99. CASE TITLE : JEBSENS MARITIME, INC. v. GUTIERREZ, G.R. No.

244098, March 3, 2021

JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS CRUISES LTD./EFFEL T. SANTILLAN

Syllabi Class : RULE 65, RES JUDICATA, Medical Allowance under SEC. 20 POEA-SEC

FACTS:
Lordelito B. Gutierrez (respondent) was hired on March 27, 2014 as Third Cook for the vessel  MV Mein
Schiff I by Jebsens Maritime, Inc. for its foreign principal, Sea Chefs Cruises Ltd. (collectively, petitioners).
On June 19, 2014, while on board, respondent experienced severe pain on the right paralumbar area,
accompanied by paresthesia on the lower right extremity, and difficulty in movement. He consulted with
the ship doctor and underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the lumbosacral spine while
the ship was docked in Kiel, Germany, on June 27, 2014. Thereafter, respondent was diagnosed with
Disc Prolapse L4-L5 and medically repatriated on July 2, 2014.

On July 4, 2014, respondent was examined by the company-designated physician at Shiphealth, Inc. On
July 9, 2014, he was diagnosed with L4-L5 Herniated Nucleos Pulposus and was recommended to
undergo 18 sessions of physical therapy which he completed on September 9, 2014. On the same day,
respondent was given his Final Medical Report which diagnosed that his condition had become
asymptomatic and declared that he was "FIT TO WORK FOR THE CONDITION REFERRED, CASE CLOSURE."

After receiving the fit to work diagnosis, respondent applied for re-engagement sometime in October
2014, but his application was denied by petitioners because he failed the pre-employment medical
examination (PEME). The examining physician during the PEME declared that there was a '"high
probability of recurrence' of respondent's previous illness." On November 7, 2014, respondent
underwent an x-ray of the lumbar spine which showed a mild dextroscoliosis of the lumbar vertebrae.

Thus, respondent filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) on November 28, 2014 for continuation
of medical treatment, underpayment of sick leave pay, payment of sickness allowance, and attorney's
fees (First Case). The complaint (First Case) was dismissed due to the absence of contrary medical
findings from respondent's personally appointed physician to refute the fit to work diagnosis of the
company-designated physician.

On July 3, 2015, respondent filed a second complaint, this time for total permanent disability benefits,
medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees (Second Case) and while the first
case was pending respondent had continued his medical treatment and sought the opinion of a
personally appointed physician, Dr. Renato P. Runas who issued a Medical Evaluation Report finding that
respondent was "permanently unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity with a recommendation for
permanent disability." The Second Case was raffled to LA Julia Cecily Coching-Sosito (LA Sosito). During
the conference on July 23, 2015, the parties agreed to refer respondent's condition to a third doctor.

On August 5, 2015, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata, arguing that the
dismissal of the First Case barred respondent from claiming total and permanent disability benefits in
the Second Case. LA Sosito denied the motion, holding that the complaint is not barred by res judicata as
the issues in the First Case and Second Case are not identical.
The third doctor, Dr. Jason Paul P. Santiago (Dr. Santiago) opined that respondent was "presently
impaired and might not be able to perform his duty as a Chief cook which involves carrying heavy food
pan, cooking utensils, standing for long hours. Physical therapy might lessen the pain whoever (sic)
higher chance that it will come back again. Surgery might improve sic but will not guarantee a full
recovery and he might not be able to go back to his present job. Lifestyle and work modification should
be highly considered to prevent further aggravation of low back pain to prevent other serious
complications."

Thereafter, both parties filed their respective position papers and replies. Notably, petitioners admitted
in their Position Paper that respondent's injury or illness was work-related. They maintained, however,
that respondent's claim was barred by res judicata and that respondent was already declared fit to work
by the company-designated physician. They also reiterated their opposition to the admission of the third
doctor's opinion.

LA Sosito issued a Decision in favor of respondent, finding that he had suffered a work-related illness
which rendered him totally and permanently disabled and unfit for sea duty. Petitioners were held
solidarily liable to pay respondent total permanent disability benefits of US$60,000.00 and attorney's
fees of US$6,000.00.

Petitioners appealed LA Sosito's Decision in the Second Case to the NLRC which reversed the Decision
and dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The NLRC held that the First Case and Second
Case, although praying for different reliefs, involved the same issue as to the validity of the fit to work
certification of the company-designated physician. The NLRC held that LA Napiza had already sustained
the company-designated physician's findings in the First Case as respondent failed to present the
contrary opinion of a personally appointed physician before filing the complaint in the First Case. In
initiating the Second Case, respondent sought to re-litigate the same issue. The NLRC denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration (MR).

Respondent elevated the case via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, which ruled in his
favor. In its Decision dated August 29, 2018, the CA overturned the findings of the NLRC, holding that
the Second Case was not barred by the First Case as they had different causes of action, issues, and
reliefs sought. The First Case was an action for payment of sickness allowance and continuation of
medical treatment while the Second Case was an action for total and permanent disability benefits. The
CA further ruled that the cause of action in the Second Case was not yet in existence at the time of filing
of the complaint in the First Case. The CA reinstated LA Sosito's award of total and permanent disability
benefits and attorney's fees. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in reversing the NLRC Decision and Resolution as all
the elements of res judicata are present in the case.

RULING:
No. Res judicata is not applicable

The literal interpretation of res judicata is "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment." It is anchored on the principle that parties should not be allowed
to re-litigate the same issue in multiple suits. Once a right or fact has been tried and established or an
opportunity for trial has been provided to the parties, the final judgment of the court shall be conclusive
as between the parties and their privies.

There are two concepts of  res judicata, (1) bar by prior judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment applies when the following requisites are present:

1. The prior decision must be a final judgment or order;

The CA correctly ruled that the Second Case is not barred by res judicata as the third element is lacking;
the two cases are based on different causes of action. The present case is a claim for total and
permanent disability benefits while the First Case was a claim for continuation of medical treatment,
payment of sickness allowance, and underpayment of sick leave pay.

A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which one party violates the right of another. The
elements that constitute a cause of action are: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) correlative
obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant that
violates such right.

The employer has an obligation to provide medical treatment and sickness allowance under Section
20(A)(2) and (3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC). After the medical treatment, if the seafarer is found to be suffering from permanent total or
partial disability due to the work-related injury or illness, the employer has an obligation to pay the
seafarer disability benefits under Section 20(A)(6) of the POEA-SEC in accordance with the schedule of
disability ratings under Section 32. In some cases, these benefits may be claimed together since they
usually arise from the same injury or illness. In the instant case, respondent had a right to claim the two
causes of action separately, even if they arose from the same illness. Further, Section 20(A)(3) of the
POEA-SEC mandates that when there are conflicting findings by the company-designated physician and
the seafarer's personally appointed physician, the parties may refer to a third doctor mutually agreed
upon, whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

A fundamental test to determine whether two suits relate to the same cause of action is whether the
cause of action in the second case was already existing at the time of filing of the prior complaint. At the
time respondent filed the First Case, the cause of action for permanent and total disability benefits did
not yet exist as the true nature and extent of respondent's condition and whether this was work-related
was not yet known. This is precisely why respondent initially requested for the continuation of his
medical treatment instead of immediately claiming disability compensation. Thus, res judicata as a bar
by prior judgment does not apply as the two cases are premised on different causes of action.

Res judicata under the second concept of conclusiveness of judgment likewise does not apply. The
principle of conclusiveness of judgment dictates that when a competent court has issued a final decision
on a particular fact or question which has been squarely put in issue, deliberated, and passed upon, the
parties cannot raise the same issues or points in a later case even if based on a different cause of action.
Stated conversely, if the prior and the latter cases have the same parties but different causes of action,
the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely related thereto. Conclusiveness of judgment does not bar the
Second Case because the issue of whether respondent is entitled to total and permanent disability
benefits was not raised and passed upon in the First Case. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that res judicata
does not apply. The dismissal of the First Case for continuation of medical treatment, sickness
allowance, and underpayment of sick leave pay does not bar respondent's current claim for total and
permanent disability benefits.

DISPOSITIVE: the Petition is DENIED. The CA’s decision are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The total
monetary awards shall earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until full payment.