SEMANTICS AND NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION by A. Thiselton

CHAPTER IV
SEMANTICS AND NEW TESTAMENT

INTERPRETATION
Anthony C. Thiselton
I. Semantics and Theories of Meaning
1. INTRODUCTION
Semantics is the study of meanings; but not simply the meanings of

words. What is at issue is the varied meanings and kinds of meaning which
belong both to words and to sentences as they occur within a context that is
both linguistic and extra-linguistic. John Lyons comments in his Structural
Semantics. "Any meaningful linguistic unit, up to and including the com-
plete utterance, has meaning in context. The context of the utterance is the
situation in which it occurs ... The concept of 'situation' is fundamental for
semantic statement ... Situation must be given equal weight with linguistic
form in semantic theory". I It will be seen that this is not very far from the
traditional concerns of New Testament exegesis, in which the aim is to dis-
cover and interpret the meaning of an utterance in relation to its historical
and literary context. Semantics, however, also raises explicit questions about
such issues as synonymy, multiple meaning, types of semantic opposition,
kinds and degrees of vagueness and ambiguity, change of meaning,
cognitive and emotive factors in meaning, and so on.
The relevance of semantics to biblical interpretation was demonstrated
for the first time, but demonstrated decisively, with the publication in 1961
of James Barr's epoch-making book The Semantics of Biblical Language.
Since that time there have been other attempts to apply principles of seman-
tics, or at least ofiinguistics, to biblical interpretation, including most recent-
ly the very different approaches of Erhardt Giittgemanns, Rene Kieffer,
John Sawyer and K. L. Burres. 2 Although the study of semantics can be
approached from the side of philosophy as well as linguistics, James Barr
and in practice all these writers draw their in sights exclusively from
linguistics. Indeed the claim which will be put forward here is that in spite of
his obvious knowledge of more recent writers, the fundamental inspiration
behind Barr's contribution is the figure of Ferdinand de Saussure whose
famous Cours de linguis/ique genera le was published posthumously in
1915. Apart from some brief attempts by the present writer, perhaps the
only studies, to date, to draw on more philosophical work in the service of
75
NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION
biblical interpretation are those of D. D. Evans and, less directly, O. R.

Jones. )
If semantics is so important to New Testament interpretation, why have
we had to wait until after 1961 for its insights and potentialities to become
apparent? Either, it seems, the exegete can manage very well with only his
traditional questions about vocabulary and grammar; or else, it seems, some
convincing explanation is needed of why biblical scholars have been slow to
avail themselves of its insights.
2. THE INHIBITING EFFECTS OF TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT

LANGUAGE
Part of the answer to this question is suggested by Stephen Ullmann's

description of semantics as "the youngest branch of modern linguistics", "
The earliest hints of a fully modern semantics came towards the end of the
nineteenth century with the work of Arsene Darmesteter and more especial-
ly Michel Breal. 5 Semantic study at this period, however, was seriously
hampered by a number of mistaken assumptions, some of which still find
their way into the outlook of some interpreters of the New Testament even
today.
These false assumptions include the following:
(1) that the word. rather than the sentence or speech-act. constitutes the
basic unit of meaning to be investigated; 6 (2) that questions about
etymology somehow relate to the real or "basic" meaning of a word; (3) that
language has a relation to the world which is other than conventional. and
that its "rules" may therefore be prescriptive rather than merely descriptive;
(4) that logical and grammatical structure are basically similar or even
isomorphic; (5) that meaning always turns on the relation between a word
and the object to which it refers; (6) that the basic kind of language-use to
be investigated (other than words themselves) is the declarative proposition
or statement; and (7) that language is an externalization. sometimes a mere-
ly imitative and approximate externalization, of inner concepts or ideas.
Commenting only on three of these assumptions, Max Black writes, "Until
comparatively recently the prevailing conception of the nature of language
was straightforward and simple. It stressed communication of thought to the
neglect of feeling and attitude, emphasized words rather than speech-acts in
context, and assumed a sharp contrast between thought and its symbolic
expression.,,7 While such assumptions held sway, semantic enquiries could
not advance beyond an elementary point.
An especially disastrous assumption for semantics was logico-gram-
matical parallelism. s When interest grew in eighteenth and nineteenth-cen-
tury linguistics in the relation between language-structure and national
character, the effects of this error were particularly unfortunate. Supposed
differences of conceptual thought were based on arbitrary differences of
grammar.
The influence of such a view persists in biblical studies in a work such as
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SEMANTICS AND NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION
T Boman's Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, and we shall trace

~me of the ways in which J ames Barr rightly criticizes it. On the other
~and, once we recognize that 10gica.1 fun~tion, or meaning, !s not wh~lIy
determined by grammar, huge questIOns m New Testament mterpretatlOn
are opened up. Is Bultmann correct in claiming, for example, that what
looks like an objective declarative statement, "God will judge men at the last
day", really means an imperative: "act responsibly in the present ... "? Cer-
tainly in every-day speech I may use an indicative to function as an im-
perative: If I exclaim, "This is poison", I may. be making a .declara~ive
descriptive statement. But I may also be uttenng an urgent Imperative,
"Quick! Fetch a doctor"; or giving a warning, "Look out! Don't drink this";
or even uttering a reproach, "You forgot to put sugar into my coffee." Y The
meaning of the words depends on their setting or non-linguistic situation.
even more than upon grammar. Yet on the basis of the traditional view,
"this is poison" is simply a statement, for "is" is a third person singular pre-
sent indicative form in grammar.
The traditional view received two death-blows, one from linguistics and
one from philosophy. From the direction of linguistics, Saussure pointed out
the arbitrary character of grammatical forms. ID More sharply and decisively
still, in his philosophical discussion of logic Russell showed in his Theory of
Descriptions that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be
the real one." 11 Denoting phrases such as "the present king of France" or
"the author of Waverley" cannot be reduced to simple referring expressions.
"Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves." 12 The linguistic
form "a round square does not exist" does not logically make an assertion
about some non-existent entity called a round square; it is a negation of the
statement, "an x exists which is such that 'round' and 'square' can be
predicated of it simultaneously." The linguistic form of the expression con-
ceals its logical function. But once this principle is accepted, the New Testa-
ment interpreter should be extremely cautious about making too much of
such maxims as "this word is in the indicative, therefore it is a statement";
or "this verb is an imperative, therefore it expresses a command." Whether
it is a command depends on the whole context and situation in which it is
uttered. Thus, we shall be cautious about reading too much into the fact
that, for example, an imperative or an indicative features in a particular
verse. In Phi\' 3: 1 and 4 :4, for instance, "rejoice in the Lord" (xatet:7:E EV
ICve1q» is admittedly a second person plural present imperative. On this basis
Karl Barth writes that rejoicing "must" take place, because it is "expressed
as an imperative", and W. Hendriksen insists that we are bidden "to rejoice
in obedience to a command ".13 But, firstly, it is possible that Xatent: IS a
form of greeting, which is no more a command than "how do you do?" is a
question. On the basis of grammar, one can imagine an exegete interpreting
"~ow do you do?" as a call to self-examination! When Judas greets Jesus
With a betraying kiss in Mt. 26:49, Xaiet: means simply "hello", and certain-
ly not "rejoice". In Phi\' 3:1 and 4:4 F. W. Beare translates the word
"Farewell".14 Secondly, even if we Insist, after examining the historical and
77
literary setting (which Barth and Hendriksen fail to do), that xat(!eu: still
means "rejoice", the fact that it occurs in the imperative is no guarantee that
it must be understood as a "command". If I cry "Help!" in the imperative,
or "Lord, save me", this is a plea; if someone tells me, "enjoy yourself', but
in the end I spend a miserable afternoon, this need not be "disobedience to a
command".
The task of Bible translation also reveals the utter impossibility of remain-
ing wedded to the idea of logico-grammatical parallelism. In I John 2 :26, for
example, the writer states "I have written this to you (mum ey(!mpa v}itv)
concerning those who would mislead you." But ey(!mpa, although it is an "in-
dicative" (I have written) does not serve primarily to describe the action of
writing here; it in fact signals the end of a topic. So the New English Bible
sensibly renders it, "So much for those who would mislead you."
In Bible translation, the rejection of logico-grammatical parallelism stems
not only from structural linguistics (discussed in 11.2), and from a recogni-
tion of the conventionality of grammatical form (discussed in II.3), but also
from the influence of Noam Chomsky's type of "transformational"
generative grammar (discussed in Ill). Eugene A. Nida and William L.
WonderIy accept the principle of transformation in terms of "kernef'
sentences as an axiom of Bible translation. 15 Thus the complex R. S. V.
sentence in Eph. 1:7 "... we have redemption through his blood, the
forgiveness of our trespasses" is analyzed into four "kernel" sentences: (1)
(God) redeems us; (2) (Christ) died (or shed his blood); (3) (God) forgives
(us); and (4) we sinned. The "quasi-kernel" structure is now: "we sinned.
But Christ died; therefore God redeems us and he forgives us." Today's
English Version then renders this: "by the death of Christ we are set free,
and our sins are forgiven"; whilst the New English Bible has: "in Christ our
release is secured and our sins are forgiven through the shedding of his
blood." Neither grammatical structure follows the Greek at all closely.
Whether such a handling of the text is justified cannot be determined
without carefully examining the issues which are discussed in the remainder
of this essay.
3. WORDS AND MEANINGS
Genuine advances in semantics were decisively inhibited all the while the
word was viewed as the basic unit of meaning. But in some types of exegesis
the assumption still lurks in the background that words are the basic carriers
of meaning, whilst sentences convey the exact sum of the semantic values of
their verbal components. A virtue is made out of the method of moving over
a text "word by word". Side by side with this is often the assumption that
exhaustive interpretation must proceed by way of analysis, atomizing
language into ever-smaller and smaller units. Such an approach may seem
to be connected with a theory of "verbal" inspiration, but is in reality based,
rather, on ignorance about the nature of language. As Saussure has shown
decisively in one way, and Wittgenstein decisively in another, the meaning
78
of a word depends not on what it is in itself, but on its relation to other

words and to other sentences which form its context. Dictionary-entries
about words are rule-of-thumb generalizations based on assumptions about
characteristic contexts. Admittedly these comments will be qualified in due
course; for words do indeed possess a stable core of meaning without whicr.
lexicography would be impossible, and there is also a legitimate place for
word-study. Nevertheless, the most urgent priority is to point out the fallacy
of an atomizing exegesis which pays insufficient attention to context.
This should heighten our appreciation of the value of all technical work in
biblical studies which seeks to shed light on the historical and literary con-
texts of utterances. In a valuable article John F. A. Sawyer compares the
emphasis placed on "context of situation" in linguistics with the account
taken of situation, setting, or Sitz im Leben in form criticism. 16 Indeed he
goes as far as to claim, "The relation between Gattung and Sitz im Leben in
Old Testament literary theory is potentially more important for semantic
theory (my italics) than a number of situational theories put forward by the
professional linguistician from Bloomfield to Firth." 17 Thus the necessity
and value of standard techniques in New Testament studies is not simply a
question which can be decided on theological grounds alone. Because bibli-
cal language as language can only be understood with reference to its con-
text and extra-linguistic situation, attention to the kind of question raised in
critical study of the text is seen to be necessary on purely linguistic grounds.
To try to cut loose "propositions" in the New Testament from the specific
situation in which they were uttered and to try thereby to treat them
"timelessly" is not only bad theology; it is also bad linguistics. For it leads
to a distortion of what the text means. This point will emerge with fuller
force when we look at the structural approach of Ferdinand de Saussure
(below, 11.2).
There are also other inbuilt limitations in the traditional approach te'
language. For example, a persistent pre-occupation with descriptive asser-
tions or "propositions" tends to flatten out the distinctive contributions of
biblical poetry, metaphor, parable, and apocalyptic, reducing it all to the
level of discursive "units of information". A consideration of the issues dis-
cussed in the remainder of this essay, however, will show that a
"mechanical" emphasis on verbal and propositional forms is not only pre-
critical in terms of Biblical studies, it is also obsolete in terms of semantics.
violating virtually every modern insight into the nature of meanings.
H. Some Fundamental Principles in Saussure and Modern Linguistics and

their place in the work of lames Barr
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) is rightly regarded as the founder of
modern linguistics. He viewed language as a social and structured system.
t~ereby preparing the way for a structural semantics. We may trace the out-
hnes of his thought under four headings: (1) the contrast between syn-
chronic and diachronic methods of language-study; (2) the structural ap-
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NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETA nON
proach to language; (3) the connexion between structuralism and conven-

tionality, with its implications about the relation between language and
thought; and (4) the basic contrast between langue, the language system,
and parole, actual speech. All four principles are fundamental for semantics,
and three, at least, feature prominently in the work of James Barr.
1. SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE
By "diachronic" linguistics Saussure means the study of language from

the point of view of its historical evolution over a period of time. By
"synchronic" linguistics he means "the relations of co-existing things ...
from which the intervention of time is excluded... the science of
language-states (hats de langue) ... Synchrony and diachrony designate
respectively a language-state and an evolutionary phase." I~ Saussure's point
is not, as is occasionally thought, that one of these methods is right and the
other wrong, but that the two methods are fundamentally different, and per-
form different tasks. Certainly of the two, synchronic linguistics has priority
both in importance and in sequence of application. But as long as the two
methods are kept distinct, each has its own role to play.
During the nineteenth century comparative philology had become the
centre of interest in lingUistics, and much energy went to the formulation of
laws of development, such as Grimm's law and Verner's law, which could
account for the phenomena of language-change in terms of general scientific
principles.
It is against this background that Ferdinand de Saussure voiced his
protest, "The linguist who wishes to understand a state (etat de langue) must
discard all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony.
He can enter the mind of the speakers only by completely suppressing the
past.,,14 Saussure illustrates the principle from chess. To understand the
state of a game it is unnecessary and irrelevant to know how the players
arrived at it. A chess problem is simply set out by describing the state of the
board.
During the years between Saussure and Barr, the priority of synchronic
description became a fundamental and universally accepted principle in
semantics; and the distinction between synchronic and diachronic perspec-
tives has become an axiom in linguistics. 20 In particular this principle strikes
at etymologizing in semantics. Many writers, including a number of biblical
scholars, believe that the etymological meaning of a word is somehow its
"basic" or "proper" meaning. As James Barr comments, "We hear from
time to time that 'history' 'properly' means 'investigation' (Greek tuwqia) or
that 'person' 'basically' means 'mask' (Latin persona)." 21
But can an etymological meaning based on diachronic investigation, or
even inference, concerning the long distant past be the "real" meaning of a
word from the point of view of synchronic enquiry? The English word
"nice" is said to be derived from the Latin nescius, ignorant. Is "ignorant"
the "basic" meaning of "nice"? When Englishmen say "Good-bye" do they
80
"properly" mean "God be with you"? "Hussy" is etymologically a doublet

of "housewife", but can it be said on this basis that if I were to call someone
a hussy I "properly" meant only "housewife"? 22 As James Barr rightly
asserts, "The main point is that the etymology of a word is not a statement
about its meaning but about its history." 2J Hundreds of words diverge from
or even (like "nice") oppose their etymology.
We may admit that in lexicography, etymological considerations may oc-
casionally be of value, as, for example, in cases of homonymy, when two
distinct words of different meanings have the same lexical form. But biblical
scholars have not been content to restrict their study of etymology to such
cases. As a general principle Edmond Jacob declares, "The first task of the
Hebraist in the presence of a word is to recover the original meaning from
which others were derived.,,24 The very arrangement of the Hebrew lexicon
of Brown, Driver, a:1d Briggs may seem to encourage such a procedure.
Some writers, says J. Barr, have even interpreted the word "holy" in terms
of an English etymology. Contrary to actual usage in Hebrew and Greek,
they take its "basic" meaning to be that of "healthy" or "sound". But in
practice, Barr insists, this is only "a kind of opportunist homiletic trick"
whereby "holy" may be thought to lose some of its less attractive and more
challenging features. 25 Norman Snaith certainly goes to the Hebrew, rather
than to the English, for the meaning of "Blessed is the man ... " in Psalm
1: 1. But he claims that "happiness of" or "blessed" is related by etymology
to' the idea of "footstep", or "going straight ahead". Hence, supposedly,
"this shows how apt is the use of the first word ... The happy man is the
man who goes straight ahead." Barr observes, "There is not the slightest
evidence that these associations were in the mind of the poet, and indeed
some of them were almost certainly unknown and unknowable to him." 2"
When we come specifically to the New Testament, it will be seen that it
can be seriously misleading to base the meanings of words on their use in
Plato or i:1 Homer, let alone on their etymologies. For example, it is
sometimes suggested. as Barr points out, that AflTOV!?yta "means" a work
(E!?YOV) performed by the people (Aaac;) perhaps through a priestly or kingly
representative. But at least by the time of Aristotle the word had simply
become a generalized one for any kind of "service" or "function". 27
Sometimes interpreters seek to read too much into a dead metaphor. Thus
"to show compassion" (OJTAayxvl(oflal) is said to be a matter of one's inner-
most being, since OJrAQyxva means "internal organs". But the metaphor is no
longer any more a live force than when we speak of "losing heart". Similar-
ly, it is sometimes claimed that U:TlT)eTT)C; in 1 Cor. 4: 1 "literally" means the
under-rower (U:TlO + }!?e~aw) of a ship.28 But the word has become a dead
metaphor meaning simply "servant" or "assistant"; no more than
"dandelion" "literally" means dent de lion or "lion's tooth". Occasionally
someone even uses diachronic investigation in a way that leads to sheer
anachronism, as when we are told that "witness" (pa!?TV!?lOv) means "mar-
tyrdom"; or, worse still, that livvafll<; in the New Testament "properly"
means "dynamite"!
81
Neither Saussure nor Barr rules out diachronic linguistics as illegitimate.

Indeed it may be helpful to use diachronic study to demonstrate that the
meaning of a Greek word has changed in between Plato and the New Testa-
ment. It is proper to trace the historical evolution of a term and its changing
semantic value, provided that two factors are borne in mind: firstly, that
synchronic description is the pre-requisite of diachronic study at every
separate stage; secondly, that adequate attention is paid to the phenomenon
of semantic change. David Crystal sums up the point made by Saussure:
"Both are subjects in themselves, with different procedures of study and
largely different aims. Neither excludes the other ... But ... a synchronic
description is pre-requisite for a proper diachronic study." 2Y
2. THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO LANGUAGE
In his introduction to the English edition of Saussure's work, W. Baskin,

his translator, comments, "Saussure was among the first to see that
language is a self-contained system whose interdependent parts function and
acquire value through their relationship to the whole." 30 In Saussure's own
words, "Language is a system of interdependent terms (les termes sont
solidaires) in which the value (la valeur) of each term results solely from the
simultaneous presence of the others." 31 He adds, "Within the same
language, all words used to express related ideas limit each other reciprocal-
ly ... The value (la valeur) of just any term is accordingly determined by its
environment."]2 Words or other linguistic signs have no "force", validity,
or meaning, independently of the relations of equivalence and contrast
which hold between them.
Once again Saussure illustrates the point with reference to chess. The
"value" of a given piece depends on its place within the whole system.
Depending on the state of the whole board when one piece is moved.
resulting changes of value will be either nil, very serious, or of average im-
portance. A certain move can revolutionize the whole game, i.e. radically
affect the value of all the other pieces. "Exactly the same holds for
language." 33
This brings us to a major pair of categories which are fundamental and
central in modern linguistics, namely to syntagmatic and paradigmatic
relations. A linguistic unit, Saussure pointed out, is related to the rest of the
system within which it functions in two distinct ways. Firstly, it has a linear
relationship with other words or units with which it is chained together.
"Combinations supported by linearity are syntagms." 34 In the phrase "a
crown of thorns", the word "crown" stands in syntagmatic relationship to
"a" and "of thorns"; just as in the phrase "God is righteous", "righteous"
has a syntagmatic relation to "God is". From a semantic viewpoint, if ""eat"
stands in syntagmatic relationship to "bread", "meat" and "cheese" but not
to "water", "tea" or "beer", this contributes to establishing its meaning, as
the ingestion of solid food.
The paradigmatic relation was called by Saussure an associative relation .
82
although writers in linguistics prefer the former term. This is the relation
between a word or linguistic unit and another such unit which is not present
in the actual utterance, but which might have been chosen in its place. In the
phrase "a crown of thorns" the words "laurel" or "gold" could have been
slotted in, in place of "thorns". Thus "thorns" stands in a paradigmatic rela-
tion to "laurel", "gold", "silver", and so on. In "God is righteous", the word
"righteous" stands in paradigmatic relation to "good", or "merciful". This
principle is so important that John Lyons states that one of the two "defin-
ing characteristics" of modern structural linguistics is the axiom that
"linguistic units have no validity independently of their paradigmatic and
syntagmatic relations with other units." 35
The relevance of this principle to New Testament interpretation has been
conclusively demonstrated by Erhardt Giittgemanns and by Kenneth L.
Burres ..16 Giittgemanns, for example, shows how the meaning of
"righteousness" in Romans turns partly on its syntagmatic relations to "of
God" (EJcov) and "on the basis of faith" (E" muiewc;). Burres discusses the
meaning of "reveal" (dno"aAVJtTw) partly in terms of its syntagmatic or "syn-
tactic" relations to "righteousness of God", "wrath of God", and other
phrases; partly in terms of its paradigmatic or "paratactic" relations to
'PavEeOW and its two-way relations (e.g. in 1 Cor. 14:6) to yvwutC; and neo-
'P1}rela. The aim in the case of Burres' work is to build up a semantic field of
terms relevant to the semantic value of "reveal" in Paul.
The notion of paradigmatic relations is connected with the semantic ax-
iom that meaning implies choice. For example, "pound" (weight) draws part
of its meaning from the fact that it functions to exclude ton, stone, ounce, or
dram. It also draws part of its meaning from its syntactic relation to bu~ter.
cheese, or apples. On the other hand, "pound" (money) draws part of its
meaning from its paradigmatic relation to SOp, lOOp or £5; and part of its
meaning from its syntagmatic relation to "pay me a" or "change for a".
Thus Giittgemanns examines the paradigmatic relations of "righteousness
of God" to "power of God" and "wrath of God", as well as its syntagmatic
relations to "on the basis of faith" and "on the basis of law". Similarly the
meaning of "arc:! uae"a depends not only on its syntagmatic relation to
'Iuea1A ("earthly" Israel) or UOrpOI (wise according to "human standards");
but also on its paradigmatic relation to "arc:! nVEv/la (spirit).
Saussure's notion of "associative fields", which depends largely on
paradigmatic relations, thus provides a way into the task of mapping out a
semantic field. K. L. Burres uses both syntagmatic and paradigmatic
relations to map the semantic field surrounding Paul's uses of words mean-
ing "to reveal" . .17
In view of the importance of the field, Barr and Burres each supports
Trier's point that a word has meaning not autonomously or independently
but "only as part of a whole" (nur als Teil des Ganzen); only within a field
(irn Feld). J~ All the same, criticisms about words as units of meaning should
not be taken too far. No less an authority than G. Stern has written: "There
is no getting away from the fact that single words have more or less perma-
83
nent meanings, that they actually do refer to certain referents, and not to
others, and that this characteristic is the indispensable basis of all
communication." 39 Or as Stephen Ullmann puts it, more moderately,
"There is usually in each word a hard core of meaning which is relatively
stable and can only be modified by the context within certain limits." .0
Word-studies, then, are not to be dismissed as valueless.
When James Barr ruthlessly criticizes many of the articles in G. Kittel's
multi-volume Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, it might be
tempting to imagine that he is mainly attacking the method of word-study.
But word-study as such is not his main target of criticism. His real com-
plaint is against what he calls "illegitimate totality transfer". 41 This occurs
when the semantic value of a word as it occurs in one context is added to its
semantic value in another context; and the process is continued until the
sum of these semantic values is then read into a particular case.
Barr illustrates this fallacy with reference to the meaning of bexA1]uia,
church, in the New Testament. "If we ask 'What is the meaning of ExxA1]uia
in the New Testament?' the answer may be an adding or compounding of
different statements about the EXXA1]uia in various passages. Thus we might
say (a) 'the Church is the Body of Christ' (b) 'the Church is the first instal-
ment of the Kingdom of God' (c) 'the Church is the Bride of Christ', and
other such statements." 42 In one sense Barr concedes, this is the "meaning"
of "church". But it is certainly not "the meaning of 'church' in Matt. 16.18."
Yet preachers and expositors often lump together the meanings of words
drawn from various different contexts, and "expound" them as the meaning
of the word in a given verse. Barr quite successfully shows, for example, that
this error is committed by Grundmann in his article on aya8or; "good", in
Kittel's Dictionary.
This error stands in complete contrast to the principles elucidated in
modern linguistics after Saussure by Eugene A. Nida and by Martin Joos in
particular. Nida asserts, "The correct meaning of any term is that which
contributes least to the total context." 43 For example we might define the
semantic values of "green" in several ways: as a colour, as meaning inex-
perienced, as meaning unripe, and so on. Similarly, we might define "house"
as a dwelling, lineage, and a business establishment. But as soon as we place
"green" and "house" in syntagmatic relation to each other, we minimize the
semantic values of each, so that "green" can only be a colour, and "house"
only a dwelling. In the case of "greenhouse" the contribution of "green"
almost disappears. Yet if "green house" were a phrase in the New Testa-
ment, we could imagine an expositor exploring the supposed "richness" of
each term separately, and then adding together the components into one
great theological compound. On the other hand Martin Joos calls it "seman-
tic axiom number one" that in defining a word it must be made to "con-
tribute least to the total message desirable from the passage where it is at
home, rather than e.g. defining it according to some presumed etymology or
semantic history." 44 Nida concludes "Words do not carry with them all the
meanings which they may have in other sets of co-occurences." 45 Thus in a
84
balanced comment on the whole question of word-meaning R. H. Robins

adds that words may be convenient units about which to state meanings
"provided that it is borne in mind that words have meaning by virtue of their
employment in sentences ... and that the meaning of a sentence is not to be
thought of as a sort of summation of the meanings of its component words
taken individually." .6
3. CONVENTIONALITY IN LANGUAGE AND ITS CONNEXION WITH

STRUCTURALISM
Saussure was certainly not the first to show what he called "'the arbitrary
nature of the sign" in language. "No-one", he writes, "disputes the principle
of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a truth
than to assign to it its proper place." What was distinctive about Saussure's
assessment was, firstly, that he described it as the very first principle in
language-study, which "dominates all the linguistics of language; its conse-
quences are numberless."·7 Secondly, the far-reaching effects of this
principle on the relationship between language and thought, or between
words and concepts, emerge clearly only against the background of struc-
turalism. Saussure's structural approach, we have seen, calls in question a
semantics which is based entirely on the word as a unit of meaning. This
now enables us to expose what Barr has called the one word/one concept
fallacy, and also to challenge the drawing of inferences about national
"thought" made on the basis of linguistic distinctions which turn out to be
arbitrary.
There are everyday phenomena in language which make it clear that the
relations between language and the world depend in many respects on ar-
bitrary or conventional factors rather than on "nature" or even logic. These
include homonymy (when two words of different meanings have the same
form, e.g. "he left me", as against "turn lejt");polysemy (when one word has
multiple meanings, e.g. "board and lodging", "board of directors", "board
from the floor"); opaqueness in vocabulary (e.g. in contrast to the
transparent meanings of onomatopoeia); and diachronic change in
language: K Saussure, however, points simply to the very basic fact of
differences both in vocabulary and in grammar between different languages,
When logically the same semantic value is involved. The relation between the
French word soeur and a sister is no more "natural", "inner" or "logical"
than it is in the case of the German Schwester or the English sister. Similar-
ly, in terms of grammar, in the sentence ces gants sont bon marche, "'these
¥Ioves are cheap", bon marche functions logically or semantically as an ad-
Jective, but is not an adjective from the arbitrary viewpoint of grammar. 4'1
(We have already referred, in philosophy, to the parallel observations of
Russell about such phrases as "the present King of France", or Ha round
square"). Further, in terms of morphology, bon marche is composed of two
Words which correspond to the one word "cheap". Even the limits of the
Word as a unit have an arbitrary element. In Latin and in Greek amo and
85
fjJtAW or ayanw must be translated by two words in English and in German,

"I love," and "ich liebe". Saussure concludes, "The division of words into
substantives, verbs, adjectives, etc., is not an undeniable linguistic reality." 50
We have already noted some of the fallacies involved in logico-gram-
matical parallelism. The other side of the coin is the equally misguided
attempt to draw inferences about the distinctive thought of a people, for ex-
ample, about "Hebrew thought" or "Greek thought", on the basis of its
grammatical categories. Eugene A. Nida writes, "The idea that the Hebrew
people had a completely different view of time because they had a different
verbal system does not stand up under investigation. It would be just as un-
founded to claim that people of the English-speaking world have lost interest
in sex because the gender distinctions in nouns and adjectives have been
largely eliminated, or that Indo-Europeans are very time conscious because
in many languages there are tense-distinctions in the verbs. But no people
seems more time-orientated than the Japanese, and their verbal system is
not too different from the aspectual structures of Hebrew. Furthermore, few
peoples are so little interested in time as some of the tribes in Africa, many
of whose languages have far more time distinctions than any Indo-European
language has." 51
J. Pedersen, T. Boman, and G. A. F. Knight are among the many Biblical
scholars who have made pronouncements about "Hebrew thought" on the
basis of grammatical categories. Knight, for example, asserts, "the Hebrew
almost invariably thought in terms of the concrete. There are few abstract
nouns in the Hebrew language." 52 T. Boman argues, again mainly on the
basis of a grammatical and morphological investigation of linguistic
categories, that Israelite thinking is "dynamic, vigorous, passionate" while
"Greek thinking is static, peaceful, moderate, and harmonious." 53 For
example, he claims that even stative verbs in Hebrew express an activity
rather than portray a static state of affairs. Some of his most extreme
arguments occur in connexion with quantity and number. The so-called
"concept of number" is arrived at in Greek and in modern thinking in terms
of visual representation. But the distinctive "concept" in Hebrew is evident
from the "meaning" of the word "two": "Shenayim comes from the verb
shanah - double, repeat, do for the second time. Thus the Hebrews form the
concept of number not, as we do, through visual perception, but through
frequent repetition of the same motion." 54 Similarly, the two words for
"small" come from verbal forms meaning "to diminish", "to become less";
and the word min which expresses "more than" in comparative degree really
means "away from". Boman actually concludes "Number or quantitive
variety is thus not something spatial and quantitive but dynamic and
qualitative.,,55 When Saul is said to be "taller than" all the people, he
dynamically towers over and "away from" the others!
But not only is this to argue on the basis of a supposed logico-gram-
matical parallelism; it is also to compound this particular error with further
arguments of a diachronic or even etymological nature, and to ignore the
role of context in semantics. If, for example, min means "away from" in
86
many contexts, its context in a comparison restricts its semantic value to

"more than". On the one hand, Boman's method flies in the face of struc-
turalism; on the other hand, as Barr concludes, "Boman's kind of interpret a-
tion of language ... depends to a great extent on the \ogico-grammatical un-
clarities of the older grammar, and evaporates with the stricter method of
modern linguistics." 56 This is not to say that all of Boman's conclusions are
wrong. For sometimes, as Barr admits, he expresses an insight which may
have independent value as an exegetical observation. 57 Barr does n01
dispute that Hebrew uses of language may sometimes be more "dynamic"
than Greek or English near-equivalents. The error, however, is to attempt to
base such conclusions on dubious linguistic arguments which ignore struc-
turalism and conventionality in language, and Barr has performed a
valuable service in subjecting this approach to systematic criticism.
This brings us to a fundamental principle in semantics, about the
relationship between language and "concepts". Commenting on claims
made about the Hebrew or Greek "mind" or "way of thinking", David
Crystal makes a crucial observation. He writes, "One often hears statements
of the form 'Language X has a word for it, but Y has not, therefore X can
say something Y cannot', or 'X is a better language than Y.' This fallacy
stems from the misconception ... that the unit of translation-equivalence
between languages is the word ... Thefact that Y has no wordfor an object
does not mean that it cannot talk about that object; it cannot use the same
mechanical means to do so, but it can utilize alternatil'e forms of expression
in its own structurefor the same end." 58
The implication which is made by the vast majority of writers in
linguistics is that, in John Lyons' words, "No language can be said to be in-
trinsically 'richer' than another - each is adapted to the characteristic pur-
suits of its users." 59 The number of classifications under which "life" or
"the world" could be described is virtually infinite. The distinctions which
already exist within a given language, then, reflect only those that have
hitherto in the past been of importance for that particular culture. But they
do not absolutely determine the limits of what can be said in the future, for
example by a creative thinker within that culture, or by a translator. This is
not entirely to deny that there may be some element of truth in the
well-known hypothesis of B. L. Whorf, based on the outlook of Wilhelm von
Humboldt, that the structure of a language may influence a culture in terms
of its thought. For, firstly, the translation or expression of certain ideas may
be made easier or more difficult by the presence of this or that distinction, or
lack of distinction, already to hand in a language. Secondly, habits of
language-use make certain ways of thinking easier or more difficult in the
sense shown by Wittgenstein. But difficulty does not mean impossibility.
The weaknesses of the Whorf hypothesis have been demonstrated by Max
Black, among others in several discussions. 60 Even so-called primitive
languages are, as Edward Sapir admits (in the words of David Crystal) "not
better or worse; only different." 61
Biblical scholars, however, have been quick to draw far-reaching con-
87
clusions about Hebrew or Greek "thought" on the basis of

vocabulary-stock. John Paterson, for example, makes the far-fetched state-
ment that the ancient Israelite was "economical of words", because
"Hebrew speech has less than 10,000 words while Greek has 200,000. Thus
a word to the Hebrew was something ... to be expended carefully." He was
a man of few words, for "He knew there was power in words and that such
power must not be used indiscriminately." 62 I have tried to expose the
fallaciousness of this whole approach in the study to which I have referred
on the supposed power of words in the biblical writings.
lames Barr has little difficulty in citing and criticizing what he calls
"arguments of the 'the Greeks had a word for it' type which so proliferate in
Biblical theology." 63 For example, J. A. T. Robinson writes, "If we ask why
it was that the Jews here (i.e. in language about "flesh" and "body") made
do with one word (basar) where the Greeks required two (uae; and uWfJ,a) we
come up against some of the most fundamental assumptions of Hebraic
thinking about man." The difference in vocabulary-stock shows, according
to Robinson, "that the Hebrews never posed, like the Greeks, certain
questions the answer to which would have forced them to differentiate the
'body' from the 'flesh'." 64 Barr comments, "This statement could not have
been written except in a total neglect of linguistic semantics." 65 It may be
that this criticism should be softened in the light of the half truth represented
by the Whorf hypothesis. But the main force of Barr's criticism is un-
doubtedly correct.
Barr also criticizes the methodological procedure of Kittel's Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament according to which in effect, "the lex-
ical-stock of N.T. Greek can be closely correlated with the concept-stock of
the early Christians." 66 The Dictionary is a dictionary, in practice, of
words; but it purports to be a "concept-history" (BegrifJsgeschichte). Thus a
contributor writes not about "the Greek word -" but "the Greek con-
cept _". The temptation to which this leads is to commit the "illegitimate
totality transfer" (which we described and discussed in Il, 1). Since words
and concepts do not necessarily correspond with each other isomorphically,
such ambiguity of terms can only be misleading, and the confusion becomes
still worse when some German scholars use BegrifJto mean both "concept"
and "word".
4. LANGUE AND PAROLE
The distinction between langue and parole, so important for Saussure.

has been taken up in connexion with the form criticism of the gospels by
Erhardt Giittgemanns. According to Saussure, language (either langue or, in
a different sense /angage cf. Sprache) must not be confused with speech or
actual speaking (parole; cf. sprechen). Langue "is both a social product of
the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have
been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that
faculty." It is inherited within the community; and is "the sum of word-
88
images stored in the minds of all individuals ... a storehouse filled by the
members of a given community . .. Language is not complete in any (in-
dividual) speaker, it exists perfectly only within a collectivity." Langue is
thus the language-system which, as it were, waits in readiness for acts of
speech. By contrast, parole is "the executive side of speaking ... an in-
dividual act".07
Parole, the actual concrete act of speaking on the part of an individual, is
the only object directly available for study by the linguist, although from its
study he draws inferences about the structure of a langue. In his work on
form-criticism E. Giittgemanns stresses the sociological and communal
character of a langue, in contrast to the individual origin of paroles. b" The
paroles of the individual are objectified in written forms, for only an in-
dividual can do the actual writing. On the other hand the written paroles
reflect the oral tradition of the langue of the community. One of
Giittgemanns's points is that just as langue should not be confused with
parole, so the "laws" which apply to the growth of oral traditions should not
be made to apply to forms which already have been committed to writing by
individuals. He believes that traditional form criticism in Germany has not
been careful enough in keeping apart (1) written forms, individual speech,
parole; and (2) oral forms, the language of the social community, langue.
One consequence of Saussure's distinction between langue and parole is
of interest to the New Testament interpreter .. We have already stressed in
connexion with paradigmatic relations (in 11.2) that "meaning is choice."
The interpreter cannot know how much significance to attach to an author's
use of word x until he also knows what alternatives were available to him at
the same time. It is often said, for example, that the choice of ayanw and
aYcln1} to mean "love" in the New Testament is especially significant because
Christian writers chose them in preference to e(!w and E(!W<; and also to rptAW
and rptA/a. Supposedly agape is a discerning and creative love; eras is a
passionate love which seeks self-gratification; whilst philia is a more general
word for solicitous love or kindly inclination. But before we can say with
certainty that a New Testament writer "chooses" to use ayan1} we must first
establish whether the other two words for love were genuinely live options in
the contexts concerned. It is not enough to ask whether different words for
"love" might be available in first-century Greek in general. In this respect a
lexicon may even be misleading. We must also ask: what words for love
were available for use in the linguistic repertoire of the New Testament
writer in question? Words may perhaps exist in Greek of which he is un-
aware, or for which he has a personal dislike for any of a variety of reasons.
It would then be thoroughly misleading to argue that he has chosen word x
as against these.
89
NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRET A TION
Ill. Other Basic Tools in Field Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy
1. TOOLS IN fiELD SEMANTICS: TYPES OF OPPOSITION AND SYNONYMY
We have already seen the principle laid down by J. Trier that a word has
meaning "only as part of a whole ... it yields a meaning only within a field"
(nur im Feld gibt es Bedeutung). Following the implications suggested by
Saussure's structuralism, the task of the semanticist, as Trier saw it, was to
set up lexical systems or sub-systems (Wortfelder) in terms of semantic
relations of sameness or similarity of meaning (synonymy); of opposition or
incompatibility of meaning (antonymy or complementarity); and of a special
kind of illclusiveness of meaning (hyponymy) as where one word expresses a
class ("furniture") to which the items belong ("chair", "table"). In broad
outline this describes the programme of field semantics. 69
E. A. Nida has suggested that more use should be made of the methods of
field semantics in Biblical lexicology. He writes, "Quite new approaches to
lexicology must be introduced ... Critical studies of meaning must be based
primarily upon the analysis of related meanings of dijJerent li'ords. not upon
the dijJerent meanings of single words." 70 According to the traditional
method, the lexicographer would take a word such as "run", for example,
and distinguish in terms of its syntagmatic relations (1) running along the
road; (2) running a business; (3) a run on the bank; and so on. But the
method in field semantics would be to compare "run" in the first sense with
words to which it stood in paradigmatic relation, such as "walk", "skip",
"crawl"; and to compare "run" in the second sense with "control",
"operate" and "direct". In this way a "field" very much like Saussure's
"associative field", or system of paradigmatic relations, may be constructed.
The traditional attention to syntagmatic relations in lexicology is in fact
complementm:l' to newer methods. In New Testament Greek, a traditional
lexicon-entry under rrvEvfla for example, would distinguish between (1) wind
or breath; (2) men's spirit; (3) the Spirit of God; and (4) spirit-beings. The
"field" approach would examine the first category in relation to aVEflo" rrvEw
and ).alAmj!; the second category in relation to aa[J~. 1pvX1, aWfla, and so on. A
diagram will illustrate how the two approaches can be complementary.
Katz and Foder put forward a comparable system oflexicology, in which
they call the first explanatory term (noun) a grammatical marker; the se-
cond set of terms (e.g. human, divine) semantic markers; and the third set of
subdivisions within the semantic markers (e.g. mind, breath) semantic dis-
lillguis/zers. I have then added Greek words which commence the construc-
tion of a semantic field.
We must now look more closely at different types of opposition. In a
whole book devoted to the subject C. K. Ogden lists some twenty or so ex-
amples, most of which involve a distinctive type of semantic opposition.'
The basic distinction, however, is between what he calls opposition by cut
and opposition by scale. The sharpest type of opposition by cut is the rela-
tion of two-way exclusion known as complemenlarity. The denial of the one
90
:n:VEvpa
I
noun
:=//~
CIl
m
s::
;l>
Z
-I
(of natural forces) (human) (divine) (other supernatural agencies)

n
CIl
;l>
~ /~
Z
/ 1\
o
Z
m
~
-I
'D m
CIl
1. wind 2. breath 3. spirit 4. seat of 5. person, 6. The Spirit 7. spirit- 8. evil -I
;l>
(in contrast emotion, the whole beings spirits s::m
to body) insight, etc man Z
-I
"
aVEfWC;, :n:VEW awpa, xaebla, TO Ej1}JV EV bvvapEI, AEIWVeYlxa balpwv, Z
-I
m
Aa/Amp, acplival aae~, EWeax&r] :n:VEvpa, XVelOc;, :n:vEvpaTa, balpaVlOV, ::<l
:n:v01, TO :n:VEvpa, 1p vX1) , njj :n:vEvpan, PE, rO :n:VEvpa aTOlXEIOV,

'"::<lm
aex1, -I
;l>
etc. EX Bwv, etc. etc. -I
aVEpl(opal. £PJrVElV, etc. (;PflC;,
o
TO :n:VEvpa Z
Epcpvaaw. etc.
wv xoapOl;,
etc.
involves the assertion of the other, and vice versa. Paul sets the word Xa(!ITI
"by grace", in opposition to e~ eeywv "by works" in this way in Rom. 11 :6.
"Grace" and "works" derive their semantic value from their very relation of
complementarity. Thus Paul writes, "if it is by grace, it is no longer on the
basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace." Similarly f.
Giittgemanns attempts to shed light on ?JtxalOuvv1) 8cov righteousness of
God, in Rom. 1 by showing that in that chapter it stands in a relation of op
position to oey~ 8eov, wrath of God. 72
Not every kind of opposition functions in this way, however. What i,
strictly termed a relation of antonymy is a one-way relation of opposition
which is relative and gradable by scale. Rom. 5 :6-8 illustrates this kind of
opposition. To say that a man is "good" (dya86c;) is to deny that he i~
positively bad. But on the other hand, to say that he is "not good" does not
entail "he is bad". For "good" may stand in contrast to "law-abiding"
(8ixalO,) and a man may be law-abiding but neither good nor bad. Similarly
in the gospels a "great" crowd or a "large" crowd stands in opposition to a
"small" crowd; but a crowd which is "not large" need not be small. The
type of opposition involved in grading-words like "good" and ""great"" j,
different from that entailed by such terms as "grace" and "works". In an ar
ticle published elsewhere I have tried to unravel the complex semantic
relationship between ]lVEVpa, spirit, and uae~y, flesh. J3 In certain contexts to
live according to the Spirit stands in a relation of complementarity to living
according to the flesh (cr. Rom. 8 :9, 12). On the other hand, whilst the
Corinthian believers are in some sense men of the Spirit (1 Cor. 2:6-16:
12-14) in another sense Paul refuses to accept their inference that therefore
they are "not fleshly" (3: 1-4).
One more type of opposition deserves attention. namely that of call
verseness. "Buy" and "sell" stand normally in a relation of converseness, for
if a buys x from b, it can be said that b sells x to a. But when Paul says in I
Cor. 6:19 that Christians are "bought" (dyoea(w) with a price, we cannot
transform this into a converse sentence using "sell". The semantic applica
tion here is the warning that theological uses of dyoea(w entail a slightl)
different meaning from "buy" in ordinary commercial contexts.
There are also different types and degrees of synonymy, or sameness or
likeness of meaning. Absolute, total, and complete synonymy is extremel)
rare in ordinary language. Absolute synonyms, if they do exist, are usually
technical terms from areas such as medicine; perhaps "semantics" and
"semasiology" are absolute synonyms. The major test of synonymy is ill
terchangeability. S. Ullmann writes, "Only those words can be described as
synonymous which can replace each other in any given context, without the
slightest alteration either in cognitive or emotive import." 74
A moment's reflection will disclose two principles. Firstly, most so-called
synonyms are context-dependent. In many contexts "jump" is synonymous
with "leap"; but we do not say "that noise made me leap." "Sick" often
means the same as "ill"; but we do not talk about a bird of sick omen, nor
say that we are ill of repeating the same thing. Similarly in New Testament
92
Greek xam),; and vEoe; are clearly synonymous when both mean "new" as
applied to the "covenant" (8ta8~x1), e.g. cf. Heb. 8:8 with Heb. 12:24); but a
writer would not presumably speak of 'WtVOV rpVeafla (dough) or of a young
man as xatvoe;. It could be misleading, then, to answer "yes" or "no" to the
simple question: are "atVOC; and vEoe; synonyms? The semanticist will ask,
rather: in what kinds of context, if any, are they synonymous?
Secondly, many words are synonymous with others at a cognitive level,
but not in emotive terms or in terms of register. We might write to "decline"
an invitation, but hardly to "reject" it; yet it is difficult to see any great
difference between them in cognitive scope. "Decease" is more formal and
professional than "death"; whilst "passed on", "popped off', "was called to
higher service" and "kicked the bucket" all have their own special over-
tones. Similarly in certain contexts Mark's xea{3anoe;, mattress, may be
cognitively synonymous with Matthew and Luke's "Atv1), bed; but the collo-
quial overtones of Mark's word are deemed inappropriate by Matthew and
Luke. Sometimes similar actions or attitudes can be described by terms
suggesting overtones of moral approval or blame. Thus Bertrand Russell
begins his well-known "emotive conjugations" as follows: "I am firm, you
are obstinate, he is pig-headed; ... I have reconsidered, you have changed
your mind, he has gone back on his word." "Reasoning" in the New Testa-
ment can be alluded to with overtones of disapproval (btaAoywfloe;) or either
neutrally or with approval (cr. v01)fla, vove;).
Three further comments may be made about synonymy. Firstly. another
test of context-dependent synonymy can be provided by antonymy. "Wide"
is a synonym of "broad", for example, in contexts in which "narrow" would
be applicable: a narrow plank or a narrow road. But we do not talk about a
narrow accent; only of a broad one. "Deep" and "profound" thought stand
in opposition to "shallow" thought; but the opposite to a deep voice is a high
one. Secondly, synonymy may be explored in diachronic linguistics.
Sometimes over a period of many years two words may move more closely
together in meaning, and if they become total synonyms one may eventually
disappear. David Clines has shown in an unpublished study that this
happens to aya8oe; and "aAoe;. In classical Greek they are distinct, aya86e; be-
ing reserved mainly for moral goodness; in New Testament Greek they are
usually synonymous; in modern Greek aya8oe; has disappeared. Sometimes,
however, the procedure may be reversed, and what were once synonyms
may develop in different directions. Thirdly, synonymy raises questions of
style. Many writers call on similar terms, for example, simply to avoid
repetition of the same word. 75 In such contexts similar terms may become
more clearly synonymous. It is likely that this is the case, for example, with
ayamo and rptAr.; in John 21:15-17.
2. TYPES OF VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR
. Certain kinds of vagueness are useful and desirable. Language would be

Impoverished if we could never talk about "furniture", but only about chairs
93
and tables; or never talk about something's being "red", without specifying
whether we mean crimson or scarlet; or never talk about "flowers" without
explicating whether we mean tulips, roses, or a mixture of both. When the
New Testament interpreter comes across a superordinate term like xaxia,
badness, it is a mistake to insist on a greater degree of precision than that
suggested by the text. I have argued this point in two articles, one with
reference to the applications of the parables, the other with reference to the
meaning of aae~ in 1 Cor. 5: 5. 76
One type of vagueness is due to lack of specijicity, of which superordinate
terms supply some, but not all, examples. A skilful politician may retain
universal support, for example, if he promises to "take steps" to meet a
crisis; he loses some votes if he is forced to specify what steps.
Another type of vagueness is due to lack of a clear cut-off point on a
scale. Words like "urban", "warm", and "middle-aged" are very useful, not
least because they are not quantified precisely like "above 60°F." or
"between 39 and 61 years old."
A third type of vagueness is that of polymorphous concepts, which are of
special interest in philosophy. The meaning of a word of this type cannot be
given in generalizing terms, but only as different meanings apply by way of
example in different contexts. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle and others,
insist that we cannot say in general what "thinking" is; only give examples
of the application of the term in specific situations. G. E. M. Anscombe ex
amines the logic of "intention" in this way; and A. R. White underlines the
polymorpl:ous character of "attention". What attending is depends on what
we are attending to. It seems likely, to my mind, that rrlan" faith, has this
polymorphous character, especially in Paul. Depending on the situation or
context it may involve intellectual assent, or practical obedience; it may
stand eschatologically in contrast to sight; or mean a Christ-centred ap-
propriation of God's gift. To try to overcome this so-called ambiguity by
offering a generalizing definition is to invite misunderstanding about what
"faith" means.
Too often in biblical interpretation exegetes have looked for exactness
where the author chose vagueness. Must the "horrifying abomination" in
Mark 13: 14 refer specifically to the violence of the zealots, or to a statue of
Titus, or to Caligula or Hadrian? Must "Son of man" be robbed of an am-
biguity which may have commended the term to Jesus? Might not the New
Testament writers have wished to keep some ideas open-ended no less often
than we do?
We must also glance briefly at metaphor, which is not unrelated to
questions about vagueness. A live metaphor presupposes a well-established
use of language (often popularly called the "literal" meaning) and then ex-
tends this use in a way that is novel or logically odd. The aim of this exten-
sion is twofold. Firstly, it sets up a tension which is intended to provoke the
hearer into some reaction; secondly, it provides a model, or picture, or
frame of reference, according to which the hearer now "sees" the point in
question in a new way. It should be stressed, however, that this happens
94
only when a metaphor is genuinely "live". Most metaphors very soon

become dead metaphors. This is one crucial difficulty confronting the New
Testament interpreter about biblical metaphors. The well-known metaphor
of the Christian's armour in Eph. 6: 14-17 has become dead metaphor, or
even a mere analogy or simile, because a term like "sword of the spirit" has
itself become an established use of language. Sometim~s a new translation
will recapture some force by replacing an old metaphor by a new but
closely-related one. Thus "gird up the loins of your mind" in 1 Pet.!: 13
becomes "stripped for action" in the NEB. On the other hand "anchor of
the soul" (Heb. 6: 19), "fed you with milk" (1 Cor. 3 :2) and "living stones"
(1 Pet. 2:5) still retain an element of their original tension without alteration.
The interpreter has to steer a very careful path between evaporating the
force of a metaphor by total explication, and leaving its meaning open to
doubt. If a metaphor is already dead even in the New Testament, no harm is
done by erring on the side of clarity. Thus "hand of the Lord" (Acts 11 :21)
becomes "the Lord's power" in Today's English Version; and "pass from
me this cup" (Luke 22:42) becomes "free me from having to suffer this
trial" in the Spanish Version Popular. But it is a different matter when the
metaphor is a live one. It is difficult to justify, for example. the rendering of
Paul's "put on Christ" (Gal. 3 :27) by "take upon themselves the qualities of
Christ himself' (Today's English Version). A metaphor is to make the
hearer think for himself. often by means of some deliberate ambiguity. It
gives us something as a model for something else without making explicit in
exactly what way it is supposed to be a model. 77 We could say of metaphor
what F. Waismann says of poetry: "Its mission is to break through the wall
of conventional values that encloses us, to startle us into seeing the world
through fresh eyes." ;R If metaphor is eliminated or turned into simile, as W.
L. Wonderly recommends as a "basic technique" of popular Bible transla-
tion, this entire dimension is lost. 79
The literature on metaphor is extensive. 80 It should warn us against ever
talking about Biblical metaphors as "mere" metaphors, as if to imply that
metaphorical language is somehow inferior to non-metaphorical discourse.
But it is also evident from this range of literature that there are different
types of metaphors with different purposes; and that the line between
metaphor and non-metaphor is not in fact a line but a continuous scale,
passing through "dead" metaphor and merely figurative language such as
metonymy or synecdoche. Robert Funk and Sallie TeSelle have argued that
the parables of Jesus function as metaphor; and in theology, especially with
reference to Bultmann, it is crucial to distinguish between metaphor and
myth.
3. SOME El-FlOC 1's OF RECENT APPROACHES IN LINGUISTICS
Ideally a comprehensive discussion of the present subject would include

an examination of transformational grammar with special reference to the
work of Noam Chomsky. However, in practice this area is far too complex
95
and technical to allow for a brief summary in a few paragraphs. Our aim in
this section, therefore, must be more modest. We shall attempt to describe
and evaluate only the uses to which this approach has been put at the hand~
of those engaged in Bible translation. This concerns especially the work ot
Eugene A. Nida, who speaks enthusiastically of the in sights of transfor
mational grammar, and in particular draws on the technique of reducing thl
surface structure of stretches of language to its underlying kernels.
Nida and Taber write, "One of the most important insights coming from
'transformational grammar' is the fact that in all languages there are half ~!
dozen to a dozen basic structures out of which all the more elaborate for
mations are constructed by means of so-called 'transformations'. In COil
trast, back-transformation, then, is the analytic process of reducing the sur
face structure to its underlying kernels." 81 We have already illustrated thl~
principle by noting certain kernel forms behind Eph. 1:7. Nida and Taber
further cite the example of Eph. 2:8, 9: "For by grace you have been saved
through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God - nOl
because of works lest any man should boast." This can be reduced to seven
kernel sentences: (1) God showed you grace; (2) God saved you; (3) YOL
believed; (4) you did not save yourselves; (5) God gave it; (6) you did not
work for it; (7) no man should boast. 82 The kernel sentences may in
principle undergo further transformation in terms of what Chomsky call:,
"deep structure", but whilst this is of interest in theoretical linguistics Nida
and Taber question its practical value for the Bible translator. Tht;:
translator's task, they suggest, is firstly to reduce utterances to kernel
sentences by "back-transformation" (if necessary making explicit an~
elements that are still ambiguous), and then at the end of the process to re
formulate the kernels into a linguistic structure which best accords with a
native speaker's understanding in the receptor language.
One merit of this approach is to demonstrate, once again, the ar
bitrariness of surface-grammar and the fallacy of assumptions about
logico-grammatical parallelism. The surface-grammar of the final transla
tion may not necessarily correspond to the surface-grammar of the original
Greek. In this respect, translation is a creative task and not merely a
mechanical one.
We must also note, however, that the contrast between surface grammar
and deep grammar is used as a means of eliminating certain types of Gm
biguity. As long ago as 1924, Otto Jespersen noted the fundamental
difference in structure between two such superficially parallel phrases a,
"the doctor's arrival" and "the doctor's house", The reason for the
difference is that, in Chomsky's terms, "the doctor's arrival" derives from
the transform "the doctor arrived", which has the form NP/Vi (noUl.
phraselintransitive verb); whilst "the doctor's house" derives from the
transform "the doctor has a house", which has the form NPiVt//N'(noun
phrase/transitive verb//noun in the accusative). 8J
This example of transformational techniques is already employed, by im-
plication. in New Testament exegesis and in traditional grammar. The
96
traditional contrast between "objective genitive" and "subjective genitive" is

usually explained in wha~, amoun~s to transforIl!a~!on~1 ter~s. In 1 _Cor. 1 :6,
for example, the phrase the testimony of ChrIst (ro IW(!TV(!WV rov X(!wroii)
is as it stands, ambiguous. If it is subjective genitive it derives from the
tr~sform "Christ testified", in which "Christ" is subject; if it is objective
genitive i~ d~riv.es from .the tr.an~form "Paul testifies to Christ", in whic~
"Christ" IS (mdlrect) object. SImIlarly, as the phrase stands, "love of God
(~ ayanTJ :ov ewv) in 1 John is ambiguous, and ,?as t~ b~ interp.r~ted as
deriving eIther from the transform "God loves. .. (subjectIve gemtive), or
from " ... loves God" (objective genitive). It is a regular manoeuvre in
Today's English Version to remove ambiguity of this kind by clearly reflec-
ting one particular transform. Thus "light of the world" (Mt. 5: 14) becomes
"light for the world" (objective genitive, from "lights the world"); and "the
promise of the Holy Spirit" (Acts 2:33) becomes "the Holy Spirit, as his
Father had promised" (objective genitive, from the transform "the Father
promised the Holy Spirit", excluding the alternative transform "the Holy
Spirit promised").
Transformational grammar often seeks to make explicit elements of
meaning which are implied, but not expressed, in a sentence. Chomsky com-
ments, "Surface similarities may hide distinctions of a fundamental nature
... It may be necessary to guide and draw out the speaker's intuition in
perhaps fairly subtle ways before we can determine what is the actual
character of his knowledge." 84 This principle is of positive value in Bible
translation, provided it is recognised that, once again, translation inevitably
becomes interpretation. Sometimes it is possible that this technique of mak-
ing linguistic elements explicit goes further than the text allows. Thus it i~
questionable whether Today's English Version is justified in translating Itat'
IlJwv 0 'ITJuov, r~v ntartv avrwv as "Jesus saw how much faith they had"
(Mark 2.5). The R.S.V. simply has "when Jesus saw their faith". But
presumably the translators of Today's English Version would claim to be
making explicit what they judged was implicit in the text.
One further point arises from this principle of making linguistic elements
explicit. It demonstrates that statistical statements about word-occurrences
may often be superficial or even misleading guides to the occurrence of ac-
tual concepts. K. L. Burres makes this point about "boasting" in Rom.
85
3:27. The text reads: "Then what becomes of our boasting? It is excluded.
On what principle? On the principle of works? No, but on the principle of
faith." In this form of the text "boasting" occurs once only. But if we allow a
transformational analysis to unpack occurrences which are implicit but
fUnctionally operative, Burres suggests that we now have: "Then what
becomes of our boasting? Our boasting is excluded. On what principle is our
boasting excluded? Is our boasting excluded on the principle of works? No.
Our boasting is excluded on the principle of faith". "Boasting" now occurs
five times.
Although Nida succeeds in demonstrating points of value in transfor-
mational approaches for Bible translation, however, I still have hesitations
97
about certain uses of these techniques. Firstly, in spite of Nida's obvious

awareness of the problem, the translator must be on guard against thinking
of semantic equivalence simply in cognitive terms. If "decease", departure
from this life", and so on, could all be transformed into the kernel sentence
"he dies", it would be easy to overlook the emotive, cultural, or religious
overtones of meaning which may have been important in the original
utterance. Nida would no doubt agree that every effort must be made not to
lose sight of this problem. Indeed he and Taber stress this very point in a
chapter entitled "Connotative Meaning". Secondly, the notion of kernel
sentences comes too near for comfort to Wittgenstein's earlier notions in the
Tractatus about elementary propositions. We cannot attempt to evaluate
the theories of the Tractatus in this essay, but it is not irrelevant to point out
that in his later writings Wittgenstein expressed his own deep dissatisfaction
with theories of meaning which are arrived at in this way. Theories about a
"universal" grammar of objects, events, abstracts and relations are too
reminiscent of the theory of language which Wittgenstein first propounded
and then rejected. These criticisms do not invalidate this whole approach,
but they perhaps call for caution over the ways in which it is used.
IV. A Concluding Example of Semantic Exploration: Justification by Faith

By way of conclusion I shall try to show how a particular set of problems
in New Testament interpretation may be solved, or at least made to look
very different, by explorations into questions of sel;,2ntics and logic. Since
hitherto we have been looking mainly at tools which have been forged in
general linguistics, I shall conclude by glancing at some possibilities which
emerge against the background of linguistic philosophy. Beginning with the
contrast between descriptive and evaluative language-uses, I shall draw on
Wittgenstein's notion of "seeing as", on his idea of the "home" setting of a
language-game, and on the concept of analycity or "grammaticalness" in his
own sense of the term. I shall apply these notions to three standard
problems raised by justification in Pauline thought. 86
1. How can the Christian be both "righteous" and yet also a sinner? E.
Kiisemann speaks of the "logical embarrassment" of this doctrine, and F.
Prat exclaims, "How can the false be true, or how can God declare true
what he knows to be false?" 87 Various answers have been put forward: for
example, that dikaioo (btlwtow) means to make righteous, rather than to
count righteous; that "righteousness" refers only to God's acting as cham-
pion, to vindicate the oppressed; that the "righteousness" of God means his
saving power; or that "being made righteous" means "put into a right rela-
tion with God", without special reference to ethics or to ethical status. K~ For
reasons which cannot be discussed here, I do not think that any of these ap-
proaches is entirely satisfactory. The "paradox" remains that the Christian
is a sinner, but that God regards him as if he were righteous.
2. Is justification present or future? Many passages indicate that it is a
present reality (Rom. 5:1, 9; 9:30; I Cor. 6:11); but in Gal. 5:5 Paul states
98
unambiguously that believers "wait for the hope of righteousness" in the

future. Many interpreters of Paul, following Weiss and Schweitzer, believe
that it "belongs strictly speaking" to the future, but is also effective in the
present.
3. How can Paul place "faith" in contrast to "works" when it is not, as
Whiteley puts it, "another kind of work"; it is not a species of the same
genus? 89 It is not as if "having faith" were a trump card which could be
played if one had run out of "good works".
Taking these three problems together, I shall now make three suggestions
about the semantics, or logic, of Paul's language.
(1) In speaking of the believer as iustus et peccator we are not dealing
with two sets of descriptive assertions which may be true or false; we are
dealing with two different evaluations or verdicts each of which is valid
within its own frame of reference. Whereas two mutually exclusive asser-
tions stand in a relation of contradiction or perhaps "paradox", this is a mis-
leading way of describing the logical relation between two competing
evaluations. If one man claims "x is black", and another man claims, "x is
white", one of them must be wrong. But if one claims "x is satisfactory" or
"x is fast" and the other claims "x is unsatisfactory" or "x is slow", each
may be a valid assessment in relation to a different frame of reference. In
particular, Wittgenstein examines the phenomenon of "seeing x as y". "" A
man may see a puzzle-picture, now as a series of dots, now as a face. He
may see a drawing of a cube now as a glass cube, now as an open box, now
as a wire frame, now as three boards forming a solid angle. What is seen
remains the same; but how it is seen depends on its function within a system
or frame of reference provided by the viewer. If a thing can be "seen as"
more than one possible thing, there must be more than one possible frame of
reference within which it can be viewed. Donald Evans argues this point
about "onlooks", in which we "look on" x as y. 91 In Pauline thought the
Christian is "seen as" or "looked on" as righteous or as a sinner, because he
can stand within two alternative frames of reference.
(2) These two frames belong, respectively, to eschatology and to history.
In the context of history, in terms of what he is in this world and of what his
past has made him, the Christian remains a sinner. Justification is strictly a
matter of the future, when he will be acquitted at the last judgment.
Nevertheless the eschatological frame is the decisive one because it cor-
responds with future reality, and it can be brought forward and ap-
propriated in the present by faith. In this sense, justification becomes a pre-
sent reality, for it is granted "apart from the law" (Rom. 3:21, cf. Gal. 2:16;
Phil. 3:9). In as far as the believer is already accorded his eschatological
status, viewed in that context he is justified. In as far as he still lives in the
everyday world, he remains a sinner who awaits future justification. History
and eschatology each provide a frame or logical context in which a different
verdict on the Christian is valid and appropriate. In Wittgenstein's sense of
the "home" setting of a language-game, eschatology is the home setting in
Which the logic of justification by faith receives its currency.
99
(3) We are now in a position to see that "justification" and "faith" have
an internal, "grammatical", or analytical relation to each other in this set-
ting. "Faith", in the context of justification (certainly not in all contexts in
Paul) means the acceptance of this future-orientated onlook as being effec-
tively relevant in the present. The verdict which, for external history, will be
valid only at the judgment day is validfor faith now. From an external view-
point, justification remains future; but faith involves stepping out of that
purely historical frame of reference. In this sense, faith for Paul is not as
remote from Heb. 11: 1 ("faith is the substance of things hoped for") as it is
often imagined to be. But if this is true, faith may now be seen not as a mere-
ly external means which somehow "procures" justification, but as part of
what justification is and entails. In Wittgenstein's terms, to say "justifica-
tion requires faith" is to make an analytical statement about the grammar or
concept of justification. It is like saying, "Green is a colour", or "Water boils
at lOO°e." n It does not so much state a condition, in the sense of
qualification for justification, as state something more about what justifica-
tion involves and is.
I have deliberately concluded with a speculative example suggested by the
philosophical side of semantics. Many of the insights drawn from linguistics
otTer largely negative warnings to the New Testament interpreter, urging
him to proceed with rigour and with caution, and challenging a number of
cherished assumptions. A number of insights drawn from philosophers,
however, seem to otTer fresh perspectives sometimes of a more positive
nature. 93 In this essay we have also noted philosophical contributions to the
study of synonymy and metaphor. Both sides, however, otTer indispensable
contributions to the interpreter of the New Testament in so far as he is con-
cerned with language and meanings. He can ignore their methods and con-
clusions only at his own peril.
NOTES
I. John Lyons, Structural Semantics. A n Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato (OX-
ford 1963), pp. 23-4. Cf. C. K. Ogden and 1. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (Lon
don 1923), pp. 306-7; cf. pp. 308-36, and also Stephen R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford 1972).
pp. 1-5.
2. J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford 1961); E. Giittgemanns, studia
Linguistica iVeotestamentica. Gesammelte Aujsiitze zur linguistischen Grundlage eiller
Neutestamentlichen Theologie (Beitriige zur evangelischen Theologie Bd. 60; Miinich 1971):
R. Kieffer, Essais de mhhodologie miotestamentaire (Lund 1972); J. F. A. Sawyer. Semall-
tics ill Biblical Research, New Methods of Defining Hebrew Words for Salvation (London
1972) and Kenneth L. Burres Structural Semantics in the Study of the Pauline Understa ll -
ding of Revelation (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation Northwestern University, Evans ton .
Illinois, 1970; University Microfilms Xerox, Ann Arbor, Michigan 71-18lO). Cf. also the
journal edited by Giittgemanns, entitled Linguistica Biblica: interdiszipliniire Zeitschri/t jilr
Theologie und Linguistik, and published in Bonn: see also the discussions of Barr's work in:
G. Friedrich "Semasiologie und Lexicologie", in TLZ 94 (1969) cols. 801-16, especially cols.
100
803- 7 ; cf also T. Boman, ibid., 87 (1962), cols. 262-5; D. Hill, Greek Words and Hebrew
Meanings. Studies in the Semantics of Soteriological Terms (Cambridge 1967); l. Barr
"Common Sense and Biblical Language", in Biblica 49 (1968), pp. 377-87; and especially
K. Arvid Tangberg, "Linguistics and Theology: an Attempt to Analyse and Evaluate lames
Barr's Argumentation ... ", in The Bible Translator 24 (1973), p. 301-10. For other articles
involving semantics see G. B. Caird "Towards a Lexicon of the Septuagint" in lTS 19
(J 968), pp. 453-75.
J For my articles see notes 9, 48, 73, 76, 86. For D. D. Evans see n. 91 and for O. R.
Jones see n. 93. 2
4. S. Ullmann. The Principles of Semantics, (Oxford 1957 ), p. I.
5
5. A. Darmesteter, La vie des mots etudiee dans leur significations Paris, 1895 ) especially
in pp. 138-48 on synonymy; and M. Breal Semantics, Studies in the Science of Meaning
(London 1900), especially chapters 14 and 15 on polysemy.
6... Probably all mediaeval philosophers, all the 16th and 17th century authors, and later
Johnson and Mill, and still later Frege ... Meinong, Russell ... and Wittgenstein (in their
earlier work) - all of them de facto constructed theories of meaning of names, and tried, with
varying success, to extend them to all linguistic expressions, above all to sentences. In doing
so they were motivated by the belief that the meaning of a sentence ... is a function of the
meanings of its components." l. Pelc. Studies in Functional Logical Semiotics of Natural
Language (The Hague 1971), p. 58.
7. M. Black. The Labyrinth of Language (London 1968), p. 9.
8. S. Ullmann, The Principles of Semalllics, p. 16.
9. I have used this example in A. C. Thiselton. "The use of Philosophical Categories in
New Testament Hermeneutics", in The Churchman 87 (1973), p. 96.
10. F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique gimerale (edition critique par R. Engler:
Wiesbaden 1967,3 fascicles), fasc. 2, pp. 147-73 and 303-16; cf. E.T. Course ill General
Linguistics (London 1960, ed. by C. Bally et al.), p. 67-78, and 134-9.
11. Cf. 1. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London 1961), 4.0031; and B.
Russell, "On Denoting", in Mind 14 (1905) pp. 479-93.
12. B. Russell, loco cit., p. 480.
13. K. Barth, The Epistle to the Philippians (London 1962), p. 121; and W. Hendriksen,
Philippians (London 1962, rp. 1973), p. 192 (his italics). Similarly cf. J. J. Muller, The
Epistles of Paul to the Philippians and to Philemon (Grand Rapids 1955), p. 140.
14. F. W. Beare, The Epistle to the Philippians (London 1959), pp. 100 and 145-6. Cr. W.
F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, (W. Bauer) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature (Chicago 1957), p. 882.
15. E. A. Nida, Towards a Science of Translating (Leiden 1964), especially pp. 9-10 and
60-63 and chapters 8-10; and W. 1. Wonderly, Bible Translations for Popular Use (Lon-
don 1968), pp. 50-55 and 149-172.
16. J. F. A. Sawyer, "Context of Situation and Sitz im Leben. Some Questions concerning
Meaning in Classical Hebrew", in Proceedings of the Newcastle on Tyne Philosophical Socie-
ty I (1967), p. 13 7-4 7. Similarly, cr. the important work of Erhardt Guttgemanns, OjJene
Fragen zur Formgeschichte
2
des Evangeliums (Beitriige zur evangelischen Theologie, 54;
Munich 1971 ) p. 44-68: 174-7; et passim.
17. l. F. A. Sawyer, loco cit., p. 140.
18. F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 80-81; cf. Cours de linguistique
generale, p. 177-8.
19. F. de Saussure Course in General Linguistics, p. 81 (Edition critique p. 181-2).
2~. E.g. J. Lyons, IlIIroduction to Theoretical LinguistiCS, pp. 45-50; S. UlImann, The Prin-
Ciples of Semantics, pp. 144-52; A. Martinet Elements of General Linguistics (London
1964). p. 37[; David Crystal, Linguistics, Language and Religion (London 1965), pp. 57-9:
a.nd K. 1. Burres, Structural Semantics in the Study of the Pauline Understanding of Revela-
tion, p. 36-40.
21. 1. Barr, op. cit., p. 108.
22. Some of these examples. and many more. are suggested by S. UlImann. Semantics, pp.
97-9, and Principles of Semantics, pp. 171-257.
101
NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRET A nON
23. 1. Barr, op. cit., p. 109 (my italics).

24. E. 1acob, Theology of the Old Testament (London 1958), p. 159.
25. Ibid., p. 113.
26. Ibid., p. 116; cf. N. Snaith, "The Language of the Old Testament", in The Interpreter's
Bible (Nashville 1952) vol. I, p. 224.
27. 1. Barr, op. cit., p. 149-5\.
28. As in C. Hodge, The First Epistle /0 the Corinthians (London 1958), p. 64.
29. D. Crystal, op. cit., p. 58.
30. F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. p. xii.
31. Ibid" p. 114, and Cours de linguistique genera le (edition critique) fasc. 2, p. 259 col. i
(Baskin's translation has not been without criticism).
32. F. de Saussure, (Course in General Linguistics. p. 166 (edition critique, pp. 261-262).
33. Ibid., p. 89; cr. p. 110.
34. Ibid .. p. 123.
35. 1. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. p. 75. Similarly, cr. R. H. Robins.
General Linguistics. An Introductory Survey (London 1964), p. 47-50; David Crystal.
Linguistics (London 1971), pp. 163-6; and Herbert E. Brekle, Semantik. Ein EiI!fiihrung in
die sprachwissenschaftlich Bedeutungslehre (Munich 1972), p. 81-8.
36. E. Glittgemanns, Studia linguistica neotestamentica. especially pp. 75-93; and K. L.
Burres, op. cit., p. 59-123.
37. K. L. Burres, op. cit., p. 107-23 and 222-307; cf. especially charts 5-7 on pp. 282-3.
291 and 294-7.
38. Trier, Del' Deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes (Heidelberg 1931), p. 6.
39. G. Stern, Meaning and Change of Meaning. With Special Reference to the English
Language (Goteborgs Hogskolas Arsskrift, 38, Gothenburg 1931), p. 85.
40. S. Ullmann, Semantics. p. 49.
41. Ibid., p. 218.
42. Ibid.
43. E. A. Nida "The Implications of Contemporary Linguistics for Biblical Scholarship". in
1BL 91 (1972). p. 86 (cf. pp. 73-89).
44. M. Joos "Semantic Axiom Number One" in Language 48 (1972), p. 257 (cf. pp.
258-65, in which Joos acknowledges his indebtedness for this approach to Stern).
45. E. A. Nida. loc. cit., p. 86.
46. R. H. Robins, General LingUistics. p. 22.
47. F. de Saussure, op. cit., p. 68 (cf. edition critique, p. 152-3).
48. Cf. A. C. Thiselton, "The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings", JTS 25
(1974), pp. 283-299; 1. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. pp. 4-8, 59-75, 272
and 403: S. Ullmann. Semantics. pp. 80-115; L. R. Palmer, op. cit., p. 175-8: E. A. Nida.
Towards a Science of Translating (Leiden 1964). pp. 46-51; P. Naert, "Arbitraire et
necessaire en linguistique", in Studia Linguistica (1947), pp. 5- 10.
49. F. de Saussure, op. cit., p. 109.
50. Ibid .. p. I 10.
51. E. A. Nida. "The implications of Contemporary Linguistics for Biblical Scholarship".
loc. cit., p. 83.
52. G. A. F. Knight, A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity (Edinburgh 1953). p.
8.
53. T. Boman. Hebrew Thought compared with Greek (London 1960), p. 27.
54. Ibid., p. 165.
55. Ibid.
56. 1. Barr, op. cit., p. 67: cf. pp. 46-88.
57. E.g. Boman's remarks about practical atheism in Psalm 14: I, op. cit., p. 48-9.
58. D. Crystal, Language. Linguistics and Religion. p. 144 (my italics).
59. 1. Lyons. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, p. 45.
60. Cf. M. Black, The Labyrinth of Language, pp. 63-90; and "Linguistic Relativity. The
Views of Benjamin Lee Whorf', in Philosophical Review 68 (1959), p. 228-38; cf. also S.
Ullmann, "Words and Concepts" in Language and Style (Oxford 1964), pp. 212-28.
102
61. D. Crystal, Linguistics, p. 72; cf. p. 49.

62. J. Paterson, The Book thar is Alive. Srudies in Old Tesramem Life and Thought as Ser
Forth by rhe Hebrew Sages (New York 1954), p. 3.
63. J. Barr, op. cit.. p. 35; cf. pp. 21-45.
64. J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, A Study in Pauline Theology (London 1952), pp. 12 and
13.
65. J. Barr, op. eit., p. 35.
66. Ibid., p. 207; ef. pp. 206-19.
67. F. de Saussure, op. cit., pp. 9 and 13-14 (my italics); cf. H. E. Brekle, Semalllik, pp.
50--54.
68. E. Giittgemanns. O/rene Fragell zur Formgeschichte, pp. 50-54.
69. Cf. 1. Trier. op. cit.. 6ff. I am not concerned to draw too careful a distinction between the
"linguistic field" (sprachliches Feld) of Trier and the "semantic field" (BedeUlullgsfeld) of
Ipsen or Porzig. For the distinction see S. Vllmann, The Principles ofSemamics, pp. 156-69;
ef. also J. Lyons. Structural Semalltics, pp. 44-50.
70. E. A. Nida. "The Implications of Contemporary Linguistics for Biblical Scholarship",
'I
loe. cit., p. 85 (my italics). cf. also E. Giittgemanns, O./Jene Fragen zur Formgeschichte des
Evangeliums, pp. 54-7.
71. C. K. Ogden, Opposirioll. A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis, (Bloomington
1967 2), especially p. 65-90. On the three most basic types of opposition, however, see J.
Lyons, llllrodllction 10 Theorerical LingUistics, pp. 460-70.
72. E. Giittgemanns, Studia Linguistica neotestamentica, pp. 8·7-93. On antithesis in Paul
see especially Norbert Schneider, Die rhelOrische Eigenart der paufinischen Antithese
(Tiibingen 1970); 1. Ndis, "Les Antitheses litteraires dans les epltres de S. Paul", in Nouvelle
Revue TMologique 70 (] 948), pp. 360-87; J. Weiss, "Beitrage zur Paulinischen Rhetorik" in
Theologische Srudien Bernhard Weiss (Gottingen 1897), pp. 165-247; and Willard H.
Taylor, The Amithetic Method in Pauline Theology (unpublished doctoral dissertation for
Northwestern University: Evanston. iIIinois. 1959).
73. A. C. Thiselton, "The Meaning of Die~ in 1 Corinthians 5.5: A Fresh Approach in the
Light of Logical and Semantic Factors", in SJT 26 (1973), p. 204-28.
74. S. Ullmann, The Principles of Semamics, pp. 108-9; cf. pp. 110-14, and Semamics, pp.
141-55 and J. Lyons. Imroducrion 10 Theoretical Linguisrics, p. 446-53. From the
philosophical side ef. W. P. Alston. op. Clt., pp. 44-7; J. Searie, op. cit., p. 5-12, N. Good·
man, "A Note on Likeness of Meaning", in AnalysiS 10 (1950), pp. 115-8; and other con-
tributions in Ana!rsis by Rollins and Thomson, in 11 (1951). pp. 18-19.38-45, and 12
(1952), pp. 73 .. 6.
75. See S. Ullmann, Semantics, pp. 152-3.
76. A. C. Thiselton "The Parables as Language Event. Some Comments on Fuchs's
Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy" in SJT 23 (1970) especially pp. 450-58
and 461-7; and "The Meaning of EcieCin 1 Cor. 5:5", op. cit.. especially pp. 207-8, 217-18
and 227-8.
77. W. P. Alston, PhilosophY of Language (Englewood Cliffs. N.J. 1964). op. cit.. p. 102.
78. F. Waismann, "The Resources of Language", in M. Black (ed.). The Imparlance of
Language (Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 1962), p. 116.
79. W. L. Wonderly, op. cit., pp. 121-8.
80. The following selection is of special value: W. P. Alston, PhilosophY of Language, pp.
~6-106; Mary A. McCloskey. ·'Metaphor". in Mind 73 (1964), pp. 215-233; C. S. Lewis,
Bluspels and Flalansfercs", and O. Barfield. "Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction", both in M.
~Iack (ed.), The Importance of Language, pp. 36-50, and 51-71; J. Pelc, Studies in Func-
r/onal Logical Semiorics of NalUral Language, pp. 142-94; C. M. Turbayne, The Myth of
Metaphor (New Haven 1962); Marcus B. Hester, The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor. An
AnalYSis in the Light oJ Wi!rgenstein's Claim that Meaning is Use (The Hague 1967). es-
peCially pp. 114-92; M. Black. Models and Melaphors (New York 1962), pp. 25-47; and J.
de Waard, "Biblical Metaphors and their Translation", in The Bible Translator 25 (1974),
~p, 107-116; cf. also V. Heylen "Les Metaphores et les metonymies dans les Epitres
aUhniennes ", in ETL 8 (I935), pp. 253-90.
103
81. E. A. Nida and C. R. Taber, The Theory and Prac[ice of Transla[ion (Leiden 1969), p.
39. Cr. also E. A. Nida, Towards a Science of Translating.
82. E. A. Nida and C. R. Taber, op. cit., pp. 53-4.
83. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge Mass. 1965, rp. 1970), p. 21.
Cr. also J. Lyons, Chomsky (London 1970), pp. 47-82, and lntroduc[ion [0 Theoretical
Linguistics, pp. 247-69.
84. N. Chomsky, op. cit. p. 24. Cr. pp. 179-82, on "deletion".
85. K. L. Burres, op. cit., p. 105.
86. A.C. Thiselton. "On the Logical Grammar of Justification in Paul". paper read at the
Fifth International Congress on Biblical Studies (September 1973), forthcoming in Studiu
Erangeiica.
87. E. Kasemann, New Testament Questions of Today (London 1969), p. 171; and F. Prat,
The Theology of St. Paul (London 1945), vo!. 2, p. 247.
88. L. Cerfaux. The Christian in the Theology of Paul (London, 1967). pp. 391-400; P.
Stuhlmacher. Gerechtigkeit Gottes bei Paulus (Giittingen. 1965) 1. A. Ziesler. The Meaning
of Righteousness in Paul (Cambridge 1972); R. Bultmann, Theology of the New TeSlamelll,
vo!. I (London 1952) pp. 270-85; and other standard discussions.
89. D. E. H. Whiteley, The Theology of St. Paul (Oxford, 1964), p. 164 cf. G. Bornkamm.
Paul (London 1972), pp. 141-6.
90. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophicallnves[igation s, sect. 74, and H, xi, pp. 193-214; the BllIe
and BrOI\'n Books, pp. 163-74; and Ze[[el, sects. 195-235. (cf. especially Zeltel, sect. 228).
91. D. D. Evans. The Logic of Self-Involvemenl, (London 1963), pp. 124-41.
92. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical lnl'estigations, sects. 248-52; and On Certainly (Oxford
1969). sects. 292-3 and 604.
93. A. C. Thiselton, "The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings" and "The
Parables as Language Event", op. cit., pp. 438-9. Cr. O. R. lones, The Concept of Holiness
(London 1961) and D. D. Evans, op. cit.
104

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What are some of the traditional assumptions about language that hampered early semantic study?

What are some of the traditional assumptions about language that hampered early semantic study?

What are some of the false assumptions that still find their way into the outlook of some interpreters of the New Testament?

What are some of the false assumptions that still find their way into the outlook of some interpreters of the New Testament?

CHAPTER IV

SEMANTICS AND NEW TESTAMENT

I. Semantics and Theories of Meaning

Semantics is the study of meanings; but not simply the meanings of

biblical interpretation are those of D. D. Evans and, less directly, O. R.

2. THE INHIBITING EFFECTS OF TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT

Part of the answer to this question is suggested by Stephen Ullmann's

T Boman's Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, and we shall trace

3. WORDS AND MEANINGS

of a word depends not on what it is in itself, but on its relation to other

H. Some Fundamental Principles in Saussure and Modern Linguistics and

proach to language; (3) the connexion between structuralism and conven-

1. SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE

By "diachronic" linguistics Saussure means the study of language from

"properly" mean "God be with you"? "Hussy" is etymologically a doublet

Neither Saussure nor Barr rules out diachronic linguistics as illegitimate.

2. THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO LANGUAGE

In his introduction to the English edition of Saussure's work, W. Baskin,

balanced comment on the whole question of word-meaning R. H. Robins

3. CONVENTIONALITY IN LANGUAGE AND ITS CONNEXION WITH

fjJtAW or ayanw must be translated by two words in English and in German,

many contexts, its context in a comparison restricts its semantic value to

clusions about Hebrew or Greek "thought" on the basis of

4. LANGUE AND PAROLE

The distinction between langue and parole, so important for Saussure.

Ill. Other Basic Tools in Field Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy

1. TOOLS IN fiELD SEMANTICS: TYPES OF OPPOSITION AND SYNONYMY

(of natural forces) (human) (divine) (other supernatural agencies)

:n:v01, TO :n:VEvpa, 1p vX1) , njj :n:vEvpan, PE, rO :n:VEvpa aTOlXEIOV,

2. TYPES OF VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR

. Certain kinds of vagueness are useful and desirable. Language would be

only when a metaphor is genuinely "live". Most metaphors very soon

3. SOME El-FlOC 1's OF RECENT APPROACHES IN LINGUISTICS

Ideally a comprehensive discussion of the present subject would include

traditional contrast between "objective genitive" and "subjective genitive" is

about certain uses of these techniques. Firstly, in spite of Nida's obvious

IV. A Concluding Example of Semantic Exploration: Justification by Faith

unambiguously that believers "wait for the hope of righteousness" in the

23. 1. Barr, op. cit., p. 109 (my italics).

61. D. Crystal, Linguistics, p. 72; cf. p. 49.

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