Supreme Court G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961 ANTONIO GELUZ, Petitioner, The Hon. Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo, Respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439             July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and
against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the
award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 —
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This
we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10
ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that
the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or
the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz
as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge
Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that
no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore,
the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is
deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed
by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text
of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish
Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el


sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino
que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause
of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state
a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix
Icao. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182836               October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, 


vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution 2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and
other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental


Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE


xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay
to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental
insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of
the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is
single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died
during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite
the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to
file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). 9 In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty.
Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and
Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan
was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died
during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed
the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41
and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same
line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery
was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent,
since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither
of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were
deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to
the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its
claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the
loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s
"dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented. 18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner


Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of
₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement
leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had
occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of
the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a
fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention
was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no
such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used
in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which
the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is
no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance
to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death
benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of
"death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be
equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this
light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is
for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point. 20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]. 21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of
Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites
for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to
prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define
the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the
CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by
death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him
to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his
unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the
CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of
a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In the same way, the CBA
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that
"when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same
must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the
amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight
of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and
justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated
20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198694               February 13, 2013

RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON, Petitioner, 


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the June
30, 2011 Decision2 and September 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
No. 32544 which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 2
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-358669 convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y
Martinez (Ramon) of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3)
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.’’

The Factual Antecedents

At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2
Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who wereall assigned tothe Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a
routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting
"Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" Forpurportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance
of the City of Manila (Manila City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later
identified as Ramon,was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the course thereof, the
police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon
to Police Station 9 where the former markedthe item with the latter’s initials, "RMG." There, Police
Superintendent Ferdinand RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante) prepared a request for laboratory
examination which, together with the specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination.

Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal (PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe


specimen which contained 0.173 gram of white crystalline substanceand found the same positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).

Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article
II of RA 9165 throughan Information dated January 3, 2008 which states:

That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without
being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of white
crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous
drug.5

In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the incident. He narrated that on
December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, whilewalking alongBalingkit Street to borrow a
welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is
Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who
eventually introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar)
wherethe said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still
brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soquepropositioned Ramon and asked for
₱20,000.00 in exchange for his release.When Ramon’s wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the
₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soquehad asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for
inquest proceedings.
The RTC Ruling

In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous
drugs as charged, finding all its elements tohave been established through the testimonies of the
prosecution’sdisinterested witnesses. In this relation,it alsoupheld the legality of Ramon’s
warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City
Ordinance during the time of his apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment oftwelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Aggrieved, Ramon elevated his
conviction to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramon’s appeal and thereby affirmedhis conviction.
Itupheld the factual findings of the RTC which found that the elements of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in possession of a prohibited drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.6

Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an incident of alawful
warrantless arrest for breach of the peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers,
notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace)subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain of custody of the prohibited drug
wassufficiently establishedfrom the time PO2Soque took the sameup to its actual presentation in
court.

Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon’s claim of extortion as his asseverationsfailed to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ official duties.

The Issue

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the
RTC convicting Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted intrusions by the
government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that:

Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by
government authoritiesin contraventionof the foregoingarerendered inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that:

2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not, however, an
absolute and rigid one.7 As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs
searches,8 searches of moving vehicles,9seizure of evidence in plain view,10 consented
searches,11 "stop and frisk" measures12 andsearches incidental to a lawful arrest.13 This last-
mentioned exception is of particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further
disquisition.

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the
parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court 14 which requires that the apprehending
officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arresta person caught in flagrante delicto. To
be sure,the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 15Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 16 In this light, the
determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the
factual incidents.

Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City
Ordinance which provides as follows:

Sec. 844. – Breaches of the Peace. – No person shall make, and, countenance, or assist in making
any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault, beat or use personal
violence upon another without just cause in any public place; or utter any slanderous, threatening or
abusive language or expression or exhibit or display any emblem, transparency, representation,
motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any public place, meeting or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly.1âwphi1

PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or fine not more than Two Hundred
pesos (PHP 200.00)

As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinancepenalizes the following acts: (1) making,
countenancing, or assisting in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace;
(2) assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another without just cause in any public
place; (3) uttering any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibiting or
displaying any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or thing;
and (4) doing any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose, or
disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen
of these offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest
based on the same, it must be established that the apprehension was effected after a reasonable
assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
In this regard, PO2 Soque’s testimony detailed the surrounding circumstances leading to Ramon’s
warrantless warrant, viz:

DIRECT EXAMINATION:

ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:

Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol? PO2 Soque:

A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on top of his voice telling "Putang ina
mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" pointing to his right front pocket, sir.

Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was the shouting came from?

A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.

Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?

A: About ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?

A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a man, sir.

Q: Who was that man?

A: Goco, sir.

Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?

A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir.

Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?

A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.

Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded immediately, when you saw a man?

A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.

Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other cooperatives?

A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity of the place, sir.

Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting?
A: Past 9:00, sir.

Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted?

A: Me, sir.

Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with Goco?

A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming near the place, sir, they
scampered in different directions.

Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you approached the accused?

A: They followed me, sir.

Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused therein Goco?

A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir.

x x x x17

CROSS EXAMINATION:

xxxx

ATTY. AMURAO:

Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated? PO2 Soque:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And there are many people outside their houses?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?

A: They were talking casually.

x x x x18

Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable cause when the
police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, with many people
conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section
844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot,
affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using
personal violence upon another; and, the words he allegedly shouted – "Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" –are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended
to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was
still teeming with people and alive with activity.

Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramon’s
shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a certain
Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the store of a certain
MangRomy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon,
immediately handcuffed and took him away.19

In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances could not have engendereda
well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time that his
warrantless arrest was effected. All told, noprobable cause existedto justify Ramon’s warrantless
arrest.

Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer
or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the
act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, 20 this should not be
exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw
enforcers, it is largely expectedof them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation at
hand. The determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct
unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between legitimate human conduct on the
one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performedwisely
and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely,
as constitutionally guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be
clothed with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a higher sense of public accountability.

Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless search that
resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the
above discussed constitutional provision. In this regard, considering that the confiscated shabuis the
very corpus delicitof the crime charged, Ramon's acquital should therefore come as a matter of
course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and September 20, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.


Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create
a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE


MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2,
1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at
this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence
— on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that
defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955
stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry
the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not
valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800,
December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner
to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-
14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere
breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh.
C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn.,
6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,:
simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question
is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that
the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in
the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that
the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18630      December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.


Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support
and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant
(appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age;
that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due
time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage
plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until
December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded
in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff
became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as
promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and
that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's
fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case,
holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as
yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court
of origin to proceed with the case.

Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are
not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-
14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De
Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

We find this appeal meritorious.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above
mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring
to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined
by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved.
The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or


inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path
of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission
of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to
the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class
of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as
follows:

I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City,
while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where
he may be served with summons;

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in
December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of
young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to
each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of
marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to
have carnal knowledge with him;

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in
December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
the plaintiff;

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was
confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant
and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his
promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the
plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has
broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this
Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.

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