Equitable Doctrines Questions
Equitable Doctrines Questions
Equitable doctrines
Introduction
The maxims of equity are the general principles upon which the Chancery Court developed this
system of law and reflect the desire to be fair and even-handed between litigants. The maxims
underlie the equitable doctrines and remedies. Their origins are to be found in the history of
property law but they are sometimes applied to more modern situations and not always very
happily. The application of conversion to trusts for sale of land led to some surprising results and
the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act (TLATA) 1996 converted all trusts for
sale of land existing on 1 January 1997 (when the Act came into force) into trusts of land to which
the doctrine does not apply. (There is one very limited exception to this which is referred to in
question 2(a)(iii) in this chapter.) Although it is still possible to create a trust for sale of land, there
is little point in it, as the power to postpone sale overrides any provision to the contrary (s. 4(1)),
and s. 3 abolishes the application of the doctrine of conversion to a trust for sale of land.
Questions on the doctrines of equity may well be general essay questions which will draw on
your overall knowledge of the subject. It would be unwise to attempt these types of questions
perhaps, unless you feel you have read generally and widely enough on the background of equity.
Problem questions involving the more modern applications of the doctrines are a possibility if your
In deciding how much attention to give to these more general areas of equity, you should look at
past examination papers and consider the emphasis given to equity itself by your lecturer.
Although all courses on trusts will include some background of equity, some lecturers will not
regard it as worthy of examination questions, whilst other lecturers may set questions on it. You
will only know which type of course your lecturer favours by looking at the past examination
Question 1
Discuss critically the applications of this maxim in the equitable doctrine of conversion.
Commentary
The equitable doctrine of conversion is an anachronism which can produce unfortunate results in
its present day applications. It probably has more significance in land law than in trusts, although it
is still capable of affecting interests on succession. The material for this type of question is more
likely to be found in a book on equity rather than a book on trusts, and some reference may well
be made to it in books on land law, e.g., Maudsley and Burn’s, Land Law: Cases and Materials,
It is essentially only something which would be examined on a course which covers equity as
well as trusts.
Answer plan
Wherever there is an obligation to convert property to another form, e.g., to sell land and
Where there is a contract for the sale of land, equity therefore regards the purchaser as
having already acquired the beneficial interest in the land; the vendor has the bare legal title
This was extended in the rule in Lawes v Bennett to options to purchase and applied in Re
Trustees of residuary personalty left in succession must also convert wasting or future assets
Suggested answer
Although equity did not have the same rigid rules of precedent as the common law, the Court of
Chancery did have certain principles which it applied in administering equity. These became
known as the ‘maxims’ of equity, and ‘equity looks on that as done which ought to be done’ is one
of these. Its application is evident in several areas of equity and it underlies the doctrine of
conversion.
The doctrine applies wherever there is an obligation to convert property into another form. Equity
will then notionally convert the property before the actual conversion takes place. This has the
curious result that realty may sometimes be regarded as personalty, and vice versa, in the eyes of
equity. This was significant on the passing of property on an intestacy before 1926, when realty
devolved upon the heir and personalty to the next of kin, and may still be relevant after 1925 in the
Jekyll MR gave the reason for the doctrine in Lechmere v Earl of Carlisle (1733) 3 P Wms 211
as the fact that a cestui que trust should not be prejudiced by a trustee’s possible delay in dealing
with trust property in accordance with his obligations. It has received some unfortunate extensions
however, in certain areas, which have produced criticisms from the judges, and it was abolished
The doctrine of conversion still applies, however, to a contract for the sale of land. As soon as
there is an enforceable contract, equity will impose a constructive trust on the vendor. From the
contract, the vendor’s interest is treated as being in the proceeds of sale which, if the vendor dies
before completion, are payable to the persons entitled to his personalty. The purchaser, who is
regarded as having a beneficial interest in the land, should therefore insure it. The position as to
insurance may of course be varied by the terms of the contract for sale, and the Standard
Conditions applicable to domestic conveyances provide that insurance of the property shall remain
In Re Sweeting (deceased) [1988] 1 All ER 1016, the doctrine was applied to a conditional
contract where the condition was not fulfilled until after the testator’s death. An unfortunate
extension of its application is the rule in Lawes v Bennett (1785) 1 Cox 167, which decided that
the doctrine applies retrospectively when an option to purchase is exercised after the grantor’s
death. Moreover, if the option is granted after a specific devise of the property by will, on exercise
of the option the devise is adeemed and the property, which becomes personalty retrospectively,
A duty to convert property also arises under the rule in Howe v Earl of Dartmouth (1802) 7 Ves
137. The rule aims at achieving fairness as to investments between a life tenant and a
convert any wasting assets, or future assets not yielding an income, into authorised investments,
unless the will reveals a contrary intention. The income from any such part of the fund before
A strict application of the doctrine of conversion can produce some unfortunate results, and it is
hardly surprising that the courts have sought to avoid it in some circumstances.
Question 2
James, who died earlier this year, appointed Tina and Tom as executors and trustees of his will
and devised all his realty to his son Sam and all his personalty to his daughter Doris.
Advise the executors as to who is entitled to the following properties owned by James:
(a)(i) ‘The Beeches’, held by James and his wife Wynne upon trust for sale for themselves as
tenants in common.
(ii) Would your answer differ if James and Wynne had held ‘The Beeches’ as joint tenants?
(iii) Would your answer differ if James had died before 1 January 1997?
(b) ‘The Larches’, which James contracted to sell to Peter shortly before he died, subject
to Peter obtaining planning consent for an extension. Peter has now obtained planning
consent.
(c)‘The Firs’, upon which he had granted an option to purchase to Frank. Since James died,
Frank has given notice to Tina and Tom of his intention to exercise the option. Would your
answer differ if the will had included a specific devise of ‘The Firs’ to Sam?
Commentary
This question requires a knowledge of some of the circumstances in which the doctrine of
conversion applies.
Like all questions in parts, it is probably unwise to attempt it unless you know the answer to at
least two parts of it! If you have revised this topic, however, it is a fairly straightforward question,
with almost arithmetical answers. You should achieve at least a pass if you can apply the
principles, although a more detailed knowledge of the cases would be required to pass well.
Part (a)(iii) will have an increasingly limited relevance as its only importance now is in tracing title
to unregistered land where there is such a will disposing of property subject to a trust for sale.
Answer plan
(a) (i) A trust for sale takes effect as a trust of land under TLATA 1996 and the doctrine of
conversion does not apply to it (TLATA, s. 3). ‘The Beeches’ is regarded by equity as land and
passes to Sam
(ii) Wherever there is a joint tenancy, property passes by the right of survivorship to the surviving
joint tenant or joint tenants and not under the will. ‘The Beeches’ would therefore go to Wynne
(iii) This is the only exception to TLATA, s. 3. The doctrine of conversion still applies to land held
on a trust for sale in the will of a testator who dies before 1 January 1997 leaving ‘realty’ and
‘personalty’ specifically in the will. ‘The Beeches’ would therefore pass as personalty to Doris
(b) The doctrine of conversion applies to a binding contract for sale, and ‘The Firs’ is therefore
• This includes a conditional contract once the condition is fulfilled (Re Sweeting), and so the
(c) As soon as an option to purchase is exercised, there is a binding contract to sell, and ‘The Firs’ is
• If ‘The Firs’ had been specifically devised by name before the option was granted, the option
• If the specific devise was made after the option was granted, then ‘The Firs’ would go to Sam
Suggested answer
(a)(i) Wherever there is co-ownership of land, this must take effect behind a trust. Before 1
January 1997, s. 34 of the Law of Property Act 1925 imposed a statutory trust for sale. Because
a trust imposes a binding obligation on trustees and ‘equity looks on that as done which ought to
be done’, the equitable doctrine of conversion operated to convert property held on a trust for sale
to personalty. In the eyes of equity, there was a notional sale and the property was regarded as
money.
On or after 1 January 1997 when the TLATA 1996 came into force, co-ownership takes effect
behind a trust of land under the Act, and any trusts for sale existing at that date became trusts of
land. It is still possible expressly to create a trust for sale (as here), but the requirement to sell can
be overridden (TLATA 1996, s. 4(1)) and it will take effect as a trust of land under the Act.
Section 3 of the Act abolishes the doctrine of conversion as regards any trust for sale of land (with
James and Wynne will therefore hold the legal estate to ‘The Beeches’ as joint tenants at law on
a trust of land under TLATA 1996, for themselves as tenants in common in equity. The right of
survivorship does not apply to a tenancy in common and James’s share of ‘The Beeches’ will
(ii) If James and Wynne held ‘The Beeches’ as joint tenants, the position as regards the legal
estate is the same, and co-ownership takes effect behind a trust of land under TLATA 1996. The
right of survivorship applies to a joint tenancy at law or in equity, however, so that James’s
equitable interest in ‘The Beeches’ will pass to Wynne and not under James’s will at all.
(iii) Although s. 3 of the TLATA 1996 abolished the application of the doctrine of conversion to a
trust for sale of land, a saving was made by the section for a will such as James’s where the
testator died before the Act came into force. If James had died before 1 January 1997, therefore,
at his death the doctrine of conversion would have applied to the trust for sale on which ‘The
Beeches’ was held, and his share would have passed under his will as personalty to Doris.
The position would have been the same even if there had been no express trust for sale but one
had been imposed by reason of co-ownership by s. 34 of the Law of Property Act 1925.
This provision can now be relevant only in tracing title, and in practice, wills leaving personalty to
one person and realty to another are rare (except perhaps in examination questions!). A testator is
much more likely to specify the property he is leaving by name (‘The Beeches’) in his will.
(b) As soon as a valid and enforceable contract to sell property exists, equity regards the
beneficial interest as having passed to the purchaser, and the vendor holds the legal title as a
constructive trustee for the purchaser. Because the contract is enforceable by equity, equity
regards the transaction as a notional sale. The interest of the vendor is therefore in the proceeds
conditional contract for sale when the condition was fulfilled after the testator’s death.
(c) The application of the doctrine of conversion to contracts for the sale of land was extended by
the rule in Lawes v Bennett (1785) 1 Cox 167 to options to purchase. As soon as an option to
purchase land is exercised, the property becomes personalty in the hands of the vendor because
there is a binding obligation to sell it. This is still the case, even if the option is made exercisable
after the death of the grantor (Re Isaacs [1894] 3 Ch 506). Therefore, as soon as Frank gives
notice to Tina and Tom of his intention to exercise the option, it is regarded as personalty in their
However, if the will makes it clear that the devisee of property is to take all the testator’s interest
in it, then the devise may operate to override the rule in Lawes v Bennett. Moreover, it is relevant
whether the option was granted before or after the devise in the will. If it was granted before the
devise, then there may be a presumption that the testator intended to give the whole of his interest
in the property to the devisee, including any rights under the option. In Calow v Calow [1928] Ch
710, a devise of land or ‘the proceeds of sale of the land’ was held to survive a subsequent
contract to sell the land completed after the testator’s death. Conversely, if the option was granted
after the devise, then the option is regarded as overriding the devise: Re Carrington [1932] 1 Ch
1.
If James’s will specifically devising ‘The Firs’ to Sam was made before the option to purchase
was granted, then the effect of Frank’s notice to Tina and Tom to exercise the option is to operate
the doctrine of conversion retrospectively. ‘The Firs’ becomes personalty in their hands and will go
to Doris.
If James’s will was made after the option was granted, however, then it is likely that the option will
be regarded as a right attaching to the property, and ‘The Firs’ will pass, together with the right, to
Sam as realty.
Question 3
(a) Two sisters, Amy and Bertha, were joint tenants of a house. Amy, who died recently, by her will
purported to leave the house to Bertha and their brother Cyril in equal shares. There was also a
bequest in the will of valuable jewellery worth at least half of the value of the house to Bertha.
(b) John, who died recently, made a will in which he gave a legacy of £5,000 to Bill. Bill had lent John
£5,000 secured by a charge on John’s house. There is a sum of £3,000 outstanding on this debt.
Commentary
The first part of this question is on the application of the doctrine of election, and the second part
Both of these doctrines have their origins in equity’s desire to be fair to the children of a family in
the distribution of family wealth. The doctrines were extended, however, beyond the family
circumstances and the doctrine of satisfaction particularly, in its application to creditors to whom a
legacy was left. There are few recent cases on the doctrines although they are still occasionally
applicable today.
This is not a subject to cover unless your lecturer directs you to do so or deals with it in your
lectures. The doctrines, which were included in the 15th edition of Hanbury and Martin’s Modern
Equity (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) were left out of the 16th edition (2001) and all later editions, no
doubt to allow room for more modern developments and applications of the subject.
Answer plan
(a) • Where a person receives a benefit but also suffers a loss from a transaction or a will, he may
elect to reject it or to accept it; if he accepts the benefit of the transaction, he must also suffer the
loss
• The doctrine would therefore apply to Bertha with regard to Amy’s half share of the house and
the jewellery
(b) • The doctrine of satisfaction, which had its origins in allowing for portions advanced to
• The satisfaction of a debt by a legacy left to a creditor became subject to certain technical rules
(listed in the answer) which may mean that it will not apply here
Suggested answer
(a) The doctrine of election means that a person who receives a benefit from a transaction, from
which he also suffers a loss, must elect to take with the transaction or against it; that is, he may
elect to take the benefit and suffer the loss, or not to accept the benefit at all. It usually applies to a
will and arises where property is left to A and some of A’s property is left by the same will to B. A
cannot accept the gift under the will unless he compensates B from his own property. It is
irrelevant that the testator has made a mistake as to the ownership of A’s property which he has
purported to leave to B.
Because Amy and Bertha were joint tenants of the house and the right of survivorship applies to
a joint tenancy, the house automatically passes to Bertha on Amy’s death. Amy is therefore
leaving to Cyril property which is not hers to dispose of. In Re Gordon’s Will Trusts [1978] Ch
145, where a mother and son owned a house as joint tenants and the mother devised it to her
trustee upon trust for sale and left furniture and £1,000 to her son, Buckley LJ accepted that the
In that case, other property given in trust for the son was not freely alienable by him, which in fact
prevented the application of the doctrine to it. If the property of the elector is not freely alienable,
no case for election arises (Re Lord Chesham (1886) 31 ChD 466). The jewellery in this question
would appear to have been given outright to Bertha, however, so it would seem that the doctrine
would apply.
Bertha will therefore have to elect to take with the will, in which case she may keep the jewellery
but must convey half of the house to Cyril, or against it, in which case she may keep the whole of
the house but must compensate Cyril by letting him have the jewellery. She will be obliged to let
him have the whole of the jewellery, however, and not just jewellery to the value of half of the
house.
Hanbury and Martin’s Modern Equity, 15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, criticised the doctrine of
election as ‘too uncertain an instrument of equity’, pointing out that the ultimate donee of the
elector’s property will always benefit, whereas the person put to their election may not benefit at
(b) The doctrine of satisfaction evolved in order to ensure, as far as possible, an equal distribution
of family wealth among the children of a family. It was applied in certain circumstances to adeem a
legacy left to a child who had previously received a portion (a sum of money to set him up in life).
It also applies where a legacy is left to a creditor, the underlying maxim for this being that ‘equity
imputes an intent to fulfil an obligation’. It must be possible to presume from the circumstances
that the testator did intend to pay the debt with the legacy and, like all presumptions, it is
First, the legacy must be as beneficial to the creditor as the debt (see Re Van den Bergh’s Will
Trusts [1948] 1 All ER 935). As Bill’s loan was secured by a charge on John’s house, this would
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the will was made after the debt was incurred. We are not
Thirdly, it will not apply if the will includes a clause (which is frequently included in wills) directing
the testator’s executors to pay the testator’s debts and funeral and testamentary expenses. In
these circumstances, both the debt and the legacy will be payable. This principle was established
in Chancey’s Case (1717) 1 P Wms 408. It is not even necessary for the clause to include
For all these reasons, it is possible that the doctrine of satisfaction will not apply to the legacy in
John’s will, and Bill will be able to recover his debt from the estate and also take his legacy of
£5,000.