and the lockout is justified, the workmen would not
be entitled to any wages at all. Similarly, where the strike is justified and the lock-out is
unjustified, the workmen would be entitled to the entire wages for the period of strike and
lock-out. Where, however, a strike is unjustified and is followed by a lock-out, which
becomes unjustified, a case for apportionment of blame arises.

Itakhoole Tea Estate Vs. Workmen [(1960) 2LLJ 2]

Facts:
The said dispute between the management and the workmen of the Tea Estate arose under the
following circumstances. On September 5, 1952, at 12 noon, the labourers wanted leave on
the ground that it was raining, but the manager of the Estate refused to give the leave and
directed them to pluck leaves in the afternoon also. The labourers did not do any work in the
afternoon on that day. On September 11, 1952, thirty-nine men-labourers left plucking at 3-
20 p.m. without permission, although the schedule time for stopping work was approximately
4-30 p.m. Those who left early were weighed in after all the other labourers had been
weighed in and they were also each fined two annas and were also directed not to pluck but to
weed on the next day. On the next day i.e., on September 12, 1952, the other men also left
plucking and joined the weeders and later on in the day all went on plucking. At mid-day on
the same day the women-labourers were weighed in, but the men-labourers refused to be
weighed in unless those who were ordered to weed were also weighed in. The Manager did
not agree to this course. The same trouble occurred in the evening also. In the afternoon of
September 12, 1952, the then Zonal Secretary, Mr. Alien, and the Government Labour
Officer, Dibrugarh, arrived at the garden at 3 p.m. and they were apprised of the intention of
the Manager to close down the garden from September 13, 1952, for garden labour and from
September 14, 1952, for factory labourers. The practice in the garden was that the labourers
who turned up late were allowed to work but they had to make up for their late arrival in the
evening by working after the schedule time for stoppage of work. The Manager declared a
lock-out of all labour of the garden at 9 a.m. on September 13, 1952, and the lock-out
continued till September 25, 1952, and the garden was opened on the morning of September
26, 1952. Tribunal held on the material placed before it that the action of the Manager in
declaring a lock-out at 9 a.m. was hasty, that it Was not just or equitable to punish all the
labourers for the acts of indiscipline committed by a few of them and that, therefore, the lock-
out was not justified. But as 402 workmen reported for work on September 13, 1952, it
directed their wages for that day to be paid to them. In regard to the women-labourers who
were weighed in on September 11 and 12, 1952, and also the men-labourers whose leaves
were weighed in on September 11, 1952, they were directed to be paid off their dues. Against
the said award the workmen filed an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal of India in so far as the
award was against them, but the management did not prefer any appeal. 
Issue:
Whether the management of Itakhoolie Tea Estate was justified in declaring a lock-out in the
garden from 13th September to 25th September, 1952?

Held:
It was held that lock-out was not justified; the entire body of workmen was entitled to
compensation for the period of lock-out. 

Edward Keventors vs. Delhi administration (1983)

Facts:
The petitioners are the employees of the respondent-company and are represented by their
Union. It is the common case of the parties that the respondent-company was declared to be a
Public Utility Service under section 2(n) of the Act. On November 20, 1963 a letter
containing a number of demands was sent on behalf of the petitioners to the respondent-
company for increasing dearness allowance and granting other monetary benefits to them.
Negotiations were thereafter held between the parties and a settlement was arrived at on
February 1, 1964, As a result of settlement, there was increase in the dearness allowance
payable to the workmen and the increase was linked with the rise of the cost of living. On or
about June 22, 1966 the petitioners submitted a charter of demands to the respondent-
company. In that charter the petitioners infer alia raised the demands for the payment of
bonus amounting to four months dearness allowance at the rate of Rs. 30.00 per workman
and stopping of new recruitment. As no action was taken by the respondent-company on that
charter, the petitioners gave the following notice on July 27, 1966. Copy of the above notice
was sent to the Conciliation Officer and other authorities. The Conciliation Officer then
intervened and started conciliation proceedings which took place on August 6, 1966. The
conciliation proceedings were still pending on August 11, 1966 when the petitioners went on
strike. The petitioners filed the present petition on August 25, 1966 and the principal
contention, which has been raised on their behalf, is that as the strike notice related to 16
demands and as only one of those demands has been referred for adjudication to the Tribunal,
respondent No. 1 was not justified in prohibiting the petitioners in continuing the strike.

Issue:
Whether the workmen are entitled to bonus for the year ending 30th of June, 1966?

Held:
The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Delhi High Court, held that the Appropriate
Government could prohibit Strikes or lockout only in respect of the demands which were referred for
adjudication. The strike in respect of those demands, the Government can prohibit the continuance of
the strike under this provision only if it had referred all the demands for adjudication. In other words,
if the Government does not refer all those demands for adjudication, it cannot prohibit the strike in
respect of the demands which were not referred. The words “such disputes which may be in existence
on the date of reference” are read together as relating to the disputes referred. It was held that the
words “which may be in existence on the date of reference” do not relate to strike or lockout but to the
disputes. The Kerala High Court took the view that the power under Section 10(3) is of a quasi
judicial nature and therefore an order there under cannot be passed by the Government without giving
the notice and hearing to those who would be affected by the order.