Game Theory - Zero-Sum Two-Player Game
Game Theory - Zero-Sum Two-Player Game
Player B
B1: B2:
Player A A1: Payoff A1B1 Payoff A1B2
A2: Payoff A2B1 Payoff A2B2
Payoff matrix
The best strategy for player A is A4, the best strategy for player B is B3.
The value of the game for both players is 0.
X X1 4 2 2
X2 1 10 1
Maximum in 4 10
columns
There is no saddle point in this game. So, you have to apply a mixed strategy.
• Mixed strategy
Let P be the probability that X will play X1, 1-P be the probability X will play X2.
Let Q be the probability that Y will play Y1, 1-Q be the probability Y will play Y2.
Y Expected gain
Y1 Y2
Q 1-Q
X X1 P 4 2 4Q + 2(1-Q)
X2 1-P 1 10 1Q + 10(1-Q)
Expected gain 4P + 1(1-P) 2P + 10(1-P)
For player X, we have:
4P + 1(1-P) = 2P + 10 (1-P)
--> P = 9/11 , 1-P = 2/11
For player Y:
4Q + 2(1-Q) = 1Q + 10 (1-Q)
--> Q = 8/11, 1-Q = 3/11
The value of the game for player X:
4(9/11) + 1(2/11) = 2(9/11) + 10 (2/11) = 38/11
The value of the game for player Y:
4(8/11) + 2(3/11) = 1(8/11) + 10 (3/11) = 38/11
Conclusion
9/11 and 2/11 are the probability that X will play X1 and X2, respectively.
8/11 and 3/11 are the probability that Y will play Y1 and Y2, respectively.
The value of the game is 38/11 for both players and X has more advantages.
PRACTICE 1:
Dominos pizza and Pizza Hut are sharing the pizza market in HCM city. If Dominos pizza does no advertising, it will
not lose any share of the market if Pizza Hut does nothing. It will lose 2% of the market if Pizza Hut invests $10,000 in
advertising, and it will lose 5% of the market if Pizza Hut invests $20,000 in advertising.
On the other hand, if Dominos pizza invests $15,000 in advertising, it will gain 3% of the market if Pizza Hut does
nothing; it will gain 1% of the market if Pizza Hut invests $10,000 in advertising; and it will lose 1% if Pizza Hut
invests $20,000 in advertising.
a. Develop a payoff table/matrix for this game.
b. What are the best strategies for each player?
c. What is the value of the game? Which company has more advantages?
PRACTICE 2:
Mr Hanh has a $1 bill and a $20 bill, and Miss Phuc has a $5 bill and a $10 bill. Each of them will select a bill from the
other one without knowing what bill the other player selected. If the total of the bills selected is odd, Mr Hanh gets both
of the two bills that were selected, but if the total is even, Miss Phuc gets both bills.
a. Develop a payoff table for this game. (Hint: Place the sum of both bills in each cell)
b. What are the best strategies for each player?
c. What is the value of the game? Which player would you like to be?
SOLUTION:
a. Payoff matrix:
Miss Phuc
Select $1 Select $20
Mr Hanh Select $5 -6 25
Select $10 11 -30
• For Mr Hanh
-6P+ 11( 1 - P )= 25P-30(1-P)
--> P =41/72 ,1-P = 31/72
• For Miss Phuc, we have:
-6Q + 25(1 – Q) = 11Q –30(1-Q)
--> Q =55/72 ,1-Q =17/72
PRACTICE 3:
CocaCola and Pepsi Co. are competitors in soft drink products market. They consider investing some money in advertising
campaigns.
• If Cocacola invests $30000 in advertising campaign, it will gain 5% market share if Pepsi does nothing, it will gain 3%
market share if Pepsi invests $15000 in advertisement, and gain 2% market share if Pepsi invests $22000 in advertisement.
• If CoCaCola invests $25000 in advertising campaign, it will gain 4% market share if Pepsi does nothing, it will gain 1%
market share if Pepsi invests $15000 in advertisement, and loss 1% market share if Pepsi invests $22000 in advertisement.
• If Cococala does nothing, it will not loss its market share if Pepsi does nothing, it will loss 3% market share if Pepsi invests
$15000 in advertisement, and loss 4% market share if Pepsi. invests $22000 in advertisement.
(a)Develop a payoff table for this problem.
(b) What are the best strategies for each company using?
(c) What is the value of the game? Which company has more advantages?
a. Payoff matrix:
Pepsi
Do nothing Invest $15,000 Invest $22,000
Cococola Do nothing 0 -3 -4
Invest $25000 4 1 -1
Invest $30,000 5 3 2