PROPERTY DIGEST POOL

A.Y. 2021 – 2022

214587
Case Title: DELOS REYES V. KALIBO G.R. No:
26
Topic: Quieting of Title Date: February
2018
Tickler: area of accretion into a garbage dumpsite; reliance on tax declaration
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject matter of the action.
While legal title denotes registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial
ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud
to be prevented or removed. Likewise, the plaintiff must show that the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

It is settled that an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because
the lot that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece
of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the
Civil Code; imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to
the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the
Doctrine/s: owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this
protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein
certain judicial procedures have been provided.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.

But neither can they validly rely on said tax declarations and the supposed actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property by their predecessors-
in-interest. Any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also
prove that he has been in actual possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property
involved had been declared for taxation purposes for a certain period of time, does not
constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership, in the absence of the
claimant's actual possession of said property.
FACTS
Case Type: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Lot No. 2076 of the Kalibo Cadastre, with a total area of 101,897 sqm was covered by
OCT No. 24435 R0-831, and registered in the name of Ana O. Peralta. Upon her demise,
her property passed on to her brother, Jose Peralta, who caused registration of the same
in his name under TCT No. T-5547, issued on January 13,1975. Jose later had the
property divided into Lots 2076-A and 2076-B, and sold the latter portion. Lot 2076-A,
on the other hand, remained in Jose's name and was registered under TCT No. 6166 on
November 17, 1975.

In the meantime, allegedly through accretion, land was added to Lot No. 2076. Said
area was first occupied by and declared for taxation purposes (Tax Declaration No.
General
6466) in the name of Ambrocio Ignacio in 1945. He was the Peraltas' tenant, but he later
Facts
executed a Quitclaim of Real Property in Jose's favor for the amount of P70.44 on March
14, 1955. When Jose died, Lot 2076-A, together with the supposed area of accretion,
was transferred to his son, Juanito Peralta. While TCT T-13140 was issued for Lot 2076-
A on September 1, 1983, the area of accretion was apportioned and registered under
Tax Declaration Nos. 21162-A, 21163-A, 21164-A, and 21165-A in the names of
siblings Juanito, Javier Peralta, Josephine delos Reyes, and Julius Peralta. Subsequently,
Juanito likewise died.

On the other hand, the Municipality of Kalibo, through its then Mayor Diego Luces and
the members of its Sangguniang Bayan, sought to convert more or less four (4) hectares

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana

of said area of accretion into a garbage dumpsite. On November 10, 1992, Juanito, in
his capacity as his siblings' representative, opposed said project in a letter. For failure
to get a favorable response from the mayor's office, he wrote a formal protest to the
Secretary of DENR on October 2, 1997.

Despite the Peraltas' opposition, the Municipality of Kalibo continued the project under
the justification that the contested property is actually part of the public domain.
Moreover, the DENR's Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) showed that the
project would not harm the dumpsite' s neighboring areas, including the water systems.
Thus, the municipality built a retaining wall on the property facing the Aklan river in
1996. More of the structures were built on the area from 1997 to 1998. Later, the area
was enclosed with a perimeter fence.

On January 26, 1998, the Peraltas filed a Complaint for quieting of title over the two (2)
portions of accretion declared in their names for taxation purposes. Peraltas' prayer for
an injunctive writ against the construction of the dumpsite was denied.

Petitioner’s
Contention

Respondent’s
Contention

RTC of Kalibo ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring the
Trial Court’s parcels of land as an accretion and not a public land. Defendants are also ordered to
Decision cease and desist from occupying that portion of the garbage dumpsite with an area of
31,320 square meters, which are within Lots 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' property
CA’s CA granted the appeal of Municipality of Kalibo and reversed the RTC’s ruling.
Decision
ISSUE/S

Whether or not the CA committed an error when it reversed the RTC, which declared the subject
parcels of land as accretion and not part of the public domain. – NO

RULING
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to,
or interest in, the property which is the subject matter of the action. While legal title denotes registered
ownership, equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or
interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Likewise, the plaintiff must show that the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

It must be noted that the Peraltas, the petitioners in the instant case, are not even registered owners of the
area adjacent to the increment claimed, much less of the subject parcels of land. Only the late Juanito
became the registered owner of Lot 2076-A, the lot next to the supposed accretion. Assuming that the
petitioners are Juanito's rightful successors, they still did not register the subject increment under their
names. It is settled that an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received
by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code; imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not
vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by
the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have
been provided.

If at all, whatever rights the Peraltas derived from their predecessors-in- interest respecting the area in
question came only from the quitclaim of real property executed by Ignacio in Jose's favor in 1955. There

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana

is no concrete evidence showing any right of title on Ignacio's part for him to be able to legally and
validly cede the property to Jose. What the quitclaim merely proves is that Ignacio had forfeited any
claim or interest over the accretion in Jose's favor. It is settled that equitable title is defined as a title
derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable principles, or the
right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him. In order that a
plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one from whom he derives
his right had himself a right to transfer. Considering the aforementioned facts, the plaintiffs have
neither legal nor equitable title over the contested property.

Moreover, even the character of the land subject of the quitclaim is highly questionable. Ignacio, who
was purportedly the first occupant of the area in 1945 and who was also in the best position to describe
the lot, stated that "the said parcel of swampy land is an integral expansion or continuity of the said
Cadastral Lot No. 2076, formed by a change of the shoreline of the Visayan Sea, which shoreline has
receded towards the North, thus, leaving the swampy or parcel of land described in the immediately
preceding paragraph which accrues to the owner of said right of said Cadastral Lot No. 2076 (Torrens
Title No. 24435), Jose O. Peralta by right of lawful accretion or accession."

Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, under which the Peraltas claim ownership over the
disputed parcels of land, provides: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to
be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Here, Ignacio characterized the land in question as swampy and its increase in size as the effect of the
change of the shoreline of the Visayan Sea, and not through the gradual deposits of soil coming from the
river or the sea. Also, Baltazar Gerardo, the Officer-in-Charge of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office of the Bureau of Lands, found upon inspection in 1987 that the subject area
was predominantly composed of sand rather than soil. One of the plaintiffs, Javier, also testified that in
1974 or 1976, the Visayan Sea was around one (1) kilometer from the land in question, and in 2003, the
distance already became around three (3) kilometers, giving the impression that the increment was
actually the result of additional area of sand deposits left by the sea when it had receded, and not by
gradual deposits of soil or sediment caused by the action of water. In addition, the DENR has remained
firm and consistent in classifying the area as land of the public domain for being part of either the Visayan
Sea of the Sooc Riverbed and is reached by tide water. Further, the Sheriff's Report dated July 13, 1998
shows that when he conducted an ocular inspection of the area, part of it was reached by the tide. At
around 11:30 a.m., he was able to measure the deepest portion of the high tide at around nineteen (19)
inches, and its wideness at five (5) meters near the concrete wall.

Indeed, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
administrative agencies, like the DENR, are in a better position to pass judgment on the same, and their
findings of fact are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. Such findings must be
respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant. Hence, the questionable character of the land, which could
most probably be part of the public domain, indeed bars Jose from validly transferring the
increment to any of his successors.

Indubitably, the plaintiffs are merely successors who derived their alleged right of ownership from tax
declarations. But neither can they validly rely on said tax declarations and the supposed actual,
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property by their predecessors-in-
interest. Any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove that he
has been in actual possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved had been
declared for taxation purposes for a certain period of time, does not constitute proof of possession,
nor is it proof of ownership, in the absence of the claimant's actual possession of said property. In
the case at bar, the Peraltas failed to adequately prove their possession and that of their predecessors-in-
interest.

Verily, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must do so with a preponderance of evidence,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the defendant's weakness.

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of
credible evidence." Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the
opposing evidence. Since the Peraltas must first establish their legal or equitable title to or interest
in the property in order for their action for quieting of title may prosper, failure to do so would
mean lack of cause of action on their part to pursue said remedy.

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana