OSJI Model Indictment Crime of Aggression Committed Against Ukraine

Model Indictment for the Crime of
Aggression Committed against

Ukraine
May 2022
Model Indictment for the Crime of Aggression
AGAINST
VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN (“VLADIMIR PUTIN”)

NIKOLAI PLATONOVICH PATRUSHEV (“NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV”)
SERGEI KUZHUGETOVICH SHOIGU (“SERGEI SHOIGU”)
SERGEI EVGENIEVICH NARYSHKIN (“SERGEI NARYSHKIN”)
VALENTINA IVANOVNA MATVIYENKO (“VALENTINA MATVIYENKO”)
SERGEI ORESTOVICH BESEDA (“SERGEI BESEDA”)
SERGEI VIKTOROVICH LAVROV (“SERGEI LAVROV”)
and VALERY VASILIEVICH GERASIMOV (“VALERY GERASIMOV”)
INDICTMENT
The Office of the Prosecutor, pursuant to their authority, charges:
VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV,

SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, SERGEI BESEDA,
SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY GERASIMOV
with the Crime of Aggression, as follows:
THE ACCUSED
1. By actions taken between 7 April 2021 and 5 April 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN,
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, SERGEI BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and
VALERY GERASIMOV planned, prepared, initiated and/or executed the
Russian Federation’s acts of aggression in Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin
2. VLADIMIR PUTIN was born on 7 October 1952 in Leningrad. He is serving
his fourth term as the President of the Russian Federation (hereinafter,
“Russia”). He was previously President from 1999 to 2008, and has served as
President again since 2012.1 As President, VLADIMIR PUTIN is the
constitutionally designated Head of State, 2 with the authority as guarantor of the
Constitution to take measures to protect the sovereignty of Russia, its
independence and state integrity; maintain civil peace and harmony in the
country; and ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of public
authorities. 3 As President, VLADIMIR PUTIN is also constitutionally tasked
with determining the main direction of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy,4
1
Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Members of the Security Council of the
Russian Federation since its inception”, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/about/all_time/.
2
Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993, as amended 2020), Article 80(1).
3
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 80(2).
4
and with representing Russia within the country and in its international
relations. 5 Furthermore, as President of Russia, VLADIMIR PUTIN is the
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Russia. 6 The Federal
Law on Security stipulates that state security policy forms part of Russia’s
domestic and foreign policy,7 which VLADIMIR PUTIN is required to direct.
Under this Law, as President, VLADIMIR PUTIN is also granted the power to
determine the main direction of state security8 and to approve the national
security strategy. 9
3. As the President of Russia, VLADIMIR PUTIN is constitutionally mandated to
form the Security Council to assist him as Head of State in exercising his
powers on issues of ensuring the national interests and security of the individual,
society and the state; maintaining civil peace and harmony in the country;
protecting Russia’s sovereignty, independence and state integrity; and
preventing internal and external threats. 10 The Federal Law on Security assigns
the Security Council several main functions, including: (1) considering issues of
security, organization of defense and other issues related to protecting Russia’s
constitutional order, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; (2)
developing and refining the national security strategy; (3) implementing
strategic planning on security; and (4) preparing the President’s draft regulatory
legal acts on issues of ensuring security.11 The Security Council’s main tasks, as
stipulated by the Federal Law on Security, include: (1) providing conditions for
the President’s exercise of powers relating to security; (2) forming state security
policy and controlling its implementation; (3) developing measures to neutralize
security or military threats; (4) preparing proposals for the President on
measures to prevent and eliminate emergency situations and overcome their
consequences. 12 The Federal Law on Security further provides that the Security
Council is chaired by the President, VLADIMIR PUTIN, and required to
coordinate security activities with him.13 Regulations of the Security Council
are to be approved by the President, VLADIMIR PUTIN. 14
4. By virtue of his role, VLADIMIR PUTIN is in a position effectively to exercise
control over Russia’s political and military action. He exercises power over
Russian political and military action in concert with a close circle of trusted
advisors, who also have influence over such decisions. 15 These advisors include
5
6
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 87.
7
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, 28 December 2010, Article 4(1),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=87862&p_country=RUS&p
_count=802.
8
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, Article 8(1).
9
10
Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993, as amended 2020), Article 83(g).
11
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, Articles 4(3), 13(1), 14(2).
12
13
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, Article 6.
14
15
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Putin Conscripts History”, Center for European Policy
Analysis, 18 February 2022, https://cepa.org/putin-conscripts-history/; Anton Troianovski,
“The Hard-Line Russian Advisers Who have Putin’s Ear”, The New York Times, 30
January 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/30/world/europe/putin-top-advisers-
3
the other accused persons, several of whom are Members of the Security
Council and/or trusted high-level Russian officials with security service
backgrounds, known as “siloviki”.
5. VLADIMIR PUTIN announced the beginning of a “special military operation”
in Ukraine in a speech on 24 February 2022.16 Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov stated on 24 February 2022 during a call with media that VLADIMIR
PUTIN as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces would decide
the duration of the military operation in Ukraine: “Deadline are determined by
effectiveness and expediency. Will, of course, be determined by the Supreme
Commander.”17 On 4 March 2022, Dmitry Peskov stated that VLADIMIR
PUTIN as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief “receives information” and
“makes decisions about how, and by what means to carry out the assigned tasks
during that operation.”18
Nikolai Patrushev
6. NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV was born on 11 July 1951 in Leningrad. He has served
as Secretary of the Russian Security Council since 2008.19 Members of the
Security Council are personally appointed by VLADIMIR PUTIN,20 such that
membership of the Security Council may be indicative of the level of trust
VLADIMIR PUTIN has in a particular individual such as NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV. Members of the Security Council are required to participate in
meetings, at which they have the right to an advisory vote.21 Decisions of the
Security Council are taken at its sessions and meetings by Permanent Members
of the Security Council, who have equal decision-making rights.22 Decisions of
the Security Council enter into force on approval by the President, and are
thereafter binding on government agencies and officials.23 Thus, each Member of
the Security Council, and especially each Permanent Member, has the ability to
influence the conduct of its main tasks and functions. An expert on Russian
politics explains that, while the exact extent of power actually afforded to the
Security Council is unclear, the Security Council remains a “locus of power,”
ukraine.html; Alexander Gabuev, “Alexander Gabuev Writes from Moscow on Why

Vladimir Putin and his Entourage want War”, The Economist, 19 February 2022,
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/02/19/alexander-gabuev-writes-from-
moscow-on-why-vladimir-putin-and-his-entourage-want-war.
16
Kremlin, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation”, 24 February 2022,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843.
17
“В Кремле рассказали о целях специальной операции по защите Донбасса”, Vmeste,
24 February 2022, https://vmeste-rf.tv/news/v-kremle-rasskazali-o-tselyakh-spetsialnoy-
operatsii-po-zashchite-donbassa/.
18
“Кремль прокомментировал просьбу Кадырова дать приказ на взятие Киева и
Харькова”, Lenta, 4 March 2022, https://lenta.ru/news/2022/03/04/donbss_putin/.
19
Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Patrushev Nikolai Platonovich”,
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/about/leadership/person8/.
20
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, Articles 15(2)-(3).
21
22
23
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, Articles 18(2)-(3).
4
and the Members of the Security Council are “key players within the Russian
political system.” 24
7. As Secretary of the Security Council, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV has the
additional responsibility of being responsible for implementing the tasks and
functions of the Security Council.25 Unlike other Members, Patrushev reports
directly to VLADIMIR PUTIN, as President, 26 and his powers are determined
by the President.27
8. Besides his official role as Secretary of the Security Council, NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV also holds decision-making power by virtue of his relationship
with VLADIMIR PUTIN. NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV has had a long career in the
security services, dating back to 1974.28 Prior to his role as Secretary of the
Security Council, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV served as the Director of the
Russian Federal Security Service (“FSB”) from 1999 to 2008. 29 He was
appointed to that position by the former President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, to
replace VLADIMIR PUTIN.30 NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV is hence one of the
high-level Russian officials with security service backgrounds, referred to as
“siloviki”. 31 The siloviki are regarded as among VLADIMIR PUTIN’s most
trusted advisors, 32 potentially because many of them share VLADIMIR
PUTIN’s KGB background. 33 The siloviki are also thought to have gained
24
Mark Galeotti, “Russia’s Security Council: Where Policy, Personality, and Process Meet”,
Marshall Center, October 2019, Number 041,
https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/russias-security-council-
where-policy-personality-and-process-meet-0.
25
26
27
28
Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Patrushev Nikolai Platonovich”,
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/about/leadership/person8/.
29
Database of Free Russia Forum, “Putin’s List – Patrushev Nikolai”, https://www.spisok-
putina.org/en/personas/patrushev-2/.
30
Database of Free Russia Forum, “Putin’s List – Patrushev Nikolai”, https://www.spisok-
putina.org/en/personas/patrushev-2/.
31
Anton Troianovski, “The Hard-Line Russian Advisers Who have Putin’s Ear”, The New York
Times, 30 January 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/30/world/europe/putin-top-
advisers-ukraine.html; James Langton, “Meet Russia’s siloviki – Putin’s inner circle”, The
National News, 15 March 2022,
https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2022/03/15/meet-russias-siloviki-putins-
inner-circle/.
32
Analysis, 18 February 2022, https://cepa.org/putin-conscripts-history/; Anton Troianovski,
“The Hard-Line Russian Advisers Who have Putin’s Ear”, The New York Times, 30
January 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/30/world/europe/putin-top-advisers-
ukraine.html; Andrew Roch, “Putin’s security men: the elite group who ‘fuel his anxieties’”,
The Guardian, 4 February 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/putin-
security-elite-siloviki-russia.
33
advisers-ukraine.html.
5
increasing influence in recent years. 34 VLADIMIR PUTIN even names

NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV as one of his trusted allies in his autobiography. 35
9. Russia experts and commentators also consider NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV to be
one of VLADIMIR PUTIN’s most trusted advisors: In January 2022, the New
York Times’ Moscow Bureau Chief identified NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV as one
of the individuals who would figure most prominently in making the decision on
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 36 Another expert on Russian policy deemed
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV a member of VLADIMIR PUTIN’s “war cabinet,”37
while yet another observes that NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV enjoys the particular
trust of VLADIMIR PUTIN, is a vocal and high-profile figure within Russian
security and foreign policy, and that the actual power of the Security Council
largely vests in NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV himself. 38 It has also been observed
that NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV is VLADIMIR PUTIN’s unofficial national
security advisor. 39
10. In relation to Russian decision-making around Ukraine in particular, NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV was placed on the EU sanctions lists in 2014,40 and on the US
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”)
sanctions list in 2018,41 for contributing to undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty.
The UK Treasury also placed NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV on its sanctions list in
2020 for his involvement, as part of the Security Council, in “shaping the policy
of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or
34
Emily Sherwin, “Putin’s inner circle: Who has the Russian president’s ear on the war in
Ukraine?”, Deutsche Welle, 11 March 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/putins-inner-circle-
who-has-the-russian-presidents-ear-on-the-war-in-ukraine/a-61102576.
35
Vladimir Putin, First Person (Hachette Publishing, 2000), 201.
36
37
Alexander Gabuev, “Alexander Gabuev Writes from Moscow on Why Vladimir Putin and his
Entourage want War”, The Economist, 19 February 2022, https://www.economist.com/by-
invitation/2022/02/19/alexander-gabuev-writes-from-moscow-on-why-vladimir-putin-and-
his-entourage-want-war.
38
Mark Galeotti, “Russia’s Security Council: Where Policy, Personality, and Process Meet”,
Marshall Center, October 2019, Number 041,
https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/russias-security-council-
where-policy-personality-and-process-meet-0. See also Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra:
Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016,
https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR_169_-
_PUTINS_HYDRA_INSIDE_THE_RUSSIAN_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_1513.pdf.
39
Andrew Roch, “Putin’s security men: the elite group who ‘fuel his anxieties’”, The Guardian,
4 February 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/putin-security-elite-
siloviki-russia.
40
Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 810/2014
implementing Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of
actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, 25 July 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0810.
41
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and
Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity”, 6 April 2018,
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0338.
6
independence of Ukraine.”42 In relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of

Ukraine, the US Department of the Treasury considers NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV part of Russia’s “ruling elite.”43
Sergei Shoigu
11. SERGEI SHOIGU was born on 21 May 1955 in Chadan, Tuva. He has served as
Defense Minister of Russia since 2012. 44 The Defense Minister is responsible
for the Russian Armed Forces, encompassing land forces, air and space forces,
and the navy. He is directly subordinate to the President of Russia—the
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces—thus second in the chain
of command.45 As Defense Minister, SERGEI SHOIGU reportedly oversees the
Russian Military Intelligence Agency (“GRU”). 46 Russian independent
investigative outlets istories and Agency published a detailed profile of SERGEI
SHOIGU, stating that, since he took over the Ministry of Defense in 2012, his
priority has been public relations.47 He has established a sizable
communications department within the Ministry and secured media attention
over his activities. SERGEI SHOIGU is also a Permanent Member of the
Security Council,48 and is therefore one of the select individuals with a vote on
state security decisions.
12. Besides his official role as Defense Minister, SERGEI SHOIGU also holds
decision-making power by virtue of his relationship with VLADIMIR PUTIN.
SERGEI SHOIGU is one of the siloviki, 49 regarded as having VLADIMIR
PUTIN’s trust. SERGEI SHOIGU was one of the founders of United Russia
political party in 2001 and is to this day considered one of its most prominent
members and among VLADIMIR PUTIN’s strongest supporters. 50 One media
42
Her Majesty’s Treasury – Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Consolidated List of
Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK, updated 15 March 2022,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/1061009/Russia.pdf.
43
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Russian
Federation President Vladimir Putin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov”, 25
February 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0610.
44
https://structure.mil.ru/management/minister.htm.
45
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,
https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/leader.htm?id=10330475@SD_Employee.
46
The GRU now uses the name “Main Directorate of the General Staff”: see Ministry of
Defense of the Russian Federation, “Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation”,
https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9711@egOrganization
; Andrew Roch, “Putin’s security men: the elite group who ‘fuel his anxieties’”, The
Guardian, 4 February 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/putin-
security-elite-siloviki-russia.
47
iStories and Agency, “Minister with a small cult of personality”, 6 September 2021,
https://istories.media/investigations/2021/09/06/ministr-s-malenkim-kultom-lichnosti/.
48
Kremlin, “Security Council Structure – Members”,
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/structure/security-council/members.
49
James Langton, “Meet Russia’s siloviki – Putin’s inner circle”, The National News, 15 March
2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2022/03/15/meet-russias-siloviki-
putins-inner-circle/.
50
United Russia, “Shoigu Sergey Kuzhugetovich”, https://er.ru/person/62a3fd77-d8e1-4663-
8f45-36cf0679c905.
7
outlet quotes a former employee of the presidential administration saying that

SERGEI SHOIGU can be considered one of the leaders of a powerful political
clan, which unites the Governor of the Moscow region Andrei Vorobyov, the
Chairwoman of the Federation Council VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, and a
friend of VLADIMIR PUTIN Gennady Timchenko. 51 The clan is connected by
related businesses and is in good standing with VLADIMIR PUTIN.
13. SERGEI SHOIGU’s personal relationship with VLADIMIR PUTIN is
documented as well. VLADIMIR PUTIN visited SERGEI SHOIGU several
times at his home region in the Siberian taiga, where they spent quality time
together.52 Media reports speculate that VLADIMIR PUTIN’s visit to SERGEI
SHOIGU in late September 2021 may have been an occasion for planning
Russia’s acts of aggression in Ukraine in 2022.53
14. SERGEI SHOIGU is hence considered to be heavily involved in Russia’s
military decision-making not only by virtue of his official role, but also in
practice.
15. In relation to Russian decision-making around Ukraine in particular, SERGEI
SHOIGU has been identified as one of the two architects of the 2014 annexation
of Crimea, support for pro-Russian non-state armed groups in Donbas, and the
formulation of Russia’s military strategy in Syria.54
16. Russia experts and commentators also consider SERGEI SHOIGU to be one of
the key architects of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine: Some analysts with
expertise on the Russian security services identify SERGEI SHOIGU as one of
two individuals most strongly entrenched in VLADIMIR PUTIN’s circle of
trusted advisors. 55 These experts also credit the Russian military with driving
Russia’s 2022 aggression against Ukraine. 56 SERGEI SHOIGU was also
identified by the New York Times as one of the individuals who would figure
most prominently in making the decision on Russia’s 2022 invasion of
51
Roman Shleynov, “Global, financial, family”, Novaya Gazeta, 20 November 2008.
https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2008/11/20/35800-mirovoy-finansovyy-semeynyy.
52
Alexey Korostelev, “The president’s lair: in which taiga estate does Putin celebrate
birthdays and make key decisions?”, TVRain, 20 May 2017,
https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/reportazh/logovo_presidenta_v_taige-435153/ ; Kremlin,
“Vladimir Putin spent the weekend in Tuva and the Krasnoyarsk Territory”, 26 July 2013,
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18957; Kremlin, “Trip to Tuva, August 1-3”, 7
August 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55308; Kremlin, “Vladimir Putin spent
a holiday in Siberia”, 7 October, 2019, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61732.
53
Emily Sherwin, “Putin’s inner circle: Who has the Russian president’s ear on the war in
Ukraine?”, Deutsche Welle, 11 March 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/putins-inner-circle-
who-has-the-russian-presidents-ear-on-the-war-in-ukraine/a-61102576.
54
Sebastian Seibt, “Shoigu and Gerasimov: Masters of Putin’s Wars”, France 24, 4 March
2022, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220304-shoigu-and-gerasimov-masters-of-
putin-s-wars.
55
Analysis, 18 February 2022, https://cepa.org/putin-conscripts-history/.
56
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Man Behind Putin’s Military – How Sergey Shoygu
Paved the Way for Russia’s Ukraine Assault”, Foreign Affairs, 26 February 2022,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2022-02-26/man-behind-putins-
military?utm_campaign=tw_daily_soc&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter_posts.
8
Ukraine, 57 and by another expert on Russian policy as a member of VLADIMIR

PUTIN’s “war cabinet.” 58 One source also reports that SERGEI SHOIGU
ordered the build-up of Russian troops at the border with Ukraine in March to
April 2021 and oversaw war games in Belarus in February 2022, in advance of
the 2022 invasion.59
17. SERGEI SHOIGU has also been sanctioned for his involvement in the 2022
Russian invasion of Ukraine. The EU placed SERGEI SHOIGU on its sanctions
list in February 2022 because of his role as Defense Minister, his public
comments about Crimea being and remaining Russian, his command and order
of Russian troops in the illegally annexed Crimea, and his command and order
of Russian troops’ positioning at the border with Ukraine. 60 In particular, the EU
found that SERGEI SHOIGU is “ultimately responsible for any military action
against Ukraine,” and is “therefore responsible for actively supporting and
implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or
security in Ukraine.” The US Department of the Treasury also placed SERGEI
SHOIGU on its OFAC sanctions list in February 2022, finding that he is one of
the individuals “directly responsible for the further invasion of Ukraine.”61
Thereafter, the UK Treasury placed SERGEI SHOIGU on its sanctions list in
March 2022 in relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. 62
Sergei Naryshkin
18. SERGEI NARYSHKIN was born on 27 October 1954 in St. Petersburg. He has
served as Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (“SVR”) since
2016, when he was appointed to the position by VLADIMIR PUTIN.63 The
Federal Law on Foreign Intelligence tasks the SVR with conducting Russia’s
intelligence activities in the political, economic, military-strategic, scientific,
57
58
59
siloviki-russia.
60
of Ukraine, 23 February 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:042I:FULL&from=EN.
61
62
63
Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “Director of the Foreign Intelligence
Service of the Russian Federation”, http://www.svr.gov.ru/svr_today/director.htm.
9
technical and environmental spheres, and providing intelligence information to

Russia’s highest legislative and executive bodies. 64 The SVR hence provides
intelligence information to VLADIMIR PUTIN, the Federation Council, and the
State Duma, among others.65 One source reports that the SVR provides
VLADIMIR PUTIN with a daily report of foreign intelligence issues. 66 The
goals and objectives of the SVR are to ensure Russian national security and
interests. 67 In order to accomplish its mandate, the SVR is empowered to use
overt and covert methods and means of intelligence activities. 68 As Director of
the SVR, SERGEI NARYSHKIN oversees its activities. SERGEI
NARYSHKIN is also a Permanent Member of the Security Council, 69 and is
therefore one of the select individuals with a vote on state security decisions.
19. Besides his official role as Director of the SVR, SERGEI NARYSHKIN also
holds decision-making power by virtue of his relationship with VLADIMIR
PUTIN. Prior to this role, SERGEI NARYSHKIN served as Chairman of the
State Duma from 2011 to 2016, and as Head of the Presidential Administration
from 2008 to 2011. 70 He also reportedly attended the Higher School of the KGB
for two years, starting in 1978.71 SERGEI NARYSHKIN is hence one of the
siloviki, 72 regarded as having VLADIMIR PUTIN’s particular trust.
20. Russia experts and commentators consider SERGEI NARYSHKIN to hold
significant sway over security decisions, including the 2022 Russian invasion of
Ukraine: Some analysts with expertise on the Russian security services identify
SERGEI NARYSHKIN as one of two individuals most strongly entrenched in
President Putin’s circle of trusted advisors.73 SERGEI NARYSHKIN was also
identified by the New York Times’ Moscow Bureau Chief as one of the
individuals who would figure most prominently in making the decision on
64
Federal Law No. 5-FZ “On Foreign Intelligence”, Article 11, 10 January 1996,
http://www.svr.gov.ru/svr_today/doc02.htm.
65
Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “FAQ”,
http://www.svr.gov.ru/pressburo/faq.htm.
66
Adam Campbell, “A Bad Crime Novel? Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)”, The
Security Distillery, 15 September 2021, https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/-a-bad-
crime-novel-russias-foreign-intelligence-service-svr.
67
Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “FAQ”,
http://www.svr.gov.ru/pressburo/faq.htm.
68
Federal Law No. 5-FZ “On Foreign Intelligence”, Article 13.
69
70
71
Roman Shleynov, “Nikolai Tokarev: the path from the KGB to Transneft”, Vedomosti, 11
February 2013,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150823051758/https:/www.vedomosti.ru/library/articles/201
3/02/11/revizor_iz_razvedochnoj_partii.
72
James Langton, “Meet Russia’s siloviki – Putin’s inner circle”, The National News, 15 March
2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2022/03/15/meet-russias-siloviki-
putins-inner-circle/.
73
Analysis, 18 February 2022, https://cepa.org/putin-conscripts-history/.
10
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, 74 and by another expert on Russian policy as

a member of President Putin’s “war cabinet.” 75 It has also been commented that
SERGEI NARYSHKIN could be a potential successor to President Putin. 76
21. SERGEI NARYSHKIN was placed on EU and US OFAC sanctions lists in
2014 for contributing to undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. 77 The UK Treasury
also placed SERGEI NARYSHKIN on its sanctions list in 2020 for supporting
the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine, publicly supporting the Russia-
Crimea unification treaty and the related federal constitutional law, and his
positions as Director of the SVR and Permanent Member of the Security
Council. 78 In relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US
Department of the Treasury considers SERGEI NARYSHKIN part of Russia’s
“ruling elite.”79
Valentina Matviyenko
22. VALENTINA MATVIYENKO was born on 7 April 1949. She has served as
Chairwoman or Speaker of the Federation Council since 2011. 80 The Russian
Parliament, known as the Federal Assembly, comprises two chambers—the
Federation Council and the State Duma. 81 The Federation Council currently
includes 200 members, who are appointed by representative and executive
organs of federation entities.82 The Chairperson of the Federation Council is
elected from among its members, and is tasked with chairing its sessions and
overseeing its internal routine.83 The Federation Council is constitutionally
74
75
76
siloviki-russia.
77
of Ukraine, 21 March 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0284&from=PL; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Members Of The Russian Leadership’s
Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The Situation In Ukraine”, 20 March 2014,
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl23331.aspx.
78
79
80
Federation Council, “Speaker of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation”, http://council.gov.ru/en/structure/persons/257/.
81
Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993, as amended 2020), Article 95.
82
http://council.gov.ru/en/structure/council/
83
11
entrusted with jurisdiction over several matters, including approving the

President’s edicts introducing martial law, approving the President’s edicts
introducing a state of emergency, and deciding on the possibility of using
Russian Armed Forces outside Russian territory.84 One of the Federation
Council’s main tasks is to consider draft federal laws adopted by the State
Duma, and ultimately to make the decision on enactment of federal laws for the
President’s signing and promulgation.85 Relatedly, the Federal Law on Security
provides that the Federation Council is responsible for considering federal laws
on security that are adopted by the State Duma.86 Thus, by virtue of her position
as Chairwoman or Speaker of the Federation Council, VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO is heavily involved in the enactment of legislation in Russia.
23. VALENTINA MATVIYENKO is also a Permanent Member of the Security
Council, 87 and is therefore one of the select individuals with a vote on state
security decisions.
24. In relation to Russian decision-making around Ukraine in particular,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO was placed on EU and US OFAC sanctions lists
in 2014 for contributing to undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. 88 The UK
Treasury also placed VALENTINA MATVIYENKO on its sanctions list in
2020 for her role as Speaker of the Federation Council and her public support in
the Federation Council of the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine in March
2014. 89 In relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US Department
of the Treasury considers VALENTINA MATVIYENKO part of Russia’s
“ruling elite.”90
84
85
Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993, as amended 2020), Articles 105-107.
86
Federal Law No. 390-FZ “On Security”, 28 December 2010, Article 9(1),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=87862&p_country=RUS&p
_count=802.
87
88
of Ukraine, 21 March 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0284&from=PL; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, “Issuance of a new Ukraine-related Executive Order; Ukraine-related
Designations”, 17 March 2014, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-
sanctions/recent-actions/20140317.
89
90
12
Sergei Beseda
25. SERGEI BESEDA was born on 1 January 1954. He heads the 5th Service of the
FSB, the Service of Operational Information and International Relations, 91
otherwise known as the FSB’s foreign intelligence and espionage branch. 92 The
FSB’s operations are governed by the Federal Law on the Federal Security
Service. 93 The law provides that the FSB is the unified central system of
Russia’s federal security service organs, tasked with safeguarding Russian
security. 94 The FSB’s main areas of activity are counter-intelligence, combating
terrorism, combating crime, intelligence, border activity and safeguarding
information security.95 The FSB is obliged to perform a number of tasks,
including informing the President and others of security threats, combating
foreign intelligence activity that seeks to harm Russia, safeguarding the security
of Russian authorities and state communications, and undertaking foreign
intelligence measures to safeguard Russian security. 96 The FSB also has wide-
ranging powers, including the use of special methods and means for intelligence
and counter-intelligence activities, infiltration of foreign states’ special services
and organizations, extraterritorial conduct of foreign intelligence activity, and
the authority to arm its staff.97
26. In relation to Russian decision-making around Ukraine in particular, SERGEI
BESEDA is believed to oversee the FSB’s foreign intelligence work in relation
to Ukraine.98 For instance, his signature reportedly appears on various sensitive
documents on intelligence operations conducted in Ukraine. 99 Additionally,
following the opening of a Ukrainian investigation into SERGEI BESEDA’s
involvement in crimes committed in Kyiv in February 2014, the FSB publicly
confirmed that SERGEI BESEDA was in Kyiv at the time, reportedly checking
on the protection of the Russian embassy. 100
27. SERGEI BESEDA was placed on EU and US OFAC sanctions lists since 2014
for contributing to undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. 101 The US Department
91
Thomas Harding, “Russian general killed and clutch of spy chiefs arrested”, The National
News, 11 March 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/uk-
news/2022/03/11/russian-general-killed-and-clutch-of-spy-chiefs-arrested/.
92
See FSB website, http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/structure.htm; Andrei Soldatov, “Inside Vladimir
Putin’s Shadowy Army of Global Spies”, The Daily Beast, 30 August 2021,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-vladimir-putins-shadowy-army-of-global-spies.
93
Federal Law No. 40-FZ “On the Federal Security Service”, 22 February 1995, unofficial
English translation by the Council of Europe available here:
https://policehumanrightsresources.org/content/uploads/2016/08/Federal-Law-on-Federal-
Security-Service-Russia-1995.pdf?x96812.
94
Federal Law No. 40-FZ “On the Federal Security Service”, Article 1.
95
96
97
98
R.Politik, Bulletin No. 5 (91) – Analytical Report, 8 March 2022, on file.
99
Andrei Soldatov, “Inside Vladimir Putin’s Shadowy Army of Global Spies”, The Daily Beast,
30 August 2021, https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-vladimir-putins-shadowy-army-of-
global-spies.
100
“FSB of the Russian Federation: the responsible officer of the department was in Kyiv on
February 20-21”, Interfax, 5 April 2014, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/369704.
101
13
of the Treasury also identified the FSB as being involved in the funding and
supporting of separatist activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, 102
indicating the role that the FSB has historically played in undermining the
sovereignty of Ukraine. The UK Treasury also placed SERGEI BESEDA on its
sanctions list in 2020 for his role in heading the FSB service responsible for
overseas intelligence operations and international activity.103
28. A Russian political analysis firm identifies SERGEI BESEDA’s Service of the
FSB as having participated in preparations for the 2022 Russian invasion of
Ukraine. 104 This is supported by the findings of an expert on Russian security
services, who notes that the FSB’s 5th Service was responsible for providing
VLADIMIR PUTIN with information on political developments in Ukraine in
the lead-up to the 2022 invasion.105
Sergei Lavrov
29. SERGEI LAVROV was born on 21 March 1950 in Moscow. He has served as
the Foreign Minister of Russia since 2004. 106 In this position, he is responsible
for the conduct of Russia’s international relations and oral statements made by
him may be legally binding on Russia. 107 SERGEI LAVROV has hence been
instrumental in justifying Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, including
before international fora. SERGEI LAVROV is also a Permanent Member of the
Security Council,108 and therefore one of the select individuals with a vote on
state security decisions.
30. In relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the UK Treasury placed
SERGEI LAVROV on its sanctions list in February 2022 for his role as a
“senior member of the Government of Russia, and a key decision-maker,” and
therefore his involvement in “attempts to destabilise Ukraine and undermining

of Ukraine, 25 July 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0810; U.S. Department of the Treasury,
“Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and
Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those
Undermining Ukraine’s Sovereignty”, 16 July 2014, https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/pages/jl2572.aspx.
102
Andrei Soldatov, “Inside Vladimir Putin’s Shadowy Army of Global Spies”, The Daily Beast,
30 August 2021, https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-vladimir-putins-shadowy-army-of-
global-spies.
103
Her Majesty’s Treasury – Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Consolidated List
of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK, updated 15 March 2022,
104
R.Politik, Bulletin No. 5 (91) – Analytical Report, 8 March 2022, on file.
105
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “From bad intel to worse – Putin reportedly turns on
FSB agency that botched Russia’s Ukraine prep”, Meduza, 11 March 2022,
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/11/from-bad-intel-to-worse.
106
107
Joanne Foakes, The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 113, see Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
Permanent Court of International Justice, Ser A/B, No 53 (1933).
108
14
and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of

Ukraine.” 109 The US Department of the Treasury also placed Lavrov on its
OFAC sanctions list in February 2022 for his role, as Foreign Minister, in
advancing the false narrative that Ukraine is the aggressor; for his having
“aggressively sought to justify Russia’s actions globally;” and for his role, as the
top diplomat representing Russia globally, in helping to “facilitate Russia’s
aggressive actions against sovereign states.” 110
Valery Gerasimov
31. VALERY GERASIMOV was born on 8 September 1955 in Kazan. He has
served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and First
Deputy Minister of Defense since 2012.111 As Chief of General Staff, the central
organ of the military command of the Armed Forces, he oversees operational
command of the armed forces under the Russian Ministry of Defense. VALERY
GERASIMOV is third in the chain of command after VLADIMIR PUTIN and
SERGEI SHOIGU. 112
32. VALERY GERASIMOV is a Member of the Security Council, 113 and is
therefore one of the select individuals with the right to provide an advisory vote
on state security decisions.
33. VALERY GERASIMOV is considered to be heavily involved in Russia’s
military decision-making not only by virtue of his official role, but also in
practice. For instance, a journalist identified VALERY GERASIMOV as one of
the two architects of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, support for pro-Russian
non-state armed groups in Donbas, and the formulation of Russia’s military
strategy in Syria.114
34. In relation to Russian decision-making around Ukraine in particular, the UK
Treasury placed VALERY GERASIMOV on its sanctions list in 2020 for his
role as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and as Deputy Minister
of Defence.115 In sanctioning VALERY GERASIMOV, the UK Treasury held
him responsible for the mass deployment of Russian troops along the border
109
110
111
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,
https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/leader.htm?id=10330475@SD_Employee.
112
https://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy.htm
113
114
Sebastian Seibt, “Shoigu and Gerasimov: Masters of Putin’s Wars”, France 24, 4 March
2022, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220304-shoigu-and-gerasimov-masters-of-
putin-s-wars.
115
15
with Ukraine and failure to de-escalate the situation. In relation to the 2022
Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US Department of the Treasury placed
VALERY GERASIMOV on its OFAC sanctions list in February 2022. 116
RUSSIA’S ACTS OF AGGRESSION
35. Russia has committed acts of aggression by using armed force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. These
acts of aggression constitute manifest violations of the UN Charter.
Russia used armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of Ukraine
36. Russia used armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of Ukraine. Article 8 bis (2) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court states that any of the following acts, regardless of a
declaration of war, qualifies as an act of aggression in accordance with United
Nations (“UN”) General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December
1974:
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory
of another State or part thereof;
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of
the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third State;
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein.
37. This section demonstrates that various acts of aggression were committed, or
continue to be committed, in Ukraine.
116
16
Russia invaded, attacked and occupied the territory of Ukraine

38. First, the Russian Armed Forces invaded and attacked the territory of Ukraine
and such invasion and attacks have resulted in military occupation of parts of
the territory of Ukraine, according to the meaning of Article 8 bis (2)(a).
39. Russian Armed Forces initiated a major military invasion and attack on Ukraine
on 24 February 2022. 117 At approximately 5:00am Ukrainian time, shortly after
President Putin declared in a televised speech the start of a “special military
operation” seeking the “demilitarization and denazification” of Ukraine, 118
Russian troops crossed the border from multiple directions. Russian strikes and
assaults were documented in various cities, including the capital Kyiv, Kharkiv,
Ukraine’s second-largest city, and cities ranging from Ivano-Frankivsk in the
west to Odesa and Mariupol in the south on 24 February 2022. 119 The Ukrainian
government asserted that at least eight had been killed and nine injured by the
Russian shelling on the first day of the invasion.120
40. The assault has continued since. By the close of 1 March 2022, the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) had recorded and
confirmed that Russia’s military attack on Ukraine had resulted in at least 752
civilian casualties, including 227 killed, 15 of them children.121 By the close of
13 March 2022, the OHCHR had recorded 1,761 civilian casualties in the
country: 636 killed and 1,125 injured.122
41. The Russian invasion and attacks on the territory of Ukraine has resulted in the
occupation by Russian troops of parts of the territory of Ukraine. For instance,
the mayor of Melitopol, a city in Southeastern Ukraine, announced on 1 March
117
New York Times, “Putin’s Forces Attack Ukraine”, published on 23 February 2022,
updated 14 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-
putin; UN OHCHR, “Human Rights Council Begins Urgent Debate on Situation of Human
Rights in Ukraine Stemming from the Russian Aggression”, 3 March 2022,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28197&LangID
=E.
118
The transcript which was transmitted to the UN Secretary General appears in Appendix 1
of this memorandum.
119
Michael Birnbaum, Mary Ilyushina, Paul Sonne and Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Russia
unleashes military assault on Ukraine that Biden calls ‘premeditated war’”, New York
Times, 24 February 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/2022/02/23/russia-attack-ukraine/.
120
Al Jazeera, “Kyiv says 8 killed; Moscow says not targeting Ukraine cities”, 24 February
2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/russia-says-not-targeting-ukraine-cities-
kyiv-claims-8-killed.
121
UN OHCHR, “Human Rights Council Begins Urgent Debate on Situation of Human Rights
in Ukraine Stemming from the Russian Aggression”, 3 March 2022,
=E.
122
UN OHCRH, “Ukraine: civilian casualty update”, 14 March 2022,
https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Ukraine%20-
%20civilian%20casualty%20update%20as%20of%2024.00%2013%20March%202022%2
0ENG.pdf.
17
2022 that Russian forces were occupying the city. 123 The maps below illustrate
the wide areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces as of 13 March 2022.
Source: Institute of the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022124
Russia has bombarded and used weapons against the territory of Ukraine
42. Second, the Russian Armed Forces have bombarded and used weapons against
the territory of Ukraine, according to the meaning of Article 8 bis (2)(b).
43. Russian Armed Forces launched an estimated 100 missiles, including a mix of
short and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and sea-launched
missiles, in the early hours of 24 February 2022.125
123
Korobova, Marina, "Мелитополь не сдался, Мелитополь – временно оккупирован" –
городской голова о ситуации на 1 марта" ["Melitopol did not surrender, Melitopol is
temporarily occupied" – the mayor on the situation on March 1”], Mestnyye Vesti, 1 March
2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#cite_note-243.
124
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment”, Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project, 13 March
2022,
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessme
nts%20Mar%2013.pdf, p. 2.
125
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russia-Ukraine Warning
Update: Initial Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment”, Institute for the Study of War,
24 February 2022,
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Initial%20Russian%20Offensive%20C
ampaign%20Assessment.pdf, p. 1, based on reports from Brian Everstine,
https://twitter.com/beverstine/status/1496869155420934153?s=20&t=IIXt0iyFgu5kUQz2eL
_Vog.
18
44. The spokesperson of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Liz
Throssell, reiterated on 11 March 2022 grave concern for “the rising death toll
and human suffering in Ukraine”. 126 The statement notes the effect of “what
appear to be indiscriminate attacks, with Russian forces using explosive
weapons with wide area effects in or near populated areas”. Such explosive
weapons included “missiles, heavy artillery shells and rockets, as well as
airstrikes.” On 14 March 2002, the UN OHCHR, stressed that most of the
civilian casualties were caused “by the use of explosive weapons with a wide
impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multi-launch rocket
systems, and missile and air strikes.”127
45. Russian naval forces continued to conduct missile strikes against targets
throughout Ukraine, according to an intelligence update from the British
Defense Ministry on 13 March 2022. 128 The following Ukrainian cities have
notably come under heavy Russian bombardments: Kharkiv,129 Kherson, 130
Mariupol, 131 and Kyiv. 132
126
Press briefing notes on Ukraine: Grave concerns, 11 March 2022,
=E.
127
UN OHCRH, “Ukraine: civilian casualty update”, 14 March 2022,
https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Ukraine%20-
%20civilian%20casualty%20update%20as%20of%2024.00%2013%20March%202022%2
0ENG.pdf.
128
British Ministry of Defense, Intelligence Update, Update on Ukraine, 13 March 2022,
https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1503120744280170501?s=20&t=7YBIENR6xG7sAC
p_3cQG0Q.
129
See e.g. “Russia-Ukraine war: Destruction in Kharkiv after bombardment”, Al Jazeera, 8
March 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/its-barbaric-kharkiv-residents-
devastated-by-russian-bombing; Andrey Poznyakov, “'The next night was hell': Life amid
Russia's bombardment of Kharkiv”, Euronews, 11 March 2022,
https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/10/ukraine-war-how-one-woman-survived-and-
escaped-russia-s-bombardment-of-kharkiv; Luke Harding, “‘Horrendous’ rocket attack kills
civilians in Kharkiv as Moscow ‘adapts its tactics’”, The Guardian, 1 March 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/ukraine-several-killed-by-russian-rocket-
strikes-in-civilian-areas-of-kharkiv.
130
Michael Schwirtz and Richard Pérez-Peña, “First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes
More Civilian Targets”, The New York Times, 2 March 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/kherson-ukraine-russia.html.
131
Mostafa Rachwani, “Mariupol bombing: before and after satellite images show destruction
in Ukraine city”, The Guardian, 10 March 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/10/mariupol-bombing-ukraine-before-and-
after-satellite-images-map-russian-attack-residential-maternity-childrens-hospital, which
notes that targets have included “numerous residential houses, a children’s and maternity
hospital, the main administration service building, and the city’s giant Avostal metallurgical
factory”; Deutsche Welle, “Ukraine: Satellite images show infrastructure damage in
Mariupol — as it happened”, 12 March 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-satellite-
images-show-infrastructure-damage-in-mariupol-as-it-happened/a-61104419.
132
“Ukrainian Officials Report Missile Attacks in Kyiv”, New York Times, 13 March 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-attacks-ukraine; Aleksandar
Vasovic, “Russia bombards Ukraine urban areas as armed convoy stalls “, Reuters, 2
March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-isolation-intensifies-ukraine-
fighting-rages-2022-03-01/.
19
46. According to a New York Times’ tally of air-related attacks, at least 67

Ukrainian towns and cities have been hit by aerial bombardment since the start
of the invasion.133
Russia has blockaded the ports and coasts of Ukraine
47. Third, the Russian Armed Forces have blockaded the ports and coasts of
Ukraine, according to the meaning of Article 8 bis (2)(c).
48. Russian naval forces established a blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast which
effectively isolated Ukraine from international maritime trade, according to an
intelligence update from the British Defense Ministry on 13 March 2022. 134
Russia attacked the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of Ukraine
49. Fourth, the Russian Armed Forces attacked the Ukrainian Armed Forces and
military bases across Ukraine, according to the meaning of Article 8 bis (2)(d).
50. On 24 February 2022, the first day of the invasion, Russian Armed Forces
targeted a Ukrainian garrison on the island of Zmiinyi also known as Snake
Island situated in the Black Sea. 135
51. Russian Armed Forces have targeted Ukrainian military bases. For instance, on
14 March 2022, Russian Armed Forces hit Ukraine’s military base in Yavoriv,
in western Ukraine, less than 15 miles from the border with Poland, killing 35
people and wounding 134. 136
Russia reportedly sent armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, to carry
out acts of armed force against Ukraine
52. Fifth, there are indications that Russia sent armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries to carry out acts of armed force against Ukraine. In particular, the
Wagner Group, a private military contractor firms which has been linked to
Yevgeny Prigozhin has reportedly been active in Ukraine. 137 A senior US
133
“From small towns to large cities, the extent of Russia’s aerial bombardment of Ukraine”,
New York Times, 12 March 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html.
134
British Ministry of Defense, Intelligence Update, Update on Ukraine, 13 March 2022,
https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1503120744280170501?s=20&t=7YBIENR6xG7sAC
p_3cQG0Q.
135
Justin McCurry and Elias Visontay, “Ukraine island defenders who told Russian navy ‘go
fuck yourself’ may still be alive”, The Guardian 27 February 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/ukraine-island-defenders-who-told-
russian-officer-go-fuck-yourself-may-still-be-alive; Ben Farmer and Tanya Kzyreva,
“Ukrainians anxiously await news of the defenders of Snake Island, taken by Russia at the
start of the conflict”, The Telegraph, 14 March 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-
health/terror-and-security/ukrainians-anxiously-await-news-defenders-snake-island-taken/.
136
Dan Sabbagh, “Russia sends message with Yavoriv strike but attack on Poland unlikely”,
The Guardian, 13 March 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/13/russia-
sends-message-with-yavoriv-strike-but-attack-on-poland-unlikely; Pavel Polityuk and
Natalia Zinets, “Russian strike on base brings Ukraine war close to NATO's border”,
Reuters, 13 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-warns-
desolation-if-russia-tries-take-kyiv-2022-03-13/.
137
Nprwpi Daragjo, “Guns for hire: How shadowy Wagner Group mercenaries support
Russian soldiers in Ukraine conflict”, The Independent, 4 March 2022,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-wagner-group-
20
defense official told reporters on 28 February 2022 that there were “some
indications” of the presence of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, including in
attempts to seize the Ukrainian capital.138 The Ukrainian President allegedly
survived multiple assassination attempts by the Wagner Group in later
February.139
53. Additional investigation is necessary to determine the involvement of private
military contractors in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including to determine
the extent to which such groups participated in acts of aggression against
Ukraine.
Russia’s acts of aggression constitute manifest violations of the UN Charter
54. Russia’s acts of aggression constitute a “manifest violation” of the UN Charter
because of their “character, gravity and scale”, according to the meaning of
Article 8 bis (1).
Russia’s acts of aggression are manifest violations by their illegal character
55. The acts of aggression, by their character, must constitute an evident violation of
the UN Charter. The criterion of “manifest violation” applies to uses of force
which indisputably violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force in
international law enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 140
56. Russia has sought to justify its use of armed force in Ukraine as an act of self-
defense. On 24 February 2022, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin,
announced Russia’s military action in Ukraine in a speech. 141 On the same day,
the Russian Permanent Representative to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, notified the
UN Secretary-General that the military action was “taken in accordance with
Article 51 of the UN Charter in the exercise of the right of self-defence.” 142 The
transcript of President Putin’s speech was appended to the Article 51 letter as
sole legal justification for Russia’s use of force. The transcript of President
mercenaries-soldiers-b2028799.html; The Economist, “What is the Wagner Group,

Russia’s mercenary organisation?”, 7 March 2022, https://www.economist.com/the-
economist-explains/2022/03/07/what-is-the-wagner-group-russias-mercenary-organisation.
138
Joyce Karam, “Russia seeking to encircle Ukraine’s capital in ‘coming days’: Pentagon”,
The Matopma; Mews, 28 February 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-
news/2022/02/28/russia-seeking-to-encircle-ukraines-capital-in-coming-days-pentagon/.
139
Manveen Rana, “Volodymyr Zelensky survives three assassination attempts in days”, 3
March 2022, The Times, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/zelensky-survives-three-
assassination-attempts-in-days-xnstdfdfc.
140
Claus Kreß, “The Crime of Aggression before the First Review of the ICC Statute” (2007) 20
Leiden Journal of International Law 851, p. 859; Claus Kreß, “The State Conduct Element”
in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds) The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 508-510.
141
The original transcript is available on the official website of the President of the Russian
federation: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. A translation of the speech in
English is available on the official website at
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843 and in the ‘Letter dated 24 February
2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General’, S/2022/154, https://undocs.org/en/S/2022/154.
142
‘Letter dated 24 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, S/2022/154,
https://undocs.org/en/S/2022/154.
21
Putin’s speech was also appended to Russia’s written submissions dated 7

March 2022 in the case before the ICJ on Allegations of Genocide under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation).143 The written submissions quoted extensively
from President Putin’s speech and asserted that Russia’s only justification for
the use of force against Ukraine was self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter:
“The special military operation conducted by Russia in the territory of
Ukraine is based on the United Nations Charter, its Article 51 and customary
international law. The legal basis for the military operation was
communicated on 24 February 2022 to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and the United Nations Security Council by the Permanent
Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in the form
of a notification under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The relevant
letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General with the request to circulate it
as a document of the UN Security Council forwarded “the address of the
President of the Russian Federation H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin to the citizens
of Russia informing them of the measures taken in accordance with Article
51 of the UN Charter in exercise of the right of self-defense” (emphasis in
original)144
President Putin appears to make two legal arguments for Russia’s purported use
of force in self-defense in his speech from 24 February 2022: an individual self-
defense argument according to which Russia is using force in individual self-
defense to protect itself and/or Russian nationals and a collective self-defense
argument according to which Russia is using force in collective self-defense to
protect the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’.
The factual circumstances do not support either self-defense argument.
57. According to the individual self-defense argument, Russia would be using force
in individual self-defense to protect itself. President Putin’s speech refers to “the
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bloc to the east
and the advance of its military infrastructure ever closer to Russia’s borders” as
“fundamental threats against our country.”145 President Putin specifically uses
the language of individual self-defense. He stated that “Russia cannot feel safe,
develop and exist with a constant threat emanating from the territory of present-
143
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), “Document (with annexes) from the
Russian Federation setting out its position regarding the alleged “lack of jurisdiction” of the
Court in the case”, 7 March 2022, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-
20220307-OTH-01-00-EN.pdf.
144
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), “Document (with annexes) from the
Russian Federation setting out its position regarding the alleged “lack of jurisdiction” of the
Court in the case”, 7 March 2022, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-
20220307-OTH-01-00-EN.pdf, para. 15.
145
Appendix, para. 3. President Putin presents the expansion of NATO in Ukraine as a threat
to Russia itself in several parts of his speech, see Appendix, paras. 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28.
22
day Ukraine” 146 and that “We simply have been left with no other way to defend
Russia and our people than the one we are forced to use today”. 147
58. Russia could not legally resort to individual self-defense as Ukraine had not
committed an armed attack against Russia and did not pose an imminent threat
to Russia, and Russia’s military action was neither necessary nor proportionate.
a) First, Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that a State may exercise its
right of individual or collection self-defense “if an armed attack occurs”.
The ICJ distinguished in the Nicaragua case “the most grave forms of the
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave
forms”.148 That not all use of force amount to an armed attack giving rise to
the right to self-defense was reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Oil Platforms
case. 149 Russia has not demonstrated that it has been the victim of an armed
attack by Ukraine. In fact, there is no evidence that Ukraine used any force
against Russia prior to Russia using force against Ukraine on 24 February
2022.
b) Second, right of self-defense arises in situations of both an actual and
imminent armed attack.150 The criteria for imminence laid down in the
Caroline case are frequently invoked: there must be “a necessity of self-
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation”.151 International law does not support the right of
preemptive self-defense according to which self-defense could be used to
defend against or prevent possible non-imminent attacks emanating from
another state. 152 Thus, a State which seeks to resort to the right to self-
146
Appendix, para. 34. President Putin specifically uses the language of individual self-
defense in several parts of his speech, see Appendix, paras. 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, and 51.
147
Appendix, para. 37.
148
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 101.
149
The Oil Platforms (Iran v. US) case, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 187.
150
The Institut de Droit International resolution on Self-Defence 2007, https://www.idi-
iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2007_san_02_en.pdf, para. 3, provides that ‘The right of self-
defence arises for the target state in case of an actual or manifestly imminent armed
attack’, and that it may be exercised ‘only when there is no lawful alternative in practice in
order to forestall, stop or repel the armed attack’; Report of the UN High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2004, para. 188, provides that “a threatened
state, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as
the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is
proportionate” (emphasis in original). The response of the UN Secretary-General, In Larger
Freedom, A/59/2005, para. 124, stated that the right to self-defense extended to imminent
threats. See also the Chatham House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force
in Self-Defence, 55 ICLQ, 2006, pp. 963, 964–5.
151
SS Caroline (1837), 29 BFSP, p. 1137.
152
Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2004,
at paras. 189 and the UN Secretary-General’s Report, In Larger Freedom, A/59/2005,
para. 125, both state that resort should be had to the Security Council where the threat is
not imminent; The Institut de Droit International resolution on Self-Defence 2007,
https://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2007_san_02_en.pdf, para. 6, notes that
“There is no basis in international law for the doctrine of ‘preventive’ self-defence in the
absence of an actual or manifestly imminent armed attack”; see also the Chatham House
Principles on International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 ICLQ, 2006, pp.
963, 968.
23
defense must show that the armed attack has occurred or is imminent. Russia
has not shown that the alleged threat posed by Ukraine was imminent.
c) Third, any use of force in self-defense must be necessary and proportional.
The ICJ stated in Nicaragua that the “specific rule whereby self-defense
would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, [is] a rule well established in customary
international law.”153 On necessity, it must be shown that the response by
the State claiming to exercise force in self-defense is required by the armed
attack, whether actual or imminent, and that no alternative responses to the
use of force are available. 154 Proportionality relates to the magnitude,
duration and target of the response. The criteria of necessity and
proportionality are not met in the Russia’s purported use of force in self-
defense. Ukraine posed no imminent threat to Russia. Consequently,
Russia’s use of force against the territory of Ukraine was not necessary.
Further, the scale of Russia’s use of force illustrates that Russia’s response is
grossly disproportionate.
59. According to the collective self-defense argument, Russia would be using force
in collective self-defense to protect the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the
‘Luhansk People’s Republic’. President Putin claimed in his speech that the
decision “to conduct a special military operation” was done to protect the two
purported ‘Republics’, pursuant to “the treaties on friendship and mutual
assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s
Republic, as ratified by the Federal Assembly on 22 February this year.”155
President Putin noted that Russia had received a request for help from “The
People’s Republics of Donbas.” 156
60. Russia could not legally resort to collective self-defense to protect the ‘Donetsk
People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ as these entities are not
States under international law which can give rise to collective self-defense or
request forcible assistance from Russia, and Russia’s military action was in any
case neither necessary nor proportionate. 157
a) First, the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’
are not States under international law capable of exercising the right to self-
defense or to request assistance. Russia recognized the Donetsk People’s
Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic on 21 February 2022 as
153
v. United States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 94, 103. The ICJ also stated in its
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports,
1996, pp. 226, 245, that “The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law” and the
same conditions applied to the right to self-defense under Article 51.
154
For instance, the ICJ held in the Oil Platforms cases held that the US attacks on the oil
platforms, allegedly in self-defense were not necessary on the facts of the case, The Oil
Platforms (Iran v. US) case, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 198.
155
Appendix, para. 38.
156
Appendix, para. 37.
157
The actions of Donetsk and Luhansk amount to illegal secession under international law.
See Aaland Islands case, Permanent Court of International Justice, League of Nations
O.J. Spec. Suppl. No. 3 (October 1920).
24
independent States. 158 However, the mere fact of Russia recognizing these
two allegedly independent States does not make these two entities into
States. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of
States lays down the criteria of statehood in international law: a) a
permanent population, b) a defined territory, c) government, and d) capacity
to enter into relations with other States. The ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’
and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ do not fulfil these four criteria.
According to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “There can be no doubt
that the ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ are wholly dependent on Russia”. 159 The two
entities controlled only a portion of their alleged State territory when Russia
recognized them. The entities only had established control of parts of their
purposed state territory. This is reflected in the language adopted in the
General Assembly Resolution overwhelmingly condemning the aggression
against Ukraine and the purported change in status only “of certain areas of
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.” 160 The right to self-defense
and the right to request forcible assistance by another State in self-defense
are limited to States. President Putin claims that the People’s Republics of
Donbas requested Russia’s assistance. However, as these two entities are not
States, any request for assistance made by no-state actors in two territories of
Ukraine does not trigger Russia’s right to exercise collective self-defense to
protect these two entities.
b) Second, as the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s
Republic’ are not States, they cannot be the victims of an armed attack
triggering the right to self-defense. Any forcible operations conducted by
Ukrainian forces in the east of Ukraine would amount either to law
enforcement operations or a non-international armed conflict, as opposed to
an armed attack triggering the right to individual or collective self-defense.
c) Third, as the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s
Republic’ are not States under international law, Russia was prevented from
intervening in Ukraine upon a request from these non-state actors. The ICJ
stated in Nicaragua that the principle of non-intervention would “lose its
effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be justified by a
mere request for assistance made by an opposition group in another
State.” 161 Consequently, a State has no right to intervene, militarily or
otherwise, in the internal affairs of another State upon a request for
assistance of non-state actors in the territory of this other State. Russia’s
intervention in Ukraine in response to a request for assistance by non-state
actors in these territories would violate the principle of non-intervention.
158
A translation of the transcript in English is available on the official website of the President
of the Russian federation: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828.
159
Report from Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, “Legal remedies for human
rights violations on the Ukrainian territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities”,
26 September 2016, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/23007#trace-2, para. 56.
160
United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, para. 5.
161
v. United States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 126.
25
d) Fourth, regardless of the status of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the
“Luhansk People’s Republic” under international law, Russia would be
required to abide by the preconditions for the use of self-defense. As seen
above at Paragraph 58, Russia’s use of force in Ukraine was not preceded by
an armed attack and it has been neither necessary nor proportionate.
61. Thus, Russia’s use of armed force in individual or collective self-defense was
neither legally nor factually supported.
62. Russia did not make any other legal arguments to justify its use of force in
Ukraine. The legality of other potential arguments to justify the use of force,
relating to the protection of Russian nationals abroad and humanitarian
intervention, is debatable under international law. Notwithstanding their
legality, these exceptions would, in any case, be inapplicable on the facts here.
There is no evidence that Russian nationals were under attack in Ukraine at the
material time to justify force under the principle of the defense of nationals
abroad. Nor is there evidence of overwhelming humanitarian necessity to justify
force under the principle of humanitarian intervention.
63. Therefore, Russia lacks any legal justification for its use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. This
constitutes a manifest violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The UN
General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted on 2 March 2022 a resolution
which notably “[d]eplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian
Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter”. 162 That
the resolution was adopted by a vote of 141 in favor to 5 against illustrates the
international consensus that Russia’s acts of aggression were manifestly
unlawful.
Russia’s acts of aggression are manifest violations by their gravity and scale
64. The acts of aggression must also be a manifest violation by their gravity and
scale. Thus, the use of force must not only be obviously illegal, but also be of a
certain intensity.163 Russia’s acts of aggression in Ukraine display the required
gravity and scale.
65. The “gravity” component relates to the effects of the use of force, which could
include number of human casualties on all sides, the scope of the disturbance of
common life within the victim state, and the level of property destruction on all
sides. 164 The use of force by Russia has had particularly grave effects.
a) First, there has been a high number of human casualties on all sides. The
OHCHR recorded 1,761 civilian casualties by the close of 13 March 2022
(see Paragraph 40 above). The US military estimates that between 2,000 and
4,000 Ukrainian armed forces, national guard and volunteer forces between
5,000 and 6,000 Russian soldiers were killed in the two weeks spanning the
162
GA/12407, https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm.
163
Claus Kreß, “The State Conduct Element” in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds) The
Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 510-511.
164
Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 520, based
on the Separate Opinion of Judge Simma in the Armed Activities case, at para. 2.
26
start of the invasion on 24 February 2022 and 9 March 2022.165 The

Ukrainian Armed Forces claimed that over 12,000 Russian had been killed
by 9 March 2022. 166
b) Second, common life in Ukraine has been severely disturbed. The UNHCR
estimated that over 3 million refugees had fled Ukraine between 24 February
2022 and 15 March 2022.167
c) Third, property destruction has been particularly severe in Ukraine. Several
Ukrainian cities have come under heavy Russian bombardments (see
Paragraph 45 above). Residential houses, hospitals, and schools have been
hit.168 Small Ukrainian towns, such as Schastia and Volnovakha, have been
reportedly devastated with thousands trapped in basement and over 80% of
the infrastructure of the towns being damaged. 169
66. The “scale” component relates to the means used, including the intensity of the
people- and firepower used.170 The means used by Russia in Ukraine illustrate
the scale of the use of force. As noted at Paragraph 44 above, Russian forces
have used explosive weapons ranging from missiles, heavy artillery shells and
rockets, and airstrikes.
67. Thus, Russia’s acts of aggression in Ukraine constitute a manifest violation of
the UN Charter because of their evident illegality and because of their scale and
gravity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
68. Each of the accused persons—VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV,
SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO,
SERGEI BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY GERASIMOV—
planned, prepared, initiated and/or executed Russia’s acts of aggression. The
accused persons perpetrated these acts, either by taking steps personally or, by
virtue of their privileged position in Russian political and/or military decision-
making, directing the actions of the Russian state and its agents.
69. Further investigation will assist in defining the conduct of each of the accused
persons in relation to Russia’s acts of aggression. Additional evidence may
165
“Up to 6,000 Russians may have been killed in Ukraine so far, U.S. official estimates”,
CBS News, 10 March 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-death-toll-
invasion/.
166
“Ukraine’s military: Over 12,000 Russian troops have been killed since Feb. 24.”, The Kyiv
Independent, 9 March 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/ukraines-military-
over-12000-russian-troops-have-been-killed-since-feb-24/.
167
UNHRC, Ukraine Refugee Situation (accessed on 15 March 2022), the data is updated
daily, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.
168
Russian attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine could be a war crime: UN rights office,
11 March 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113782.
169
Emma Graham-Harrison and Isobel Koshiw, ‘90% of houses are damaged’: Russia’s
Syria-honed tactics lay waste Ukraine towns”, The Guardian, 4 March 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/ninety-per-cent-of-houses-are-damaged-
thousands-trapped-in-ukraines-small-towns.
170
Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 520.
27
illustrate that some of the accused persons committed additional acts of

aggression beyond those identified in this indictment.
Planning
70. Planning includes participating in high-level meetings during which plans for
the acts of aggression are formulated, 171 and enacting legislation, decrees and
ordinances concerning the aggressive plans. 172
VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI
NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and SERGEI LAVROV
attended high-level meetings to plan Russia’s acts of aggression
71. The following accused persons convened high-level meetings to plan Russia’s
acts of aggression:
a) On 18 February 2022, the Russian Security Council held a meeting to
discuss the situation in Ukraine and “growing tensions that are provoked by
external forces.”173 The meeting was attended by VLADIMIR PUTIN,
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and SERGEI LAVROV. 174
b) On or about 21 February 2022,175 the Russian Security Council held an
extraordinary meeting to discuss the situation in Donbas. 176 At this meeting,
members of the Security Council agreed on the recognition of the DPR and
the LPR as independent states. The meeting was attended by VLADIMIR
171
The tribunals which tried individuals for crimes against peace after World War II found
attendance in high-level meetings constituted planning, Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, Historical review of developments relating to aggression,
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 64 (judgment against Göring para. 64 (g),
p. 66 (judgment against Keitel, para. 72 (d), (f), (g), (h)). p. 67 (judgment against Raeder,
para. 74 (d)), p. 67 (judgment against Jodl, para. 76(g)). See also Carrie McDougall, The
Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Cambridge University Press, 2021, 2nd ed), p. 237.
172
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Historical review of
developments relating to aggression, Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 79
(judgment against Koki Hirota, para. 335 (b)).
173
Kremlin, “Meeting with Permanent Members of the Security Council”, 18 February 2022,
174
175
There is reason to believe that this meeting was staged, with Russian independent
network TV Rain observing that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s watch
displayed a time five hours earlier than the purported “live” meeting that was aired. See
Shaun Walker, “Putin’s absurd, angry spectacle will be a turning point in his long reign”,
angry-spectacle-amounts-to-declaration-war-ukraine; Dave Lawler, “Putin orders Russian
‘peacekeeping operations’ in eastern Ukraine”, Axios, https://www.axios.com/putin-
recognize-donetsk-luhansk-republics-ukraine-166bbe54-2d6a-446a-87bd-
e9e63cf21ca9.html.
176
Kremlin, “Security Council Meeting”, 21 February 2022,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67825 video available here:
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67825.
28
PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI

NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and SERGEI LAVROV. 177
72. A statement from the Kremlin confirmed that Russia’s military operation in
Ukraine followed a previously laid out plan to demilitarize Ukraine and ensure
its neutrality. Following a call between VLADIMIR PUTIN and the President of
France, Emmanuel Macron, on 3 March 2022, the statement read that Russia’s
operation was going “according to plan.” 178 Further, it stated that
Vladimir Putin outlined in detail the fundamental approaches and
conditions in the context of negotiations with representatives of Kyiv.
It was confirmed that, first of all, we are talking about the
demilitarisation and neutral status of Ukraine, so that a threat to the
Russian Federation will never emanate from its territory
The statement also noted that, “It was emphasised [by VLADIMIR PUTIN] that
the tasks of the special military operation will be fulfilled in any event.”
73. SERGEI LAVROV has stated that Russia had decided to launch its “special
military operation” in Ukraine to achieve the same planned objective: to protect
the rights of Russian speakers and citizens of Ukraine and to demilitarize and
de-nazify Ukraine. 179
VLADIMIR PUTIN and VALENTINA MATVIYENKO enacted legislation
and decrees concerning Russia’s aggressive plans
74. Legislation and Presidential decrees/orders were enacted to plan Russia’s acts of
aggression:
a) On 24 April 2019, VLADIMIR PUTIN enacted a decree “On determining
for humanitarian purposes categories of individuals who may apply for the
citizenship of the Russian Federation via a simplified procedure.”180 The
decree extends Russian citizenship to residents of the DPR and the LPR.
b) On 2 July 2021, VLADIMIR PUTIN signed into law Russia’s updated
National Security Strategy, which states that Russia considers it lawful to
respond to unfriendly actions that pose a threat to Russia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity by taking symmetrical and asymmetrical measures to
suppress these actions and prevent their recurrence. 181
177
178
Kremlin, “Telephone conversation with French President Emmanuel Macron”, 3 March
2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67898..
179
UN OHCHR, “On the Second Day of the Human Rights Council’s High-level Segment,
Russia’s attack on Ukraine Continues to Dominate the Discussion”, 1 March 2022,
=E.
180
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 183 “On determining for
humanitarian purposes categories of individuals who may apply for the citizenship of the
Russian Federation via a simplified procedure”, 24 April 2019, on file.
181
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 183 “On the National Security
Strategy of the Russian Federation”, Article 99, 2 July 2021,
http://ips.pravo.gov.ru:8080/default.aspx?pn=0001202107030001.
29
c) On 13 September 2021, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade adopted

a national technical standard for urgent burial of corpses in wartime and
peacetime, to take effect from 1 February 2022.182 The standard allows for
designation as burial sites of areas as large as 40 hectares. 183
d) On 15 February 2022, the State Duma approved184 a resolution to recognize
the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR,185 submitted by the CPRF
faction.186 On the same day, the State Duma sent the resolution to
VLADIMIR PUTIN for his signature. 187
e) On 21 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN issued an instruction to the
Defense Ministry to deploy “peacekeeping” troops to Donbas. 188
f) On 22 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN signed the resolution to
recognize the sovereignty of the DPR with the Head of the DPR, Denis
Pushilin. 189 The resolution passed into law on the same day and allowed for
the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops to the DPR.
g) On 22 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN signed the resolution to
recognize the sovereignty of the LPR with the Head of the LPR, Leonid
Pasechnik. 190 The resolution passed into law on the same day, and allowed
for the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops to the LPR.
182
Order of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, N 950-st “On
approval of the national standard of the Russian Federation”, 13 September 2021,
https://docs.cntd.ru/document/727930017?marker=64S0IJ.
183
National Standard of the Russian Federation, OKS 13.200 “Urgent Burying of Bodies in
War and Peace Time – Emergency Disposal of the Dead in Wartime and Peace Time”, 1
February 2022, https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200180859#7D20K3.
184
State Duma, “Members of the State Duma voted for the draft appeal to the Russian
President for LPR and DPR recognition”, 15 February 2022,
http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53431/.
185
On file.
186
State Duma, “Vyacheslav Volodin: the Council of the State Duma to consider draft on
recognition of LPR and DPR next week”, 21 January 2022,
187
188
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 71 “On the recognition of the
Donetsk People’s Republic”, 21 February 2022,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202202220002#print.
189
Federal Law No. 15-FZ “On Ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Donetsk People’s Republic”,
22 February 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202202220032;
Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Lugansk People’s Republic”,
22 February 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202202220033.
190
30
h) On 22 February 2022, the Federation Council unanimously ratified the

resolutions to recognize the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR.191 The
Federation Council is chaired by VALENTINA MATVIYENKO.
i) On 22 February 2022, the Federation Council passed a resolution granting
VLADIMIR PUTIN’s request to authorize deployment of Russian armed
forces abroad.192 The Federation Council is chaired by VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO.
j) On 27 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN ordered the Minister of Defense,
SERGEI SHOIGU, and the Chief of the General Staff, VALERY
GERASIMOV, to transfer the “deterrence forces” of the Russian army to a
special mode of combat duty.193
75. By the foregoing acts, conduct and practices, VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY GERASIMOV are
responsible for the crime of aggression by planning Russia’s acts of aggression,
as charged in Count 1.
Preparation
76. Preparation refers to concrete steps taken to realize the plan and can include acts
to create the necessary military or economic capacities to commit acts of
aggression and political and diplomatic maneuvers. 194 Preparation includes
preparing official justification for acts of aggression; making false assurances of
peaceful intentions; 195 pressuring the other State by amassing troops; 196
191
192
Decree of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, No.
35-SF “On the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of
the Russian Federation”, 22 February 2022,
193
Kremlin, “Meeting with Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov”, 27 February 2022,
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67876.
194
Florian Jeßberger, “Implementing Kampala: The New Crime of Aggression under the
German Code of Crimes against International Law” in Martin Böse et al (eds), Justice
Without Borders (Brill, 2018), p. 190; Carrie McDougall, “The Crime of Aggression under
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” (Cambridge University Press, 2021,
2nd ed), p. 237.
195
On the jurisprudence of the tribunals after World War II, Preparatory Commission for the
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 66 (judgment against von Ribbentrop,
para. 71 (g)).
196
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 66 (judgment against von Ribbentrop,
para. 71 (g)).
31
intervening in the internal affairs of the other State; 197 engaging in diplomatic
maneuvers to prevent third States from aiding the other State;198 and
engineering incidents as pretexts for military action. 199
VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI
NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, SERGEI LAVROV and
VALERY GERASIMOV prepared official justifications for Russia’s acts of
aggression
77. VLADIMIR PUTIN’s speech of 24 February 2022 seeks to justify Russia’s acts
of aggression as being conducted in self-defense to protect its own territory or
Russian nationals (individual self-defense), and to protect the DPR and the LPR
(collective self-defense). 200 In advance of Russia’s acts of aggression,
preparations were made to establish these official justifications.
78. In preparation for the individual self-defense justification, a number of
statements were made before and after the initiation of the invasion of Ukraine
to establish a record of Russia’s alleged perception of a threat from Ukraine, or
to otherwise insinuate that Russia believes that such a threat exists. These
statements and insinuations refer to the alleged threat posed to Russia by the
Ukrainian armed forces and by the NATO presence in Ukraine:
a) On 12 April 2021, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV claimed that the
US is engaging “especially assertively” in military activity in Ukraine, and
that this action is accompanied by aggressive rhetoric from the US. He
continued that it is unclear what the US is doing in Ukraine, with its ships
and military personnel frequently in the country. 201
b) On 14 April 2021, in a meeting in Sevastopol on ensuring Russia’s “national
security” in Crimea, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV stated that, with the support
of the US, Ukraine is increasingly planning to establish control over Crimea
by force, and that Ukraine’s new military security strategy specifically
identifies Russia as a military enemy.202
c) On 12 July 2021, VLADIMIR PUTIN published an article titled “On the
Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” claiming that Ukraine is
“aggressive towards Russia,” as evinced by supposed discrimination against
197
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 66 (judgment against Keitel, para. 72 (b)).
198
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 65 (judgment against Hess, para. 67 (h)
(i)), p. 65 (judgment against von Ribbentrop, para. 71 (e)).
199
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Historical review of
developments relating to aggression, Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 86
(judgment against Seishiro Itagaki, para. 341 (a) (g)).
200
Appendix, para. 3.
201
TASS, “Lavrov: Russia warns all countries against fueling militaristic sentiments in Kyiv”,
12 April 2021, https://tass.ru/politika/11123257.
202
TASS, “Patrushev: Kyiv can organize provocations to start military operations against
Crimea”, 14 April 2021, https://tass.ru/politika/11146349.
32
Russian speakers in Ukraine, termed “Russophobia”. 203 In this article,

VLADIMIR PUTIN also purports that Ukraine is indulging in aggressive
rhetoric and militarizing, and that Ukraine’s authorities, security services
and armed forces are under direct external control.
d) On 19 August 2021, in a media interview, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV
remarked that the US is pumping Ukraine with weapons, and that Ukraine
serves foreign interests as it seeks to enter NATO. 204
e) On 18 November 2021, in a speech at an expanded meeting of Russia’s
Foreign Ministry Board, VLADIMIR PUTIN identified “Ukraine’s internal
crisis” as a pressing issue for Russia, with Ukraine’s failure to fulfil its
obligations under the Minsk Agreements preventing resolution of the issue.
He continued that the West is exacerbating the situation by “supplying Kiev
with modern lethal weapons, conducting provocative military exercises in
the Black Sea and other regions close to our borders,” and that NATO’s
expansion to Russia’s borders could be used offensively against Russia. 205
f) On 23 November 2021, in a media interview, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV
asserted that Ukraine is a protectorate of the “West”, and that the situation in
Ukraine could flare up at any minute.206
g) On 30 November 2021, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV asserted
that Western countries have been provoking Ukraine into taking anti-
Russian actions for many years, and that the West is currently inciting
Ukraine to use force in Donbas, thereby posing a direct threat to Russian
security. 207
h) On 7 December 2021, in a meeting with the President of the United States of
America, Joseph Biden, VLADIMIR PUTIN expressed concern that NATO
was “undertaking dangerous attempts to gain a foothold on Ukrainian
territory, and building up its military capabilities along the Russian
border.”208
203
Kremlin, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’”, 12
July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.
204
Alexey Zabrodin, “Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai
Patrushev – on the results of US interference in the internal affairs of other countries and
the affected Afghans”, Izvestiya, 19 August 2021, https://iz.ru/1209165/aleksei-
zabrodin/pokhozhaia-situatciia-ozhidaet-i-storonnikov-amerikanskogo-vybora-na-ukraine.
205
Kremlin, “Expanded meeting of the Foreign Ministry Board”, 18 November 2021,
206
Vitaly Tseplyaev, “The West and its hostages: Nikolai Patrushev on the causes of the
crisis with migrants”, AiF, 23 November 2021,
https://aif.ru/politics/world/zapad_i_ego_zalozhniki_nikolay_patrushev_o_prichinah_krizisa
_s_migrantami.
207
TASS, “Lavrov said that the West has been provoking Ukraine for anti-Russian actions for
several years”, 30 November 2021, https://tass.ru/politika/13066903.
208
Kremlin, “Meeting with US President Joseph Biden”, 7 December 2021,
33
i) On 9 December 2021, VLADIMIR PUTIN declared, at a meeting of the

Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, that “Russophobia” is the first
step towards genocide. 209
j) On 9 December 2021, the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Maria Zakharova, reportedly accused Ukraine of moving heavy
artillery towards the line of contact in Donbas, and of failing to engage in a
peace process. 210
k) On 21 December 2021, in an expanded meeting of the Russian Defense
Ministry Board, SERGEI SHOIGU made a number of claims regarding
alleged US and NATO military presence in Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk,
and military drills targeting Russia. 211 Among these claims, SERGEI
SHOIGU stated that US private military companies were preparing a
provocation with chemical components in eastern Ukraine and that about
120 representatives of US private military companies were already in
Ukraine. At this meeting, VLADIMIR PUTIN also reportedly stated that
what the US is doing in Ukraine is at Russia’s border, and that Russia simply
has nowhere to retreat. He continued that the US would put “hypersonic”
weapons in Ukraine and thereby arm and push extremists from Ukraine into
Russia, perhaps by attacking Crimea.212 The meeting was attended by
VLADIMIR PUTIN, SERGEI SHOIGU, VALERY GERASIMOV, 213
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO214 and unnamed “representatives of bodies
of state power and public organizations” and “command officials from
military districts.”215
l) On 27 December 2021, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV opined
that the West may be seeking to fuel militaristic sentiments and begin a war
in Ukraine, planning to blame the war on Russia and thus impose
sanctions. 216
m) On 30 December 2021, in a media interview, VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO assured Russian citizens, in relation to the situation in
Ukraine, that VLADIMIR PUTIN, the Russian government and the Federal
209
Kremlin, “Meeting of Council for Civil Society and Human Rights”, 9 December 2021,
210
TASS, “Kiev sending more troops to Donbass conflict area – MFA”, 9 December 2021,
https://tass.com/world/1373263.
211
Kremlin, “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board”, 21 December 2021,
212
TASS, “Russia simply has ‘nowhere to retreat’ if US weapons appear in Ukraine – Putin”,
21 December 2021, https://tass.com/politics/1378741.
213
Kremlin, “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board – Photos”, 21 December 2021,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67402/photos.
214
Federation Council, “V. Matvienko took part in the expanded meeting of the Board of the
Ministry of Defense of Russia”, 21 December 2021,
http://council.gov.ru/events/chairman/132083/.
215
216
Sakina Nurieva, “Lavrov assessed the likelihood of war in Ukraine”, Gazeta, 27 December
2021, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/12/27/17069797.shtml.
34
Assembly are taking exhaustive measures to ensure Russia’s national

security and preserve its sovereignty.217
n) On 9 January 2022, SERGEI SHOIGU gave an interview stating that the
there is a big war on information that Russia has no right to lose.218
o) On 20 January 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
called on the West to “stop [its] aggressive anti-Russian info campaign, stop
contributing to Ukraine’s militarization, encourage Kiev to implement the
#MinskAgreements.” 219
p) On 22 January 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
accused the US of encouraging Ukraine’s aggressive actions in Donbas by
sending weapons. 220
q) On 4 February 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
accused the US and NATO of hampering the search for a peaceful solution
to the conflict in Donbas by continuing to deliver military aid to Ukraine. 221
r) In early February 2022, SERGEI SHOIGU met with the President of
Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, and promised to hold military drills and set
modern weapons on Belarus’s western borders to ensure protection and
resist the “destructive line of the West.”222
s) On 15 February 2022, at a press conference, VLADIMIR PUTIN stated that
the US and NATO responses to Russian proposals on security guarantees did
not meet Russian requirements.223
t) On 16 February 2022, in an interview published on the Federation Council’s
website, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that NATO had begun the
military development of Ukrainian territory, pumping its armed forces with
military equipment, ammunition and weapons, thereby creating “hotbeds of
instability around Russian borders.” She continued that the goal of the West
is to restrain Russia and stop its development, and therefore the West has
217
RIA, “Matvienko commented on the situation around Ukraine”, 30 December 2021,
https://ria.ru/20211230/matvienko-1766175446.html.
218
TVVezda, “‘This is a big war’: Shoigu announced the importance of victory in the ‘battle for
information’”, 9 January 2022, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/202219846-htwov.html.
219
MFA Russia, Tweet, 20 January 2022,
https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1484078942201991170.
220
221
MFA Russia, Tweet, 4 February 2022,
222
RT News, “Russia will supply Belarus with modern weapons to strengthen the borders”, 9
February 2022,
https://russian.rt.com/ussr/news/959727-rossiya-dast-belorussiya-oruzhie; RT News, “Shoigu:
Moscow highly appreciates the determination of Minsk in confronting the ‘destructive line
of the West’”, 3 February 2022,
https://russian.rt.com/ussr/news/956815-shoigu-podderzhka-rossiya-belorussiya.
223
Kremlin, “News Conference following Russian-German Talks”, 15 February 2022,
35
entrusted Ukraine with the mission of provoking an armed conflict with

Russia. 224
u) On 16 February 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
called on everyone to “stop whipping up hysteria,” remarking that peace in
the region is threatened by Western steps to build NATO forces on the
Russian border and to supply weapons to Ukraine. 225
v) On 18 February 2022, the Russian Security Council held a meeting focusing
on the “growing tensions that are provoked by external forces” in relation to
Ukraine. 226 The meeting was attended by VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI
MATVIYENKO and SERGEI LAVROV. 227
w) On 18 February 2022, the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko,
explained in a joint press conference with VLADIMIR PUTIN that the
“growing military threat” on Russian and Belarussian borders with Ukraine
and the “pumping of Ukraine with weapons” had compelled Belarus and
Russia to look for adequate means of repelling a potential attack on their
borders. 228
x) On 24 February 2022, in a media interview, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO
opined that Russians who oppose the “special operation” in Ukraine ought to
worry about Russia’s security rather than momentary difficulties they
face. 229
y) On 24 February 2022, as reported on the Federation Council’s website,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that Ukraine’s supposed
provocations are “not only a security issue for Lugansk and Donetsk,” but
also for Russia itself, and that “a state hostile to Russia has been formed.” 230
z) On 25 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN stated
that Russia is forced to defend itself and its allies through the special
operation in Ukraine.231
224
Federation Council, “Russian society does not want war either with Ukraine or with anyone
else”, 16 February 2022, http://council.gov.ru/events/news/133299/.
225
226
227
228
Kremlin, “News Conference following Russian-Belarussian Talks”, 18 February 2022,
229
RIA, “Matvienko criticized the opponents of the military operation in Ukraine”, 24 February
2022, https://ria.ru/20220224/matvienko-1774824293.html.
230
Federation Council, “V. Matvienko: We could not leave people for extermination”, 24
February 2022, http://council.gov.ru/events/chairman/133529/.
231
Julie Coleman, “Spy chief humiliated by Putin on Russian TV for stammering releases new
video echoing Putin’s war rhetoric”, 25 February 2022,
https://www.businessinsider.com/spy-chief-putin-humiliated-releases-video-echoing-putins-
war-rhetoric-2022-2.
36
aa) On 25 February 2022, in a speech at the Seventh Inter-Parliamentary Forum

in Tajikistan, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that Russia has
persistently called for a diplomatic solution to the “intra-Ukrainian conflict,”
and that it is the Ukrainian authorities, with Western support, who chose
otherwise by intensifying military operations, shelling and terrorist attacks.
She continued that these conditions left Russia with no choice but to
recognize the independence of the DPR and the LPR, and conduct the
“special military operation” to enforce peace and demilitarize Ukraine. 232
bb) On 27 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN claimed that the West is taking
unfriendly actions against Russia, not only economically through sanctions,
but also in the form of top officials of NATO Member States making
“aggressive statements” against Russia. In response to this alleged
aggression, he ordered the Minister of Defense, SERGEI SHOIGU, and the
Chief of the General Staff, VALERY GERASIMOV, to transfer the
“deterrence forces” of the Russian army to a special mode of combat duty. 233
cc) On 1 March 2022, SERGEI LAVROV appeared before the UN Human
Rights Council on 1 March 2022, where he claimed that Ukraine had “made
territorial claims against the Russian Federation, threatened to use force and
acquire a military nuclear capability.” 234 Further, he stated that Russia had
decided to launch its “special military operation” to protect the rights of
Russian speakers and citizens of Ukraine and demilitarize and de-nazify
Ukraine. 235
dd) On 3 March 2022, the SVR published a press statement by its Director,
SERGEI NARYSHKIN, asserting that the US and its allies are seeking to
lower the iron curtain on Russia under the pretense of protecting EU security
and Ukrainian sovereignty. He further stated that Ukraine has regained
technical capability to build nuclear weapons much larger than those of
North Korea or Iran, and that the SVR’s intelligence indicates that Ukraine
is working towards further development of nuclear weapons with the US’s
knowledge. 236
ee) On 4 March 2022, the SVR, headed by SERGEI NARYSHKIN, published a
press statement disclosing information on alleged training of ISIS prisoners
at a US military base in Syria for combat in Donbas, and the use of Poland
232
Together-RF, “We were simply left with no other choice: Matvienko on the military
operation in Ukraine”, 25 February 2022,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zZ73wc4Dq0.
233
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67876.
234
“Diplomats walk out of Lavrov’s speech at the U.N. in Geneva”, The New York Times, 1
March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/world/europe/lavrov-speech-un.html.
235
UN OHCHR, “On the Second Day of the Human Rights Council’s High-level Segment,
Russia’s attack on Ukraine Continues to Dominate the Discussion”, 1 March 2022,
=E.
236
Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “Director of the SVR of Russia
Sergey Naryshkin on the Special Military Operation in Ukraine”, 3 March 2022,
http://www.svr.gov.ru/smi/2022/03/direktor-svr-rossii-sergey-naryshkin-o-spetsialnoy-
voennoy-operatsii-na-ukraine-.htm.
37
as a “logistics hub” by NATO Members. The statement further asserted that

the “Westerners expect to ‘absorb’ the remnants of the Ukrainian special
services and directly direct their hostile activities against Russia.” 237
ff) On 4 March 2022, in her speech opening the 520th Session of the Federation
Council, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that Russia’s “special
targeted military operation” in Ukraine aimed to demilitarize and de-Nazify
Ukraine, to ensure that there is no military threat to Russia from Ukrainian
territory. She continued that the Russian armed forces are fighting for
Russia, its security, and its citizens.238
gg) On 6 March 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claimed that, in the course of Russia’s “special military operation” in
Ukraine, they had discovered evidence of an emergency clean-up of
Ukraine’s military-biological program, financed by the US Department of
Defense. 239
hh) On 9 March 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought
to confirm its claim that, in the course of Russia’s “special military
operation” in Ukraine, they had discovered evidence of a military-biological
program, implemented by Ukraine and financed by the US Department of
Defense. 240
ii) On 10 March 2022, in a press conference, SERGEI LAVROV opined that
Russia had not attacked Ukraine, but was merely acting in response to a
direct threat to Russian security. 241
jj) On 15 March 2022, at a meeting on national security in the North Caucasus,
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV claimed that Ukraine fell under the external
control of the US following the “coup” in 2014, that the US aims to turn
Ukraine into a state hostile to Russia, and that the US is encouraging and
helping Ukraine to create biological and nuclear weapons. 242
kk) On 16 March 2022, in a meeting on socio-economic support for the
constituent entities of Russia, VLADIMIR PUTIN claimed that Russia had
“no alternative for self-defence” and to ensure its security, and therefore was
237
Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “Intelligence Agencies of NATO
Countries are Transferring Foreign Terrorist Fighters to Ukraine”, 4 March 2022,
http://www.svr.gov.ru/smi/2022/03/spetssluzhby-stran-nato-perebrasyvayut-inostrannykh-
terroristov-boevikov-na-ukrainu.htm.
238
Federation Council, “520th meeting of the Federation Council – Transcript”, 4 March 2022,
http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/133659/transcript/.
239
MFA Russia, Tweet, 6 March 2022,
240240
241
Euronews, “Lavrov: Russia doesn’t plan to attack other countries”, 10 March 2022,
https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/10/lavrov-russia-doesn-t-plan-to-attack-other-
countries-and-did-not-attack-ukraine.
242
Sputnik Azerbaijan, “Abundance of foreign consultants in Kyiv provokes new threats –
Patrushev”, 15 March 2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220316062514/https://az.sputniknews.ru/20220315/obilie-
inostrannykh-konsultantov-kieva-provotsiruet-novye-ugrozy---patrushev-440175674.html.
38
forced to begin the “special military operation” in Ukraine. He continued

that Russia would “never allow Ukraine to be a bridgehead for aggressive
actions against our country.”243
ll) On 16 March 2022, at an expert council for historical education at the
Russian Ministry of Education and Science, SERGEI NARYSHKIN stated
that this is a “truly historic moment” for Russia, which is facing attempts at
its destruction, disguised by the US and its allies as attempts to protect the
sovereignty of Ukraine and European security.244
mm) On 16 March 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN
claimed that the decision to conduct a special military operation was aimed
at protecting the population of Donbas and protecting Russian security, and
that any delay in doing so would have turned into a great tragedy. 245
nn) On 5 April 2022, as reported on the Federation Council’s website,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that the West is trying to hide the
truth about provocations against Russia, thereby fostering “Russophobia”
and hatred of Russia. She continued that the West has been saturating
Ukraine with weapons.246
79. In preparation for the individual self-defense justification, steps were also taken
to establish a record of Russia’s alleged perception of a threat to Russian
citizens in Ukraine from Ukrainian authorities or armed forces:
a) On 24 April 2019, VLADIMIR PUTIN enacted a decree “On determining
for humanitarian purposes categories of individuals who may apply for the
citizenship of the Russian Federation via a simplified procedure.”247 The
decree enabled residents of Donetsk and Luhansk to apply for Russian
citizenship, thereby laying the foundation for claims that the situation in
Donbas threatens “Russian citizens,” and therefore threatens Russia itself.
b) On 16 February 2022, in an interview published on the Federation Council’s
website, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO stated that thousands of Russian
citizens live in Donbas, and in the event of an invasion by the Ukrainian
armed forces, Russia will do everything necessary to protect those
citizens. 248
243
Kremlin, “Meeting on Socioeconomic Support for Regions”, 16 March 2022,
244
Kristina Stashchenko, “Naryshkin: Now the fate of Russia and its future place in the world
are being decided”, Parliamentskaya Gazeta, 16 March 2022,
https://www.pnp.ru/social/naryshkin-seychas-reshaetsya-sudba-rossii-i-ee-budushhee-
mesto-v-mire.html.
245
RIA, “Naryshkin: the decision to conduct a special operation in Ukraine was based on an
assessment of the situation”, 16 March 2022, https://ria.ru/20220316/spetsoperatsiya-
1778390555.html.
246
Federation Council, “V. Matvienko: Our servicemen accurately and precisely carry out the
order to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, treating the civilian population with care”, 5 April
2022, http://council.gov.ru/events/chairman/134760/.
247
On file.
248
39
c) On 22 February 2022, on the Federation Council’s adoption of a resolution

permitting the deployment of Russian armed forces abroad, VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO declared the decision as being aimed at establishing peace,
and preventing the continuation of bloodshed and shelling of citizens. 249
d) On 23 February 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
Representative of Russia to the UN Vassily Nebenzia, stated at a UN
Security Council meeting that “[t]he goal of this special operation is
protection of people who have been victimized and exposed to genocide by
the Kiev regime. To ensure this, we will seek… criminal prosecution for
those who committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians, including
citizens of the Russian Federation.”250
80. In preparation for the collective self-defense justification, VLADIMIR PUTIN
enacted a decree on 24 April 2019 allowing residents of the DPR and the LPR to
apply for Russian citizenship, as described in Paragraphs 74.a) and 79.a).
Thereafter, a number of statements were made as to the alleged genocide and
“Russophobia” in Donbas:
a) On 21 September 2021, in a media interview, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV
claimed that Ukrainian authorities pass laws that discriminate against the
Russian language and indigenous peoples. 251
b) On 9 December 2021, at a meeting of the Council for Civil Society and
Human Rights, VLADIMIR PUTIN declared that the “current developments
in Donbas… are very reminiscent of genocide.” 252
c) On 18 January 2022, in a media interview at an exhibition titled ‘Violations
of Human Rights in Ukraine (2017-2020)’, SERGEI NARYSHKIN claimed
that a “real civil war was unleashed by the Ukrainian elite,” resulting in the
deaths of civilians in Donbas for the past seven years. He continued that the
killings were conducted by persons “inspired by the image of Ukraine as
anti-Russia”. 253
d) On 15 February 2022, at a press conference, VLADIMIR PUTIN asserted
that there was an ongoing genocide in Donbas, and that Ukraine is
249
Federation Council, “The Federation Council agreed to the use of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation”, 22 February 2022,
250
Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN, Statement and Reply at UNSC briefing on
Ukraine, 23 February 2022, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/230222un.
251
Vitaly Tseplyaev, “Chaos chain reaction: Nikolai Patrushev on alliances and values alien to
Russia”, AiF, 21 September 2021,
https://aif.ru/politics/russia/cepnaya_reakciya_haosa_nikolay_patrushev_o_chuzhdyh_ross
ii_soyuzah_i_cennostyah.
252
Kremlin, “Meeting of Council for Civil Society and Human Rights”, 9 December 2021,
253
1tv, “Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Russian Historical Society Sergey
Naryshkin spoke at the opening of the exhibition ‘Violation of Human Rights in Ukraine’”,
18 January 2022, https://www.1tv.ru/news/2022-01-18/419647-
glava_svr_i_rossiyskogo_istoricheskogo_obschestva_sergey_naryshkin_vystupil_na_otkry
tii_vystavki_narushenie_prav_cheloveka_na_ukraine.
40
systematically violating human rights in Donbas and endorsing

discrimination against Russian speakers at the legislative level. 254
e) On 18 February 2022, Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin,
stated that the West is ignoring the “genocide” in Donbas. 255
f) On 23 February 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
Representative of Russia to the UN Vassily Nebenzia, stated at a UN
Security Council meeting that, Ukraine “has turned into ‘Anti-Russia’ and
raised its fight against the Russian language and everything Russian to the
level of state policy… All those who disagree with such policies were
persecuted, subjected to repressions, legal prosecution and violence.”256
Nebenzia also referred to the situation in Donbas as a “flagrant genocide and
violation of the main human right – the right to life.” 257
81. In preparation for the collective self-defense justification, allegations were also
raised as to Ukraine’s intention to violate the Minsk Agreements, and the actual
or threatened use of force in Donbas by the armed forces of Ukraine and/or
NATO Members:
a) On 12 July 2021, VLADIMIR PUTIN published an article titled “On the
Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” claiming that Ukraine
regularly declares its “full adherence” to the Minsk Agreements, but does
not intend to seriously implement the same, instead arranging “bloody
provocations” in Donbas. 258
b) On 27 November 2021, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN
claimed that the US is seeking to push Ukraine to attack Donbas, and that
this motivation belies allegations that Russia is preparing to invade
Ukraine. 259
c) On 30 November 2021, in a media interview with the state news outlet
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV claimed that Ukraine has
increased its military spending, provoked tension in its eastern region, and
regularly bombards the DPR and the LPR in violation of the Minsk
Accords. 260
254
255
State Duma, “Vyacheslav Volodin blamed Western states for using double standards in
situation with genocide in Ukraine”, 18 February 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53483/.
256
Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN, Statement at UNGA under agenda item
“The situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine”, 23 February 2022,
https://russiaun.ru/en/news/230222ga.
257
258
Kremlin, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’”, 12
July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.
259
Interfax, “Naryshkin called the purpose of the rumors about the allegedly impending
Russian invasion of Ukraine”, 27 November 2021, https://www.interfax.ru/world/805305.
260
TASS, “Russia’s security chief sees no unsubstantiated troop movements near border with
Ukraine”, 30 November 2021,
41
d) On 7 December 2021, in a meeting with the President of the United States of

America, Joseph Biden, VLADIMIR PUTIN “shared specific examples to
illustrate the destructive nature of Kyiv’s policy to dismantle” the Minsk
Agreements and expressed serious concern about Kyiv’s “provocative
actions against Donbas.” 261
e) On 21 December 2021, at an expanded meeting of the Russian Defense
Ministry Board, SERGEI SHOIGU claimed that the Ukrainian military was
shelling civilian neighborhoods in Donbas. 262 At this meeting, SERGEI
SHOIGU also made a number of claims regarding alleged US and NATO
military presence in Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk, and military drills
targeting Russia. The meeting was attended by VLADIMIR PUTIN,
SERGEI SHOIGU, VALERY GERASIMOV, 263 VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO 264 and unnamed “representatives of bodies of state power
and public organizations” and “command officials from military
districts.” 265
f) On 27 December 2021, in a media interview, VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO claimed that Ukraine was preparing for the military seizure
of Donbas. 266
g) On 18 January 2022, Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin,
claimed that NATO is aiming to occupy Ukraine, constituting a matter of
security for Russian citizens. 267 In this statement, Volodin also asserted that
the State Duma is tasked with preventing a “terrible tragedy” in Donbas and
Russia is ready to react.268
h) On 21 January 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
decried the alleged killing of thousands of civilians in eastern Ukraine by the
Ukrainian authorities.269
i) On 26 January 2022, in her speech opening the 516th Session of the
Federation Council, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that the
https://tass.com/politics/1368809?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_c
ampaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com.
261
Kremlin, “Meeting with US President Joseph Biden”, 7 December 2021,
262
263
Kremlin, “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board – Photos”, 21 December 2021,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67402/photos.
264
Federation Council, “V. Matvienko took part in the expanded meeting of the Board of the
Ministry of Defense of Russia”, 21 December 2021,
265
266
RIA, “Ukraine was preparing for the military seizure of Donbass, said Matviyenko”, 27
December 2021, https://ria.ru/20211227/ukraina-1765629914.html.
267
State Duma, “Chairman of the State Duma: NATO aims to occupy Ukraine”, 18 January
2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53231/.
268
State Duma, “Chairman of the State Duma: NATO aims to occupy Ukraine”, 18 January
2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53231/.
269
42
Ukrainian government is planning various provocations and the use of force

in Donetsk and Lugansk. 270
j) On 9 February 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
accused Ukrainian authorities of sabotaging their obligations under the
Minsk Agreements, “under the passive eye of the West.” 271
k) On 10 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN stated
that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian Armed Forces
(UAF) are preparing provocations at the contact line in Donbas, with
military equipment and ammunition being transported in large quantities
from the US, Europe and Canada. 272
l) On 10 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN
asserted that the main threat for Ukraine is the internal armed conflict with
the DPR and the LPR.273
m) On 15 February 2022, at a press conference, VLADIMIR PUTIN stated that
Ukraine is refusing to abide by the Minsk Agreements and 2015
arrangements. 274
n) On 18 February 2022, the Head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, posted a video
online and on Telegram claiming that his forces have observed an increase
in the number of Ukrainian military personnel and weapons along the line of
contact, and that the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, would soon
be ordering his military to invade Donbas, thereby necessitating
“emergency” evacuations from the DPR. 275 The Head of the LPR, Leonid
Pasechnik, posted a similar video later on the same day. 276
o) On 18 February 2022, Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin,
stated that Ukraine was attempting to escalate conflict in violation of the
Minsk Agreements by starting mortar attacks in Donbas. 277
270
Federation Council, “516th meeting of the Federation Council – Transcript”, 26 January
2022, http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/132817/transcript/.
271
272
TASS, “Ukrainian intelligence, military prepare provocations in Donbas – intelligence
head”, 10 February 2022,
https://tass.com/world/1401167?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_ca
mpaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com.
273
Ileana Ferrer Fonte, “Intelligence director denies Russia’s plans Against Ukraine”, Prensa
Latina, 10 February 2022, https://www.plenglish.com/news/2022/02/10/intelligence-
director-denies-russias-plans-against-ukraine/.
274
275
The Donetsk People’s Republic, “Emergency appeal of the Head of the DPR Denis
Pushilin in connection with the sharp aggravation of the military situation”, 18 February
2022, https://denis-pushilin.ru/news/ekstrennoe-obrashhenie-glavy-dnr-denisa-pushilina-v-
svyazi-s-rezkim-obostreniem-voennoj-situatsii/.
276
Telegram channel available here: https://t.me/pushilindenis/1999.
277
State Duma, “Vyacheslav Volodin blamed Western states for using double standards in
situation with genocide in Ukraine”, 18 February 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53483/.
43
p) On 18 February 2022, in a joint press conference with the President of

Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, VLADIMIR PUTIN noted Ukraine’s non-
compliance with the Minsk Agreements, including in particular its strong
opposition to direct dialogue with Donetsk and Luhansk, and the alleged
worsening situation in Donbas.278
q) On 19 February 2022, Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin,
claimed that the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, is instigating
the beginning of a big war, with Ukrainian threats of full-scale military
operations prompting citizens in Donbas to evacuate. 279
r) On 20 February 2022, in a telephone conversation with the President of
France, Emmanuel Macron, VLADIMIR PUTIN claimed that “provocations
from Ukrainian militants were the reason for the escalation” along the
contact line in Donbas, with the modern weapons and ammunition being
sent to Ukraine by NATO Members allegedly “encouraging Kiev to pursue a
military solution to the Donbas problem” and thereby forcing civilians in
Donetsk and Luhansk to flee to Russia. 280
s) On or about 21 February 2022,281 the Russian Security Council held an
extraordinary meeting on the situation in Donbas, as described at Paragraph
71.b). At the meeting, the Head of the Russian Security Service (FSB),
Alexander Bortnikov, alleged that a skirmish occurred earlier that day, with
Ukrainian forces crossing the border into Russian territory. 282 At this
meeting, SERGEI SHOIGU claimed that there had been over 107 heavy
weapons attacks by Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk, that the city of
Donetsk was out of water, that two-thirds of Luhansk was out of gas, that
those who stayed in the region were under constant attack, and that 59,000
Ukrainian troops were at the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk. 283 SERGEI
SHOIGU also drew the Security Council’s attention to the President of
Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky’s statement that he would like to make
278
Kremlin, “News Conference following Russian-Belarussian Talks”, 18 February 2022,
279
State Duma, “Vyacheslav Volodin: Zelensky is instigating the beginning of a big war”, 19
February 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53493/.
280
Kremlin, “Telephone Conversation with President of France Emmanuel Macron”, 20
February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67818.
281
e9e63cf21ca9.html.
282
283
44
Ukraine a nuclear country again, warning that Ukraine’s capabilities could

exceed those of Iran and North Korea. NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV further
remarked that the US is responsible for the events in Donbas, and that
Russia is obliged to support the DPR and the LPR. The meeting was
attended by VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI
SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and
SERGEI LAVROV. 284
t) On 23 February 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
Representative of Russia to the UN Vassily Nebenzia, made a statement at a
UN Security Council meeting claiming that, instead of implementing the
Minsk Agreements, Ukraine is “proceeding with bombardments of
residential quarters and sabotage activities… Elderly people and children
hide from shells in basements. Refugee count – I stress that people are
seeking refuge in Russia, and not Ukraine – stands at dozens of thousands
these past days, most specifically – 96 thousand people as of now.” 285
Nebenzia also claimed that “[b]ombardments of residential quarters of the
two republics [the DPR and the LPR] have not stopped.”
82. In preparation for the collective self-defense justification, steps were taken to
recognize the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR, purportedly in response to
the threat from Ukraine:
a) On 21 January 2022, Leader of the CPRF faction and Member of the State
Duma Gennady Zyuganov, submitted to the State Duma a draft on
recognition of the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR, purportedly raised in
order to protect the people living there from “external threats and the
genocidal policy implementation.”286
b) On 21 January 2022, Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin,
announced that the State Duma would consider the draft on recognition of
the DPR and the LPR in an attempt to find solutions to ensure the safety of
Russian citizens there. 287
c) On 26 January 2022, Leader of the CPRF faction and Member of the State
Duma Gennady Zyuganov, made a statement as to the importance of
protecting the supposed interests of Russian citizens living in Donetsk and
284
285
286
287
45
Luhansk, and claimed that Russia is “obliged to defend the Russian

world.”288
d) On 15 February 2022, the State Duma voted in favor of sending the
resolution on recognition of the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR to
President Putin for approval. 289
e) On or about 21 February 2022,290 the Russian Security Council held an
extraordinary meeting to discuss the situation in Donbas, 291 as described in
Paragraphs 71.b) and 81.s). At this meeting, members of the Security
Council agreed on the recognition of the DPR and the LPR as independent
states.
f) On 21 February 2022, the Head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, made a request
for VLADIMIR PUTIN to recognize the DPR. The request was aired on
Russian television. 292 The Head of the LPR, Leonid Pasechnik, made a
similar request for the LPR on the same day. 293
g) On 22 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN and the Head of the DPR, Denis
Pushilin, signed the resolution on recognition of the sovereignty of the
DPR, 294 as described in Paragraph 74.f). The resolution includes a provision
on mutual military assistance, serving as an ostensible legal basis for the
deployment of Russian armed forces in Donbas.
h) On 22 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN and the Head of the LPR, Leonid
Pasechnik, signed the resolution on recognition of the sovereignty of the
288
State Duma, “Remarks by leaders and representatives of the State Duma factions on
report of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov”, 26 January 2022,
289
State Duma, “Members of the State Duma voted for the draft appeal to the Russian
President for LPR and DPR recognition”, 15 February 2022,
290
e9e63cf21ca9.html.
291
292
The Moscow Times, “Putin Says Considering Ukraine Separatists’ Independence
Request”, 21 February 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/21/putin-says-
considering-ukraine-separatists-independence-request-a76496. For an analysis on
Russia’s effective control over the DPR and the LPR, and therefore of such “requests” for
Russian assistance, see the forthcoming report by Global Rights Compliance.
293
Adomeit et al., “Russia Recognizes the Independent Statehood of the so-called ‘Donetsk
People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’: Implications”, Marshall Center,
February 2022, https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/2496.
294
46
LPR, 295 as described in Paragraph 74.g). Like the resolution recognizing the
DPR, this resolution also included a clause on mutual military assistance.
i) On 22 February 2022, the Federation Council unanimously ratified the
resolutions to recognize the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR,296 as
described at Paragraph 74.h). The Federation Council is chaired by
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO.
j) On 22 February 2022, at a plenary meeting, Members of the State Duma
unanimously supported ratification of the resolutions to recognize the DPR
and the LPR. 297
83. In preparation for the collective self-defense justification, the deployment of
Russian armed forces abroad was authorized on the basis of the resolutions
recognizing the DPR and the LPR:
a) On 21 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN issued an instruction to the
Defense Ministry to deploy “peacekeeping” troops to Donbas, 298 as
described at Paragraph 74.e).
b) On 22 February 2022, on the basis of the agreements recognizing the
sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR, VLADIMIR PUTIN requested
authorization to deploy the use of Russian armed forces abroad. 299
c) On 22 February 2022, the Federation Council passed a resolution granting
VLADIMIR PUTIN’s request for authorization to deploy the use of Russian
armed forces abroad, 300 as described at Paragraph 74.i). The Federation
Council is chaired by VALENTINA MATVIYENKO.
d) On 22 February 2022, Chairman of the Federation Council Andrey Klishas,
explained that the agreements recognizing these territories “create a legal
base for the deployment of Russian army units on these territories to
maintain peace in the region,” and that VLADIMIR PUTIN’s appeal to
295
296
297
State Duma, “The State Duma ratified Treaties of Friendship with the Donetsk and
Lugansk People’s Republics”, 22 February 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53516/.
298
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 71 “On the recognition of the
Donetsk People’s Republic”, 21 February 2022,
299
Kremlin, “Vladimir Putin Submits Proposal to Federation Council to Approve Resolution
Authorising Use of Armed Forces Aboard”, 22 February 2022,
300
Decree of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, No.
35-SF “On the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of
the Russian Federation”, 22 February 2022,
47
permit use of armed forces outside Russia was issued on the basis of these
agreements. 301
e) On 23 February 2022, the Head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, and the Head of
the LPR, Leonid Pasechnik, requested Russia’s military assistance. 302
84. In preparation for the collective self-defense justification, further statements
were made before and after the initiation of the invasion of Ukraine to reflect
Russia’s alleged perception that any use of armed force against Ukraine would
be justifiable in light of Ukraine’s supposed acts of provocation in Donbas and
non-compliance with international law:
a) On 1 November 2021, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV claimed
that Ukraine is trying to create a provocative situation in Donbas in order to
draw Russia into hostilities, and that Ukraine has been bombing Donbas in
direct violation of the Minsk Agreements. 303
b) On 9 December 2021, in a briefing of foreign military diplomats, VALERY
GERASIMOV reportedly stated that any provocations by Ukrainian
authorities to settle the conflict in Donbas with the use of force would be
thwarted. 304
c) On 22 February 2022, as reported in a tweet by the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, VLADIMIR PUTIN warned that those in power in Ukraine
must immediately stop hostilities, otherwise “responsibility for the possible
continuation of the bloodshed will lie entirely on the conscience of
Ukraine’s ruling regime.”305
d) On 23 February 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
UN Security Council meeting that “Ukraine did not heed our signals that we
sent to Kiev about the need to stop provocations against LPR and DPR…
Over past 24 hours, OSCE SMM made records of almost 2,000 ceasefire
violations, including almost 1,500 explosions… In a word, the nature of
provocations of Ukraine’s Armed Forces has not changed.” 306 Nebenzia also
stated that “the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, of
which violation we are being accused with regard to Ukraine… must be
strictly observed with regard to states that are ‘conducting themselves in
301
TASS, “Russia’s upper house sanctions use of army outside Russia over situation in
Donbas”, 22 February 2022, https://tass.com/politics/1408551.
302
Deutsche Welle, “Russia says Donbas separatists ask Putin for military support”, 23
February 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/russia-says-donbas-separatists-ask-putin-for-
military-support/a-60893224.
303
Interfax, “Lavrov said that Kyiv is trying to draw the Russian Federation into hostilities in
the Donbass”, 1 November 2021, https://www.interfax.ru/world/800736.
304
TASS, “Moscow to thwart any provocations by Kiev in Donbass, Russian military chief
warns”, 9 December 2021,
305
306
48
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of

peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.’ The
current government of Ukraine is not like this.” 307 Nebenzia further stated
that “Ukraine’s provocations against Donbas not only failed to stop, but
actually intensified, that is why the leadership of DPR and LPR turned to us
with a request to grant military support under bilateral agreements on
cooperation… This is a logical step that clearly follows from the acts of
Ukrainian regime.”308
e) On 23 February 2022, in a televised speech, VLADIMIR PUTIN announced
that Russia would begin a “specialized military operation” in Donbas, with
the aim of demilitarizing Ukraine. 309
f) On 23 February 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
Representative of Russia to the UN Vassily Nebenzia, made a statement at
the same UN Security Council meeting that “what clearly follows from his
message [VLADIMIR PUTIN’s 23 February 2022 speech] is that occupation
of Ukraine is not part of our plan. The goal of this special operation is
protection of people who have been victimized and exposed to genocide by
the Kiev regime. To ensure this, we will seek demilitarization and
denazification of Ukraine, and criminal prosecution for those who
committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians… This decision was
made as per Article 51 of the UN Charter and authorized by the Federation
Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia in pursuance of the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with DPR and LPR.”310
g) On 24 February 2022, as reported on the Federation Council’s website,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that Russia’s “special military
operation” was aimed at a ceasefire, and that Russia had insisted that the
conflict in Donbas could only be resolved peacefully but Ukrainian
authorities engaged in constant shelling and caused civilian deaths. She
continued that Ukraine, through its declared intention to join NATO,
intended to regain its nuclear status. Further, she claimed that Russia “could
not leave people for extermination” in Donbass, and therefore supported the
decision of the DPR and the LPR to be independent states. 311
h) On 25 February 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated that Russia encouraged Ukrainian authorities to “stop the punitive
operation against its own people and settle the conflict in Donbass by
307
308
309
Referred to by the UN Security Council, see SC/14803.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14803.doc.htm.
310
311
Federation Council, “V. Matvienko: We could not leave people for extermination”, 24
February 2022, http://council.gov.ru/events/chairman/133529/.
49
peaceful, political and diplomatic means,” but Ukraine ignored these

pleas. 312
i) On 3 March 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claimed that, in addition to attacks on the population in Donbas, Ukraine had
introduced an economic and transportation blockade in the region which
brought it to “the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe.” 313
j) On 4 March 2022, in her speech opening the 520th Session of the Federation
Council, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that the Russian armed
forces are fighting for peace in Donbas. 314
k) On 9 March 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claimed that classified documents acquired by the Russian Ministry of
Defense disclosed an order by the Ukrainian Commander of the National
Guard which confirmed that Ukraine was covertly preparing an offensive
operation against Donbas, scheduled for March 2022. 315
l) On 15 March 2022, in a meeting on national security in the North Caucasus,
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV reportedly claimed that, in the course of its
“special military operation,” Russia had uncovered evidence of Ukraine’s
preparations to “invade” the DPR and the LPR, and on Crimea, in March
2022. 316
m) On 16 March 2022, in a meeting on socio-economic support for the
constituent entities of Russia, VLADIMIR PUTIN claimed that the main
goal of Russia’s use of force in Ukraine was “to help our people in Donbass,
who have been subjected to real genocide for nearly eight years,” and that,
since Russia’s diplomatic efforts to resolve the matter were unsuccessful, it
had been “left with no peaceful alternative to settle the problems that
developed through no fault of [Russia’s]” but to begin the “special military
operation.” He continued that the Russian “special military operation” is not
connected with any desire to occupy Ukraine, and that Russia had “no
alternative for self-defence.” 317
n) On 16 March 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN claimed
that the decision to conduct a special military operation was aimed at
312
313
314
Federation Council, “520th meeting of the Federation Council – Transcript”, 4 March 2022,
http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/133659/transcript/.
315
316
Iz, “Patrushev announced evidence of Kyiv’s preparations for an attack on Crimea”, 15
March 2022, https://iz.ru/1305402/2022-03-15/patrushev-soobshchil-o-dokazatelstvakh-
podgotovki-kieva-k-napadeniiu-na-krym.
317
50
protecting the population of Donbas and protecting Russian security, and

that any delay in doing so would have turned into a great tragedy. 318
o) On 24 March 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated it hoped Ukraine would recognize the necessity of a peaceful solution
to ensure its demilitarization and de-Nazification, and transformation into a
neutral state. The tweet continued that, the sooner Ukraine realizes this, the
sooner Russia’s “special military operation” would end. 319
p) On 28 March 2022, in a meeting with the Director-General of the
Directorate of Documentation and External Security of Alegria, NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV asserted that the goal of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine
is not regime change, but the protection of people from genocide, and the
demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. 320
q) On 28 March 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV stated that the
goal of Russian actions in Ukraine is to eliminate threats that caused
thousands of deaths and targeted civilian facilities, in Donbas. 321
r) On 5 April 2022, as reported on the Federation Council’s website,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that Ukraine had been preparing for
another attempt to seize territory in Donetsk and Lugansk, necessitating
Russia’s “special military operation.” She also claimed that Ukraine had
been conducting a blockade and daily shelling in Donbas, killing thousands
of civilians.322
VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI NARYSHKIN,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY
GERASIMOV gave false assurances of Russia’s peaceful intentions in respect
of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
85. False assurances of Russia’s peaceful intentions and respect for Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity were made in preparation for Russia’s acts
of aggression:
a) On 27 November 2021, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN
claimed that rumors of Russia’s preparation to invade Ukraine were
318
RIA, “Naryshkin: the decision to conduct a special operation in Ukraine was based on an
assessment of the situation”, 16 March 2022, https://ria.ru/20220316/spetsoperatsiya-
1778390555.html.
319
320
Abdulrahman Yusupov, “Patrushev: Russia does not seek to overthrow Zelensky”,
Anadolu Agency, 28 March 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/мир/матрушев-россия-не-
стремится-к-свержению-зеленского-/2548176.
321
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, “Interview with S. Lavrov to the Serbian media”, 28
March 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4q8pXRcfSo.
322
51
“nonsense,” and merely propaganda conducted by the US State

Department. 323
b) On 30 November 2021, in a media interview, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV
stated that there are no unsubstantiated Russian troop movements or
unplanned military exercises near the border with Ukraine, and that the
rhetoric from Western media and US officials that Russia nurtures
aggressive plans is groundless. 324
c) On 1 December 2021, in a media interview, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO
claimed that accusations of an impending Russian attack on Ukraine are lies
with no basis. 325
d) On 9 December 2021, in a briefing of foreign military diplomats, VALERY
GERASIMOV reportedly stated that “hype” in the media about preparation
for a Russian invasion of Ukraine is a lie, and that troop movements in the
course of combat training constitute routine practice. 326
e) On 30 January 2022, in a media interview, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV stated
that it is a “complete absurdity” to suggest that Russia is threatening
Ukraine, and that Russia does not want war. 327
f) On 31 January 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
Representative of Russia to the UN Vassily Nebenzia, made a statement to
the UN decrying US claims of “the presence of Russian troops on Russian
territory as a threat to international peace and security” as an interference in
Russia’s internal affairs and an attempt to mislead the international
community as to the reality of the situation in Donbas. 328
g) On 9 February 2022, in a tweet, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
called for de-escalation of tensions around Ukraine, and for settlement of the
conflict in Donbas.329
323
Interfax, “Naryshkin called the purpose of the rumors about the allegedly impending
Russian invasion of Ukraine”, 27 November 2021, https://www.interfax.ru/world/805305.
324
TASS, “Russia’s security chief sees no unsubstantiated troop movements near border with
Ukraine”, 30 November 2021,
ampaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com.
325
RIA, “Moscow did not give Kiev a reason to talk about aggression, said Matvienko”, 1
December 2021, https://ria.ru/20211201/ukraina-1761643113.html.
326
TASS, “Moscow to thwart any provocations by Kiev in Donbass, Russian military chief
warns”, 9 December 2021,
327
TASS, “Patrushev called the allegations that the Russian Federation threatens Ukraine
‘total absurdity’”, 30 January 2022, https://tass.ru/politika/13566241.
328
Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN, Statement requesting a procedural vote
on the US proposal to convene a UNSC meeting on Ukraine, 31 January 2022,
https://russiaun.ru/en/news/310122.
329
52
h) On 10 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN

asserted that Russia has no aggressive plans in relation to Ukraine, and that
suggestions to the contrary are “dangerous lies” spread by the US. 330
i) On 10 February 2022, SERGEI LAVROV denied that Russia had any plans
to invade Ukraine.331 Following the invasion, SERGEI LAVROV has
continued to falsely claim that Russia did not attack Ukraine, stating:
“Russia has no plans to attack other countries, we have not even attacked
Ukraine.”332
j) On 15 February 2022, at a press conference, VLADIMIR PUTIN stated that
opportunities to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity via a direct dialogue
with Donetsk and Luhansk continue to be ignored. 333
k) On 16 February 2022, in an interview published on the Federation Council’s
website, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that Russia does not want
war with Ukraine and will do everything to ensure that there is no war. 334
l) On 22 February 2022, Chairman of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin,
stated that the decision to recognize the sovereignty of the DPR and the LPR
had stopped war, and was aimed at bringing peace. 335
m) On 23 February 2022, an agent of the Russian state, Permanent
UN Security Council meeting claiming that “Russian military will be
monitoring the ceasefire upon request of Donetsk and Lugansk.” 336
VLADIMIR PUTIN, SERGEI SHOIGU and VALERY GERASIMOV amassed
troops on the border with Ukraine
86. Russia used large scale military exercises as a pretense to reposition its armed
forces near Ukraine, and to prepare for an invasion.
87. From 7 April 2021 to 17 May 2021, the Russian Armed Forces built up
significant force elements in eastern Ukraine regions. A central focal point for
this build-up was an air and amphibious assault exercise held on the southern
330
Ileana Ferrer Fonte, “Intelligence director denies Russia’s plans Against Ukraine”, Prensa
Latina, 10 February 2022, https://www.plenglish.com/news/2022/02/10/intelligence-
director-denies-russias-plans-against-ukraine/.
331
Victoria Craw, “Russia’s Sergei Lavrov describes Liz Truss talks as ‘speaking to a deaf
person’ as Ukraine tensions escalate”, INews, 10 February 2022,
https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russias-sergei-lavrov-describes-liz-truss-talks-as-speaking-
to-a-deaf-person-amid-ukraine-tensions-1452975.
332
Patrick Wintour, “Sergei Lavrov prefers propaganda over reality in Ukraine talks”, The
Guardian, 10 March 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/10/sergei-lavrov-
russia-foreign-minister-propaganda-in-ukraine-talks.
333
334
335
State Duma, “Chairman of the State Duma: the decision to recognize DPR and LPR has
stopped war”, 22 February 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/53521/.
336
53
coast of the Crimean Peninsula. These exercises were assessed to have been
intended as a public demonstration of Russian capability to launch an
overwhelming offensive against south-eastern Ukraine. They also served as a
basis for significant position forces close to Ukraine.
88. According to official statements, the Southern Military District (SMD) and
Western Military District (WMD) combat readiness checks were completed on
22 April 2021, and the units involved should have returned to their permanent
bases by 1 May 2021. However, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu
stated that the equipment and weaponry attached to the WMD would not be
redeployed to its permanent bases, but instead transported to Pogonovo
temporary field camp in Voronezh, close to the Ukrainian boarder.
89. The Russian Ministry of Defense officials stated that since April 2021, the
Pogonovo training ground in Voronezh Oblast was storing the Central Military
District’s 41st Combined Arms Army’s (CAA) equipment ahead of a joint
military exercise with Belarus, named Zapad-2021, that took place over a six-
day period, between 10 – 16 September 2021, at nine training grounds located
on Russian territory, in the Baltic Sea, as well as at five training grounds of the
armed forces of the Republic of Belarus.337 Zapad-2021 was a large-scale
exercise consisting of an integrated ground, air, and sea activity. Zapad-2021
included 200,000 personnel; approximately 80 aircraft and helicopters; up to
760 units of military equipment, including 290 tanks, 240 guns, multiple launch
rocket systems and mortars; and up to 15 ships.338 VALERY GERASIMOV
specifically briefed PRESIDENT PUTIN on the deployment of troops
conducted as part of the Zapad-2021 exercises. 339
90. Media reporting suggests that neither the Pogonovo training ground nor the 41st
CAA, were significantly involved in the Zapad-2021 main exercise, likely
indicating that the Ministry of Defense’s statement in April 2021 about storing
equipment in region for Zapad-2021 was rhetorical justification for the
redeployment of a significant Central Military District (CMD) force near
Ukraine’s north-eastern border with Russia, possibly for pre-positioning for acts
of aggression.
91. Due to the further lack of return to base by the battalion tactical groups of the
Russian army post-Zapad 2021, this meant that significant forces were kept in
proximity to Ukraine after the exercises. In addition, nineteen battalion tactical
groups that had appeared primarily during Zapad-2021 in both Russia and
Belarus, were also not returned to base after Zapad-2021 exercises.
92. On 18 January 2022, a joint Russian Ministry of Defense-Belarusian Ministry of
Defense combat readiness exercise called ‘Union Resolve’ would be held
337
“На полигоне Мулино в Нижегородской области состоялась церемония открытия
совместного стратегического учения «Запад-2021»”, Ministry of Defense of Russia, 9
September 2021,
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12382979@egNews.
338
“Russian-Belarusian exercise Zapad-2021 begins in Nizhny Novgorod Region”, TASS, 9
September 2021, https://tass.com/defense/1335631.
339
Kremlin, “Zapad 2021 military exercises”, 13 September 2021,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66675/print.
54
between 10th – 20th February 2022. Union Resolve would be conducted in two
stages. According to Chief of the Belarusian Defense Ministry’s International
Military Cooperation Department, “[i]n the first stage before February 9, the
Belarusian and Russian militaries will practice redeploying troops and creating
task forces in dangerous directions within a short period. At the second stage of
the inspection that will run on February 10-20, the Union Resolve 2022 joint
drills will be held.”340
93. On 10 February 2022, Russia and Belarus began 10 days of joint military drills.
The military drills, called Allied Resolve-2022, began in Belarus and was
reported to end on 20 February 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense
announced in a statement.341 VLADIMIR PUTIN stated that Russian military
drills were “purely defensive” and “not a threat to any other country.”342 The
statement from the Ministry of Defense stated that “[t]he purpose of the exercise
is to work out the tasks of suppressing and repelling external aggression while
conducting a defensive operation, countering terrorism and protecting the
interests of the Union State.”343 Russia’s military exercises threatened Ukraine
of an impending risk of invasion. Ukraine had decried the Zapad joint exercises
as a form of psychological pressure. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr
Zelensky, said on 10 February 2022 that “the buildup of troops along the
borders is psychological pressure from our neighbors.” 344
94. Russia’s deployment into Belarus was believed to be its biggest there since the
Cold War, with “an expected 30,000 combat troops, Spetsnaz special operation
forces, fighter jets including SU-35, Iskander dual-capable missiles and S-400
air defense systems.” 345 Satellite imagery on 7 February 2010 showed the
Russian military had established camps close to the Belarusian border with
Ukraine. 346 Thus, Russia was preparing its invasion into Ukraine by amassing
troops at its border.
95. On Thursday 10 February, the Russian Defense Ministry posted images of six
large amphibious landing ships at the port of Sevastopol in Crimea, after they
340
“Russia, Belarus to hold Union Resolve 2022 drills on February 10-20 — top brass”,
TASS, 18 January 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1389595.
341
“Russia holds military drills in Belarus amid rising tensions with Ukraine”, The Hill, 10
February 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/593674-russia-holds-military-drills-in-
belarus-amid-tensions-with-ukraine/.
342
“Russia’s Putin says military exercises are ‘purely defensive and do not threaten anyone’”,
18 February 2022, CNN,
https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-18-22-
intl/h_9fdbc09e3aa1f8f6ed7820efe0eacefa.
343
“Russia holds military drills in Belarus amid rising tensions with Ukraine”, The Hill, 10
February 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/593674-russia-holds-military-drills-in-
belarus-amid-tensions-with-ukraine/.
344
“Zelensky calls military buildup along Ukraine’s borders ‘psychological pressure’”, Interfax,
10 February 2022, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/797330.html.
345
“Russia has sent some 30,000 combat troops, modern weapons to Belarus, NATO says”,
Reuters, 3 February 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-has-sent-some-
30000-combat-troops-modern-weapons-belarus-nato-says-2022-02-03/.
346
“Russia and Belarus hold joint military exercises as diplomatic talks ramp back up”, CNN,
10 February 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/10/europe/ukraine-russia-news-
thursday-military-exercises-intl/index.html.
55
transited into the Black Sea earlier this week. 347 Russia has declared a wide
swath of the Sea of Azov and Black Sea unsafe as it performs missile and
artillery fire exercises between 14 and 19 February, the Ukrainian Naval Forces
Command said in a statement shared by the Defense Ministry on 10 February
2022. 348
96. On 15 February 2022, SERGEI SHOIGU visited the President of Syria, Bashar
al-Assad, and inspected a Russian navy exercise in the Mediterranean Sea.
During this visit, SERGEI SHOIGU also heard a report from Russian Navy
Commander Nikolai Yevmenov on joint combat training exercises involving
Russian ships and air force planes dedicated to defeating a simulated enemy’s
naval groups and firing artillery and anti-submarine systems at sea-based and
airborne targets.349
97. The amassing of Russian troops at the border with Ukraine would have been
overseen by VLADIMIR PUTIN as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Russian Armed Forces, SERGEI SHOIGU as the second in command with
responsibility for the Russian Armed Forces, and VALERY GERASIMOV as
the third in command with operational command of the Russian Armed Forces.
VLADIMIR PUTIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and SERGEI LAVROV
engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to prevent third States from aiding Ukraine
98. In preparing for Russia’s acts of aggression, several steps were taken to prevent
third States, particularly the US and other NATO Members, from aiding
Ukraine:
a) On 9 February 2022, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs set out
conditions for the West to de-escalate the situation at the border with
Ukraine. These conditions were for third States to “stop weapon deliveries to
Ukraine, withdraw their military advisers and instructors, discontinue joint
VSU-NATO exercises, and pull out all earlier supplied foreign armaments to
locations beyond the Ukrainian territory.”350
b) At the same 9 February 2022 meeting, the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs exerted diplomatic pressure on NATO to renounce its open-doors
policy. 351
347
“Russia and Belarus hold joint military exercises as diplomatic talks ramp back up”, CNN,
10 February 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/10/europe/ukraine-russia-news-
thursday-military-exercises-intl/index.html.
348
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Statement on 10 February 2022,
https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/02/10/we-expect-a-strong-response-from-the-
partners-when-the-russian-federations-vessels-will-be-not-able-to-entry-easily-civilized-
ports-they-will-see-the-price-for-their-impudence-%E2%80%93-the-minister-of-defence-of-
ukraine/.
349
TASS, “Defense chief inspects Russian Navy’s massive Mediterranean drills”, 15 February
2022,
https://tass.com/defense/1403933?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_
campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com.
350
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova”,
9 February 2022, https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1797611/#9.
351
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova”,
9 February 2022, https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1797611/#9.
56
99. In addition, Russia engaged in diplomatic negotiations over the tension with
Ukraine up to the invasion, maintaining the appearance that Russia intended to
resolve any tensions through diplomatic negotiations while simultaneously
conducting other preparations for aggression against Ukraine:
a) On 14 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN met with SERGEI LAVROV to
discuss the US and NATO responses to Russia’s proposals regarding
NATO’s expansion eastwards, projecting the appearance of an intention to
resolve any tensions through diplomatic negotiations. 352
b) On 15 February 2022, following talks with the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf
Scholz, VLADIMIR PUTIN stated that the US and NATO responses to
Russian proposals on security guarantees did not meet Russian requirements,
and that Ukraine is refusing to abide by the Minsk Agreements and 2015
arrangements. 353
c) On 16 February 2022, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov, told the press
that the State Duma’s request to recognize the DPR and the LPR, while
indicative of prevailing public opinion in Russia, would not be in line with
the Minsk Agreements which VLADIMIR PUTIN is focused on
implementing.354
d) On 16 February 2022, in an interview published on the Federation Council’s
website, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO claimed that, despite the West’s
refusal to provide security guarantees, Russia continues to keep the door
open for negotiations and is ready to discuss the “proposals of opponents, to
look for mutually acceptable solutions.” 355
VLADIMIR PUTIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and SERGEI BESEDA
intervened in the internal affairs of Ukraine
100. Russia intervened in Ukraine’s internal affairs in several ways, specifically in
relation to the Donbas region. Paragraphs 71.b) and 74 above set out Russia’s
intervening actions on the Donbas region in detail. In summary:
a) VLADIMIR PUTIN enacted a decree extending Russian citizenship to
residents of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine.
b) Russia deployed “peacekeeping troops” to Donbas, Ukraine.
c) Lawmakers in Russia, including at the State Duma, at the Federation
Council, which is chaired by VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, and
VLADIMIR PUTIN, passed a resolution recognizing the sovereignty of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Lugansk People’s Republic,” both
352
Kremlin, “Meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov”, 14 February 2022,
353
354
TASS, “Recognition of Donbas republics not in line with Minsk accords, says Kremlin”, 16
February 2022,
ampaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com
355
57
regions of Ukraine. In doing so, VLADIMIR PUTIN signed agreements on

mutual military assistance with the heads of these supposed republics. The
UN General Assembly deemed this decision to recognize the DPR and the
LPR as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine,
contrary to the principles of the UN Charter. 356
d) VLADIMIR PUTIN requested authorization to deploy Russian armed forces
abroad, and the Federation Council, which is chaired by VALENTINA
MATVIYENKO, passed a resolution granting this request.
101. As noted at Paragraph 27 SERGEI BESEDA has been sanctioned by the EU and
the US OFAC since 2014 for contributing to undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty
and by the US Department of the Treasury for funding and supporting separatist
activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014.
MATVIYENKO, SERGEI BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY
GERASIMOV are responsible for the crime of aggression by preparing Russia’s
acts of aggression, as charged in Count 1.
Initiation
103. Initiation includes the decision taken immediately before the first use of force to
commit the act of aggression, including by way of a declaration of hostilities,357
and the first actual use of force.358
VLADIMIR PUTIN made a declaration of hostilities
104. VLADIMIR PUTIN initiated Russia’s acts of aggression by making a
declaration of hostilities in his speech of 24 February 2022. In that speech, he
announced that he had decided to conduct a “special military operation,”359
which would involve unilateral military action by Russian armed forces on
Ukrainian territory. Ukraine was clearly identified as the target State for the
hostilities as the speech made 13 references to Ukraine; identified the
operation’s objective as the “demilitarization and de-nazification of Ukraine”; 360
356
GA Res. ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022.
357
Muhammad Aziz Shukri, “Individual Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression”, in Roberto
Bellilli (ed), International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to its
Review (Ashgatem, 2010), p. 528; Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (Cambridge University Press, 2021, 2nd
ed), p. 238.
358
The Nuremberg Tribunal described the “the initiation of war” as a “a unilateral operation.
When war is formally declared or the first shot is fired the initiation of the war has ended
and from then on there is a waging of war between the two adversaries”, Nuremberg Trial,
High Command Case, The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials
of War Criminals, vol. XII, 1949, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llmlp/Law-
Reports_Vol-12/Law-Reports_Vol-12.pdf, p. 67.
359
See Letter dated 24 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, S/2022/154,
https://undocs.org/en/S/2022/154, reproduced in Appendix at para. 38.
360
Appendix, para. 39.
58
exhorted members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to lay down their weapons; 361
and referenced events in the Donbas region of Ukraine. 362
VLADIMIR PUTIN initiated the first use of force in Ukraine
105. The first use of force by Russia in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 to execute
VLADIMIR PUTIN’s “special military operation” is described at paragraph 39
above.
106. By the foregoing acts, conduct and practices, VLADIMIR PUTIN is responsible
for the crime of aggression by initiating Russia’s acts of aggression, as charged
in Count 1.
Execution
107. Execution refers to “all substantive strategic acts undertaken after the initiation
of an act of aggression to secure the continuation and success of the aggressive
act.” 363 Execution includes commanding armed forces conducing the acts of
aggression, 364 and governing territory occupied as a result of the acts of
aggression. 365
VLADIMIR PUTIN, SERGEI SHOIGU, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO and
SERGEI LAVROV secured the continuation of Russia’s acts of aggression
108. The beginning of Russia’s acts of aggression in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is
described in detail at Paragraph 5039, demonstrating the execution of the act of
aggression. Russia’s acts of aggression in Ukraine in 2022, and the ensuing
conflict, has resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties (see Paragraph 40);
bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, including of populated areas (see
Paragraphs 42-46); blockades of Ukrainian ports and coasts (see Paragraphs 47-
48); and attacks against the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see Paragraphs 49-51).
109. The accused persons secured the continuation of Russia’s acts of aggression by
shoring up domestic support for, and suppressing dissent on, these acts:
a) On 4 March 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN enacted a law ostensibly aimed at
preventing the discrediting of the Russian armed forces in their operations to
protect Russian interests and maintain international peace and security. 366
This law was approved prior by the Federation Council, which is chaired by
361
Appendix, para. 49.
362
Appendix, paras 1, 38.
363
Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 2021, 2nd ed), p. 239.
364
On the jurisprudence of the tribunals after World War II, see Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, Historical review of developments relating to aggression,
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 64 (judgment against Göring, paras. 64
(k), (m) and para. 65), noting that as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Göring
commanded armed forces during an aggressive war.
365
On the jurisprudence of the tribunals after World War II, see Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, Historical review of developments relating to aggression,
Addendum, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, p. 78 (judgment against Keppler, paras.
217(e), 219.
366
Federal Law No. 32-FZ “On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
and Articles 31 and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation”, 4
March 2022, http://ips.pravo.gov.ru:8080/default.aspx?pn=0001202203040007.
59
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO. This law criminalizes calls against the use

of Russian troops to protect Russian interests, and calls for sanctions against
Russia. Accordingly, individuals may face criminal penalties for referring to
the “special military operation” as a “war” or “invasion.” 367
b) On 11 March 2022, concluding the 521st Session of the Federation Council,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO exhorted Members of the Federation
Council to meet with Russians, including youth, and explain to them the
goals of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, in accordance with
guidelines provided to them. She also requested that Members of the
Federation Council share the people’s concerns with the Federation Council
so as to allow for a swift response. 368
c) On 15 March 2022, SERGEI SHOIGU reportedly wrote a personal appeal to
the Minister of Culture, Olga Lyubimova, requesting the exclusion of
Zelensky and Rodnyansky from Russia’s “cultural agenda.” He continued
that the Ministry of Defense, as part of the conduct of the “special military
operation,” is taking steps to form a positive general opinion of Russian
citizens and to foster support for the country’s leadership and for the
activities of the armed forces. 369
110. The accused persons also secured the continuation of Russia’s acts of aggression
by expressing and/or supporting Russia’s conditions for ceasing the use of force
in Ukraine:
a) On 17 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV stated that
the security of Europe depends on improving its position on stopping NATO
expansion to the East and non-deployment of strike weapons. 370
b) On 11 March 2022, in a press conference, SERGEI LAVROV stated that
Russia had made highly specific proposals, in the form of a legally binding
draft document, to resolve the situation in Ukraine. 371
c) On 29 March 2022, in a media interview, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO
stated that she is not optimistic about negotiations between Russia and
367
See, for e.g., Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, “Russian Lawmakers OK Bill On ‘False
News’ About Military Operations, In Further Curb On Media”, 4 March 2022,
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-fake-news-military-invasion-independent-
media/31735798.html; Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, “Russian Nobel Laureate
Muratov Doused With Red Paint By Unknown Attacker”, 7 April 2022,
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-new-novaya-gazeta-europe-muratov/31791421.html?s=09.
368
Federation Council, “521st meeting of the Federation Council – Transcript”, 11 March
2022, http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/133821/transcript/.
369
SVTV News, Tweet, 17 March 2022,
https://twitter.com/svtv_news/status/1504468417595682820?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwc
amp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1504468417595682820%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5
Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ffanyv88.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.svoboda.org%2Fa%2Fverjte-tem-kto-obeschaet-
vas-ubitj-hroniki-repressiy-glazami-sotssetey%2F31759482.html.
370
Euronews, “Lavrov and Di Maio – about the situation in Ukraine”, 17 February 2022,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eU8xYtPAztg.
371
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s
remarks and answers to media questions following talks with Foreign Minister of Turkey
Mevlut Cavusoglu and Foreign Minister of Ukraine Dmitry Kuleba”, 10 March 2022,
https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1803752/.
60
Ukraine, continuing that Russia is clear as to the basis on which an

agreement may be reached, but the Ukrainian position is unclear.372
VLADIMIR PUTIN, SERGEI SHOIGU and VALERY GERASIMOV secured
the occupation of parts of Ukraine’s territory
111. The occupation of Ukrainian territory by Russia in 2022, and therefore the
execution of Russia’s acts of aggression, is described at Paragraph 41.
VLADIMIR PUTIN as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed
Forces, SERGEI SHOIGU as the second in command, and VALERY
GERASIMOV as the third in command oversaw the occupation of Ukrainian
territory.
112. By the foregoing acts, conduct and practices, VLADIMIR PUTIN, SERGEI
SHOIGU, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY
GERASIMOV are responsible for the crime of aggression by executing Russia’s
acts of aggression, as charged in Count 1.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
113. Each of the accused persons, VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV,
SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO,
SERGEI BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY GERASIMOV are
individually criminally responsible for the commission of the crime of
aggression by planning, preparing, initiating and/or executing Russia’s acts of
aggression, as charged in Count 1.
114. At all relevant times, VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI
SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, SERGEI
BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY GERASIMOV were aware of the
factual circumstances that established that Russia’s use of armed force against
the sovereignty territorial integrity or political independence of another State
was inconsistent with the UN Charter and that such acts of aggression
constituted a manifest violation of the UN Charter.
115. The accused persons made statements directly evincing their knowledge of the
factual circumstances surrounding Russia’s use of armed force in Ukraine
beginning 24 February 2022, or projecting that they are in a position to have
acquired such knowledge:
a) On 16 February 2022, in an interview published on the Federation Council’s
website, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO stated that any Russian military
action in Ukraine will be commensurate with the “scale of the aggression”
by Ukraine in Donbas and the military-political situation that has arisen.373
b) On 22 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI LAVROV opined that,
under international law, the right to sovereignty need only be observed in
372
Interfax, “Matvienko called the condition for stopping the military operation in Ukraine”, 29
March 2022, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/831901.
373
61
relation to states that represent all the people living on their territory, and
that Ukraine had ceased to do so since 2014.374
c) On 5 March 2022, at a meeting with Russian airline crew, VLADIMIR
PUTIN stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense “has taken the path of
destroying the military infrastructure of Ukraine, this part of the operation is
almost completed.” 375
d) On 10 March 2022, in a press conference following talks with Ukrainian
Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba, SERGEI LAVROV made assertions as to
Russia’s military conduct in Ukraine. In particular, he claimed that the
Russian military is taking steps to alleviate the suffering of civilians used as
human shields by Ukraine, and that Russia continues to open humanitarian
corridors daily. 376
e) On 11 March 2022, at a meeting of the Security Council, SERGEI SHOIGU
proposed that Russian forces in Donbas be given air defense equipment,
including portable anti-aircraft missile systems, and anti-tank and anti-
aircraft systems. 377 He further suggested that the Western weapons seized in
Ukrainian territory be delivered to them. SERGEI SHOIGU also suggested
that VLADIMIR PUTIN allow volunteers from the Middle East to join
Russian forces in Ukraine, with VLADIMIR PUTIN accepting this
suggestion. 378
f) On 15 March 2022, at a meeting on national security in the North Caucasus,
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV remarked that the Russian operation in Ukraine is
“proceeding in accordance with the plan.”379
g) On 16 March 2022, in a meeting on socio-economic support for the
constituent entities of Russia, VLADIMIR PUTIN stated that the combat
tactics drafted by the Russian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff had
“fully justified itself” in the Ukraine context, and that Russian soldiers and
officers were doing all they could to avoid civilian losses in Ukrainian
cities. 380
374
Interfax, “Lavrov denied Ukraine the right to sovereignty”, 22 February 2022,
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/823676.
375
Interfax, “Putin said that the destruction of the military infrastructure of Ukraine is almost
complete”, 5 March 2022, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/826578.
376
, “Sergey Lavrov: Russia wants to see Ukraine demilitarized and friendly”, 10 March 2022,
https://www.1tv.ru/news/2022-03-10/423115-
sergey_lavrov_rossiya_hochet_videt_ukrainu_demilitarizovannoy_i_druzhestvennoy.
377
Kremlin, “Meeting with permanent members of the Security Council”, 11 March 2022,
378
Vedomosti, “Peskov explained Shoigu’s proposal to involve volunteers in a special
operation in Ukraine”, 11 March 2022,
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2022/03/11/913089-peskov-dobrovoltsev.
379
Sputnik Azerbaijan, “Abundance of foreign consultants in Kyiv provokes new threats –
Patrushev”, 15 March 2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220316062514/https://az.sputniknews.ru/20220315/obilie-
inostrannykh-konsultantov-kieva-provotsiruet-novye-ugrozy---patrushev-440175674.html.
380
62
h) On 28 March 2022, in a media interview, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO

stated that Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine is going “according to
plan,” and that its assigned tasks will be completed in full.381
i) On 28 March 2022, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO met with the Chairman
of Kazakhstan’s Parliament Senate and, as reported by the Federation
Council, updated him in detail on the causes and course of the “special
operation” in Ukraine.382
j) On 29 March 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI SHOIGU observed that
the main tasks of the first stage of the Russian military operation have been
completed, and that the reduction in the combat potential of the Ukrainian
armed forces will allow Russia to focus its attention and efforts on achieving
the main goal of the operation, which is the “liberation” of Donbas. 383
k) On 5 April 2022, as reported on the Federation Council’s website,
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO stated that she is confident Russia will
“successfully complete the special military operation in accordance with the
plan,” and that Russian servicemen “accurately and precisely carry out the
order to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, treating the civilian population
with care.”384
l) On 7 April 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN opined that
Russia is creating a multipolar world by directly challenging the system, to
create a new world order. 385
m) On 11 April 2022, in a televised broadcast, SERGEI LAVROV reportedly
announced an additional goal of the Russian “special operation” in
Ukraine—to end US dominance worldwide. He continued that the operation
is “designed to put an end to the reckless expansion and reckless course
towards the complete dominance of the United States and under them the
rest of the Western countries in the international arena.” 386
381
MKRU, “Matvienko said that ‘the special operation in Ukraine is going according to plan’”,
28 March 2022, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2022/03/28/matvienko-zayavila-chto-
specoperaciya-na-ukraine-idet-po-planu.html.
382
Federation Council, “V. Matvienko held a meeting with the Chairman of the Senate of the
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan M. Ahsimbaev”, 28 March 2022,
http://council.gov.ru/events/news/134294/?hl=%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0
%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%20%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B5%D
0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE.
383
Valentyna Romanenko, “Shoigu: Ukraine has ‘suffered significant losses’ and it is time to
‘liberate Donbas’ again”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 29 March 2022,
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/29/7335485/.
384
385
TASS, “Russia creating genuine never-before-seen multipolar world, says foreign intel
chief”, 7 April 2022, https://tass.com/politics/1434003.
386
Bloknot, “Lavrov named another target of the special operation Z, and this is not Ukraine”,
11 April 2022, https://bloknot.ru/politika/lavrov-nazval-eshhe-odnu-tsel-spetsoperatsii-z-i-e-
to-ne-ukraina-912608.html.
63
116. Additionally, the accused persons participated in meetings regarding

developments in Russia’s use of armed force in Ukraine beginning 24 February
2022, indicating knowledge of the conduct of hostilities:
a) On 27 February 2022, VLADIMIR PUTIN met with SERGEI SHOIGU and
VALERY GERASIMOV at the Kremlin, where he ordered that the Russian
Army’s deterrence forces be put on high combat alert. 387
b) On 11 March 2022, 388 the Permanent Members of the Security Council
convened. At this meeting, SERGEI SHOIGU reported that Russian military
action in Ukraine was proceeding as planned, and made suggestions on
accepting volunteer fighters, delivery of seized weapons to Donbas, and
reinforcing Russia’s western borders. VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI
PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI NARYSHKIN AND
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO attended the meeting. 389
c) On 18 March 2022, the Permanent Members of the Security Council
convened to discuss progress in the “special military operation” in Ukraine.
VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU,
SERGEI NARYSHKIN AND SERGEI LAVROV attended the meeting. 390
d) On 24 March 2022, the Permanent Members of the Security Council
convened to discuss progress in the negotiations with Ukraine. SERGEI
SHOIGU also reported on the ongoing “special military operation,” and
efforts by the Russian military to “provide humanitarian aid, ensure security
and restore vital infrastructure in the liberated territories.” VLADIMIR
PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI
NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO AND SERGEI LAVROV
attended the meeting. 391
e) On 7 April 2022, the Permanent Members of the Security Council convened
to discuss progress in the “special military operation” in Ukraine, including
the need to strongly counteract any “information attacks” or sabotage.
VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU,
SERGEI NARYSHKIN, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO AND SERGEI
LAVROV attended the meeting. 392
COUNT 1
387
388
389
390
391
392
Kremlin, “Meeting with permanent members of the Security Council”, 7 April 2022,
64
MATVIYENKO, SERGEI BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY

GERASIMOV are responsible for the following crimes:
Count 1: crime of aggression, punishable under Article 8 bis of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court
DATE
LOCATION
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OSJI Model Indictment Crime of Aggression Committed Against Ukraine

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Model Indictment for the Crime of

Aggression Committed against

VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN (“VLADIMIR PUTIN”)

The Office of the Prosecutor, pursuant to their authority, charges:

VLADIMIR PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV,

with the Crime of Aggression, as follows:

ukraine.html; Alexander Gabuev, “Alexander Gabuev Writes from Moscow on Why

increasing influence in recent years. 34 VLADIMIR PUTIN even names

independence of Ukraine.”42 In relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of

outlet quotes a former employee of the presidential administration saying that

Ukraine, 57 and by another expert on Russian policy as a member of VLADIMIR

technical and environmental spheres, and providing intelligence information to

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, 74 and by another expert on Russian policy as

entrusted with jurisdiction over several matters, including approving the

actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence

and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of

Russia invaded, attacked and occupied the territory of Ukraine

46. According to a New York Times’ tally of air-related attacks, at least 67

mercenaries-soldiers-b2028799.html; The Economist, “What is the Wagner Group,

Putin’s speech was also appended to Russia’s written submissions dated 7

start of the invasion on 24 February 2022 and 9 March 2022.165 The

illustrate that some of the accused persons committed additional acts of

PUTIN, NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV, SERGEI SHOIGU, SERGEI

c) On 13 September 2021, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade adopted

h) On 22 February 2022, the Federation Council unanimously ratified the

Russian speakers in Ukraine, termed “Russophobia”. 203 In this article,

i) On 9 December 2021, VLADIMIR PUTIN declared, at a meeting of the

Assembly are taking exhaustive measures to ensure Russia’s national

entrusted Ukraine with the mission of provoking an armed conflict with

aa) On 25 February 2022, in a speech at the Seventh Inter-Parliamentary Forum

as a “logistics hub” by NATO Members. The statement further asserted that

forced to begin the “special military operation” in Ukraine. He continued

c) On 22 February 2022, on the Federation Council’s adoption of a resolution

systematically violating human rights in Donbas and endorsing

d) On 7 December 2021, in a meeting with the President of the United States of

Ukrainian government is planning various provocations and the use of force

p) On 18 February 2022, in a joint press conference with the President of

Ukraine a nuclear country again, warning that Ukraine’s capabilities could

Luhansk, and claimed that Russia is “obliged to defend the Russian

compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of

peaceful, political and diplomatic means,” but Ukraine ignored these

protecting the population of Donbas and protecting Russian security, and

“nonsense,” and merely propaganda conducted by the US State

h) On 10 February 2022, in a media interview, SERGEI NARYSHKIN

regions of Ukraine. In doing so, VLADIMIR PUTIN signed agreements on

VALENTINA MATVIYENKO. This law criminalizes calls against the use

Ukraine, continuing that Russia is clear as to the basis on which an

h) On 28 March 2022, in a media interview, VALENTINA MATVIYENKO

116. Additionally, the accused persons participated in meetings regarding

MATVIYENKO, SERGEI BESEDA, SERGEI LAVROV and VALERY

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