SUPREME COURT - Marcos Ill-Gotten Wealth

453 Phil.
1059
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE]
MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE
MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set
aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September
19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate
amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission

on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held
by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain
Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as
well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen
at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of
the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc,

Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements[6] dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and
then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of
the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated
December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement
thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause

the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that
petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs
in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioner's request
for legal assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the
enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen
to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the

General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as
witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said
agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto
which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand,
Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the
motion for summary judgment."
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was
not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she
owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich,
Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an
escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses,
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld
the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of
the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed
in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger
of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September
8, 1998, granted the motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial
order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set
for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another
motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million,
based on the following grounds:
I
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS
SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT

HAVE ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION
FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8]
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were
established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner's motion for summary
judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc,
Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was
conducted.
In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's

motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB
are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the

Philippines and against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000
together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [10]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26,
2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for
reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated
October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs.
Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its

September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioner's motion for summary
judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that
the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal
proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in
escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have
been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without
basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered
and set aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings. [12]
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that --
I
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE

PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA
R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR
SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE

SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
0. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ANSWER;
1. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL

AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO
IMPLEMENT;
2. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE

RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION
TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND
3. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN

RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME
OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC
OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF

UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT

RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE

LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE
BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS

DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM
DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER
JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE
AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR "AUTHENTICATED
TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION
OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY 29, 1999
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US
DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. [13]
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity,
accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated,
it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated
translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for
reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their
motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court
decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been
previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a "decisive issue" before
it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the

authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was
a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-
gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the
petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all
granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate
comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[14]
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of
the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the
matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does
not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner
has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit
authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must
be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case for further
proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on the grounds that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10
MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents' Answer and
other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the
Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against
petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary
Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the
basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to move for
summary judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions,
particularly the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature.
These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in favor of private
respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of
R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the
property which the Marcos couple allegedly acquired during their incumbency.
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple acquired or own the
Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been
proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing
how much of the Swiss funds was acquired during the incumbency of the
Marcos couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner
has failed to establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired
property of the Marcos couple over and above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c)
(d),[16] and (e)[17] of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the
[15]
prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet
attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN

STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS" SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY
THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental
Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements submitted in
relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against private
respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other
statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no such judicial
admissions were made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM
ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI,
THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS.[18]
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously
petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent
Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court
matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the
Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining
to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and
impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests
that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have
the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our known language. She says the
authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be
presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein.
Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit
and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper
before this Court.
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding
the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65 [19] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated
January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception
to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the
Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. [20] But
where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy
and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the
existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.[21]
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the
recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former
President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was
EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in
the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship. The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court
in Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:
surely x x x an enterprise" of great pith and moment"; it was attended by" great
expectations"; it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but
also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to
set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede
judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at
the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and
firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such
cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now.
Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying
procedural sidetracks.[23]
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not
respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate
summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove
its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take
place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary judgment was described as a

judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded.
It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits,
depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in
turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents.
This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and
finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is
sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.[25]
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any
material fact in the action.[26] The theory of summary judgment is that, although an
answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated
by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham
or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment for petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
xxx
1. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by

his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously
and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President
and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31,
1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on
February 22-25, 1986.
2. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former

First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year martial law regime,
occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June
1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She
likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro
Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report
of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President
form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year;
while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human
Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME
xxx
1. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years
1965-1975 were filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the
years 1976 until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification
No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
2. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the
"Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in the following
schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of Income (Annex "T" hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2" hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof).
3. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses

reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a
period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as
follows:
Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%

Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total - P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
4.
5. FM's official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in
1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of
the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand,
Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to
1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the
reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Human
Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light
Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.
6. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the

amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents "receivables from prior
years" during the period 1967 up to 1984.
7. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section
38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he
had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a
President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession
during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving
payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his
Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his
ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from
client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize
as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax
certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any
known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously
stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The
joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal
the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
8. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years

1972 up to 1976 which he referred to in his return as "Miscellaneous
Items" and "Various Corporations." There is no indication of any payor
of the dividends or earnings.
9. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any
deposits and placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search of
pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they did not find
any records involving the tax transactions of spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A,
Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8,
Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac.
Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of
capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the
years 1960 to 1965.
10. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-
year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88% of the gross
income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or
US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount of
P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for subscription, postage,
stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the
amount of P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees,
taxes and licenses. The total deductions in the amount of
P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income.
11. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts

to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that
represents that portion of the Marcoses income that is free for
consumption, savings and investments. The amount is arrived at by
adding back to the net income after tax the personal and additional
exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary
of the President for the years 1966 until 1972.
12. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total

accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda.
Respondent's Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the
year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency,
indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM declared as
Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the
income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning
capital is increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon
the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total
networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 until
1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income
from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS
13. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly

show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the
country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon
layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its
detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who
formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and
maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not
the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the
following presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups,
with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the
filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the
need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

14. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to
Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or
SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO
Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in
favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering him to transact business in
behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos
mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz.
Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr.
Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the
Board of Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was
named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second
beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written
order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the
foundation's first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December
14, 1971.
15. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole

beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on
December 4, 1972.
16. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to

VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees remained the same. On
March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO
FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST
COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the account "Reference
OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on
June 25, 1981.
17. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits

beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, FM effected the
establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty.
Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides
Trust, were designated as members of the Board of Trustees. The
account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust
Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the
securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of
February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December
31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed.
18. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR

FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.
19. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees

decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation
was sent to the Office of the Public Register on March 21, 1986.
However, the bank accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR
FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an
attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation's funds to another
account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order
issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained
by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr.
Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR
FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G.
Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos
Familie"
20. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of

VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No.
469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI- VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA

FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
21. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the
Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups under the foundation
organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FM's benefit, eventually
joined together and became one (1) account group under the
AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is
the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the
Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Bank's dollar-
denominated treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
22. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency,
Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym
WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next
day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened
her own bank accounts with the same bank using an American-
sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents
in Malacañang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful
night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for
"Declaration/Specimen Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple.
Under the caption "signature(s)" Ferdinand and Imelda signed their
real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These
accounts were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses for
about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970
and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
23. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in

Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were named as
members of the Board of Trustees.
24. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the

foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the
handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the
type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated February
13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first beneficiaries, the
surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children -
Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene - as equal third
beneficiaries.
25. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION

on August 29, 1978. The Board of Trustees remained the same at the
outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr.
Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued
a written order to the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and
transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES
TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
26. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981

in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of Trustees.
Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on
September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made
known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary.
However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP
FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as
those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR
as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December
31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina
Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is
certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is
AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of
December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of
Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents
received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by IVO
Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are
FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates
that Avertina Foundation is owned by the "Marcos Families."
27. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined

AVERTINA were also established by FM through his dummies, which
started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.
28. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on

December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr.
Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal
counsel, acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the
mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM himself was
named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second
beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on
November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney
to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with
regard to Charis Foundation.
29. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari
Foundation but the directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981
FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all
its assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust
Company under the account "Reference OMAL". The Board of Directors
decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June
25, 1981.
30. The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in

Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundation's Board of
Directors. The account was officially opened with SKA on September
10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundation was not made known
to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list
of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of
December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the
safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981.
Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the
beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation.
31. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from

Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer
the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several
transfers from the foundation's German marks and US dollar accounts
were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M,
respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the
Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of
the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows
that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
32. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in

Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury
as the foundation's directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to
establish the foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The
regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August 28, 1970
were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first
beneficiary and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong)
and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries.
33. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz

with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of the board of directors.
Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the
foundation with a note that the foundation's capitalization as well as
the cost of establishing it be debited against the account of Trinidad
Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby
foundation. According to written information from SKA dated
November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to
transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another
foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However,
transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda issued
a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to
Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same
date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve
the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of
Fides Trust Co. Under the account "Reference Dido," Rayby was
dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3,
1981.
34. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in

Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the Foundation's Board of
Directors. The account was officially opened with the SKA on
September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the
bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one
compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of
Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy
Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that
practically the same securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it
is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the
Trinidad Foundation.
35. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank

accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account No. 391528 is
$17,214,432.00.
36. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a

declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of
Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows
that the said Palmy Foundation is owned by "Marcos Familie".
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
37. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the

beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was executed on September
24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation
maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under
the general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies from
Japanese suppliers were hidden.
38. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and

all its assets were transferred to Aguamina Corporation's (Panama)
Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation
of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents
from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and
Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a
declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated
October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law
applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further
confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was involved while
transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the
beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300

amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
39. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its

rules and regulations was found among Malacañang documents. It
stated, among others, that 50% of the Company's assets will be for
sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime,
which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts among their
children. Another Malacañang document dated October 19,1968 and
signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr.
Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and
as administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The
Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that they bought
the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and
Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that
all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed
with the word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will have the same value as
the couple's own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and
Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis.
40. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with

SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey
and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories.
41. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler

Establishment into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed
to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets was
left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered
on November 17, 1981 appear to be the same articles applied to Maler
Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the
power of attorney for the management of its assets in favor of SBC
and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
42. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundation's

Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG
16,195,258, respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only
until December 31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it
was still an establishment which was subsequently transformed into a
foundation.
43. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a
total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars
($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex "R-5" hereto attached as
integral part hereof.
x x x x x x.[27]
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and

Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
2. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it

states that summons and other court processes may be served on
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the
matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with
summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022
P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
1. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
2. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they
cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.

contents of the alleged ITRs.


7. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as
it attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos,
for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure
assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.


contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the
activities of the BIR.
10. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for

lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.


13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges

that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in
Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation
and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that
Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged
Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.
15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude
the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and
46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were
not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were
privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having
occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of

the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to
they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a
long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos
and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer
to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute
a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of
privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part
of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to
tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently
calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of
a spurious defense:
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief
dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the
pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene
Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs.
Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the
Marcos children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion
for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000
likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated
December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children;
(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.
An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation
contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they
gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could
not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds
were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only
a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and
shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. [28]
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them
disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together
with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres
to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by
compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the
controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.
It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired.
However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful
manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated
in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired"
without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by
them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully
acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove,
by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired
legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their
alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations of the petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through
a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The
question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as
the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court
of Appeals,[30] this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a
party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter
did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be
made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses
responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim
of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise
an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they
were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.[31]
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for

forfeiture stated:
1. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in

detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the country's
wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of
foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection.
Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those
foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as
well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following
presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with
balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing
of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need
arise.[32]
Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
1. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that

Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland
and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate
entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid
properties were lawfully acquired.[33]
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of
the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. [34] Stated otherwise,
a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It
is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.[35]
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition
were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The
denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed
the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents' answer was
thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss
bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically
denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. xxx.[36]
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their

answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the
Republic's petition for forfeiture:
1. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and
30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since respondents were
not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur
Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos,
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
2. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude
the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.
3. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the
petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to
the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they
cannot remember with exactitude, the same having occurred a long
time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
4. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the

petition for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to
they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a
long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer

pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective
ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the
Republic's petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically
denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were
lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said
deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph
23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss
bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the petition for forfeiture referring
to the creation and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as
well as the averment in paragraph 52-a[39] of the said petition with respect to the
sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not
specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all
respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and
amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held
in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendant's denial is a negative pregnant, it is
equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents' denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was just a
pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her
signatures on some of the vital documents[41] attached to the petition for forfeiture
which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules. [42]
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for
forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late
husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their
knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr.
in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3)
approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income
of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM
and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the
names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to
other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated
by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or
Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the
Foundations as dummies.[43]
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information
regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups
of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and
participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact
respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as
well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the
ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was
not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent
Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the
ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying
the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial.[44] An unexplained denial of information within the control of the
pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial.[45]
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in
good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to
what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made
for the purpose of delay.[46] In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present
unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court
by presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily
within the pleader's knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at
all.[47] Respondents' ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the
averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted
by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth
the substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such
matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue. [48]
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for
forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions" cannot
rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-
in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their
father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said
brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as
in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show
and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their
respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
xxx
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective
testimonies.[49]
It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit their
pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the
stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as
well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of
the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and
of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the
particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being
put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not
only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their proofs,
and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the
specified period for the prompt disposition of the action. [50]
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos

children, merely stated:
xxx
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to
present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
xxx
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence
documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her
evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was
stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in
fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the
substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either.
Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold
that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary
judgment.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED MARCH 21,

2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated
March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children
as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions
at least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[51]
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the
sworn declarations in the Republic's motion only demonstrated that the averments
of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DATED MAY 2, 2000;[52] MOTIONS FOR

RECONSIDERATION;[53] AND MEMORANDA OF MRS. MARCOS AND THE
MARCOS CHILDREN[54]
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful
acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials
without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing,
thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the
pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds,
contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of
or interest in the funds.
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense

because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos
children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of
Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of
the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not
belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. That's your statement
of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does
the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position taken by my other compañeros here, Your Honor.
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.[55]
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse
petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what issues they intended
to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were
leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag
this forfeiture case to eternity.
MANIFESTATION DATED MAY 26, 1998 FILED BY MRS. MARCOS;

GENERAL/SUPPLEMENTAL COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER
28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In

their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of
the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything
as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was
lawfully acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this
Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-
entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to
the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to
implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss
deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses
of the said deposits.
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses
denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The
"facts" pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or
issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in
substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.
We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for.
Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on
their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. [56]
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in

evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57] A summary judgment is one granted
upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are
patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent
fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a
civil action where there exists no serious controversy. [58] Summary judgment is a
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender
issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that
those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with
the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner. [59]
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached
sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses'
participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under
the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the
ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent
pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations
against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby
failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would
have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition
for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn
declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable
conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer were false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only
half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is
only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to
allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules
of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of
the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents'
good faith should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive
reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long
time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all
respondents have offered are foxy responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or
lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago" or, as to
Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, they
also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the
Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that by its positive acts and
express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10,
2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing
issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary
judgment.[60]
We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the
petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at
any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours) [61]
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim) has been served. No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How
else does one construe the phrase any time after the answer has been served?"
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative

work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws
and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our laws
and rules were copied, is in order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary
judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of
the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party,
and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may
move for summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New
York, specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made
until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.
[62]
Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed prescriptive period
is provided.
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that
a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined,
meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary
judgment.[64] And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed
reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule
35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for
summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly
does the phrase at any stage of the litigation mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the
New York Supreme Court ruled:
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by
the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of
the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the
plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The
plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil
Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding
to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that
the answer and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and
unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions
and the defendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised
no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice
Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary
judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to
summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the
parties, and there is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a
determination at any stage of the litigation. (emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, any stage of the litigation means that
even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from
thereafter moving for summary judgment. [66]
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and
before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue
that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner
waived its right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we
apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the motion for
summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, that
plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment by her act of proceeding to
trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for
summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more
so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary
judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served
in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means at any stage of the
litigation. Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable
issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous,
plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go
against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to weed out
sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in
a trial.[68]
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do
almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration
sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their
favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and
encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and
the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases.
Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to
avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner
Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents'
answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The
fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from
moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly
raised by respondent Marcoses.
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the [r]ules should be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.[69]
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on
respondents' answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the
case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches
had already set in against petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or

unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
abandoned his right or declined to assert it. [70] In effect, therefore, the principle of
laches is one of estoppel because it prevents people who have slept on their rights
from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction
of the original parties and their successors-in-interest. [71]
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact
never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every
remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18,
1996. The motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another
motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the
subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which
prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not
because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary
judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only
unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the
action is barred.[72]
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as
they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be
adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the
doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights. [73] Nor can estoppel validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy.[74]
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.[75] Equity demands that petitioner Republic should
not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or
not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired,

hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to
the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide:
xxxxxx
Section 2. Filing of petition. - Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and
the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
xxxxxx
Sec. 6. Judgment - If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the

court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of
such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the
State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any
general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may,
in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be
established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency,
whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly
disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time
material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent
Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a
public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to
February 25, 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents
of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos
who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to
1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements,
from June 1976 to February 1986.[78]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the

allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the
accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.
[79]
The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the
Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and
Management Alberto Romulo.[80] The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount
of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, AS PRESIDENT
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
IMELDA R. MARCOS, AS MINISTER
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's
combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33.
Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to
U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing
during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had
an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange
of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official
monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for
Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court provides that:
Section 4. - Judicial admissions - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[81]
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the
parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the
case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are
deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as
required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under
the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any
other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities".[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source."[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like
the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited
under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) - The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their
tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution,
nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 - No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall
he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled
corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 - The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject
to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel
before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any
profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be
provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly
serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of
the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for
the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements
under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal
statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against
the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other lawful income
or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply
because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position
to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was
such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in
their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify
the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima

facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties
and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL)
from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was
in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for
not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in

their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to
them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of

their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia
dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of
the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the
Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds,

respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents'
answer stated:
1. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that

respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland
and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate
entities for being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid
properties were lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents
unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by
failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable
documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier,
Section 11, Rule 8[86] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material
averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements executed by petitioner and

respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner
Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement
declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the
Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after
7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of
conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY
shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually
withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably
indicated the manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with
petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' willingness to agree to an amicable settlement
with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple
reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the
General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void. [89] They insist that
nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them
because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section
27, Rule 130[90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror."
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements

was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant
of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's
commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the government's undertaking to
cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The
reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity
and truthfulness of respondents' admission with respect to their ownership of the
Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements,
respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject
Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later
declared null and void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castañeda, Jr. in the

decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without
legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained
therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted
above, remain binding on the respondents.[91]
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is
contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is
made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by
reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been
held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable. [92]
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the
motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent
credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted
ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand
Jr.'s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C.
Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by
PCGG against your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving
some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and the Marcos family.
The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were initiated by our then
counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open,
we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and any
approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my reaction was the
same as what I have always ... why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an
end to this problem.[94]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the
banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.[95]
xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in
connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was
forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then,
subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadn't really discussed the
details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the mechanism would
be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the
agreement was perfected and that we were beginning to implement it and that was a
source of satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end.[96]
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a
confirmation of respondents' recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a
party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a
judicial admission.[97] It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that the Marcos
family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally
putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss
accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The
rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal
judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is
peculiarly within his own knowledge.[98]
In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore
revealed the following:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-
various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to
the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx

Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos'
manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary
of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the
documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the
foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the
authenticity of such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders" and
"Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos,
respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature,
was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of
said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8[100] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the
approval of the Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of
the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following
manifestations:
xxx xxx xxx
1. The Republic's cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in
favor of the government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other
hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate
asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of ownership
over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the
Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must
yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
1. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed

themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace,
reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with
the Republic for the release and transfer of the US Dollar 150 million
for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the
litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imelda's admission of the Marcoses'
ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss
deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos,

Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion[102] on May 4, 1998 asking the
Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:
1. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the

aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the
Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the
petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes
that he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits.
Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said
deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos
foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss
bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the
human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human
rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party,
desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights
victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the
funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995,
although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss
courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its
rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights
victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner
failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds" and that "it was only by
arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out
of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court
is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and
document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs
presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if
each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-
reaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and
examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have
bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence,
is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent
Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes
conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the
adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[105]
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial
admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them
pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. - The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. - Where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to
the property, is evidence against the former.[107]
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of
estate" exists between the declarant and the party, the term "privity of estate"
generally denoting a succession in rights. [108] Consequently, an admission of one in
privity with a party to the record is competent. [109] Without doubt, privity exists
among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are
jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is
competent against all.[110]
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner

Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to

say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous
records of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or employee
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x"
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public
officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the
public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and
owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss
accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and
ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second
element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property
is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and his other lawful
income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether
a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of
the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge
deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five
different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima
facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses
were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us
that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing
the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was
considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the
presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly
established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate
amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total
government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. - Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material
possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose
value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-
gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption
and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully
acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved. [111]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been
impleaded as they were indispensable parties without whom no complete
determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner
Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore,
the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by
the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them
of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and
international law.[112]
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign
foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [113] taken from
Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must
be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an
indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding
indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not
jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even
in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the
non-joined party.[114]
An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:

[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it
cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render
justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect
upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence will
be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded
the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be
decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? [116] There is,
however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can
only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or
litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her
May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole
beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10%
belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. [117] Viewed against this admission, the
foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the
proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and
according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the
$356 million was neither inimical to the foundations' interests nor inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only
confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were
established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from
petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign
foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be
given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption
that they owned a nominal share of the assets. [118] But this was already refuted by
no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given
by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets
as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by
Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and
their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that impleading the firms which
are the res of the action was unnecessary:
"And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves
guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct - in other words, the
companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res
thereof - there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not
proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds,
absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part...
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds,
however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give
the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth -
at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former
with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical
personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said
corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause of
action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their
members' (or stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal
origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply
the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as
defendants in said actions."
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here
were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus,
they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not
have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the

failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously
cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120]
"Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the
Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public
funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government
contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the
defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules - e.g.,
Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment
during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20
[governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of
so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines
that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be
cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly
in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is
essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be
rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely
allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court,
where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character
as such indispensable parties."[121]
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties
in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do
not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground
to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable
parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11,
Rule 3[122] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on
the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court
on its own initiative.[123]
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section
7, Rule 3[124] on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of
indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to
afford the moving party full relief.[125] Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does
not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.
[126]
Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment
rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign
foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the
absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not
on the absent party.[127] If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due
to the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their
inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did.
Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary

evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of
their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered
ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of
RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED
TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding

Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions
and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier
PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of
these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the
motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims.
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart,

there might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The
presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss
decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and
reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on
the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Court's.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the
decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is
important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor
of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the
absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on
hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which
were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank
in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-

Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result
Quisumbing, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
Carpio, J., no part.
[1]
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the
Procedure Therefor.
[2]
E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the
Marcoses fled the country, creating the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist
the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates, both
here and abroad.
[3]
E.O. No. 2 - issued twelve (12) days later, warning all persons and entities who
had knowledge of possession of ill-gotten assets and properties under pain of
penalties prescribed by law, prohibiting them from concealing, transferring or
dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of
the government.
[4]
E.O. No. 14 - Series of 1986, as amended by E.O. No. 14-A.
[5]
Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the exclusive and original jurisdiction
over cases, whether civil or criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the assistance of
the Office of the Solicitor General. The law also declared that the civil actions for
the recovery of unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil action under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed
with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos et. al., may proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of
evidence.
[6]
Declared null and void by this Court on December 9, 1998 in the case of
"Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG and Magtanggol Gunigundo, docketed as G.R. No.
130716.
[7]
In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2, the Republic of the Philippines through the
PCGG filed a request for mutual assistance with the Swiss Federal Police
Department, under the procedures of the International Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to freeze the bank deposits of the Marcoses located in
Switzerland.
IMAC is a domestic statute of Switzerland which generally affords relief to the kind
of request from foreign governments or entities as authorized under E.O. No. 2.
The various Swiss local authorities concerned granted the request of petitioner
Republic, and ordered the Swiss deposits to be "blocked" until the competent
Philippine court could decide on the matter.
[8]
Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195.
[9]
Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.
[10]
Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218.
[11]
Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena with the separate concurring
opinions of Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both
wrote their respective dissenting opinions.
[12]
Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
[13]
Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62.
[14]
Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605.
[15]
Sec. 3 - the petition shall contain the following information
xxx
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in
his past and present offices and employments.
[16]
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the
Solicitor General.
[17]
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and
incomes from legitimately acquired property xxx.
[18]
Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654.
[19]
Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of Court.
[20]
Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996].
[21]
Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972].
[22]
240 SCRA 376 [1995].
[23]
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316 [1997].
[24]
69 SCRA 524 [1976].
[25]
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
[26]
Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970].
[27]
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37.
[28]
[29]
16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910].
[30]
197 SCRA 391 [1991].
[31]
Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246 [1973].
[32]
Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236.
[33]
Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064.
[34]
61A Am. Jur., 172-173.
[35]
Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428, Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1995 ed.].
[36]
[37]
Supra.
[38]
Supra.
[39]
"All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of
about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by
Annex `R-5' hereto attached as integral part hereof."
[40]
22 SCRA 48 [1968]
[41]
XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a) Contract for opening of deposit
dated March 21, 1968; (b) Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated March 3, 1970;
(d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated February 13, 1970; (e) Letter of
instruction dated March 10, 1981; (f) Letter of Instructions dated March 10, 1991.
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION: (a) Management agreement dated August
28, 1990; (b) Letter of instruction dated August 26, 1970 to Markers Geel of Furich;
(c) Approval of Statutes and By-laws of Trinidad Foundation dated August 26,
1990; (d) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated August 28, 1970; (e)
Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation prepared by Markers Geel dated August 28,
1970; (f) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Rayby Foundation dated March 10,
1981; (g) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Trinidad Foundation dated March
10, 1981.
MALER ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a) Rules and Regulations of Maler dated

October 15, 1968; (b) Letter of Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to Barbey d
Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to Muler to Swiss Bank dated October 19, 1968.
[42]
"Where an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading xxx, the genuineness and due execution of
the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts xxx."
[43]
Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194.
[44]
Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941, 43 F. Supp. 281.
[45]
Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L- 31869, Aug. 8, 1973.
[46]
Warner Barnes Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G. 3109-3111.
[47]
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 [1991].
[48]
28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969].
[49]
Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but the change(s) had no
adverse effects on the rights of private respondents.
[50]
Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49410, 169 SCRA 409
[1989].
[51]
[52]
adopted by the Marcos children.
[53]
dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos; dated October 5, 2000 as
jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental motion for
reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand,
Jr.;
[54]
dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000 as filed by the Marcos
children.
[55]
TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999.
[56]
Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses Antera and Virgilio Soriano,
April 20, 2001.
[57]
Plantadosi vs. Loew's, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, June 2, 1943.
[58]
Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000].
[59]
Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 348 [1989].
[60]
Rollo, pp. 2659-70.
[61]
Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
[62]
Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an answer is served in an action to
recover a debt or a liquidated demand arising,
1. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or
2. on a judgment for a stated sum;
the answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and the
affidavit of the plaintiff or of any other person having knowledge of the facts,
verifying the cause of action and stating the amount claimed, and his belief that
there is no defense to the action; unless the defendant by affidavit or other proof,
shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion,
sufficient to entitle him to defend. (emphasis ours)
[63]
73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
[64]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II. (1996), pp. 183-184.
[65]
19 NYS2d 250 [1940].
[66]
73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
[67]
Supra.
[68]
Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion, et. al., 71 SCRA 523 [1976].
[69]
[70]
Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983].
[71]
Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956].
[72]
Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958].
[73]
Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764, October 4, 2002; Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[74]
Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124 Phil. 472 [1966].
[75]
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].
[76]
An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor, approved on June 18, 1955.
[77]
Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081.
[78]
Ibid.
[79]
Id., p. 1062.
[80]
Exhibit "S."
[81]
[82]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1997 ed., p. 650.
[83]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V, 1980 ed., p. 64.
[84]
Section 9, Article VII.
[85]
Section 4(1), Article VII.
[86]
[87]
Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098.
[88]
Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100.
[89]
Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998].
[90]
[91]
Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205.
[92]
31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721.
[93]
Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178.
[94]
Ibid, p. 1181.
[95]
Ibid, p. 1188.
[96]
Ibid, p. 1201.
[97]
29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.
[98]
31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795.
[99]
Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261.
[100]
[101]
Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507.
[102]
Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256.
[103]
Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289.
[104]
Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974].
[105]
[106]
[107]
[108]
29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.
[109]
31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817.
[110]
Ibid, p. 814.
[111]
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857.
[112]
Rollo, pp. 2255-2265.
[113]
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.--Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
[114]
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties §97 (2000).
[115]
Supra note 3 § 13 (2000).
[116]
Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786, 199 SE2d 223.
[117]
Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:
"Comes now undersigned counsel for the respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before
this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:
I. That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject-matter of the above-
various Foundations alleged in the case;
II. That in fact only 10% of the subject-matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the
Estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;"
[118]
Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18, 2000 memorandum of
respondent Mrs. Marcos:
"On the other hand, the opponent to the appeal, formally the owner of the assets to
be seized and restituted, has not been involved in the collecting procedure pending
in the Philippines. Even though such opponent is nothing but a legal construction to
hide the true ownership to the assets of the Marcos family, they nevertheless are
entitled to a hearing as far as the proceedings are concerned with accounts which
are nominally theirs. The guarantees of the Republic of the Philippines therefore
must include the process rights not only of the defendants but also of the formal
owners of the assets to be delivered."
[119]
240 SCRA 376, 469 [1995].
[120]
Supra.
[121]
Id at 470-471.
[122]
[123]
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined
party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
[124]
Same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
[125]
Supra note 3 § 265 (2000)
[126]
Id citing Gentry vs. Smith (CA5 Fla) 487 F2d 571, 18 FR Serv 2d 221, later app
(CA5 Fla) 538 F2d 1090, on reh (CA5 Fla) 544 F2d 900, holding that a failure to
request the joinder of a defendant was excused where the moving party's former
counsel, who had resisted the joinder, abruptly withdrew his appearance and
substitute counsel moved promptly to join the corporation.
[127]
Supra note 3.

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453 Phil.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc,

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the

RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT

In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's

The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the

Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.

In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE

B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE

1. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL

2. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE

3. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN

D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE

B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS

THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the

IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN

ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT

(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary judgment was described as a

1. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by

2. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former

Schedule of Income (Annex "T" hereof);

Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof);

Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2" hereof);

Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof).

3. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses

Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%

6. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the

8. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years

11. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts

12. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total

G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS

13. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly

H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

15. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole

16. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to

17. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits

18. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR

19. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees

20. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of

I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI- VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA

23. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in

24. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the

25. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION

26. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981

27. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined

28. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on

30. The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in

31. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from

J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS