THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020 ]

ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PETITIONER, V.
COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND
HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA III, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENTS,
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State's declared
policy to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the
[1]
law, a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a
last name.
[2] [3]
This Court resolves the Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision
[4]
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional
[5]
Trial Court Orders denying Anacleto Ballaho Alanis Ill's appeal to
change his name to Abdulhamid Ballaho.

Petitioner filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga

[6]
City, Branch 12, to change his name. He alleged that he was born to
[7]
Mario Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid,
and that the name on his birth certificate was "Anacleto Ballaho Alanis
[8]
III." However, he wished to remove his father's surname "Alanis III,"
and instead use his mother's maiden name "Ballaho," as it was what he has
[9]
been using since childhood and indicated in his school records. He
likewise wished to change his first name from "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid"
[10]
for the same reasons.
During trial, petitioner testified that his parents separated when he was five
years old. His father was based in Maguindanao while his mother was
based in Basilan. His mother testified that she single-handedly raised him
[11]
and his siblings.
As summarized by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner presented the
following in evidence to support his claim that the requested change would
avoid confusion:
... a.) petitioner's photograph in what appears to be a page of a
yearbook; b.) another photograph of the petitioner appearing in
the editorial staff of ND Beacon where he appears to be the
assistant editor-in-chief; c.) the high school diploma of the
petitioner certifying that he finished his high school education
at Notre Dame of Parang in Parang, Maguindanao; d.) another
copy of the editorial of the ND Beacon where petitioner's name
appears as one of its editorial staff; e.) another copy of the
editorial of ND Beacon where the name of the petitioner
appears as the editor-in-chief; f.) a certificate of participation
issued to the petitioner by the Department of [E]ducation,
Culture and Sports; g.) a CAP College Foundation, Inc.,
diploma issued in the name of petitioner; h.) another CAP
College Foundation, Inc., diploma issued in the name of
petitioner; i.) a [WJestern Mindanao State University student
identification card in the name of petitioner; j.) a non-
professional driver[']s license issued in the name of petitioner;
[12]
k.) the Community Tax Certificate of petitioner[.]
[13]
In its April 9, 2008 Order, the Regional Trial Court denied the Petition,
holding that petitioner failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant a change
[14]
of name. It noted that the mere fact that petitioner has been using a
different name and has become known by it is not a valid ground for change
of name. It also held that to allow him to drop his last name was
[15]
to disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father, in violation
of the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that legitimate children
[16]
shall principally use their fathers' surnames.
The Regional Trial Court acknowledged that confusion could exist here,
but found that granting his petition would create more confusion:
Although it may appear that confusion may indeed arise as to
the identity of the petitioner herein who has accordingly used
the name Abdulhamid Ballaho in all his records and is known
to the community as such person and not Anacleto Ballaho
Alanis III, his registered full name is his Certificate of Live
Birth, this Court believes that the very change of name sought
by the petitioner in this petition would even create more
confusion since if so granted by this Court, such change sought
after could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her
parentage and/or paternity, bearing in mind that he is the
legitimate eldest child of the spouses Mario Alanis y
[17]
Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid[.]
Thus, the trial court concluded that, instead of seeking to change his name
in his birth certificate, petitioner should have had the other private and
public records corrected to conform to his true and correct name:
Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that, in
similar circumstances, the proper remedy for the petitioner is to
instead cause the proper correction of his private and public
records to conform to his true and correct first name and
surname, which in this case is Anacleto Ballaho Alanis, III and
not to change his said official, true and correct name as
appearing in his Certificate of Live Birth simply because either
he erroneously and inadvertently or even purposely or
deliberately used an incorrect first name and surname in his
[18]
private and public records.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no legal,

proper, justified and reasonable grounds to allow the change of
name of the herein petitioner from Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III
as appearing in his Certificate of Live Birth to Abdulhamid
Ballaho as prayed for by the petitioner in his petition dated
 February 1, 2007 the above-entitled petition is hereby DENIED
and ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit. No cost.

[19]
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Regional Trial Court denied
[20]
this in a June 2, 2008 Order.
It appears that on May 2, 2008, a month before the trial court rendered this
Order, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Johny Boy Dialo (Atty. Dialo), had
figured in a shooting incident and failed to report for work. Thus, petitioner
was only able to file a notice of appeal on September 2, 2008—months
after Atty. Dialo's law office had received the Order, beyond the filing
period. He invoked his counsel's excusable neglect for a belated appeal,
[21]
alleging the shooting incident.
Thereafter, with a new counsel, petitioner filed a Record on Appeal and
[22]
Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2008, reiterating his counsel's
[23]
excusable negligence. He added that he was set to take the Bar
Examinations and had to come home from his review, only to find out after
checking with Atty. Dialo's law office that he had lost the case and the
[24]
appeal period had lapsed. However, the Record and Notice of Appeal
were denied in the Regional Trial Court's September 16, 2008 Order for
[25]
having been filed out of time.
[26]
Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, providing the same reason to explain his failure to timely appeal.
[27]
In its May 26, 2014 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition,
holding that petitioner failed to show any reason to relax or disregard the
[28]
technical rules of procedure. It noted that the trial court did not gravely
err in denying petitioner's Record on Appeal for having been filed out of
[29]
time.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was also denied in the Court
 [30]
of Appeals' December 15, 2014 Resolution. Thus, he filed this Petition
[31]
for Certiorari.
Petitioner insists that the serious indisposition of his counsel after being
shot and receiving death threats is excusable negligence for a belated
[32]
appeal, it not being attended by any carelessness or inattention.
Delving on the substantive issue, petitioner maintains that he has the right
to use his mother's surname despite his legitimate status, as recognized in
[33]
Alfon v. Republic?
[34]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that this
Petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong remedy, and that
[35]
the proper course was to file a petition for review on certiorari. Further, it
argues that the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in
[36]
upholding the trial court's ruling. It points out that since Atty. Dialo's
law office has more than one lawyer, and it had admittedly received the
[37]
Order, the belated appeal was unjustified. Further, petitioner was
already a law graduate when he filed the first Petition, and was expected to
[38]
be more vigilant of his case's progress. Thus, the Office of the Solicitor
General finds no "exceptionally meritorious" reason to warrant a liberal
interpretation of technical rules. In any case, petitioner's reason is not
[39]
among the grounds to warrant a change in name.
[40]
In his Reply, petitioner failed to address the argument that a petition
for certiorari is the wrong remedy to assail the Court of Appeals' dismissal
of his Petition for Certiorari. He only reiterated the Court of Appeals
should have discarded technicalities, because jurisprudence on Article 364
[41]
of the Civil Code is settled in his favor.
After this Court had given due course to the Petition, the parties filed their
[42]
respective memoranda.
The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's

failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals;

Second, whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their
mothers' surnames as their surnames; and

Finally, whether or not petitioner has established a recognized ground for

changing his name.

This Court grants the Petition.

The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but petitioner
did not even attempt to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Court of Appeals. On this ground alone, the Petition may be dismissed.

It is not disputed that the Record on Appeal was filed out of time. The
Court of Appeals could have relaxed the rules for perfecting an appeal, but
was not required, by law, to review it.

The Court of Appeals found no reason to warrant any relaxation of the

rules, after appreciating the following circumstances: (1) petitioner did not
[43]
adduce evidence to prove the alleged shooting of his former counsel;
(2) petitioner was represented by counsel belonging to a law office which
had more than one associate;44 and (3) petitioner was a law graduate and
[45]
should have been more vigilant.
This Court cannot sidestep the rule on reglementary periods for appealing
[46]
decisions, except in the most meritorious cases.
Petitioner claims that the circumstances surrounding the failure to file the
appeal are bereft of carelessness or inattention on the part of counsel, and
thus, constitute excusable negligence.

This is unconvincing. In Sublay v. National Labor Relations

[47]
Commission the petitioner filed an appeal out of time because the
counsel on record did not inform her or her other counsel that a decision
had been rendered in her case. This Court affirmed the denial of her appeal
for having been filed out of time, explaining that:
The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that clients are bound
by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case.
Otherwise, if the lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted
as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to
litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent
[48]
or experienced or learned. (Citation omitted)
This Court noted in Sublay that the petitioner was represented by more
than one lawyer. The decision she wished to appeal had been duly served
on one of her lawyers on record, who failed to inform the more active
counsel. This Court ruled that the petitioner was bound by the negligence
of her counsel:
Lastly, petitioner's claim for judicial relief in view of her
counsel's alleged negligence is incongruous, to say the least,
considering that she was represented by more than one (1)
lawyer. Although working merely as a collaborating counsel
who entered his appearance for petitioner as early as May 1996,
i.e., more or less six (6) months before the termination of the
proceedings a quo, Arty. Alikpala had the bounden duty to
monitor the progress of the case. A lawyer has the
responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of
time left to file an appeal. He cannot rely on the courts to
appraise him of the developments in his case and warn him
against any possible procedural blunder. Knowing that the lead
counsel was no longer participating actively in the trial of the
case several months before its resolution, Atty. Alikpala who
alone was left to defend petitioner should have put himself on
guard and thus anticipated the release of the Labor Arbiter's
decision. Petitioner's lead counsel might have been negligent
but she was never really deprived of proper representation. This
[49]
fact alone militates against the grant of this petition.
Here, petitioner failed to respond to the assertion that Atty. Dialo's law office,
Dialo Darunday & Associates Law Office, is a law firm with more than one
lawyer, as well as legal staff, who must have been aware that Atty.
Dialo was not reporting to office or receiving his mail sent there.
Moreover, Atty. Dialo stopped reporting to office on May 2, 2008, whereas
the law firm received the June 2, 2008 Order more than a month later, on
June 12, 2008. Without any response to this point, this Court cannot
automatically excuse the law office and assume that it could not adjust to
Atty. Dialo's absence.

The law firm was certainly negligent in how it dealt with the Order. Given
the other circumstances of this case, petitioner would ordinarily be bound
by this negligence. Consequently, petitioner had the burden to sufficiently
establish, by alleging and arguing, that this case is so meritorious that it
warrants the relaxation of the procedural rules. This, petitioner did not
bother to do.
[50]
Nonetheless, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may
choose to apply procedural rules more liberally to promote substantial
justice. Thus, we delve into the substantial issues raised by petitioner.

II

The fundamental equality of women and men before the law shall be
ensured by the State. This is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
[52]
[51] a statute, and an international convention to which the Philippines is a
party.

In 1980, the Philippines became a signatory to the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and is thus
now part of the Philippine legal system. As a state party to the Convention,
the Philippines bound itself to the following:
Article 2

(f) to take all appropriate measures, including

legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women;
Article 5
 (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men
[53]
and women[.]
Non-discrimination against women is also an emerging customary norm.
Thus, the State has the duty to actively modify what is in its power to
modify, to ensure that women are not discriminated.

Accordingly, Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution reiterated the

State's commitment to ensure gender equality:
SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
In keeping with the Convention, Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution
requires that the State be active in ensuring gender equality. This provision
is even more noticeably proactive than the more widely-invoked equal
protection and due process clauses under the Bill of Rights. In Racho v.
[54]
Tanaka, this Court observed:
This constitutional provision provides a more active application
than the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be
denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection,
within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that
any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be
given to women. It does not require the State to actively pursue
"affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy — that
complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure
[55]
women's disempowerment." (Citation omitted)
Article II, Section 14 implies the State's positive duty to actively dismantle
the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports it.
With the Philippines as a state party to the Convention, the emerging
customary norm, and not least of all in accordance with its constitutional
duty, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act. Reiterating Article II, Section 14,
the law lays down the steps the government would take to attain this
policy:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role of

women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and
opportunities equal to that of men.
To attain the foregoing policy:

(1) A substantial portion of official development

assistance funds received from foreign governments and
multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and
utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and
activities for women;

(2) All government departments shall ensure that women

benefit equally and participate directly in the development
programs and projects of said department, specifically those
funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure
the full participation and involvement of women in the
development process; and

(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and

revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures
[56]
to remove gender bias therein.
Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure
the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly,
where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and
men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate
children cannot use their mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy,
the trial court treated the surnames of petitioner's mother and father
unequally when it said:
In the case at bar, what the petitioner wishes is for this Court to
allow him to legally change is [sic] his given and registered
first name from Anacleto III to Abdulhamid and to altogether
disregard or drop his registered surname, Alanis, the surname
of his natural and legitimate father, and for him to use as his
family name the maiden surname of his mother Ballaho, which
is his registered middle name, which petitioner claims and in
fact presented evidence to be the name that he has been using
and is known to be in all his records.
In denying the herein petition, this Court brings to the attention
of the petitioner that, our laws on the use of surnames state that
legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate
children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of
their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the father's surname. Legitimate
children, such as the petitioner in this case, has [sic] the right to
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity
with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames, and it is so
provided by law that legitimate and legitimated children shall
[57]
principally use the surname of the father. (Citations omitted)
This treatment by the Regional Trial Court was based on Article 174 of the
Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in

conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames[.]
In turn, Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
 ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.
The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is
incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall
"principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean
"exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the
State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men
before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it. This Court has
[58]
explicitly recognized such interpretation in Alfon v. Republic:
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's
prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use
the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code.
But the word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a
legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover,
this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194, April
29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said:
"The following may be considered, among others, as
proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the
grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when
the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when
the request for change is a consequence of a change
of status, such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the
change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p.
[59]
660)."
Given these irrefutable premises, the Regional Trial Court patently erred in
denying petitioner's prayer to use his mother's surname, based solely on the
word "principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code.

III
Having resolved the question of whether a legitimate child is entitled to use
their mother's surname as their own, this Court proceeds to the question of
changing petitioner's first name from "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid."

Whether grounds exist to change one's name is a matter generally left to

[60]
the trial court's discretion. Notably, the Petition is devoid of any legal
arguments to persuade this Court that the Regional Trial Court erred in
denying him this change. Nonetheless, we revisit the ruling, and
petitioner's arguments as stated in his appeal.

The Regional Trial Court correctly cited the instances recognized under
jurisprudence as sufficient to warrant a change of name, namely:
... (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based
on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
[61]
public interest. (Citation omitted)
As summarized in the Record on Appeal, the petition to change name was
filed to avoid confusion:
Petitioner has been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho in all
his records and transactions. He is also known to and called by
his family and friends by such name. He has never used the
name Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III even once in his life. To have
the petitioner suddenly use the name Anacleto Ballaho Alanis
III would cause undue embarrassment to the petitioner since he
has never been known by such name. Petitioner has shown not
only some proper or compelling reason but also that he will be
 prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. A mere
correction of his private and public records to conform to the
name stated in his Certificate of Live Birth would create more
confusion because petitioner has been using the name
Abdulhamid Ballaho since enrollment in grade school until
finishing his law degree. The purpose of the law in allowing
change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103
of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to
improve his personality and to provide his best interest[.] There
is therefore ample justification to grant fully his petition, which
is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
[62]
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion[.] (Citations
omitted)
These arguments are well taken. That confusion could arise is evident. In
[63]
Republic v. Bolante, where the respondent had been known as "Maria
Eloisa" her whole life, as evidenced by scholastic records, employment
records, and licenses, this Court found it obvious that changing the name
written on her birth certificate would avoid confusion:
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name
and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause
therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be
the best evidence available. What is involved in special
proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v.
Court of Appeals, . . . "not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event
of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts. "

With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for

a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it
were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name
and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie
Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as
 well as records in government offices, including that of her
driver's license, professional license as a certified public
accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission,
and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest
to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant

petition is granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice
dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of
any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he
does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of
[64]
the State or of other people. (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

[65]
This Court made a similar conclusion in Chua v. Republic:
The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has
established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than
"Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the Court,
other than his Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty
of reiteration, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police
Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High
School Diploma all reflect his surname to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him
to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to
confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official documents,
save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will
correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. For even their
own Certificates of Live Birth state that their father's surname is "Chua."
To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's
identity in his community, but also to that of his children.
[66]

Similarly, in this case, this Court sees fit to grant the requested change to
avoid confusion.

The Regional Trial Court itself also recognized the confusion that may
arise here. Despite this, it did not delve into the issue of changing
"Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid," but instead concluded that granting the
petition would create even more confusion, because it "could trigger much
[67]
deeper inquiries regarding [his] parentage and/or paternity[.]"
This Court fails to see how the change of name would create more
confusion. Whether people inquire deeper into petitioner's parentage or
paternity because of a name is inconsequential here, and seems to be more
a matter of intrigue and gossip than an issue for courts to consider.
Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still appears
in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be
referred to in cases where paternity is relevant.

Aside from being unduly restrictive and highly speculative, the trial court's
reasoning is also contrary to the spirit and mandate of the Convention, the
Constitution, and Republic Act No. 7192, which all require that the State
take the appropriate measures to ensure the fundamental equality of
women and men before the law.

Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The

more it pervades our culture, the more its chances to infect this and future
[68]
generations.
The trial court's reasoning further encoded patriarchy into our system. If a
surname is significant for identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting the
laws to mean that a marital child's surname must identify only the paternal
line renders the mother and her family invisible. This, in turn, entrenches
the patriarchy and with it, antiquated gender roles: the father, as dominant,
[69]
in public; and the mother, as a supporter, in private.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2014 Decision
and December 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R.
SP No. 02619-MIN, as well as the April 9, 2008 and June 2, 2008 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 in Special
Proceeding No. 5528, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

As prayed for in his Petition for Change of Name, petitioner's name is

declared to be ABDULHAMID BALLAHO. Accordingly, the Civil
Registrar of Cebu City is DIRECTED to make the corresponding
corrections to petitioner's name, from ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS
III to ABDULHAMID BALLAHO.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, J., (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting*, Delos Santos and Rosario,

JJ., concur.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on November 11, 2020 a Decision, copy attached
hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on February 10, 2021 at 3:25
p.m.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG

III Division Clerk of Court

* On official leave.

[1] Section 2, Republic Act No. 7192 (1992). Women in Development and
Nation Building Act.
[2] Rollo, pp. 11-20.

[3] Id. at 22-30. The May 26, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 02619-
MIN was penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in
by Associate Justices Oscar V. Badelles and Edward B. Contreras of the
Special Twenty-First Division of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro
City.

[4] Id. at 32-33. The December 15, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
02619-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and
concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar V. Badelles and Edward B.
Contreras of the Former Special Twenty-First Division of the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.

[5] Id. at 34-41. The April 9, 2008 Order in Special Proceeding No. 5528
was penned by Presiding Judge Gregorio V. Dela Pefia, III of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12. The Regional Trial Court also
issued a June 2, 2008 Order.

[6] Id. at 12.

[7] Id. at 43.
[8] Id. at 35.
[9] Id. at 12.
[10] Id. at 35.

[11] Id. at 36.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 34-41.

[14] Id. at 40.

[15] Id. at 39.

[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 39-40.

[18] Id. at 40.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 13.

[21] Id. at 61.

[22] Id. at 63.

[23] Id. at 64.

[24] Id. at 59.

[25] Id. at 63-64.

[26] Id. at 68-75.

[27] Id. at 22-30.

[28] Id. at 26.

[29] Id. at 29.

[30] Id. at 14.

[31]
Id. at 11. Filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

[32] Id. at 15-16.

[33] Id. at 17 citing 186 Phil. 600 (1980) [Per J. Abad Santos,
Second Division].
[34] Id. at 99-117.

[35] Id. at 102-105.

[36] Id. at 105-109.

[37] Id. at 107.

[38] Id. at 108.

[39] Id. at 109.

[40] Id. at 119-121.

[41] Id. at 120.

[42] Id. at 133-141 and 143-166.

[43] Id. at 27.

[44] Id. at 28.

[45] Id. at 27.

[46] Sublay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 381 Phil. 198, 204 (2000)
[Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

[47] 381 Phil. 198 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

[48] Id. at 205.

[49] Id. at 206.

[50] See Durban Apartments Corp. v. Catacutan, 514 Phil. 187 (2005)
[Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

[51] Const., art. I, sec. 14 states:

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,

and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.

[52] Republic Act No. 7192 (1992). Women in Development and Nation
Building Act.

[53] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women (1979), sees. 2 and 5.

[54] G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018, 868 SCRA 25 [Per J. Leonen, Third
Division].

[55] Id. at 44.

[56] Republic Act No. 7192 (1992), sec. 2.

[57] Rollo, pp. 39-40.

[58] 186 Phil. 600 [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division].

[59] Id. at 603.

[60] Republic v. Bolante, 528 Phil. 328 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second
Division].

[61] Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996) [Per J.

Regalado, Second Division].

[62] Rollo, p. 54.

[63] 528 Phil. 328 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].

[64] Id. at 339-340.

[65] 820 Phil. 1257 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division],

[66] Id. at 1263.

[67] Rollo, p. 40.

[68] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Re: Untian, Jr, A.C. No. 5900
(Resolution), April 10, 2019, [Per J. A. Reyes, Jr, En Bane].

[69] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

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