1 FILED

2022 APR 11 09:27 AM

2 KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
3 E-FILED
CASE #: 21-2-12876-5 SEA
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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FOR KING COUNTY
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CHANDRA N. HAMPSON, as director of Cause No. 21-2-12876-5 SEA
Seattle School District No. 1,
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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellant,
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v.
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SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,
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a municipal corporation,
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Defendant/Respondent.
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Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
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 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Table of Authorities .........................................................................................................................3

3 A. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................4

4 B. REPLY ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................4

5 (1) The Standard of Review Is De Novo........................................................................4

6 (2) The District’s Decisions Were Arbitrary and Capricious and Contrary
to the Policy .............................................................................................................6
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C. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
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 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Table of Cases

3 Washington Cases

4 Bawden v. Seattle Pub. Sch.,

__ Wn. App. 2d __, 2022 WL 277048 (2022) .................................................................... 4, 5, 9
5 Benson v. Roberts,
35 Wn. App. 362, 666 P.2d 947 (1983) .................................................................................. 5, 6
6 Hillis v. State of Wash., Dept. of Ecology,
131 Wn.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139 (1997) ......................................................................................... 7
7 Porter v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
160 Wn. App. 872, 248 P.3d 1111 (2011) .............................................................................. 4, 6
8 State ex rel. Hood v. Personnel Bd.,
82 Wn.2d 396, 511 P.2d 52 (1973) ............................................................................................. 5
9 Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc.,
193 Wn.2d 611, 444 P.3d 606 (2019) ......................................................................................... 6
10 Wash. Fed’n of State Emp. v. State Pers. Bd.,
29 Wn. App. 818, 630 P.2d 951 (1981) ...................................................................................... 5
11 Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
97 Wn.2d 215, 643 P.2d 426 (1982) ........................................................................................... 5
12 Yaw v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist. No. 140,
106 Wn.2d 408, 722 P.2d 803 (1986) ..................................................................................... 5, 6
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Statutes
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RCW 28A.150.230...................................................................................................................... 5, 7
RCW 28A.320.015...................................................................................................................... 5, 7
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 1 A. INTRODUCTION

2 Even under the standard of review that the Seattle School District (“District”) demands, its

3 decisions are reversible if they were “in disregard of the facts and circumstances.” Porter v. Seattle

4 Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn. App. 872, 880, 248 P.3d 1111 (2011). Yet the District’s brief ignores

5 this case’s critical facts and circumstances: District staff, who wanted to control the development

6 of an important new policy, did not move the policy forward despite an elected Director’s repeated

7 requests for swift action; the elected Director then expressed disapproval to the staff members,

8 who gave as good as they got in a phone call that was emotional for everyone; and the staff

9 members then attempted to hijack a Board Executive Committee meeting to reassert control over

10 the policy. Just as a negative job evaluation in Bawden v. Seattle Public Schools, __ Wn. App. 2d

11 __, 2022 WL 277048, at *2 (2022) did not violate Policy 5207, no harassment occurs when an

12 elected Director admonishes staff for failing to carry out a Director’s instructions on policy

13 development and the Director then supports the Board Executive Committee’s discretionary choice

14 to press ahead with the policy on its own. District staff thought they knew better and felt sidelined.

15 But the authority over Direct policy lies in the hands of the governing Directors, not staff. The

16 District has improperly employed Policy 5207 to rebalance the power between elected Directors

17 and staff. This error becomes especially clear when evaluated against the plain language of Policy

18 5207, which requires findings of wrongful intent and pervasive harm. And this error becomes

19 irrefutable under the de novo standard of review that applies here. This Court should reject the

20 District’s arguments.

21 B. REPLY ARGUMENT

22 (1) The Standard of Review Is De Novo

23 The District insists that Director Hampson “cites no authority” establishing that de novo

24 review applies. Resp. at 7. But no appellate decision directly addresses this issue because it is
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 1 unprecedented for a school district to adjudicate an employee’s claim against a sitting elected

2 official. While the District compares its actions to “personnel matters,” Resp. at 8, the District’s

3 cases all involve supervisors’ decisions regarding employees: Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, at *1-2

4 (principal’s job evaluation of a teacher); Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 97 Wn.2d 215, 216-

5 17, 643 P.2d 426 (1982) (demotions of vice principals to teaching positions); State ex rel. Hood v.

6 Personnel Bd., 82 Wn.2d 396, 401, 511 P.2d 52 (1973) (state employees); and Wash. Fed’n of

7 State Emp. v. State Pers. Bd., 29 Wn. App. 818, 819, 630 P.2d 951 (1981) (same). But Director

8 Hampson is not a District employee; she was hired by the voters of Seattle. AR 16, 19. As an

9 elected Director, she has the authority to govern the District and to take steps that no District

10 employee can. AR 16; RCW 28A.320.015. Regardless of what district employees do, board

11 directors have “final responsibility” for matters such as district policies, staff performance criteria,

12 teaching materials, curriculum standards, allocation of staff time, and the like. RCW 28A.150.230.

13 Because elected directors are not employees and answer to voters, not District management, this

14 case is not about “personnel management.”

15 The District relies also on Yaw v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist. No. 140, 106 Wn.2d 408, 722

16 P.2d 803 (1986), but that precedent supports Director Hampson. In Yaw, an employee complained

17 when denied a promotion. That dispute might have been a “personnel matter” in some sense, but

18 de novo review still applied. Id. at 414. Our Supreme Court reasoned that the school district “would

19 be investigating, declaring and enforcing the rights and obligations of [the complainant] and the

20 junior employee, which again resembles the ordinary business of courts.” Id. at 415. Id. To identify

21 these features of quasi-judicial action, the Court relied heavily on Benson v. Roberts, 35 Wn. App.

22 362, 666 P.2d 947 (1983), noting that the dispute there required “the interpretation of the policies

23 of the school board incorporated in the teacher’s contract,” and thus was a “quasi-judicial act which

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 1 justified de novo review.” Yaw, 106 Wn.2d at 415.

2 The same must be true here, because this case shares the same features as in Yaw and

3 Benson. The District conducted a lengthy investigation, adopted findings of fact, claims that it

4 interpreted a District policy, purported to apply that policy to its findings of fact, and selected a

5 sanction. AR 9-10, 16, 45-46, 314-15. That activity “resembles the ordinary business of courts,”

6 Yaw, 106 Wn.2d at 415, and thus de novo review applies.

7 (2) The District’s Decisions Were Arbitrary and Capricious and Contrary to the Policy

8 Even under the District’s standard, the District’s decisions were error. While the District

9 emphasizes its investigative process, the number of witness interviews and the volume of

10 documents do not insulate the District’s decisions from scrutiny. See Porter, 160 Wn. App. at 880

11 (“[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard is not a rubber stamp and cannot be met simply by

12 showing that an adequate number of meetings were held or that deliberations took a certain amount

13 of time.”). The District’s decisions were arbitrary and capricious if made “in disregard of the facts

14 and circumstances of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted). And that is what happened here, especially

15 given Policy 5207’s definition of “harassment, intimidation, and bullying.”

16 Policy 5027 contains two elements: First, a mens rea (“intended to intimidate, bully,

17 degrade, or humiliate”). AR 137; App’x. Second, an actus reus: “written messages or images …,

18 verbal comments, or physical acts” that cause “substantial” or “pervasive” harm. Id. The District

19 insists that courts defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own internal policies. Resp. at 13

20 (citing Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 611, 627, 444 P.3d 606 (2019)).

21 But this case differs from Taylor, 193 Wn.2d at 617, 626-27, when a state agency adopted a

22 regulation defining a statutory term that the Legislature did not define. Here, the District suggests

23 no special definitions for Policy 5207’s terms, and makes no textual analysis of any kind. Also,

24 Policy 5027 is not a policy regarding the education of children—a policy that might be within the
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 1 District’s special expertise. This Court is fully capable of interpreting a legal text concerning the

2 mental state of intent and the acts of harm defined in Policy 5027.

3 The District never even purported to find that Director Hampson acted with wrongful

4 intent, nor that anything she did caused the type of severe harm defined in Policy 5207. AR 16,

5 45-46. In fact, the MFR Report says nothing about Hampson’s mental state. Id. As for harm, it

6 finds only “detriment” to Doe and Roe. Id. But “detriment” is not one of the elements in Policy

7 5207. AR 137. If this record allowed “room for two opinions,” Hillis v. State of Wash., Dept. of

8 Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 383, 932 P.2d 139 (1997), as the District says, then the District should

9 be able to articulate specific facts bearing on Policy 5027’s two elements. But the District never

10 has. Simply put, the District’s decision is contrary to the policy.

11 Stretching Policy 5027 beyond its text to cover this situation would be a troubling

12 precedent and should be rejected as a matter of law. For example, the District argues that Director

13 Hampson acted “inappropriately” to “curtail Doe and Roe’s participation” in the Board Executive

14 Committee meeting. Resp. at 6, 11. But the District never shows that staff had the right to speak

15 at the Board’s meeting, or to control the Board’s process for drafting and approving a policy for

16 the District. Indeed, these matters were within the Board’s exclusive authority. See RCW

17 28A.150.230; RCW 28A.320.015. Staff involvement was a privilege, not a right. Meanwhile,

18 Director Hampson’s pre-meeting emails were directed at other people, not to Doe or Roe. AR 25-

19 28. And “Dir. Hampson was not overtly rude or disrespectful” during the meeting.” AR 46. To say

20 harassment occurred when a Director exercised Board prerogatives politely and non-

21 confrontationally would strip Directors of their “final responsibility” for the District. RCW

22 28A.150.230.

23 The undisputed facts underscore that the meeting’s events merely embodied a power

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 1 struggle and staff’s substantive disagreements with Director Hampson—not harassment. Roe

2 admitted that she “interrupt[ed] [Director] DeWolf in the meeting to,” in her mind, “correct the

3 record.” AR 60. To this day, Doe and Roe object to the community-engagement process led by the

4 SCPTSA that Director Hampson believed to be adequate, even insulting Director Hampson as a

5 “control freak.” AR 56, 59-60, 99. And Doe laments the substance of the policy advanced by

6 Director Hampson at the Board Executive Committee, calling it insufficiently “pro-Black” and

7 “pro-Indigenous” (again, despite Director Hampson being Native American and growing up on

8 tribal land, AR 19). AR 98. Doe and Roe might have been upset about Directors using their

9 inherent authority to move their preferred version of draft Policy 0040 forward, but it is not

10 harassment to act within their power as elected officials.

11 The August 28 conference call did not violate Policy 5207 either. The District points to

12 nothing in the record showing that Director Hampson acted with the requisite intent to harass.

13 While the District gives a string citation of the record, see Resp. at 11 (citations omitted), the

14 District points to no specific evidence of ill intent. In fact, a witness’s notes on the call show that,

15 at most, the call was a heated discussion about substance—the Directors’ concerns about staff’s

16 delays in readying the anti-racism policy for Board approval. AR 250-53. Staff’s central objections

17 to the call were twofold: Director Wolfe saying he was transferring control over the policy to

18 Director Hampson; and staff’s disagreement with the directors’ evaluations of their performance.

19 AR 31, 56, 99. The heated emotions went both ways; Doe admits that she was “pushing back” and

20 “raise[d] her voice back” during the call. AR 97. The District has no explanation for how a single

21 phone call resulted in the type of pervasive and substantial harm required under the policy’s plain

22 terms. To equate the call’s substantive disagreements about who would control the policy’s

23 development and about staff’s performance would strip elected Directors of the ability to

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 1 negatively evaluate staff’s compliance with their directives. See Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, at *2

2 (“Concluding that a negative job evaluation is prohibited harassment, intimidation, or bullying,

3 would prevent the District from determining that an employee's performance is deficient in any

4 respect.”).

5 C. CONCLUSION

6 For these reasons and those discussed in the opening brief, this Court should reverse and

7 vacate.

8 I certify that this reply brief contains 1,743 words, excluding the words in the caption, the
tables of contents and authorities, the headers and footers, this certificate of compliance, and the
9 signature block. This reply brief is therefore within the word limit of 1,750 words established by
this Court’s order dated January 11, 2022.
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11 DATED this 11th day of April 2022.

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/s/ Philip A. Talmadge
13 /s/ Gary W. Manca
Philip A. Talmadge, WSBA #6973
14 Gary W. Manca, WSBA #42798
Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
15 2775 Harbor Avenue SW
Third Floor, Suite C
16 Seattle, WA 98126
(206) 574-6661
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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APPENDIX
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR KING COUNTY
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CHANDRA N. HAMPSON, as director of Cause No. 21-2-12876-5 SEA
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Seattle School District No. 1,
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Plaintiff/Appellant, DECLARATION OF SERVICE
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v.
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SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,
a municipal corporation,
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Defendant/Respondent.
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On said day below, I had delivered by electronically served via King County E-service true
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and accurate copies of the Appellant’s Reply Brief to the following parties:
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Kymberly K. Evanson, WSBA #39973
Pacifica Law Group LLP
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1191 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98101-3404
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Tel: (206) 245-1700
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Judge’s Working Copies delivered via E-service to:
Honorable Judge Regina Cahan
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King County Superior Court
516 Third Avenue, Room C-203
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Seattle, WA 98104
Tel: (206) 477-1385
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Original electronically filed via King County E-service to:
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King County Superior Court
Clerk’s Office
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Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington and the United
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States that the foregoing is true and correct.
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DATED this 11th day of April, 2022, at Seattle, Washington.
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/s/ Matt J. Albers
5 Matt J. Albers, Paralegal
Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
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Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
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