Preweek - Remedial Law - Vice Dean Cheska Senga - Senga Remedial Law Preweek 2022
Preweek - Remedial Law - Vice Dean Cheska Senga - Senga Remedial Law Preweek 2022
Preweek - Remedial Law - Vice Dean Cheska Senga - Senga Remedial Law Preweek 2022
PRE-WEEK
1. GY entered into a contract for sum of money with FS for the amount of Php1,000,000.00. FS
failed to pay, despite demand. The case was filed in the MTC. Did the MTC have jurisdiction
over the case?
It depends on when the action was commenced because jurisdiction of the court is conferred by
the Constitution and by the laws in force at the time of the commencement of the action. If filed
after RA 11576 became effective on 21 August 2021, then the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter. BP 129 as amended by RA 11576 provides that MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions, probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Php2Million, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs.
If the commencement of the action is prior to the effectivity of RA 11576, then the law in force
would be BP 129 as amended RA 7691. In which case, the RTC shall exercise exclusive and original
jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount of demand exceeds Php300,000.00 or, in Metro
Manila, where the amount of demand exceeds Php400,000.00. (BP 129, as amended by RA
7691/11576; Alemar's (Sibal & Sons), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94996, January 26, 2001)
2. JK entered into a contract of sale with FS over a parcel of land, for the purchase price of
Php1,000,000.00, and with an assessed value of Php100,000.00. It was agreed that upon
execution of the contract, JK would deliver the title and possession over the land to FS, and the
latter would pay the purchase price one month from delivery. JK complied with his obligation
but FS failed to do so, despite demand. JK filed an action for rescission with the RTC of the
contract of sale, praying for the reconveyance of the land. FS moved to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. JK opposed the motion on the ground that the
RTC has jurisdiction over the rescission of contract, it being incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Decide.
Although denominated as rescission of contract, the case involved is a real action, one involving
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, since the relief sought for is the
reconveyance of real property, because jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The allegations of
the complaint prevail over the title.
It is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the real action whether the case be filed prior to or after
the effectivity of RA 11576, amending BP 129. Under BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, the law in
force prior to the effectivity of RA 11576, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over real
actions where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Php20,000,00.00 or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Php50,000.00, except actions for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, where the original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. BP 129,
as amended by RA 11576 provides that RTCs exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Php400,000,00.00, except actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, where the original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
3. Omicron filed an action for unlawful detainer against Linta, after Linta refused to vacate the
premises Omicron owned, despite demand to do so. Omicron alleged in the Complaint that
Linta was allowed to stay on his land by mere tolerance only. The action was filed within one
year from demand to vacate with the MTC. Linta filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that the relationship between Omicron and Linta is tenancy under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and outside the MTC jurisdiction. The MTC denied
the motion for being a prohibited motion. Linta filed an Answer alleging the same ground of
dismissal as an affirmative defense.
a. Was the denial of the motion to dismiss proper? Why or why not?
The ground for denying the motion to dismiss is not proper as it is not a prohibited motion in
summary procedure. As a rule, motions to dismiss are prohibited in summary procedure, except
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and failure to comply with condition precedent.
However, the motion to dismiss should be denied as the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over unlawful detainer cases, regardless of the assessed value of the property, as provided under
BP 129, as amended. (BP 129, Summary Procedure, Sec. 19(a))
4. Rules on Motions to Dismiss under Ordinary Procedure, Summary Procedure and Small
claims
Ordinary Procedure – All are prohibited, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (Litis pendentia), the cause
of action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata), the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations; allege prohibited and allowable grounds as affirmative defenses (ROC, Rule 15, Sec.
12)
Summary Procedure - All are prohibited, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and failure to comply with prior resort to barangay conciliation; allege prohibited and allowable
grounds as affirmative defenses (BP 129, Summary Procedure, Sec. 19(a))
Small Claims – Absolutely prohibited; allege the grounds as affirmative defenses (A.M. No. 08-
8-7-SC, Sec. 16)
7. X allowed Y to stay on his land by mere tolerance. X later demanded that Y vacate the
premises, which Y refused to heed. X filed a complaint with the MTC for unlawful detainer
against Y, who moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there being
no prior resort to barangay conciliation proceedings.
a. Is Y correct?
No. Non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature, and may be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss or in a responsive pleading. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and
BP 129, as amended provides that the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over unlawful
detainer case. Y should have moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to resort to barangay
conciliation proceedings. (Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, 6 August 2018)
8. X owes Y Php100,000.00. They entered into an amicable settlement before the Barangay for
X to pay Y Php50,000.00, 2 months from execution of the amicable settlement. X failed to
comply with his undertaking. What are Y’s remedies?
Y can execute the amicable settlement for the amount of Php50,000 before the barangay within 6
months from the date of settlement, or, before the MTC under small claims procedure for the
same amount, beyond the said 6 month period, or, to treat the amicable settlement as rescinded,
pursuant to Article 2041 of the Civil Code, and insist on his original claim of Php100,000.00 and
institute a collection of sum of money case against X before the MTC, whether under summary
procedure or small claims. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 2, LGC, Sec. 417; Civil Code, Art. 2041)
As a rule, parties shall personally appear on the designated date of hearing. Appearance through
representative must be for a valid cause but the representative whether of an individual or a
judicial entity cannot be a lawyer. For an individual, the representative must be related to the
party or next-of-kin. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 18-19)
However, additionally, if the plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, banking and similar
activities, and has a branch within the municipality or city where the defendant resides, the
Statement of Claims shall be filed where that branch is located. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 7; ROC,
Rule 4, Sec. 1-2)
However, if more than 5 small claims are filed by one party within the calendar year, regardless
of the judicial station, an additional filing fee of Php500.00 shall be paid for every claim after the
5th claim and an additional Php100.00 or a total of Php600.00 for every claim after the 10th claim,
and another Php100.00 or a total of Php700.00 for every claim filed after the 15th, progressively
and cumulatively.
If the plaintiff is engaged in the business of banking, lending and similar activities, the amount of
filing and other legal fees shall be the same as those applicable to cases filed under regular rules.
In no case shall a party, even if declared an indigent be exempt from payment of the Php1,000.00
fee for service of summons and processes. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 10)
15. What are the instances under Small Claims when the court may dismiss the case?
1. Non-submission of the required affidavits will cause the immediate dismissal of the claim or
counterclaim.;
2. Failure to pay docket fees within 5 days from denial of motion to sue as indigent, which motion
is attached to the statement of claims;
3. After the court determines that the case falls under Small Claims, it may, from an examination
of the allegations of the Statement of Claim/s and such evidence attached thereto, by itself,
dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of the case. The order of
dismissal shall state if it is with or without prejudice;
4. If, during the hearing, the court is able to determine that there exists a ground for dismissal of
the Statement of Claim/s, the court may, by itself, dismiss the case even if such ground is not
pleaded in the defendant's Response;
5. If plaintiff misrepresents that he/she/it is not engaged in the business of banking, lending or
similar activities when in fact he/she/it is so engaged, the Statement of Claim/s shall be
dismissed with prejudice and plaintiff shall be meted the appropriate sanctions, such as direct
contempt;
6. If summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the court shall
order the plaintiff to cause the service of summons and shall inform the court within 30 days from
notice if said summons was served or not; otherwise, the Statement of Claim/s shall be dismissed
without prejudice as to those who were not served with summons;
7. Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be cause for the dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s
without prejudice. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 10, 11, 12, 20,)
16. What happens if a case for unlawful detainer was instead filed under Small Claims instead
of under Summary Procedure and vice versa?
If the case does not fall under Small Claims Rule, but falls under summary or ordinary procedure,
the case shall not be dismissed. Instead, the case shall be re-docketed under the appropriate
procedure, and returned to the court where it was assigned, subject to payment of any deficiency
in the applicable regular rate of filing fees. This is because the inferior court still has exclusive
original jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, and therefore it will not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction
17. Defendant in a Small Claims case failed to file a Response. Plaintiff move to declare him
in default, which the court granted, and ordered Plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. Is this
correct?
No. The motion should have been denied because a motion to declare the defendant in default
is a prohibited motion under Small Claims. Should the Defendant fail to file a response within
the required period of 10 days from receipt of summons, and shall likewise fail to appear on the
date set for hearing, the court shall render judgment on the same day, as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the Statement of Claims.
Should the Defendant fail to file a response within the required period but appears on the date
set for hearing, the court shall ascertain what defense he has to offer which shall constitute his
Response, and proceed to hear or adjudicate the case on the same day as if a Response has been
filed. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 14)
18. Judgment was rendered in a case covered by small claims. May the losing party move for
reconsideration of the judgment? If yes, within what period. If not, why not and what is the
remedy?
No. A motion for reconsideration of the judgment under Small Claims is a prohibited motion.
The decision in small claims is final, executory and unappealable. There being no appeal or any
other plain speedy adequate remedy, and provided the decision is rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the remedy is to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the RTC. (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 16 and 24; (A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma
Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, 22 January 2014)
20. Should the assessed value be alleged in the complaint involving a real action? If not alleged
what is the effect?
YES. To determine the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with appropriate
jurisdiction, an examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary. The court should
only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction. By exception, if the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint but is alleged in
the documents attached to the complaint then that would be sufficient for determining
jurisdiction. In the absence of any allegation of assessed value, whether in the complaint or in its
attachments, there would be a dismissal of the case because it cannot be determined whether the
RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action. (Foronda-Crystal v. Son,
G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017)
23. When may lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter be raised?
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even
for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches, which
may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost 15
years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in
several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision
adverse to the movant.
The failure to assail jurisdiction during trial, on its own, is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to
apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court and no considerable length
of time had elapsed, then laches will not apply. Laches refers to the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R.
No. 195477, January 25, 2016)
25. Distinguish jurisdiction over the subject matter from jurisdiction over the remedy.
Courts are vested with jurisdiction over the remedy and over the subject matter. These types of
jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties.
Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to the court’s competence over the process. This should not
be confused with the relief, that which the party filing the case wants the court to declare, and
which addresses the breach of the right or obligation. Generally, jurisdiction over the remedy is
provided by the Rules of Court. Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which the Supreme Court
Meanwhile, the source of jurisdiction over the subject matter is generally conferred by law. This
is why the doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. Laws can only
be amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do in any case can change it. Thus, the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal, not
simply because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but mainly because it is the law that
prescribes it.
“Subject matter” in jurisdiction over the subject matter can refer to: (a) the cause of action, or the
breach of legal right or legal duty; or (b) the res, or the thing over which the legal right or duty
breached subsists. In forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions, the subject matter refers to a
breach of the general right to actual possession, which is an attribute of ownership and the res
which is always real property.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, jurisdiction over the remedy must
be seasonably raised. (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance M.C.
Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019, J. Leonen Case)
26. X found that Y had installed without X’s knowledge or consent underground cables in X’s
property in April 2003. Thus, X filed a Complaint for forcible entry against Y on October 1,
2004, with the MTC. Will the action prosper?
No, the action will not prosper because the MTC has no jurisdiction over the remedy. Sec. 1, Rule
70 provides that a party may file a complaint for forcible entry at any time within 1 year from
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession against the person unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, for the restitution of such possession. Here, the one-year
period for filing under the Rules of Court has lapsed. The one-year prescriptive period is a
jurisdictional requirement consistent with the summary nature of ejectment suits. (Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019, J.
Leonen Case)
27. X filed a complaint for Y, but did not attach to the complaint any authority for X to do so
on Y’s behalf. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over Y?
No. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by filing the (1) complaint; or (2) other initiatory
pleading by which he signifies his submission to the court’s power and authority (Davao Light &
Power Co. Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 93262, December 29, 1991).
If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. The
court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint
and the plaintiff. Since no valid complaint was ever filed with the court the same did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff. (Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219,
September 3, 2012)
30. Is jurisdiction over the person of the defendant always required for the court to be able to
dispose of the case on the merits?
No. Jurisdiction over the defendant is only needed for the court to validly try and decide the case
in actions in personam, which is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
If the action involved is one that is quasi in rem or in rem, jurisdiction over the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. An action quasi in rem involves the status of a property over which a party has interest
and the decision therein is binding only upon the parties who joined the action. An action in rem
is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person and judgment therein is binding
upon the whole world. Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or
the property under litigation. It is acquired either by the (1) seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective
However, in actions quasi in rem and in rem, summons must still be served on the defendant, not
for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but for satisfying the due process
requirements. (Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005; Biaco v. Philippine Counryside
Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007; Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, July 29,
2005; Biaco v. PH Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 08, 2007).
31. Distinguish jurisdiction over the subject matter from jurisdiction over the issue.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law, while jurisdiction over the issue is
conferred by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter,
may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not
duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the
parties, and in which case, the pleadings are deemed amended, and the issue raised during trial
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. This cannot be done
when jurisdiction over the subject matter is involved. (Reyes v. Diaz, G.R. No. 48754, November 26,
1941; ROC, Rule 10, Sec 5)
34. X entered into a contract with Y for the sale and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at
stipulated prices for a period of 4 years. On the 2nd year of the contract, X willfully and
deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Y, despite demand. X refused to
make any more deliveries until higher prices were paid, which prices were never agreed upon
in the contract. Y filed an action against X for damages because of X’s material breach of the
contract. X moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Decide.
The motion should be denied for being a prohibited motion. The only grounds for a motion to
dismiss allowed under ordinary rules are lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (Litis pendentia), the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata), the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations (prescription).
Even if alleged as an affirmative defense, the allegation of failure to state a cause of action must
still fail, as the case falls under the Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach. Even if the contract is divisible
in its performance and the future periodic deliveries are not yet due, if the obligor, in this case X,
has already manifested his willful refusal to comply with his future periodic obligations, the
contract is entire and the breach total, hence, there can only be one action for damages. Thus, the
complaint states a cause of action. (Danfoss Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp., G.R. No. 143788,
September 9, 2005; ROC, Rule 15, Sec. 12)
39. X entered into a contract of loan secured by real estate mortgage with Y. When the loan
became due and demandable, X failed to pay despite demand.
a. May Y file both an action for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and a collection of
sum of money case against X for the full amount of the loan, considering that the first is a
special civil action and the second is governed by ordinary procedure, and hence, different
causes of action?
No. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee
has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the
filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or
successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute
separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same
obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of
the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing
of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. (Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, July
22, 2015)
c. Y filed an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Before the property mortgaged could
be sold at a foreclosure sale, Y filed an action for sum of money for the same loan amount,
arguing this may be done since no foreclosure sale had taken place in the first action. Can this
be done?
No. The fact that no foreclosure sale appears to have been conducted is of no moment because
the remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon the filing of the complaint therefor.
(Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015)
40. X entered into a contract of loan secured by real estate mortgage and a post-dated check
with Y. When the loan became due and demandable, X failed to pay despite demand. The
check was also dishonored for being draw against insufficient account. What are the remedies
of Y?
If the debtor fails (or unjustly refuses) to pay his debt when it falls due and the debt is secured by
a mortgage and by a check, the creditor has 3 options against the debtor and the exercise of one
will bar the exercise of the others. He may pursue any of the 3 but not all or a combination of
them.
First, the creditor may file a collection suit against the debtor. This will open up all the properties
of the debtor to attachment and execution, even the mortgaged property itself.
Second, the creditor may opt to foreclose on the mortgaged property. In case the debt is not fully
satisfied, he may recover from the debtor for deficiency judgment (not a collection case for the
whole indebtedness), in which case, all the properties of the debtor, other than the mortgaged
property, are again opened up for the satisfaction of the deficiency.
Lastly, the creditor may opt to sue the debtor for violation of BP 22 if the checks securing the
obligation bounce. Circular 57-97 and Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court both provide
that the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, i.e., a collection suit. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed or recognized. (Spouses Yap v. Frst e-Bank Corp., G.R. No. 169889, September 29,
2009)
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the foregoing conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 are
not met. (Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005).
42. Should joinder of causes of action involve only the same parties?
No. Joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If it involves
different parties, there must be compliance with the rules on joinder of parties, meaning that there
must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same
transaction or series of transaction (Spouses Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005;
Pantranco North Express Inc. v. Standard Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005)
43. In a single complaint filed by X against Y in the RTC, X alleged that: (1) Y owed X
Php1,000,000.00 pursuant to a contract of loan, which Y failed to pay despite demand; (2) Y
breached his obligation under a contract of sale with X, to pay the purchase price for the car in
the amount of Php1,500,000.00, despite repeated demand; and (3) Y failed to pay X for the
services X rendered for Y in connection with construction of Y’s house, despite demand, in the
amount of Php500,000.00. Y moved to dismiss on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action,
claiming that the 3 causes of action do not arise out of the same or series of transaction. Will
the motion to dismiss prosper?
No. First, the motion to dismiss is prohibited. A motion to dismiss on the ground of misjoinder
of causes of action is not among the motions to dismiss allowed by the rules.
Second, assuming without admitting that there is misjoinder of causes of action, such is not a
ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on
the initiative of the court, be served and proceeded with separately.
Third, there is no misjoinder of causes of action here. The parties involved for the 3 causes of
action are the same – X and Y. The requirement of compliance with the rule on joinder of parties,
i.e., there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the
same transaction or series of transaction, is only required if the joinder of causes of action involves
different parties. Here, there is proper joinder of causes of action between X and Y, and the action
is properly filed with the RTC, because the claims in all the causes action are principally for
recovery of money, and hence the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction,
which in this case is Php3,000,000.00, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
(Spouses Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005; ROC, Rule 2, Sec. 5)
44. X filed an action for ejectment against Y after the lease contract terminated with prayer for
damages. X also filed a separate action for sum of money against Y for Php300,000.00,
pertaining to lease rentals not fully paid prior to the possession becoming unlawful, there
being periods during the lease not paid in full. Y filed a motion to dismiss the second case on
The second and third requirements are absent. While the complaints appear to involve the same
parties and properties, there is no identity of causes of action. In the unlawful detainer case, the
cause of action stemmed from the prejudice X suffered due to the loss of possession of his
properties, where Y refused to vacate the premises despite demand to do so after termination of
the contract of lease.
In the complaint for collection of sum of money, the same was founded upon alleged violation of
Y as lessee, of certain stipulations with regard to payment of the lease, i.e., whether Y correctly
paid the rental fees for the subject period as stipulated in the lease agreement.
Moreover, in unlawful detainer, the recoverable damages are reckoned from the time the
possession of the property becomes unlawful, which is different from the claim in the sum of
money case. The rentals in arrears that the trial court can award in ejectment cases also pertain to
rentals with specific or determinable amount from the time the cause of action for illegal detainer
accrued. In the sum of money case, the deficiency amounts claimed were before the cause of
action for unlawful detainer arose.
Finally, the action for collection of sum of money may not be properly joined with the action for
ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for
unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure. (Lajave
Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses Javellana, G.R. No. 223785,
November 7, 2018)
45. Common Carrier C, driven by its employee B, collided with a vehicle belonging to X. The
car was covered by insurance but the insurance company only paid X amount the amount of
80,000.00, leaving an unpaid balance for the repairs in the amount of Php500,000.00, which X
had to shoulder on his own. May X and the insurance company join their causes of action
against common carrier C, and its driver employee B, for reimbursement in the amount of
Php80,000.00 on the part of the insurance company, and Php500,000.00 on the part of X? Which
court will have jurisdiction?
Yes. In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, the Common Carrier C hitting
the X’s car. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether Common Carrier C and its
employee driver B were negligent. There being a single transaction common to the X and the
insurance company, consequently, they may bring their claims against C and B in a single case.
The claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, and hence the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction, which in this case is Php580,000.00.
46. X was the owner of a parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in Parañaque.
X entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Y for the sale of the same payable
in 6 installments by post-dated checks (PDC). The MOA provides that if 2 of the PDC will be
dishonored, the Y is obliged to reconvey the property. The first 2 checks were dishonored.
Despite demand, Y did not reconvey the property or even pay for the unpaid price. Y remained
to possess the property. X, then a resident of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a complaint with the court
of Malolos for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages for
reasonable compensation for the use of the property and moral damages. Y moved to dismiss
on the ground of improper venue, since the reconveyance is a real action that should have been
brought in Parañaque and not in Malolos. Y also alleged there was misjoinder of cases of
action. Decide.
First, the case does not involve joinder of causes of action. X only has one cause of action against
Y, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the first two installments in
payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to X the possession of the real property,
as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by Y. The claim for damages for reasonable
compensation for Y’s use and occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as moral and
exemplary damages suffered by X on account of the breach of contract of Y are merely incidental
to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of action.
Second, the case is not filed in the proper venue. X’s action for the rescission of the MOA on
account of Y’s breach thereof and failure to return the premises to X, and the Y’s eviction
therefrom is a real action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where
the property is located, namely, in Parañaque City. (Spouses Decena v. Spouses Piquero, G.R. No.
155736, March 31, 2005)
47. The court ordered the severance of the misjoined causes of action for quieting of title, a
special civil action, and an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Plaintiff refused to
comply for no justifiable cause. If you are counsel for defendant, what would you do?
I will move to dismiss the case, with prejudice, due to the fault of the plaintiff. Section 3, Rule 17
provides that if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation
of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court
(Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016)
49. Both the body and the complaint alleged that X prayed for Php1,000,000.00. Docket fees in
the amount of Php50,000.00 were assessed but X at the time of filing, could only pay
Php10,000.00. X said he would get the funds needed and come back to pay the full amount.
Should the complaint be dismissed outright?
No. The Manchester Rule will only apply when there is clearly an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in this case, the plaintiff
demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying an initial amount of docket fees. Also, where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Thus, the case should not be dismissed outright. (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 79937-38, 13 February 1989)
49. X filed an action against Y, praying for the recovery of the sum of the principal loan of
Php100,000.00, and prayed for such as may be awarded by the court as it may deem proper
under the circumstances. The court, in its ruling, directed Y to pay said principal amount and
moral damages in the amount of Php50,000.00. Y objects to the award of moral damages since
no docket fees were paid therefor as it was not alleged in the complaint and therefore not
included in the assessment of docket fees. Decide.
The additional filing fee for the claim not specified in the pleading or the claim specified but left
for the determination of the court shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall then be the
responsibility of the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee. (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, G.R Nos. 79937-38, February
13, 1989)
No filing fees shall be required for actual damages, except when otherwise provided by the rules.
In BP 22 Cases, upon filing of the joint criminal and civil action, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. (ROC, Rule 111, Sec. 1)
52. May there be an action instituted by those not directly injured by the assailed government
act?
Yes. There are 4 types of "non-traditional suitors" who, though not having been directly injured
by the assailed governmental act, were nonetheless allowed to file the petition because they raised
issues of critical significance: (1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (2) For voters, there must be a showing
of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (3) For concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and (4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
their prerogatives as legislators. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570 & 215634,
October 15, 2019, J. Leonen)
53. May a deceased person be named as a defendant in an action for collection of sum of
money?
NO. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant
in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 unequivocally states that only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The proper remedy is to file the case against
the estate of the deceased, an entity authorized by law to be a party in a civil action (Gaffney v.
Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017)
54. Distinguish lack of legal capacity to sue from lack of personality to sue.
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or
does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims. It refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party. This can be raised as a ground to dismiss in the Answer as an
affirmative defense, that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue.
On the other hand, lack of personality to sue means that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest. This can be raised as a ground to dismiss in the Answer as an affirmative defense, based
on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, states no cause of action. (Evangelista v. Santiago,
G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005)
56. X, Y, Z are co-owners of a parcel of land. X and Y filed an action for judicial partition of
land, together with W, Z’s eldest son. Z, at that time, was in the country, and gave no authority
for W to file the case on Z’s behalf. Z was not aware of the action for partition. The complaint
alleged that X, Y Z were co-owners. Should the court dismiss the case because Z is not
impleaded and W, was instead impleaded?
No. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of action. W was
misjoined as a party, not being a co-owner and having no authority to file on behalf of Z. W may
be dropped and any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately.
58. A is the owner of a parcel of land. He mortgaged it to B, as security for the loan obtained
from B. The loan was not paid despite demand so was foreclosed, and B was the highest bidder.
A also sold the same property to C, who caused the cancellation of title in A’s name, and caused
a new title over the property to be issued in C’s name. The mortgage was annotated in the title
of A, as well as the judicial foreclosure case. B filed an action for reconveyance and annulment
of title against C, who argued that A should have been impleaded as an indispensable party.
Is C correct?
No. A is not an indispensable party in the action for reconveyance but rather it is only C who is
the indispensable party defendant. C is the absolute and registered owner of the subject property,
as such C possesses that certain interest in the property without which, the courts cannot proceed
for registered owners of parcels of land whose title is sought to be nullified should be impleaded
as an indispensable party. A, however, which already sold his interests in the subject land, is no
longer regarded as an indispensable party, but is, at best, considered to be a necessary party
whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far
Note: A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court (ROC,
Rule 17, Sec. 2)
60. A, B, C, Stockholders of X Corporation, filed before the RTC a class suit in representation
of other stockholders, and against E, F, G, stockholders of X Corporation, for Declaration of
Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in X Corporation and All Posterior
Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages. Plaintiffs alleged that the transfer of shares
were invalid and in violation of law. Was the class suit proper?
No. When the object is a specific stockholder or a definite class of stockholders, an
individual suit or class/representative suit must be resorted to. When the object of the wrong
done is the corporation itself or the whole body of its stock and property without any severance
or distribution among individual holders, it is a derivative suit that a stockholder must resort to.
A shareholder's derivative suit seeks to recover for the benefit of the corporation and its whole
body of shareholders when injury is caused to the corporation that may not otherwise be
redressed because of failure of the corporation to act. Thus, 'the action is derivative, i.e., in the
corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body
of its stock and property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or it
seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets, as in this case.
Erroneously pursuing a derivative suit as a class suit not only meant that the A, B, C lacked a
cause of action, it also meant that they failed to implead an indispensable party. In derivative
suits, the corporation concerned must be impleaded as a party. (Florete, Jr. v. Florete, G.R. No.
174909 & 177275, January 20, 2016, J. Leonen)
61. X filed an action for sum of money against Y. During the pendency of the case, Y died.
a. Will the case be dismissed due to Y’s death? If not, what will happen?
No. When an action is for sum of money and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in
the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but
shall be instead allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment therein
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided under the rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor and administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for minor heirs.
If no legal representative is named by counsel for the deceased party, or if the one named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor and administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. (ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 16 and 20)
b. What if Y dies after entry of final judgment against him and after Y’s property had been
levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution?
In case of death of the judgment obligor, after execution is actually levied upon any of his
property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment obligation, and the officer
making the sale shall account to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in
his hands. (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 7(c))
62. X filed an action for sum of money against Y, who alleged in his answer that the loan subject
of the complaint had already in paid, attaching thereto a receipt for payment acknowledged
by X. The court motu proprio ruled on the affirmative defense, and dismissed the complaint.
Y then filed an action for moral damages against X, because the baseless case filed by X against
Y caused him sleepless nights and hurt feelings, and prayed also for attorney’s fees for those
incurred by Y in defending himself in that case filed by X. Should the case prosper?
No. The claims for moral damages and attorney’s fees in the second complaint should have been
raised as a compulsory counterclaim in Answer in the sum of money case because it arose out of
or are connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of X’s claim
for sum of money and did not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. The compulsory counterclaim which was not raised in the
first action is now barred by res judicata. Y, for failing to raise the same in the first action, is deemed
to have waived it. (ROC, Rule 6, Sec. 7; Rule 9, Sec. 2)
64. X filed an action for sum of money against Y, attaching to the complaint the promissory
note, which is basis of the loan, and further alleging that despite demand, no payment was
made. Y, in his unverified answer, alleged there was already full payment of the loan, without
attaching any other proof. Should the case be dismissed?
65. Can there be a proper denial of an actionable document even if the specific denial was not
under oath?
Yes. As a rule, the actionable document should be specifically denied under oath. However, the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to
the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused. (ROC, Rule 8, Sec. 8)
70. What are the grounds to deny the admission of a third-party complaint and what is the
remedy against such denial?
The third-party complaint shall be denied admission where: (1) the third-party defendant cannot
be located within 30 calendar days from the grant of leave; (2) matter extraneous to the issue in
the principal case are raised; or (3) the effect would be to introduce a new and separate
controversy into the action. The remedy would be to institute a separate action on said complaint.
(ROC, Rule 6, Sec. 11)
72. What is the effect if the judicial affidavits of the witnesses to be presented to prove a party’s
claims or defenses are not attached to the pleading stating a party’s claims or defenses?
The witnesses whose judicial affidavits are not attached to the pleading stating a party’s claims
or defenses shall not be presented during trial. Except if a party presents meritorious reasons as
basis for the admission of additional witnesses, no other witness or affidavit shall be heard or
admitted by the court. (ROC, Rile 7, Sec. 6(b))
Action of the court on affirmative defenses and remedies against the ruling therein
74. X filed a complaint in the RTC against Y, who filed alleged an affirmative defense in the
answer of failure to state a cause of action. Y then moved to set the case for preliminary hearing
on affirmative defenses. The court denied the motion, ruling that the issues threshed out are
Sec. 12, Rule 8 provides that the court shall motu proprio resolve the affirmative defenses within
30 calendar days from the filing of the Answer. Here, the said 30-day period form the filing of the
answer had long expired when the trial court issued the resolution on the affirmative defenses,
more than a year since the Answer was filed. The trial court should have desisted from applying
the 2019 amendments because when it did, the same was no longer feasible, as it was already
more than 30 days from the filing of the answer.
The application of the 2019 rules also caused injustice for as a consequence, plaintiff lost his
substantial right to be heard on the affirmative defense and his right to seek a reconsideration of
the order of dismissal or action on the affirmative defense, which were both granted him under
the 1997 Rules, but now prohibited under the revised rules
It was also inaccurate for the trial court to say that it was motu proprio acting on the affirmative
defenses. In truth, the trial court had already resolved this affirmative defense of failure to state
a cause of action, when the court held that the issues were complex and would be better threshed
out in trial. (Colmenar v. Colmenar, et al., G.R. No. 252467, 21 June 2021)
75. Distinguish failure to state a cause of action from lack of cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to
dismiss a particular action. Failure to state a cause of action reefers to the insufficiency of the
The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the
allegations in the pleading.
A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on "information and belief,"
or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading. (ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 4)
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's
certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading. (ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 5)
81. X and Y are co-plaintiffs but only X executed a certification against forum shopping which
was attached to the complaint. Is this sufficient?
No. Where there are two or more plaintiffs, both should execute the certification unless one is
authorized by the other to sign and execute the certification on behalf of the other, and such
authority is attached to the pleading. (Pagtalunan v. Manlapig, G.R. No. 155738, August 9, 2005)
82 What is the effect of failure to comply with the certification against forum shopping?
Failure to comply shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. (ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 5)
83. What are the instances where the court allowed a belated filing of a certification against
forum shopping?
The court has allowed the belated filing one day after the filing of the initiatory pleading,
when there are special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the
requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping, and such as when there was
substantial compliance and justifiable reason. (LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653,
January 25, 2006)
84. What is the effect of the submission of a false certification against forum shopping or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein?
It shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his or her counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions
(ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 5)
87. What is the period within which to file an Answer to the Complaint.
It is within 30 calendar days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the
court. Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made
on the government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be filed within
60 calendar days after receipt of summons by such entity. (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 1 and 2)
89. May there be motion for extension of time to file pleadings other than the Answer?
No. A motion for extension of time file any pleading other than an answer is prohibited and
considered a mere scrap of paper. (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 11)
90. Defendant X received summons on 1 March 2021. X filed his Answer on 1 May 2021. The
court then set the case for pre-trial. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the order, arguing
that the court should not have admitted the Answer and declared X in default for failure to file
Answer on time. Decide.
Plaintiff is incorrect, the motion for reconsideration should be denied. The court may allow any
other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by the rules, especially when the defendant had not
yet been declared in default. The court cannot motu proprio declare the defendant in default. If
the defendant fails to file the answer on time, the court shall declare him in default upon motion
of the claiming party, with notice on the defending party, and proof of such failure. Here, no
motion to declare defendant in default was filed. (ROC, Rule 9, Sec. 3; Rule 11, Sec. 11)
92. The defendant filed an answer to the original complaint. Subsequently, the complaint was
amended/supplemented, and the defendant failed to answer the amended/supplemental
complaint. May the defendant be declared in default?
No. An answer earlier filed may serve as an answer to the amended complaint/supplemental
complaint if no new answer is filed. (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 3 and 7)
93. What is the remedy of defendant against an order of default prior to judgment?
Defendant may, at any time after notice of the order of default and before judgment, file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default, upon proper showing that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense. In
94. Will all material allegations in a pleading asserting a claim or defense not specifically
denied be deemed admitted?
Material averments in a pleading asserting a claim or defense, other than those as to the amount
of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. (ROC, Rule 8,
Sec. 11)
95. X, Y, Z filed an action for quieting of title, claiming that the real property was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and that they and their predecessor in interest have
occupied said property continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than 30 years; and
that they have accordingly filed applications for land titling in their respective names with the
appropriate government agency. The defendants were several persons and corporations who
were titled owners of the subdivided parcels of land within the subject property, A, B, C and
D. A and B filed their answer, while C and D failed to do so. Upon motion, the court declared
C and D in default. The court allowed X, Y, Z to present evidence ex parte against C and D.
Was this proper?
No. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending
parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. Considering that
X, Y, Z, in their complaint stated a common cause of action against A, B, C and D, the court should
have heard the case as against all defendants, the defaulted defendants included. (Pinlac v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 91486, January 19, 2001)
96. Distinguish amendment as matter of right from amendment with leave of court of
pleadings.
The pleading may be amended once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or in the case of a reply, at any time within 10 calendar days after it is served.
Amendment by leave of court pertains to substantial amendments after a responsive pleading
has been served or in the case of a reply, after the lapse of 10 calendar days from the time it is
served. Leave shall be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to
delay or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the pleading stated no cause of action from the
beginning which could be amended. (ROC, Rule 10, Sec. 2 and 3)
101. What are the different modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments
and other court submissions?
They shall be served personally or by registered mail, ordinary mail if no registry service is
available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, accredited courier, electronic mail,
facsimile transmission, other electronic means as may be authorized by the court or as provided
for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party. (ROC, rule 13, Sec. 3, 7)
101. Given that there are several modes of filing and service of pleadings or other court
submissions, does it mean that any of these modes may be availed of at any time?
No. The following orders, pleadings, and other documents must be served or filed conventionally
- personally or by registered mail when allowed, and shall not be served or filed electronically,
unless express permission is granted by the court: (a) initiatory pleadings and initial responsive
pleadings, such as answer; (b) subpoenae, protection orders and writs; (c) appendices and
exhibits to motions or other documents that are not readily amenable to electronic scanning may,
at the option of the party filing such, be filed and served conventionally; and (d) sealed and
confidential documents or records. (ROC, Rule 13, Sec. 14)
102. Distinguish personal service of court submissions from personal service of summons.
Court submissions may be served personally by: (a) personal delivery of a copy to the party or
his counsel, or to their authorized representative named In the appropriate pleading or motion;
or (b) by leaving it in his office with his clerk, or with a person having charge thereof; or (c) if no
person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the
copy between the hours of 8:00 am and 6:00 pm, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known,
with a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein.
In personal service of summons, whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by: (a)
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person in his address indicated in the complaint,
informing the defendant that he is being served; or (b) if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
leaving the summons within the view and in the presence of the defendant. (ROC, Rule 13, Sec. 6;
Rule 14, Sec. 5)
In substituted service of summons, if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
personally after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) different dates, service may be effected: (a)
By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence to a person at least 18 years of age
and of sufficient discretion residing therein; (b) By leaving copies of the summons at the
105. X filed a specific performance case against Y, alleging in the complaint an incomplete
address of Y in the Philippines. The complaint alleged that Y was a resident of S Village,
Darasa, Tanauan Batangas. The complaint also alleges that Y’s whereabouts in Italy are
uncertain. Because the address was incomplete, the sheriff could not serve summons. He
sought the help of barangay officials who pointed him to a house belonging to Y’s father. The
sheriff went thereto, and was informed by the occupant that he was only a caretaker thereof
and that the residents thereof were already in Italy. The sheriff served summons on the
caretaker.
If such service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing persons, it shall be made upon the
person who customarily receives the correspondences for the defendant at its principal office.
In case of domestic juridical entity under receivership or liquidation, it shall be made on the
receiver or liquidator, as the case may be.
Should there be a refusal on the part of the persons above-mentioned to receive summons despite
at least 3 attempts on 2 different dates, service may be made electronically, if allowed by the court.
(ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 12)
None of the foregoing was complied with. Thus, I shall deputize defendant’s counsel to serve
summons on his client X. (ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 13)
109. A filed a complaint for damages against B, a non-resident who is no found in the
Philippines. A moved for leave of court to avail of extraterritorial service of summons. The
court granted the motion for leave, and summons was served extraterritorially by publication.
Was there valid service of summons?
No, because the complaint for damages is in the nature of an action in personam, which does not
fall under the instances when extraterritorial service of summons may be availed of. In actions in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be acquired through personal or
substituted service of summons for the court to validly try and decide the case. Since B is a non-
resident who is not found in the Philippines and summons cannot be served on him personally
or by substituted service of summons. The remedy is for the plaintiff to convert the action to a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, by attaching B’s property. In quasi in rem and in rem actions,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court, provided the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thereafter, summons may be served
extraterritorially with leave of court, not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction,
but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play and due process. (Tradition
Asia Pacific PTE., LTD., v. Moya, G.R. No. 232092, December 13, 2017)
111. What are the requisites for the 2-dismissal Rule to apply?
For the two-dismissal rule to apply where the second dismissal, upon the instance of plaintiff,
would be with prejudice, the following requisites must be present: (1) there was a previous case
that was dismissed by a competent court; (2) both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) both notices of dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (4) when the motion to dismiss filed
by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied
all the claims of the former. (Ching v. Ching, G.R No. 175507, October 8, 2014), J. Leonen)
112. What is the effect of the party and counsel's failure to appear during pre-trial, court-
annexed mediation and judicial dispute resolution, if necessary, in civil cases, when they are
duly notified?
As a rule, it shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the during pre-trial,
court-annexed mediation and judicial dispute resolution, if necessary. A representative may
appear on behalf of a party, but must be fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admission of facts and documents.
The failure of the plaintiff and counsel to appear without valid cause when so required shall be
cause for dismissal of the action, with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant and counsel shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte within 10 calendar days from termination of the pre-trial and the court to reader
judgment on the basis of the evidence offered. This is the same effect as the failure to file the pre-
trial brief.
If the failure to appear was with valid cause, it shall be excused and the foregoing effects will not
apply. The non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused only for acts of God, force
majeure, or duly substantiated physical inability. (ROC, Rule 18, Sec. 4, 5, 6)
113. May additional evidence not previously pre-marked during pre-trial be allowed during
trial?
Yes, provided that the evidence was not available during pretrial and was reserved in the
following manner during pre-trial: (1) for testimonial evidence, by giving the name or position
and the nature of the testimony of the proposed witness; and (2) for documentary and other object
evidence, by giving a particular description of the evidence. No reservation shall be allowed if
not made in the foregoing manner. (ROC, Rule 18, Sec. 2(g)(4))
115. May the order of the court in the pre-trial order to submit the case to judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment be assailed by motion for reconsideration and certiorari?
It may be assailed by motion for reconsideration, since it is not among the prohibited motions.
However, Sec. 10, Rule 18 categorically prohibits said order from being the subject of an appeal
or certiorari. The remedy, if motion for reconsideration of the order is denied, is to appeal the
judgment later rendered.
116. What is the effect of failure to serve written interrogatories under Rule 25?
A party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to
give testimony in open court, or to give deposition pending appeal, unless allowed by the court
for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice (ROC, Rule 25, Sec. 6).
117. Is the rule requiring intervention before rendition of judgment by the trial court subject
to exceptions?
Yes, in the following instances: (a) When demanded by the higher interest of justice; (b) To afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard; (c) to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties; and
(4) because of the grave legal issues raised.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Bongais, G.R. No. 226405, July 23, 2018)
118. What is the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and is it subject to exceptions?
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect. There are recognized exceptions to this general rule such as: (1) the correction of clerical
errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (2) void
judgments; and (3) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable. (Rivera v. Catalo, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422, July 20, 2015)
119. What is the effect of judgment rendered without jurisdiction? May it be executed?
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a source of any right
nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from
it have no legal effect. It can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.
120. Distinguish demurrer to evidence, judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment.
If defendant’s motion to Any action of the court on a Any action of the court on a
dismiss or demurrer to motion to render judgment on motion to render summary
evidence is denied, the the pleadings shall not be judgment shall not be subject
defendant shall have the right subject of an appeal, petition of an appeal, petition for
to present evidence. for certiorari, prohibition or certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. It may be the mandamus. It may be the
122. What are the grounds for a motion for reconsideration and motion for new trial?
A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that the damages awarded are
excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision
or final order is contrary to law.
For motion for new trial, the grounds are: (a) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved
party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) newly discovered evidence which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial, and which if presented
would probably alter the result, (ROC, Rule 37, Sec. 1)
123. If the motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial is denied, may a second one be
filed?
126. What is the material date rule and will the failure to comply therewith always lead to a
dismissal of the case?
The following material dates must be alleged to show timeliness of an appeal: (a) the date when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for
new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and (c) the date when notice of the
denial thereof was received. These dates should be reflected to enable the reviewing court to
determine if appeal was filed on time because the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required
by law renders the judgment final and executory.
By exception, failure to comply with alleging the material dates may be excused if the said dates
are evident from the records provided that to merit such liberality, a valid and compelling reason
or a reasonable cause justifying non-compliance with the rules must be shown and must convince
the court that the outright dismissal of the appeal would defeat the administration of substantive
justice (Yu v. SR Metals, Inc., G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017).
127. Judgment was rendered against X, who received notice thereof on 1 February 2021. Entry
of judgment was made on 20 February 2021.
a. Since X failed to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may he file a
petition for relief of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud?
No. A party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment is barred from such relief
when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure;
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
128. Is a petition for relief from judgment an available remedy in the Supreme Court?
NO. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court. The
use of the phrase "any court" in Section 1, Rule 38 refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts and the procedure in the CA and the SC are governed by separate
provisions of the Rules. It is not among the list of original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court
under Section 1, Rule 56 and, moreover, a petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of the Supreme Court.
(Dela Cruz v. Andres, G.R. No. 161864, 27 April 2007)
129. What is the period within which to file a petition for relief from judgment?
It must be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment or within 6 months from the entry of
judgment. Otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed. The double period required under Section
3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A petition for relief from
judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a petition
for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments
(AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. RTC, Marikina City, Branch 193, G.R. No. 183906, February
14, 2011; Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014)
130. When may a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 be availed of?
A verified petition for relief may be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than 6 months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, when: (1) a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, in which case, the petition shall be filed in such
court and in the same case, praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside (ROC,
Rule 38, Sec. 1); or (2) a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party
thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an
appeal, in which case the petition shall be filed in such court and in the same case, praying that
the appeal be given due course. (ROC, Rule 38, Sec. 2).
The petition must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be (ROC, Rule 38, Sec. 3).
131. A judgment was rendered holding X liable to pay a sum of money. The decision became
final and executory and a writ of execution was issued. How should the judgment be executed?
The sheriff shall enforce the judgment by demanding payment from the X in cash or any other
form of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If no payment can be made, the sheriff shall
132. If the judgment directs X to execute a conveyance of land, which X, on execution, fails to
comply with, how will the judgment be executed?
The court may direct the act be done at the cost of X by some other person appointed by the court
and the act when so done shall have the effect as if done by X. If the property is situated within
the Philippines, the court, in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof, may by an order divest the
title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance
executed in due form of law. (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 10(a))
132. If the judgment is for delivery of real property ruled against X, how shall it be executed?
The officer shall demand X to peaceably vacate the property within 3 working days and restore
possession thereof to the judgment obligee. Otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such
means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession and place the judgment obligee in
possession of that property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall
be satisfied in the same manner as judgment for money. (ROC, Rule 39, Sec, 10(c))
133. A judgment in an action for mandamus was rendered, directing the LCR to issue the
marriage license. On execution, the LCR refused to do so. What is the remedy?
The LCR may be punished for contempt for disobeying such judgment. (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 11)
134. When may a judgment be executed upon motion and when by revival of judgment?
Sec. 6, Rule 39 provides that the final and executory judgment may be executed upon motion,
within 5 years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time and before it is barred by statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by an independent action for revival of judgment filed with the RTC, as it is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The revived judgment may also be enforced within 5 years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 6)
135. If the property levied on execution is claimed by a third party, what is his remedy?
He may file am affidavit of his title thereto or right of possession thereof, stating the grounds for
such right or title, and serving the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof on
the judgment obligee. The officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment
obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. The third party may also file
an independent action to resolve the issue of title over the property. (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 16)
136. When does ordinary appeal by record on appeal apply under Rule 41?
It applies in appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, where the law
or the Rules of Court require the same. (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 2)
139. X entered into a contract of loan secured by real estate mortgage with Y for the loan amount
of Php100,000,000.00. Despite demand, X failed to pay the loan. Y filed a Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned
and sold to Y, the highest bidder. X filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
before the RTC on the ground that it never received the loan amount. X paid the assessed filing
fees based on an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Y contended that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case since it was a real action to recover the mortgaged property,
and as such, the filing fees should have been based on the value of property. RTC dismissed
the case for lack jurisdiction over the annulment of mortgage case, which was held to be in the
nature of an action to recover real property and there was failure to pay the appropriate filing
fees for a real action. X filed a motion for reconsideration, insisting that its complaint is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The RTC denied X’s Motion for Reconsideration. What is
X’s next remedy, if any?
X can seek direct recourse to the Supreme Court with a verified Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 within 15 days from notice of the order denying X’s motion for reconsideration,
since only a question of law is involved. The issue for the Supreme Court’s resolution pertains to
jurisdiction or whether the RTC attained jurisdiction over the Complaint with the amount of
docket fees paid. An issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. Pursuant to Rule 41, Sec. 2(c),
in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal from the judgment of
the RTC rendered in its original jurisdiction shall be in the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari, in accordance with Rule 45. (First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank
of Communications, G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018, J. Leonen).
140. A judgment was rendered by the RTC in an intra-corporate case. Raising pure questions
of law, the losing party appealed the decision to the Supreme Court by Rule 45. Is the appeal
proper?
No. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
under RA 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review
under Rule 43, which allows appeals to the CA to raise questions of fact, of law, or a mix of both.
A party assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special commercial court,
purely on questions of law, must raise these issues before the CA through a petition for review
under Rule 43. (Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017, J. Leonen)
141. Is the filing of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment proper, after an appeal is denied
on the ground of extrinsic fraud because the party’s counsel allegedly failed to file documents
in support of the party’s defenses?
No, because appeal was an available remedy and was already availed of. Assuming that no
appeal or other remedy was available, the petition is still improper for although it alleged fraud,
the failure of the petitioner’s counsel to file documents in support of their defense does not
constitute extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of judgment. Fraud is extrinsic when it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which the
judgment is procured. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court. N, as the prevailing
party, had no part in the commission of the fraud committed by the petitioners' counsel.
(Estrellado v. Presiding Judge of the MTC, G.R. No. 164482 & 211320, November 08, 2017).
143. Which court has jurisdiction over an annulment of judgment of the RTC?
If it is the RTC judgment that is the subject of the petition for annulment, then the CA has original
jurisdiction over the same. (ROC, Rule 47, Sec. 1)
Where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the
court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein.
146. May there be a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 to assail the RTC
judgment in a criminal case?
No, Sec. 1, Rule 47 limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTC for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner. Section 18, Rule 124 does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from
the enumeration of the civil procedure provisions which have suppletory application to criminal
cases. (People v. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June 26, 2007).
147. What must be proven in order to warrant the issuance of injunctive relief?
It must be proven that: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is a right in esse or clear legal right; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such
right; (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury (Municipality of Famy, Laguna v. Municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, G.R. No. 203806,
February 10, 2020, J. Leonen)
148. What are the grounds for a preliminary attachment? The following are the exclusive
grounds: (a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than
moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or
quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud
his creditors; (b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor,
broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty; (c) In an action to recover the possession of
property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any part
thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the
applicant or an authorized person; (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the
performance thereof; (e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his
property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or (f) In an action against a
party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be
served by publication. (ROC, Rule 57, Sec. 1)
149. When may replevin be availed of and what are the requirements?
A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property may, at the commencement
of the action or at any time before answer, apply for an order or the delivery of such property to
him, in the manner hereinafter provided.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows
the facts: (a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or
is entitled to the possession thereof; (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse
party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief; (c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may
recover from the applicant in the action. (ROC, Rule 60, Sec. 1-2)
150. What is the remedy against a judgment in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto or habeas corpus case rendered by the RTC?
The party may either file a motion for reconsideration and from the denial thereof, or without
filing a motion for reconsideration, avail of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 by filing a notice of
appeal with the RTC, to appeal to the CA. (ROC, Rule 44, Sec. 10)
151. When may a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 be availed of?
Under Section 1, Rule 65, it may be availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Under the expanded certiorari jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, the writ may be availed of when there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
152. What are the remedies against the ruling of the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary
investigation and the rulings of the Ombudsman in an administrative case and in a
preliminary investigation, after motions for reconsideration assailing the foregoing have been
denied?
Provided there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
remedies are as follows: (1) against the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, Rule 65 petition for
certiorari filed with the CA; (2) against the ruling of the Ombudsman in a preliminary
investigation, Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed with the SC; (3) against the ruling of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty is not light or does not absolve the
respondent of the charge, petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA; and (5) against the ruling
of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty is light or absolves the
respondent of the charge, Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed with the CA. (Fabian v. Disierto, G.R.
No. 129742, September 16, 1998; Dagan v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013; Go v.
King, G.R. No. 194063, March 11, 2015)
155. X was convicted. He timely filed a motion for reconsideration of his conviction, which was
denied. Within 15 days from the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, X filed
a notice of appeal, invoking the Neypes Ruling as applicable in criminal cases. A motion to
dismiss appeal was filed on the ground that the Neypes Ruling was inapplicable in criminal
cases. A motion for execution was thereafter filed. The trial court considered the motions
submitted for resolution. What is the remedy of X?
X may file a petition for prohibition, to restrain the Trial Court from acting on the motion to
dismiss and the motion for execution. The Neypes Ruling as applicable in criminal cases. The
appeal should instead be given due course. (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011)
157. X failed to comply with his obligation to deliver the car in violation of the contract of sale
he entered into with Y. May Y file a petition for mandamus to compel X to deliver the car?
No. Mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations, for Y has other remedies under
law for a breach of contract, such as one for damages. (COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No.
151992, September 18, 2002)
158. May mandamus lie to compel the Secretary of Justice to act on the petition for review filed
before it?
Yes, if the Secretary of Justice does not act on the petition for review, since it is a duty enjoined
by law for the Secretary of Justice to act on the same. However, mandamus will not lie to compel
the Secretary of Justice to act a certain way, such as to grant or deny said petition, because the
ruling on the petition requires the exercise of discretion which is beyond the ambit of a writ of
mandamus. (Ampatuan, Jr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013)
160. May the SC entertain direct resort to it of a petition for quo warranto?
Yes, as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, where the petition is of transcendental
importance, where the ruling would have far-reaching implications that it is paramount that the
SC make definite pronouncements on the issues presented for the guidance of the bench, bar and
public in future analogous cases, or where the petition involves the qualification of a member of
the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice thereof, the highest official of the judiciary. (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
161. X, a private individual, filed a petition for quo warranto against a Sandiganbayan justice,
praying that the latter be prevented from exercising his powers on the ground of his
disqualification to hold said office, owing to his alleged foreign citizenship. Will the petition
prosper?
No, because X did not show any sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office
of the Justice of the Sandiganbayan. There being no showing that X is entitled to assume said
office, the petition should be denied. (Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008)
162. What is the remedy to determine the right of exercise of franchise or whether the right to
enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user?
Such determination is properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to
assert which, as a rule, belongs to the state, upon complaint or otherwise, because the abuse of a
franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of franchise will have to be
declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because franchise is granted
by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of government. (Divinagracia v.
Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc, G.R. No. 162272, 7 April 2009)
163. What is the period within which to institute a petition for quo warranto under Rule 66?
It is within 1 year after the cause of such ouster or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position arose. However, the SC clarified in Republic v. Sereno that 1-year reglementary period
does not apply where it is the government itself that sues for public interest and seeks relief for a
public wrong. The 1-year limitation applies when the petition is instituted by an individual
claiming a right to a public office. (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
164. May a quo warranto case under Rule 66 be filed against an impeachable officer during the
pendency of an impeachment proceeding against said officer?
Yes. The pendency of the impeachment proceeding is not inconsistent with and will not bar the
institution of a quo warranto proceeding. Impeachment and quo warranto are not mutually
exclusive and may proceed simultaneously because their nature, purpose, grounds, jurisdiction,
and limitations are different. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
165. A judgement for quo warranto was rendered against Y, the usurper, upon petition by X.
Before the judgment could be executed, Y was replaced by newly appointed A. Will the
judgment against Y be binding on A, the successor, but was not a party to the quo warranto
case and be executed?
Under the OEC, the petition must be filed within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of
the election, by any voter even if he is not entitled to the office.
Under the ROC, the petition must be filed within 1 year from the petitioner’s ouster from the
office, or the right of the petitioner to hold the office or position, arose. The 1-year reglementary
period does not apply where it is the government itself that sues for public interest and seeks
relief for a public wrong (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018) It may be filed in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines by the Solicitor General, or a public prosecutor; or by the
person claiming to be entitled to the office and would assume it if the action succeeds, in his own
name.
Under the OEC, the grounds are ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
Under ROC, the court will oust the person illegally appointed and will order the seating of the
person who was legally appointed and entitled to the office.
Under the OEC, the petition is brought in the: (1) COMELEC – if against a regional provincial, or
city officer; (2) or RTC – if against a municipal officer; or (3) MTC – if against a barangay officer.
But if the winning candidate in congress has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as Member of the House of Representatives/ Senate, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s/SET’s own
jurisdiction begins (Rivera v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 210273 & 213069, April 19, 2016).
The petition under Rule 66 is brought in the SC, the CA or the RTC. The Sandiganbayan has
exclusive original jurisdiction on quo warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed under E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14, 14-A S. 1986.
168. X was appointed as acting Chairman of GSIS. Y was then appointed later as regular
chairman. May X bring an action for quo warranto against Y?
No. An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing
authority. (General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, 29 March 2011)
172. What may be the court’s action on the commissioners’ report in the determination of just
compensation?
The court may, after hearing: (1) accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith
or; (2) for cause shown, recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; (3)
set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or (4) accept the report in part and reject it
in part; and (5) make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff of the
property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property given. (ROC, Rule 67, Sec. 8)
173. When may the court disregard the findings of the commissioner?
The court may disregard the findings of commissioners and substitute its own estimate of the
value, for valid reasons, such as when: (1) the commissioners applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them; (2) the commissioners disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence; or (3) the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Spouses Ortega v.
City of Cebu, G.R. Nos. 181562-63 & 181583-84, 2 October 2009)
175. The LGU instituted expropriation proceedings for the taking of A’s land. After
proceedings, judgment was rendered on the amount of just compensation. The LGU claims it
did not enact an ordinance to satisfy the judgment declaring the amount of just compensation.
A motion for execution was filed, which was granted, and the trial court ordered that the
properties of the LGU be attached to satisfy the judgment. Is this valid?
No. Government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution, attachment or
garnishment, to satisfy judgments, based on considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by corresponding appropriations as required by law. The proper
remedy for enforcing final money judgments against the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is to seek relief with the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it within
176. X is an illegal settler on the land sought to be expropriated. Should X be impleaded in the
expropriation case?
No. Mere possessors without any legal interest on the land do not have the right to be joined as
defendants in the expropriation case involving the land they are occupying. (De Knecht v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 108015, 20 May 1998)
178. How can there be immediate possession of the property sought to be expropriated under
Rule 67?
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation
to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.
(1) 100% of the value of the land based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR issued not
more than 3 years prior to the filing of the expropriation complaint. Where there is no lang
classification, the city or municipal assessor is mandated, within a period of 60 days from
date of filing of expropriation case, to come up with the required land classification and
corresponding declaration of real property and improvement for the area. In areas where
there is no zonal valuation, or where the current zonal valuation has been in force or more
than 3 years, the BIR is mandated, within a period of 60 days from date of filing the
expropriation case, to conduct a zonal valuation of area, based on the land classification
done by the city or municipal assessor.
By exception, if the completion of the project is of utmost urgency and importance, and
there is no land classification or no existing zonal valuation of the area concerned or the
zonal valuation has been in force for more than 3 years, the implementing agency shall
use the BIR zonal value and land classification of similar lands within the adjacent vicinity
as basis for the valuation;
(2) Replacement cost at current market value of the improvements and structures as
determined by: (a) implementing agency; (b) government financial institution with
adequate experience in property appraisal; (c) an independent property appraiser
accredited by the BSP; and
(3) The current market value of crops and trees located within the property as determined by
a government financial institution or an independent property appraiser. (RA, 10752, Sec.
6)
179. What are the modes of acquiring property for national infrastructure projects?
183. X was illegally arrested and has been in detention, without any charge against him for 2
months. An Information for illegal possession of drugs was filed against X and the court where
the information was filed issued an order for X’s confinement. X filed a petition for habeas
corpus for his release from custody. Will the petition prosper? If not, what is X’s remedy?
No. Although the arrest of X was inceptively illegal, the filing of information and the issuance of
the confinement order against him are supervening events that bar his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into in habeas corpus is the legality of his detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as filing of the information
and the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. (Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255,
November 24, 2003)
Rather than availing of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial
and exhaust the usual remedies, such as a motion to quash the information. X can also file criminal
and administrative cases against those responsible for his illegal arrest and failure to follow the
periods under Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 163108, February 23, 2005)
184. Police officer X was detained during an inquest proceeding for the charge of murder
against him. The Prosecutor recommended his release as further investigation was required.
However, X remained in detention after administrative charges for grave misconduct were
filed against him by the PNP. X filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing he should be
In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an
officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty
before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to
summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge
to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 6)
But if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered
only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such
facts. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 13)
187. What is the remedy of the convict if the post-conviction DNA Testing Result is favorable
to him?
A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus may be filed by the convict/prosecution in the court of
origin, Court of Appeals (or any member thereof), Supreme Court (or any member thereof). The
Court of Appeals/Supreme Court or any member thereof may conduct a hearing thereon or
remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders. If the court finds that
the petition is meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the
188. When may there be post-conviction DNA testing without need of prior court order?
Post-conviction DNA Testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the
prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment, provided that: (a) a
biological sample exists; (b) such sample is relevant to the case; and (c) the testing would probably
result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction. (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Sec. 6).
189. When may the writ of Habeas Corpus be allowed as a Post-Conviction Remedy?
The writ may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the
conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances: (1) there was
deprivation a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus
voiding the sentence to such access; (4) when the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are
favorable to the convict. (Barredo v. Vinarao, G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007; A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC,
Sec 10)
190. When may writ of habeas corpus be availed of in relation to the custody of minors?
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of a minor is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. In custody cases involving minors, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. The grant of the writ
depends on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of
custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the
petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in
the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent. (Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July
30, 2018).
191. If the petition for writ of habeas corpus is ruled in favor of the petitioner, when shall he
be released?
When the court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and
is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge
from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been
served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the
prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec.
15)
192. FS filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with GY on the ground of
psychological incapacity, praying that she be awarded sole custody of their minor child. FS
also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, praying for the sole custody of the minor child.
Will the petition for habeas corpus prosper?
No, it should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia, because there is identity of parties, FS
and GY, identity of rights asserted and reliefs pray for, insofar as who is entitled to the custody
of the minor child, and the identity of the 2 cases is such that the judgment rendered in the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the habeas corpus case. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is the
more appropriate action to determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody
over the minor child since the Family Code provides that the final judgment in the nullity of
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. The indispensable element of government
participation should also be proven by substantial evidence. There must be a showing that the
extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof was carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization. There must be
showing by substantial evidence of direct or indirect government participation in order for the
Rule to apply. (Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo, G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015).
The filing of the aggrieved party himself suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file
similar petitions. The filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party
suspends the right of all others, observing the foregoing order established. (A.M. 07-9-12-SC, Sec.
2)
195. Where can you file a petition for writ of amparo and where shall be the writ returnable?
Where to File Petition Where Writ is Returnable
RTC of the place where the threat, act or Writ is returnable before such court or judge
omission was committed or any of its
elements occurred
Sandiganbayan or Court of Appeals or any of Writ is returnable before such court or any
its justices justice thereof, or to any RTC of the place
where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred
Supreme Court or any of its justices Writ is returnable before such court or any
justice thereof, Sandiganbayan or any justice
thereof, CA or any of its justices, or to any RTC
of the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements occurred
196. What is the extent of enforceability of the writ of amparo as compared to that of the writ
of habeas corpus?
The writ of amparo is enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, regardless of which court issued
it. (A.M. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 3)
If the writ of habeas corpus is issued by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, or the Court
of Appeals, or any member thereof, it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. If granted
by the RTC, it shall be enforceable within its judicial region. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 2)
Inspection order may be issued upon verified motion, stating in detail the place to be inspected
and supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of enforced
disappearances or whereabouts of aggrieved party, and after due hearing. The purpose of which
is to permit entry for inspecting, measuring, surveying or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon. The movant must show inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. This is also
aavailable to the respondent upon motion, supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the defenses of respondent.
Production Order may be issued upon verified motion and after due hearing to order any person
in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute
or contain evidence relevant to the petition or return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the
ground of national security or privileged nature of the information, in which case the hearing
may be conducted in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. This interim relief is also
aavailable to the respondent upon motion, supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the defenses of respondent (A.M. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 14)
199. When shall the return in writ of amparo be filed and what should it contain?
Within 5 working days after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return
together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the
right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the
prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. All defenses shall be raised
in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived. (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 9-10)
202. The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, thereby commencing the conduct of
several investigations by the AFP and the PNP to determine the whereabouts and the
circumstances behind the disappearance of A. In its Formal Report submitted to the RTC, the
PNP stated that it encountered problems in gathering evidence, there were no more active
leads to pursue. As a result, the RTC recommended, among others, the archiving of the case,
considering that the ongoing investigation had reached an impasse. Is archiving of the case
proper?
Yes, Archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of
cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright
dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation
obtains in which action thereon can be taken. The Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases,
Availment of the writ of habeas data requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
The existence of a person's right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. Without an
actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data
petition will not prosper. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014)
The writ of habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s
College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014)
204. What is the meaning of an entity engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about
the aggrieved party?
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means
“to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting, or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavor,
for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ
from getting to said person or entity (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
2014).
206. Where can you file a petition for writ of habeas data and where shall be the writ
returnable?
210. Define Environmental Protection Order (EPO) and Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO)
An EPO refers to an order issued by the court directing or enjoining any person or government
agency to perform or desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate
the environment. The TEPO is issued if it appears from the verified complaint with prayer for
issuance of EPO that the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice
and irreparable injury. The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for the
issuance of a TEPO. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 1, Sec. 4 (d); Rule 2, Sec. 8).
The judge shall report any action taken on a TRO or a preliminary injunction, including its
modification and dissolution to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the court administrator,
within 10 days from the action taken. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 2, Sec. 10-11)
218. What are the requisites for the writ of kalikasan to issue?
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual
219. Why is a petition for writ of kalikasan in the nature of a citizen suit
It may be filed by any Filipino citizen, in representation of others, including minors or generations
yet unborn, to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule
2, Sec. 5)
The return should include the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or other
expert studies, and if possible, object evidence in support of the defense of the respondent. A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. 8)
221. What is the effect of failure to file the return for the writ of kalikasan?
Respondent shall not be declared in default for a motion to declare respondent in default is a
prohibited motion. The court shall instead proceed to hear the petition ex parte. (A.M. No. 09-6-
8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. 10)
224. What is the remedy after the motion for reconsideration of judgment in kalikasan is
denied?
To prosper, there must be showing of unlawful neglect on the part of respondents to perform any
act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No.
211010, March 7, 2017)
226. Which courts have jurisdiction over petitions for writ of continuing mandamus?
The petition may be filed in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or RTC exercising Jurisdiction
over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred. (A.M. No, 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8,
Sec 3)
227. Is there payment of filing fees in petitions for writ of continuing mandamus?
No. Petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of docket fees (A.M. No, 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Sec 3)
228. May there be an award for damages in petitions for writ of continuing mandamus?
Yes. The court may render judgment directing payment of damages sustained by petitioner by
reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent under the law, rules or
regulations (A.M. No, 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Sec 1)
229. How shall the judgment be enforced in petitions for writ of continuing mandamus?
After the judgment becomes final, the court retains jurisdiction to ensure the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance
thereof. The court shall require respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and
execution of the judgment. The court may, by itself or through a commissioner or appropriate
government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. Periodic reports shall be contained in
partial returns of the writ. The Petitioner may submit comments or observations on the execution
of the judgment (A.M. No, 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Sec 7-8)
The public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal
case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when
the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. Thus, courts do not meddle
with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary investigation because it is exclusively within the
prosecutor's discretion, unless there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
However, once the information is already filed in court, the court has acquired jurisdiction of the
case. Any motion to dismiss or determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is within
the court’s discretion. (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018; Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. Gidwani, G.R. No. 234616, June 20, 2018; J. Leonen)
However, in case of a warrantless arrest, before a complaint or information is filed, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation provided he signs a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the RPC, in the presence of his counsel. Any waiver by a person arrested or detained
under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation,
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver
shall be null and void and of no effect.
Likewise, after the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, in case of a warrantless arrest, the accused may, within 5 days from the time he
learns of the filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in
his defense. (ROC, Rule 112, Sec. 6; RA 7438, Sec. 2(e))
While as a rule, substantial amendments are only allowed before accused enters his plea, by
exception the Supreme Court allowed a substantial amendment of downgrading an offense from
murder to homicide after the accused entered his plea, since it benefitted the accused and the
amendment did not deprive him of defenses available before the amendment. (People v. Janairo,
G.R. No. 129254, 22 July 1999)
The accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. The court shall
commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing
of the proper information (ROC, Rules 110, Sec. 14; 119, Sec. 19)
240. Should the officer making the arrest be in possession of the warrant of arrest issued to
make a valid arrest with a warrant?
Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (RA 7438,
Sec. 2(e))
Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of
the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3, Section 5, Rule 114 is present, then bail shall
be denied. If all the circumstances under paragraph 3, Section 5, Rule 114 are absent, bail does not
become a matter of right and remains discretionary on the court.
When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of
right nor of discretion. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, July 31, 1996; Leviste v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010)
243. Give an instance when a detained person may be released on reduced bail or recognizance.
By exception, if before such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed
temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or accused is incapable of filing one, the
court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community
In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence (ROC, Rule
114, Sec. 24)
At the arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. If the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and the offended party, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily include the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
By exception, if the offended party fails to appear at the arraignment despite due notice, the court
may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included
in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty.
No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (ROC, Rule 116, Sec. 1(f) and 2; Rule
117, Sec. 7(c))
246. What are the duties of a court when an accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense?
When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court is required to accomplish 3 things:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused's plea; (2) to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires. This procedure is
mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe it commits a grave abuse of discretion (People v.
Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, July 20, 1990)
248. What is the effect of a failure to raise grounds for a motion to quash before the accused
pleads?
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
following: (1) the facts charged d not constitute an offense; (2) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (4)
the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent; and (5) the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so (ROC, Rule 117, Sec. 9; Villa v. Ibanez, 88 Phil. 402
(1951); People v. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, 29 March 2004)
250. When may the conviction of the accused not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information?
The conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information, under any of the
following circumstances: (1) The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from
the same act or omission constituting the former charge; (2) The facts constituting the graver
charge became known or where discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint
of information; or (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party, except as provide in Section 1(f) Rule 116, specifically, when
the offended party fails to appear at the arraignment despite due notice, the court may allow the
accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense
(ROC, Rule 117, Sec. 7)
However, a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial, with the
consent of the accused, will not have the effect of a provisional dismissal but will have the effect
When the delays are due to the absence of an essential witness whose whereabouts are unknown
or cannot be determined and are subject to exclusion in determining compliance with the
prescribed time limits which caused the trial court to exceed 180 days, the court shall
provisionally dismiss the action with the express consent of the detained accused (A.M. No. 12-
11-2-SC, Sec. 10(a))
When the delays are due to the absence of an essential witness whose presence cannot be obtained
by due diligence though his whereabouts are known, the court shall provisionally dismiss the
action with the express consent of the detained accused, provided:
(1) Hearing is previously twice postponed due to non-appearance of essential witness and
both the witness and offended party, if they are 2 different persons, have been given notice
of the setting of the case for the third hearing, which notice contains a warning that the
case would be dismissed if the essential witness continues to be absent; and
(2) There is proof of service of pertinent notices of hearings or subpoenas upon the essential
witness and the offended party at their last known postal or e-mail addresses or mobile
phone numbers (A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, Sec. 10(b))
253. When may an accused be discharged as a state witness under Rule 119, Sec. 17?
When 2 or more persons ae jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution, before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge the court is satisfied that: (1) There is absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (2) There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused; (3) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(4) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (5) Said accused has not at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude (ROC, Rule 119, Sec. 17).
254. What is the effect of a discharge of an accused as a state witness under Rule 119, Sec. 17?
The order amounts to an acquittal of the discharged accused and it shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless accused fails or refuses to testify against the co-accused
in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge (ROC, Rule 119,
Sec. 18)
266. What are the effects of the grant or denial of demurrer to evidence, and the denial of a
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence?
If the demurrer is granted, with or without leave of court, it results in the acquittal of the accused.
If the demurrer with leave of court is denied, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. If
the demurrer without leave of court is denied, the accused waives right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution
The order denying motion for leave of court to file demurrer or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. However, by exception, when the denial
of the demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion as when the demurrer to evidence was
denied despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment and
despite the absence of factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. In the absence of the foregoing
circumstances, the proper remedy is to proceed to presentation of accused’s evidence, if the
demurrer was with leave of court, or to later on appeal the judgment of conviction rendered, if
the demurrer was without leave of court. (Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017).
267. What should be the ruling when there is variance between offense charged in
complaint/information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily
includes the offense proved?
The accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
the offense charged, which is included in the offense proved (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 4)
268. Is it correct to say that the absence of the accused during promulgation of judgment is
always prejudicial to him?
No. As a general rule, the judgment is promulgated in the presence of the accused, except if: (a)
the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative; or (b) the judgment is for acquittal, in which case the
presence of the accused is not necessary. There is no prejudice to the accused in such exceptions.
If the judgment is for conviction and the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in the rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
If the absence is justifiable, the accused has 15 days from promulgation of judgment within which
to surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of said remedies, stating in the motion
the reasons for his absence. If accused proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, then he
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice. (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 6; Pascua
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140243, December 14, 2000)
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only.
The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An order granting
or denying probation shall not be appealable.
The benefits of Probation shall not be extended to those: (a) sentenced to serve a maximum term
of imprisonment of more than 6 years; (b) convicted of any offense against national security; (c)
who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment
of not less than 6 months and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than Php1,000.00; (d) who have been
once on probation; and (e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions
of this Decree became applicable (RA 10707, Sec. 1-2)
278. The lawful occupant was in the premises of the house to be searched for drugs, pursuant
to a search warrant. In implementing the search warrant, the police directed the lawful
occupant and his relatives to stay instead in the living room while they conducted the search
and confiscation of drugs in the other areas of the house in the presence of 2 witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Is this valid? What is its effect?
NO. Section 8, Rule 126 is a mandatory rule and preventing the lawful occupant or a member of
his family from actually witnessing the searching and choosing instead 2 other witnesses to
observe the search taints the search with the vice of unreasonableness, rendering the seized
articles inadmissible due to the application of the exclusionary rule or for being the fruit of the
poisonous tree. Since the drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused must
be acquitted. (Bulauitan y Mauayan v. People, G.R. No. 218891, September 19, 2016)
280. A went to the police station to report B regarding a mauling incident. A also reported that
B was illegally planting marijuana. The police and A proceeded to B’s home and arrested B as
he was walking the trail leading towards his house, after A identified B. After the arrest, the
police found marijuana plants planted beneath the gabi plants outside B’s home and a meter
away from where he was arrested. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the police called the
barangay captain and a representative of the farmer’s association to witness the uprooting of
the marijuana plants, which were taken to the police station for marking and inventory, in the
presence of said witnesses. The plants were tested positive for marijuana. B objected to the
admissibility of the plants as they were allegedly not validly seized. Are the plants admissible
in evidence?
NO. The plants were illegally seized without a warrant and are inadmissible in evidence against
B for being fruits of the poisonous tree. When the police officers proceeded to B’s home, they were
already they were already alerted to the fact that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the
area. The discovery of the plants was not inadvertent and the seizure thereof cannot fall under
the plain view doctrine. The seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. The police proceeded to B's home, not only to arrest him for the mauling
incident, but also to verify A's report that B was illegally planting marijuana. The seized
marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous
tree. (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019)
281. X was arrested without a warrant. The police then conducted an initial cursory body search
on X, and nothing was found in his person. After X was brought to the police station, the police
conducted another thorough search on the person of X which yielded 5 sachets of shabu. Is the
shabu admissible in evidence?
NO. The shabu was obtained on the second search, after a substantial amount of time had elapsed
from the time of the arrest, and at a place other than the venue of the place of actual arrest. The
lawful search as an incident of a lawful arrest was done during the first search, where no shabu
was found. The subsequent search was unlawful and unreasonable. The shabu is inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019)
282. May the failure to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule still sustain a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Yes. The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over
the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.
283. A buy bust operation was done by the PDEA at 8:00 pm. Briefing for this started as early
as 2:30 pm of the same day. The marking and inventory was done in the presence of the
accused, an elected official but without the presence of a representative from the DOJ and the
media. When asked why there was no signatures in the space provided for the representative
of the DOJ and media, the police testified that there was no media available because it was
already past office hours. Is this sufficient justification to warrant exception to chain of
custody rule?
No. The PDEA had hours to spare from the time of briefing to implementation of buy bust
operation (2:30 to 8:00 pm). They could have used that time to secure the presence of
representatives from the DOJ and the media who would have accompanied them in the conduct
of the inventory and photography of the items to be seized from Ramos on account of the buy-
bust. There was no justifiable reason for the failure to comply and no showing of any genuine
and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses.
Prosecution must show earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under the law. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. Mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable
as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police
officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-
bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full
well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of
RA 9165. Police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but
must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the
mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were
reasonable. (People v. Ramos y Cabanatan, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018)
Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters that
are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can
safely be assumed from the tribunal's general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer Inc., G.R. No. 155110, March 31, 2005)
288. May the appellate court consider theories or arguments raised for the first time on appeal?
Generally, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not
be considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet
the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue or argument
is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted. (Borromeo v. Mina, G.R.
No. 193747, June 5, 2013)
293. What is the original document rule and what are its exceptions?
The original document rule provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than
the original document itself (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 3). The rule is not absolute and admits of the
following exceptions:
(1) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(2) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original
cannot be obtained by local judicial processes and procedures;
(3) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole;
(4) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office; and
(5) When the original is not closely-related to the controlling issue. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 3)
However, by exception, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in a verified pleading: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake
or imperfection in the written instrument; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d)
the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec.10).
295.What is the marital disqualification rule and what are its exceptions?
It provides that during the marriage, the husband or wife cannot testify against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse. Its exceptions ae: (1) when there is the consent of the spouse
against whom testimony is to be made; (2) in a civil case by one against the other; and (3) in
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 23)
296. What is the marital privileged communication rule and what are its exceptions?
It provides that the husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other, as to any communication received in confidence by one from
This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant
and not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them
(People v. Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013).
The rule, however, admits of exceptions: (1) admission by co-partner or agent; (2) act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party; (3)
admission by conspirator; (4) admission by privies; and (5) admission by silence. (ROC, Rule 130,
Sec. 30-33)
298. How may the act or extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator be admissible against the co-
conspirator?
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his co-conspirator, it is
necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b)
the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (People v. Tena, G.R. No. 100909, 21 October 1992)
If the foregoing requisites are not present, does this mean that the extrajudicial confession will
be inadmissible?
No. Although not admissible against the co-conspirators, it is still against the confessant. (People
v. Palijon, G.R. No. 123545, 18 October 2000)
An accused testified in open court implicating his co-accused. Is this inadmissible because the
declaration was not made during the existence of the conspiracy?
No, it is admissible. The requisites for admissibility of statements of a conspirator against co-
conspirators under Sec. 31, Rule 130 only apply to extrajudicial declarations, where the
conspirators have no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. A judicial confession is
admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-
examine the former. The co-accused’s admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
witness stand. where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter. (People v. Palijon,
G.R. No. 123545, 18 October 2000)
A report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the
statements. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact
that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply (Lea Mer Industries Inc. v.
Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 161745, September 30, 2005)
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent makes
known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the hearing, or by the pre-trial stage in the
case of a trial of the main case, to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet it, the
proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 50)
However, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 40)
For verbal acts, it is required that: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2)
the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal
act; and (4) the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act. (Talidano v. Falcon Maritime
& Allied Services, Inc., G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008)
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by the participants,
victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reaction inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity to fabricate. (People v. Estibal, G.R. No.
208749, November 26, 2014; People v. Sace, G.R. No. 178063, April 5, 2010)
For impeaching a witness, evidence that he has been convicted by final judgment of a crime shall
be admitted if: (a) the crime was punishable by a penalty in excess of1 year; (b) the crime involved
moral turpitude, regardless of the penalty
Evidence of conviction not admissible if conviction has been the subject of an amnesty or
annulment of conviction (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 11-12)
All other writings are private (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 19)
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be (ROC, Rule
132, Sec. 20).
However, evidence of authenticity of a private writing is not required when the private document
is more than 30 years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuineness and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion. (ROC, Rule 32,
Sec. 21)
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 23)
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