Bar Exam 2016 Suggested Answers in Political Law

DECEMBER 27, 2018

BY: The UP LAW COMPLEX

I.

The contents of the vault of ABC Company consisting of cash and documents were stolen. Paulyn, the
treasurer of ABC, was invited by the Makati City Police Department to shed light on the amount of cash
stolen and the details of the missing documents. Paulyn obliged and volunteered the information asked.
Later, Paulyn was charged with qualified theft together with suspects. Paulyn claims her rights under the
Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly violated. The police explained that they were just
gathering evidence when Paulyn was invited for a conference and she was not a suspect at that time.
Rule on her defense. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

No, the defense of Paulyn is not valid. When she was invited for questioning by the Makati City Police
Department and she volunteered information, she was not yet a suspect. Her constitutional rights of a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense under Section 12(1), Article Ill of the
Constitution begins to operate when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry upon an unsolved
crime and begins to be aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and the
questions tend to elicit incriminating statements (People v. Marra, G.R. No. 108494, September 20,
1994, 236 SCRA 565).

II.

Sec. 11, Art. Xll of the Constitution, provides: “No franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associa. tions organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centur of
whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.” Does the term “capital” mentioned in the cited section
refer to the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock, or to both or “separately
to each class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any class of
shares?” Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
The term “capital” mentioned in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total outstanding
capital stock of public utilities. The require. ment that at least sixty percent of the capital must be owned
by Filipino citizens applies separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred, non-voting,
preferred voting, or any class of shares. Mere legal title is not enough. Full beneficial ownership of sixty
percent of the outstanding capital stock is required (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. 176579, June 28, 2011, 652
SCRA 690).

III.

A law converted the component city of Malumanay, Laguna into a highly urbanized city. The Local
Government Code (LGC) provides that the conversion “shall take effect only after it is approved by the
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the political units directly affected.” Before the
COMELEC, Mayor Xenon of Malumanay City insists that only the registered voters of the city should vote
in the plebiscite because the city is the only political unit directly affected by the conversion. Governor
Yuri asserts that all the registered voters of the entire province of Laguna should participate in the
plebiscite, because when the LGC speaks of the “qualified voters therein,” it means all the voters of all
the political units affected by such conversion, and that includes all the voters of the entire province. He
argues that the income, population and area of Laguna will reduce. Who, between Mayor Xenon and
Governor Yuri, is correct? Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Governor Yuri is correct. All the registered voters of the Province of Laguna should be included in the
plebiscite. The conversion of the City of Malumanay into a highly urbanized city will adversely affect the
Province of Laguna and its residents. The territory of the Province of Laguna will be reduced. Its share in
the internal revenue allotment will be reduced, because the population and land area are included as
basis for determining its share. Once the City of Malumanay becomes a highly urbanized city, the
Province of Laguna will no longer share in the taxes collected by the City of Malumanay. The City of
Malumanay will be under the supervision of the President instead of the Province of Laguna. Decisions
of the City of Malumanay in administrative cases involving barangay officials will no longer be
appealable to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The registered voters of the City of Malumanay will no
longer be entitled to vote for provincial officials. To limit the plebiscite to the voters of the City of
Malumanay would nullify the principle of majority rule (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
203974. April 22, 2014,723 SCRA 170).

IV.
 

Several concerned residents of the areas fronting Manila Bay, among them a group of students who are
minors, filed a suit against the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Education (DepEd), the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), and a number of other executive agencies, asking the court to order them to
perform their duties relating to the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection of Manila Bay. The complaint
alleges that the continued neglect by defendants and their failure to prevent and abate pollution in
Manila Bay constitute a violation of the petitioners’ constitutional right to life, health and a balanced
ecology.

(A) If the defendants assert that the students/petitioners who are minors

do not have locus standi to file the action, is the assertion correct? Explain your answer. (2.5%)

(B) In its decision which attained finality, the Court ordered the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate and
sanitize Manila Bay within eighteen (18) months, and to submit to the Court periodic reports of their
accomplishment, so that the Court can monitor and oversee the activities undertaken by the agencies in
compliance with the Court’s directives. Subsequently, a resolution was issued extending the time
periods within which the agencies should comply with the directives covered by the final decision. A
view was raised that the Court’s continued intervention after the cases has been decided violates the
doctrine of separation of powers considering that the government agencies all belong to the Executive
Department and are under the control of the President. Is this contention correct? Why or why not?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) The assertion that the students/petitioners who are minors have no locus standi is erroneous.
Pursuant to the obligation of the State under Section 16, Article ll of the Constitution to protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature, minors have standing to sue based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility (Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792).

(B) The order of the Supreme Court to the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate and sanitize Manila Bay is
an exercise of judicial power, because the execution of its decision is an integral part of its adjudicative
function. Since the submission of periodic reports is needed to fully implement the decision, the
Supreme Court can issue a continuing writ of mandamus to the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority until full compliance with its order is shown (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90).

V.

Section 8 of P.D. No. 910, entitled “Creating an Energy Development Board, defining its powers and
functions, providing funds therefor and for other purposes,” provides that: “All fees, revenues and
receipts of the Board from any and all sources x x x shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.”

The Malampaya NGO contends that the provision constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” gives the
President unbridled discretion to determine the purpose for which the funds will be used. On the other
hand, the government urges the application of ejusdem generis.

(A) Explain the “completeness test” and “sufficient standard test.” (2.5%)

(B) Does the assailed portion of section 8 of PD 910 hurdle the two (2) tests? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) The completeness test means that the law sets forth the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, October 18, 2005,
469 SCRA 1). The “sufficient standard test” means the law lays down adequate guidelines or limitations
to map out the boundaries of the authority of the delegate and prevent the delegate from running riot.
The standard must specify the limits of the authority of the delegate, announce the legislative policy and
identify the condition under which it is to be implemented (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No.
168056, October 18, 2005, 469 SCRA 1).

(B) The assailed portion of Presidential Decree No. 910 does not satisfy the two tests. The phrase “and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” gives the President unbridled
discretion to determine the purpose for which the funds will be used. An infrastructure is any basic
facility needed by society. The power to determine what kind of infrastructure to prioritize and fund is a
power to determine the purpose of the appropriation and is an undue delegation of the power to
appropriate (Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1).

 
The assailed provision does not fail under the principle of ejusdem generis. First, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government states a singular and
general class. Second, it exhausts the class it represents (Belgica v Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1).

VI.

Pornographic materials in the form of tabloids, magazines and other printed materials, proliferate and
are being sold openly in the streets of Masaya City. The city Mayor organized a task force which
confiscated these materials. He then ordered that the materials be burned in public. Dominador,
publisher of the magazine, “Plaything”, filed a suit, raising the following constitutional issues: (a) the
confiscation of the materials constituted an illegal search and seizure, because the same was done
without a valid search warrant; and (b) the confiscation, as well as the proposed destruction of the
materials, is a denial of the right to disseminate information, and thus, violates the constitutional right
to freedom of expression. Is either or both contentions proper? Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(a) The confiscation of the materials constituted an illegal search and seizure, because it was done
without a valid search warrant. It cannot be justified as a valid warrantless search and seizure, because
such search and seizure must have been an incident of a lawful arrest. There was no lawful arrest (Pita v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 362).

(b) The argument of Dominador that pornographic materials are

protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression is erroneous. Obscenity is not protected
expression (Fernando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 351). Section 2
of Presidential Decree No. 969 requires the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
(Nograles v. People, G.R. No. 191080, November 21, 2011, 660 SCRA 475).

VII.

Ernesto, a minor, while driving a motor vehicle, was stopped at a mobile checkpoint. Noticing that
Ernesto is a minor, SPO1 Jojo asked Ernesto to exhibit his driver’s license but Ernesto failed to produce
it. SPO1 Jojo requested Ernesto to alight from the vehicle and the latter acceded. Upon observing a
bulge in the pants of Ernesto, the policeman frisked him and found an unlicensed .22-caliber pistol
inside Ernesto’s right pocket. Ernesto was arrested, detained and charged. At the trial, Ernesto, through
his lawyer, argued that, policemen at mobile checkpoints are empowered to conduct nothing more than
a “visual search”. They cannot order the persons riding the vehicle to alight. They cannot frisk, or
conduct a body search of the driver or the passengers of the vehicle.

Ernesto’s lawyer thus posited that:

(A) The search conducted in violation of the Constitution and established jurisprudence was an illegal
search; thus, the gun which was seized in the course of an illegal search is the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” and is inadmissible in evidence. (2.5%)

(B) The arrest made as a consequence of the invalid search was likewise

illegal, because an unlawful act (the search) cannot be made the basis of a lawful arrest. (2.5%)

Rule on the correctness of the foregoing arguments, with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) The warrantless search of motor vehicles at checkpoints should be

limited to a visual search. Its occupants should not be subjected to a body search (Aniag, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 424). The “stop and frisk rule”
applies when a police officer observes suspicious activity or unusual activity which may lead him to
believe that a criminal act may be afoot. The “stop and frisk” is merely a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 421),

(B) Since there was no valid warrantless search, the warrantless search was also illegal. The
unlicensed .22 caliber pistol is inadmissible in evidence (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29,
2012, 667 SCRA 421).

VIII.

A law is passed intended to protect women and children from all forms of violence. When a woman
perceives an act to be an act of violence or a threat of violence against her, she may apply for a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO) to be issued by the Barangay Chairman, which shall have the force and
effect of law. Conrado, against whom a BPO had been issued on petition of his wife, went to court to
challenge the constitutionality of the law. He raises the following grounds:

(A) The law violates the equal protection clause, because while it extends protection to women who
may be victims of violence by their husbands, it does not extend the same protection to husbands who
may be battered by their wives. (2.5%)

(B) The grant of authority to the Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection Order (BPO)
constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power, because obviously, the issuance of the BPO entails
the exercise of judicial power. (2.5%)

Rule on the validity of the grounds raised by Conrado, with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is based on substantial distinctions. The
unequal power relationship between women and men, the greater likelihood for women than men to be
victims of violence, and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352).

(B) The grant of authority to the Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay

Protection Order is a purely executive function pursuant to his duty to enforce all laws and ordinances
and to maintain public order (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013,599 SCRA 352).

IX

The Government, through Secretary Toogoody of the Department of Transportation (DOTr), filed a
complaint for eminent domain to acquire a 1,000-hectare property in Bulacan, owned by Baldomero.
The court granted the expropriation, fixed the amount of just compensation, and installed the
Government in full possession of the property.

 
(A) If the Government does not immediately pay the amount fixed by the court as just compensation,
can Baldomero successfully demand the return of the property to him? Explain your answer. (2.5%)

(B) If the Government paid full compensation but after two years it abandoned its plan to build an
airport on the property, can Baldomero compel the Government to re-sell the property back to him?
Explain your answer. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) If the government does not pay Baldomero the just compensation

immediately, he cannot demand the return of the property to him. Instead, legal interest should be paid
from the time of taking of the property until actual payment in full (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611).

(B) With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property for
the purpose stated in the petition. If not, it is incumbent upon it to return the property to the owner, if
the owner desires to reacquire it. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation will lack the element of
public use. The owner will be denied due process and the judgment will violate his right to justice
(Mactan-Cebu Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010, 613 SCRA 618). If the
just compensation was not paid within 5 years from finality of judgment, the owner is entitled to
recover the property (Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 265).

X.

The Philippines entered into an international agreement with members of the international community
creating the International Economic Organization (IEO) which will serve as a forum to address economic
issues between States, create standards, encourage greater volume of trade between its members, and
settle economic disputes. After the Philippine President signed the agreement, the Philippine Senate
demanded that the international agreement be submitted to it for its ratification. The President refused,
arguing that it is an executive agreement that merely created an international organization and it dwells
mainly on addressing economic issues among States.

 
Is the international agreement creating the IEO a treaty or an executive agreement? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The agreement creating the International Economic Organization (IEC) is an executive agreement and
not a treaty. In Section 21, Article VIl is the only provision of the Constitution which defines a “treaty or
international agreement” as valid and effective law by reason of concurrence of the Senate. However, it
is the intendment of the Constitution that such “treaty or international agreement” does not include
executive agreement which therefore is excluded from the Senate’s authority of concurrence over
treaties.

This constitutional intent is expressed in the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission in its
awareness that at the time the power of the President to conclude executive agreement was clearly
recognized by at least decisions of the Supreme Court establishing the principle that the President’s
power includes conclusion of executive agreements which are valid without need of Senate
concurrence. Hence, logically the Treaty Clause in Section 21, Article VII is to be interpreted as excluding
executive agreement (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, October 31,
1961, 3 SCRA 351; USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, G.R. No. L-10500, June 30, 1959, 105 Phil.
1030).

Moreover, as the Supreme Court has pointed out in Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622), the President has the sole power to ratify treaties. The Senate
may be able to exercise its authority of concurrence only if the President transmits the instrument of
ratification by which he accepts the terms agreed on by his diplomatic negotiators of the proposed
treaty in question, together with the text of the proposed treaty, with the request addressed to the
Senate President to ratify such proposed treaty as requested by the President. It is only on the basis of
the authority of the President to ratify treaties that the Senate may act in concurrence under the Treaty
clause of the Constitution.

XI.

The USS Liberty, a warship of the United States (U.S.), entered Philippine archipelagic waters on its way
to Australia. Because of the negligence of the naval officials on board, the vessel ran aground off the
island of Palawan, damaging coral reefs and other marine resources in the area. Officials of Palawan filed
a suit for damages against the naval officials for their negligence, and against the U.S., based on Articles
30 and 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 31 provides that
the Flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the Coastal State resulting
from noncompliance by a warship with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea. The U.S. Government raised the defenses that:

 
(A) The Philippine courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign State, including its warship
and naval officials. (2.5%).

(B) The United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS and thus cannot be bound by its provisions. (2.5%)

Rule on the validity of the defenses raised by the U.S., with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The defenses raised by the U.S. Government are not valid.

(A) This defense relies on sovereign immunity from suit as advanced by the U.S. Government. But the
suit filed by the Officials of Palawan draws its strength from Article 30 and 31 of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

However, the U.S. defense is defeated by the UNCLOS through the application of Article 32 which
provides:

“With such exceptions as are contained in sub-section A and in Articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. (emphasis added]”

In reality the supreme relevance of Article 32 quoted above is actualized by quoting an existing U.S.
government document sourced from Dispatch Supplement, Law of the Sea Convention: Letters of
Transmittal and Submittal and Commentary, as follows:

“Article 32 provides, in effect that the only rules in the Convention derogating from the immunities of
warships and government ships operated for non-government purposes are those found in Articles 17-
26, 30 and 31 (February 1995, Vol. 6, Supplement No. 1 p. 12).

(8) The U.S. Government turns to the defense that it is not bound by the UNCLOS for the reason that it is
not a State Party or a signatory.

However, to be bound by the principle, it does not have to be a party to a treaty or convention. If it has
the normative status of a customary norm of international law, it is binding on all states. This appears to
be the holding of the principle of immunity of warship in question, as upheld by the U.S.

Government in the document cited above (Ibid., at p. 17). It states from the UNCLOS, thus:

The Convention protects and strengthens the key principle of sovereign immunity for war-ships…
Although not a new concept, sovereign immunity is a principle or of vital importance to the United
States. The Convention provides for a universally recognized formulation of this principle… Article 32
provides that, with such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in Articles 30 and 31… nothing
in the Convention affects the immunities of warships…

XII.

Paragraphs c, d and f of Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165 provide:

“Sec. 36. Authorized drug testing. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: X X X C.
Students of secondary and tertiary schools x x x; d. Officers and employees of public and private offices x
x x;

All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day;”

Petitioners contend that the assailed portions of Sec. 36 are unconstitutional for violating the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the equal protection clause. Decide if
the assailed provisions are unconstitutional. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The drug testing of students of secondary and tertiary schools is valid. Deterring their use of drugs by
random drug testing is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement.

Random drug testing of officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable. Their
expectation of privacy in office is reduced. The drug tests and results are kept confidential. Random drug
testing is a effective way of deterring drug use and is reasonable.

Public officials and employees are required by the Constitution to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

The mandatory testing of all persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a criminal offense
punishable with imprisonment of at least six years and one day is void. They are not randomly picked
and are not beyond suspicions. They do not consent to the procedure or waive their right to privacy
(Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 & 161658, November 3,
2008, 570 SCRA 410).

 
XIII

While Congress was not in session, the President appointed Antero as Secretary of the Department of
Tourism (DOT), Benito as Commissioner the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Clodualdo as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), and
Emmanuel as Philippine Ambassador to Cameroon. The following day, all the appointees took their oath
before the President, and commenced to perform the functions of their respective offices.

(A) Characterize the appointments, whether permanent or temporary; and whether regular or interim,
with reasons. (2.5%).

(B) A civil society group, the Volunteers Against Misguided Politics (VAMP), files suit, contesting the
legality of the acts of the appointees and claiming that the appointees should not have entered into the
performance of the functions of their respective offices, because their appointments had not yet been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Is this claim of VAMP correct? Why or why not? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A)

1.The appointment of Antero as Secretary of Tourism is ad interim, because it is subject to confirmation

of the Commission on Appointments and was made while Congress was not in session. He can start
performing his duties upon his acceptance, because it is permanent and cannot be withdrawn after its
acceptance (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2. 2002, 380 SCRA 49).

2. The appointment of Benito as Commissioner of the Bureau of

Immigration is regular and permanent. It is not required to be confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments. He can start performing his duties upon acceptance of the appointment (Section 16,
Article Vll of the Constitution).

3. The appointment of Clodualdo as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission is ad interim,

because it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and was made while
Congress was not in session. He can start performing his duties upon his acceptance of the
appointment, because it is permanent and cannot be withdrawn.

 
 4. The appointment of Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is regular and
permanent upon his acceptance. It is not required to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. He can start performing his duties upon his acceptance (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R.
No. 86439, April 13, 1989, 172 SCRA 160).

5. The appointment of Emmanuel as Ambassador to Cameroon is ad interim, because it is subject

to confirmation by the Commission on Appointment (Section 16, Article Vll of the Constitution).

(B) The claim of VAMP is not correct. The Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and the Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights can immediately start performing their functions upon acceptance
since they are not required to be confirmed. The Secretary of the Department of Tourism and the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, can immediately start performing their duties upon
acceptance, since their ad interim appointment is permanent.

XIV.

Onofre, a natural born Filipino citizen, arrived in the United States in 1985. in 1990, he married
Salvacion, a Mexican, and together they applied for and obtained American citizenship in 2001. In 2015,
the couple and their children-Alfred, 21 years of age, Robert, 16, and Marie, 14, who were all worn in
the U.S.-returned to the Philippines on June 1, 2015, informed that he could reacquire Philippine
citizenship without losing his American citizenship, Onofre went home to the Philippines and took the
oath of allegiance prescribed under R.A. No. 9225. On October 28, 2015, he filed Certificate of Candidacy
to run in the May 9, 2016 elections for the position of Congressman in his home province of Palawan,
running against re-electionist Congressman Profundo.

(A) Did Onofre’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship benefit his wife, Salvacion, and their minor
children and confer upon them Filipino citizenship? Explain your answer. (2.5%)

(B) Before the May 9, 2016 elections, Profundo’s lawyer filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy against Onofre. What grounds can he raise in his Petition to support it?
Explain your answer. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by Onofre did not automatically make his American wife,
Salvacion, a Filipino citizen. Nowhere does Republic Act No. 9228 provide that the foreign wife of a
former Filipino citizen who reacquired his Filipino citizenship will automatically become a Filipino citizen.

Robert, who is 16 years old, and Marie, who is 14 years old, also became Filipino citizens. The unmarried
children below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship are also deemed
citizens of the Philippines (Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9225).

(B) The lawyer of Congressman Profundo can ask for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy on
the ground that he did not execute an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship as required by
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 and he lacked one-year residence in the Philippines as required by
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

XV

Congress passed a bill appropriating P100-billion. Part of the money is to be used for the purchase of a
200-hectare property in Antipolo. The rest shall be spent for the development of the area and the
construction of the Universal Temple for all the World’s Faiths (UTAW-F). When completed, the site will
be open, free of charge, to all religions, beliefs, and faiths, where each devotee or believer shall be
accommodated and treated in a fair and equal manner, without distinction, favor, or prejudice. There
will also be individual segments or zones in the area which can be used for the conduct of whatever
rituals, services, sacraments, or ceremonials that may be required by the customs or practices of each
particular religion. The President approved the bill, happy in the thought that this could start the healing
process of our wounded country and encourage people of varied and often conflicting faiths to live
together in harmony and in peace.

If the law is questioned in the ground that it violates Sec. 5, Article Il of the Constitution that “no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” how will
you resolve the challenge? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The contention must be rejected. The use of the site temple will not be limited a particular religious
sect. It will be made available to all religious sects. The temporary use of public property for religious
purposes without discrimination does not violate the Constitution (Ignacio v. De la Cruz, No. L-6858, May
31, 1956, 99 Phil. 346; People v. Fernandez, 40 O.G. 1089 [1956]).

 
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER

The contention is meritorious. The state cannot pass laws which aid one religion, all religions, or prefer
one religion over another (Emerson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.A. 1[1947]).